Mercurial > hg > Aquinas
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| author | ht |
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| date | Sun, 03 Jan 2010 14:43:02 +0000 |
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--- /dev/null Thu Jan 01 00:00:00 1970 +0000 +++ b/summa/english/FS_vii.html Sun Jan 03 14:43:02 2010 +0000 @@ -0,0 +1,3148 @@ +<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" id="FS.vii" class="div2"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q108_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q109.html"></a> + <h2 id="FS.vii-p0.1">TREATISE ON GRACE (QQ[109]-114)</h2> + <div id="FS_Q109" class="div3"> + <a href="summa.FS.vii.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q109_A1.html"></a> + <h3 id="FS_Q109-p0.1">OF THE NECESSITY OF GRACE (TEN ARTICLES)</h3> + <p id="FS_Q109-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q109-p2"> We must now consider the exterior principle of human acts, i.e. God, in so far as, through grace, we are helped by Him to + do right: and, first, we must consider the grace of God; secondly, its cause; thirdly, its effects. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q109-p3"> The first point of consideration will be threefold: for we shall consider (1) The necessity of grace; (2) grace itself, as + to its essence; (3) its division. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q109-p4"> Under the first head there are ten points of inquiry:</p> + <p id="FS_Q109-p5"> (1) Whether without grace man can know anything?</p> + <p id="FS_Q109-p6"> (2) Whether without God's grace man can do or wish any good?</p> + <p id="FS_Q109-p7"> (3) Whether without grace man can love God above all things?</p> + <p id="FS_Q109-p8"> (4) Whether without grace man can keep the commandments of the Law?</p> + <p id="FS_Q109-p9"> (5) Whether without grace he can merit eternal life?</p> + <p id="FS_Q109-p10"> (6) Whether without grace man can prepare himself for grace?</p> + <p id="FS_Q109-p11"> (7) Whether without grace he can rise from sin?</p> + <p id="FS_Q109-p12"> (8) Whether without grace man can avoid sin?</p> + <p id="FS_Q109-p13"> (9) Whether man having received grace can do good and avoid sin without any further Divine help?</p> + <p id="FS_Q109-p14"> (10) Whether he can of himself persevere in good?</p> + <div id="FS_Q109_A1" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q109.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q109_A2.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q109_A1-p0.1">Whether without grace man can know any truth?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q109_A1-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q109_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that without grace man can know no truth. For, on + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q109_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.12.3" target="asv">1 Cor. 12:3</a>: "No man can say, the Lord Jesus, but by the Holy Ghost," a gloss says: "Every truth, by whomsoever spoken is from the Holy + Ghost." Now the Holy Ghost dwells in us by grace. Therefore we cannot know truth without grace. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q109_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Augustine says (Solil. i, 6) that "the most certain sciences are like things lit up by the sun so as to be seen. + Now God Himself is He Whom sheds the light. And reason is in the mind as sight is in the eye. And the eyes of the mind are + the senses of the soul." Now the bodily senses, however pure, cannot see any visible object, without the sun's light. Therefore + the human mind, however perfect, cannot, by reasoning, know any truth without Divine light: + and this pertains to the aid of grace. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q109_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the human mind can only understand truth by thinking, as is clear from Augustine (De Trin. xiv, 7). But the Apostle + says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q109_A1-p4.1" href="./asv.html#iiCor.3.5" target="asv">2 Cor. 3:5</a>): "Not that we are sufficient to think anything of ourselves, as of ourselves; but our sufficiency is from God." Therefore + man cannot, of himself, know truth without the help of grace. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q109_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (Retract. i, 4): "I do not approve having said in the prayer, O God, Who dost wish the sinless alone to know + the truth; for it may be answered that many who are not sinless know many truths." Now man is cleansed from sin by grace, + according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q109_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.50.12" target="asv"> Ps. 50:12</a>: "Create a clean heart in me, O God, and renew a right spirit within my bowels." Therefore without grace man of himself can + know truth. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q109_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> To know truth is a use or act of intellectual light, since, according to the Apostle ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q109_A1-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Eph.5.13" target="asv">Eph. 5:13</a>): "All that is made manifest is light." Now every use implies movement, taking movement broadly, so as to call thinking and + willing movements, as is clear from the Philosopher (De Anima iii, 4). Now in corporeal things we see that for movement there + is required not merely the form which is the principle of the movement or action, but there is + also required the motion of the first mover. Now the first mover in the order of corporeal things is the heavenly body. Hence + no matter how perfectly fire has heat, it would not bring about alteration, except by the motion of the heavenly body. But + it is clear that as all corporeal movements are reduced to the motion of the heavenly body as to the first corporeal mover, + so all movements, both corporeal and spiritual, are reduced to the simple First Mover, Who is God. And hence no matter how + perfect a corporeal or spiritual nature is supposed to be, it cannot proceed to its act unless it be moved by God; but this + motion is according to the plan of His providence, and not by necessity of nature, as the motion of the heavenly body. Now + not only is every motion from God as from the First Mover, but all formal perfection is from Him as from the First Act. And + thus the act of the intellect or of any created being whatsoever depends upon God in two ways: first, inasmuch as it is from + Him + that it has the form whereby it acts; secondly, inasmuch as it is moved by Him to act. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q109_A1-p7"> Now every form bestowed on created things by God has power for a determined act, which it can bring about in proportion to + its own proper endowment; and beyond which it is powerless, except by a superadded form, as water can only heat when heated + by the fire. And thus the human understanding has a form, viz. intelligible light, which of itself is sufficient for knowing + certain intelligible things, viz. those we can come to know through the senses. Higher intelligible things of + the human intellect cannot know, unless it be perfected by a stronger light, viz. the light of faith or prophecy which is + called the "light of grace," inasmuch as it is added to nature. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q109_A1-p8"> Hence we must say that for the knowledge of any truth whatsoever man needs Divine help, that the intellect may be moved by + God to its act. But he does not need a new light added to his natural light, in order to know the truth in all things, but + only in some that surpass his natural knowledge. And yet at times God miraculously instructs some by His grace in things that + can be known by natural reason, even as He sometimes brings about miraculously what nature can do. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q109_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Every truth by whomsoever spoken is from the Holy Ghost as bestowing the natural light, and moving us to understand and speak + the truth, but not as dwelling in us by sanctifying grace, or as bestowing any habitual gift superadded to nature. For this + only takes place with regard to certain truths that are known and spoken, and especially in regard to such as pertain to faith, + of which the Apostle speaks. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q109_A1-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The material sun sheds its light outside us; but the intelligible Sun, Who is God, shines within us. Hence the natural light + bestowed upon the soul is God's enlightenment, whereby we are enlightened to see what pertains to natural knowledge; and for + this there is required no further knowledge, but only for such things as surpass natural knowledge. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q109_A1-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> We always need God's help for every thought, inasmuch as He moves the understanding to act; for actually to understand anything + is to think, as is clear from Augustine (De Trin. xiv, 7). + </p> + <p id="FS_Q109_A1-p12"></p> + <p id="FS_Q109_A1-p13"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q109.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q109_A2.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q109_A2" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q109_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q109_A3.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q109_A2-p0.1">Whether man can wish or do any good without grace?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q109_A2-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q109_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that man can wish and do good without grace. For that is in man's power, whereof he is master. Now man is master + of his acts, and especially of his willing, as stated above ( + <a id="FS_Q109_A2-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q1_A1.html">Q[1], A[1]</a>; + <a id="FS_Q109_A2-p2.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q13_A6.html"> Q[13], A[6]</a>). Hence man, of himself, can wish and do good without the help of grace. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q109_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, man has more power over what is according to his nature than over what is beyond his nature. Now sin is against + his nature, as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 30); whereas deeds of virtue are according to his nature, as stated above + ( + <a id="FS_Q109_A2-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q71_A1.html">Q[71], A[1]</a>). Therefore since man can sin of himself he can wish and do good. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q109_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the understanding's good is truth, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 2). Now the intellect can of itself know + truth, even as every other thing can work its own operation of itself. Therefore, much more can man, of himself, do and wish + good. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q109_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q109_A2-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.9.16" target="asv">Rom. 9:16</a>): "It is not of him that willeth," namely, to will, "nor of him that runneth," namely to run, "but of God that showeth mercy." + And Augustine says (De Corrept. et Gratia ii) that "without grace men do nothing good when they either think or wish or love + or act." + </p> + <p id="FS_Q109_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Man's nature may be looked at in two ways: first, in its integrity, as it was in our first parent before sin; secondly, as + it is corrupted in us after the sin of our first parent. Now in both states human nature needs the help of God as First Mover, + to do or wish any good whatsoever, as stated above + <a id="FS_Q109_A2-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q109_A1.html">(A[1])</a>. But in the state of integrity, as regards the sufficiency of the operative power, man by his natural endowments could wish + and + do the good proportionate to his nature, such as the good of acquired virtue; but not surpassing good, as the good of infused + virtue. But in the state of corrupt nature, man falls short of what he could do by his nature, so that he is unable to fulfil + it by his own natural powers. Yet because human nature is not altogether corrupted by sin, so as to be shorn of every natural + good, even in the state of corrupted nature it can, by virtue of its natural endowments, work some particular good, as to + build dwellings, plant vineyards, and the like; yet it cannot do all the good natural to it, so as to fall short in nothing; + just as a sick man can of himself make some movements, yet he cannot be perfectly moved with the movements of one in health, + unless by the help of medicine he be cured. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q109_A2-p7"> And thus in the state of perfect nature man needs a gratuitous strength superadded to natural strength for one reason, viz. + in order to do and wish supernatural good; but for two reasons, in the state of corrupt nature, viz. in order to be healed, + and furthermore in order to carry out works of supernatural virtue, which are meritorious. Beyond this, in both states man + needs the Divine help, that he may be moved to act well. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q109_A2-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Man is master of his acts and of his willing or not willing, because of his deliberate reason, which can be bent to one side + or another. And although he is master of his deliberating or not deliberating, yet this can only be by a previous deliberation; + and since it cannot go on to infinity, we must come at length to this, that man's free-will is moved by an extrinsic principle, + which is above the human mind, to wit by God, as the Philosopher proves in + the chapter "On Good Fortune" (Ethic. Eudem. vii). Hence the mind of man still unweakened is not so much master of its act + that it does not need to be moved by God; and much more the free-will of man weakened by sin, whereby it is hindered from + good by the corruption of the nature. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q109_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> To sin is nothing else than to fail in the good which belongs to any being according to its nature. Now as every created + thing has its being from another, and, considered in itself, is nothing, so does it need to be preserved by another in the + good which pertains to its nature. For it can of itself fail in good, even as of itself it can fall into non-existence, unless + it is upheld by God. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q109_A2-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Man cannot even know truth without Divine help, as stated above + <a id="FS_Q109_A2-p10.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q109_A1.html">(A[1])</a>. And yet human nature is more corrupt by sin in regard to the desire for good, than in regard to the knowledge of truth. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q109_A2-p11"></p> + <p id="FS_Q109_A2-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q109_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q109_A3.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q109_A3" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q109_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q109_A4.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q109_A3-p0.1">Whether by his own natural powers and without grace man can love God above all things?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q109_A3-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q109_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that without grace man cannot love God above all things by his own natural powers. For to love God above all + things is the proper and principal act of charity. Now man cannot of himself possess charity, since the "charity of God is + poured forth in our hearts by the Holy Ghost Who is given to us," as is said + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q109_A3-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.5.5" target="asv"> Rom. 5:5.</a> Therefore man by his natural powers alone cannot love God above all things. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q109_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, no nature can rise above itself. But to love God above all things is to tend above oneself. Therefore without the + help of grace no created nature can love God above itself. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q109_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, to God, Who is the Highest Good, is due the best love, which is that He be loved above all things. Now without grace + man is not capable of giving God the best love, which is His due; otherwise it would be useless to add grace. Hence man, without + grace and with his natural powers alone, cannot love God above all things. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q109_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> As some maintain, man was first made with only natural endowments; and in this state it is manifest that he loved God to + some extent. But he did not love God equally with himself, or less than himself, otherwise he would have sinned. Therefore + he loved God above himself. Therefore man, by his natural powers alone, can love God more than himself and above all things. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q109_A3-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As was said above ( + <a id="FS_Q109_A3-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q60_A5.html">FP, Q[60], A[5]</a>), where the various opinions concerning the natural love of the angels were set forth, man in a state of perfect nature, + could by his natural power, do the good natural to him without the addition of any gratuitous gift, though not without the + help of God moving him. Now to love God above all things is natural to man and to every nature, not only rational but irrational, + and even to inanimate nature + according to the manner of love which can belong to each creature. And the reason of this is that it is natural to all to + seek and love things according as they are naturally fit (to be sought and loved) since "all things act according as they + are naturally fit" as stated in Phys. ii, 8. Now it is manifest that the good of the part is for the good of the whole; hence + everything, by its natural appetite and love, loves its own proper good on account of the common good of the whole universe, + which is God. Hence Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that "God leads everything to love of Himself." Hence in the state of perfect + nature man referred the love of himself and of all other things to the love of God as to its end; and thus he loved God more + than himself and above all things. But in the state of corrupt nature man falls short of this in the appetite of his rational + will, which, unless it is cured by God's grace, follows its private good, on account of the corruption of nature. And + hence we must say that in the state of perfect nature man did not need the gift of grace added to his natural endowments, + in order to love God above all things naturally, although he needed God's help to move him to it; but in the state of corrupt + nature man needs, even for this, the help of grace to heal his nature. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q109_A3-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Charity loves God above all things in a higher way than nature does. For nature loves God above all things inasmuch as He + is the beginning and the end of natural good; whereas charity loves Him, as He is the object of beatitude, and inasmuch as + man has a spiritual fellowship with God. Moreover charity adds to natural love of God a certain quickness and joy, in the + same way that every habit of virtue adds to the good act which is done merely by the + natural reason of a man who has not the habit of virtue. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q109_A3-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> When it is said that nature cannot rise above itself, we must not understand this as if it could not be drawn to any object + above itself, for it is clear that our intellect by its natural knowledge can know things above itself, as is shown in our + natural knowledge of God. But we are to understand that nature cannot rise to an act exceeding the proportion of its strength. + Now to love God above all things is not such an act; for it is natural to every + creature, as was said above. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q109_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Love is said to be best, both with respect to degree of love, and with regard to the motive of loving, and the mode of love. + And thus the highest degree of love is that whereby charity loves God as the giver of beatitude, as was said above. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q109_A3-p10"></p> + <p id="FS_Q109_A3-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q109_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q109_A4.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q109_A4" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q109_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q109_A5.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q109_A4-p0.1">Whether man without grace and by his own natural powers can fulfil the commandments of the Law?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q109_A4-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q109_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that man without grace, and by his own natural powers, can fulfil the commandments of the Law. For the Apostle + says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q109_A4-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.2.14" target="asv">Rom. 2:14</a>) that "the Gentiles who have not the law, do by nature those things that are of the Law." Now what a man does naturally he + can do of himself without grace. Hence a man can fulfil the commandments of the Law without grace. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q109_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Jerome says (Expos. Cathol. Fide [*Symboli Explanatio ad Damasum, among the supposititious works of St. Jerome: + now ascribed to Pelagius]) that "they are anathema who say God has laid impossibilities upon man." Now what a man cannot fulfil + by himself is impossible to him. Therefore a man can fulfil all the commandments of himself. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q109_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, of all the commandments of the Law, the greatest is this, "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with thy whole heart" + ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q109_A4-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.27.37" target="asv">Mat. 27:37</a>). Now man with his natural endowments can fulfil this command by loving God above all things, as stated above + <a id="FS_Q109_A4-p4.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q109_A3.html">(A[3])</a>. Therefore man can fulfil all the commandments of the Law without grace. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q109_A4-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Haeres. lxxxviii) that it is part of the Pelagian heresy that "they believe that without grace man can + fulfil all the Divine commandments." + </p> + <p id="FS_Q109_A4-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> There are two ways of fulfilling the commandments of the Law. The first regards the substance of the works, as when a man + does works of justice, fortitude, and of other virtues. And in this way man in the state of perfect nature could fulfil all + the commandments of the Law; otherwise he would have been unable to sin in that state, since to sin is nothing else than to + transgress the Divine commandments. But in the state of corrupted nature man cannot fulfil + all the Divine commandments without healing grace. Secondly, the commandments of the law can be fulfilled, not merely as regards + the substance of the act, but also as regards the mode of acting, i.e. their being done out of charity. And in this way, neither + in the state of perfect nature, nor in the state of corrupt nature can man fulfil the commandments of the law without grace. + Hence, Augustine (De Corrupt. et Grat. ii) having stated that "without grace men can do no good whatever," adds: + "Not only do they know by its light what to do, but by its help they do lovingly what they know." Beyond this, in both states + they need the help of God's motion in order to fulfil the commandments, as stated above ( + <a id="FS_Q109_A4-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q109_A2.html">AA[2]</a>,3). + </p> + <p id="FS_Q109_A4-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As Augustine says (De Spir. et Lit. xxvii), "do not be disturbed at his saying that they do by nature those things that are + of the Law; for the Spirit of grace works this, in order to restore in us the image of God, after which we were naturally + made." + </p> + <p id="FS_Q109_A4-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> What we can do with the Divine assistance is not altogether impossible to us; according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 3): + "What we can do through our friends, we can do, in some sense, by ourselves." Hence Jerome [*Symboli Explanatio ad Damasum, + among the supposititious works of St. Jerome: now ascribed to Pelagius] concedes that "our will is in such a way free that + we must confess we still require God's help." + </p> + <p id="FS_Q109_A4-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Man cannot, with his purely natural endowments, fulfil the precept of the love of God, as stated above + <a id="FS_Q109_A4-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q109_A3.html">(A[3])</a>. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q109_A4-p10"></p> + <p id="FS_Q109_A4-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q109_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q109_A5.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q109_A5" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q109_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q109_A6.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q109_A5-p0.1">Whether man can merit everlasting life without grace?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q109_A5-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q109_A5-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that man can merit everlasting life without grace. For Our Lord says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q109_A5-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.19.17" target="asv">Mat. 19:17</a>): "If thou wilt enter into life, keep the commandments"; from which it would seem that to enter into everlasting life rests + with man's will. But what rests with our will, we can do of ourselves. Hence it seems that man can merit everlasting life + of himself. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q109_A5-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, eternal life is the wage of reward bestowed by God on men, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q109_A5-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.5.12" target="asv"> Mat. 5:12</a>: "Your reward is very great in heaven." But wage or reward is meted by God to everyone according to his works, according + to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q109_A5-p3.2" href="./asv.html#Ps.61.12" target="asv"> Ps. 61:12</a>: "Thou wilt render to every man according to his works." Hence, since man is master of his works, it seems that it is within + his power to reach everlasting life. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q109_A5-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, everlasting life is the last end of human life. Now every natural thing by its natural endowments can attain its + end. Much more, therefore, may man attain to life everlasting by his natural endowments, without grace. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q109_A5-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q109_A5-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.6.23" target="asv">Rom. 6:23</a>): "The grace of God is life everlasting." And as a gloss says, this is said "that we may understand that God, of His own + mercy, leads us to everlasting life." + </p> + <p id="FS_Q109_A5-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Acts conducing to an end must be proportioned to the end. But no act exceeds the proportion of its active principle; and + hence we see in natural things, that nothing can by its operation bring about an effect which exceeds its active force, but + only such as is proportionate to its power. Now everlasting life is an end exceeding the proportion of human nature, as is + clear from what we have said above ( + <a id="FS_Q109_A5-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q5_A5.html">Q[5], A[5]</a>). Hence man, by his + natural endowments, cannot produce meritorious works proportionate to everlasting life; and for this a higher force is needed, + viz. the force of grace. And thus without grace man cannot merit everlasting life; yet he can perform works conducing to a + good which is natural to man, as "to toil in the fields, to drink, to eat, or to have friends," and the like, as Augustine + says in his third Reply to the Pelagians [*Hypognosticon iii, among the spurious works of St. Augustine]. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q109_A5-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Man, by his will, does works meritorious of everlasting life; but as Augustine says, in the same book, for this it is necessary + that the will of man should be prepared with grace by God. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q109_A5-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As the gloss upon + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q109_A5-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.6.23" target="asv"> Rom. 6:23, </a> "The grace of God is life everlasting," says, "It is certain that everlasting life is meter to good works; but the works + to which it is meted, belong to God's grace." And it has been said + <a id="FS_Q109_A5-p8.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q109_A4.html">(A[4])</a>, that to fulfil the commandments of the Law, in their due way, whereby their fulfilment may be meritorious, requires grace. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q109_A5-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This objection has to do with the natural end of man. Now human nature, since it is nobler, can be raised by the help of + grace to a higher end, which lower natures can nowise reach; even as a man who can recover his health by the help of medicines + is better disposed to health than one who can nowise recover it, as the Philosopher observes (De Coelo ii, 12). + </p> + <p id="FS_Q109_A5-p10"></p> + <p id="FS_Q109_A5-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q109_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q109_A6.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q109_A6" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q109_A5.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q109_A7.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q109_A6-p0.1">Whether a man, by himself and without the external aid of grace, can prepare himself for grace?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q109_A6-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q109_A6-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that man, by himself and without the external help of grace, can prepare himself for grace. For nothing impossible + is laid upon man, as stated above (A[4], ad 1). But it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q109_A6-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Zech.1.3" target="asv">Zech. 1:3</a>): "Turn ye to Me . . . and I will turn to you." Now to prepare for grace is nothing more than to turn to God. Therefore it + seems that man of himself, and without the external help of grace, can prepare himself for grace. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q109_A6-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, man prepares himself for grace by doing what is in him to do, since if man does what is in him to do, God will not + deny him grace, for it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q109_A6-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.7.11" target="asv">Mat. 7:11</a>) that God gives His good Spirit "to them that ask Him." But what is in our power is in us to do. Therefore it seems to be + in our power to prepare ourselves for grace. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q109_A6-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if a man needs grace in order to prepare for grace, with equal reason will he need grace to prepare himself for + the first grace; and thus to infinity, which is impossible. Hence it seems that we must not go beyond what was said first, + viz. that man, of himself and without grace, can prepare himself for grace. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q109_A6-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q109_A6-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Prov.16.1" target="asv">Prov. 16:1</a>) that "it is the part of man to prepare the soul." Now an action is said to be part of a man, when he can do it by himself. + Hence it seems that man by himself can prepare himself for grace. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q109_A6-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q109_A6-p6.1" href="./asv.html#John.6.44" target="asv">Jn. 6:44</a>): "No man can come to Me except the Father, Who hath sent Me, draw him." But if man could prepare himself, he would not need + to be drawn by another. Hence man cannot prepare himself without the help of grace. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q109_A6-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The preparation of the human will for good is twofold: the first, whereby it is prepared to operate rightly and to enjoy + God; and this preparation of the will cannot take place without the habitual gift of grace, which is the principle of meritorious + works, as stated above + <a id="FS_Q109_A6-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q109_A5.html">(A[5])</a>. There is a second way in which the human will may be taken to be prepared for the gift of habitual grace itself. Now in + order that man prepare himself to + receive this gift, it is not necessary to presuppose any further habitual gift in the soul, otherwise we should go on to infinity. + But we must presuppose a gratuitous gift of God, Who moves the soul inwardly or inspires the good wish. For in these two ways + do we need the Divine assistance, as stated above ( + <a id="FS_Q109_A6-p7.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q109_A2.html">AA[2]</a>,3). Now that we need the help of God to move us, is manifest. For since every agent acts for an end, every cause must direct + is effect to its end, and hence + since the order of ends is according to the order of agents or movers, man must be directed to the last end by the motion + of the first mover, and to the proximate end by the motion of any of the subordinate movers; as the spirit of the soldier + is bent towards seeking the victory by the motion of the leader of the army---and towards following the standard of a regiment + by the motion of the standard-bearer. And thus since God is the First Mover, simply, it is by His motion that everything seeks + to be likened to God in its own way. Hence Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that "God turns all to Himself." But He directs righteous + men to Himself as to a special end, which they seek, and to which they wish to cling, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q109_A6-p7.3" href="./asv.html#Ps.72.28" target="asv"> Ps. 72:28, </a> "it is good for Me to adhere to my God." And that they are "turned" to God can only spring from God's having "turned" them. + Now to prepare oneself for grace is, as it were, to be turned to God; just as, whoever has his eyes turned away + from the light of the sun, prepares himself to receive the sun's light, by turning his eyes towards the sun. Hence it is clear + that man cannot prepare himself to receive the light of grace except by the gratuitous help of God moving him inwardly. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q109_A6-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Man's turning to God is by free-will; and thus man is bidden to turn himself to God. But free-will can only be turned to + God, when God turns it, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q109_A6-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Jer.31.18" target="asv"> Jer. 31:18</a>: "Convert me and I shall be converted, for Thou art the Lord, my God"; and + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q109_A6-p8.2" href="./asv.html#Lam.5.21" target="asv"> Lam. 5:21</a>: "Convert us, O Lord, to Thee, and we shall be converted." + </p> + <p id="FS_Q109_A6-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Man can do nothing unless moved by God, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q109_A6-p9.1" href="./asv.html#John.15.5" target="asv">Jn. 15:5</a>: "Without Me, you can do nothing." Hence when a man is said to do what is in him to do, this is said to be in his power according + as he is moved by God. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q109_A6-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This objection regards habitual grace, for which some preparation is required, since every form requires a disposition in + that which is to be its subject. But in order that man should be moved by God, no further motion is presupposed since God + is the First Mover. Hence we need not go to infinity. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q109_A6-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> It is the part of man to prepare his soul, since he does this by his free-will. And yet he does not do this without the help + of God moving him, and drawing him to Himself, as was said above. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q109_A6-p12"></p> + <p id="FS_Q109_A6-p13"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q109_A5.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q109_A7.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q109_A7" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q109_A6.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q109_A8.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q109_A7-p0.1">Whether man can rise from sin without the help of grace?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q109_A7-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q109_A7-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that man can rise from sin without the help of grace. For what is presupposed to grace, takes place without + grace. But to rise to sin is presupposed to the enlightenment of grace; since it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q109_A7-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Eph.5.14" target="asv">Eph. 5:14</a>): "Arise from the dead and Christ shall enlighten thee." Therefore man can rise from sin without grace. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q109_A7-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, sin is opposed to virtue as illness to health, as stated above ( + <a id="FS_Q109_A7-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q71_A1.html">Q[71], A[1]</a>, ad 3). Now, man, by force of his nature, can rise from illness to health, without the external help of medicine, since there + still remains in him the principle of life, from which the natural operation proceeds. Hence it seems that, with equal reason, + man may be restored by himself, and return from the state of sin to the state of justice without the + help of external grace. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q109_A7-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, every natural thing can return by itself to the act befitting its nature, as hot water returns by itself to its + natural coldness, and a stone cast upwards returns by itself to its natural movement. Now a sin is an act against nature, + as is clear from Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 30). Hence it seems that man by himself can return from sin to the state of + justice. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q109_A7-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q109_A7-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Gal.2.21" target="asv">Gal. 2:21</a>; Cf. + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q109_A7-p5.2" href="./asv.html#Gal.3.21" target="asv"> Gal. 3:21</a>): "For if there had been a law given which could give life---then Christ died in vain," i.e. to no purpose. Hence with equal + reason, if man has a nature, whereby he can he justified, "Christ died in vain," i.e. to no purpose. But this cannot fittingly + be said. Therefore by himself he cannot be justified, i.e. he cannot return from a state of sin to a state of justice. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q109_A7-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Man by himself can no wise rise from sin without the help of grace. For since sin is transient as to the act and abiding + in its guilt, as stated above ( + <a id="FS_Q109_A7-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q87_A6.html">Q[87], A[6]</a>), to rise from sin is not the same as to cease the act of sin; but to rise from sin means that man has restored to him what + he lost by sinning. Now man incurs a triple loss by sinning, as was clearly shown above ( + <a id="FS_Q109_A7-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q85_A1.html">Q[85], A[1]</a>; + <a id="FS_Q109_A7-p6.3" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q86_A1.html"> + Q[86], A[1] + </a>; + <a id="FS_Q109_A7-p6.4" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q87_A1.html"> Q[87], A[1]</a>), viz. stain, corruption of natural good, and debt of punishment. He incurs a stain, inasmuch as he forfeits the lustre of + grace through the deformity of sin. Natural good is corrupted, inasmuch as man's nature is disordered by man's will not being + subject to God's; and this order being overthrown, the consequence is that the whole nature of sinful man remains disordered. + Lastly, there is the debt of punishment, inasmuch as by sinning man + deserves everlasting damnation. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q109_A7-p7"> Now it is manifest that none of these three can be restored except by God. For since the lustre of grace springs from the + shedding of Divine light, this lustre cannot be brought back, except God sheds His light anew: hence a habitual gift is necessary, + and this is the light of grace. Likewise, the order of nature can only be restored, i.e. man's will can only be subject to + God when God draws man's will to Himself, as stated above + <a id="FS_Q109_A7-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q109_A6.html">(A[6])</a>. So, too, the + guilt of eternal punishment can be remitted by God alone, against Whom the offense was committed and Who is man's Judge. And + thus in order that man rise from sin there is required the help of grace, both as regards a habitual gift, and as regards + the internal motion of God. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q109_A7-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> To man is bidden that which pertains to the act of free-will, as this act is required in order that man should rise from + sin. Hence when it is said, "Arise, and Christ shall enlighten thee," we are not to think that the complete rising from sin + precedes the enlightenment of grace; but that when man by his free-will, moved by God, strives to rise from sin, he receives + the light of justifying grace. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q109_A7-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The natural reason is not the sufficient principle of the health that is in man by justifying grace. This principle is grace + which is taken away by sin. Hence man cannot be restored by himself; but he requires the light of grace to be poured upon + him anew, as if the soul were infused into a dead body for its resurrection. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q109_A7-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> When nature is perfect, it can be restored by itself to its befitting and proportionate condition; but without exterior help + it cannot be restored to what surpasses its measure. And thus human nature undone by reason of the act of sin, remains no + longer perfect, but corrupted, as stated above ( + <a id="FS_Q109_A7-p10.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q85.html">Q[85])</a>; nor can it be restored, by itself, to its connatural good, much less to the supernatural good of justice. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q109_A7-p11"></p> + <p id="FS_Q109_A7-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q109_A6.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q109_A8.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q109_A8" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q109_A7.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q109_A9.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q109_A8-p0.1">Whether man without grace can avoid sin?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q109_A8-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q109_A8-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that without grace man can avoid sin. Because "no one sins in what he cannot avoid," as Augustine says (De + Duab. Anim. x, xi; De Libero Arbit. iii, 18). Hence if a man in mortal sin cannot avoid sin, it would seem that in sinning + he does not sin, which is impossible. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q109_A8-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, men are corrected that they may not sin. If therefore a man in mortal sin cannot avoid sin, correction would seem + to be given to no purpose; which is absurd. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q109_A8-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q109_A8-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.15.18" target="asv">Ecclus. 15:18</a>): "Before man is life and death, good and evil; that which he shall choose shall be given him." But by sinning no one ceases + to be a man. Hence it is still in his power to choose good or evil; and thus man can avoid sin without grace. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q109_A8-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Perfect Just. xxi): "Whoever denies that we ought to say the prayer 'Lead us not into temptation' (and + they deny it who maintain that the help of God's grace is not necessary to man for salvation, but that the gift of the law + is enough for the human will) ought without doubt to be removed beyond all hearing, and to be anathematized by the tongues + of all." + </p> + <p id="FS_Q109_A8-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> We may speak of man in two ways: first, in the state of perfect nature; secondly, in the state of corrupted nature. Now in + the state of perfect nature, man, without habitual grace, could avoid sinning either mortally or venially; since to sin is + nothing else than to stray from what is according to our nature---and in the state of perfect nature man could avoid this. + Nevertheless he could not have done it without God's help to uphold him in good, since if + this had been withdrawn, even his nature would have fallen back into nothingness. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q109_A8-p7"> But in the state of corrupt nature man needs grace to heal his nature in order that he may entirely abstain from sin. And + in the present life this healing is wrought in the mind---the carnal appetite being not yet restored. Hence the Apostle ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q109_A8-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.7.25" target="asv">Rom. 7:25</a>) says in the person of one who is restored: "I myself, with the mind, serve the law of God, but with the flesh, the law of + sin." And in this state man can abstain from all mortal sin, which takes its stand in + his reason, as stated above ( + <a id="FS_Q109_A8-p7.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q74_A5.html">Q[74], A[5]</a>); but man cannot abstain from all venial sin on account of the corruption of his lower appetite of sensuality. For man can, + indeed, repress each of its movements (and hence they are sinful and voluntary), but not all, because whilst he is resisting + one, another may arise, and also because the reason is always alert to avoid these movements, as was said above ( + <a id="FS_Q109_A8-p7.3" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q74_A3.html">Q[74], A[3]</a>, ad 2). + </p> + <p id="FS_Q109_A8-p8"> So, too, before man's reason, wherein is mortal sin, is restored by justifying grace, he can avoid each mortal sin, and for + a time, since it is not necessary that he should be always actually sinning. But it cannot be that he remains for a long time + without mortal sin. Hence Gregory says (Super Ezech. Hom. xi) that " a sin not at once taken away by repentance, by its weight + drags us down to other sins": and this because, as the lower appetite ought to be subject to the reason, + so should the reason be subject to God, and should place in Him the end of its will. Now it is by the end that all human acts + ought to be regulated, even as it is by the judgment of the reason that the movements of the lower appetite should be regulated. + And thus, even as inordinate movements of the sensitive appetite cannot help occurring since the lower appetite is not subject + to reason, so likewise, since man's reason is not entirely subject to God, the consequence is that many disorders + occur in the reason. For when man's heart is not so fixed on God as to be unwilling to be parted from Him for the sake of + finding any good or avoiding any evil, many things happen for the achieving or avoiding of which a man strays from God and + breaks His commandments, and thus sins mortally: especially since, when surprised, a man acts according to his preconceived + end and his pre-existing habits, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii); although with premeditation of his reason a man may + do + something outside the order of his preconceived end and the inclination of his habit. But because a man cannot always have + this premeditation, it cannot help occurring that he acts in accordance with his will turned aside from God, unless, by grace, + he is quickly brought back to the due order. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q109_A8-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Man can avoid each but every act of sin, except by grace, as stated above. Nevertheless, since it is by his own shortcoming + that he does not prepare himself to have grace, the fact that he cannot avoid sin without grace does not excuse him from sin. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q109_A8-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Correction is useful "in order that out of the sorrow of correction may spring the wish to be regenerate; if indeed he who + is corrected is a son of promise, in such sort that whilst the noise of correction is outwardly resounding and punishing, + God by hidden inspirations is inwardly causing to will," as Augustine says (De Corr. et Gratia vi). Correction is therefore + necessary, from the fact that man's will is required in order to abstain from sin; yet + it is not sufficient without God's help. Hence it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q109_A8-p10.1" href="./asv.html#Eccl.7.14" target="asv">Eccles. 7:14</a>): "Consider the works of God that no man can correct whom He hath despised." + </p> + <p id="FS_Q109_A8-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As Augustine says (Hypognosticon iii [*Among the spurious works of St. Augustine]), this saying is to be understood of man + in the state of perfect nature, when as yet he was not a slave of sin. Hence he was able to sin and not to sin. Now, too, + whatever a man wills, is given to him; but his willing good, he has by God's assistance. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q109_A8-p12"></p> + <p id="FS_Q109_A8-p13"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q109_A7.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q109_A9.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q109_A9" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q109_A8.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q109_A10.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q109_A9-p0.1">Whether one who has already obtained grace, can, of himself and without further help of grace, do good and avoid sin?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q109_A9-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q109_A9-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that whoever has already obtained grace, can by himself and without further help of grace, do good and avoid + sin. For a thing is useless or imperfect, if it does not fulfil what it was given for. Now grace is given to us that we may + do good and keep from sin. Hence if with grace man cannot do this, it seems that grace is either useless or imperfect. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q109_A9-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, by grace the Holy Spirit dwells in us, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q109_A9-p3.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.3.16" target="asv">1 Cor. 3:16</a>: "Know you not that you are the temple of God, and that the Spirit of God dwelleth in you?" Now since the Spirit of God is + omnipotent, He is sufficient to ensure our doing good and to keep us from sin. Hence a man who has obtained grace can do the + above two things without any further assistance of grace. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q109_A9-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if a man who has obtained grace needs further aid of grace in order to live righteously and to keep free from sin, + with equal reason, will he need yet another grace, even though he has obtained this first help of grace. Therefore we must + go on to infinity; which is impossible. Hence whoever is in grace needs no further help of grace in order to do righteously + and to keep free from sin. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q109_A9-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Natura et Gratia xxvi) that "as the eye of the body though most healthy cannot see unless it is helped + by the brightness of light, so, neither can a man, even if he is most righteous, live righteously unless he be helped by the + eternal light of justice." But justification is by grace, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q109_A9-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.3.24" target="asv"> Rom. 3:24</a>: "Being justified freely by His grace." Hence even a man who already possesses grace needs a further assistance + of grace in order to live righteously. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q109_A9-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above + <a id="FS_Q109_A9-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q109_A5.html">(A[5])</a>, in order to live righteously a man needs a twofold help of God---first, a habitual gift whereby corrupted human nature is + healed, and after being healed is lifted up so as to work deeds meritoriously of everlasting life, which exceed the capability + of nature. Secondly, man needs the help of grace in order to be moved by God to act. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q109_A9-p7"> Now with regard to the first kind of help, man does not need a further help of grace, e.g. a further infused habit. Yet he + needs the help of grace in another way, i.e. in order to be moved by God to act righteously, and this for two reasons: first, + for the general reason that no created thing can put forth any act, unless by virtue of the Divine motion. Secondly, for this + special reason---the condition of the state of human nature. For although healed by grace as to the mind, + yet it remains corrupted and poisoned in the flesh, whereby it serves "the law of sin," + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q109_A9-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.7.25" target="asv"> Rom. 7:25.</a> In the intellect, too, there seems the darkness of ignorance, whereby, as is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q109_A9-p7.2" href="./asv.html#Rom.8.26" target="asv">Rom. 8:26</a>): "We know not what we should pray for as we ought"; since on account of the various turns of circumstances, and because + we do not know ourselves perfectly, we cannot fully know what is for our good, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q109_A9-p7.3" href="./asv.html#Wis.9.14" target="asv"> Wis. 9:14</a>: "For the thoughts + of mortal men are fearful and our counsels uncertain." Hence we must be guided and guarded by God, Who knows and can do all + things. For which reason also it is becoming in those who have been born again as sons of God, to say: "Lead us not into temptation," + and "Thy Will be done on earth as it is in heaven," and whatever else is contained in the Lord's Prayer pertaining to this. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q109_A9-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The gift of habitual grace is not therefore given to us that we may no longer need the Divine help; for every creature needs + to be preserved in the good received from Him. Hence if after having received grace man still needs the Divine help, it cannot + be concluded that grace is given to no purpose, or that it is imperfect, since man will need the Divine help even in the state + of glory, when grace shall be fully perfected. But here grace is to some + extent imperfect, inasmuch as it does not completely heal man, as stated above. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q109_A9-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The operation of the Holy Ghost, which moves and protects, is not circumscribed by the effect of habitual grace which it + causes in us; but beyond this effect He, together with the Father and the Son, moves and protects us. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q109_A9-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This argument merely proves that man needs no further habitual grace. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q109_A9-p11"></p> + <p id="FS_Q109_A9-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q109_A8.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q109_A10.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q109_A10" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q109_A9.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q110.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q109_A10-p0.1">Whether man possessed of grace needs the help of grace in order to persevere?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q109_A10-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q109_A10-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that man possessed of grace needs no help to persevere. For perseverance is something less than virtue, even + as continence is, as is clear from the Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 7,9). Now since man is justified by grace, he needs no further + help of grace in order to have the virtues. Much less, therefore, does he need the help of grace to have perseverance. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q109_A10-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, all the virtues are infused at once. But perseverance is put down as a virtue. Hence it seems that, together with + grace, perseverance is given to the other infused virtues. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q109_A10-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, as the Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q109_A10-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.5.20" target="asv">Rom. 5:20</a>) more was restored to man by Christ's gift, than he had lost by Adam's sin. But Adam received what enabled him to persevere; + and thus man does not need grace in order to persevere. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q109_A10-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Persev. ii): "Why is perseverance besought of God, if it is not bestowed by God? For is it not a mocking + request to seek what we know He does not give, and what is in our power without His giving it?" Now perseverance is besought + by even those who are hallowed by grace; and this is seen, when we say "Hallowed be Thy name," which Augustine confirms by + the words of Cyprian (De Correp. et Grat. xii). Hence man, even when possessed of grace, + needs perseverance to be given to him by God. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q109_A10-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Perseverance is taken in three ways. First, to signify a habit of the mind whereby a man stands steadfastly, lest he be moved + by the assault of sadness from what is virtuous. And thus perseverance is to sadness as continence is to concupiscence and + pleasure, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 7). Secondly, perseverance may be called a habit, whereby a man has the purpose + of persevering in good unto the end. And in both these ways perseverance is infused + together with grace, even as continence and the other virtues are. Thirdly, perseverance is called the abiding in good to + the end of life. And in order to have this perseverance man does not, indeed, need another habitual grace, but he needs the + Divine assistance guiding and guarding him against the attacks of the passions, as appears from the preceding article. And + hence after anyone has been justified by grace, he still needs to beseech God for the aforesaid gift of perseverance, that + he may + be kept from evil till the end of his life. For to many grace is given to whom perseverance in grace is not given. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q109_A10-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This objection regards the first mode of perseverance, as the second objection regards the second. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q109_A10-p8"> Hence the solution of the second objection is clear.</p> + <p id="FS_Q109_A10-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As Augustine says (De Natura et Gratia xliii) [*Cf. De Correp. et Grat. xii]: "in the original state man received a gift + whereby he could persevere, but to persevere was not given him. But now, by the grace of Christ, many receive both the gift + of grace whereby they may persevere, and the further gift of persevering," and thus Christ's gift is greater than Adam's fault. + Nevertheless it was easier for man to persevere, with the gift of grace in the + state of innocence in which the flesh was not rebellious against the spirit, than it is now. For the restoration by Christ's + grace, although it is already begun in the mind, is not yet completed in the flesh, as it will be in heaven, where man will + not merely be able to persevere but will be unable to sin. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q109_A10-p10"></p> + <p id="FS_Q109_A10-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q109_A9.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q110.html"></a> + </div> + <a href="summa.FS.vii.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q109_A1.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q110" class="div3"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q109_A10.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q110_A1.html"></a> + <h3 id="FS_Q110-p0.1">OF THE GRACE OF GOD AS REGARDS ITS ESSENCE (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3> + <p id="FS_Q110-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q110-p2"> We must now consider the grace of God as regards its essence; and under this head there are four points of inquiry:</p> + <p id="FS_Q110-p3"> (1) Whether grace implies something in the soul?</p> + <p id="FS_Q110-p4"> (2) Whether grace is a quality?</p> + <p id="FS_Q110-p5"> (3) Whether grace differs from infused virtue?</p> + <p id="FS_Q110-p6"> (4) Of the subject of grace.</p> + <div id="FS_Q110_A1" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q110.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q110_A2.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q110_A1-p0.1">Whether grace implies anything in the soul?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q110_A1-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q110_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that grace does not imply anything in the soul. For man is said to have the grace of God even as the grace + of man. Hence it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q110_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.39.21" target="asv">Gn. 39:21</a>) that the Lord gave to Joseph "grace [Douay: 'favor'] in the sight of the chief keeper of the prison." Now when we say that + a man has the favor of another, nothing is implied in him who has the favor of the other, but an acceptance is implied in + him whose favor he has. Hence when we + say that a man has the grace of God, nothing is implied in his soul; but we merely signify the Divine acceptance. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q110_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, as the soul quickens the body so does God quicken the soul; hence it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q110_A1-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Deut.30.20" target="asv">Dt. 30:20</a>): "He is thy life." Now the soul quickens the body immediately. Therefore nothing can come as a medium between God and the + soul. Hence grace implies nothing created in the soul. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q110_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, on + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q110_A1-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.1.7" target="asv"> Rom. 1:7, </a> "Grace to you and peace," the gloss says: "Grace, i.e. the remission of sins." Now the remission of sin implies nothing in + the soul, but only in God, Who does not impute the sin, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q110_A1-p4.2" href="./asv.html#Ps.31.2" target="asv"> Ps. 31:2</a>: "Blessed is the man to whom the Lord hath not imputed sin." Hence neither does grace imply anything in the soul. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q110_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Light implies something in what is enlightened. But grace is a light of the soul; hence Augustine says (De Natura et Gratia + xxii): "The light of truth rightly deserts the prevaricator of the law, and those who have been thus deserted become blind." + Therefore grace implies something in the soul. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q110_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> According to the common manner of speech, grace is usually taken in three ways. First, for anyone's love, as we are accustomed + to say that the soldier is in the good graces of the king, i.e. the king looks on him with favor. Secondly, it is taken for + any gift freely bestowed, as we are accustomed to say: I do you this act of grace. Thirdly, it is taken for the recompense + of a gift given "gratis," inasmuch as we are said to be "grateful" for benefits. Of + these three the second depends on the first, since one bestows something on another "gratis" from the love wherewith he receives + him into his good "graces." And from the second proceeds the third, since from benefits bestowed "gratis" arises "gratitude." + </p> + <p id="FS_Q110_A1-p7"> Now as regards the last two, it is clear that grace implies something in him who receives grace: first, the gift given gratis; + secondly, the acknowledgment of the gift. But as regards the first, a difference must be noted between the grace of God and + the grace of man; for since the creature's good springs from the Divine will, some good in the creature flows from God's love, + whereby He wishes the good of the creature. On the other hand, the will of man is moved by the good + pre-existing in things; and hence man's love does not wholly cause the good of the thing, but pre-supposes it either in part + or wholly. Therefore it is clear that every love of God is followed at some time by a good caused in the creature, but not + co-eternal with the eternal love. And according to this difference of good the love of God to the creature is looked at differently. + For one is common, whereby He loves "all things that are" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q110_A1-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.11.25" target="asv">Wis. 11:25</a>), and thereby gives things + their natural being. But the second is a special love, whereby He draws the rational creature above the condition of its nature + to a participation of the Divine good; and according to this love He is said to love anyone simply, since it is by this love + that God simply wishes the eternal good, which is Himself, for the creature. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q110_A1-p8"> Accordingly when a man is said to have the grace of God, there is signified something bestowed on man by God. Nevertheless + the grace of God sometimes signifies God's eternal love, as we say the grace of predestination, inasmuch as God gratuitously + and not from merits predestines or elects some; for it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q110_A1-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Eph.1.5" target="asv">Eph. 1:5</a>): "He hath predestinated us into the adoption of children . . . unto the praise of the glory of His grace." + </p> + <p id="FS_Q110_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Even when a man is said to be in another's good graces, it is understood that there is something in him pleasing to the other; + even as anyone is said to have God's grace---with this difference, that what is pleasing to a man in another is presupposed + to his love, but whatever is pleasing to God in a man is caused by the Divine love, as was said above. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q110_A1-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> God is the life of the soul after the manner of an efficient cause; but the soul is the life of the body after the manner + of a formal cause. Now there is no medium between form and matter, since the form, of itself, "informs" the matter or subject; + whereas the agent "informs" the subject, not by its substance, but by the form, which it causes in the matter. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q110_A1-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Augustine says (Retract. i, 25): "When I said that grace was for the remission of sins, and peace for our reconciliation + with God, you must not take it to mean that peace and reconciliation do not pertain to general peace, but that the special + name of grace signifies the remission of sins." Not only grace, therefore, but many other of God's gifts pertain to grace. + And hence the remission of sins does not take place without some effect divinely caused + in us, as will appear later ( + <a id="FS_Q110_A1-p11.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q113_A2.html">Q[113], A[2]</a>). + </p> + <p id="FS_Q110_A1-p12"></p> + <p id="FS_Q110_A1-p13"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q110.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q110_A2.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q110_A2" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q110_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q110_A3.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q110_A2-p0.1">Whether grace is a quality of the soul?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q110_A2-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q110_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that grace is not a quality of the soul. For no quality acts on its subject, since the action of a quality + is not without the action of its subject, and thus the subject would necessarily act upon itself. But grace acts upon the + soul, by justifying it. Therefore grace is not a quality. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q110_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Furthermore, substance is nobler than quality. But grace is nobler than the nature of the soul, since we can do many things + by grace, to which nature is not equal, as stated above ( + <a id="FS_Q110_A2-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q109_A1.html">Q[109], AA[1]</a>,2,3). Therefore grace is not a quality. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q110_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Furthermore, no quality remains after it has ceased to be in its subject. But grace remains; since it is not corrupted, for + thus it would be reduced to nothing, since it was created from nothing; hence it is called a "new creature"( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q110_A2-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Gal.6.15" target="asv">Gal. 6:15</a>). + </p> + <p id="FS_Q110_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> on + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q110_A2-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.103.15" target="asv"> Ps. 103:15</a>: "That he may make the face cheerful with oil"; the gloss says: "Grace is a certain beauty of soul, which wins the Divine + love." But beauty of soul is a quality, even as beauty of body. Therefore grace is a quality. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q110_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above + <a id="FS_Q110_A2-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q110_A1.html">(A[1])</a>, there is understood to be an effect of God's gratuitous will in whoever is said to have God's grace. Now it was stated (Q[109], + A[1]) that man is aided by God's gratuitous will in two ways: first, inasmuch as man's soul is moved by God to know or will + or do something, and in this way the gratuitous effect in man is not a quality, but a movement of the soul; for "motion is + the act of the mover in the moved." + Secondly, man is helped by God's gratuitous will, inasmuch as a habitual gift is infused by God into the soul; and for this + reason, that it is not fitting that God should provide less for those He loves, that they may acquire supernatural good, than + for creatures, whom He loves that they may acquire natural good. Now He so provides for natural creatures, that not merely + does He move them to their natural acts, but He bestows upon them certain forms and powers, which are the principles of acts, + in order that they may of themselves be inclined to these movements, and thus the movements whereby they are moved by God + become natural and easy to creatures, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q110_A2-p6.2" href="./asv.html#Wis.8.1" target="asv"> Wis. 8:1</a>: "she . . . ordereth all things sweetly." Much more therefore does He infuse into such as He moves towards the acquisition + of supernatural good, certain forms or supernatural qualities, whereby they may be moved by Him sweetly and promptly to acquire + eternal good; and thus the gift of grace is a + quality. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q110_A2-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Grace, as a quality, is said to act upon the soul, not after the manner of an efficient cause, but after the manner of a + formal cause, as whiteness makes a thing white, and justice, just. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q110_A2-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Every substance is either the nature of the thing whereof it is the substance or is a part of the nature, even as matter + and form are called substance. And because grace is above human nature, it cannot be a substance or a substantial form, but + is an accidental form of the soul. Now what is substantially in God, becomes accidental in the soul participating the Divine + goodness, as is clear in the case of knowledge. And thus because the soul + participates in the Divine goodness imperfectly, the participation of the Divine goodness, which is grace, has its being in + the soul in a less perfect way than the soul subsists in itself. Nevertheless, inasmuch as it is the expression or participation + of the Divine goodness, it is nobler than the nature of the soul, though not in its mode of being. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q110_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As Boethius [*Pseudo-Bede, Sent. Phil. ex Artist] says, the "being of an accident is to inhere." Hence no accident is called + being as if it had being, but because by it something is; hence it is said to belong to a being rather to be a being (Metaph. + vii, text. 2). And because to become and to be corrupted belong to what is, properly speaking, no accident comes into being + or is corrupted, but is said to come into being and to be corrupted inasmuch as + its subject begins or ceases to be in act with this accident. And thus grace is said to be created inasmuch as men are created + with reference to it, i.e. are given a new being out of nothing, i.e. not from merits, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q110_A2-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Eph.2.10" target="asv"> Eph. 2:10, </a> "created in Jesus Christ in good works." + </p> + <p id="FS_Q110_A2-p10"></p> + <p id="FS_Q110_A2-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q110_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q110_A3.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q110_A3" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q110_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q110_A4.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q110_A3-p0.1">Whether grace is the same as virtue?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q110_A3-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q110_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that grace is the same as virtue. For Augustine says (De Spir. et Lit. xiv) that "operating grace is faith + that worketh by charity." But faith that worketh by charity is a virtue. Therefore grace is a virtue. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q110_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, what fits the definition, fits the defined. But the definitions of virtue given by saints and philosophers fit grace, + since "it makes its subject good, and his work good," and "it is a good quality of the mind, whereby we live righteously," + etc. Therefore grace is virtue. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q110_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, grace is a quality. Now it is clearly not in the "fourth" species of quality; viz. "form" which is the "abiding + figure of things," since it does not belong to bodies. Nor is it in the "third," since it is not a "passion nor a passion-like + quality," which is in the sensitive part of the soul, as is proved in Physic. viii; and grace is principally in the mind. + Nor is it in the "second" species, which is "natural power" or "impotence"; since grace is + above nature and does not regard good and evil, as does natural power. Therefore it must be in the "first" species which is + "habit" or "disposition." Now habits of the mind are virtues; since even knowledge itself is a virtue after a manner, as stated + above ( + <a id="FS_Q110_A3-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q57_A1.html">Q[57], AA[1]</a>,2). Therefore grace is the same as virtue. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q110_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> If grace is a virtue, it would seem before all to be one of the three theological virtues. But grace is neither faith nor + hope, for these can be without sanctifying grace. Nor is it charity, since "grace foreruns charity," as Augustine says in + his book on the Predestination of the Saints (De Dono Persev. xvi). Therefore grace is not virtue. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q110_A3-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Some held that grace and virtue were identical in essence, and differed only logically---in the sense that we speak of grace + inasmuch as it makes man pleasing to God, or is given gratuitously---and of virtue inasmuch as it empowers us to act rightly. + And the Master seems to have thought this (Sent. ii, D 27). + </p> + <p id="FS_Q110_A3-p7"> But if anyone rightly considers the nature of virtue, this cannot hold, since, as the Philosopher says (Physic. vii, text. + 17), "virtue is disposition of what is perfect---and I call perfect what is disposed according to its nature." Now from this + it is clear that the virtue of a thing has reference to some pre-existing nature, from the fact that everything is disposed + with reference to what befits its nature. But it is manifest that the virtues acquired by human acts of which + we spoke above (Q[55], seqq.) are dispositions, whereby a man is fittingly disposed with reference to the nature whereby he + is a man; whereas infused virtues dispose man in a higher manner and towards a higher end, and consequently in relation to + some higher nature, i.e. in relation to a participation of the Divine Nature, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q110_A3-p7.1" href="./asv.html#iiPet.1.4" target="asv">2 Pet. 1:4</a>: "He hath given us most great and most precious promises; that by these you may be made partakers of the Divine Nature." + And it is + in respect of receiving this nature that we are said to be born again sons of God. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q110_A3-p8"> And thus, even as the natural light of reason is something besides the acquired virtues, which are ordained to this natural + light, so also the light of grace which is a participation of the Divine Nature is something besides the infused virtues which + are derived from and are ordained to this light, hence the Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q110_A3-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Eph.5.8" target="asv">Eph. 5:8</a>): "For you were heretofore darkness, but now light in the Lord. Walk then as children of the light." For as the acquired + virtues + enable a man to walk, in accordance with the natural light of reason, so do the infused virtues enable a man to walk as befits + the light of grace. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q110_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Augustine calls "faith that worketh by charity" grace, since the act of faith of him that worketh by charity is the first + act by which sanctifying grace is manifested. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q110_A3-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Good is placed in the definition of virtue with reference to its fitness with some pre-existing nature essential or participated. + Now good is not attributed to grace in this manner, but as to the root of goodness in man, as stated above. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q110_A3-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Grace is reduced to the first species of quality; and yet it is not the same as virtue, but is a certain disposition which + is presupposed to the infused virtues, as their principle and root. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q110_A3-p12"></p> + <p id="FS_Q110_A3-p13"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q110_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q110_A4.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q110_A4" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q110_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q111.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q110_A4-p0.1">Whether grace is in the essence of the soul as in a subject, or in one of the powers?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q110_A4-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q110_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that grace is not in the essence of the soul, as in a subject, but in one of the powers. For Augustine says + (Hypognosticon iii [*Among the spurious works of St. Augustine]) that grace is related to the will or to the free will "as + a rider to his horse." Now the will or the free will is a power, as stated above ( + <a id="FS_Q110_A4-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q83_A2.html">FP, Q[83], A[2]</a>). Hence grace is in a power of the soul, as in a subject. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q110_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, "Man's merit springs from grace" as Augustine says (De Gratia et Lib. Arbit. vi). Now merit consists in acts, which + proceed from a power. Hence it seems that grace is a perfection of a power of the soul. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q110_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if the essence of the soul is the proper subject of grace, the soul, inasmuch as it has an essence, must be capable + of grace. But this is false; since it would follow that every soul would be capable of grace. Therefore the essence of the + soul is not the proper subject of grace. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q110_A4-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, the essence of the soul is prior to its powers. Now what is prior may be understood without what is posterior. Hence + it follows that grace may be taken to be in the soul, although we suppose no part or power of the soul---viz. neither the + will, nor the intellect, nor anything else; which is impossible. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q110_A4-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> By grace we are born again sons of God. But generation terminates at the essence prior to the powers. Therefore grace is + in the soul's essence prior to being in the powers. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q110_A4-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> This question depends on the preceding. For if grace is the same as virtue, it must necessarily be in the powers of the soul + as in a subject; since the soul's powers are the proper subject of virtue, as stated above ( + <a id="FS_Q110_A4-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q56_A1.html">Q[56], A[1]</a>). But if grace differs from virtue, it cannot be said that a power of the soul is the subject of grace, since every perfection + of the soul's powers has the nature of virtue, as stated above ( + <a id="FS_Q110_A4-p7.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q55_A1.html">Q[55], A[1]</a>; + <a id="FS_Q110_A4-p7.3" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q56_A1.html"> Q[56], A[1]</a>). Hence it remains that grace, as it is prior to virtue, has a subject prior to the powers of the soul, so that it is in + the essence of the soul. For as man in his intellective powers participates in the Divine knowledge through the virtue of + faith, and in his power of will participates in the Divine love through the virtue of charity, so also in the nature of the + soul does he participate in the Divine Nature, after the + manner of a likeness, through a certain regeneration or re-creation. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q110_A4-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As from the essence of the soul flows its powers, which are the principles of deeds, so likewise the virtues, whereby the + powers are moved to act, flow into the powers of the soul from grace. And thus grace is compared to the will as the mover + to the moved, which is the same comparison as that of a horseman to the horse---but not as an accident to a subject. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q110_A4-p9"> And thereby is made clear the Reply to the Second Objection. For grace is the principle of meritorious works through the + medium of virtues, as the essence of the soul is the principal of vital deeds through the medium of the powers. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q110_A4-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The soul is the subject of grace, as being in the species of intellectual or rational nature. But the soul is not classed + in a species by any of its powers, since the powers are natural properties of the soul following upon the species. Hence the + soul differs specifically in its essence from other souls, viz. of dumb animals, and of plants. Consequently it does not follow + that, if the essence of the human soul is the subject of grace, every soul may + be the subject of grace; since it belongs to the essence of the soul, inasmuch as it is of such a species. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q110_A4-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Since the powers of the soul are natural properties following upon the species, the soul cannot be without them. Yet, granted + that it was without them, the soul would still be called intellectual or rational in its species, not that it would actually + have these powers, but on account of the essence of such a species, from which these powers naturally flow. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q110_A4-p12"></p> + <p id="FS_Q110_A4-p13"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q110_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q111.html"></a> + </div> + <a href="summa.FS_Q109_A10.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q110_A1.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q111" class="div3"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q110_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q111_A1.html"></a> + <h3 id="FS_Q111-p0.1">OF THE DIVISION OF GRACE (FIVE ARTICLES)</h3> + <p id="FS_Q111-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q111-p2"> We must now consider the division of grace; under which head there are five points of inquiry:</p> + <p id="FS_Q111-p3"> (1) Whether grace is fittingly divided into gratuitous grace and sanctifying grace?</p> + <p id="FS_Q111-p4"> (2) Of the division into operating and cooperating grace;</p> + <p id="FS_Q111-p5"> (3) Of the division of it into prevenient and subsequent grace;</p> + <p id="FS_Q111-p6"> (4) Of the division of gratuitous grace;</p> + <p id="FS_Q111-p7"> (5) Of the comparison between sanctifying and gratuitous grace.</p> + <div id="FS_Q111_A1" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q111.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q111_A2.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q111_A1-p0.1">Whether grace is fittingly divided into sanctifying grace and gratuitous grace?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q111_A1-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q111_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that grace is not fittingly divided into sanctifying grace and gratuitous grace. For grace is a gift of God, + as is clear from what has been already stated ( + <a id="FS_Q111_A1-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q110_A1.html">Q[110], A[1]</a>). But man is not therefore pleasing to God because something is given him by God, but rather on the contrary; since something + is freely given by God, because man is pleasing to Him. Hence there is no sanctifying grace. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q111_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, whatever is not given on account of preceding merits is given gratis. Now even natural good is given to man without + preceding merit, since nature is presupposed to merit. Therefore nature itself is given gratuitously by God. But nature is + condivided with grace. Therefore to be gratuitously given is not fittingly set down as a difference of grace, since it is + found outside the genus of grace. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q111_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, members of a division are mutually opposed. But even sanctifying grace, whereby we are justified, is given to us + gratuitously, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q111_A1-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.3.24" target="asv"> Rom. 3:24</a>: "Being justified freely [gratis] by His grace." Hence sanctifying grace ought not to be divided against gratuitous grace. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q111_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle attributes both to grace, viz. to sanctify and to be gratuitously given. For with regard to the first he says + ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q111_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Eph.1.6" target="asv">Eph. 1:6</a>): "He hath graced us in His beloved son." And with regard to the second ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q111_A1-p5.2" href="./asv.html#Rom.2.6" target="asv">Rom. 2:6</a>): "And if by grace, it is not now by works, otherwise grace is no more grace." Therefore grace can be distinguished by its + having one only or both. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q111_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As the Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q111_A1-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.13.1" target="asv">Rom. 13:1</a>), "those things that are of God are well ordered [Vulg.: 'those that are, are ordained by God]." Now the order of things + consists in this, that things are led to God by other things, as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. iv). And hence since grace is + ordained to lead men to God, this takes place in a certain order, so that some are led to God by others. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q111_A1-p7"> And thus there is a twofold grace: one whereby man himself is united to God, and this is called "sanctifying grace"; the + other is that whereby one man cooperates with another in leading him to God, and this gift is called "gratuitous grace," since + it is bestowed on a man beyond the capability of nature, and beyond the merit of the person. But whereas it is bestowed on + a man, not to justify him, but rather that he may cooperate in the justification of another, it is not called + sanctifying grace. And it is of this that the Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q111_A1-p7.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.12.7" target="asv">1 Cor. 12:7</a>): "And the manifestation of the Spirit is given to every man unto utility," i.e. of others. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q111_A1-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Grace is said to make pleasing, not efficiently but formally, i.e. because thereby a man is justified, and is made worthy + to be called pleasing to God, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q111_A1-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Col.1.21" target="asv"> Col. 1:21</a>: "He hath made us worthy to be made partakers of the lot of the saints in light." + </p> + <p id="FS_Q111_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Grace, inasmuch as it is gratuitously given, excludes the notion of debt. Now debt may be taken in two ways: first, as arising + from merit; and this regards the person whose it is to do meritorious works, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q111_A1-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.4.4" target="asv"> Rom. 4:4</a>: "Now to him that worketh, the reward is not reckoned according to grace, but according to debt." The second debt regards + the condition of nature. Thus we say it is due to a man to have reason, and whatever + else belongs to human nature. Yet in neither way is debt taken to mean that God is under an obligation to His creature, but + rather that the creature ought to be subject to God, that the Divine ordination may be fulfilled in it, which is that a certain + nature should have certain conditions or properties, and that by doing certain works it should attain to something further. + And hence natural endowments are not a debt in the first sense but in the second. Hence they especially merit the name of + grace. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q111_A1-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Sanctifying grace adds to the notion of gratuitous grace something pertaining to the nature of grace, since it makes man + pleasing to God. And hence gratuitous grace which does not do this keeps the common name, as happens in many other cases; + and thus the two parts of the division are opposed as sanctifying and non-sanctifying grace. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q111_A1-p11"></p> + <p id="FS_Q111_A1-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q111.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q111_A2.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q111_A2" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q111_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q111_A3.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q111_A2-p0.1">Whether grace is fittingly divided into operating and cooperating grace?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q111_A2-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q111_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that grace is not fittingly divided into operating and cooperating grace. For grace is an accident, as stated + above ( + <a id="FS_Q111_A2-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q110_A2.html">Q[110], A[2]</a>). Now no accident can act upon its subject. Therefore no grace can be called operating. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q111_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, if grace operates anything in us it assuredly brings about justification. But not only grace works this. For Augustine + says, on + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q111_A2-p3.1" href="./asv.html#John.14.12" target="asv"> Jn. 14:12, </a> "the works that I do he also shall do," says (Serm. clxix): "He Who created thee without thyself, will not justify thee without + thyself." Therefore no grace ought to be called simply operating. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q111_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, to cooperate seems to pertain to the inferior agent, and not to the principal agent. But grace works in us more + than free-will, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q111_A2-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.9.16" target="asv"> Rom. 9:16</a>: "It is not of him that willeth, nor of him that runneth, but of God that sheweth mercy." Therefore no grace ought to be + called cooperating. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q111_A2-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, division ought to rest on opposition. But to operate and to cooperate are not opposed; for one and the same thing + can both operate and cooperate. Therefore grace is not fittingly divided into operating and cooperating. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q111_A2-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Gratia et Lib. Arbit. xvii): "God by cooperating with us, perfects what He began by operating in us, since + He who perfects by cooperation with such as are willing, beings by operating that they may will." But the operations of God + whereby He moves us to good pertain to grace. Therefore grace is fittingly divided into operating and cooperating. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q111_A2-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above ( + <a id="FS_Q111_A2-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q110_A2.html">Q[110], A[2]</a>) grace may be taken in two ways; first, as a Divine help, whereby God moves us to will and to act; secondly, as a habitual + gift divinely bestowed on us. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q111_A2-p8"> Now in both these ways grace is fittingly divided into operating and cooperating. For the operation of an effect is not attributed + to the thing moved but to the mover. Hence in that effect in which our mind is moved and does not move, but in which God is + the sole mover, the operation is attributed to God, and it is with reference to this that we speak of "operating grace." But + in that effect in which our mind both moves and is moved, the operation is not only attributed to God, + but also to the soul; and it is with reference to this that we speak of "cooperating grace." Now there is a double act in + us. First, there is the interior act of the will, and with regard to this act the will is a thing moved, and God is the mover; + and especially when the will, which hitherto willed evil, begins to will good. And hence, inasmuch as God moves the human + mind to this act, we speak of operating grace. But there is another, exterior act; and since it is commanded by the will, + as was + shown above ( + <a id="FS_Q111_A2-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q17_A9.html">Q[17], A[9]</a>) the operation of this act is attributed to the will. And because God assists us in this act, both by strengthening our will + interiorly so as to attain to the act, and by granting outwardly the capability of operating, it is with respect to this that + we speak of cooperating grace. Hence after the aforesaid words Augustine subjoins: "He operates that we may will; and when + we will, He cooperates that we may perfect." And thus if grace is taken for + God's gratuitous motion whereby He moves us to meritorious good, it is fittingly divided into operating and cooperating grace. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q111_A2-p9"> But if grace is taken for the habitual gift, then again there is a double effect of grace, even as of every other form; the + first of which is "being," and the second, "operation"; thus the work of heat is to make its subject hot, and to give heat + outwardly. And thus habitual grace, inasmuch as it heals and justifies the soul, or makes it pleasing to God, is called operating + grace; but inasmuch as it is the principle of meritorious works, which spring from the free-will, it is + called cooperating grace. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q111_A2-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Inasmuch as grace is a certain accidental quality, it does not act upon the soul efficiently, but formally, as whiteness + makes a surface white. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q111_A2-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> God does not justify us without ourselves, because whilst we are being justified we consent to God's justification [justitiae] + by a movement of our free-will. Nevertheless this movement is not the cause of grace, but the effect; hence the whole operation + pertains to grace. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q111_A2-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> One thing is said to cooperate with another not merely when it is a secondary agent under a principal agent, but when it + helps to the end intended. Now man is helped by God to will the good, through the means of operating grace. And hence, the + end being already intended, grace cooperates with us. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q111_A2-p13"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Operating and cooperating grace are the same grace; but are distinguished by their different effects, as is plain from what + has been said. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q111_A2-p14"></p> + <p id="FS_Q111_A2-p15"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q111_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q111_A3.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q111_A3" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q111_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q111_A4.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q111_A3-p0.1">Whether grace is fittingly divided into prevenient and subsequent grace?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q111_A3-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q111_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that grace is not fittingly divided into prevenient and subsequent. For grace is an effect of the Divine love. + But God's love is never subsequent, but always prevenient, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q111_A3-p2.1" href="./asv.html#iJohn.4.10" target="asv">1 Jn. 4:10</a>: "Not as though we had loved God, but because He hath first loved us." Therefore grace ought not to be divided into prevenient + and subsequent. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q111_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, there is but one sanctifying grace in man, since it is sufficient, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q111_A3-p3.1" href="./asv.html#iiCor.12.9" target="asv">2 Cor. 12:9</a>: "My grace is sufficient for thee." But the same thing cannot be before and after. Therefore grace is not fittingly divided + into prevenient and subsequent. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q111_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, grace is known by its effects. Now there are an infinite number of effects---one preceding another. Hence it with + regard to these, grace must be divided into prevenient and subsequent, it would seem that there are infinite species of grace. + Now no art takes note of the infinite in number. Hence grace is not fittingly divided into prevenient and subsequent. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q111_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> God's grace is the outcome of His mercy. Now both are said in + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q111_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.58.11" target="asv"> Ps. 58:11</a>: "His mercy shall prevent me," and again, + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q111_A3-p5.2" href="./asv.html#Ps.22.6" target="asv"> Ps. 22:6</a>: "Thy mercy will follow me." Therefore grace is fittingly divided into prevenient and subsequent. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q111_A3-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As grace is divided into operating and cooperating, with regard to its diverse effects, so also is it divided into prevenient + and subsequent, howsoever we consider grace. Now there are five effects of grace in us: of these, the first is, to heal the + soul; the second, to desire good; the third, to carry into effect the good proposed; the fourth, to persevere in good; the + fifth, to reach glory. And hence grace, inasmuch as it causes the first effect in us, is + called prevenient with respect to the second, and inasmuch as it causes the second, it is called subsequent with respect to + the first effect. And as one effect is posterior to this effect, and prior to that, so may grace be called prevenient and + subsequent on account of the same effect viewed relatively to divers others. And this is what Augustine says (De Natura et + Gratia xxxi): "It is prevenient, inasmuch as it heals, and subsequent, inasmuch as, being healed, we are strengthened; it + is + prevenient, inasmuch as we are called, and subsequent, inasmuch as we are glorified." + </p> + <p id="FS_Q111_A3-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> God's love signifies something eternal; and hence can never be called anything but prevenient. But grace signifies a temporal + effect, which can precede and follow another; and thus grace may be both prevenient and subsequent. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q111_A3-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The division into prevenient and subsequent grace does not divide grace in its essence, but only in its effects, as was already + said of operating and cooperating grace. For subsequent grace, inasmuch as it pertains to glory, is not numerically distinct + from prevenient grace whereby we are at present justified. For even as the charity of the earth is not voided in heaven, so + must the same be said of the light of grace, since the notion of neither + implies imperfection. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q111_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Although the effects of grace may be infinite in number, even as human acts are infinite, nevertheless all reduced to some + of a determinate species, and moreover all coincide in this---that one precedes another. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q111_A3-p10"></p> + <p id="FS_Q111_A3-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q111_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q111_A4.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q111_A4" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q111_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q111_A5.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q111_A4-p0.1">Whether gratuitous grace is rightly divided by the Apostle?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q111_A4-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q111_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that gratuitous grace is not rightly divided by the Apostle. For every gift vouchsafed to us by God, may be + called a gratuitous grace. Now there are an infinite number of gifts freely bestowed on us by God as regards both the good + of the soul and the good of the body---and yet they do not make us pleasing to God. Hence gratuitous graces cannot be contained + under any certain division. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q111_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, gratuitous grace is distinguished from sanctifying grace. But faith pertains to sanctifying grace, since we are + justified by it, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q111_A4-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.5.1" target="asv"> Rom. 5:1</a>: "Being justified therefore by faith." Hence it is not right to place faith amongst the gratuitous graces, especially since + the other virtues are not so placed, as hope and charity. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q111_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the operation of healing, and speaking divers tongues are miracles. Again, the interpretation of speeches pertains + either to wisdom or to knowledge, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q111_A4-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Dan.1.17" target="asv"> Dan. 1:17</a>: "And to these children God gave knowledge and understanding in every book and wisdom." Hence it is not correct to divide + the grace of healing and kinds of tongues against the working of miracles; and the interpretation of speeches against the + word of wisdom and + knowledge. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q111_A4-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, as wisdom and knowledge are gifts of the Holy Ghost, so also are understanding, counsel, piety, fortitude, and fear, + as stated above ( + <a id="FS_Q111_A4-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q68_A4.html">Q[68], A[4]</a>). Therefore these also ought to be placed amongst the gratuitous gifts. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q111_A4-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q111_A4-p6.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.12.8" target="asv">1 Cor. 12:8</a>, + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q111_A4-p6.2" href="./asv.html#iCor.12.9" target="asv">9</a>, + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q111_A4-p6.3" href="./asv.html#iCor.12.10" target="asv">10</a>): "To one indeed by the Spirit is given the word of wisdom; and to another the word of knowledge, according to the same Spirit; + to another, the working of miracles; to another, prophecy; to another, the discerning of spirits; to another divers kinds + of tongues; to another interpretation of speeches." + </p> + <p id="FS_Q111_A4-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As was said above + <a id="FS_Q111_A4-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q111_A1.html">(A[1])</a>, gratuitous grace is ordained to this, viz. that a man may help another to be led to God. Now no man can help in this by + moving interiorly (for this belongs to God alone), but only exteriorly by teaching or persuading. Hence gratuitous grace embraces + whatever a man needs in order to instruct another in Divine things which are above reason. Now for this three things are required: + first, a man must possess the + fullness of knowledge of Divine things, so as to be capable of teaching others. Secondly, he must be able to confirm or prove + what he says, otherwise his words would have no weight. Thirdly, he must be capable of fittingly presenting to his hearers + what he knows. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q111_A4-p8"> Now as regards the first, three things are necessary, as may be seen in human teaching. For whoever would teach another in + any science must first be certain of the principles of the science, and with regard to this there is "faith," which is certitude + of invisible things, the principles of Catholic doctrine. Secondly, it behooves the teacher to know the principal conclusions + of the science, and hence we have the word of "wisdom," which is the knowledge of Divine things. Thirdly, + he ought to abound with examples and a knowledge of effects, whereby at times he needs to manifest causes; and thus we have + the word of "knowledge," which is the knowledge of human things, since "the invisible things of Him . . . are clearly seen, + being understood by the things that are made" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q111_A4-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.1.20" target="asv">Rom. 1:20</a>). + </p> + <p id="FS_Q111_A4-p9"> Now the confirmation of such things as are within reason rests upon arguments; but the confirmation of what is above reason + rests on what is proper to the Divine power, and this in two ways: first, when the teacher of sacred doctrine does what God + alone can do, in miraculous deeds, whether with respect to bodily health---and thus there is the "grace of healing," or merely + for the purpose of manifesting the Divine power; for instance, that the sun should stand still or darken, or + that the sea should be divided---and thus there is the "working of miracles." Secondly, when he can manifest what God alone + can know, and these are either future contingents---and thus there is "prophecy," or also the secrets of hearts---and thus + there is the "discerning of spirits." + </p> + <p id="FS_Q111_A4-p10"> But the capability of speaking can regard either the idiom in which a person can be understood, and thus there is "kinds + of tongues"; or it can regard the sense of what is said, and thus there is the "interpretation of speeches." + </p> + <p id="FS_Q111_A4-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As stated above + <a id="FS_Q111_A4-p11.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q111_A1.html">(A[1])</a>, not all the benefits divinely conferred upon us are called gratuitous graces, but only those that surpass the power of nature---e.g. + that a fisherman should be replete with the word of wisdom and of knowledge and the like; and such as these are here set down + as gratuitous graces. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q111_A4-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Faith is enumerated here under the gratuitous graces, not as a virtue justifying man in himself, but as implying a super-eminent + certitude of faith, whereby a man is fitted for instructing others concerning such things as belong to the faith. With regard + to hope and charity, they belong to the appetitive power, according as man is ordained thereby to God. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q111_A4-p13"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The grace of healing is distinguished from the general working of miracles because it has a special reason for inducing one + to the faith, since a man is all the more ready to believe when he has received the gift of bodily health through the virtue + of faith. So, too, to speak with divers tongues and to interpret speeches have special efficacy in bestowing faith. Hence + they are set down as special gratuitous graces. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q111_A4-p14"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Wisdom and knowledge are not numbered among the gratuitous graces in the same way as they are reckoned among the gifts of + the Holy Ghost, i.e. inasmuch as man's mind is rendered easily movable by the Holy Ghost to the things of wisdom and knowledge; + for thus they are gifts of the Holy Ghost, as stated above ( + <a id="FS_Q111_A4-p14.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q68_A1.html">Q[68], AA[1]</a>,4). But they are numbered amongst the gratuitous graces, inasmuch as they imply such a fullness of + knowledge and wisdom that a man may not merely think aright of Divine things, but may instruct others and overpower adversaries. + Hence it is significant that it is the "word" of wisdom and the "word" of knowledge that are placed in the gratuitous graces, + since, as Augustine says (De Trin. xiv, 1), "It is one thing merely to know what a man must believe in order to reach everlasting + life, and another thing to know how this may benefit the godly and may be defended against the ungodly." + </p> + <p id="FS_Q111_A4-p15"></p> + <p id="FS_Q111_A4-p16"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q111_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q111_A5.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q111_A5" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q111_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q112.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q111_A5-p0.1">Whether gratuitous grace is nobler than sanctifying grace?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q111_A5-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q111_A5-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that gratuitous grace is nobler than sanctifying grace. For "the people's good is better than the individual + good," as the Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 2). Now sanctifying grace is ordained to the good of one man alone, whereas gratuitous + grace is ordained to the common good of the whole Church, as stated above ( + <a id="FS_Q111_A5-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q111_A1.html">AA[1]</a>,4). Hence gratuitous grace is nobler than sanctifying grace. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q111_A5-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it is a greater power that is able to act upon another, than that which is confined to itself, even as greater is + the brightness of the body that can illuminate other bodies, than of that which can only shine but cannot illuminate; and + hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 1) "that justice is the most excellent of the virtues," since by it a man bears himself + rightly towards others. But by sanctifying grace a man is perfected only in himself; whereas + by gratuitous grace a man works for the perfection of others. Hence gratuitous grace is nobler than sanctifying grace. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q111_A5-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, what is proper to the best is nobler than what is common to all; thus to reason, which is proper to man is nobler + than to feel, which is common to all animals. Now sanctifying grace is common to all members of the Church, but gratuitous + grace is the proper gift of the more exalted members of the Church. Hence gratuitous grace is nobler than sanctifying grace. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q111_A5-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q111_A5-p5.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.12.31" target="asv">1 Cor. 12:31</a>), having enumerated the gratuitous graces adds: "And I shew unto you yet a more excellent way"; and as the sequel proves + he is speaking of charity, which pertains to sanctifying grace. Hence sanctifying grace is more noble than gratuitous grace. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q111_A5-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The higher the good to which a virtue is ordained, the more excellent is the virtue. Now the end is always greater than the + means. But sanctifying grace ordains a man immediately to a union with his last end, whereas gratuitous grace ordains a man + to what is preparatory to the end; i.e. by prophecy and miracles and so forth, men are induced to unite themselves to their + last end. And hence sanctifying grace is nobler than gratuitous grace. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q111_A5-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As the Philosopher says (Metaph. xii, text. 52), a multitude, as an army, has a double good; the first is in the multitude + itself, viz. the order of the army; the second is separate from the multitude, viz. the good of the leader---and this is better + good, since the other is ordained to it. Now gratuitous grace is ordained to the common good of the Church, which is ecclesiastical + order, whereas sanctifying grace is ordained to the separate common + good, which is God. Hence sanctifying grace is the nobler. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q111_A5-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> If gratuitous grace could cause a man to have sanctifying grace, it would follow that the gratuitous grace was the nobler; + even as the brightness of the sun that enlightens is more excellent than that of an object that is lit up. But by gratuitous + grace a man cannot cause another to have union with God, which he himself has by sanctifying grace; but he causes certain + dispositions towards it. Hence gratuitous grace needs not to be the more excellent, + even as in fire, the heat, which manifests its species whereby it produces heat in other things, is not more noble than its + substantial form. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q111_A5-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Feeling is ordained to reason, as to an end; and thus, to reason is nobler. But here it is the contrary; for what is proper + is ordained to what is common as to an end. Hence there is no comparison. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q111_A5-p10"></p> + <p id="FS_Q111_A5-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q111_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q112.html"></a> + </div> + <a href="summa.FS_Q110_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q111_A1.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q112" class="div3"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q111_A5.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q112_A1.html"></a> + <h3 id="FS_Q112-p0.1">OF THE CAUSE OF GRACE (FIVE ARTICLES)</h3> + <p id="FS_Q112-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q112-p2"> We must now consider the cause of grace; and under this head there are five points of inquiry:</p> + <p id="FS_Q112-p3"> (1) Whether God alone is the efficient cause of grace?</p> + <p id="FS_Q112-p4"> (2) Whether any disposition towards grace is needed on the part of the recipient, by an act of free-will?</p> + <p id="FS_Q112-p5"> (3) Whether such a disposition can make grace follow of necessity?</p> + <p id="FS_Q112-p6"> (4) Whether grace is equal in all?</p> + <p id="FS_Q112-p7"> (5) Whether anyone may know that he has grace?</p> + <div id="FS_Q112_A1" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q112.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q112_A2.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q112_A1-p0.1">Whether God alone is the cause of grace?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q112_A1-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q112_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that God alone is not the cause of grace. For it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q112_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#John.1.17" target="asv">Jn. 1:17</a>): "Grace and truth came by Jesus Christ." Now, by the name of Jesus Christ is understood not merely the Divine Nature assuming, + but the created nature assumed. Therefore a creature may be the cause of grace. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q112_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, there is this difference between the sacraments of the New Law and those of the Old, that the sacraments of the + New Law cause grace, whereas the sacraments of the Old Law merely signify it. Now the sacraments of the New Law are certain + visible elements. Therefore God is not the only cause of grace. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q112_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, according to Dionysius (Coel. Hier. iii, iv, vii, viii), "Angels cleanse, enlighten, and perfect both lesser angels + and men." Now the rational creature is cleansed, enlightened, and perfected by grace. Therefore God is not the only cause + of grace. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q112_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q112_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.83.12" target="asv">Ps. 83:12</a>): "The Lord will give grace and glory." + </p> + <p id="FS_Q112_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Nothing can act beyond its species, since the cause must always be more powerful than its effect. Now the gift of grace surpasses + every capability of created nature, since it is nothing short of a partaking of the Divine Nature, which exceeds every other + nature. And thus it is impossible that any creature should cause grace. For it is as necessary that God alone should deify, + bestowing a partaking of the Divine Nature by a participated likeness, as it is + impossible that anything save fire should enkindle. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q112_A1-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Christ's humanity is an "organ of His Godhead," as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 19). Now an instrument does not bring + forth the action of the principal agent by its own power, but in virtue of the principal agent. Hence Christ's humanity does + not cause grace by its own power, but by virtue of the Divine Nature joined to it, whereby the actions of Christ's humanity + are saving actions. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q112_A1-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As in the person of Christ the humanity causes our salvation by grace, the Divine power being the principal agent, so likewise + in the sacraments of the New Law, which are derived from Christ, grace is instrumentally caused by the sacraments, and principally + by the power of the Holy Ghost working in the sacraments, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q112_A1-p8.1" href="./asv.html#John.3.5" target="asv"> Jn. 3:5</a>: "Unless a man be born again of water and the Holy Ghost he cannot enter into the kingdom of + God." + </p> + <p id="FS_Q112_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Angels cleanse, enlighten, and perfect angels or men, by instruction, and not by justifying them through grace. Hence Dionysius + says (Coel. Hier. vii) that "this cleansing and enlightenment and perfecting is nothing else than the assumption of Divine + knowledge." + </p> + <p id="FS_Q112_A1-p10"></p> + <p id="FS_Q112_A1-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q112.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q112_A2.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q112_A2" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q112_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q112_A3.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q112_A2-p0.1">Whether any preparation and disposition for grace is required on man's part?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q112_A2-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q112_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that no preparation or disposition for grace is required on man's part, since, as the Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q112_A2-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.4.4" target="asv">Rom. 4:4</a>), "To him that worketh, the reward is not reckoned according to grace, but according to debt." Now a man's preparation by + free-will can only be through some operation. Hence it would do away with the notion of grace. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q112_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, whoever is going on sinning, is not preparing himself to have grace. But to some who are going on sinning grace + is given, as is clear in the case of Paul, who received grace whilst he was "breathing our threatenings and slaughter against + the disciples of the Lord" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q112_A2-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Acts.9.1" target="asv">Act 9:1</a>). Hence no preparation for grace is required on man's part. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q112_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, an agent of infinite power needs no disposition in matter, since it does not even require matter, as appears in + creation, to which grace is compared, which is called "a new creature" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q112_A2-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Gal.6.15" target="asv">Gal. 6:15</a>). But only God, Who has infinite power, causes grace, as stated above (A[1] ). Hence no preparation is required on man's + part to obtain grace. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q112_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q112_A2-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Amos.4.12" target="asv">Amos 4:12</a>): "Be prepared to meet thy God, O Israel," and ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q112_A2-p5.2" href="./asv.html#iKgs.7.3" target="asv">1 Kings 7:3</a>): "Prepare your hearts unto the Lord." + </p> + <p id="FS_Q112_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above ( + <a id="FS_Q112_A2-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q111_A2.html">Q[111], A[2]</a>), grace is taken in two ways: first, as a habitual gift of God. Secondly, as a help from God, Who moves the soul to good. + Now taking grace in the first sense, a certain preparation of grace is required for it, since a form can only be in disposed + matter. But if we speak of grace as it signifies a help from God to move us to good, no preparation is required on man's part, + that, as it were, anticipates + the Divine help, but rather, every preparation in man must be by the help of God moving the soul to good. And thus even the + good movement of the free-will, whereby anyone is prepared for receiving the gift of grace is an act of the free-will moved + by God. And thus man is said to prepare himself, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q112_A2-p6.2" href="./asv.html#Prov.16.1" target="asv"> Prov. 16:1</a>: "It is the part of man to prepare the soul"; yet it is principally from God, Who moves the free-will. Hence it is said that + man's will is prepared by God, + and that man's steps are guided by God. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q112_A2-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> A certain preparation of man for grace is simultaneous with the infusion of grace; and this operation is meritorious, not + indeed of grace, which is already possessed---but of glory which is not yet possessed. But there is another imperfect preparation, + which sometimes precedes the gift of sanctifying grace, and yet it is from God's motion. But it does not suffice for merit, + since man is not yet justified by grace, and merit can only arise from grace, + as will be seen further on ( + <a id="FS_Q112_A2-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q114_A2.html">Q[114], A[2]</a>). + </p> + <p id="FS_Q112_A2-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Since a man cannot prepare himself for grace unless God prevent and move him to good, it is of no account whether anyone + arrive at perfect preparation instantaneously, or step by step. For it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q112_A2-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.11.23" target="asv">Ecclus. 11:23</a>): "It is easy in the eyes of God on a sudden to make the poor man rich." Now it sometimes happens that God moves a man to + good, but not perfect good, and this preparation precedes grace. But He sometimes moves him + suddenly and perfectly to good, and man receives grace suddenly, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q112_A2-p8.2" href="./asv.html#John.6.45" target="asv"> Jn. 6:45</a>: "Every one that hath heard of the Father, and hath learned, cometh to Me." And thus it happened to Paul, since, suddenly + when he was in the midst of sin, his heart was perfectly moved by God to hear, to learn, to come; and hence he received grace + suddenly. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q112_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> An agent of infinite power needs no matter or disposition of matter, brought about by the action of something else; and yet, + looking to the condition of the thing caused, it must cause, in the thing caused, both the matter and the due disposition + for the form. So likewise, when God infuses grace into a soul, no preparation is required which He Himself does not bring + about. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q112_A2-p10"></p> + <p id="FS_Q112_A2-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q112_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q112_A3.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q112_A3" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q112_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q112_A4.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q112_A3-p0.1">Whether grace is necessarily given to whoever prepares himself for it, or to whoever does what he can?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q112_A3-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q112_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that grace is necessarily given to whoever prepares himself for grace, or to whoever does what he can, because, + on + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q112_A3-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.5.1" target="asv"> Rom. 5:1, </a> "Being justified . . . by faith, let us have peace," etc. the gloss says: "God welcomes whoever flies to Him, otherwise there + would be injustice with Him." But it is impossible for injustice to be with God. Therefore it is impossible for God not to + welcome whoever flies to Him. Hence he receives grace of + necessity. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q112_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Anselm says (De Casu Diaboli. iii) that the reason why God does not bestow grace on the devil, is that he did not + wish, nor was he prepared, to receive it. But if the cause be removed, the effect must needs be removed also. Therefore, if + anyone is willing to receive grace it is bestowed on them of necessity. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q112_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, good is diffusive of itself, as appears from Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv). Now the good of grace is better than the + good of nature. Hence, since natural forms necessarily come to disposed matter, much more does it seem that grace is necessarily + bestowed on whoever prepares himself for grace. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q112_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Man is compared to God as clay to the potter, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q112_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Jer.18.6" target="asv"> Jer. 18:6</a>: "As clay is in the hand of the potter, so are you in My hand." But however much the clay is prepared, it does not necessarily + receive its shape from the potter. Hence, however much a man prepares himself, he does not necessarily receive grace from + God. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q112_A3-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above + <a id="FS_Q112_A3-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q112_A2.html">(A[2])</a>, man's preparation for grace is from God, as Mover, and from the free-will, as moved. Hence the preparation may be looked + at in two ways: first, as it is from free-will, and thus there is no necessity that it should obtain grace, since the gift + of grace exceeds every preparation of human power. But it may be considered, secondly, as it is from God the Mover, and thus + it has a necessity---not indeed of + coercion, but of infallibility---as regards what it is ordained to by God, since God's intention cannot fail, according to + the saying of Augustine in his book on the Predestination of the Saints (De Dono Persev. xiv) that "by God's good gifts whoever + is liberated, is most certainly liberated." Hence if God intends, while moving, that the one whose heart He moves should attain + to grace, he will infallibly attain to it, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q112_A3-p6.2" href="./asv.html#John.6.45" target="asv"> Jn. 6:45</a>: "Every one that hath heard of the + Father, and hath learned, cometh to Me." + </p> + <p id="FS_Q112_A3-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This gloss is speaking of such as fly to God by a meritorious act of their free-will, already "informed" with grace; for + if they did not receive grace, it would be against the justice which He Himself established. Or if it refers to the movement + of free-will before grace, it is speaking in the sense that man's flight to God is by a Divine motion, which ought not, in + justice, to fail. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q112_A3-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The first cause of the defect of grace is on our part; but the first cause of the bestowal of grace is on God's according + to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q112_A3-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Hos.13.9" target="asv">Osee 13:9</a>: "Destruction is thy own, O Israel; thy help is only in Me." + </p> + <p id="FS_Q112_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Even in natural things, the form does not necessarily ensue the disposition of the matter, except by the power of the agent + that causes the disposition. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q112_A3-p10"></p> + <p id="FS_Q112_A3-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q112_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q112_A4.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q112_A4" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q112_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q112_A5.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q112_A4-p0.1">Whether grace is greater in one than in another? </h4> + <p id="FS_Q112_A4-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q112_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that grace is not greater in one than in another. For grace is caused in us by the Divine love, as stated above + ( + <a id="FS_Q112_A4-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q110_A1.html">Q[110], A[1]</a>). Now it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q112_A4-p2.2" href="./asv.html#Wis.6.8" target="asv">Wis. 6:8</a>): "He made the little and the great and He hath equally care of all." Therefore all obtain grace from Him equally. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q112_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, whatever is the greatest possible, cannot be more or less. But grace is the greatest possible, since it joins us + with our last end. Therefore there is no greater or less in it. Hence it is not greater in one than in another. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q112_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, grace is the soul's life, as stated above ( + <a id="FS_Q112_A4-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q110_A1.html">Q[110], A[1]</a>, ad 2). But there is no greater or less in life. Hence, neither is there in grace. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q112_A4-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q112_A4-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Eph.4.7" target="asv">Eph. 4:7</a>): "But to every one of us is given grace according to the measure of the giving of Christ." Now what is given in measure, + is not given to all equally. Hence all have not an equal grace. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q112_A4-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above ( + <a id="FS_Q112_A4-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q52_A1.html">Q[52], AA[1]</a>,2; + <a id="FS_Q112_A4-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q56_A1.html"> Q[56], AA[1]</a>,2), habits can have a double magnitude: one, as regards the end or object, as when a virtue is said to be more noble through + being ordained to a greater good; the other on the part of the subject, which more or less participates in the habit inhering + to it. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q112_A4-p7"> Now as regards the first magnitude, sanctifying grace cannot be greater or less, since, of its nature, grace joins man to + the Highest Good, which is God. But as regards the subject, grace can receive more or less, inasmuch as one may be more perfectly + enlightened by grace than another. And a certain reason for this is on the part of him who prepares himself for grace; since + he who is better prepared for grace, receives more grace. Yet it is not here that we must seek the first + cause of this diversity, since man prepares himself, only inasmuch as his free-will is prepared by God. Hence the first cause + of this diversity is to be sought on the part of the God, Who dispenses His gifts of grace variously, in order that the beauty + and perfection of the Church may result from these various degree; even as He instituted the various conditions of things, + that the universe might be perfect. Hence after the Apostle had said ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q112_A4-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Eph.4.7" target="asv">Eph. 4:7</a>): "To every one of us + is given grace according to the measure of the giving of Christ," having enumerated the various graces, he adds ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q112_A4-p7.2" href="./asv.html#Eph.4.12" target="asv">Eph. 4:12</a>): "For the perfecting of the saints . . . for the edifying of the body of Christ." + </p> + <p id="FS_Q112_A4-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The Divine care may be looked at in two ways: first, as regards the Divine act, which is simple and uniform; and thus His + care looks equally to all, since by one simple act He administers great things and little. But, "secondly," it may be considered + in those things which come to be considered by the Divine care; and thus, inequality is found, inasmuch as God by His care + provides greater gifts to some, and lesser gifts for others. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q112_A4-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> This objection is based on the first kind of magnitude of grace; since grace cannot be greater by ordaining to a greater + good, but inasmuch as it more or less ordains to a greater or less participation of the same good. For there may be diversity + of intensity and remissness, both in grace and in final glory as regards the subjects' participation. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q112_A4-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Natural life pertains to man's substance, and hence cannot be more or less; but man partakes of the life of grace accidentally, + and hence man may possess it more or less. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q112_A4-p11"></p> + <p id="FS_Q112_A4-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q112_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q112_A5.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q112_A5" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q112_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q113.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q112_A5-p0.1">Whether man can know that he has grace?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q112_A5-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q112_A5-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that man can know that he has grace. For grace by its physical reality is in the soul. Now the soul has most + certain knowledge of those things that are in it by their physical reality, as appears from Augustine (Gen. ad lit. xii, 31). + Hence grace may be known most certainly by one who has grace. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q112_A5-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, as knowledge is a gift of God, so is grace. But whoever receives knowledge from God, knows that he has knowledge, + according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q112_A5-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.7.17" target="asv"> Wis. 7:17</a>: The Lord "hath given me the true knowledge of the things that are." Hence, with equal reason, whoever receives grace from + God, knows that he has grace. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q112_A5-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, light is more knowable than darkness, since, according to the Apostle ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q112_A5-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Eph.5.13" target="asv">Eph. 5:13</a>), "all that is made manifest is light," Now sin, which is spiritual darkness, may be known with certainty by one that is + in sin. Much more, therefore, may grace, which is spiritual light, be known. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q112_A5-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, the Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q112_A5-p5.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.2.12" target="asv">1 Cor. 2:12</a>): "Now we have received not the Spirit of this world, but the Spirit that is of God; that we may know the things that are + given us from God." Now grace is God's first gift. Hence, the man who receives grace by the Holy Spirit, by the same Holy + Spirit knows the grace given to him. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q112_A5-p6"> + <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, it was said by the Lord to Abraham ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q112_A5-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.22.12" target="asv">Gn. 22:12</a>): "Now I know that thou fearest God," i.e. "I have made thee know." Now He is speaking there of chaste fear, which is not + apart from grace. Hence a man may know that he has grace. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q112_A5-p7"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q112_A5-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Eccl.9.1" target="asv">Eccles. 9:1</a>): "Man knoweth not whether he be worthy of love or hatred." Now sanctifying grace maketh a man worthy of God's love. Therefore + no one can know whether he has sanctifying grace. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q112_A5-p8"> + <b>I answer that,</b> There are three ways of knowing a thing: first, by revelation, and thus anyone may know that he has grace, for God by a special + privilege reveals this at times to some, in order that the joy of safety may begin in them even in this life, and that they + may carry on toilsome works with greater trust and greater energy, and may bear the evils of this present life, as when it + was said to Paul ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q112_A5-p8.1" href="./asv.html#iiCor.12.9" target="asv">2 Cor. 12:9</a>): "My grace is sufficient for + thee." + </p> + <p id="FS_Q112_A5-p9"> Secondly, a man may, of himself, know something, and with certainty; and in this way no one can know that he has grace. For + certitude about a thing can only be had when we may judge of it by its proper principle. Thus it is by undemonstrable universal + principles that certitude is obtained concerning demonstrative conclusions. Now no one can know he has the knowledge of a + conclusion if he does not know its principle. But the principle of grace and its object is God, Who by reason + of His very excellence is unknown to us, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q112_A5-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Job.36.26" target="asv"> Job 36:26</a>: "Behold God is great, exceeding our knowledge." And hence His presence in us and His absence cannot be known with certainty, + according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q112_A5-p9.2" href="./asv.html#Job.9.11" target="asv"> Job 9:11</a>: "If He come to me, I shall not see Him; if He depart I shall not understand." And hence man cannot judge with certainty + that he has grace, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q112_A5-p9.3" href="./asv.html#iCor.4.3" target="asv">1 Cor. 4:3,4</a>: "But neither do I judge my own self . . . but He that + judgeth me is the Lord." + </p> + <p id="FS_Q112_A5-p10"> Thirdly, things are known conjecturally by signs; and thus anyone may know he has grace, when he is conscious of delighting + in God, and of despising worldly things, and inasmuch as a man is not conscious of any mortal sin. And thus it is written + ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q112_A5-p10.1" href="./asv.html#Rev.2.17" target="asv">Apoc. 2:17</a>): "To him that overcometh I will give the hidden manna . . . which no man knoweth, but he that receiveth it," because whoever + receives it knows, by experiencing a certain sweetness, which he who does not + receive it, does not experience. Yet this knowledge is imperfect; hence the Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q112_A5-p10.2" href="./asv.html#iCor.4.4" target="asv">1 Cor. 4:4</a>): "I am not conscious to myself of anything, yet am I not hereby justified," since, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q112_A5-p10.3" href="./asv.html#Ps.18.13" target="asv"> Ps. 18:13</a>: "Who can understand sins? From my secret ones cleanse me, O Lord, and from those of others spare Thy servant." + </p> + <p id="FS_Q112_A5-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Those things which are in the soul by their physical reality, are known through experimental knowledge; in so far as through + acts man has experience of their inward principles: thus when we wish, we perceive that we have a will; and when we exercise + the functions of life, we observe that there is life in us. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q112_A5-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> It is an essential condition of knowledge that a man should have certitude of the objects of knowledge; and again, it is + an essential condition of faith that a man should be certain of the things of faith, and this, because certitude belongs to + the perfection of the intellect, wherein these gifts exist. Hence, whoever has knowledge or faith is certain that he has them. + But it is otherwise with grace and charity and such like, which perfect the + appetitive faculty. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q112_A5-p13"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Sin has for its principal object commutable good, which is known to us. But the object or end of grace is unknown to us on + account of the greatness of its light, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q112_A5-p13.1" href="./asv.html#iTim.6.16" target="asv">1 Tim. 6:16</a>: "Who . . . inhabiteth light inaccessible." + </p> + <p id="FS_Q112_A5-p14"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> The Apostle is here speaking of the gifts of glory, which have been given to us in hope, and these we know most certainly + by faith, although we do not know for certain that we have grace to enable us to merit them. Or it may be said that he is + speaking of the privileged knowledge, which comes of revelation. Hence he adds ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q112_A5-p14.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.2.10" target="asv">1 Cor. 2:10</a>): "But to us God hath revealed them by His Spirit." + </p> + <p id="FS_Q112_A5-p15"> + <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> What was said to Abraham may refer to experimental knowledge which springs from deeds of which we are cognizant. For in the + deed that Abraham had just wrought, he could know experimentally that he had the fear of God. Or it may refer to a revelation. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q112_A5-p16"></p> + <p id="FS_Q112_A5-p17"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q112_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q113.html"></a> + </div> + <a href="summa.FS_Q111_A5.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q112_A1.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q113" class="div3"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q112_A5.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q113_A1.html"></a> + <h3 id="FS_Q113-p0.1">OF THE EFFECTS OF GRACE (TEN ARTICLES)</h3> + <p id="FS_Q113-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q113-p2"> We have now to consider the effect of grace; (1) the justification of the ungodly, which is the effect of operating grace; + and (2) merit, which is the effect of cooperating grace. Under the first head there are ten points of inquiry: + </p> + <p id="FS_Q113-p3"> (1) What is the justification of the ungodly?</p> + <p id="FS_Q113-p4"> (2) Whether grace is required for it?</p> + <p id="FS_Q113-p5"> (3) Whether any movement of the free-will is required?</p> + <p id="FS_Q113-p6"> (4) Whether a movement of faith is required?</p> + <p id="FS_Q113-p7"> (5) Whether a movement of the free-will against sin is required?</p> + <p id="FS_Q113-p8"> (6) Whether the remission of sins is to be reckoned with the foregoing?</p> + <p id="FS_Q113-p9"> (7) Whether the justification of the ungodly is a work of time or is sudden?</p> + <p id="FS_Q113-p10"> (8) Of the natural order of the things concurring to justification;</p> + <p id="FS_Q113-p11"> (9) Whether the justification of the ungodly is God's greatest work?</p> + <p id="FS_Q113-p12"> (10) Whether the justification of the ungodly is miraculous?</p> + <div id="FS_Q113_A1" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q113.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q113_A2.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q113_A1-p0.1">Whether the justification of the ungodly is the remission of sins?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q113_A1-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q113_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the justification of the ungodly is not the remission of sins. For sin is opposed not only to justice, + but to all the other virtues, as stated above ( + <a id="FS_Q113_A1-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q71_A1.html">Q[71], A[1]</a>). Now justification signifies a certain movement towards justice. Therefore not even remission of sin is justification, since + movement is from one contrary to the other. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q113_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, everything ought to be named from what is predominant in it, according to De Anima ii, text. 49. Now the remission + of sins is brought about chiefly by faith, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q113_A1-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Acts.15.9" target="asv"> Acts 15:9</a>: "Purifying their hearts by faith"; and by charity, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q113_A1-p3.2" href="./asv.html#Prov.10.12" target="asv"> Prov. 10:12</a>: "Charity covereth all sins." Therefore the remission of sins ought to be named after faith or charity rather than justice. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q113_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the remission of sins seems to be the same as being called, for whoever is called is afar off, and we are afar off + from God by sin. But one is called before being justified according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q113_A1-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.8.30" target="asv"> Rom. 8:30</a>: "And whom He called, them He also justified." Therefore justification is not the remission of sins. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q113_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> On + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q113_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.8.30" target="asv"> Rom. 8:30, </a> "Whom He called, them He also justified," the gloss says i.e. "by the remission of sins." Therefore the remission of sins + is justification. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q113_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Justification taken passively implies a movement towards heat. But since justice, by its nature, implies a certain rectitude + of order, it may be taken in two ways: first, inasmuch as it implies a right order in man's act, and thus justice is placed + amongst the virtues---either as particular justice, which directs a man's acts by regulating them in relation to his fellowman---or + as legal justice, which directs a man's acts by regulating them in their relation + to the common good of society, as appears from Ethic. v, 1. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q113_A1-p7"> Secondly, justice is so-called inasmuch as it implies a certain rectitude of order in the interior disposition of a man, + in so far as what is highest in man is subject to God, and the inferior powers of the soul are subject to the superior, i.e. + to the reason; and this disposition the Philosopher calls "justice metaphorically speaking" (Ethic. v, 11). Now this justice + may be in man in two ways: first, by simple generation, which is from privation to form; and thus justification + may belong even to such as are not in sin, when they receive this justice from God, as Adam is said to have received original + justice. Secondly, this justice may be brought about in man by a movement from one contrary to the other, and thus justification + implies a transmutation from the state of injustice to the aforesaid state of justice. And it is thus we are now speaking + of the justification of the ungodly, according to the Apostle ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q113_A1-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.4.5" target="asv">Rom. 4:5</a>): "But to him that worketh + not, yet believeth in Him that justifieth the ungodly," etc. And because movement is named after its term "whereto" rather + than from its term "whence," the transmutation whereby anyone is changed by the remission of sins from the state of ungodliness + to the state of justice, borrows its name from its term "whereto," and is called "justification of the ungodly." + </p> + <p id="FS_Q113_A1-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Every sin, inasmuch as it implies the disorder of a mind not subject to God, may be called injustice, as being contrary to + the aforesaid justice, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q113_A1-p8.1" href="./asv.html#iJohn.3.4" target="asv">1 Jn. 3:4</a>: "Whosoever committeth sin, committeth also iniquity; and sin is iniquity." And thus the removal of any sin is called the + justification of the ungodly. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q113_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Faith and charity imply a special directing of the human mind to God by the intellect and will; whereas justice implies a + general rectitude of order. Hence this transmutation is named after justice rather than after charity or faith. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q113_A1-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Being called refers to God's help moving and exciting our mind to give up sin, and this motion of God is not the remission + of sins, but its cause. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q113_A1-p11"></p> + <p id="FS_Q113_A1-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q113.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q113_A2.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q113_A2" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q113_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q113_A3.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q113_A2-p0.1">Whether the infusion of grace is required for the remission of guilt, i.e. for the justification of the ungodly?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q113_A2-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q113_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that for the remission of guilt, which is the justification of the ungodly, no infusion of grace is required. + For anyone may be moved from one contrary without being led to the other, if the contraries are not immediate. Now the state + of guilt and the state of grace are not immediate contraries; for there is the middle state of innocence wherein a man has + neither grace nor guilt. Hence a man may be pardoned his guilt without his being brought to + a state of grace. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q113_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the remission of guilt consists in the Divine imputation, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q113_A2-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.31.2" target="asv"> Ps. 31:2</a>: "Blessed is the man to whom the Lord hath not imputed sin." Now the infusion of grace puts something into our soul, as stated + above ( + <a id="FS_Q113_A2-p3.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q110_A1.html">Q[110], A[1]</a>). Hence the infusion of grace is not required for the remission of guilt. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q113_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, no one can be subject to two contraries at once. Now some sins are contraries, as wastefulness and miserliness. + Hence whoever is subject to the sin of wastefulness is not simultaneously subject to the sin of miserliness, yet it may happen + that he has been subject to it hitherto. Hence by sinning with the vice of wastefulness he is freed from the sin of miserliness. + And thus a sin is remitted without grace. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q113_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q113_A2-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.3.24" target="asv">Rom. 3:24</a>): "Justified freely by His grace." + </p> + <p id="FS_Q113_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> by sinning a man offends God as stated above ( + <a id="FS_Q113_A2-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q71_A5.html">Q[71], A[5]</a> ). Now an offense is remitted to anyone, only when the soul of the offender is at peace with the offended. Hence sin is remitted + to us, when God is at peace with us, and this peace consists in the love whereby God loves us. Now God's love, considered + on the part of the Divine act, is eternal and unchangeable; whereas, as regards the effect it imprints on us, it is sometimes + interrupted, inasmuch as we sometimes fall short of it and once more require it. Now the effect of the Divine love in us, + which is taken away by sin, is grace, whereby a man is made worthy of eternal life, from which sin shuts him out. Hence we + could not conceive the remission of guilt, without the infusion of grace. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q113_A2-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> More is required for an offender to pardon an offense, than for one who has committed no offense, not to be hated. For it + may happen amongst men that one man neither hates nor loves another. But if the other offends him, then the forgiveness of + the offense can only spring from a special goodwill. Now God's goodwill is said to be restored to man by the gift of grace; + and hence although a man before sinning may be without grace and without guilt, yet + that he is without guilt after sinning can only be because he has grace. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q113_A2-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As God's love consists not merely in the act of the Divine will but also implies a certain effect of grace, as stated above + ( + <a id="FS_Q113_A2-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q110_A1.html">Q[110], A[1]</a>), so likewise, when God does not impute sin to a man, there is implied a certain effect in him to whom the sin is not imputed; + for it proceeds from the Divine love, that sin is not imputed to a man by God. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q113_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As Augustine says (De Nup. et Concup. i, 26), if to leave off sinning was the same as to have no sin, it would be enough + if Scripture warned us thus: "'My son, hast thou sinned? do so no more?' Now this is not enough, but it is added: 'But for + thy former sins also pray that they may be forgiven thee.'" For the act of sin passes, but the guilt remains, as stated above + ( + <a id="FS_Q113_A2-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q87_A6.html">Q[87], A[6]</a>). Hence when anyone passes from the sin of one + vice to the sin of a contrary vice, he ceases to have the act of the former sin, but he does not cease to have the guilt, + hence he may have the guilt of both sins at once. For sins are not contrary to each other on the part of their turning from + God, wherein sin has its guilt. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q113_A2-p10"></p> + <p id="FS_Q113_A2-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q113_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q113_A3.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q113_A3" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q113_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q113_A4.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q113_A3-p0.1">Whether for the justification of the ungodly is required a movement of the free-will?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q113_A3-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q113_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that no movement of the free-will is required for the justification of the ungodly. For we see that by the + sacrament of Baptism, infants and sometimes adults are justified without a movement of their free-will: hence Augustine says + (Confess. iv) that when one of his friends was taken with a fever, "he lay for a long time senseless and in a deadly sweat, + and when he was despaired of, he was baptized without his knowing, and was regenerated"; which + is effected by sanctifying grace. Now God does not confine His power to the sacraments. Hence He can justify a man without + the sacraments, and without any movement of the free-will. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q113_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, a man has not the use of reason when asleep, and without it there can be no movement of the free-will. But Solomon + received from God the gift of wisdom when asleep, as related in + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q113_A3-p3.1" href="./asv.html#." target="asv">3 Kings 3</a> and + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q113_A3-p3.2" href="./asv.html#iiChr.1" target="asv">2 Paral 1</a>. Hence with equal reason the gift of sanctifying grace is sometimes bestowed by God on man without the movement of his free-will. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q113_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, grace is preserved by the same cause as brings it into being, for Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. viii, 12) that "so + ought man to turn to God as he is ever made just by Him." Now grace is preserved in man without a movement of his free-will. + Hence it can be infused in the beginning without a movement of the free-will. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q113_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q113_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#John.6.45" target="asv">Jn. 6:45</a>): "Every one that hath heard of the Father, and hath learned, cometh to Me." Now to learn cannot be without a movement of + the free-will, since the learner assents to the teacher. Hence, no one comes to the Father by justifying grace without a movement + of the free-will. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q113_A3-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The justification of the ungodly is brought about by God moving man to justice. For He it is "that justifieth the ungodly" + according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q113_A3-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.4.5" target="asv"> Rom. 4:5.</a> Now God moves everything in its own manner, just as we see that in natural things, what is heavy and what is light are moved + differently, on account of their diverse natures. Hence He moves man to justice according to the condition of his human nature. + But it is man's proper nature to have + free-will. Hence in him who has the use of reason, God's motion to justice does not take place without a movement of the free-will; + but He so infuses the gift of justifying grace that at the same time He moves the free-will to accept the gift of grace, in + such as are capable of being moved thus. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q113_A3-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Infants are not capable of the movement of their free-will; hence it is by the mere infusion of their souls that God moves + them to justice. Now this cannot be brought about without a sacrament; because as original sin, from which they are justified, + does not come to them from their own will, but by carnal generation, so also is grace given them by Christ through spiritual + regeneration. And the same reason holds good with madmen and idiots that have + never had the use of their free-will. But in the case of one who has had the use of his free-will and afterwards has lost + it either through sickness or sleep, he does not obtain justifying grace by the exterior rite of Baptism, or of any other + sacrament, unless he intended to make use of this sacrament, and this can only be by the use of his free-will. And it was + in this way that he of whom Augustine speaks was regenerated, because both previously and afterwards he assented to the Baptism. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q113_A3-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Solomon neither merited nor received wisdom whilst asleep; but it was declared to him in his sleep that on account of his + previous desire wisdom would be infused into him by God. Hence it is said in his person ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q113_A3-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.7.7" target="asv">Wis. 7:7</a>): "I wished, and understanding was given unto me." + </p> + <p id="FS_Q113_A3-p9"> Or it may be said that his sleep was not natural, but was the sleep of prophecy, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q113_A3-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Num.12.6" target="asv"> Num. 12:6</a>: "If there be among you a prophet of the Lord, I will appear to him in a vision, or I will speak to him in a dream." In such + cases the use of free-will remains. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q113_A3-p10"> And yet it must be observed that the comparison between the gift of wisdom and the gift of justifying grace does not hold. + For the gift of justifying grace especially ordains a man to good, which is the object of the will; and hence a man is moved + to it by a movement of the will which is a movement of free-will. But wisdom perfects the intellect which precedes the will; + hence without any complete movement of the free-will, the intellect can be enlightened with the gift of + wisdom, even as we see that things are revealed to men in sleep, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q113_A3-p10.1" href="./asv.html#Job.33.15" target="asv"> Job 33:15,16</a>: "When deep sleep falleth upon men and they are sleeping in their beds, then He openeth the ears of men, and teaching, instructeth + them in what they are to learn." + </p> + <p id="FS_Q113_A3-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> In the infusion of justifying grace there is a certain transmutation of the human soul, and hence a proper movement of the + human soul is required in order that the soul may be moved in its own manner. But the conservation of grace is without transmutation: + no movement on the part of the soul is required but only a continuation of the Divine influx. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q113_A3-p12"></p> + <p id="FS_Q113_A3-p13"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q113_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q113_A4.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q113_A4" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q113_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q113_A5.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q113_A4-p0.1">Whether a movement of faith is required for the justification of the ungodly?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q113_A4-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q113_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that no movement of faith is required for the justification of the ungodly. For as a man is justified by faith, + so also by other things, viz. by fear, of which it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q113_A4-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.1.27" target="asv">Ecclus. 1:27</a>): "The fear of the Lord driveth out sin, for he that is without fear cannot be justified"; and again by charity, according + to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q113_A4-p2.2" href="./asv.html#Luke.7.47" target="asv"> Lk. 7:47</a>: "Many sins are forgiven her because she hath loved much"; and again by humility, + according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q113_A4-p2.3" href="./asv.html#Jas.4.6" target="asv"> James 4:6</a>: "God resisteth the proud and giveth grace to the humble"; and again by mercy, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q113_A4-p2.4" href="./asv.html#Prov.15.27" target="asv"> Prov. 15:27</a>: "By mercy and faith sins are purged away." Hence the movement of faith is no more required for the justification of the + ungodly, than the movements of the aforesaid virtues. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q113_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the act of faith is required for justification only inasmuch as a man knows God by faith. But a man may know God + in other ways, viz. by natural knowledge, and by the gift of wisdom. Hence no act of faith is required for the justification + of the ungodly. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q113_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, there are several articles of faith. Therefore if the act of faith is required for the justification of the ungodly, + it would seem that a man ought to think on every article of faith when he is first justified. But this seems inconvenient, + since such thought would require a long delay of time. Hence it seems that an act of faith is not required for the justification + of the ungodly. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q113_A4-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q113_A4-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.5.1" target="asv">Rom. 5:1</a>): "Being justified therefore by faith, let us have peace with God." + </p> + <p id="FS_Q113_A4-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above + <a id="FS_Q113_A4-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q113_A3.html">(A[3])</a> a movement of free-will is required for the justification of the ungodly, inasmuch as man's mind is moved by God. Now God + moves man's soul by turning it to Himself according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q113_A4-p6.2" href="./asv.html#Ps.84.7" target="asv"> Ps. 84:7 </a>(Septuagint): "Thou wilt turn us, O God, and bring us to life." Hence for the justification of the ungodly a movement of the + mind is required, by which it is turned to God. Now the first turning to God is + by faith, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q113_A4-p6.3" href="./asv.html#Heb.11.6" target="asv"> Heb. 11:6</a>: "He that cometh to God must believe that He is." Hence a movement of faith is required for the justification of the ungodly. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q113_A4-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The movement of faith is not perfect unless it is quickened by charity; hence in the justification of the ungodly, a movement + of charity is infused together with the movement of faith. Now free-will is moved to God by being subject to Him; hence an + act of filial fear and an act of humility also concur. For it may happen that one and the same act of free-will springs from + different virtues, when one commands and another is commanded, inasmuch as the + act may be ordained to various ends. But the act of mercy counteracts sin either by way of satisfying for it, and thus it + follows justification; or by way of preparation, inasmuch as the merciful obtain mercy; and thus it can either precede justification, + or concur with the other virtues towards justification, inasmuch as mercy is included in the love of our neighbor. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q113_A4-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> By natural knowledge a man is not turned to God, according as He is the object of beatitude and the cause of justification. + Hence such knowledge does not suffice for justification. But the gift of wisdom presupposes the knowledge of faith, as stated + above ( + <a id="FS_Q113_A4-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q68_A4.html">Q[68], A[4]</a>, ad 3). + </p> + <p id="FS_Q113_A4-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As the Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q113_A4-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.4.5" target="asv">Rom. 4:5</a>), "to him that . . . believeth in Him that justifieth the ungodly his faith is reputed to justice, according to the purpose + of the grace of God." Hence it is clear that in the justification of the ungodly an act of faith is required in order that + a man may believe that God justifies man through the mystery of Christ. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q113_A4-p10"></p> + <p id="FS_Q113_A4-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q113_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q113_A5.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q113_A5" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q113_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q113_A6.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q113_A5-p0.1">Whether for the justification of the ungodly there is required a movement of the free-will towards sin?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q113_A5-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q113_A5-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that no movement of the free-will towards sin is required for the justification of the ungodly. For charity + alone suffices to take away sin, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q113_A5-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Prov.10.12" target="asv"> Prov. 10:12</a>: "Charity covereth all sins." Now the object of charity is not sin. Therefore for this justification of the ungodly no movement + of the free-will towards sin is required. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q113_A5-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, whoever is tending onward, ought not to look back, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q113_A5-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Phil.3.13" target="asv"> Phil. 3:13,14</a>: "Forgetting the things that are behind, and stretching forth myself to those that are before, I press towards the mark, + to the prize of the supernal vocation." But whoever is stretching forth to righteousness has his sins behind him. Hence he + ought to forget them, and not stretch forth to them by a movement of his free-will. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q113_A5-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, in the justification of the ungodly one sin is not remitted without another, for "it is irreverent to expect half + a pardon from God" [*Cap., Sunt. plures: Dist. iii, De Poenit.]. Hence, in the justification of the ungodly, if man's free-will + must move against sin, he ought to think of all his sins. But this is unseemly, both because a great space of time would be + required for such thought, and because a man could not obtain the forgiveness of such + sins as he had forgotten. Hence for the justification of the ungodly no movement of the free-will is required. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q113_A5-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q113_A5-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.31.5" target="asv">Ps. 31:5</a>): "I will confess against myself my injustice to the Lord; and Thou hast forgiven the wickedness of my sin." + </p> + <p id="FS_Q113_A5-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above + <a id="FS_Q113_A5-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q113_A1.html">(A[1])</a>, the justification of the ungodly is a certain movement whereby the human mind is moved by God from the state of sin to the + state of justice. Hence it is necessary for the human mind to regard both extremes by an act of free-will, as a body in local + movement is related to both terms of the movement. Now it is clear that in local movement the moving body leaves the term + "whence" and nears the term "whereto." + Hence the human mind whilst it is being justified, must, by a movement of its free-will withdraw from sin and draw near to + justice. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q113_A5-p7"> Now to withdraw from sin and to draw near to justice, in an act of free-will, means detestation and desire. For Augustine + says on the words "the hireling fleeth," etc. ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q113_A5-p7.1" href="./asv.html#John.10.12" target="asv">Jn. 10:12</a>): "Our emotions are the movements of our soul; joy is the soul's outpouring; fear is the soul's flight; your soul goes forward + when you seek; your soul flees, when you are afraid." Hence in the justification of the ungodly there must be two acts of + the free-will---one, whereby it + tends to God's justice; the other whereby it hates sin. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q113_A5-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> It belongs to the same virtue to seek one contrary and to avoid the other; and hence, as it belongs to charity to love God, + so likewise, to detest sin whereby the soul is separated from God. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q113_A5-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> A man ought not to return to those things that are behind, by loving them; but, for that matter, he ought to forget them, + lest he be drawn to them. Yet he ought to recall them to mind, in order to detest them; for this is to fly from them. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q113_A5-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Previous to justification a man must detest each sin he remembers to have committed, and from this remembrance the soul goes + on to have a general movement of detestation with regard to all sins committed, in which are included such sins as have been + forgotten. For a man is then in such a frame of mind that he would be sorry even for those he does not remember, if they were + present to his memory; and this movement cooperates in his justification. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q113_A5-p11"></p> + <p id="FS_Q113_A5-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q113_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q113_A6.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q113_A6" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q113_A5.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q113_A7.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q113_A6-p0.1">Whether the remission of sins ought to be reckoned amongst the things required for justification?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q113_A6-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q113_A6-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the remission of sins ought not to be reckoned amongst the things required for justification. For the + substance of a thing is not reckoned together with those that are required for a thing; thus a man is not reckoned together + with his body and soul. But the justification of the ungodly is itself the remission of sins, as stated above + <a id="FS_Q113_A6-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q113_A1.html">(A[1])</a>. Therefore the remission of sins ought not to be reckoned among the things + required for the justification of the ungodly. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q113_A6-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, infusion of grace and remission of sins are the same; as illumination and expulsion of darkness are the same. But + a thing ought not to be reckoned together with itself; for unity is opposed to multitude. Therefore the remission of sins + ought not to be reckoned with the infusion of grace. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q113_A6-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the remission of sin follows as effect from cause, from the free-will's movement towards God and sin; since it is + by faith and contrition that sin is forgiven. But an effect ought not to be reckoned with its cause; since things thus enumerated + together, and, as it were, condivided, are by nature simultaneous. Hence the remission of sins ought not to be reckoned with + the things required for the justification of the ungodly. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q113_A6-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> In reckoning what is required for a thing we ought not to pass over the end, which is the chief part of everything. Now the + remission of sins is the end of the justification of the ungodly; for it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q113_A6-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.27.9" target="asv">Is. 27:9</a>): "This is all the fruit, that the sin thereof should be taken away." Hence the remission of sins ought to be reckoned amongst + the things required for justification. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q113_A6-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> There are four things which are accounted to be necessary for the justification of the ungodly, viz. the infusion of grace, + the movement of the free-will towards God by faith, the movement of the free-will towards sin, and the remission of sins. + The reason for this is that, as stated above + <a id="FS_Q113_A6-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q113_A1.html">(A[1])</a>, the justification of the ungodly is a movement whereby the soul is moved by God from a state of sin to a state of justice. + Now in the + movement whereby one thing is moved by another, three things are required: first, the motion of the mover; secondly, the movement + of the moved; thirdly, the consummation of the movement, or the attainment of the end. On the part of the Divine motion, there + is the infusion of grace; on the part of the free-will which is moved, there are two movements---of departure from the term + "whence," and of approach to the term "whereto"; but the consummation of the movement or the attainment of the end of + the movement is implied in the remission of sins; for in this is the justification of the ungodly completed. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q113_A6-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The justification of the ungodly is called the remission of sins, even as every movement has its species from its term. Nevertheless, + many other things are required in order to reach the term, as stated above + <a id="FS_Q113_A6-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q113_A5.html">(A[5])</a>. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q113_A6-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The infusion of grace and the remission of sin may be considered in two ways: first, with respect to the substance of the + act, and thus they are the same; for by the same act God bestows grace and remits sin. Secondly, they may be considered on + the part of the objects; and thus they differ by the difference between guilt, which is taken away, and grace, which is infused; + just as in natural things generation and corruption differ, although the + generation of one thing is the corruption of another. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q113_A6-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This enumeration is not the division of a genus into its species, in which the things enumerated must be simultaneous; but + it is division of the things required for the completion of anything; and in this enumeration we may have what precedes and + what follows, since some of the principles and parts of a composite thing may precede and some follow. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q113_A6-p10"></p> + <p id="FS_Q113_A6-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q113_A5.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q113_A7.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q113_A7" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q113_A6.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q113_A8.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q113_A7-p0.1">Whether the justification of the ungodly takes place in an instant or successively?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q113_A7-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q113_A7-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the justification of the ungodly does not take place in an instant, but successively, since, as already + stated + <a id="FS_Q113_A7-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q113_A3.html">(A[3])</a>, for the justification of the ungodly, there is required a movement of free-will. Now the act of the free-will is choice, + which requires the deliberation of counsel, as stated above (Q[13], A[1]). Hence, since deliberation implies a certain reasoning + process, and this implies succession, the + justification of the ungodly would seem to be successive. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q113_A7-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the free-will's movement is not without actual consideration. But it is impossible to understand many things actually + and at once, as stated above ( + <a id="FS_Q113_A7-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q85_A4.html">FP, Q[85], A[4]</a>). Hence, since for the justification of the ungodly there is required a movement of the free-will towards several things, + viz. towards God and towards sin, it would seem impossible for the justification of the ungodly to be in an instant. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q113_A7-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, a form that may be greater or less, e.g. blackness or whiteness, is received successively by its subject. Now grace + may be greater or less, as stated above ( + <a id="FS_Q113_A7-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q112_A4.html">Q[112], A[4]</a>). Hence it is not received suddenly by its subject. Therefore, seeing that the infusion of grace is required for the justification + of the ungodly, it would seem that the justification of the ungodly cannot be in an instant. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q113_A7-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, the free-will's movement, which cooperates in justification, is meritorious; and hence it must proceed from grace, + without which there is no merit, as we shall state further on ( + <a id="FS_Q113_A7-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q114_A2.html">Q[114], A[2]</a>). Now a thing receives its form before operating by this form. Hence grace is first infused, and then the free-will is moved + towards God and to detest sin. Hence justification is not all at once. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q113_A7-p6"> + <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, if grace is infused into the soul, there must be an instant when it first dwells in the soul; so, too, if sin is + forgiven there must be a last instant that man is in sin. But it cannot be the same instant, otherwise opposites would be + in the same simultaneously. Hence they must be two successive instants; between which there must be time, as the Philosopher + says (Phys. vi, 1). Therefore the justification of the ungodly takes place not all at once, but + successively. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q113_A7-p7"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The justification of the ungodly is caused by the justifying grace of the Holy Spirit. Now the Holy Spirit comes to men's + minds suddenly, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q113_A7-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Acts.2.2" target="asv"> Acts 2:2</a>: "And suddenly there came a sound from heaven as of a mighty wind coming," upon which the gloss says that "the grace of the + Holy Ghost knows no tardy efforts." Hence the justification of the ungodly is not successive, but instantaneous. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q113_A7-p8"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The entire justification of the ungodly consists as to its origin in the infusion of grace. For it is by grace that free-will + is moved and sin is remitted. Now the infusion of grace takes place in an instant and without succession. And the reason of + this is that if a form be not suddenly impressed upon its subject, it is either because that subject is not disposed, or because + the agent needs time to dispose the subject. Hence we see that immediately the + matter is disposed by a preceding alteration, the substantial form accrues to the matter; thus because the atmosphere of itself + is disposed to receive light, it is suddenly illuminated by a body actually luminous. Now it was stated ( + <a id="FS_Q113_A7-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q112_A2.html">Q[112], A[2]</a>) that God, in order to infuse grace into the soul, needs no disposition, save what He Himself has made. And sometimes this + sufficient disposition for the reception of grace He makes suddenly, sometimes gradually and + successively, as stated above ( + <a id="FS_Q113_A7-p8.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q112_A2.html">Q[112], A[2]</a>, ad 2). For the reason why a natural agent cannot suddenly dispose matter is that in the matter there is a resistant which + has some disproportion with the power of the agent; and hence we see that the stronger the agent, the more speedily is the + matter disposed. Therefore, since the Divine power is infinite, it can suddenly dispose any matter whatsoever to its form; + and much more man's free-will, whose movement is by nature + instantaneous. Therefore the justification of the ungodly by God takes place in an instant. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q113_A7-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The movement of the free-will, which concurs in the justification of the ungodly, is a consent to detest sin, and to draw + near to God; and this consent takes place suddenly. Sometimes, indeed, it happens that deliberation precedes, yet this is + not of the substance of justification, but a way of justification; as local movement is a way of illumination, and alteration + to generation. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q113_A7-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As stated above ( + <a id="FS_Q113_A7-p10.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q85_A5.html">FP, Q[85], A[5]</a>), there is nothing to prevent two things being understood at once, in so far as they are somehow one; thus we understand + the subject and predicate together, inasmuch as they are united in the order of one affirmation. And in the same manner can + the free-will be moved to two things at once in so far as one is ordained to the other. Now the free-will's movement towards + sin is ordained to the + free-will's movement towards God, since a man detests sin, as contrary to God, to Whom he wishes to cling. Hence in the justification + of the ungodly the free-will simultaneously detests sin and turns to God, even as a body approaches one point and withdraws + from another simultaneously. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q113_A7-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The reason why a form is not received instantaneously in the matter is not the fact that it can inhere more or less; for + thus the light would not be suddenly received in the air, which can be illumined more or less. But the reason is to be sought + on the part of the disposition of the matter or subject, as stated above. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q113_A7-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> The same instant the form is acquired, the thing begins to operate with the form; as fire, the instant it is generated moves + upwards, and if its movement was instantaneous, it would be terminated in the same instant. Now to will and not to will---the + movements of the free-will---are not successive, but instantaneous. Hence the justification of the ungodly must not be successive. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q113_A7-p13"> + <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> The succession of opposites in the same subject must be looked at differently in the things that are subject to time and + in those that are above time. For in those that are in time, there is no last instant in which the previous form inheres in + the subject; but there is the last time, and the first instant that the subsequent form inheres in the matter or subject; + and this for the reason, that in time we are not to consider one instant, since neither + do instants succeed each other immediately in time, nor points in a line, as is proved in Physic. vi, 1. But time is terminated + by an instant. Hence in the whole of the previous time wherein anything is moving towards its form, it is under the opposite + form; but in the last instant of this time, which is the first instant of the subsequent time, it has the form which is the + term of the movement. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q113_A7-p14"> But in those that are above time, it is otherwise. For if there be any succession of affections or intellectual conceptions + in them (as in the angels), such succession is not measured by continuous time, but by discrete time, even as the things measured + are not continuous, as stated above ( + <a id="FS_Q113_A7-p14.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q53_A2.html">FP, Q[53], AA[2]</a>,3). In these, therefore, there is a last instant in which the preceding is, and a first instant in which the subsequent is. + Nor must there be time in + between, since there is no continuity of time, which this would necessitate. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q113_A7-p15"> Now the human mind, which is justified, is, in itself, above time, but is subject to time accidentally, inasmuch as it understands + with continuity and time, with respect to the phantasms in which it considers the intelligible species, as stated above ( + <a id="FS_Q113_A7-p15.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q85_A1.html">FP, Q[85], AA[1]</a>,2). We must, therefore, decide from this about its change as regards the condition of temporal movements, i.e. we must say + that there is no last instant that sin inheres, but a last time; + whereas there is a first instant that grace inheres; and in all the time previous sin inhered. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q113_A7-p16"></p> + <p id="FS_Q113_A7-p17"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q113_A6.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q113_A8.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q113_A8" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q113_A7.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q113_A9.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q113_A8-p0.1">Whether the infusion of grace is naturally the first of the things required for the justification of the ungodly?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q113_A8-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q113_A8-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the infusion of grace is not what is naturally required first for the justification of the ungodly. For + we withdraw from evil before drawing near to good, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q113_A8-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.33.15" target="asv"> Ps. 33:15</a>: "Turn away from evil, and do good." Now the remission of sins regards the turning away from evil, and the infusion of grace + regards the turning to good. Hence the remission of sin is naturally before the infusion of grace. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q113_A8-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the disposition naturally precedes the form to which it disposes. Now the free-will's movement is a disposition + for the reception of grace. Therefore it naturally precedes the infusion of grace. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q113_A8-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, sin hinders the soul from tending freely to God. Now a hindrance to movement must be removed before the movement + takes place. Hence the remission of sin and the free-will's movement towards sin are naturally before the infusion of grace. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q113_A8-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The cause is naturally prior to its effect. Now the infusion of grace is the cause of whatever is required for the justification + of the ungodly, as stated above + <a id="FS_Q113_A8-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q113_A7.html">(A[7])</a>. Therefore it is naturally prior to it. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q113_A8-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The aforesaid four things required for the justification of the ungodly are simultaneous in time, since the justification + of the ungodly is not successive, as stated above + <a id="FS_Q113_A8-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q113_A7.html">(A[7])</a>; but in the order of nature, one is prior to another; and in their natural order the first is the infusion of grace; the + second, the free-will's movement towards God; the third, the free-will's movement towards sin; the fourth, the remission of + sin. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q113_A8-p7"> The reason for this is that in every movement the motion of the mover is naturally first; the disposition of the matter, + or the movement of the moved, is second; the end or term of the movement in which the motion of the mover rests, is last. + Now the motion of God the Mover is the infusion of grace, as stated above + <a id="FS_Q113_A8-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q113_A6.html">(A[6])</a>; the movement or disposition of the moved is the free-will's double movement; and the term or end of the movement is the + remission of + sin, as stated above + <a id="FS_Q113_A8-p7.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q113_A6.html">(A[6])</a>. Hence in their natural order the first in the justification of the ungodly is the infusion of grace; the second is the free-will's + movement towards God; the third is the free-will's movement towards sin, for he who is being justified detests sin because + it is against God, and thus the free-will's movement towards God naturally precedes the free-will's movement towards sin, + since it is its cause and reason; the fourth and last is the + remission of sin, to which this transmutation is ordained as to an end, as stated above ( + <a id="FS_Q113_A8-p7.3" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q113_A1.html">AA[1]</a>,6). + </p> + <p id="FS_Q113_A8-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The withdrawal from one term and approach to another may be looked at in two ways: first, on the part of the thing moved, + and thus the withdrawal from a term naturally precedes the approach to a term, since in the subject of movement the opposite + which is put away is prior to the opposite which the subject moved attains to by its movement. But on the part of the agent + it is the other way about, since the agent, by the form pre-existing in it, acts for + the removal of the opposite form; as the sun by its light acts for the removal of darkness, and hence on the part of the sun, + illumination is prior to the removal of darkness; but on the part of the atmosphere to be illuminated, to be freed from darkness + is, in the order of nature, prior to being illuminated, although both are simultaneous in time. And since the infusion of + grace and the remission of sin regard God Who justifies, hence in the order of nature the infusion of grace is prior to + the freeing from sin. But if we look at what is on the part of the man justified, it is the other way about, since in the + order of nature the being freed from sin is prior to the obtaining of justifying grace. Or it may be said that the term "whence" + of justification is sin; and the term "whereto" is justice; and that grace is the cause of the forgiveness of sin and of obtaining + of justice. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q113_A8-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The disposition of the subject precedes the reception of the form, in the order of nature; yet it follows the action of the + agent, whereby the subject is disposed. And hence the free-will's movement precedes the reception of grace in the order of + nature, and follows the infusion of grace. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q113_A8-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As the Philosopher says (Phys. ii, 9), in movements of the soul the movement toward the speculative principle or the practical + end is the very first, but in exterior movements the removal of the impediment precedes the attainment of the end. And as + the free-will's movement is a movement of the soul, in the order of nature it moves towards God as to its end, before removing + the impediment of sin. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q113_A8-p11"></p> + <p id="FS_Q113_A8-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q113_A7.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q113_A9.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q113_A9" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q113_A8.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q113_A10.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q113_A9-p0.1">Whether the justification of the ungodly is God's greatest work?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q113_A9-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q113_A9-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the justification of the ungodly is not God's greatest work. For it is by the justification of the ungodly + that we attain the grace of a wayfarer. Now by glorification we receive heavenly grace, which is greater. Hence the glorification + of angels and men is a greater work than the justification of the ungodly. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q113_A9-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the justification of the ungodly is ordained to the particular good of one man. But the good of the universe is + greater than the good of one man, as is plain from Ethic. i, 2. Hence the creation of heaven and earth is a greater work than + the justification of the ungodly. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q113_A9-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, to make something from nothing, where there is nought to cooperate with the agent, is greater than to make something + with the cooperation of the recipient. Now in the work of creation something is made from nothing, and hence nothing can cooperate + with the agent; but in the justification of the ungodly God makes something from something, i.e. a just man from a sinner, + and there is a cooperation on man's part, since there is a movement of the + free-will, as stated above + <a id="FS_Q113_A9-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q113_A3.html">(A[3])</a>. Hence the justification of the ungodly is not God's greatest work. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q113_A9-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q113_A9-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.144.9" target="asv">Ps. 144:9</a>): "His tender mercies are over all His works," and in a collect [*Tenth Sunday after Pentecost] we say: "O God, Who dost + show forth Thine all-mightiness most by pardoning and having mercy," and Augustine, expounding the words, "greater than these + shall he do" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q113_A9-p5.2" href="./asv.html#John.14.12" target="asv">Jn. 14:12</a>) says that "for a just man to be made from a sinner, is greater than to create heaven and earth." + </p> + <p id="FS_Q113_A9-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> A work may be called great in two ways: first, on the part of the mode of action, and thus the work of creation is the greatest + work, wherein something is made from nothing; secondly, a work may be called great on account of what is made, and thus the + justification of the ungodly, which terminates at the eternal good of a share in the Godhead, is greater than the creation + of heaven and earth, which terminates at the good of mutable nature. Hence, Augustine, + after saying that "for a just man to be made from a sinner is greater than to create heaven and earth," adds, "for heaven + and earth shall pass away, but the justification of the ungodly shall endure." + </p> + <p id="FS_Q113_A9-p7"> Again, we must bear in mind that a thing is called great in two ways: first, in an absolute quantity, and thus the gift of + glory is greater than the gift of grace that sanctifies the ungodly; and in this respect the glorification of the just is + greater than the justification of the ungodly. Secondly, a thing may be said to be great in proportionate quantity, and thus + the gift of grace that justifies the ungodly is greater than the gift of glory that beatifies the just, for the + gift of grace exceeds the worthiness of the ungodly, who are worthy of punishment, more than the gift of glory exceeds the + worthiness of the just, who by the fact of their justification are worthy of glory. Hence Augustine says: "Let him that can, + judge whether it is greater to create the angels just, than to justify the ungodly. Certainly, if they both betoken equal + power, one betokens greater mercy." + </p> + <p id="FS_Q113_A9-p8"> And thus the reply to the first is clear.</p> + <p id="FS_Q113_A9-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The good of the universe is greater than the particular good of one, if we consider both in the same genus. But the good + of grace in one is greater than the good of nature in the whole universe. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q113_A9-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This objection rests on the manner of acting, in which way creation is God's greatest work. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q113_A9-p11"></p> + <p id="FS_Q113_A9-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q113_A8.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q113_A10.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q113_A10" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q113_A9.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q114.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q113_A10-p0.1">Whether the justification of the ungodly is a miraculous work?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q113_A10-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q113_A10-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the justification of the ungodly is a miraculous work. For miraculous works are greater than non-miraculous. + Now the justification of the ungodly is greater than the other miraculous works, as is clear from the quotation from Augustine + + <a id="FS_Q113_A10-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q113_A9.html">(A[9])</a>. Hence the justification of the ungodly is a miraculous work. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q113_A10-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the movement of the will in the soul is like the natural inclination in natural things. But when God works in natural + things against their inclination of their nature, it is a miraculous work, as when He gave sight to the blind or raised the + dead. Now the will of the ungodly is bent on evil. Hence, since God in justifying a man moves him to good, it would seem that + the justification of the ungodly is miraculous. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q113_A10-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, as wisdom is a gift of God, so also is justice. Now it is miraculous that anyone should suddenly obtain wisdom from + God without study. Therefore it is miraculous that the ungodly should be justified by God. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q113_A10-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Miraculous works are beyond natural power. Now the justification of the ungodly is not beyond natural power; for Augustine + says (De Praed. Sanct. v) that "to be capable of having faith and to be capable of having charity belongs to man's nature; + but to have faith and charity belongs to the grace of the faithful." Therefore the justification of the ungodly is not miraculous. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q113_A10-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> In miraculous works it is usual to find three things: the first is on the part of the active power, because they can only + be performed by Divine power; and they are simply wondrous, since their cause is hidden, as stated above ( + <a id="FS_Q113_A10-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q105_A7.html">FP, Q[105], A[7]</a>). And thus both the justification of the ungodly and the creation of the world, and, generally speaking, every work that + can be done by God alone, is miraculous. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q113_A10-p7"> Secondly, in certain miraculous works it is found that the form introduced is beyond the natural power of such matter, as + in the resurrection of the dead, life is above the natural power of such a body. And thus the justification of the ungodly + is not miraculous, because the soul is naturally capable of grace; since from its having been made to the likeness of God, + it is fit to receive God by grace, as Augustine says, in the above quotation. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q113_A10-p8"> Thirdly, in miraculous works something is found besides the usual and customary order of causing an effect, as when a sick + man suddenly and beyond the wonted course of healing by nature or art, receives perfect health; and thus the justification + of the ungodly is sometimes miraculous and sometimes not. For the common and wonted course of justification is that God moves + the soul interiorly and that man is converted to God, first by an imperfect conversion, that it may afterwards + become perfect; because "charity begun merits increase, and when increased merits perfection," as Augustine says (In Epist. + Joan. Tract. v). Yet God sometimes moves the soul so vehemently that it reaches the perfection of justice at once, as took + place in the conversion of Paul, which was accompanied at the same time by a miraculous external prostration. Hence the conversion + of Paul is commemorated in the Church as miraculous. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q113_A10-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Certain miraculous works, although they are less than the justification of the ungodly, as regards the good caused, are beyond + the wonted order of such effects, and thus have more of the nature of a miracle. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q113_A10-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> It is not a miraculous work, whenever a natural thing is moved contrary to its inclination, otherwise it would be miraculous + for water to be heated, or for a stone to be thrown upwards; but only whenever this takes place beyond the order of the proper + cause, which naturally does this. Now no other cause save God can justify the ungodly, even as nothing save fire can heat + water. Hence the justification of the ungodly by God is not miraculous in this + respect. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q113_A10-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> A man naturally acquires wisdom and knowledge from God by his own talent and study. Hence it is miraculous when a man is + made wise or learned outside this order. But a man does not naturally acquire justifying grace by his own action, but by God's. + Hence there is no parity. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q113_A10-p12"></p> + <p id="FS_Q113_A10-p13"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q113_A9.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q114.html"></a> + </div> + <a href="summa.FS_Q112_A5.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q113_A1.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q114" class="div3"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q113_A10.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q114_A1.html"></a> + <h3 id="FS_Q114-p0.1">OF MERIT (TEN ARTICLES)</h3> + <p id="FS_Q114-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q114-p2"> We must now consider merit, which is the effect of cooperating grace; and under this head there are ten points of inquiry:</p> + <p id="FS_Q114-p3"> (1) Whether a man can merit anything from God?</p> + <p id="FS_Q114-p4"> (2) Whether without grace anyone can merit eternal life?</p> + <p id="FS_Q114-p5"> (3) Whether anyone with grace may merit eternal life condignly?</p> + <p id="FS_Q114-p6"> (4) Whether it is chiefly through the instrumentality of charity that grace is the principle of merit?</p> + <p id="FS_Q114-p7"> (5) Whether a man may merit the first grace for himself?</p> + <p id="FS_Q114-p8"> (6) Whether he may merit it for someone else?</p> + <p id="FS_Q114-p9"> (7) Whether anyone can merit restoration after sin?</p> + <p id="FS_Q114-p10"> (8) Whether he can merit for himself an increase of grace or charity?</p> + <p id="FS_Q114-p11"> (9) Whether he can merit final perseverance?</p> + <p id="FS_Q114-p12"> (10) Whether temporal goods fall under merit?</p> + <div id="FS_Q114_A1" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q114.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q114_A2.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q114_A1-p0.1">Whether a man may merit anything from God?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q114_A1-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q114_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that a man can merit nothing from God. For no one, it would seem, merits by giving another his due. But by + all the good we do, we cannot make sufficient return to God, since yet more is His due, as also the Philosopher says (Ethic. + viii, 14). Hence it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q114_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Luke.17.10" target="asv">Lk. 17:10</a>): "When you have done all these things that are commanded you, say: We are unprofitable servants; we have done that which + we ought to do." Therefore a man can merit nothing + from God. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q114_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it would seem that a man merits nothing from God, by what profits himself only, and profits God nothing. Now by + acting well, a man profits himself or another man, but not God, for it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q114_A1-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Job.35.7" target="asv">Job 35:7</a>): "If thou do justly, what shalt thou give Him, or what shall He receive of thy hand." Hence a man can merit nothing from + God. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q114_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, whoever merits anything from another makes him his debtor; for a man's wage is a debt due to him. Now God is no + one's debtor; hence it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q114_A1-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.11.35" target="asv">Rom. 11:35</a>): "Who hath first given to Him, and recompense shall be made to him?" Hence no one can merit anything from God. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q114_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q114_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Jer.31.16" target="asv">Jer. 31:16</a>): "There is a reward for thy work." Now a reward means something bestowed by reason of merit. Hence it would seem that a + man may merit from God. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q114_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Merit and reward refer to the same, for a reward means something given anyone in return for work or toil, as a price for + it. Hence, as it is an act of justice to give a just price for anything received from another, so also is it an act of justice + to make a return for work or toil. Now justice is a kind of equality, as is clear from the Philosopher (Ethic. v, 3), and + hence justice is simply between those that are simply equal; but where there is no absolute + equality between them, neither is there absolute justice, but there may be a certain manner of justice, as when we speak of + a father's or a master's right (Ethic. v, 6), as the Philosopher says. And hence where there is justice simply, there is the + character of merit and reward simply. But where there is no simple right, but only relative, there is no character of merit + simply, but only relatively, in so far as the character of justice is found there, since the child merits something from his + father and the slave from his lord. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q114_A1-p7"> Now it is clear that between God and man there is the greatest inequality: for they are infinitely apart, and all man's good + is from God. Hence there can be no justice of absolute equality between man and God, but only of a certain proportion, inasmuch + as both operate after their own manner. Now the manner and measure of human virtue is in man from God. Hence man's merit with + God only exists on the presupposition of the Divine ordination, so that man obtains from God, as a + reward of his operation, what God gave him the power of operation for, even as natural things by their proper movements and + operations obtain that to which they were ordained by God; differently, indeed, since the rational creature moves itself to + act by its free-will, hence its action has the character of merit, which is not so in other creatures. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q114_A1-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Man merits, inasmuch as he does what he ought, by his free-will; otherwise the act of justice whereby anyone discharges a + debt would not be meritorious. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q114_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> God seeks from our goods not profit, but glory, i.e. the manifestation of His goodness; even as He seeks it also in His own + works. Now nothing accrues to Him, but only to ourselves, by our worship of Him. Hence we merit from God, not that by our + works anything accrues to Him, but inasmuch as we work for His glory. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q114_A1-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Since our action has the character of merit, only on the presupposition of the Divine ordination, it does not follow that + God is made our debtor simply, but His own, inasmuch as it is right that His will should be carried out. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q114_A1-p11"></p> + <p id="FS_Q114_A1-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q114.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q114_A2.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q114_A2" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q114_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q114_A3.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q114_A2-p0.1">Whether anyone without grace can merit eternal life?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q114_A2-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q114_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that without grace anyone can merit eternal life. For man merits from God what he is divinely ordained to, + as stated above + <a id="FS_Q114_A2-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q114_A1.html">(A[1])</a>. Now man by his nature is ordained to beatitude as his end; hence, too, he naturally wishes to be blessed. Hence man by his + natural endowments and without grace can merit beatitude which is eternal life. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q114_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the less a work is due, the more meritorious it is. Now, less due is that work which is done by one who has received + fewer benefits. Hence, since he who has only natural endowments has received fewer gifts from God, than he who has gratuitous + gifts as well as nature, it would seem that his works are more meritorious with God. And thus if he who has grace can merit + eternal life to some extent, much more may he who has no grace. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q114_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, God's mercy and liberality infinitely surpass human mercy and liberality. Now a man may merit from another, even + though he has not hitherto had his grace. Much more, therefore, would it seem that a man without grace may merit eternal life. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q114_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q114_A2-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.6.23" target="asv">Rom. 6:23</a>): "The grace of God, life everlasting." + </p> + <p id="FS_Q114_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Man without grace may be looked at in two states, as was said above ( + <a id="FS_Q114_A2-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q109_A2.html">Q[109], A[2]</a>): the first, a state of perfect nature, in which Adam was before his sin; the second, a state of corrupt nature, in which + we are before being restored by grace. Therefore, if we speak of man in the first state, there is only one reason why man + cannot merit eternal life without grace, by his purely natural endowments, viz. because man's merit depends on + the Divine pre-ordination. Now no act of anything whatsoever is divinely ordained to anything exceeding the proportion of + the powers which are the principles of its act; for it is a law of Divine providence that nothing shall act beyond its powers. + Now everlasting life is a good exceeding the proportion of created nature; since it exceeds its knowledge and desire, according + to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q114_A2-p6.2" href="./asv.html#iCor.2.9" target="asv">1 Cor. 2:9</a>: "Eye hath not seen, nor ear heard, neither hath it entered into the heart of man." And + hence it is that no created nature is a sufficient principle of an act meritorious of eternal life, unless there is added + a supernatural gift, which we call grace. But if we speak of man as existing in sin, a second reason is added to this, viz. + the impediment of sin. For since sin is an offense against God, excluding us from eternal life, as is clear from what has + been said above ( + <a id="FS_Q114_A2-p6.3" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q71_A6.html">Q[71], A[6]</a>; + <a id="FS_Q114_A2-p6.4" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q113_A2.html"> Q[113], A[2]</a>), no one existing in a state of + mortal sin can merit eternal life unless first he be reconciled to God, through his sin being forgiven, which is brought about + by grace. For the sinner deserves not life, but death, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q114_A2-p6.5" href="./asv.html#Rom.6.23" target="asv">Rom. 6:23</a>: "The wages of sin is death." + </p> + <p id="FS_Q114_A2-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> God ordained human nature to attain the end of eternal life, not by its own strength, but by the help of grace; and in this + way its act can be meritorious of eternal life. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q114_A2-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Without grace a man cannot have a work equal to a work proceeding from grace, since the more perfect the principle, the more + perfect the action. But the objection would hold good, if we supposed the operations equal in both cases. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q114_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> With regard to the first reason adduced, the case is different in God and in man. For a man receives all his power of well-doing + from God, and not from man. Hence a man can merit nothing from God except by His gift, which the Apostle expresses aptly saying + ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q114_A2-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.11.35" target="asv">Rom. 11:35</a>): "Who hath first given to Him, and recompense shall be made to him?" But man may merit from man, before he has received + anything from him, by what he has received + from God. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q114_A2-p10"> But as regards the second proof taken from the impediment of sin, the case is similar with man and God, since one man cannot + merit from another whom he has offended, unless he makes satisfaction to him and is reconciled. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q114_A2-p11"></p> + <p id="FS_Q114_A2-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q114_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q114_A3.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q114_A3" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q114_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q114_A4.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q114_A3-p0.1">Whether a man in grace can merit eternal life condignly?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q114_A3-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q114_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that a man in grace cannot merit eternal life condignly, for the Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q114_A3-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.8.18" target="asv">Rom. 8:18</a>): "The sufferings of this time are not worthy [condignae] to be compared with the glory to come, that shall be revealed in + us." But of all meritorious works, the sufferings of the saints would seem the most meritorious. Therefore no works of men + are meritorious of eternal life condignly. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q114_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, on + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q114_A3-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.6.23" target="asv"> Rom. 6:23, </a> "The grace of God, life everlasting," a gloss says: "He might have truly said: 'The wages of justice, life everlasting'; + but He preferred to say 'The grace of God, life everlasting,' that we may know that God leads us to life everlasting of His + own mercy and not by our merits." Now when anyone merits something condignly he receives it not from mercy, but from merit. + Hence it would seem that a man with grace cannot + merit life everlasting condignly. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q114_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, merit that equals the reward, would seem to be condign. Now no act of the present life can equal everlasting life, + which surpasses our knowledge and our desire, and moreover, surpasses the charity or love of the wayfarer, even as it exceeds + nature. Therefore with grace a man cannot merit eternal life condignly. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q114_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> What is granted in accordance with a fair judgment, would seem a condign reward. But life everlasting is granted by God, + in accordance with the judgment of justice, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q114_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#iiTim.4.8" target="asv">2 Tim. 4:8</a>: "As to the rest, there is laid up for me a crown of justice, which the Lord, the just judge, will render to me in that day." + Therefore man merits everlasting life condignly. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q114_A3-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Man's meritorious work may be considered in two ways: first, as it proceeds from free-will; secondly, as it proceeds from + the grace of the Holy Ghost. If it is considered as regards the substance of the work, and inasmuch as it springs from the + free-will, there can be no condignity because of the very great inequality. But there is congruity, on account of an equality + of proportion: for it would seem congruous that, if a man does what he can, God should + reward him according to the excellence of his power. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q114_A3-p7"> If, however, we speak of a meritorious work, inasmuch as it proceeds from the grace of the Holy Ghost moving us to life everlasting, + it is meritorious of life everlasting condignly. For thus the value of its merit depends upon the power of the Holy Ghost + moving us to life everlasting according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q114_A3-p7.1" href="./asv.html#John.4.14" target="asv"> Jn. 4:14</a>: "Shall become in him a fount of water springing up into life everlasting." And the worth of the work depends on the dignity + of grace, whereby a man, being + made a partaker of the Divine Nature, is adopted as a son of God, to whom the inheritance is due by right of adoption, according + to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q114_A3-p7.2" href="./asv.html#Rom.8.17" target="asv"> Rom. 8:17</a>: "If sons, heirs also." + </p> + <p id="FS_Q114_A3-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The Apostle is speaking of the substance of these sufferings. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q114_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> This saying is to be understood of the first cause of our reaching everlasting life, viz. God's mercy. But our merit is a + subsequent cause. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q114_A3-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The grace of the Holy Ghost which we have at present, although unequal to glory in act, is equal to it virtually as the seed + of a tree, wherein the whole tree is virtually. So likewise by grace of the Holy Ghost dwells in man; and He is a sufficient + cause of life everlasting; hence, + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q114_A3-p10.1" href="./asv.html#iiCor.1.22" target="asv">2 Cor. 1:22, </a> He is called the "pledge" of our inheritance. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q114_A3-p11"></p> + <p id="FS_Q114_A3-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q114_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q114_A4.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q114_A4" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q114_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q114_A5.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q114_A4-p0.1">Whether grace is the principle of merit through charity rather than the other virtues?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q114_A4-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q114_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that grace is not the principle of merit through charity rather than the other virtues. For wages are due to + work, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q114_A4-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.20.8" target="asv"> Mat. 20:8</a>: "Call the laborers and pay them their hire." Now every virtue is a principle of some operation, since virtue is an operative + habit, as stated above ( + <a id="FS_Q114_A4-p2.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q55_A2.html">Q[55], A[2]</a>). Hence every virtue is equally a principle of merit. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q114_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q114_A4-p3.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.3.8" target="asv">1 Cor. 3:8</a>): "Every man shall receive his own reward according to his labor." Now charity lessens rather than increases the labor, because + as Augustine says (De Verbis Dom., Serm. lxx), "love makes all hard and repulsive tasks easy and next to nothing." Hence charity + is no greater principle of merit than any other virtue. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q114_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the greatest principle of merit would seem to be the one whose acts are most meritorious. But the acts of faith + and patience or fortitude would seem to be the most meritorious, as appears in the martyrs, who strove for the faith patiently + and bravely even till death. Hence other virtues are a greater principle of merit than charity. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q114_A4-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Our Lord said ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q114_A4-p5.1" href="./asv.html#John.14.21" target="asv">Jn. 14:21</a>): "He that loveth Me, shall be loved of My Father; and I will love him and will manifest Myself to him." Now everlasting + life consists in the manifest knowledge of God, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q114_A4-p5.2" href="./asv.html#John.17.3" target="asv"> Jn. 17:3</a>: "This is eternal life: that they may know Thee, the only true" and living "God." Hence the merit of eternal life rests chiefly + with charity. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q114_A4-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As we may gather from what has been stated above + <a id="FS_Q114_A4-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q114_A1.html">(A[1])</a>, human acts have the nature of merit from two causes: first and chiefly from the Divine ordination, inasmuch as acts are + said to merit that good to which man is divinely ordained. Secondly, on the part of free-will, inasmuch as man, more than + other creatures, has the power of voluntary acts by acting by himself. And in both these ways does merit chiefly rest with + charity. For + we must bear in mind that everlasting life consists in the enjoyment of God. Now the human mind's movement to the fruition + of the Divine good is the proper act of charity, whereby all the acts of the other virtues are ordained to this end, since + all the other virtues are commanded by charity. Hence the merit of life everlasting pertains first to charity, and secondly, + to the other virtues, inasmuch as their acts are commanded by charity. So, likewise, is it manifest that what we do out of + love + we do most willingly. Hence, even inasmuch as merit depends on voluntariness, merit is chiefly attributed to charity. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q114_A4-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Charity, inasmuch as it has the last end for object, moves the other virtues to act. For the habit to which the end pertains + always commands the habits to which the means pertain, as was said above ( + <a id="FS_Q114_A4-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q9_A1.html">Q[9], A[1]</a>). + </p> + <p id="FS_Q114_A4-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> A work can be toilsome and difficult in two ways: first, from the greatness of the work, and thus the greatness of the work + pertains to the increase of merit; and thus charity does not lessen the toil---rather, it makes us undertake the greatest + toils, "for it does great things, if it exists," as Gregory says (Hom. in Evang. xxx). Secondly, from the defect of the operator; + for what is not done with a ready will is hard and difficult to all of us, and + this toil lessens merit and is removed by charity. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q114_A4-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The act of faith is not meritorious unless "faith . . . worketh by charity" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q114_A4-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Gal.5.6" target="asv">Gal. 5:6</a>). So, too, the acts of patience and fortitude are not meritorious unless a man does them out of charity, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q114_A4-p9.2" href="./asv.html#iCor.13.3" target="asv">1 Cor. 13:3</a>: "If I should deliver my body to be burned, and have not charity, it profiteth me nothing." + </p> + <p id="FS_Q114_A4-p10"></p> + <p id="FS_Q114_A4-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q114_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q114_A5.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q114_A5" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q114_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q114_A6.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q114_A5-p0.1">Whether a man may merit for himself the first grace?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q114_A5-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q114_A5-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that a man may merit for himself the first grace, because, as Augustine says (Ep. clxxxvi), "faith merits justification." + Now a man is justified by the first grace. Therefore a man may merit the first grace. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q114_A5-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, God gives grace only to the worthy. Now, no one is said to be worthy of some good, unless he has merited it condignly. + Therefore we may merit the first grace condignly. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q114_A5-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, with men we may merit a gift already received. Thus if a man receives a horse from his master, he merits it by a + good use of it in his master's service. Now God is much more bountiful than man. Much more, therefore, may a man, by subsequent + works, merit the first grace already received from God. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q114_A5-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The nature of grace is repugnant to reward of works, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q114_A5-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.4.4" target="asv"> Rom. 4:4</a>: "Now to him that worketh, the reward is not reckoned according to grace but according to debt." Now a man merits what is + reckoned to him according to debt, as the reward of his works. Hence a man may not merit the first grace. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q114_A5-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The gift of grace may be considered in two ways: first in the nature of a gratuitous gift, and thus it is manifest that all + merit is repugnant to grace, since as the Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q114_A5-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.11.6" target="asv">Rom. 11:6</a>), "if by grace, it is not now by works." Secondly, it may be considered as regards the nature of the thing given, and thus, + also, it cannot come under the merit of him who has not grace, both because it exceeds the proportion of nature, and because + previous to grace a man in the state of sin has an obstacle to his meriting grace, viz. sin. But when anyone has grace, the + grace already possessed cannot come under merit, since reward is the term of the work, but grace is the principle of all our + good works, as stated above ( + <a id="FS_Q114_A5-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q109.html">Q[109])</a>. But of anyone merits a further gratuitous gift by virtue of the preceding grace, it would not be the first grace. Hence + it is manifest that no one can merit for himself the first grace. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q114_A5-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As Augustine says (Retract. i, 23), he was deceived on this point for a time, believing the beginning of faith to be from + us, and its consummation to be granted us by God; and this he here retracts. And seemingly it is in this sense that he speaks + of faith as meriting justification. But if we suppose, as indeed it is a truth of faith, that the beginning of faith is in + us from God, the first act must flow from grace; and thus it cannot be meritorious + of the first grace. Therefore man is justified by faith, not as though man, by believing, were to merit justification, but + that, he believes, whilst he is being justified; inasmuch as a movement of faith is required for the justification of the + ungodly, as stated above ( + <a id="FS_Q114_A5-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q113_A4.html">Q[113], A[4]</a>). + </p> + <p id="FS_Q114_A5-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> God gives grace to none but to the worthy, not that they were previously worthy, but that by His grace He makes them worthy, + Who alone "can make him clean that is conceived of unclean seed" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q114_A5-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Job.14.4" target="asv">Job 14:4</a>). + </p> + <p id="FS_Q114_A5-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Man's every good work proceeds from the first grace as from its principle; but not from any gift of man. Consequently, there + is no comparison between gifts of grace and gifts of men. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q114_A5-p10"></p> + <p id="FS_Q114_A5-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q114_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q114_A6.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q114_A6" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q114_A5.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q114_A7.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q114_A6-p0.1">Whether a man can merit the first grace for another?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q114_A6-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q114_A6-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that a man can merit the first grace for another. Because on + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q114_A6-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.9.2" target="asv"> Mat. 9:2</a>: "Jesus seeing their faith," etc. a gloss says: "How much is our personal faith worth with God, Who set such a price on another's + faith, as to heal the man both inwardly and outwardly!" Now inward healing is brought about by grace. Hence a man can merit + the first grace for another. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q114_A6-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the prayers of the just are not void, but efficacious, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q114_A6-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Jas.5.16" target="asv"> James 5:16</a>: "The continued prayer of a just man availeth much." Now he had previously said: "Pray one for another, that you may be saved." + Hence, since man's salvation can only be brought about by grace, it seems that one man may merit for another his first grace. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q114_A6-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q114_A6-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Luke.16.9" target="asv">Lk. 16:9</a>): "Make unto you friends of the mammon of iniquity, that when you shall fail they may receive you into everlasting dwellings." + Now it is through grace alone that anyone is received into everlasting dwellings, for by it alone does anyone merit everlasting + life as stated above + <a id="FS_Q114_A6-p4.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q114_A2.html">(A[2];</a> Q[109], A[5]). Hence one man may by merit obtain for another his first grace. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q114_A6-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q114_A6-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Jer.15.1" target="asv">Jer. 15:1</a>): "If Moses and Samuel shall stand before Me, My soul is not towards this people" ---yet they had great merit with God. Hence + it seems that no one can merit the first grace for another. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q114_A6-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As shown above ( + <a id="FS_Q114_A6-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q114_A1.html">AA[1]</a>,3,4), our works are meritorious from two causes: first, by virtue of the Divine motion; and thus we merit condignly; secondly, + according as they proceed from free-will in so far as we do them willingly, and thus they have congruous merit, since it is + congruous that when a man makes good use of his power God should by His super-excellent power work still higher things. And + therefore it is clear that no one can + merit condignly for another his first grace, save Christ alone; since each one of us is moved by God to reach life everlasting + through the gift of grace; hence condign merit does not reach beyond this motion. But Christ's soul is moved by God through + grace, not only so as to reach the glory of life everlasting, but so as to lead others to it, inasmuch as He is the Head of + the Church, and the Author of human salvation, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q114_A6-p6.2" href="./asv.html#Heb.2.10" target="asv"> Heb. 2:10</a>: "Who hath brought many children + into glory [to perfect] the Author of their salvation." + </p> + <p id="FS_Q114_A6-p7"> But one may merit the first grace for another congruously; because a man in grace fulfils God's will, and it is congruous + and in harmony with friendship that God should fulfil man's desire for the salvation of another, although sometimes there + may be an impediment on the part of him whose salvation the just man desires. And it is in this sense that the passage from + Jeremias speaks. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q114_A6-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> A man's faith avails for another's salvation by congruous and not by condign merit. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q114_A6-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The impetration of prayer rests on mercy, whereas condign merit rests on justice; hence a man may impetrate many things from + the Divine mercy in prayer, which he does not merit in justice, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q114_A6-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Dan.9.18" target="asv"> Dan. 9:18</a>: "For it is not for our justifications that we present our prayers before Thy face, but for the multitude of Thy tender mercies." + </p> + <p id="FS_Q114_A6-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The poor who receive alms are said to receive others into everlasting dwellings, either by impetrating their forgiveness + in prayer, or by meriting congruously by other good works, or materially speaking, inasmuch as by these good works of mercy, + exercised towards the poor, we merit to be received into everlasting dwellings. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q114_A6-p11"></p> + <p id="FS_Q114_A6-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q114_A5.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q114_A7.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q114_A7" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q114_A6.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q114_A8.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q114_A7-p0.1">Whether a man may merit restoration after a fall?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q114_A7-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q114_A7-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that anyone may merit for himself restoration after a fall. For what a man may justly ask of God, he may justly + merit. Now nothing may more justly be besought of God than to be restored after a fall, as Augustine says [*Cf. Ennar. i super + + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q114_A7-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.70" target="asv">Ps. lxx.</a>], according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q114_A7-p2.2" href="./asv.html#Ps.70.9" target="asv">Ps. 70:9</a>: "When my strength shall fail, do not Thou forsake me." Hence a man may merit to be restored after a fall. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q114_A7-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, a man's works benefit himself more than another. Now a man may, to some extent, merit for another his restoration + after a fall, even as his first grace. Much more, therefore, may he merit for himself restoration after a fall. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q114_A7-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, when a man is once in grace he merits life everlasting by the good works he does, as was shown above + <a id="FS_Q114_A7-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q114_A2.html">(A[2];</a> Q[109], A[5]). Now no one can attain life everlasting unless he is restored by grace. Hence it would seem that he merits + for himself restoration. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q114_A7-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q114_A7-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Ezek.18.24" target="asv">Ezech. 18:24</a>): "If the just man turn himself away from his justice and do iniquity . . . all his justices which he hath done shall not + be remembered." Therefore his previous merits will nowise help him to rise again. Hence no one can merit for himself restoration + after a fall. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q114_A7-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> No one can merit for himself restoration after a future fall, either condignly or congruously. He cannot merit for himself + condignly, since the reason of this merit depends on the motion of Divine grace, and this motion is interrupted by the subsequent + sin; hence all benefits which he afterwards obtains from God, whereby he is restored, do not fall under merit---the motion + of the preceding grace not extending to them. Again, congruous merit, whereby one + merits the first grace for another, is prevented from having its effect on account of the impediment of sin in the one for + whom it is merited. Much more, therefore, is the efficacy of such merit impeded by the obstacle which is in him who merits, + and in him for whom it is merited; for both these are in the same person. And therefore a man can nowise merit for himself + restoration after a fall. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q114_A7-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The desire whereby we seek for restoration after a fall is called just, and likewise the prayer whereby this restoration + is besought is called just, because it tends to justice; and not that it depends on justice by way of merit, but only on mercy. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q114_A7-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Anyone may congruously merit for another his first grace, because there is no impediment (at least, on the part of him who + merits), such as is found when anyone recedes from justice after the merit of grace. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q114_A7-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Some have said that no one "absolutely" merits life everlasting except by the act of final grace, but only "conditionally," + i.e. if he perseveres. But it is unreasonable to say this, for sometimes the act of the last grace is not more, but less meritorious + than preceding acts, on account of the prostration of illness. Hence it must be said that every act of charity merits eternal + life absolutely; but by subsequent sin, there arises an impediment to + the preceding merit, so that it does not obtain its effect; just as natural causes fail of their effects on account of a supervening + impediment. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q114_A7-p10"></p> + <p id="FS_Q114_A7-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q114_A6.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q114_A8.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q114_A8" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q114_A7.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q114_A9.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q114_A8-p0.1">Whether a man may merit the increase of grace or charity?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q114_A8-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q114_A8-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that a man cannot merit an increase of grace or charity. For when anyone receives the reward he merited no + other reward is due to him; thus it was said of some ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q114_A8-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.6.2" target="asv">Mat. 6:2</a>): "They have received their reward." Hence, if anyone were to merit the increase of charity or grace, it would follow that, + when his grace has been increased, he could not expect any further reward, which is unfitting. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q114_A8-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, nothing acts beyond its species. But the principle of merit is grace or charity, as was shown above ( + <a id="FS_Q114_A8-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q114_A2.html">AA[2]</a>, 4). Therefore no one can merit greater grace or charity than he has. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q114_A8-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, what falls under merit a man merits by every act flowing from grace or charity, as by every such act a man merits + life everlasting. If, therefore, the increase of grace or charity falls under merit, it would seem that by every act quickened + by charity a man would merit an increase of charity. But what a man merits, he infallibly receives from God, unless hindered + by subsequent sin; for it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q114_A8-p4.1" href="./asv.html#iiTim.1.12" target="asv">2 Tim. 1:12</a>): "I know Whom I + have believed, and I am certain that He is able to keep that which I have committed unto Him." Hence it would follow that + grace or charity is increased by every meritorious act; and this would seem impossible since at times meritorious acts are + not very fervent, and would not suffice for the increase of charity. Therefore the increase of charity does not come under + merit. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q114_A8-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (super Ep. Joan.; cf. Ep. clxxxvi) that "charity merits increase, and being increased merits to be perfected." + Hence the increase of grace or charity falls under merit. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q114_A8-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above ( + <a id="FS_Q114_A8-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q114_A6.html">AA[6]</a>,7), whatever the motion of grace reaches to, falls under condign merit. Now the motion of a mover extends not merely to the + last term of the movement, but to the whole progress of the movement. But the term of the movement of grace is eternal life; + and progress in this movement is by the increase of charity or grace according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q114_A8-p6.2" href="./asv.html#Prov.4.18" target="asv"> Prov. 4:18</a>: "But the path of the just as a shining light, + goeth forward and increaseth even to perfect day," which is the day of glory. And thus the increase of grace falls under condign + merit. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q114_A8-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Reward is the term of merit. But there is a double term of movement, viz. the last, and the intermediate, which is both beginning + and term; and this term is the reward of increase. Now the reward of human favor is as the last end to those who place their + end in it; hence such as these receive no other reward. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q114_A8-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The increase of grace is not above the virtuality of the pre-existing grace, although it is above its quantity, even as a + tree is not above the virtuality of the seed, although above its quantity. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q114_A8-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> By every meritorious act a man merits the increase of grace, equally with the consummation of grace which is eternal life. + But just as eternal life is not given at once, but in its own time, so neither is grace increased at once, but in its own + time, viz. when a man is sufficiently disposed for the increase of grace. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q114_A8-p10"></p> + <p id="FS_Q114_A8-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q114_A7.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q114_A9.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q114_A9" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q114_A8.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q114_A10.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q114_A9-p0.1">Whether a man may merit perseverance?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q114_A9-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q114_A9-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that anyone may merit perseverance. For what a man obtains by asking, can come under the merit of anyone that + is in grace. Now men obtain perseverance by asking it of God; otherwise it would be useless to ask it of God in the petitions + of the Lord's Prayer, as Augustine says (De Dono Persev. ii). Therefore perseverance may come under the merit of whoever has + grace. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q114_A9-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it is more not to be able to sin than not to sin. But not to be able to sin comes under merit, for we merit eternal + life, of which impeccability is an essential part. Much more, therefore, may we merit not to sin, i.e. to persevere. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q114_A9-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, increase of grace is greater than perseverance in the grace we already possess. But a man may merit an increase + of grace, as was stated above + <a id="FS_Q114_A9-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q114_A8.html">(A[8])</a>. Much more, therefore, may he merit perseverance in the grace he has already. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q114_A9-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> What we merit, we obtain from God, unless it is hindered by sin. Now many have meritorious works, who do not obtain perseverance; + nor can it be urged that this takes place because of the impediment of sin, since sin itself is opposed to perseverance; and + thus if anyone were to merit perseverance, God would not permit him to fall into sin. Hence perseverance does not come under + merit. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q114_A9-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Since man's free-will is naturally flexible towards good and evil, there are two ways of obtaining from God perseverance + in good: first, inasmuch as free-will is determined to good by consummate grace, which will be in glory; secondly, on the + part of the Divine motion, which inclines man to good unto the end. Now as explained above ( + <a id="FS_Q114_A9-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q114_A6.html">AA[6]</a>,7,8), that which is related as a term to the free-will's movement directed to God the mover, + falls under human merit; and not what is related to the aforesaid movement as principle. Hence it is clear that the perseverance + of glory which is the term of the aforesaid movement falls under merit; but perseverance of the wayfarer does not fall under + merit, since it depends solely on the Divine motion, which is the principle of all merit. Now God freely bestows the good + of perseverance, on whomsoever He bestows it. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q114_A9-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> We impetrate in prayer things that we do not merit, since God hears sinners who beseech the pardon of their sins, which they + do not merit, as appears from Augustine [*Tract. xliv in Joan.] on + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q114_A9-p7.1" href="./asv.html#John.11.31" target="asv"> Jn. 11:31, </a> "Now we know that God doth not hear sinners," otherwise it would have been useless for the publican to say: "O God, be merciful + to me a sinner," + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q114_A9-p7.2" href="./asv.html#Luke.18.13" target="asv"> Lk. 18:13.</a> So too may we impetrate of God in prayer the grace of + perseverance either for ourselves or for others, although it does not fall under merit. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q114_A9-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The perseverance which is in heaven is compared as term to the free-will's movement; not so, the perseverance of the wayfarer, + for the reason given in the body of the article. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q114_A9-p9"> In the same way may we answer the third objection which concerns the increase of grace, as was explained above.</p> + <p id="FS_Q114_A9-p10"></p> + <p id="FS_Q114_A9-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q114_A8.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q114_A10.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q114_A10" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q114_A9.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q114_A10-p0.1">Whether temporal goods fall under merit?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q114_A10-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q114_A10-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that temporal goods fall under merit. For what is promised to some as a reward of justice, falls under merit. + Now, temporal goods were promised in the Old Law as the reward of justice, as appears from + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q114_A10-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Deut.28" target="asv">Dt. 28.</a> Hence it seems that temporal goods fall under merit. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q114_A10-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, that would seem to fall under merit, which God bestows on anyone for a service done. But God sometimes bestows temporal + goods on men for services done for Him. For it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q114_A10-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Exod.1.21" target="asv">Ex. 1:21</a>): "And because the midwives feared God, He built them houses"; on which a gloss of Gregory (Moral. xviii, 4) says that "life + everlasting might have been awarded them as the fruit of their goodwill, but on account of their sin of falsehood they + received an earthly reward." And it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q114_A10-p3.2" href="./asv.html#Ezek.29.18" target="asv">Ezech. 29:18</a>): "The King of Babylon hath made his army to undergo hard service against Tyre . . . and there hath been no reward given + him," and further on: "And it shall be wages for his army . . . I have given him the land of Egypt because he hath labored + for me." Therefore temporal goods fall under merit. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q114_A10-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, as good is to merit so is evil to demerit. But on account of the demerit of sin some are punished by God with temporal + punishments, as appears from the Sodomites, + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q114_A10-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.19" target="asv">Gn. 19</a>. Hence temporal goods fall under merit. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q114_A10-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> On the contrary, What falls under merit does not come upon all alike. But temporal goods regard the good and the wicked alike; + according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q114_A10-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Eccl.9.2" target="asv"> Eccles. 9:2</a>: "All things equally happen to the just and the wicked, to the good and to the evil, to the clean and to the unclean, to + him that offereth victims and to him that despiseth sacrifices." Therefore temporal goods do not fall under merit. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q114_A10-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> What falls under merit is the reward or wage, which is a kind of good. Now man's good is twofold: the first, simply; the + second, relatively. Now man's good simply is his last end (according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q114_A10-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.72.27" target="asv">Ps. 72:27</a>: "But it is good for men to adhere to my God") and consequently what is ordained and leads to this end; and these fall simply + under merit. But the relative, not the simple, good of man is what is good to him now, or what is a good to him + relatively; and this does not fall under merit simply, but relatively. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q114_A10-p7"> Hence we must say that if temporal goods are considered as they are useful for virtuous works, whereby we are led to heaven, + they fall directly and simply under merit, even as increase of grace, and everything whereby a man is helped to attain beatitude + after the first grace. For God gives men, both just and wicked, enough temporal goods to enable them to attain to everlasting + life; and thus these temporal goods are simply good. Hence it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q114_A10-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.33.10" target="asv">Ps. + 33:10 + </a>): "For there is no want to them that fear Him," and again, + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q114_A10-p7.2" href="./asv.html#Ps.36.25" target="asv"> Ps. 36:25</a>: "I have not seen the just forsaken," etc. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q114_A10-p8"> But if these temporal goods are considered in themselves, they are not man's good simply, but relatively, and thus they do + not fall under merit simply, but relatively, inasmuch as men are moved by God to do temporal works, in which with God's help + they reach their purpose. And thus as life everlasting is simply the reward of the works of justice in relation to the Divine + motion, as stated above ( + <a id="FS_Q114_A10-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q114_A3.html">AA[3]</a>,6), so have temporal goods, considered in + themselves, the nature of reward, with respect to the Divine motion, whereby men's wills are moved to undertake these works, + even though, sometimes, men have not a right intention in them. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q114_A10-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As Augustine says (Contra Faust. iv, 2), "in these temporal promises were figures of spiritual things to come. For the carnal + people were adhering to the promises of the present life; and not merely their speech but even their life was prophetic." + </p> + <p id="FS_Q114_A10-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> These rewards are said to have been divinely brought about in relation to the Divine motion, and not in relation to the malice + of their wills, especially as regards the King of Babylon, since he did not besiege Tyre as if wishing to serve God, but rather + in order to usurp dominion. So, too, although the midwives had a good will with regard to saving the children, yet their will + was not right, inasmuch as they framed falsehoods. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q114_A10-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Temporal evils are imposed as a punishment on the wicked, inasmuch as they are not thereby helped to reach life everlasting. + But to the just who are aided by these evils they are not punishments but medicines as stated above ( + <a id="FS_Q114_A10-p11.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q87_A8.html">Q[87], A[8]</a>). + </p> + <p id="FS_Q114_A10-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> All things happen equally to the good and the wicked, as regards the substance of temporal good or evil; but not as regards + the end, since the good and not the wicked are led to beatitude by them. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q114_A10-p13"> And now enough has been said regarding morals in general.</p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q114_A9.html"></a> + <a href="summa.SS.html"></a> + </div> + <a href="summa.FS_Q113_A10.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q114_A1.html"></a> + </div> + <a href="summa.FS_Q108_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q109.html"></a> + ` + </div> \ No newline at end of file