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+<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" id="FS.vi" class="div2">
+            <a href="summa.FS_Q89_A6.html"></a>
+            <a href="summa.FS_Q90.html"></a>
+            <h2 id="FS.vi-p0.1">TREATISE ON LAW (QQ 90-108)</h2>
+            <div id="FS_Q90" class="div3">
+               <a href="summa.FS.vi.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.FS_Q90_A1.html"></a>
+               <h3 id="FS_Q90-p0.1">OF THE ESSENCE OF LAW (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3>
+               <p id="FS_Q90-p1"></p>
+               <p id="FS_Q90-p2"> We have now to consider the extrinsic principles of acts. Now the extrinsic principle inclining to evil is the devil, of
+                  whose temptations we have spoken in the 
+                  <a id="FS_Q90-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q114.html">FP, Q[114].</a> But the extrinsic principle moving to good is God, Who both instructs us by means of His Law, and assists us by His Grace:
+                  wherefore in the first place we must speak of law; in the second place, of grace.
+               </p>
+               <p id="FS_Q90-p3"> Concerning law, we must consider: (1) Law itself in general; (2) its parts. Concerning law in general three points offer
+                  themselves for our consideration: (1) Its essence; (2) The different kinds of law; (3) The effects of law.
+               </p>
+               <p id="FS_Q90-p4"> Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:</p>
+               <p id="FS_Q90-p5"> (1) Whether law is something pertaining to reason?</p>
+               <p id="FS_Q90-p6"> (2) Concerning the end of law;</p>
+               <p id="FS_Q90-p7"> (3) Its cause;</p>
+               <p id="FS_Q90-p8"> (4) The promulgation of law.</p>
+               <div id="FS_Q90_A1" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q90.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q90_A2.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="FS_Q90_A1-p0.1">Whether law is something pertaining to reason?</h4>
+                  <p id="FS_Q90_A1-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q90_A1-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that law is not something pertaining to reason. For the Apostle says (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q90_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.7.23" target="asv">Rom. 7:23</a>): "I see another law in my members," etc. But nothing pertaining to reason is in the members; since the reason does not make
+                     use of a bodily organ. Therefore law is not something pertaining to reason.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q90_A1-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, in the reason there is nothing else but power, habit, and act. But law is not the power itself of reason. In like
+                     manner, neither is it a habit of reason: because the habits of reason are the intellectual virtues of which we have spoken
+                     above (
+                     <a id="FS_Q90_A1-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q57.html">Q[57])</a>. Nor again is it an act of reason: because then law would cease, when the act of reason ceases, for instance, while we are
+                     asleep. Therefore law is nothing pertaining to reason.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q90_A1-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the law moves those who are subject to it to act aright. But it belongs properly to the will to move to act, as
+                     is evident from what has been said above (
+                     <a id="FS_Q90_A1-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q9_A1.html">Q[9], A[1]</a>). Therefore law pertains, not to the reason, but to the will; according to the words of the Jurist (Lib. i, ff., De Const.
+                     Prin. leg. i): "Whatsoever pleaseth the sovereign, has force of law."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q90_A1-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It belongs to the law to command and to forbid. But it belongs to reason to command, as stated above (
+                     <a id="FS_Q90_A1-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q17_A1.html">Q[17], A[1]</a>). Therefore law is something pertaining to reason.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q90_A1-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> Law is a rule and measure of acts, whereby man is induced to act or is restrained from acting: for "lex" [law] is derived
+                     from "ligare" [to bind], because it binds one to act. Now the rule and measure of human acts is the reason, which is the first
+                     principle of human acts, as is evident from what has been stated above (
+                     <a id="FS_Q90_A1-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q1_A1.html">Q[1], A[1]</a>, ad 3); since it belongs to the reason to direct to the end, which is the first principle in all matters
+                     of action, according to the Philosopher (Phys. ii). Now that which is the principle in any genus, is the rule and measure
+                     of that genus: for instance, unity in the genus of numbers, and the first movement in the genus of movements. Consequently
+                     it follows that law is something pertaining to reason.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q90_A1-p7">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Since law is a kind of rule and measure, it may be in something in two ways. First, as in that which measures and rules:
+                     and since this is proper to reason, it follows that, in this way, law is in the reason alone. Secondly, as in that which is
+                     measured and ruled. In this way, law is in all those things that are inclined to something by reason of some law: so that
+                     any inclination arising from a law, may be called a law, not essentially but by
+                     participation as it were. And thus the inclination of the members to concupiscence is called "the law of the members."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q90_A1-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Just as, in external action, we may consider the work and the work done, for instance the work of building and the house
+                     built; so in the acts of reason, we may consider the act itself of reason, i.e. to understand and to reason, and something
+                     produced by this act. With regard to the speculative reason, this is first of all the definition; secondly, the proposition;
+                     thirdly, the syllogism or argument. And since also the practical reason makes use of a
+                     syllogism in respect of the work to be done, as stated above (
+                     <a id="FS_Q90_A1-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q13_A3.html">Q[13], A[3]</a>;
+                     <a id="FS_Q90_A1-p8.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q76_A1.html"> Q[76], A[1]</a>) and since as the Philosopher teaches (Ethic. vii, 3); hence we find in the practical reason something that holds the same
+                     position in regard to operations, as, in the speculative intellect, the proposition holds in regard to conclusions. Such like
+                     universal propositions of the practical intellect that are directed to actions have the nature of law. And these
+                     propositions are sometimes under our actual consideration, while sometimes they are retained in the reason by means of a habit.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q90_A1-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Reason has its power of moving from the will, as stated above (
+                     <a id="FS_Q90_A1-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q17_A1.html">Q[17], A[1]</a>): for it is due to the fact that one wills the end, that the reason issues its commands as regards things ordained to the
+                     end. But in order that the volition of what is commanded may have the nature of law, it needs to be in accord with some rule
+                     of reason. And in this sense is to be understood the saying that the will of the sovereign has the force of
+                     law; otherwise the sovereign's will would savor of lawlessness rather than of law.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q90_A1-p10"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q90_A1-p11"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q90.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q90_A2.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="FS_Q90_A2" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q90_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q90_A3.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="FS_Q90_A2-p0.1">Whether the law is always something directed to the common good? </h4>
+                  <p id="FS_Q90_A2-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q90_A2-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the law is not always directed to the common good as to its end. For it belongs to law to command and
+                     to forbid. But commands are directed to certain individual goods. Therefore the end of the law is not always the common good.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q90_A2-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the law directs man in his actions. But human actions are concerned with particular matters. Therefore the law is
+                     directed to some particular good.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q90_A2-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Isidore says (Etym. v, 3): "If the law is based on reason, whatever is based on reason will be a law." But reason
+                     is the foundation not only of what is ordained to the common good, but also of that which is directed private good. Therefore
+                     the law is not only directed to the good of all, but also to the private good of an individual.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q90_A2-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Isidore says (Etym. v, 21) that "laws are enacted for no private profit, but for the common benefit of the citizens."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q90_A2-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above 
+                     <a id="FS_Q90_A2-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q90_A1.html">(A[1])</a>, the law belongs to that which is a principle of human acts, because it is their rule and measure. Now as reason is a principle
+                     of human acts, so in reason itself there is something which is the principle in respect of all the rest: wherefore to this
+                     principle chiefly and mainly law must needs be referred. Now the first principle in practical matters, which are the object
+                     of the practical reason, is the last
+                     end: and the last end of human life is bliss or happiness, as stated above (Q[2], A[7]; Q[3], A[1]). Consequently the law
+                     must needs regard principally the relationship to happiness. Moreover, since every part is ordained to the whole, as imperfect
+                     to perfect; and since one man is a part of the perfect community, the law must needs regard properly the relationship to universal
+                     happiness. Wherefore the Philosopher, in the above definition of legal matters mentions both happiness and the body
+                     politic: for he says (Ethic. v, 1) that we call those legal matters "just, which are adapted to produce and preserve happiness
+                     and its parts for the body politic": since the state is a perfect community, as he says in Polit. i, 1.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q90_A2-p7"> Now in every genus, that which belongs to it chiefly is the principle of the others, and the others belong to that genus
+                     in subordination to that thing: thus fire, which is chief among hot things, is the cause of heat in mixed bodies, and these
+                     are said to be hot in so far as they have a share of fire. Consequently, since the law is chiefly ordained to the common good,
+                     any other precept in regard to some individual work, must needs be devoid of the nature of a law, save in so
+                     far as it regards the common good. Therefore every law is ordained to the common good.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q90_A2-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> A command denotes an application of a law to matters regulated by the law. Now the order to the common good, at which the
+                     law aims, is applicable to particular ends. And in this way commands are given even concerning particular matters.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q90_A2-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Actions are indeed concerned with particular matters: but those particular matters are referable to the common good, not
+                     as to a common genus or species, but as to a common final cause, according as the common good is said to be the common end.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q90_A2-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Just as nothing stands firm with regard to the speculative reason except that which is traced back to the first indemonstrable
+                     principles, so nothing stands firm with regard to the practical reason, unless it be directed to the last end which is the
+                     common good: and whatever stands to reason in this sense, has the nature of a law.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q90_A2-p11"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q90_A2-p12"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q90_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q90_A3.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="FS_Q90_A3" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q90_A2.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q90_A4.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="FS_Q90_A3-p0.1">Whether the reason of any man is competent to make laws?</h4>
+                  <p id="FS_Q90_A3-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q90_A3-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the reason of any man is competent to make laws. For the Apostle says (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q90_A3-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.2.14" target="asv">Rom. 2:14</a>) that "when the Gentiles, who have not the law, do by nature those things that are of the law . . . they are a law to themselves."
+                     Now he says this of all in general. Therefore anyone can make a law for himself.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q90_A3-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 1), "the intention of the lawgiver is to lead men to virtue." But every man
+                     can lead another to virtue. Therefore the reason of any man is competent to make laws.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q90_A3-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, just as the sovereign of a state governs the state, so every father of a family governs his household. But the sovereign
+                     of a state can make laws for the state. Therefore every father of a family can make laws for his household.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q90_A3-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Isidore says (Etym. v, 10): "A law is an ordinance of the people, whereby something is sanctioned by the Elders together
+                     with the Commonalty."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q90_A3-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> A law, properly speaking, regards first and foremost the order to the common good. Now to order anything to the common good,
+                     belongs either to the whole people, or to someone who is the viceregent of the whole people. And therefore the making of a
+                     law belongs either to the whole people or to a public personage who has care of the whole people: since in all other matters
+                     the directing of anything to the end concerns him to whom the end belongs.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q90_A3-p7">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As stated above (A[1], ad 1), a law is in a person not only as in one that rules, but also by participation as in one that
+                     is ruled. In the latter way each one is a law to himself, in so far as he shares the direction that he receives from one who
+                     rules him. Hence the same text goes on: "Who show the work of the law written in their hearts."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q90_A3-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> A private person cannot lead another to virtue efficaciously: for he can only advise, and if his advice be not taken, it
+                     has no coercive power, such as the law should have, in order to prove an efficacious inducement to virtue, as the Philosopher
+                     says (Ethic. x, 9). But this coercive power is vested in the whole people or in some public personage, to whom it belongs
+                     to inflict penalties, as we shall state further on (Q[92], A[2], ad 3;
+                     
+                     <a id="FS_Q90_A3-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q64_A3.html">SS, Q[64], A[3]</a>). Wherefore the framing of laws belongs to him alone.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q90_A3-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As one man is a part of the household, so a household is a part of the state: and the state is a perfect community, according
+                     to Polit. i, 1. And therefore, as the good of one man is not the last end, but is ordained to the common good; so too the
+                     good of one household is ordained to the good of a single state, which is a perfect community. Consequently he that governs
+                     a family, can indeed make certain commands or ordinances, but not such as to have
+                     properly the force of law.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q90_A3-p10"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q90_A3-p11"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q90_A2.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q90_A4.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="FS_Q90_A4" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q90_A3.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q91.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="FS_Q90_A4-p0.1">Whether promulgation is essential to a law?</h4>
+                  <p id="FS_Q90_A4-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q90_A4-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that promulgation is not essential to a law. For the natural law above all has the character of law. But the
+                     natural law needs no promulgation. Therefore it is not essential to a law that it be promulgated.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q90_A4-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it belongs properly to a law to bind one to do or not to do something. But the obligation of fulfilling a law touches
+                     not only those in whose presence it is promulgated, but also others. Therefore promulgation is not essential to a law.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q90_A4-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the binding force of a law extends even to the future, since "laws are binding in matters of the future," as the
+                     jurists say (Cod. 1, tit. De lege et constit. leg. vii). But promulgation concerns those who are present. Therefore it is
+                     not essential to a law.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q90_A4-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is laid down in the Decretals, dist. 4, that "laws are established when they are promulgated."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q90_A4-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above 
+                     <a id="FS_Q90_A4-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q90_A1.html">(A[1])</a>, a law is imposed on others by way of a rule and measure. Now a rule or measure is imposed by being applied to those who
+                     are to be ruled and measured by it. Wherefore, in order that a law obtain the binding force which is proper to a law, it must
+                     needs be applied to the men who have to be ruled by it. Such application is made by its being notified to them by promulgation.
+                     Wherefore promulgation is necessary for
+                     the law to obtain its force.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q90_A4-p7"> Thus from the four preceding articles, the definition of law may be gathered; and it is nothing else than an ordinance of
+                     reason for the common good, made by him who has care of the community, and promulgated.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q90_A4-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The natural law is promulgated by the very fact that God instilled it into man's mind so as to be known by him naturally.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q90_A4-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Those who are not present when a law is promulgated, are bound to observe the law, in so far as it is notified or can be
+                     notified to them by others, after it has been promulgated.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q90_A4-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The promulgation that takes place now, extends to future time by reason of the durability of written characters, by which
+                     means it is continually promulgated. Hence Isidore says (Etym. v, 3; ii, 10) that "lex [law] is derived from legere [to read]
+                     because it is written."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q90_A4-p11"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q90_A4-p12"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q90_A3.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q91.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <a href="summa.FS.vi.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.FS_Q90_A1.html"></a>
+            </div>
+            <div id="FS_Q91" class="div3">
+               <a href="summa.FS_Q90_A4.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.FS_Q91_A1.html"></a>
+               <h3 id="FS_Q91-p0.1">OF THE VARIOUS KINDS OF LAW (SIX ARTICLES)</h3>
+               <p id="FS_Q91-p1"></p>
+               <p id="FS_Q91-p2"> We must now consider the various kinds of law: under which head there are six points of inquiry:</p>
+               <p id="FS_Q91-p3"> (1) Whether there is an eternal law?</p>
+               <p id="FS_Q91-p4"> (2) Whether there is a natural law?</p>
+               <p id="FS_Q91-p5"> (3) Whether there is a human law?</p>
+               <p id="FS_Q91-p6"> (4) Whether there is a Divine law?</p>
+               <p id="FS_Q91-p7"> (5) Whether there is one Divine law, or several?</p>
+               <p id="FS_Q91-p8"> (6) Whether there is a law of sin?</p>
+               <div id="FS_Q91_A1" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q91.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q91_A2.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="FS_Q91_A1-p0.1">Whether there is an eternal law?</h4>
+                  <p id="FS_Q91_A1-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q91_A1-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that there is no eternal law. Because every law is imposed on someone. But there was not someone from eternity
+                     on whom a law could be imposed: since God alone was from eternity. Therefore no law is eternal.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q91_A1-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, promulgation is essential to law. But promulgation could not be from eternity: because there was no one to whom
+                     it could be promulgated from eternity. Therefore no law can be eternal.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q91_A1-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, a law implies order to an end. But nothing ordained to an end is eternal: for the last end alone is eternal. Therefore
+                     no law is eternal.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q91_A1-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. i, 6): "That Law which is the Supreme Reason cannot be understood to be otherwise than unchangeable
+                     and eternal."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q91_A1-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above (Q[90], A[1], ad 2; 
+                     <a id="FS_Q91_A1-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q91_A3.html">AA[3]</a>,4), a law is nothing else but a dictate of practical reason emanating from the ruler who governs a perfect community. Now
+                     it is evident, granted that the world is ruled by Divine Providence, as was stated in the 
+                     <a id="FS_Q91_A1-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q22_A1.html">FP, Q[22], AA[1]</a>,2, that the whole community of the universe is governed by Divine Reason. Wherefore the very Idea of the government of things
+                     in God the
+                     Ruler of the universe, has the nature of a law. And since the Divine Reason's conception of things is not subject to time
+                     but is eternal, according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q91_A1-p6.3" href="./asv.html#Prov.8.23" target="asv"> Prov. 8:23, </a> therefore it is that this kind of law must be called eternal.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q91_A1-p7">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Those things that are not in themselves, exist with God, inasmuch as they are foreknown and preordained by Him, according
+                     to 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q91_A1-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.4.17" target="asv">Rom. 4:17</a>: "Who calls those things that are not, as those that are." Accordingly the eternal concept of the Divine law bears the character
+                     of an eternal law, in so far as it is ordained by God to the government of things foreknown by Him.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q91_A1-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Promulgation is made by word of mouth or in writing; and in both ways the eternal law is promulgated: because both the Divine
+                     Word and the writing of the Book of Life are eternal. But the promulgation cannot be from eternity on the part of the creature
+                     that hears or reads.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q91_A1-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The law implies order to the end actively, in so far as it directs certain things to the end; but not passively---that is
+                     to say, the law itself is not ordained to the end---except accidentally, in a governor whose end is extrinsic to him, and
+                     to which end his law must needs be ordained. But the end of the Divine government is God Himself, and His law is not distinct
+                     from Himself. Wherefore the eternal law is not ordained to another end.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q91_A1-p10"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q91_A1-p11"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q91.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q91_A2.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="FS_Q91_A2" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q91_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q91_A3.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="FS_Q91_A2-p0.1">Whether there is in us a natural law?</h4>
+                  <p id="FS_Q91_A2-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q91_A2-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that there is no natural law in us. Because man is governed sufficiently by the eternal law: for Augustine
+                     says (De Lib. Arb. i) that "the eternal law is that by which it is right that all things should be most orderly." But nature
+                     does not abound in superfluities as neither does she fail in necessaries. Therefore no law is natural to man.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q91_A2-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, by the law man is directed, in his acts, to the end, as stated above (
+                     <a id="FS_Q91_A2-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q90_A2.html">Q[90], A[2]</a>). But the directing of human acts to their end is not a function of nature, as is the case in irrational creatures, which
+                     act for an end solely by their natural appetite; whereas man acts for an end by his reason and will. Therefore no law is natural
+                     to man.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q91_A2-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the more a man is free, the less is he under the law. But man is freer than all the animals, on account of his free-will,
+                     with which he is endowed above all other animals. Since therefore other animals are not subject to a natural law, neither
+                     is man subject to a natural law.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q91_A2-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> A gloss on
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q91_A2-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.2.14" target="asv"> Rom. 2:14</a>: "When the Gentiles, who have not the law, do by nature those things that are of the law," comments as follows: "Although
+                     they have no written law, yet they have the natural law, whereby each one knows, and is conscious of, what is good and what
+                     is evil."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q91_A2-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above (Q[90], A[1], ad 1), law, being a rule and measure, can be in a person in two ways: in one way, as in him
+                     that rules and measures; in another way, as in that which is ruled and measured, since a thing is ruled and measured, in so
+                     far as it partakes of the rule or measure. Wherefore, since all things subject to Divine providence are ruled and measured
+                     by the eternal law, as was stated above 
+                     <a id="FS_Q91_A2-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q91_A1.html">(A[1])</a>; it is evident that
+                     all things partake somewhat of the eternal law, in so far as, namely, from its being imprinted on them, they derive their
+                     respective inclinations to their proper acts and ends. Now among all others, the rational creature is subject to Divine providence
+                     in the most excellent way, in so far as it partakes of a share of providence, by being provident both for itself and for others.
+                     Wherefore it has a share of the Eternal Reason, whereby it has a natural inclination to its proper act and end: and
+                     this participation of the eternal law in the rational creature is called the natural law. Hence the Psalmist after saying
+                     (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q91_A2-p6.2" href="./asv.html#Ps.4.6" target="asv">Ps. 4:6</a>): "Offer up the sacrifice of justice," as though someone asked what the works of justice are, adds: "Many say, Who showeth
+                     us good things?" in answer to which question he says: "The light of Thy countenance, O Lord, is signed upon us": thus implying
+                     that the light of natural reason, whereby we discern what is good and what is evil, which is the function of the
+                     natural law, is nothing else than an imprint on us of the Divine light. It is therefore evident that the natural law is nothing
+                     else than the rational creature's participation of the eternal law.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q91_A2-p7">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This argument would hold, if the natural law were something different from the eternal law: whereas it is nothing but a participation
+                     thereof, as stated above.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q91_A2-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Every act of reason and will in us is based on that which is according to nature, as stated above (
+                     <a id="FS_Q91_A2-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q10_A1.html">Q[10], A[1]</a>): for every act of reasoning is based on principles that are known naturally, and every act of appetite in respect of the
+                     means is derived from the natural appetite in respect of the last end. Accordingly the first direction of our acts to their
+                     end must needs be in virtue of the natural law.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q91_A2-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Even irrational animals partake in their own way of the Eternal Reason, just as the rational creature does. But because the
+                     rational creature partakes thereof in an intellectual and rational manner, therefore the participation of the eternal law
+                     in the rational creature is properly called a law, since a law is something pertaining to reason, as stated above (
+                     <a id="FS_Q91_A2-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q90_A1.html">Q[90], A[1]</a>). Irrational creatures, however, do not partake thereof
+                     in a rational manner, wherefore there is no participation of the eternal law in them, except by way of similitude.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q91_A2-p10"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q91_A2-p11"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q91_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q91_A3.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="FS_Q91_A3" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q91_A2.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q91_A4.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="FS_Q91_A3-p0.1">Whether there is a human law?</h4>
+                  <p id="FS_Q91_A3-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q91_A3-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that there is not a human law. For the natural law is a participation of the eternal law, as stated above 
+                     <a id="FS_Q91_A3-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q91_A2.html">(A[2])</a>. Now through the eternal law "all things are most orderly," as Augustine states (De Lib. Arb. i, 6). Therefore the natural
+                     law suffices for the ordering of all human affairs. Consequently there is no need for a human law.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q91_A3-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, a law bears the character of a measure, as stated above (
+                     <a id="FS_Q91_A3-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q90_A1.html">Q[90], A[1]</a>). But human reason is not a measure of things, but vice versa, as stated in Metaph. x, text. 5. Therefore no law can emanate
+                     from human reason.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q91_A3-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, a measure should be most certain, as stated in Metaph. x, text. 3. But the dictates of human reason in matters of
+                     conduct are uncertain, according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q91_A3-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.9.14" target="asv"> Wis. 9:14</a>: "The thoughts of mortal men are fearful, and our counsels uncertain." Therefore no law can emanate from human reason.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q91_A3-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine (De Lib. Arb. i, 6) distinguishes two kinds of law, the one eternal, the other temporal, which he calls human.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q91_A3-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above (
+                     <a id="FS_Q91_A3-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q90_A1.html">Q[90], A[1]</a>, ad 2), a law is a dictate of the practical reason. Now it is to be observed that the same procedure takes place in the practical
+                     and in the speculative reason: for each proceeds from principles to conclusions, as stated above (De Lib. Arb. i, 6). Accordingly
+                     we conclude that just as, in the speculative reason, from naturally known indemonstrable principles, we draw the conclusions
+                     of the various
+                     sciences, the knowledge of which is not imparted to us by nature, but acquired by the efforts of reason, so too it is from
+                     the precepts of the natural law, as from general and indemonstrable principles, that the human reason needs to proceed to
+                     the more particular determination of certain matters. These particular determinations, devised by human reason, are called
+                     human laws, provided the other essential conditions of law be observed, as stated above (
+                     <a id="FS_Q91_A3-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q90_A2.html">Q[90],
+                        AA[2]
+                     </a>,3,4). Wherefore Tully says in his Rhetoric (De Invent. Rhet. ii) that "justice has its source in nature; thence certain things
+                     came into custom by reason of their utility; afterwards these things which emanated from nature and were approved by custom,
+                     were sanctioned by fear and reverence for the law."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q91_A3-p7">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The human reason cannot have a full participation of the dictate of the Divine Reason, but according to its own mode, and
+                     imperfectly. Consequently, as on the part of the speculative reason, by a natural participation of Divine Wisdom, there is
+                     in us the knowledge of certain general principles, but not proper knowledge of each single truth, such as that contained in
+                     the Divine Wisdom; so too, on the part of the practical reason, man has a natural
+                     participation of the eternal law, according to certain general principles, but not as regards the particular determinations
+                     of individual cases, which are, however, contained in the eternal law. Hence the need for human reason to proceed further
+                     to sanction them by law.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q91_A3-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Human reason is not, of itself, the rule of things: but the principles impressed on it by nature, are general rules and measures
+                     of all things relating to human conduct, whereof the natural reason is the rule and measure, although it is not the measure
+                     of things that are from nature.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q91_A3-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The practical reason is concerned with practical matters, which are singular and contingent: but not with necessary things,
+                     with which the speculative reason is concerned. Wherefore human laws cannot have that inerrancy that belongs to the demonstrated
+                     conclusions of sciences. Nor is it necessary for every measure to be altogether unerring and certain, but according as it
+                     is possible in its own particular genus.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q91_A3-p10"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q91_A3-p11"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q91_A2.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q91_A4.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="FS_Q91_A4" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q91_A3.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q91_A5.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="FS_Q91_A4-p0.1">Whether there was any need for a Divine law?</h4>
+                  <p id="FS_Q91_A4-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q91_A4-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that there was no need for a Divine law. Because, as stated above 
+                     <a id="FS_Q91_A4-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q91_A2.html">(A[2])</a>, the natural law is a participation in us of the eternal law. But the eternal law is a Divine law, as stated above 
+                     <a id="FS_Q91_A4-p2.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q91_A1.html">(A[1])</a>. Therefore there was no need for a Divine law in addition to the natural law, and human laws derived therefrom.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q91_A4-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q91_A4-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.15.14" target="asv">Ecclus. 15:14</a>) that "God left man in the hand of his own counsel." Now counsel is an act of reason, as stated above (Q[14], A[1]). Therefore
+                     man was left to the direction of his reason. But a dictate of human reason is a human law as stated above 
+                     <a id="FS_Q91_A4-p3.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q91_A3.html">(A[3])</a>. Therefore there is no need for man to be governed also by a Divine law.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q91_A4-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, human nature is more self-sufficing than irrational creatures. But irrational creatures have no Divine law besides
+                     the natural inclination impressed on them. Much less, therefore, should the rational creature have a Divine law in addition
+                     to the natural law.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q91_A4-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> David prayed God to set His law before him, saying (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q91_A4-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.118.33" target="asv">Ps. 118:33</a>): "Set before me for a law the way of Thy justifications, O Lord."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q91_A4-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> Besides the natural and the human law it was necessary for the directing of human conduct to have a Divine law. And this
+                     for four reasons. First, because it is by law that man is directed how to perform his proper acts in view of his last end.
+                     And indeed if man were ordained to no other end than that which is proportionate to his natural faculty, there would be no
+                     need for man to have any further direction of the part of his reason, besides the natural law
+                     and human law which is derived from it. But since man is ordained to an end of eternal happiness which is inproportionate
+                     to man's natural faculty, as stated above (
+                     <a id="FS_Q91_A4-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q5_A5.html">Q[5], A[5]</a>), therefore it was necessary that, besides the natural and the human law, man should be directed to his end by a law given
+                     by God.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q91_A4-p7"> Secondly, because, on account of the uncertainty of human judgment, especially on contingent and particular matters, different
+                     people form different judgments on human acts; whence also different and contrary laws result. In order, therefore, that man
+                     may know without any doubt what he ought to do and what he ought to avoid, it was necessary for man to be directed in his
+                     proper acts by a law given by God, for it is certain that such a law cannot err.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q91_A4-p8"> Thirdly, because man can make laws in those matters of which he is competent to judge. But man is not competent to judge
+                     of interior movements, that are hidden, but only of exterior acts which appear: and yet for the perfection of virtue it is
+                     necessary for man to conduct himself aright in both kinds of acts. Consequently human law could not sufficiently curb and
+                     direct interior acts; and it was necessary for this purpose that a Divine law should supervene.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q91_A4-p9"> Fourthly, because, as Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. i, 5,6), human law cannot punish or forbid all evil deeds: since while
+                     aiming at doing away with all evils, it would do away with many good things, and would hinder the advance of the common good,
+                     which is necessary for human intercourse. In order, therefore, that no evil might remain unforbidden and unpunished, it was
+                     necessary for the Divine law to supervene, whereby all sins are forbidden.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q91_A4-p10"> And these four causes are touched upon in
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q91_A4-p10.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.118.8" target="asv"> Ps. 118:8, </a> where it is said: "The law of the Lord is unspotted," i.e. allowing no foulness of sin; "converting souls," because it directs
+                     not only exterior, but also interior acts; "the testimony of the Lord is faithful," because of the certainty of what is true
+                     and right; "giving wisdom to little ones," by directing man to an end supernatural and Divine.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q91_A4-p11">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> By the natural law the eternal law is participated proportionately to the capacity of human nature. But to his supernatural
+                     end man needs to be directed in a yet higher way. Hence the additional law given by God, whereby man shares more perfectly
+                     in the eternal law.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q91_A4-p12">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Counsel is a kind of inquiry: hence it must proceed from some principles. Nor is it enough for it to proceed from principles
+                     imparted by nature, which are the precepts of the natural law, for the reasons given above: but there is need for certain
+                     additional principles, namely, the precepts of the Divine law.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q91_A4-p13">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Irrational creatures are not ordained to an end higher than that which is proportionate to their natural powers: consequently
+                     the comparison fails.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q91_A4-p14"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q91_A4-p15"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q91_A3.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q91_A5.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="FS_Q91_A5" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q91_A4.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q91_A6.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="FS_Q91_A5-p0.1">Whether there is but one Divine law?</h4>
+                  <p id="FS_Q91_A5-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q91_A5-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that there is but one Divine law. Because, where there is one king in one kingdom there is but one law. Now
+                     the whole of mankind is compared to God as to one king, according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q91_A5-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.46.8" target="asv"> Ps. 46:8</a>: "God is the King of all the earth." Therefore there is but one Divine law.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q91_A5-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, every law is directed to the end which the lawgiver intends for those for whom he makes the law. But God intends
+                     one and the same thing for all men; since according to 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q91_A5-p3.1" href="./asv.html#iTim.2.4" target="asv">1 Tim. 2:4</a>: "He will have all men to be saved, and to come to the knowledge of the truth." Therefore there is but one Divine law.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q91_A5-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the Divine law seems to be more akin to the eternal law, which is one, than the natural law, according as the revelation
+                     of grace is of a higher order than natural knowledge. Therefore much more is the Divine law but one.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q91_A5-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle says (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q91_A5-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Heb.7.12" target="asv">Heb. 7:12</a>): "The priesthood being translated, it is necessary that a translation also be made of the law." But the priesthood is twofold,
+                     as stated in the same passage, viz. the levitical priesthood, and the priesthood of Christ. Therefore the Divine law is twofold,
+                     namely the Old Law and the New Law.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q91_A5-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated in the 
+                     <a id="FS_Q91_A5-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q30_A3.html">FP, Q[30], A[3]</a>, distinction is the cause of number. Now things may be distinguished in two ways. First, as those things that are altogether
+                     specifically different, e.g. a horse and an ox. Secondly, as perfect and imperfect in the same species, e.g. a boy and a man:
+                     and in this way the Divine law is divided into Old and New. Hence the Apostle (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q91_A5-p6.2" href="./asv.html#Gal.3.24" target="asv">Gal. 3:24,25</a>) compares the state of man under the Old
+                     Law to that of a child "under a pedagogue"; but the state under the New Law, to that of a full grown man, who is "no longer
+                     under a pedagogue."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q91_A5-p7"> Now the perfection and imperfection of these two laws is to be taken in connection with the three conditions pertaining to
+                     law, as stated above. For, in the first place, it belongs to law to be directed to the common good as to its end, as stated
+                     above (
+                     <a id="FS_Q91_A5-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q90_A2.html">Q[90], A[2]</a>). This good may be twofold. It may be a sensible and earthly good; and to this, man was directly ordained by the Old Law:
+                     wherefore, at the very outset of the law, the people were invited to
+                     the earthly kingdom of the Chananaeans (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q91_A5-p7.2" href="./asv.html#Exod.3.8" target="asv">Ex. 3:8</a>, 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q91_A5-p7.3" href="./asv.html#Exod.3.17" target="asv">17</a>). Again it may be an intelligible and heavenly good: and to this, man is ordained by the New Law. Wherefore, at the very
+                     beginning of His preaching, Christ invited men to the kingdom of heaven, saying (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q91_A5-p7.4" href="./asv.html#Matt.4.17" target="asv">Mat. 4:17</a>): "Do penance, for the kingdom of heaven is at hand." Hence Augustine says (Contra Faust. iv) that "promises of temporal
+                     goods are contained in the Old Testament, for which reason it is called old; but the promise of
+                     eternal life belongs to the New Testament."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q91_A5-p8"> Secondly, it belongs to the law to direct human acts according to the order of righteousness 
+                     <a id="FS_Q91_A5-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q91_A4.html">(A[4])</a>: wherein also the New Law surpasses the Old Law, since it directs our internal acts, according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q91_A5-p8.2" href="./asv.html#Matt.5.20" target="asv"> Mat. 5:20</a>: "Unless your justice abound more than that of the Scribes and Pharisees, you shall not enter into the kingdom of heaven."
+                     Hence the saying that "the Old Law restrains the hand, but the New Law controls the mind" ( Sentent. iii,
+                     D, xl).
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q91_A5-p9"> Thirdly, it belongs to the law to induce men to observe its commandments. This the Old Law did by the fear of punishment:
+                     but the New Law, by love, which is poured into our hearts by the grace of Christ, bestowed in the New Law, but foreshadowed
+                     in the Old. Hence Augustine says (Contra Adimant. Manich. discip. xvii) that "there is little difference [*The 'little difference'
+                     refers to the Latin words 'timor' and 'amor'---'fear' and 'love.'] between the Law and the Gospel---fear
+                     and love."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q91_A5-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As the father of a family issues different commands to the children and to the adults, so also the one King, God, in His
+                     one kingdom, gave one law to men, while they were yet imperfect, and another more perfect law, when, by the preceding law,
+                     they had been led to a greater capacity for Divine things.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q91_A5-p11">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The salvation of man could not be achieved otherwise than through Christ, according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q91_A5-p11.1" href="./asv.html#Acts.4.12" target="asv"> Acts 4:12</a>: "There is no other name . . . given to men, whereby we must be saved." Consequently the law that brings all to salvation
+                     could not be given until after the coming of Christ. But before His coming it was necessary to give to the people, of whom
+                     Christ was to be born, a law containing certain rudiments of righteousness unto salvation,
+                     in order to prepare them to receive Him.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q91_A5-p12">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The natural law directs man by way of certain general precepts, common to both the perfect and the imperfect: wherefore it
+                     is one and the same for all. But the Divine law directs man also in certain particular matters, to which the perfect and imperfect
+                     do not stand in the same relation. Hence the necessity for the Divine law to be twofold, as already explained.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q91_A5-p13"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q91_A5-p14"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q91_A4.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q91_A6.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="FS_Q91_A6" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q91_A5.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q92.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="FS_Q91_A6-p0.1">Whether there is a law in the fomes of sin?</h4>
+                  <p id="FS_Q91_A6-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q91_A6-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that there is no law of the "fomes" of sin. For Isidore says (Etym. v) that the "law is based on reason." But
+                     the "fomes" of sin is not based on reason, but deviates from it. Therefore the "fomes" has not the nature of a law.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q91_A6-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, every law is binding, so that those who do not obey it are called transgressors. But man is not called a transgressor,
+                     from not following the instigations of the "fomes"; but rather from his following them. Therefore the "fomes" has not the
+                     nature of a law.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q91_A6-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the law is ordained to the common good, as stated above (
+                     <a id="FS_Q91_A6-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q90_A2.html">Q[90], A[2]</a>). But the "fomes" inclines us, not to the common, but to our own private good. Therefore the "fomes" has not the nature of
+                     sin.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q91_A6-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle says (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q91_A6-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.7.23" target="asv">Rom. 7:23</a>): "I see another law in my members, fighting against the law of my mind."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q91_A6-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above 
+                     <a id="FS_Q91_A6-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q91_A2.html">(A[2];</a> Q[90], A[1], ad 1), the law, as to its essence, resides in him that rules and measures; but, by way of participation, in
+                     that which is ruled and measured; so that every inclination or ordination which may be found in things subject to the law,
+                     is called a law by participation, as stated above 
+                     <a id="FS_Q91_A6-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q91_A2.html">(A[2];</a> Q[90], A[1] , ad 1). Now those who are subject to a law may receive a twofold
+                     inclination from the lawgiver. First, in so far as he directly inclines his subjects to something; sometimes indeed different
+                     subjects to different acts; in this way we may say that there is a military law and a mercantile law. Secondly, indirectly;
+                     thus by the very fact that a lawgiver deprives a subject of some dignity, the latter passes into another order, so as to be
+                     under another law, as it were: thus if a soldier be turned out of the army, he becomes a subject of rural or of mercantile
+                     legislation.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q91_A6-p7"> Accordingly under the Divine Lawgiver various creatures have various natural inclinations, so that what is, as it were, a
+                     law for one, is against the law for another: thus I might say that fierceness is, in a way, the law of a dog, but against
+                     the law of a sheep or another meek animal. And so the law of man, which, by the Divine ordinance, is allotted to him, according
+                     to his proper natural condition, is that he should act in accordance with reason: and this law was so effective
+                     in the primitive state, that nothing either beside or against reason could take man unawares. But when man turned his back
+                     on God, he fell under the influence of his sensual impulses: in fact this happens to each one individually, the more he deviates
+                     from the path of reason, so that, after a fashion, he is likened to the beasts that are led by the impulse of sensuality,
+                     according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q91_A6-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.48.21" target="asv"> Ps. 48:21</a>: "Man, when he was in honor, did not understand: he hath been compared to
+                     senseless beasts, and made like to them."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q91_A6-p8"> So, then, this very inclination of sensuality which is called the "fomes," in other animals has simply the nature of a law
+                     (yet only in so far as a law may be said to be in such things), by reason of a direct inclination. But in man, it has not
+                     the nature of law in this way, rather is it a deviation from the law of reason. But since, by the just sentence of God, man
+                     is destitute of original justice, and his reason bereft of its vigor, this impulse of sensuality, whereby he is
+                     led, in so far as it is a penalty following from the Divine law depriving man of his proper dignity, has the nature of a law.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q91_A6-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This argument considers the "fomes" in itself, as an incentive to evil. It is not thus that it has the nature of a law, as
+                     stated above, but according as it results from the justice of the Divine law: it is as though we were to say that the law
+                     allows a nobleman to be condemned to hard labor for some misdeed.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q91_A6-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> This argument considers law in the light of a rule or measure: for it is in this sense that those who deviate from the law
+                     become transgressors. But the "fomes" is not a law in this respect, but by a kind of participation, as stated above.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q91_A6-p11">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This argument considers the "fomes" as to its proper inclination, and not as to its origin. And yet if the inclination of
+                     sensuality be considered as it is in other animals, thus it is ordained to the common good, namely, to the preservation of
+                     nature in the species or in the individual. And this is in man also, in so far as sensuality is subject to reason. But it
+                     is called "fomes" in so far as it strays from the order of reason.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q91_A6-p12"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q91_A6-p13"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q91_A5.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q92.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <a href="summa.FS_Q90_A4.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.FS_Q91_A1.html"></a>
+            </div>
+            <div id="FS_Q92" class="div3">
+               <a href="summa.FS_Q91_A6.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.FS_Q92_A1.html"></a>
+               <h3 id="FS_Q92-p0.1">OF THE EFFECTS OF LAW (TWO ARTICLES)</h3>
+               <p id="FS_Q92-p1"></p>
+               <p id="FS_Q92-p2"> We must now consider the effects of law; under which head there are two points of inquiry:</p>
+               <p id="FS_Q92-p3"> (1) Whether an effect of law is to make men good?</p>
+               <p id="FS_Q92-p4"> (2) Whether the effects of law are to command, to forbid, to permit, and to punish, as the Jurist states?</p>
+               <div id="FS_Q92_A1" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q92.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q92_A2.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="FS_Q92_A1-p0.1">Whether an effect of law is to make men good?</h4>
+                  <p id="FS_Q92_A1-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q92_A1-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that it is not an effect of law to make men good. For men are good through virtue, since virtue, as stated in Ethic.
+                     ii, 6 is "that which makes its subject good." But virtue is in man from God alone, because He it is Who "works it in us without
+                     us," as we stated above (
+                     <a id="FS_Q92_A1-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q55_A4.html">Q[55], A[4]</a>) in giving the definition of virtue. Therefore the law does not make men good.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q92_A1-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Law does not profit a man unless he obeys it. But the very fact that a man obeys a law is due to his being good.
+                     Therefore in man goodness is presupposed to the law. Therefore the law does not make men good.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q92_A1-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Law is ordained to the common good, as stated above (
+                     <a id="FS_Q92_A1-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q90_A2.html">Q[90], A[2]</a>). But some behave well in things regarding the community, who behave ill in things regarding themselves. Therefore it is
+                     not the business of the law to make men good.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q92_A1-p5">
+                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, some laws are tyrannical, as the Philosopher says (Polit. iii, 6). But a tyrant does not intend the good of his
+                     subjects, but considers only his own profit. Therefore law does not make men good.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q92_A1-p6">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 1) that the "intention of every lawgiver is to make good citizens."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q92_A1-p7">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> as stated above (Q[90], A[1], ad 2; 
+                     <a id="FS_Q92_A1-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q92_A3.html">AA[3]</a>,4), a law is nothing else than a dictate of reason in the ruler by whom his subjects are governed. Now the virtue of any
+                     subordinate thing consists in its being well subordinated to that by which it is regulated: thus we see that the virtue of
+                     the irascible and concupiscible faculties consists in their being obedient to reason; and accordingly "the virtue of every
+                     subject consists in his
+                     being well subjected to his ruler," as the Philosopher says (Polit. i). But every law aims at being obeyed by those who are
+                     subject to it. Consequently it is evident that the proper effect of law is to lead its subjects to their proper virtue: and
+                     since virtue is "that which makes its subject good," it follows that the proper effect of law is to make those to whom it
+                     is given, good, either simply or in some particular respect. For if the intention of the lawgiver is fixed on true good, which
+                     is
+                     the common good regulated according to Divine justice, it follows that the effect of the law is to make men good simply. If,
+                     however, the intention of the lawgiver is fixed on that which is not simply good, but useful or pleasurable to himself, or
+                     in opposition to Divine justice; then the law does not make men good simply, but in respect to that particular government.
+                     In this way good is found even in things that are bad of themselves: thus a man is called a good robber, because he works
+                     in a
+                     way that is adapted to his end.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q92_A1-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Virtue is twofold, as explained above (
+                     <a id="FS_Q92_A1-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q63_A2.html">Q[63], A[2]</a>), viz. acquired and infused. Now the fact of being accustomed to an action contributes to both, but in different ways; for
+                     it causes the acquired virtue; while it disposes to infused virtue, and preserves and fosters it when it already exists. And
+                     since law is given for the purpose of directing human acts; as far as human acts conduce to virtue, so far does law make men
+                     good.
+                     Wherefore the Philosopher says in the second book of the Politics (Ethic. ii) that "lawgivers make men good by habituating
+                     them to good works."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q92_A1-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> It is not always through perfect goodness of virtue that one obeys the law, but sometimes it is through fear of punishment,
+                     and sometimes from the mere dictates of reason, which is a beginning of virtue, as stated above (
+                     <a id="FS_Q92_A1-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q63_A1.html">Q[63], A[1]</a>).
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q92_A1-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The goodness of any part is considered in comparison with the whole; hence Augustine says (Confess. iii) that "unseemly is
+                     the part that harmonizes not with the whole." Since then every man is a part of the state, it is impossible that a man be
+                     good, unless he be well proportionate to the common good: nor can the whole be well consistent unless its parts be proportionate
+                     to it. Consequently the common good of the state cannot flourish, unless the
+                     citizens be virtuous, at least those whose business it is to govern. But it is enough for the good of the community, that
+                     the other citizens be so far virtuous that they obey the commands of their rulers. Hence the Philosopher says (Polit. ii,
+                     2) that "the virtue of a sovereign is the same as that of a good man, but the virtue of any common citizen is not the same
+                     as that of a good man."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q92_A1-p11">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> A tyrannical law, through not being according to reason, is not a law, absolutely speaking, but rather a perversion of law;
+                     and yet in so far as it is something in the nature of a law, it aims at the citizens' being good. For all it has in the nature
+                     of a law consists in its being an ordinance made by a superior to his subjects, and aims at being obeyed by them, which is
+                     to make them good, not simply, but with respect to that particular
+                     government.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q92_A1-p12"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q92_A1-p13"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q92.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q92_A2.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="FS_Q92_A2" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q92_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q93.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="FS_Q92_A2-p0.1">Whether the acts of law are suitably assigned?</h4>
+                  <p id="FS_Q92_A2-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q92_A2-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the acts of law are not suitably assigned as consisting in "command," "prohibition," "permission" and
+                     "punishment." For "every law is a general precept," as the jurist states. But command and precept are the same. Therefore
+                     the other three are superfluous.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q92_A2-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the effect of a law is to induce its subjects to be good, as stated above 
+                     <a id="FS_Q92_A2-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q92_A1.html">(A[1])</a>. But counsel aims at a higher good than a command does. Therefore it belongs to law to counsel rather than to command.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q92_A2-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, just as punishment stirs a man to good deeds, so does reward. Therefore if to punish is reckoned an effect of law,
+                     so also is to reward.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q92_A2-p5">
+                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, the intention of a lawgiver is to make men good, as stated above 
+                     <a id="FS_Q92_A2-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q92_A1.html">(A[1])</a>. But he that obeys the law, merely through fear of being punished, is not good: because "although a good deed may be done
+                     through servile fear, i.e. fear of punishment, it is not done well," as Augustine says (Contra duas Epist. Pelag. ii). Therefore
+                     punishment is not a proper effect of law.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q92_A2-p6">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Isidore says (Etym. v, 19): "Every law either permits something, as: 'A brave man may demand his reward'": or forbids something,
+                     as: "No man may ask a consecrated virgin in marriage": or punishes, as: "Let him that commits a murder be put to death."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q92_A2-p7">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> Just as an assertion is a dictate of reason asserting something, so is a law a dictate of reason, commanding something. Now
+                     it is proper to reason to lead from one thing to another. Wherefore just as, in demonstrative sciences, the reason leads us
+                     from certain principles to assent to the conclusion, so it induces us by some means to assent to the precept of the law.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q92_A2-p8"> Now the precepts of law are concerned with human acts, in which the law directs, as stated above (
+                     <a id="FS_Q92_A2-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q90_A1.html">Q[90], AA[1]</a>,2;
+                     <a id="FS_Q92_A2-p8.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q91_A4.html"> Q[91], A[4]</a>). Again there are three kinds of human acts: for, as stated above (
+                     <a id="FS_Q92_A2-p8.3" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q18_A8.html">Q[18], A[8]</a>), some acts are good generically, viz. acts of virtue; and in respect of these the act of the law is a precept or command,
+                     for "the law commands all acts of virtue" (Ethic. v, 1). Some acts are evil
+                     generically, viz. acts of vice, and in respect of these the law forbids. Some acts are generically indifferent, and in respect
+                     of these the law permits; and all acts that are either not distinctly good or not distinctly bad may be called indifferent.
+                     And it is the fear of punishment that law makes use of in order to ensure obedience: in which respect punishment is an effect
+                     of law.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q92_A2-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Just as to cease from evil is a kind of good, so a prohibition is a kind of precept: and accordingly, taking precept in a
+                     wide sense, every law is a kind of precept.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q92_A2-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> To advise is not a proper act of law, but may be within the competency even of a private person, who cannot make a law. Wherefore
+                     too the Apostle, after giving a certain counsel (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q92_A2-p10.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.7.12" target="asv">1 Cor. 7:12</a>) says: "I speak, not the Lord." Consequently it is not reckoned as an effect of law.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q92_A2-p11">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> To reward may also pertain to anyone: but to punish pertains to none but the framer of the law, by whose authority the pain
+                     is inflicted. Wherefore to reward is not reckoned an effect of law, but only to punish.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q92_A2-p12">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> From becoming accustomed to avoid evil and fulfill what is good, through fear of punishment, one is sometimes led on to do
+                     so likewise, with delight and of one's own accord. Accordingly, law, even by punishing, leads men on to being good.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q92_A2-p13"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q92_A2-p14"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q92_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q93.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <a href="summa.FS_Q91_A6.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.FS_Q92_A1.html"></a>
+            </div>
+            <div id="FS_Q93" class="div3">
+               <a href="summa.FS_Q92_A2.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.FS_Q93_A1.html"></a>
+               <h3 id="FS_Q93-p0.1">OF THE ETERNAL LAW (SIX ARTICLES)</h3>
+               <p id="FS_Q93-p1"></p>
+               <p id="FS_Q93-p2"> We must now consider each law by itself; and (1) The eternal law; (2) The natural law; (3) The human law; (4) The old law;
+                  (5) The new law, which is the law of the Gospel. Of the sixth law which is the law of the "fomes," suffice what we have said
+                  when treating of original sin.
+               </p>
+               <p id="FS_Q93-p3"> Concerning the first there are six points of inquiry:</p>
+               <p id="FS_Q93-p4"> (1) What is the eternal law?</p>
+               <p id="FS_Q93-p5"> (2) Whether it is known to all?</p>
+               <p id="FS_Q93-p6"> (3) Whether every law is derived from it?</p>
+               <p id="FS_Q93-p7"> (4) Whether necessary things are subject to the eternal law?</p>
+               <p id="FS_Q93-p8"> (5) Whether natural contingencies are subject to the eternal law?</p>
+               <p id="FS_Q93-p9"> (6) Whether all human things are subject to it?</p>
+               <div id="FS_Q93_A1" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q93.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q93_A2.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="FS_Q93_A1-p0.1">Whether the eternal law is a sovereign type [*Ratio] existing in God?</h4>
+                  <p id="FS_Q93_A1-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q93_A1-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the eternal law is not a sovereign type existing in God. For there is only one eternal law. But there
+                     are many types of things in the Divine mind; for Augustine says (Qq. lxxxiii, qu. 46) that God "made each thing according
+                     to its type." Therefore the eternal law does not seem to be a type existing in the Divine mind.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q93_A1-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it is essential to a law that it be promulgated by word, as stated above (Q[90], A[4]). But Word is a Personal name
+                     in God, as stated in the 
+                     <a id="FS_Q93_A1-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q34_A1.html">FP, Q[34], A[1]</a>: whereas type refers to the Essence. Therefore the eternal law is not the same as a Divine type.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q93_A1-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Augustine says (De Vera Relig. xxx): "We see a law above our minds, which is called truth." But the law which is
+                     above our minds is the eternal law. Therefore truth is the eternal law. But the idea of truth is not the same as the idea
+                     of a type. Therefore the eternal law is not the same as the sovereign type.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q93_A1-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. i, 6) that "the eternal law is the sovereign type, to which we must always conform."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q93_A1-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> Just as in every artificer there pre-exists a type of the things that are made by his art, so too in every governor there
+                     must pre-exist the type of the order of those things that are to be done by those who are subject to his government. And just
+                     as the type of the things yet to be made by an art is called the art or exemplar of the products of that art, so too the type
+                     in him who governs the acts of his subjects, bears the character of a law, provided the
+                     other conditions be present which we have mentioned above (Q[90]). Now God, by His wisdom, is the Creator of all things in
+                     relation to which He stands as the artificer to the products of his art, as stated in the 
+                     <a id="FS_Q93_A1-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q14_A8.html">FP, Q[14], A[8]</a>. Moreover He governs all the acts and movements that are to be found in each single creature, as was also stated in the 
+                     <a id="FS_Q93_A1-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q103_A5.html">FP, Q[103], A[5]</a>. Wherefore as the type of the Divine Wisdom, inasmuch as by It all things are
+                     created, has the character of art, exemplar or idea; so the type of Divine Wisdom, as moving all things to their due end,
+                     bears the character of law. Accordingly the eternal law is nothing else than the type of Divine Wisdom, as directing all actions
+                     and movements.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q93_A1-p7">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Augustine is speaking in that passage of the ideal types which regard the proper nature of each single thing; and consequently
+                     in them there is a certain distinction and plurality, according to their different relations to things, as stated in the 
+                     <a id="FS_Q93_A1-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q15_A2.html">FP, Q[15], A[2]</a>. But law is said to direct human acts by ordaining them to the common good, as stated above (Q[90], A[2]). And things, which
+                     are in themselves different, may be
+                     considered as one, according as they are ordained to one common thing. Wherefore the eternal law is one since it is the type
+                     of this order.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q93_A1-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> With regard to any sort of word, two points may be considered: viz. the word itself, and that which is expressed by the word.
+                     For the spoken word is something uttered by the mouth of man, and expresses that which is signified by the human word. The
+                     same applies to the human mental word, which is nothing else that something conceived by the mind, by which man expresses
+                     his thoughts mentally. So then in God the Word conceived by the intellect of the
+                     Father is the name of a Person: but all things that are in the Father's knowledge, whether they refer to the Essence or to
+                     the Persons, or to the works of God, are expressed by this Word, as Augustine declares (De Trin. xv, 14). And among other
+                     things expressed by this Word, the eternal law itself is expressed thereby. Nor does it follow that the eternal law is a Personal
+                     name in God: yet it is appropriated to the Son, on account of the kinship between type and word.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q93_A1-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The types of the Divine intellect do not stand in the same relation to things, as the types of the human intellect. For the
+                     human intellect is measured by things, so that a human concept is not true by reason of itself, but by reason of its being
+                     consonant with things, since "an opinion is true or false according as it answers to the reality." But the Divine intellect
+                     is the measure of things: since each thing has so far truth in it, as it represents
+                     the Divine intellect, as was stated in the 
+                     <a id="FS_Q93_A1-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q16_A1.html">FP, Q[16], A[1]</a>. Consequently the Divine intellect is true in itself; and its type is truth itself.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q93_A1-p10"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q93_A1-p11"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q93.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q93_A2.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="FS_Q93_A2" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q93_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q93_A3.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="FS_Q93_A2-p0.1">Whether the eternal law is known to all?</h4>
+                  <p id="FS_Q93_A2-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q93_A2-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the eternal law is not known to all. Because, as the Apostle says (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q93_A2-p2.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.2.11" target="asv">1 Cor. 2:11</a>), "the things that are of God no man knoweth, but the Spirit of God." But the eternal law is a type existing in the Divine
+                     mind. Therefore it is unknown to all save God alone.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q93_A2-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, as Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. i, 6) "the eternal law is that by which it is right that all things should be most
+                     orderly." But all do not know how all things are most orderly. Therefore all do not know the eternal law.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q93_A2-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Augustine says (De Vera Relig. xxxi) that "the eternal law is not subject to the judgment of man." But according
+                     to Ethic. i, "any man can judge well of what he knows." Therefore the eternal law is not known to us.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q93_A2-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. i, 6) that "knowledge of the eternal law is imprinted on us."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q93_A2-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> A thing may be known in two ways: first, in itself; secondly, in its effect, wherein some likeness of that thing is found:
+                     thus someone not seeing the sun in its substance, may know it by its rays. So then no one can know the eternal law, as it
+                     is in itself, except the blessed who see God in His Essence. But every rational creature knows it in its reflection, greater
+                     or less. For every knowledge of truth is a kind of reflection and participation of the
+                     eternal law, which is the unchangeable truth, as Augustine says (De Vera Relig. xxxi). Now all men know the truth to a certain
+                     extent, at least as to the common principles of the natural law: and as to the others, they partake of the knowledge of truth,
+                     some more, some less; and in this respect are more or less cognizant of the eternal law.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q93_A2-p7">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> We cannot know the things that are of God, as they are in themselves; but they are made known to us in their effects, according
+                     to 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q93_A2-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.1.20" target="asv"> Rom. 1:20</a>: "The invisible things of God . . . are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q93_A2-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Although each one knows the eternal law according to his own capacity, in the way explained above, yet none can comprehend
+                     it: for it cannot be made perfectly known by its effects. Therefore it does not follow that anyone who knows the eternal law
+                     in the way aforesaid, knows also the whole order of things, whereby they are most orderly.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q93_A2-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> To judge a thing may be understood in two ways. First, as when a cognitive power judges of its proper object, according to
+                     
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q93_A2-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Job.12.11" target="asv">Job 12:11</a>: "Doth not the ear discern words, and the palate of him that eateth, the taste?" It is to this kind of judgment that the
+                     Philosopher alludes when he says that "anyone can judge well of what he knows," by judging, namely, whether what is put forward
+                     is true. In another way we speak of a superior judging of a subordinate
+                     by a kind of practical judgment, as to whether he should be such and such or not. And thus none can judge of the eternal law.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q93_A2-p10"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q93_A2-p11"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q93_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q93_A3.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="FS_Q93_A3" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q93_A2.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q93_A4.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="FS_Q93_A3-p0.1">Whether every law is derived from the eternal law?</h4>
+                  <p id="FS_Q93_A3-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q93_A3-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that not every law is derived from the eternal law. For there is a law of the "fomes," as stated above (
+                     <a id="FS_Q93_A3-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q91_A6.html">Q[91], A[6]</a>), which is not derived from that Divine law which is the eternal law, since thereunto pertains the "prudence of the flesh,"
+                     of which the Apostle says (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q93_A3-p2.2" href="./asv.html#Rom.8.7" target="asv">Rom. 8:7</a>), that "it cannot be subject to the law of God." Therefore not every law is derived from the eternal law.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q93_A3-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, nothing unjust can be derived from the eternal law, because, as stated above (A[2], OBJ[2]), "the eternal law is
+                     that, according to which it is right that all things should be most orderly." But some laws are unjust, according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q93_A3-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.10.1" target="asv"> Is. 10:1</a>: "Woe to them that make wicked laws." Therefore not every law is derived from the eternal law.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q93_A3-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. i, 5) that "the law which is framed for ruling the people, rightly permits many things
+                     which are punished by Divine providence." But the type of Divine providence is the eternal law, as stated above 
+                     <a id="FS_Q93_A3-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q93_A1.html">(A[1])</a>. Therefore not even every good law is derived from the eternal law.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q93_A3-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Divine Wisdom says (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q93_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Prov.8.15" target="asv">Prov. 8:15</a>): "By Me kings reign, and lawgivers decree just things." But the type of Divine Wisdom is the eternal law, as stated above
+                     
+                     <a id="FS_Q93_A3-p5.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q93_A1.html">(A[1])</a>. Therefore all laws proceed from the eternal law.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q93_A3-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above (
+                     <a id="FS_Q93_A3-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q90_A1.html">Q[90], AA[1]</a>,2), the law denotes a kind of plan directing acts towards an end. Now wherever there are movers ordained to one another,
+                     the power of the second mover must needs be derived from the power of the first mover; since the second mover does not move
+                     except in so far as it is moved by the first. Wherefore we observe the same in all those who govern, so that the plan of government
+                     is derived by secondary
+                     governors from the governor in chief; thus the plan of what is to be done in a state flows from the king's command to his
+                     inferior administrators: and again in things of art the plan of whatever is to be done by art flows from the chief craftsman
+                     to the under-crafts-men, who work with their hands. Since then the eternal law is the plan of government in the Chief Governor,
+                     all the plans of government in the inferior governors must be derived from the eternal law. But these plans of inferior
+                     governors are all other laws besides the eternal law. Therefore all laws, in so far as they partake of right reason, are derived
+                     from the eternal law. Hence Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. i, 6) that "in temporal law there is nothing just and lawful, but
+                     what man has drawn from the eternal law."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q93_A3-p7">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The "fomes" has the nature of law in man, in so far as it is a punishment resulting from Divine justice; and in this respect
+                     it is evident that it is derived from the eternal law. But in so far as it denotes a proneness to sin, it is contrary to the
+                     Divine law, and has not the nature of law, as stated above (
+                     <a id="FS_Q93_A3-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q91_A6.html">Q[91], A[6]</a>).
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q93_A3-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Human law has the nature of law in so far as it partakes of right reason; and it is clear that, in this respect, it is derived
+                     from the eternal law. But in so far as it deviates from reason, it is called an unjust law, and has the nature, not of law
+                     but of violence. Nevertheless even an unjust law, in so far as it retains some appearance of law, though being framed by one
+                     who is in power, is derived from the eternal law; since all power is from the
+                     Lord God, according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q93_A3-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.13.1" target="asv"> Rom. 13:1.</a>
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q93_A3-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Human law is said to permit certain things, not as approving them, but as being unable to direct them. And many things are
+                     directed by the Divine law, which human law is unable to direct, because more things are subject to a higher than to a lower
+                     cause. Hence the very fact that human law does not meddle with matters it cannot direct, comes under the ordination of the
+                     eternal law. It would be different, were human law to sanction what the eternal law
+                     condemns. Consequently it does not follow that human law is not derived from the eternal law, but that it is not on a perfect
+                     equality with it.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q93_A3-p10"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q93_A3-p11"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q93_A2.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q93_A4.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="FS_Q93_A4" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q93_A3.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q93_A5.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="FS_Q93_A4-p0.1">Whether necessary and eternal things are subject to the eternal law?</h4>
+                  <p id="FS_Q93_A4-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q93_A4-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that necessary and eternal things are subject to the eternal law. For whatever is reasonable is subject to
+                     reason. But the Divine will is reasonable, for it is just. Therefore it is subject to (the Divine) reason. But the eternal
+                     law is the Divine reason. Therefore God's will is subject to the eternal law. But God's will is eternal. Therefore eternal
+                     and necessary things are subject to the eternal law.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q93_A4-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, whatever is subject to the King, is subject to the King's law. Now the Son, according to 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q93_A4-p3.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.15.28" target="asv">1 Cor. 15:28,24, </a> "shall be subject . . . to God and the Father . . . when He shall have delivered up the Kingdom to Him." Therefore the Son,
+                     Who is eternal, is subject to the eternal law.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q93_A4-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the eternal law is Divine providence as a type. But many necessary things are subject to Divine providence: for
+                     instance, the stability of incorporeal substances and of the heavenly bodies. Therefore even necessary things are subject
+                     to the eternal law.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q93_A4-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Things that are necessary cannot be otherwise, and consequently need no restraining. But laws are imposed on men, in order
+                     to restrain them from evil, as explained above (
+                     <a id="FS_Q93_A4-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q92_A2.html">Q[92], A[2]</a>). Therefore necessary things are not subject to the eternal law.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q93_A4-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above 
+                     <a id="FS_Q93_A4-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q93_A1.html">(A[1])</a>, the eternal law is the type of the Divine government. Consequently whatever is subject to the Divine government, is subject
+                     to the eternal law: while if anything is not subject to the Divine government, neither is it subject to the eternal law. The
+                     application of this distinction may be gathered by looking around us. For those things are subject to human government, which
+                     can be done by man; but what pertains
+                     to the nature of man is not subject to human government; for instance, that he should have a soul, hands, or feet. Accordingly
+                     all that is in things created by God, whether it be contingent or necessary, is subject to the eternal law: while things pertaining
+                     to the Divine Nature or Essence are not subject to the eternal law, but are the eternal law itself.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q93_A4-p7">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> We may speak of God's will in two ways. First, as to the will itself: and thus, since God's will is His very Essence, it
+                     is subject neither to the Divine government, nor to the eternal law, but is the same thing as the eternal law. Secondly, we
+                     may speak of God's will, as to the things themselves that God wills about creatures; which things are subject to the eternal
+                     law, in so far as they are planned by Divine Wisdom. In reference to these things
+                     God's will is said to be reasonable [rationalis]: though regarded in itself it should rather be called their type [ratio].
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q93_A4-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> God the Son was not made by God, but was naturally born of God. Consequently He is not subject to Divine providence or to
+                     the eternal law: but rather is Himself the eternal law by a kind of appropriation, as Augustine explains (De Vera Relig. xxxi).
+                     But He is said to be subject to the Father by reason of His human nature, in respect of which also the Father is said to be
+                     greater than He.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q93_A4-p9"> The third objection we grant, because it deals with those necessary things that are created.</p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q93_A4-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> As the Philosopher says (Metaph. v, text. 6), some necessary things have a cause of their necessity: and thus they derive
+                     from something else the fact that they cannot be otherwise. And this is in itself a most effective restraint; for whatever
+                     is restrained, is said to be restrained in so far as it cannot do otherwise than it is allowed to.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q93_A4-p11"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q93_A4-p12"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q93_A3.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q93_A5.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="FS_Q93_A5" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q93_A4.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q93_A6.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="FS_Q93_A5-p0.1">Whether natural contingents are subject to the eternal law? </h4>
+                  <p id="FS_Q93_A5-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q93_A5-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that natural contingents are not subject to the eternal law. Because promulgation is essential to law, as stated
+                     above (
+                     <a id="FS_Q93_A5-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q90_A4.html">Q[90], A[4]</a>). But a law cannot be promulgated except to rational creatures, to whom it is possible to make an announcement. Therefore
+                     none but rational creatures are subject to the eternal law; and consequently natural contingents are not.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q93_A5-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, "Whatever obeys reason partakes somewhat of reason," as stated in Ethic. i. But the eternal law, is the supreme
+                     type, as stated above 
+                     <a id="FS_Q93_A5-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q93_A1.html">(A[1])</a>. Since then natural contingents do not partake of reason in any way, but are altogether void of reason, it seems that they
+                     are not subject to the eternal law.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q93_A5-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the eternal law is most efficient. But in natural contingents defects occur. Therefore they are not subject to the
+                     eternal law.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q93_A5-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q93_A5-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Prov.8.29" target="asv">Prov. 8:29</a>): "When He compassed the sea with its bounds, and set a law to the waters, that they should not pass their limits."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q93_A5-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> We must speak otherwise of the law of man, than of the eternal law which is the law of God. For the law of man extends only
+                     to rational creatures subject to man. The reason of this is because law directs the actions of those that are subject to the
+                     government of someone: wherefore, properly speaking, none imposes a law on his own actions. Now whatever is done regarding
+                     the use of irrational things subject to man, is done by the act of man himself moving
+                     those things, for these irrational creatures do not move themselves, but are moved by others, as stated above (
+                     <a id="FS_Q93_A5-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q1_A2.html">Q[1], A[2]</a>). Consequently man cannot impose laws on irrational beings, however much they may be subject to him. But he can impose laws
+                     on rational beings subject to him, in so far as by his command or pronouncement of any kind, he imprints on their minds a
+                     rule which is a principle of action.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q93_A5-p7"> Now just as man, by such pronouncement, impresses a kind of inward principle of action on the man that is subject to him,
+                     so God imprints on the whole of nature the principles of its proper actions. And so, in this way, God is said to command the
+                     whole of nature, according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q93_A5-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.148.6" target="asv"> Ps. 148:6</a>: "He hath made a decree, and it shall not pass away." And thus all actions and movements of the whole of nature are subject
+                     to the eternal law. Consequently irrational
+                     creatures are subject to the eternal law, through being moved by Divine providence; but not, as rational creatures are, through
+                     understanding the Divine commandment.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q93_A5-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The impression of an inward active principle is to natural things, what the promulgation of law is to men: because law, by
+                     being promulgated, imprints on man a directive principle of human actions, as stated above.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q93_A5-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Irrational creatures neither partake of nor are obedient to human reason: whereas they do partake of the Divine Reason by
+                     obeying it; because the power of Divine Reason extends over more things than human reason does. And as the members of the
+                     human body are moved at the command of reason, and yet do not partake of reason, since they have no apprehension subordinate
+                     to reason; so too irrational creatures are moved by God, without, on that account,
+                     being rational.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q93_A5-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Although the defects which occur in natural things are outside the order of particular causes, they are not outside the order
+                     of universal causes, especially of the First Cause, i.e. God, from Whose providence nothing can escape, as stated in the 
+                     <a id="FS_Q93_A5-p10.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q22_A2.html">FP, Q[22], A[2]</a>. And since the eternal law is the type of Divine providence, as stated above 
+                     <a id="FS_Q93_A5-p10.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q93_A1.html">(A[1])</a>, hence the defects of natural things are subject to the
+                     eternal law.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q93_A5-p11"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q93_A5-p12"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q93_A4.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q93_A6.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="FS_Q93_A6" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q93_A5.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q94.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="FS_Q93_A6-p0.1">Whether all human affairs are subject to the eternal law?</h4>
+                  <p id="FS_Q93_A6-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q93_A6-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that not all human affairs are subject to the eternal law. For the Apostle says (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q93_A6-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Gal.5.18" target="asv">Gal. 5:18</a>): "If you are led by the spirit you are not under the law." But the righteous who are the sons of God by adoption, are led
+                     by the spirit of God, according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q93_A6-p2.2" href="./asv.html#Rom.8.14" target="asv"> Rom. 8:14</a>: "Whosoever are led by the spirit of God, they are the sons of God." Therefore not all men are under the eternal law.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q93_A6-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the Apostle says (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q93_A6-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.8.7" target="asv">Rom. 8:7</a>): "The prudence [Vulg.: 'wisdom'] of the flesh is an enemy to God: for it is not subject to the law of God." But many are
+                     those in whom the prudence of the flesh dominates. Therefore all men are not subject to the eternal law which is the law of
+                     God.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q93_A6-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. i, 6) that "the eternal law is that by which the wicked deserve misery, the good, a
+                     life of blessedness." But those who are already blessed, and those who are already lost, are not in the state of merit. Therefore
+                     they are not under the eternal law.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q93_A6-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix, 12): "Nothing evades the laws of the most high Creator and Governor, for by Him the peace
+                     of the universe is administered."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q93_A6-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> There are two ways in which a thing is subject to the eternal law, as explained above 
+                     <a id="FS_Q93_A6-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q93_A5.html">(A[5])</a>: first, by partaking of the eternal law by way of knowledge; secondly, by way of action and passion, i.e. by partaking of
+                     the eternal law by way of an inward motive principle: and in this second way, irrational creatures are subject to the eternal
+                     law, as stated above 
+                     <a id="FS_Q93_A6-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q93_A5.html">(A[5])</a>. But since the rational nature, together
+                     with that which it has in common with all creatures, has something proper to itself inasmuch as it is rational, consequently
+                     it is subject to the eternal law in both ways; because while each rational creature has some knowledge of the eternal law,
+                     as stated above 
+                     <a id="FS_Q93_A6-p6.3" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q93_A2.html">(A[2])</a>, it also has a natural inclination to that which is in harmony with the eternal law; for "we are naturally adapted to the
+                     recipients of virtue" (Ethic. ii, 1).
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q93_A6-p7"> Both ways, however, are imperfect, and to a certain extent destroyed, in the wicked; because in them the natural inclination
+                     to virtue is corrupted by vicious habits, and, moreover, the natural knowledge of good is darkened by passions and habits
+                     of sin. But in the good both ways are found more perfect: because in them, besides the natural knowledge of good, there is
+                     the added knowledge of faith and wisdom; and again, besides the natural inclination to good, there is the added
+                     motive of grace and virtue.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q93_A6-p8"> Accordingly, the good are perfectly subject to the eternal law, as always acting according to it: whereas the wicked are
+                     subject to the eternal law, imperfectly as to their actions, indeed, since both their knowledge of good, and their inclination
+                     thereto, are imperfect; but this imperfection on the part of action is supplied on the part of passion, in so far as they
+                     suffer what the eternal law decrees concerning them, according as they fail to act in harmony with that law.
+                     Hence Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. i, 15): "I esteem that the righteous act according to the eternal law; and (De Catech.
+                     Rud. xviii): Out of the just misery of the souls which deserted Him, God knew how to furnish the inferior parts of His creation
+                     with most suitable laws."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q93_A6-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This saying of the Apostle may be understood in two ways. First, so that a man is said to be under the law, through being
+                     pinned down thereby, against his will, as by a load. Hence, on the same passage a gloss says that "he is under the law, who
+                     refrains from evil deeds, through fear of punishment threatened by the law, and not from love of virtue." In this way the
+                     spiritual man is not under the law, because he fulfils the law willingly, through
+                     charity which is poured into his heart by the Holy Ghost. Secondly, it can be understood as meaning that the works of a man,
+                     who is led by the Holy Ghost, are the works of the Holy Ghost rather than his own. Therefore, since the Holy Ghost is not
+                     under the law, as neither is the Son, as stated above (A[4], ad 2); it follows that such works, in so far as they are of the
+                     Holy Ghost, are not under the law. The Apostle witnesses to this when he says (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q93_A6-p9.1" href="./asv.html#iiCor.3.17" target="asv">2 Cor. 3:17</a>): "Where the
+                     Spirit of the Lord is, there is liberty."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q93_A6-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The prudence of the flesh cannot be subject to the law of God as regards action; since it inclines to actions contrary to
+                     the Divine law: yet it is subject to the law of God, as regards passion; since it deserves to suffer punishment according
+                     to the law of Divine justice. Nevertheless in no man does the prudence of the flesh dominate so far as to destroy the whole
+                     good of his nature: and consequently there remains in man the inclination to act in
+                     accordance with the eternal law. For we have seen above (
+                     <a id="FS_Q93_A6-p10.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q85_A2.html">Q[85], A[2]</a>) that sin does not destroy entirely the good of nature.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q93_A6-p11">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> A thing is maintained in the end and moved towards the end by one and the same cause: thus gravity which makes a heavy body
+                     rest in the lower place is also the cause of its being moved thither. We therefore reply that as it is according to the eternal
+                     law that some deserve happiness, others unhappiness, so is it by the eternal law that some are maintained in a happy state,
+                     others in an unhappy state. Accordingly both the blessed and the damned are
+                     under the eternal law.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q93_A6-p12"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q93_A6-p13"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q93_A5.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q94.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <a href="summa.FS_Q92_A2.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.FS_Q93_A1.html"></a>
+            </div>
+            <div id="FS_Q94" class="div3">
+               <a href="summa.FS_Q93_A6.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.FS_Q94_A1.html"></a>
+               <h3 id="FS_Q94-p0.1">OF THE NATURAL LAW (SIX ARTICLES)</h3>
+               <p id="FS_Q94-p1"></p>
+               <p id="FS_Q94-p2"> We must now consider the natural law; concerning which there are six points of inquiry:</p>
+               <p id="FS_Q94-p3"> (1) What is the natural law?</p>
+               <p id="FS_Q94-p4"> (2) What are the precepts of the natural law?</p>
+               <p id="FS_Q94-p5"> (3) Whether all acts of virtue are prescribed by the natural law?</p>
+               <p id="FS_Q94-p6"> (4) Whether the natural law is the same in all?</p>
+               <p id="FS_Q94-p7"> (5) Whether it is changeable?</p>
+               <p id="FS_Q94-p8"> (6) Whether it can be abolished from the heart of man?</p>
+               <div id="FS_Q94_A1" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q94.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q94_A2.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="FS_Q94_A1-p0.1">Whether the natural law is a habit?</h4>
+                  <p id="FS_Q94_A1-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q94_A1-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the natural law is a habit. Because, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 5), "there are three things in
+                     the soul: power, habit, and passion." But the natural law is not one of the soul's powers: nor is it one of the passions;
+                     as we may see by going through them one by one. Therefore the natural law is a habit.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q94_A1-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Basil [*Damascene, De Fide Orth. iv, 22] says that the conscience or "synderesis is the law of our mind"; which
+                     can only apply to the natural law. But the "synderesis" is a habit, as was shown in the 
+                     <a id="FS_Q94_A1-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q79_A12.html">FP, Q[79], A[12]</a>. Therefore the natural law is a habit.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q94_A1-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the natural law abides in man always, as will be shown further on 
+                     <a id="FS_Q94_A1-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q94_A6.html">(A[6])</a>. But man's reason, which the law regards, does not always think about the natural law. Therefore the natural law is not an
+                     act, but a habit.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q94_A1-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Bono Conjug. xxi) that "a habit is that whereby something is done when necessary." But such is not the
+                     natural law: since it is in infants and in the damned who cannot act by it. Therefore the natural law is not a habit.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q94_A1-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> A thing may be called a habit in two ways. First, properly and essentially: and thus the natural law is not a habit. For
+                     it has been stated above (
+                     <a id="FS_Q94_A1-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q90_A1.html">Q[90], A[1]</a>, ad 2) that the natural law is something appointed by reason, just as a proposition is a work of reason. Now that which a
+                     man does is not the same as that whereby he does it: for he makes a becoming speech by the habit of grammar. Since then a
+                     habit is that by which we act, a
+                     law cannot be a habit properly and essentially.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q94_A1-p7"> Secondly, the term habit may be applied to that which we hold by a habit: thus faith may mean that which we hold by faith.
+                     And accordingly, since the precepts of the natural law are sometimes considered by reason actually, while sometimes they are
+                     in the reason only habitually, in this way the natural law may be called a habit. Thus, in speculative matters, the indemonstrable
+                     principles are not the habit itself whereby we hold those principles, but are the principles the habit
+                     of which we possess.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q94_A1-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The Philosopher proposes there to discover the genus of virtue; and since it is evident that virtue is a principle of action,
+                     he mentions only those things which are principles of human acts, viz. powers, habits and passions. But there are other things
+                     in the soul besides these three: there are acts; thus "to will" is in the one that wills; again, things known are in the knower;
+                     moreover its own natural properties are in the soul, such as immortality
+                     and the like.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q94_A1-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> "Synderesis" is said to be the law of our mind, because it is a habit containing the precepts of the natural law, which are
+                     the first principles of human actions.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q94_A1-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This argument proves that the natural law is held habitually; and this is granted.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q94_A1-p11"> To the argument advanced in the contrary sense we reply that sometimes a man is unable to make use of that which is in him
+                     habitually, on account of some impediment: thus, on account of sleep, a man is unable to use the habit of science. In like
+                     manner, through the deficiency of his age, a child cannot use the habit of understanding of principles, or the natural law,
+                     which is in him habitually.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q94_A1-p12"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q94_A1-p13"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q94.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q94_A2.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="FS_Q94_A2" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q94_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q94_A3.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="FS_Q94_A2-p0.1">Whether the natural law contains several precepts, or only one?</h4>
+                  <p id="FS_Q94_A2-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q94_A2-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the natural law contains, not several precepts, but one only. For law is a kind of precept, as stated
+                     above (
+                     <a id="FS_Q94_A2-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q92_A2.html">Q[92], A[2]</a>). If therefore there were many precepts of the natural law, it would follow that there are also many natural laws.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q94_A2-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the natural law is consequent to human nature. But human nature, as a whole, is one; though, as to its parts, it
+                     is manifold. Therefore, either there is but one precept of the law of nature, on account of the unity of nature as a whole;
+                     or there are many, by reason of the number of parts of human nature. The result would be that even things relating to the
+                     inclination of the concupiscible faculty belong to the natural law.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q94_A2-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, law is something pertaining to reason, as stated above (
+                     <a id="FS_Q94_A2-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q90_A1.html">Q[90], A[1]</a>). Now reason is but one in man. Therefore there is only one precept of the natural law.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q94_A2-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The precepts of the natural law in man stand in relation to practical matters, as the first principles to matters of demonstration.
+                     But there are several first indemonstrable principles. Therefore there are also several precepts of the natural law.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q94_A2-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above (
+                     <a id="FS_Q94_A2-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q91_A3.html">Q[91], A[3]</a>), the precepts of the natural law are to the practical reason, what the first principles of demonstrations are to the speculative
+                     reason; because both are self-evident principles. Now a thing is said to be self-evident in two ways: first, in itself; secondly,
+                     in relation to us. Any proposition is said to be self-evident in itself, if its predicate is contained in the notion of the
+                     subject: although, to
+                     one who knows not the definition of the subject, it happens that such a proposition is not self-evident. For instance, this
+                     proposition, "Man is a rational being," is, in its very nature, self-evident, since who says "man," says "a rational being":
+                     and yet to one who knows not what a man is, this proposition is not self-evident. Hence it is that, as Boethius says (De Hebdom.),
+                     certain axioms or propositions are universally self-evident to all; and such are those propositions whose terms are
+                     known to all, as, "Every whole is greater than its part," and, "Things equal to one and the same are equal to one another."
+                     But some propositions are self-evident only to the wise, who understand the meaning of the terms of such propositions: thus
+                     to one who understands that an angel is not a body, it is self-evident that an angel is not circumscriptively in a place:
+                     but this is not evident to the unlearned, for they cannot grasp it.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q94_A2-p7"> Now a certain order is to be found in those things that are apprehended universally. For that which, before aught else, falls
+                     under apprehension, is "being," the notion of which is included in all things whatsoever a man apprehends. Wherefore the first
+                     indemonstrable principle is that "the same thing cannot be affirmed and denied at the same time," which is based on the notion
+                     of "being" and "not-being": and on this principle all others are based, as is stated in Metaph. iv,
+                     text. 9. Now as "being" is the first thing that falls under the apprehension simply, so "good" is the first thing that falls
+                     under the apprehension of the practical reason, which is directed to action: since every agent acts for an end under the aspect
+                     of good. Consequently the first principle of practical reason is one founded on the notion of good, viz. that "good is that
+                     which all things seek after." Hence this is the first precept of law, that "good is to be done and pursued, and evil is to
+                     be avoided." All other precepts of the natural law are based upon this: so that whatever the practical reason naturally apprehends
+                     as man's good (or evil) belongs to the precepts of the natural law as something to be done or avoided.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q94_A2-p8"> Since, however, good has the nature of an end, and evil, the nature of a contrary, hence it is that all those things to which
+                     man has a natural inclination, are naturally apprehended by reason as being good, and consequently as objects of pursuit,
+                     and their contraries as evil, and objects of avoidance. Wherefore according to the order of natural inclinations, is the order
+                     of the precepts of the natural law. Because in man there is first of all an inclination to good in
+                     accordance with the nature which he has in common with all substances: inasmuch as every substance seeks the preservation
+                     of its own being, according to its nature: and by reason of this inclination, whatever is a means of preserving human life,
+                     and of warding off its obstacles, belongs to the natural law. Secondly, there is in man an inclination to things that pertain
+                     to him more specially, according to that nature which he has in common with other animals: and in virtue of this inclination,
+                     those things are said to belong to the natural law, "which nature has taught to all animals" [*Pandect. Just. I, tit. i],
+                     such as sexual intercourse, education of offspring and so forth. Thirdly, there is in man an inclination to good, according
+                     to the nature of his reason, which nature is proper to him: thus man has a natural inclination to know the truth about God,
+                     and to live in society: and in this respect, whatever pertains to this inclination belongs to the natural law; for instance,
+                     to
+                     shun ignorance, to avoid offending those among whom one has to live, and other such things regarding the above inclination.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q94_A2-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> All these precepts of the law of nature have the character of one natural law, inasmuch as they flow from one first precept.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q94_A2-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> All the inclinations of any parts whatsoever of human nature, e.g. of the concupiscible and irascible parts, in so far as
+                     they are ruled by reason, belong to the natural law, and are reduced to one first precept, as stated above: so that the precepts
+                     of the natural law are many in themselves, but are based on one common foundation.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q94_A2-p11">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Although reason is one in itself, yet it directs all things regarding man; so that whatever can be ruled by reason, is contained
+                     under the law of reason.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q94_A2-p12"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q94_A2-p13"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q94_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q94_A3.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="FS_Q94_A3" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q94_A2.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q94_A4.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="FS_Q94_A3-p0.1">Whether all acts of virtue are prescribed by the natural law?</h4>
+                  <p id="FS_Q94_A3-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q94_A3-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that not all acts of virtue are prescribed by the natural law. Because, as stated above (
+                     <a id="FS_Q94_A3-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q90_A2.html">Q[90], A[2]</a>) it is essential to a law that it be ordained to the common good. But some acts of virtue are ordained to the private good
+                     of the individual, as is evident especially in regards to acts of temperance. Therefore not all acts of virtue are the subject
+                     of natural law.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q94_A3-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, every sin is opposed to some virtuous act. If therefore all acts of virtue are prescribed by the natural law, it
+                     seems to follow that all sins are against nature: whereas this applies to certain special sins.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q94_A3-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, those things which are according to nature are common to all. But acts of virtue are not common to all: since a
+                     thing is virtuous in one, and vicious in another. Therefore not all acts of virtue are prescribed by the natural law.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q94_A3-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 4) that "virtues are natural." Therefore virtuous acts also are a subject of the natural
+                     law.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q94_A3-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> We may speak of virtuous acts in two ways: first, under the aspect of virtuous; secondly, as such and such acts considered
+                     in their proper species. If then we speak of acts of virtue, considered as virtuous, thus all virtuous acts belong to the
+                     natural law. For it has been stated 
+                     <a id="FS_Q94_A3-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q94_A2.html">(A[2])</a> that to the natural law belongs everything to which a man is inclined according to his nature. Now each thing is inclined
+                     naturally to an operation
+                     that is suitable to it according to its form: thus fire is inclined to give heat. Wherefore, since the rational soul is the
+                     proper form of man, there is in every man a natural inclination to act according to reason: and this is to act according to
+                     virtue. Consequently, considered thus, all acts of virtue are prescribed by the natural law: since each one's reason naturally
+                     dictates to him to act virtuously. But if we speak of virtuous acts, considered in themselves, i.e. in their proper species,
+                     thus not all virtuous acts are prescribed by the natural law: for many things are done virtuously, to which nature does not
+                     incline at first; but which, through the inquiry of reason, have been found by men to be conducive to well-living.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q94_A3-p7">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Temperance is about the natural concupiscences of food, drink and sexual matters, which are indeed ordained to the natural
+                     common good, just as other matters of law are ordained to the moral common good.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q94_A3-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> By human nature we may mean either that which is proper to man---and in this sense all sins, as being against reason, are
+                     also against nature, as Damascene states (De Fide Orth. ii, 30): or we may mean that nature which is common to man and other
+                     animals; and in this sense, certain special sins are said to be against nature; thus contrary to sexual intercourse, which
+                     is natural to all animals, is unisexual lust, which has received the special name of
+                     the unnatural crime.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q94_A3-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This argument considers acts in themselves. For it is owing to the various conditions of men, that certain acts are virtuous
+                     for some, as being proportionate and becoming to them, while they are vicious for others, as being out of proportion to them.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q94_A3-p10"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q94_A3-p11"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q94_A2.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q94_A4.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="FS_Q94_A4" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q94_A3.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q94_A5.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="FS_Q94_A4-p0.1">Whether the natural law is the same in all men?</h4>
+                  <p id="FS_Q94_A4-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q94_A4-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the natural law is not the same in all. For it is stated in the Decretals (Dist. i) that "the natural
+                     law is that which is contained in the Law and the Gospel." But this is not common to all men; because, as it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q94_A4-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.10.16" target="asv">Rom. 10:16</a>), "all do not obey the gospel." Therefore the natural law is not the same in all men.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q94_A4-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, "Things which are according to the law are said to be just," as stated in Ethic. v. But it is stated in the same
+                     book that nothing is so universally just as not to be subject to change in regard to some men. Therefore even the natural
+                     law is not the same in all men.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q94_A4-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, as stated above (
+                     <a id="FS_Q94_A4-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q94_A2.html">AA[2]</a>,3), to the natural law belongs everything to which a man is inclined according to his nature. Now different men are naturally
+                     inclined to different things; some to the desire of pleasures, others to the desire of honors, and other men to other things.
+                     Therefore there is not one natural law for all.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q94_A4-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Isidore says (Etym. v, 4): "The natural law is common to all nations."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q94_A4-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above (
+                     <a id="FS_Q94_A4-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q94_A2.html">AA[2]</a>,3), to the natural law belongs those things to which a man is inclined naturally: and among these it is proper to man to
+                     be inclined to act according to reason. Now the process of reason is from the common to the proper, as stated in Phys. i.
+                     The speculative reason, however, is differently situated in this matter, from the practical reason. For, since the speculative
+                     reason is busied chiefly with the necessary
+                     things, which cannot be otherwise than they are, its proper conclusions, like the universal principles, contain the truth
+                     without fail. The practical reason, on the other hand, is busied with contingent matters, about which human actions are concerned:
+                     and consequently, although there is necessity in the general principles, the more we descend to matters of detail, the more
+                     frequently we encounter defects. Accordingly then in speculative matters truth is the same in all men, both as to
+                     principles and as to conclusions: although the truth is not known to all as regards the conclusions, but only as regards the
+                     principles which are called common notions. But in matters of action, truth or practical rectitude is not the same for all,
+                     as to matters of detail, but only as to the general principles: and where there is the same rectitude in matters of detail,
+                     it is not equally known to all.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q94_A4-p7"> It is therefore evident that, as regards the general principles whether of speculative or of practical reason, truth or rectitude
+                     is the same for all, and is equally known by all. As to the proper conclusions of the speculative reason, the truth is the
+                     same for all, but is not equally known to all: thus it is true for all that the three angles of a triangle are together equal
+                     to two right angles, although it is not known to all. But as to the proper conclusions of the practical
+                     reason, neither is the truth or rectitude the same for all, nor, where it is the same, is it equally known by all. Thus it
+                     is right and true for all to act according to reason: and from this principle it follows as a proper conclusion, that goods
+                     entrusted to another should be restored to their owner. Now this is true for the majority of cases: but it may happen in a
+                     particular case that it would be injurious, and therefore unreasonable, to restore goods held in trust; for instance, if they
+                     are
+                     claimed for the purpose of fighting against one's country. And this principle will be found to fail the more, according as
+                     we descend further into detail, e.g. if one were to say that goods held in trust should be restored with such and such a guarantee,
+                     or in such and such a way; because the greater the number of conditions added, the greater the number of ways in which the
+                     principle may fail, so that it be not right to restore or not to restore.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q94_A4-p8"> Consequently we must say that the natural law, as to general principles, is the same for all, both as to rectitude and as
+                     to knowledge. But as to certain matters of detail, which are conclusions, as it were, of those general principles, it is the
+                     same for all in the majority of cases, both as to rectitude and as to knowledge; and yet in some few cases it may fail, both
+                     as to rectitude, by reason of certain obstacles (just as natures subject to generation and corruption fail in
+                     some few cases on account of some obstacle), and as to knowledge, since in some the reason is perverted by passion, or evil
+                     habit, or an evil disposition of nature; thus formerly, theft, although it is expressly contrary to the natural law, was not
+                     considered wrong among the Germans, as Julius Caesar relates (De Bello Gall. vi).
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q94_A4-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The meaning of the sentence quoted is not that whatever is contained in the Law and the Gospel belongs to the natural law,
+                     since they contain many things that are above nature; but that whatever belongs to the natural law is fully contained in them.
+                     Wherefore Gratian, after saying that "the natural law is what is contained in the Law and the Gospel," adds at once, by way
+                     of example, "by which everyone is commanded to do to others as he would be done
+                     by."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q94_A4-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The saying of the Philosopher is to be understood of things that are naturally just, not as general principles, but as conclusions
+                     drawn from them, having rectitude in the majority of cases, but failing in a few.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q94_A4-p11">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As, in man, reason rules and commands the other powers, so all the natural inclinations belonging to the other powers must
+                     needs be directed according to reason. Wherefore it is universally right for all men, that all their inclinations should be
+                     directed according to reason.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q94_A4-p12"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q94_A4-p13"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q94_A3.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q94_A5.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="FS_Q94_A5" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q94_A4.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q94_A6.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="FS_Q94_A5-p0.1">Whether the natural law can be changed?</h4>
+                  <p id="FS_Q94_A5-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q94_A5-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the natural law can be changed. Because on 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q94_A5-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.17.9" target="asv"> Ecclus. 17:9, </a> "He gave them instructions, and the law of life," the gloss says: "He wished the law of the letter to be written, in order
+                     to correct the law of nature." But that which is corrected is changed. Therefore the natural law can be changed.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q94_A5-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the slaying of the innocent, adultery, and theft are against the natural law. But we find these things changed by
+                     God: as when God commanded Abraham to slay his innocent son (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q94_A5-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.22.2" target="asv">Gn. 22:2</a>); and when he ordered the Jews to borrow and purloin the vessels of the Egyptians (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q94_A5-p3.2" href="./asv.html#Exod.12.35" target="asv">Ex. 12:35</a>); and when He commanded Osee to take to himself "a wife of fornications" (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q94_A5-p3.3" href="./asv.html#Hos.1.2" target="asv">Osee 1:2</a>). Therefore the natural law can be changed.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q94_A5-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Isidore says (Etym. 5:4) that "the
+                     possession of all things in common, and universal freedom, are matters of natural law." But these things are seen to be changed
+                     by human laws. Therefore it seems that the natural law is subject to change.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q94_A5-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is said in the Decretals (Dist. v): "The natural law dates from the creation of the rational creature. It does not vary
+                     according to time, but remains unchangeable."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q94_A5-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> A change in the natural law may be understood in two ways. First, by way of addition. In this sense nothing hinders the natural
+                     law from being changed: since many things for the benefit of human life have been added over and above the natural law, both
+                     by the Divine law and by human laws.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q94_A5-p7"> Secondly, a change in the natural law may be understood by way of subtraction, so that what previously was according to the
+                     natural law, ceases to be so. In this sense, the natural law is altogether unchangeable in its first principles: but in its
+                     secondary principles, which, as we have said 
+                     <a id="FS_Q94_A5-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q94_A4.html">(A[4])</a>, are certain detailed proximate conclusions drawn from the first principles, the natural law is not changed so that what
+                     it prescribes be not right in most
+                     cases. But it may be changed in some particular cases of rare occurrence, through some special causes hindering the observance
+                     of such precepts, as stated above 
+                     <a id="FS_Q94_A5-p7.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q94_A4.html">(A[4])</a>.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q94_A5-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The written law is said to be given for the correction of the natural law, either because it supplies what was wanting to
+                     the natural law; or because the natural law was perverted in the hearts of some men, as to certain matters, so that they esteemed
+                     those things good which are naturally evil; which perversion stood in need of correction.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q94_A5-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> All men alike, both guilty and innocent, die the death of nature: which death of nature is inflicted by the power of God
+                     on account of original sin, according to 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q94_A5-p9.1" href="./asv.html#iKgs.2.6" target="asv">1 Kings 2:6</a>: "The Lord killeth and maketh alive." Consequently, by the command of God, death can be inflicted on any man, guilty or innocent,
+                     without any injustice whatever. In like manner adultery is intercourse with another's wife; who is allotted to him by the
+                     law
+                     emanating from God. Consequently intercourse with any woman, by the command of God, is neither adultery nor fornication. The
+                     same applies to theft, which is the taking of another's property. For whatever is taken by the command of God, to Whom all
+                     things belong, is not taken against the will of its owner, whereas it is in this that theft consists. Nor is it only in human
+                     things, that whatever is commanded by God is right; but also in natural things, whatever is done by God, is, in some way,
+                     natural, as stated in the 
+                     <a id="FS_Q94_A5-p9.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q105_A6.html">FP, Q[105], A[6]</a>, ad 1.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q94_A5-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> A thing is said to belong to the natural law in two ways. First, because nature inclines thereto: e.g. that one should not
+                     do harm to another. Secondly, because nature did not bring in the contrary: thus we might say that for man to be naked is
+                     of the natural law, because nature did not give him clothes, but art invented them. In this sense, "the possession of all
+                     things in common and universal freedom" are said to be of the natural law, because, to
+                     wit, the distinction of possessions and slavery were not brought in by nature, but devised by human reason for the benefit
+                     of human life. Accordingly the law of nature was not changed in this respect, except by addition.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q94_A5-p11"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q94_A5-p12"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q94_A4.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q94_A6.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="FS_Q94_A6" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q94_A5.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q95.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="FS_Q94_A6-p0.1">Whether the law of nature can be abolished from the heart of man?</h4>
+                  <p id="FS_Q94_A6-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q94_A6-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the natural law can be abolished from the heart of man. Because on
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q94_A6-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.2.14" target="asv"> Rom. 2:14, </a> "When the Gentiles who have not the law," etc. a gloss says that "the law of righteousness, which sin had blotted out, is
+                     graven on the heart of man when he is restored by grace." But the law of righteousness is the law of nature. Therefore the
+                     law of nature can be blotted out.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q94_A6-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the law of grace is more efficacious than the law of nature. But the law of grace is blotted out by sin. Much more
+                     therefore can the law of nature be blotted out.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q94_A6-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, that which is established by law is made just. But many things are enacted by men, which are contrary to the law
+                     of nature. Therefore the law of nature can be abolished from the heart of man.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q94_A6-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (Confess. ii): "Thy law is written in the hearts of men, which iniquity itself effaces not." But the law which
+                     is written in men's hearts is the natural law. Therefore the natural law cannot be blotted out.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q94_A6-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above (
+                     <a id="FS_Q94_A6-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q94_A4.html">AA[4]</a>,5), there belong to the natural law, first, certain most general precepts, that are known to all; and secondly, certain secondary
+                     and more detailed precepts, which are, as it were, conclusions following closely from first principles. As to those general
+                     principles, the natural law, in the abstract, can nowise be blotted out from men's hearts. But it is blotted out in the case
+                     of a particular action, in so far
+                     as reason is hindered from applying the general principle to a particular point of practice, on account of concupiscence or
+                     some other passion, as stated above (Q[77], A[2]). But as to the other, i.e. the secondary precepts, the natural law can be
+                     blotted out from the human heart, either by evil persuasions, just as in speculative matters errors occur in respect of necessary
+                     conclusions; or by vicious customs and corrupt habits, as among some men, theft, and even unnatural vices, as the Apostle
+                     states (Rom. i), were not esteemed sinful.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q94_A6-p7">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Sin blots out the law of nature in particular cases, not universally, except perchance in regard to the secondary precepts
+                     of the natural law, in the way stated above.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q94_A6-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Although grace is more efficacious than nature, yet nature is more essential to man, and therefore more enduring.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q94_A6-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This argument is true of the secondary precepts of the natural law, against which some legislators have framed certain enactments
+                     which are unjust.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q94_A6-p10"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q94_A6-p11"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q94_A5.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q95.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <a href="summa.FS_Q93_A6.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.FS_Q94_A1.html"></a>
+            </div>
+            <div id="FS_Q95" class="div3">
+               <a href="summa.FS_Q94_A6.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.FS_Q95_A1.html"></a>
+               <h3 id="FS_Q95-p0.1">OF HUMAN LAW (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3>
+               <p id="FS_Q95-p1"></p>
+               <p id="FS_Q95-p2"> We must now consider human law; and (1) this law considered in itself; (2) its power; (3) its mutability. Under the first
+                  head there are four points of inquiry:
+               </p>
+               <p id="FS_Q95-p3"> (1) Its utility.</p>
+               <p id="FS_Q95-p4"> (2) Its origin.</p>
+               <p id="FS_Q95-p5"> (3) Its quality.</p>
+               <p id="FS_Q95-p6"> (4) Its division.</p>
+               <div id="FS_Q95_A1" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q95.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q95_A2.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="FS_Q95_A1-p0.1">Whether it was useful for laws to be framed by men?</h4>
+                  <p id="FS_Q95_A1-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q95_A1-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that it was not useful for laws to be framed by men. Because the purpose of every law is that man be made good
+                     thereby, as stated above (
+                     <a id="FS_Q95_A1-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q92_A1.html">Q[92], A[1]</a>). But men are more to be induced to be good willingly by means of admonitions, than against their will, by means of laws.
+                     Therefore there was no need to frame laws.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q95_A1-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, As the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 4), "men have recourse to a judge as to animate justice." But animate justice
+                     is better than inanimate justice, which contained in laws. Therefore it would have been better for the execution of justice
+                     to be entrusted to the decision of judges, than to frame laws in addition.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q95_A1-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, every law is framed for the direction of human actions, as is evident from what has been stated above (
+                     <a id="FS_Q95_A1-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q90_A1.html">Q[90], AA[1]</a>,2). But since human actions are about singulars, which are infinite in number, matter pertaining to the direction of human
+                     actions cannot be taken into sufficient consideration except by a wise man, who looks into each one of them. Therefore it
+                     would have been better for human acts to be directed by the judgment
+                     of wise men, than by the framing of laws. Therefore there was no need of human laws.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q95_A1-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Isidore says (Etym. v, 20): "Laws were made that in fear thereof human audacity might be held in check, that innocence might
+                     be safeguarded in the midst of wickedness, and that the dread of punishment might prevent the wicked from doing harm." But
+                     these things are most necessary to mankind. Therefore it was necessary that human laws should be made.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q95_A1-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above (
+                     <a id="FS_Q95_A1-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q63_A1.html">Q[63], A[1]</a>;
+                     <a id="FS_Q95_A1-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q94_A3.html"> Q[94], A[3]</a>), man has a natural aptitude for virtue; but the perfection of virtue must be acquired by man by means of some kind of training.
+                     Thus we observe that man is helped by industry in his necessities, for instance, in food and clothing. Certain beginnings
+                     of these he has from nature, viz. his reason and his hands; but he has not the full complement, as other animals have,
+                     to whom nature has given sufficiency of clothing and food. Now it is difficult to see how man could suffice for himself in
+                     the matter of this training: since the perfection of virtue consists chiefly in withdrawing man from undue pleasures, to which
+                     above all man is inclined, and especially the young, who are more capable of being trained. Consequently a man needs to receive
+                     this training from another, whereby to arrive at the perfection of virtue. And as to those young people who are inclined
+                     to acts of virtue, by their good natural disposition, or by custom, or rather by the gift of God, paternal training suffices,
+                     which is by admonitions. But since some are found to be depraved, and prone to vice, and not easily amenable to words, it
+                     was necessary for such to be restrained from evil by force and fear, in order that, at least, they might desist from evil-doing,
+                     and leave others in peace, and that they themselves, by being habituated in this way, might be brought to do willingly
+                     what hitherto they did from fear, and thus become virtuous. Now this kind of training, which compels through fear of punishment,
+                     is the discipline of laws. Therefore in order that man might have peace and virtue, it was necessary for laws to be framed:
+                     for, as the Philosopher says (Polit. i, 2), "as man is the most noble of animals if he be perfect in virtue, so is he the
+                     lowest of all, if he be severed from law and righteousness"; because man can use his reason to devise means of satisfying
+                     his lusts and evil passions, which other animals are unable to do.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q95_A1-p7">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Men who are well disposed are led willingly to virtue by being admonished better than by coercion: but men who are evilly
+                     disposed are not led to virtue unless they are compelled.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q95_A1-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As the Philosopher says (Rhet. i, 1), "it is better that all things be regulated by law, than left to be decided by judges":
+                     and this for three reasons. First, because it is easier to find a few wise men competent to frame right laws, than to find
+                     the many who would be necessary to judge aright of each single case. Secondly, because those who make laws consider long beforehand
+                     what laws to make; whereas judgment on each single case has to be
+                     pronounced as soon as it arises: and it is easier for man to see what is right, by taking many instances into consideration,
+                     than by considering one solitary fact. Thirdly, because lawgivers judge in the abstract and of future events; whereas those
+                     who sit in judgment of things present, towards which they are affected by love, hatred, or some kind of cupidity; wherefore
+                     their judgment is perverted.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q95_A1-p9"> Since then the animated justice of the judge is not found in every man, and since it can be deflected, therefore it was necessary,
+                     whenever possible, for the law to determine how to judge, and for very few matters to be left to the decision of men.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q95_A1-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Certain individual facts which cannot be covered by the law "have necessarily to be committed to judges," as the Philosopher
+                     says in the same passage: for instance, "concerning something that has happened or not happened," and the like.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q95_A1-p11"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q95_A1-p12"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q95.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q95_A2.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="FS_Q95_A2" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q95_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q95_A3.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="FS_Q95_A2-p0.1">Whether every human law is derived from the natural law?</h4>
+                  <p id="FS_Q95_A2-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q95_A2-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that not every human law is derived from the natural law. For the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 7) that "the
+                     legal just is that which originally was a matter of indifference." But those things which arise from the natural law are not
+                     matters of indifference. Therefore the enactments of human laws are not derived from the natural law.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q95_A2-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, positive law is contrasted with natural law, as stated by Isidore (Etym. v, 4) and the Philosopher (Ethic. v, 7).
+                     But those things which flow as conclusions from the general principles of the natural law belong to the natural law, as stated
+                     above (
+                     <a id="FS_Q95_A2-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q94_A4.html">Q[94], A[4]</a>). Therefore that which is established by human law does not belong to the natural law.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q95_A2-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the law of nature is the same for all; since the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 7) that "the natural just is that which
+                     is equally valid everywhere." If therefore human laws were derived from the natural law, it would follow that they too are
+                     the same for all: which is clearly false.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q95_A2-p5">
+                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, it is possible to give a reason for things which are derived from the natural law. But "it is not possible to give
+                     the reason for all the legal enactments of the lawgivers," as the jurist says [*Pandect. Justin. lib. i, ff, tit. iii, v;
+                     De Leg. et Senat.]. Therefore not all human laws are derived from the natural law.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q95_A2-p6">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Tully says (Rhet. ii): "Things which emanated from nature and were approved by custom, were sanctioned by fear and reverence
+                     for the laws."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q95_A2-p7">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> As Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. i, 5) "that which is not just seems to be no law at all": wherefore the force of a law depends
+                     on the extent of its justice. Now in human affairs a thing is said to be just, from being right, according to the rule of
+                     reason. But the first rule of reason is the law of nature, as is clear from what has been stated above (
+                     <a id="FS_Q95_A2-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q91_A2.html">Q[91], A[2]</a>, ad 2). Consequently every human law has just so much of the nature of
+                     law, as it is derived from the law of nature. But if in any point it deflects from the law of nature, it is no longer a law
+                     but a perversion of law.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q95_A2-p8"> But it must be noted that something may be derived from the natural law in two ways: first, as a conclusion from premises,
+                     secondly, by way of determination of certain generalities. The first way is like to that by which, in sciences, demonstrated
+                     conclusions are drawn from the principles: while the second mode is likened to that whereby, in the arts, general forms are
+                     particularized as to details: thus the craftsman needs to determine the general form of a house to some
+                     particular shape. Some things are therefore derived from the general principles of the natural law, by way of conclusions;
+                     e.g. that "one must not kill" may be derived as a conclusion from the principle that "one should do harm to no man": while
+                     some are derived therefrom by way of determination; e.g. the law of nature has it that the evil-doer should be punished; but
+                     that he be punished in this or that way, is a determination of the law of nature.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q95_A2-p9"> Accordingly both modes of derivation are found in the human law. But those things which are derived in the first way, are
+                     contained in human law not as emanating therefrom exclusively, but have some force from the natural law also. But those things
+                     which are derived in the second way, have no other force than that of human law.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q95_A2-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The Philosopher is speaking of those enactments which are by way of determination or specification of the precepts of the
+                     natural law.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q95_A2-p11">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> This argument avails for those things that are derived from the natural law, by way of conclusions.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q95_A2-p12">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The general principles of the natural law cannot be applied to all men in the same way on account of the great variety of
+                     human affairs: and hence arises the diversity of positive laws among various people.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q95_A2-p13">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> These words of the Jurist are to be understood as referring to decisions of rulers in determining particular points of the
+                     natural law: on which determinations the judgment of expert and prudent men is based as on its principles; in so far, to wit,
+                     as they see at once what is the best thing to decide.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q95_A2-p14"> Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 11) that in such matters, "we ought to pay as much attention to the undemonstrated
+                     sayings and opinions of persons who surpass us in experience, age and prudence, as to their demonstrations."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q95_A2-p15"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q95_A2-p16"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q95_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q95_A3.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="FS_Q95_A3" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q95_A2.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q95_A4.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="FS_Q95_A3-p0.1">Whether Isidore's description of the quality of positive law is appropriate?</h4>
+                  <p id="FS_Q95_A3-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q95_A3-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that Isidore's description of the quality of positive law is not appropriate, when he says (Etym. v, 21): "Law
+                     shall be virtuous, just, possible to nature, according to the custom of the country, suitable to place and time, necessary,
+                     useful; clearly expressed, lest by its obscurity it lead to misunderstanding; framed for no private benefit, but for the common
+                     good." Because he had previously expressed the quality of law in three conditions,
+                     saying that "law is anything founded on reason, provided that it foster religion, be helpful to discipline, and further the
+                     common weal." Therefore it was needless to add any further conditions to these.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q95_A3-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Justice is included in honesty, as Tully says (De Offic. vii). Therefore after saying "honest" it was superfluous
+                     to add "just."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q95_A3-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, written law is condivided with custom, according to Isidore (Etym. ii, 10). Therefore it should not be stated in
+                     the definition of law that it is "according to the custom of the country."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q95_A3-p5">
+                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, a thing may be necessary in two ways. It may be necessary simply, because it cannot be otherwise: and that which
+                     is necessary in this way, is not subject to human judgment, wherefore human law is not concerned with necessity of this kind.
+                     Again a thing may be necessary for an end: and this necessity is the same as usefulness. Therefore it is superfluous to say
+                     both "necessary" and "useful."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q95_A3-p6">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> stands the authority of Isidore.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q95_A3-p7">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> Whenever a thing is for an end, its form must be determined proportionately to that end; as the form of a saw is such as
+                     to be suitable for cutting (Phys. ii, text. 88). Again, everything that is ruled and measured must have a form proportionate
+                     to its rule and measure. Now both these conditions are verified of human law: since it is both something ordained to an end;
+                     and is a rule or measure ruled or measured by a higher measure. And this higher measure is
+                     twofold, viz. the Divine law and the natural law, as explained above 
+                     <a id="FS_Q95_A3-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q95_A2.html">(A[2];</a> Q[93], A[3] ). Now the end of human law is to be useful to man, as the jurist states [*Pandect. Justin. lib. xxv, ff., tit.
+                     iii; De Leg. et Senat.]. Wherefore Isidore in determining the nature of law, lays down, at first, three conditions; viz. that
+                     it "foster religion," inasmuch as it is proportionate to the Divine law; that it be "helpful to discipline," inasmuch as it
+                     is proportionate to the
+                     nature law; and that it "further the common weal," inasmuch as it is proportionate to the utility of mankind.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q95_A3-p8"> All the other conditions mentioned by him are reduced to these three. For it is called virtuous because it fosters religion.
+                     And when he goes on to say that it should be "just, possible to nature, according to the customs of the country, adapted to
+                     place and time," he implies that it should be helpful to discipline. For human discipline depends on first on the order of
+                     reason, to which he refers by saying "just": secondly, it depends on the ability of the agent; because
+                     discipline should be adapted to each one according to his ability, taking also into account the ability of nature (for the
+                     same burdens should be not laid on children as adults); and should be according to human customs; since man cannot live alone
+                     in society, paying no heed to others: thirdly, it depends on certain circumstances, in respect of which he says, "adapted
+                     to place and time." The remaining words, "necessary, useful," etc. mean that law should further the common weal: so that
+                     "necessity" refers to the removal of evils; "usefulness" to the attainment of good; "clearness of expression," to the need
+                     of preventing any harm ensuing from the law itself. And since, as stated above (
+                     <a id="FS_Q95_A3-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q90_A2.html">Q[90], A[2]</a>), law is ordained to the common good, this is expressed in the last part of the description.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q95_A3-p9"> This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.</p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q95_A3-p10"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q95_A3-p11"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q95_A2.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q95_A4.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="FS_Q95_A4" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q95_A3.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q96.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="FS_Q95_A4-p0.1">Whether Isidore's division of human laws is appropriate?</h4>
+                  <p id="FS_Q95_A4-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q95_A4-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that Isidore wrongly divided human statutes or human law (Etym. v, 4, seqq.). For under this law he includes
+                     the "law of nations," so called, because, as he says, "nearly all nations use it." But as he says, "natural law is that which
+                     is common to all nations." Therefore the law of nations is not contained under positive human law, but rather under natural
+                     law.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q95_A4-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, those laws which have the same force, seem to differ not formally but only materially. But "statutes, decrees of
+                     the commonalty, senatorial decrees," and the like which he mentions (Etym. v, 9), all have the same force. Therefore they
+                     do not differ, except materially. But art takes no notice of such a distinction: since it may go on to infinity. Therefore
+                     this division of human laws is not appropriate.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q95_A4-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, just as, in the state, there are princes, priests and soldiers, so are there other human offices. Therefore it seems
+                     that, as this division includes "military law," and "public law," referring to priests and magistrates; so also it should
+                     include other laws pertaining to other offices of the state.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q95_A4-p5">
+                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, those things that are accidental should be passed over. But it is accidental to law that it be framed by this or
+                     that man. Therefore it is unreasonable to divide laws according to the names of lawgivers, so that one be called the "Cornelian"
+                     law, another the "Falcidian" law, etc.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q95_A4-p6">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The authority of Isidore (OBJ[1]) suffices.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q95_A4-p7">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> A thing can of itself be divided in respect of something contained in the notion of that thing. Thus a soul either rational
+                     or irrational is contained in the notion of animal: and therefore animal is divided properly and of itself in respect of its
+                     being rational or irrational; but not in the point of its being white or black, which are entirely beside the notion of animal.
+                     Now, in the notion of human law, many things are contained, in respect of any of
+                     which human law can be divided properly and of itself. For in the first place it belongs to the notion of human law, to be
+                     derived from the law of nature, as explained above 
+                     <a id="FS_Q95_A4-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q95_A2.html">(A[2])</a>. In this respect positive law is divided into the "law of nations" and "civil law," according to the two ways in which something
+                     may be derived from the law of nature, as stated above 
+                     <a id="FS_Q95_A4-p7.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q95_A2.html">(A[2])</a>. Because, to the law of nations belong those things which are derived from
+                     the law of nature, as conclusions from premises, e.g. just buyings and sellings, and the like, without which men cannot live
+                     together, which is a point of the law of nature, since man is by nature a social animal, as is proved in Polit. i, 2. But
+                     those things which are derived from the law of nature by way of particular determination, belong to the civil law, according
+                     as each state decides on what is best for itself.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q95_A4-p8"> Secondly, it belongs to the notion of human law, to be ordained to the common good of the state. In this respect human law
+                     may be divided according to the different kinds of men who work in a special way for the common good: e.g. priests, by praying
+                     to God for the people; princes, by governing the people; soldiers, by fighting for the safety of the people. Wherefore certain
+                     special kinds of law are adapted to these men.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q95_A4-p9"> Thirdly, it belongs to the notion of human law, to be framed by that one who governs the community of the state, as shown
+                     above (
+                     <a id="FS_Q95_A4-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q90_A3.html">Q[90], A[3]</a>). In this respect, there are various human laws according to the various forms of government. Of these, according to the
+                     Philosopher (Polit. iii, 10) one is "monarchy," i.e. when the state is governed by one; and then we have "Royal Ordinances."
+                     Another form is "aristocracy," i.e. government by the best men or men
+                     of highest rank; and then we have the "Authoritative legal opinions" [Responsa Prudentum] and "Decrees of the Senate" [Senatus
+                     consulta]. Another form is "oligarchy," i.e. government by a few rich and powerful men; and then we have "Praetorian," also
+                     called "Honorary," law. Another form of government is that of the people, which is called "democracy," and there we have "Decrees
+                     of the commonalty" [Plebiscita]. There is also tyrannical government, which is altogether corrupt, which, therefore,
+                     has no corresponding law. Finally, there is a form of government made up of all these, and which is the best: and in this
+                     respect we have law sanctioned by the "Lords and Commons," as stated by Isidore (Etym. v, 4, seqq.).
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q95_A4-p10"> Fourthly, it belongs to the notion of human law to direct human actions. In this respect, according to the various matters
+                     of which the law treats, there are various kinds of laws, which are sometimes named after their authors: thus we have the
+                     "Lex Julia" about adultery, the "Lex Cornelia" concerning assassins, and so on, differentiated in this way, not on account
+                     of the authors, but on account of the matters to which they refer.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q95_A4-p11">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The law of nations is indeed, in some way, natural to man, in so far as he is a reasonable being, because it is derived from
+                     the natural law by way of a conclusion that is not very remote from its premises. Wherefore men easily agreed thereto. Nevertheless
+                     it is distinct from the natural law, especially it is distinct from the natural law which is common to all animals.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q95_A4-p12"> The Replies to the other Objections are evident from what has been said.</p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q95_A4-p13"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q95_A4-p14"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q95_A3.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q96.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <a href="summa.FS_Q94_A6.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.FS_Q95_A1.html"></a>
+            </div>
+            <div id="FS_Q96" class="div3">
+               <a href="summa.FS_Q95_A4.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.FS_Q96_A1.html"></a>
+               <h3 id="FS_Q96-p0.1">OF THE POWER OF HUMAN LAW (SIX ARTICLES)</h3>
+               <p id="FS_Q96-p1"></p>
+               <p id="FS_Q96-p2"> We must now consider the power of human law. Under this head there are six points of inquiry:</p>
+               <p id="FS_Q96-p3"> (1) Whether human law should be framed for the community?</p>
+               <p id="FS_Q96-p4"> (2) Whether human law should repress all vices?</p>
+               <p id="FS_Q96-p5"> (3) Whether human law is competent to direct all acts of virtue?</p>
+               <p id="FS_Q96-p6"> (4) Whether it binds man in conscience?</p>
+               <p id="FS_Q96-p7"> (5) Whether all men are subject to human law?</p>
+               <p id="FS_Q96-p8"> (6) Whether those who are under the law may act beside the letter of the law?</p>
+               <div id="FS_Q96_A1" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q96.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q96_A2.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="FS_Q96_A1-p0.1">Whether human law should be framed for the community rather than for the individual?</h4>
+                  <p id="FS_Q96_A1-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q96_A1-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that human law should be framed not for the community, but rather for the individual. For the Philosopher says
+                     (Ethic. v, 7) that "the legal just . . . includes all particular acts of legislation . . . and all those matters which are
+                     the subject of decrees," which are also individual matters, since decrees are framed about individual actions. Therefore law
+                     is framed not only for the community, but also for the individual.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q96_A1-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, law is the director of human acts, as stated above (
+                     <a id="FS_Q96_A1-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q90_A1.html">Q[90], AA[1]</a>,2). But human acts are about individual matters. Therefore human laws should be framed, not for the community, but rather
+                     for the individual.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q96_A1-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, law is a rule and measure of human acts, as stated above (
+                     <a id="FS_Q96_A1-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q90_A1.html">Q[90], AA[1]</a>,2). But a measure should be most certain, as stated in Metaph. x. Since therefore in human acts no general proposition can
+                     be so certain as not to fail in some individual cases, it seems that laws should be framed not in general but for individual
+                     cases.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q96_A1-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The jurist says (Pandect. Justin. lib. i, tit. iii, art. ii; De legibus, etc.) that "laws should be made to suit the majority
+                     of instances; and they are not framed according to what may possibly happen in an individual case."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q96_A1-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> Whatever is for an end should be proportionate to that end. Now the end of law is the common good; because, as Isidore says
+                     (Etym. v, 21) that "law should be framed, not for any private benefit, but for the common good of all the citizens." Hence
+                     human laws should be proportionate to the common good. Now the common good comprises many things. Wherefore law should take
+                     account of many things, as to persons, as to matters, and as to times. Because the
+                     community of the state is composed of many persons; and its good is procured by many actions; nor is it established to endure
+                     for only a short time, but to last for all time by the citizens succeeding one another, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei ii,
+                     21; xxii, 6).
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q96_A1-p7">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The Philosopher (Ethic. v, 7) divides the legal just, i.e. positive law, into three parts. For some things are laid down
+                     simply in a general way: and these are the general laws. Of these he says that "the legal is that which originally was a matter
+                     of indifference, but which, when enacted, is so no longer": as the fixing of the ransom of a captive. Some things affect the
+                     community in one respect, and individuals in another. These are called
+                     "privileges," i.e. "private laws," as it were, because they regard private persons, although their power extends to many matters;
+                     and in regard to these, he adds, "and further, all particular acts of legislation." Other matters are legal, not through being
+                     laws, but through being applications of general laws to particular cases: such are decrees which have the force of law; and
+                     in regard to these, he adds "all matters subject to decrees."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q96_A1-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> A principle of direction should be applicable to many; wherefore (Metaph. x, text. 4) the Philosopher says that all things
+                     belonging to one genus, are measured by one, which is the principle in that genus. For if there were as many rules or measures
+                     as there are things measured or ruled, they would cease to be of use, since their use consists in being applicable to many
+                     things. Hence law would be of no use, if it did not extend further than to one
+                     single act. Because the decrees than to one single act. Because the decrees of prudent men are made for the purpose of directing
+                     individual actions; whereas law is a general precept, as stated above (
+                     <a id="FS_Q96_A1-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q92_A2.html">Q[92], A[2]</a>, OBJ[2]).
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q96_A1-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> "We must not seek the same degree of certainty in all things" (Ethic. i, 3). Consequently in contingent matters, such as
+                     natural and human things, it is enough for a thing to be certain, as being true in the greater number of instances, though
+                     at times and less frequently it fail.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q96_A1-p10"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q96_A1-p11"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q96.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q96_A2.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="FS_Q96_A2" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q96_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q96_A3.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="FS_Q96_A2-p0.1">Whether it belongs to the human law to repress all vices?</h4>
+                  <p id="FS_Q96_A2-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q96_A2-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that it belongs to human law to repress all vices. For Isidore says (Etym. v, 20) that "laws were made in order
+                     that, in fear thereof, man's audacity might be held in check." But it would not be held in check sufficiently, unless all
+                     evils were repressed by law. Therefore human laws should repress all evils.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q96_A2-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the intention of the lawgiver is to make the citizens virtuous. But a man cannot be virtuous unless he forbear from
+                     all kinds of vice. Therefore it belongs to human law to repress all vices.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q96_A2-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, human law is derived from the natural law, as stated above (
+                     <a id="FS_Q96_A2-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q95_A2.html">Q[95], A[2]</a>). But all vices are contrary to the law of nature. Therefore human law should repress all vices.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q96_A2-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> We read in De Lib. Arb. i, 5: "It seems to me that the law which is written for the governing of the people rightly permits
+                     these things, and that Divine providence punishes them." But Divine providence punishes nothing but vices. Therefore human
+                     law rightly allows some vices, by not repressing them.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q96_A2-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above (
+                     <a id="FS_Q96_A2-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q90_A1.html">Q[90], AA[1]</a>,2), law is framed as a rule or measure of human acts. Now a measure should be homogeneous with that which it measures, as
+                     stated in Metaph. x, text. 3,4, since different things are measured by different measures. Wherefore laws imposed on men should
+                     also be in keeping with their condition, for, as Isidore says (Etym. v, 21), law should be "possible both according to nature,
+                     and according to the customs
+                     of the country." Now possibility or faculty of action is due to an interior habit or disposition: since the same thing is
+                     not possible to one who has not a virtuous habit, as is possible to one who has. Thus the same is not possible to a child
+                     as to a full-grown man: for which reason the law for children is not the same as for adults, since many things are permitted
+                     to children, which in an adult are punished by law or at any rate are open to blame. In like manner many things are permissible
+                     to
+                     men not perfect in virtue, which would be intolerable in a virtuous man.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q96_A2-p7"> Now human law is framed for a number of human beings, the majority of whom are not perfect in virtue. Wherefore human laws
+                     do not forbid all vices, from which the virtuous abstain, but only the more grievous vices, from which it is possible for
+                     the majority to abstain; and chiefly those that are to the hurt of others, without the prohibition of which human society
+                     could not be maintained: thus human law prohibits murder, theft and such like.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q96_A2-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Audacity seems to refer to the assailing of others. Consequently it belongs to those sins chiefly whereby one's neighbor
+                     is injured: and these sins are forbidden by human law, as stated.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q96_A2-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The purpose of human law is to lead men to virtue, not suddenly, but gradually. Wherefore it does not lay upon the multitude
+                     of imperfect men the burdens of those who are already virtuous, viz. that they should abstain from all evil. Otherwise these
+                     imperfect ones, being unable to bear such precepts, would break out into yet greater evils: thus it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q96_A2-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.30.33" target="asv">Ps. 30:33</a>): "He that violently bloweth his nose, bringeth out blood";
+                     and (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q96_A2-p9.2" href="./asv.html#Matt.9.17" target="asv">Mat. 9:17</a>) that if "new wine," i.e. precepts of a perfect life, "is put into old bottles," i.e. into imperfect men, "the bottles break,
+                     and the wine runneth out," i.e. the precepts are despised, and those men, from contempt, break into evils worse still.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q96_A2-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The natural law is a participation in us of the eternal law: while human law falls short of the eternal law. Now Augustine
+                     says (De Lib. Arb. i, 5): "The law which is framed for the government of states, allows and leaves unpunished many things
+                     that are punished by Divine providence. Nor, if this law does not attempt to do everything, is this a reason why it should
+                     be blamed for what it does." Wherefore, too, human law does not prohibit everything
+                     that is forbidden by the natural law.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q96_A2-p11"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q96_A2-p12"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q96_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q96_A3.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="FS_Q96_A3" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q96_A2.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q96_A4.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="FS_Q96_A3-p0.1">Whether human law prescribes acts of all the virtues?</h4>
+                  <p id="FS_Q96_A3-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q96_A3-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that human law does not prescribe acts of all the virtues. For vicious acts are contrary to acts of virtue.
+                     But human law does not prohibit all vices, as stated above 
+                     <a id="FS_Q96_A3-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q96_A2.html">(A[2])</a>. Therefore neither does it prescribe all acts of virtue.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q96_A3-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, a virtuous act proceeds from a virtue. But virtue is the end of law; so that whatever is from a virtue, cannot come
+                     under a precept of law. Therefore human law does not prescribe all acts of virtue.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q96_A3-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, law is ordained to the common good, as stated above (
+                     <a id="FS_Q96_A3-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q90_A2.html">Q[90], A[2]</a>). But some acts of virtue are ordained, not to the common good, but to private good. Therefore the law does not prescribe
+                     all acts of virtue.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q96_A3-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 1) that the law "prescribes the performance of the acts of a brave man . . . and the acts
+                     of the temperate man . . . and the acts of the meek man: and in like manner as regards the other virtues and vices, prescribing
+                     the former, forbidding the latter."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q96_A3-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> The species of virtues are distinguished by their objects, as explained above (
+                     <a id="FS_Q96_A3-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q54_A2.html">Q[54], A[2]</a>;
+                     <a id="FS_Q96_A3-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q60_A1.html"> Q[60], A[1]</a>;
+                     <a id="FS_Q96_A3-p6.3" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q62_A2.html"> Q[62], A[2]</a>). Now all the objects of virtues can be referred either to the private good of an individual, or to the common good of the
+                     multitude: thus matters of fortitude may be achieved either for the safety of the state, or for upholding the rights of a
+                     friend, and in like
+                     manner with the other virtues. But law, as stated above (
+                     <a id="FS_Q96_A3-p6.4" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q90_A2.html">Q[90], A[2]</a>) is ordained to the common good. Wherefore there is no virtue whose acts cannot be prescribed by the law. Nevertheless human
+                     law does not prescribe concerning all the acts of every virtue: but only in regard to those that are ordainable to the common
+                     good---either immediately, as when certain things are done directly for the common good---or mediately, as when a lawgiver
+                     prescribes certain things
+                     pertaining to good order, whereby the citizens are directed in the upholding of the common good of justice and peace.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q96_A3-p7">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Human law does not forbid all vicious acts, by the obligation of a precept, as neither does it prescribe all acts of virtue.
+                     But it forbids certain acts of each vice, just as it prescribes some acts of each virtue.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q96_A3-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> An act is said to be an act of virtue in two ways. First, from the fact that a man does something virtuous; thus the act
+                     of justice is to do what is right, and an act of fortitude is to do brave things: and in this way law prescribes certain acts
+                     of virtue. Secondly an act of virtue is when a man does a virtuous thing in a way in which a virtuous man does it. Such an
+                     act always proceeds from virtue: and it does not come under a precept of law, but is
+                     the end at which every lawgiver aims.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q96_A3-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> There is no virtue whose act is not ordainable to the common good, as stated above, either mediately or immediately.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q96_A3-p10"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q96_A3-p11"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q96_A2.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q96_A4.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="FS_Q96_A4" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q96_A3.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q96_A5.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="FS_Q96_A4-p0.1">Whether human law binds a man in conscience?</h4>
+                  <p id="FS_Q96_A4-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q96_A4-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that human law does not bind man in conscience. For an inferior power has no jurisdiction in a court of higher
+                     power. But the power of man, which frames human law, is beneath the Divine power. Therefore human law cannot impose its precept
+                     in a Divine court, such as is the court of conscience.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q96_A4-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the judgment of conscience depends chiefly on the commandments of God. But sometimes God's commandments are made
+                     void by human laws, according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q96_A4-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.15.6" target="asv"> Mat. 15:6</a>: "You have made void the commandment of God for your tradition." Therefore human law does not bind a man in conscience.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q96_A4-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, human laws often bring loss of character and injury on man, according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q96_A4-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.10.1" target="asv"> Is. 10:1 </a>et seqq.: "Woe to them that make wicked laws, and when they write, write injustice; to oppress the poor in judgment, and do
+                     violence to the cause of the humble of My people." But it is lawful for anyone to avoid oppression and violence. Therefore
+                     human laws do not bind man in conscience.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q96_A4-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q96_A4-p5.1" href="./asv.html#iPet.2.19" target="asv">1 Pet.
+                        2:19
+                     </a>): "This is thankworthy, if for conscience . . . a man endure sorrows, suffering wrongfully."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q96_A4-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> Laws framed by man are either just or unjust. If they be just, they have the power of binding in conscience, from the eternal
+                     law whence they are derived, according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q96_A4-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Prov.8.15" target="asv"> Prov. 8:15</a>: "By Me kings reign, and lawgivers decree just things." Now laws are said to be just, both from the end, when, to wit, they
+                     are ordained to the common good---and from their author, that is to say, when the law that is made does not exceed the power
+                     of the
+                     lawgiver---and from their form, when, to wit, burdens are laid on the subjects, according to an equality of proportion and
+                     with a view to the common good. For, since one man is a part of the community, each man in all that he is and has, belongs
+                     to the community; just as a part, in all that it is, belongs to the whole; wherefore nature inflicts a loss on the part, in
+                     order to save the whole: so that on this account, such laws as these, which impose proportionate burdens, are just and binding
+                     in
+                     conscience, and are legal laws.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q96_A4-p7"> On the other hand laws may be unjust in two ways: first, by being contrary to human good, through being opposed to the things
+                     mentioned above---either in respect of the end, as when an authority imposes on his subjects burdensome laws, conducive, not
+                     to the common good, but rather to his own cupidity or vainglory---or in respect of the author, as when a man makes a law that
+                     goes beyond the power committed to him---or in respect of the form, as when burdens are imposed unequally
+                     on the community, although with a view to the common good. The like are acts of violence rather than laws; because, as Augustine
+                     says (De Lib. Arb. i, 5), "a law that is not just, seems to be no law at all." Wherefore such laws do not bind in conscience,
+                     except perhaps in order to avoid scandal or disturbance, for which cause a man should even yield his right, according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q96_A4-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.5.40" target="asv"> Mat. 5:40,41</a>: "If a man . . . take away thy coat, let go thy cloak also unto him; and whosoever will
+                     force thee one mile, go with him other two."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q96_A4-p8"> Secondly, laws may be unjust through being opposed to the Divine good: such are the laws of tyrants inducing to idolatry,
+                     or to anything else contrary to the Divine law: and laws of this kind must nowise be observed, because, as stated in
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q96_A4-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Acts.5.29" target="asv"> Acts 5:29, </a> "we ought to obey God rather than man."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q96_A4-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As the Apostle says (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q96_A4-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.13.1" target="asv">Rom. 13:1,2</a>), all human power is from God . . . "therefore he that resisteth the power," in matters that are within its scope, "resisteth
+                     the ordinance of God"; so that he becomes guilty according to his conscience.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q96_A4-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> This argument is true of laws that are contrary to the commandments of God, which is beyond the scope of (human) power. Wherefore
+                     in such matters human law should not be obeyed.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q96_A4-p11">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This argument is true of a law that inflicts unjust hurt on its subjects. The power that man holds from God does not extend
+                     to this: wherefore neither in such matters is man bound to obey the law, provided he avoid giving scandal or inflicting a
+                     more grievous hurt.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q96_A4-p12"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q96_A4-p13"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q96_A3.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q96_A5.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="FS_Q96_A5" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q96_A4.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q96_A6.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="FS_Q96_A5-p0.1">Whether all are subject to the law?</h4>
+                  <p id="FS_Q96_A5-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q96_A5-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that not all are subject to the law. For those alone are subject to a law for whom a law is made. But the Apostle
+                     says (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q96_A5-p2.1" href="./asv.html#iTim.1.9" target="asv">1 Tim. 1:9</a>): "The law is not made for the just man." Therefore the just are not subject to the law.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q96_A5-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Pope Urban says [*Decretals. caus. xix, qu. 2]: "He that is guided by a private law need not for any reason be bound
+                     by the public law." Now all spiritual men are led by the private law of the Holy Ghost, for they are the sons of God, of whom
+                     it is said (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q96_A5-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.8.14" target="asv">Rom. 8:14</a>): "Whosoever are led by the Spirit of God, they are the sons of God." Therefore not all men are subject to human law.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q96_A5-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the jurist says [*Pandect. Justin. i, ff., tit. 3, De Leg. et Senat.] that "the sovereign is exempt from the laws."
+                     But he that is exempt from the law is not bound thereby. Therefore not all are subject to the law.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q96_A5-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle says (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q96_A5-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.13.1" target="asv">Rom. 13:1</a>): "Let every soul be subject to the higher powers." But subjection to a power seems to imply subjection to the laws framed
+                     by that power. Therefore all men should be subject to human law.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q96_A5-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above (
+                     <a id="FS_Q96_A5-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q90_A1.html">Q[90], AA[1]</a>,2; A[3], ad 2), the notion of law contains two things: first, that it is a rule of human acts; secondly, that it has coercive
+                     power. Wherefore a man may be subject to law in two ways. First, as the regulated is subject to the regulator: and, in this
+                     way, whoever is subject to a power, is subject to the law framed by that power. But it may happen in two ways that one is
+                     not subject to a power. In one way,
+                     by being altogether free from its authority: hence the subjects of one city or kingdom are not bound by the laws of the sovereign
+                     of another city or kingdom, since they are not subject to his authority. In another way, by being under a yet higher law;
+                     thus the subject of a proconsul should be ruled by his command, but not in those matters in which the subject receives his
+                     orders from the emperor: for in these matters, he is not bound by the mandate of the lower authority, since he is directed
+                     by that of a higher. In this way, one who is simply subject to a law, may not be a subject thereto in certain matters, in
+                     respect of which he is ruled by a higher law.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q96_A5-p7"> Secondly, a man is said to be subject to a law as the coerced is subject to the coercer. In this way the virtuous and righteous
+                     are not subject to the law, but only the wicked. Because coercion and violence are contrary to the will: but the will of the
+                     good is in harmony with the law, whereas the will of the wicked is discordant from it. Wherefore in this sense the good are
+                     not subject to the law, but only the wicked.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q96_A5-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This argument is true of subjection by way of coercion: for, in this way, "the law is not made for the just men": because
+                     "they are a law to themselves," since they "show the work of the law written in their hearts," as the Apostle says (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q96_A5-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.2.14" target="asv">Rom. 2:14,15</a>). Consequently the law does not enforce itself upon them as it does on the wicked.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q96_A5-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The law of the Holy Ghost is above all law framed by man: and therefore spiritual men, in so far as they are led by the law
+                     of the Holy Ghost, are not subject to the law in those matters that are inconsistent with the guidance of the Holy Ghost.
+                     Nevertheless the very fact that spiritual men are subject to law, is due to the leading of the Holy Ghost, according to 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q96_A5-p9.1" href="./asv.html#iPet.2.13" target="asv">1 Pet. 2:13</a>: "Be ye subject . . . to every human creature for God's
+                     sake."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q96_A5-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The sovereign is said to be "exempt from the law," as to its coercive power; since, properly speaking, no man is coerced
+                     by himself, and law has no coercive power save from the authority of the sovereign. Thus then is the sovereign said to be
+                     exempt from the law, because none is competent to pass sentence on him, if he acts against the law. Wherefore on
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q96_A5-p10.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.50.6" target="asv"> Ps. 50:6</a>: "To Thee only have I sinned," a gloss says that "there is no man who
+                     can judge the deeds of a king." But as to the directive force of law, the sovereign is subject to the law by his own will,
+                     according to the statement (Extra, De Constit. cap. Cum omnes) that "whatever law a man makes for another, he should keep
+                     himself. And a wise authority [*Dionysius Cato, Dist. de Moribus] says: 'Obey the law that thou makest thyself.'" Moreover
+                     the Lord reproaches those who "say and do not"; and who "bind heavy burdens and lay them on men's shoulders, but with a finger
+                     of
+                     their own they will not move them" (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q96_A5-p10.2" href="./asv.html#Matt.23.3" target="asv">Mat. 23:3,4</a>). Hence, in the judgment of God, the sovereign is not exempt from the law, as to its directive force; but he should fulfil
+                     it to his own free-will and not of constraint. Again the sovereign is above the law, in so far as, when it is expedient, he
+                     can change the law, and dispense in it according to time and place.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q96_A5-p11"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q96_A5-p12"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q96_A4.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q96_A6.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="FS_Q96_A6" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q96_A5.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q97.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="FS_Q96_A6-p0.1">Whether he who is under a law may act beside the letter of the law?</h4>
+                  <p id="FS_Q96_A6-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q96_A6-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that he who is subject to a law may not act beside the letter of the law. For Augustine says (De Vera Relig. 31):
+                     "Although men judge about temporal laws when they make them, yet when once they are made they must pass judgment not on them,
+                     but according to them." But if anyone disregard the letter of the law, saying that he observes the intention of the lawgiver,
+                     he seems to pass judgment on the law. Therefore it is not right for one who is under the
+                     law to disregard the letter of the law, in order to observe the intention of the lawgiver.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q96_A6-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, he alone is competent to interpret the law who can make the law. But those who are subject to the law cannot make
+                     the law. Therefore they have no right to interpret the intention of the lawgiver, but should always act according to the letter
+                     of the law.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q96_A6-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, every wise man knows how to explain his intention by words. But those who framed the laws should be reckoned wise:
+                     for Wisdom says (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q96_A6-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Prov.8.15" target="asv">Prov. 8:15</a>): "By Me kings reign, and lawgivers decree just things." Therefore we should not judge of the intention of the lawgiver otherwise
+                     than by the words of the law.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q96_A6-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Hilary says (De Trin. iv): "The meaning of what is said is according to the motive for saying it: because things are not
+                     subject to speech, but speech to things." Therefore we should take account of the motive of the lawgiver, rather than of his
+                     very words.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q96_A6-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above 
+                     <a id="FS_Q96_A6-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q96_A4.html">(A[4])</a>, every law is directed to the common weal of men, and derives the force and nature of law accordingly. Hence the jurist says
+                     [*Pandect. Justin. lib. i, ff., tit. 3, De Leg. et Senat.]: "By no reason of law, or favor of equity, is it allowable for
+                     us to interpret harshly, and render burdensome, those useful measures which have been enacted for the welfare of man." Now
+                     it happens often that the observance of some
+                     point of law conduces to the common weal in the majority of instances, and yet, in some cases, is very hurtful. Since then
+                     the lawgiver cannot have in view every single case, he shapes the law according to what happens most frequently, by directing
+                     his attention to the common good. Wherefore if a case arise wherein the observance of that law would be hurtful to the general
+                     welfare, it should not be observed. For instance, suppose that in a besieged city it be an established law that the gates
+                     of the city are to be kept closed, this is good for public welfare as a general rule: but, it were to happen that the enemy
+                     are in pursuit of certain citizens, who are defenders of the city, it would be a great loss to the city, if the gates were
+                     not opened to them: and so in that case the gates ought to be opened, contrary to the letter of the law, in order to maintain
+                     the common weal, which the lawgiver had in view.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q96_A6-p7"> Nevertheless it must be noted, that if the observance of the law according to the letter does not involve any sudden risk
+                     needing instant remedy, it is not competent for everyone to expound what is useful and what is not useful to the state: those
+                     alone can do this who are in authority, and who, on account of such like cases, have the power to dispense from the laws.
+                     If, however, the peril be so sudden as not to allow of the delay involved by referring the matter to authority,
+                     the mere necessity brings with it a dispensation, since necessity knows no law.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q96_A6-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> He who in a case of necessity acts beside the letter of the law, does not judge the law; but of a particular case in which
+                     he sees that the letter of the law is not to be observed.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q96_A6-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> He who follows the intention of the lawgiver, does not interpret the law simply; but in a case in which it is evident, by
+                     reason of the manifest harm, that the lawgiver intended otherwise. For if it be a matter of doubt, he must either act according
+                     to the letter of the law, or consult those in power.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q96_A6-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> No man is so wise as to be able to take account of every single case; wherefore he is not able sufficiently to express in
+                     words all those things that are suitable for the end he has in view. And even if a lawgiver were able to take all the cases
+                     into consideration, he ought not to mention them all, in order to avoid confusion: but should frame the law according to that
+                     which is of most common occurrence.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q96_A6-p11"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q96_A6-p12"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q96_A5.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q97.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <a href="summa.FS_Q95_A4.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.FS_Q96_A1.html"></a>
+            </div>
+            <div id="FS_Q97" class="div3">
+               <a href="summa.FS_Q96_A6.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.FS_Q97_A1.html"></a>
+               <h3 id="FS_Q97-p0.1">OF CHANGE IN LAWS (FOUR ARTICLES) </h3>
+               <p id="FS_Q97-p1"></p>
+               <p id="FS_Q97-p2"> We must now consider change in laws: under which head there are four points of inquiry:</p>
+               <p id="FS_Q97-p3"> (1) Whether human law is changeable?</p>
+               <p id="FS_Q97-p4"> (2) Whether it should be always changed, whenever anything better occurs?</p>
+               <p id="FS_Q97-p5"> (3) Whether it is abolished by custom, and whether custom obtains the force of law?</p>
+               <p id="FS_Q97-p6"> (4) Whether the application of human law should be changed by dispensation of those in authority?</p>
+               <div id="FS_Q97_A1" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q97.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q97_A2.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="FS_Q97_A1-p0.1">Whether human law should be changed in any way?</h4>
+                  <p id="FS_Q97_A1-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q97_A1-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that human law should not be changed in any way at all. Because human law is derived from the natural law,
+                     as stated above (
+                     <a id="FS_Q97_A1-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q95_A2.html">Q[95], A[2]</a>). But the natural law endures unchangeably. Therefore human law should also remain without any change.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q97_A1-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 5), a measure should be absolutely stable. But human law is the measure of human
+                     acts, as stated above (
+                     <a id="FS_Q97_A1-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q90_A1.html">Q[90], AA[1]</a>,2). Therefore it should remain without change.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q97_A1-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, it is of the essence of law to be just and right, as stated above (
+                     <a id="FS_Q97_A1-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q95_A2.html">Q[95], A[2]</a>). But that which is right once is right always. Therefore that which is law once, should be always law.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q97_A1-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. i, 6): "A temporal law, however just, may be justly changed in course of time."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q97_A1-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above (
+                     <a id="FS_Q97_A1-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q91_A3.html">Q[91], A[3]</a>), human law is a dictate of reason, whereby human acts are directed. Thus there may be two causes for the just change of
+                     human law: one on the part of reason; the other on the part of man whose acts are regulated by law. The cause on the part
+                     of reason is that it seems natural to human reason to advance gradually from the imperfect to the perfect. Hence, in speculative
+                     sciences, we see that the teaching
+                     of the early philosophers was imperfect, and that it was afterwards perfected by those who succeeded them. So also in practical
+                     matters: for those who first endeavored to discover something useful for the human community, not being able by themselves
+                     to take everything into consideration, set up certain institutions which were deficient in many ways; and these were changed
+                     by subsequent lawgivers who made institutions that might prove less frequently deficient in respect of the common weal.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q97_A1-p7"> On the part of man, whose acts are regulated by law, the law can be rightly changed on account of the changed condition of
+                     man, to whom different things are expedient according to the difference of his condition. An example is proposed by Augustine
+                     (De Lib. Arb. i, 6): "If the people have a sense of moderation and responsibility, and are most careful guardians of the common
+                     weal, it is right to enact a law allowing such a people to choose their own magistrates for the government
+                     of the commonwealth. But if, as time goes on, the same people become so corrupt as to sell their votes, and entrust the government
+                     to scoundrels and criminals; then the right of appointing their public officials is rightly forfeit to such a people, and
+                     the choice devolves to a few good men."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q97_A1-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The natural law is a participation of the eternal law, as stated above (
+                     <a id="FS_Q97_A1-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q91_A2.html">Q[91], A[2]</a>), and therefore endures without change, owing to the unchangeableness and perfection of the Divine Reason, the Author of
+                     nature. But the reason of man is changeable and imperfect: wherefore his law is subject to change. Moreover the natural law
+                     contains certain universal precepts, which are everlasting: whereas human law contains certain
+                     particular precepts, according to various emergencies.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q97_A1-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> A measure should be as enduring as possible. But nothing can be absolutely unchangeable in things that are subject to change.
+                     And therefore human law cannot be altogether unchangeable.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q97_A1-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> In corporal things, right is predicated absolutely: and therefore, as far as itself is concerned, always remains right. But
+                     right is predicated of law with reference to the common weal, to which one and the same thing is not always adapted, as stated
+                     above: wherefore rectitude of this kind is subject to change.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q97_A1-p11"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q97_A1-p12"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q97.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q97_A2.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="FS_Q97_A2" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q97_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q97_A3.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="FS_Q97_A2-p0.1">Whether human law should always be changed, whenever something better occurs?</h4>
+                  <p id="FS_Q97_A2-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q97_A2-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that human law should be changed, whenever something better occurs. Because human laws are devised by human
+                     reason, like other arts. But in the other arts, the tenets of former times give place to others, if something better occurs.
+                     Therefore the same should apply to human laws.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q97_A2-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, by taking note of the past we can provide for the future. Now unless human laws had been changed when it was found
+                     possible to improve them, considerable inconvenience would have ensued; because the laws of old were crude in many points.
+                     Therefore it seems that laws should be changed, whenever anything better occurs to be enacted.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q97_A2-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, human laws are enacted about single acts of man. But we cannot acquire perfect knowledge in singular matters, except
+                     by experience, which "requires time," as stated in Ethic. ii. Therefore it seems that as time goes on it is possible for something
+                     better to occur for legislation.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q97_A2-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is stated in the Decretals (Dist. xii, 5): "It is absurd, and a detestable shame, that we should suffer those traditions
+                     to be changed which we have received from the fathers of old."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q97_A2-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above 
+                     <a id="FS_Q97_A2-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q97_A1.html">(A[1])</a>, human law is rightly changed, in so far as such change is conducive to the common weal. But, to a certain extent, the mere
+                     change of law is of itself prejudicial to the common good: because custom avails much for the observance of laws, seeing that
+                     what is done contrary to general custom, even in slight matters, is looked upon as grave. Consequently, when a law is changed,
+                     the binding power of the law is
+                     diminished, in so far as custom is abolished. Wherefore human law should never be changed, unless, in some way or other, the
+                     common weal be compensated according to the extent of the harm done in this respect. Such compensation may arise either from
+                     some very great and every evident benefit conferred by the new enactment; or from the extreme urgency of the case, due to
+                     the fact that either the existing law is clearly unjust, or its observance extremely harmful. Wherefore the jurist says
+                     [*Pandect. Justin. lib. i, ff., tit. 4, De Constit. Princip.] that "in establishing new laws, there should be evidence of
+                     the benefit to be derived, before departing from a law which has long been considered just."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q97_A2-p7">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Rules of art derive their force from reason alone: and therefore whenever something better occurs, the rule followed hitherto
+                     should be changed. But "laws derive very great force from custom," as the Philosopher states (Polit. ii, 5): consequently
+                     they should not be quickly changed.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q97_A2-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> This argument proves that laws ought to be changed: not in view of any improvement, but for the sake of a great benefit or
+                     in a case of great urgency, as stated above. This answer applies also to the Third Objection.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q97_A2-p9"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q97_A2-p10"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q97_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q97_A3.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="FS_Q97_A3" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q97_A2.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q97_A4.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="FS_Q97_A3-p0.1">Whether custom can obtain force of law?</h4>
+                  <p id="FS_Q97_A3-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q97_A3-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that custom cannot obtain force of law, nor abolish a law. Because human law is derived from the natural law
+                     and from the Divine law, as stated above (
+                     <a id="FS_Q97_A3-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q93_A3.html">Q[93], A[3]</a>;
+                     <a id="FS_Q97_A3-p2.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q95_A2.html"> Q[95], A[2]</a>). But human custom cannot change either the law of nature or the Divine law. Therefore neither can it change human law.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q97_A3-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, many evils cannot make one good. But he who first acted against the law, did evil. Therefore by multiplying such
+                     acts, nothing good is the result. Now a law is something good; since it is a rule of human acts. Therefore law is not abolished
+                     by custom, so that the mere custom should obtain force of law.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q97_A3-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the framing of laws belongs to those public men whose business it is to govern the community; wherefore private
+                     individuals cannot make laws. But custom grows by the acts of private individuals. Therefore custom cannot obtain force of
+                     law, so as to abolish the law.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q97_A3-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (Ep. ad Casulan. xxxvi): "The customs of God's people and the institutions of our ancestors are to be considered
+                     as laws. And those who throw contempt on the customs of the Church ought to be punished as those who disobey the law of God."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q97_A3-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> All law proceeds from the reason and will of the lawgiver; the Divine and natural laws from the reasonable will of God; the
+                     human law from the will of man, regulated by reason. Now just as human reason and will, in practical matters, may be made
+                     manifest by speech, so may they be made known by deeds: since seemingly a man chooses as good that which he carries into execution.
+                     But it is evident that by human speech, law can be both changed and expounded, in so
+                     far as it manifests the interior movement and thought of human reason. Wherefore by actions also, especially if they be repeated,
+                     so as to make a custom, law can be changed and expounded; and also something can be established which obtains force of law,
+                     in so far as by repeated external actions, the inward movement of the will, and concepts of reason are most effectually declared;
+                     for when a thing is done again and again, it seems to proceed from a deliberate judgment of reason. Accordingly,
+                     custom has the force of a law, abolishes law, and is the interpreter of law.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q97_A3-p7">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The natural and Divine laws proceed from the Divine will, as stated above. Wherefore they cannot be changed by a custom proceeding
+                     from the will of man, but only by Divine authority. Hence it is that no custom can prevail over the Divine or natural laws:
+                     for Isidore says (Synon. ii, 16): "Let custom yield to authority: evil customs should be eradicated by law and reason."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q97_A3-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As stated above (
+                     <a id="FS_Q97_A3-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q96_A6.html">Q[96], A[6]</a>), human laws fail in some cases: wherefore it is possible sometimes to act beside the law; namely, in a case where the law
+                     fails; yet the act will not be evil. And when such cases are multiplied, by reason of some change in man, then custom shows
+                     that the law is no longer useful: just as it might be declared by the verbal promulgation of a law to the contrary. If, however,
+                     the same reason remains,
+                     for which the law was useful hitherto, then it is not the custom that prevails against the law, but the law that overcomes
+                     the custom: unless perhaps the sole reason for the law seeming useless, be that it is not "possible according to the custom
+                     of the country" [*
+                     <a id="FS_Q97_A3-p8.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q95_A3.html">Q[95], A[3]</a>], which has been stated to be one of the conditions of law. For it is not easy to set aside the custom of a whole people.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q97_A3-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The people among whom a custom is introduced may be of two conditions. For if they are free, and able to make their own laws,
+                     the consent of the whole people expressed by a custom counts far more in favor of a particular observance, that does the authority
+                     of the sovereign, who has not the power to frame laws, except as representing the people. Wherefore although each individual
+                     cannot make laws, yet the whole people can. If however the people have
+                     not the free power to make their own laws, or to abolish a law made by a higher authority; nevertheless with such a people
+                     a prevailing custom obtains force of law, in so far as it is tolerated by those to whom it belongs to make laws for that people:
+                     because by the very fact that they tolerate it they seem to approve of that which is introduced by custom.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q97_A3-p10"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q97_A3-p11"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q97_A2.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q97_A4.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="FS_Q97_A4" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q97_A3.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q98.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="FS_Q97_A4-p0.1">Whether the rulers of the people can dispense from human laws?</h4>
+                  <p id="FS_Q97_A4-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q97_A4-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the rulers of the people cannot dispense from human laws. For the law is established for the "common weal,"
+                     as Isidore says (Etym. v, 21). But the common good should not be set aside for the private convenience of an individual: because,
+                     as the Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 2), "the good of the nation is more godlike than the good of one man." Therefore it seems
+                     that a man should not be dispensed from acting in compliance with the general
+                     law.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q97_A4-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, those who are placed over others are commanded as follows (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q97_A4-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Deut.1.17" target="asv">Dt. 1:17</a>): "You shall hear the little as well as the great; neither shall you respect any man's person, because it is the judgment
+                     of God." But to allow one man to do that which is equally forbidden to all, seems to be respect of persons. Therefore the
+                     rulers of a community cannot grant such dispensations, since this is against a precept of the Divine law.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q97_A4-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, human law, in order to be just, should accord with the natural and Divine laws: else it would not "foster religion,"
+                     nor be "helpful to discipline," which is requisite to the nature of law, as laid down by Isidore (Etym. v, 3). But no man
+                     can dispense from the Divine and natural laws. Neither, therefore, can he dispense from the human law.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q97_A4-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle says (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q97_A4-p5.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.9.17" target="asv">1 Cor. 9:17</a>): "A dispensation is committed to me."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q97_A4-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> Dispensation, properly speaking, denotes a measuring out to individuals of some common goods: thus the head of a household
+                     is called a dispenser, because to each member of the household he distributes work and necessaries of life in due weight and
+                     measure. Accordingly in every community a man is said to dispense, from the very fact that he directs how some general precept
+                     is to be fulfilled by each individual. Now it happens at times that a precept, which is
+                     conducive to the common weal as a general rule, is not good for a particular individual, or in some particular case, either
+                     because it would hinder some greater good, or because it would be the occasion of some evil, as explained above (
+                     <a id="FS_Q97_A4-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q96_A6.html">Q[96], A[6]</a>). But it would be dangerous to leave this to the discretion of each individual, except perhaps by reason of an evident and
+                     sudden emergency, as stated above (
+                     <a id="FS_Q97_A4-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q96_A6.html">Q[96], A[6]</a>). Consequently he who is
+                     placed over a community is empowered to dispense in a human law that rests upon his authority, so that, when the law fails
+                     in its application to persons or circumstances, he may allow the precept of the law not to be observed. If however he grant
+                     this permission without any such reason, and of his mere will, he will be an unfaithful or an imprudent dispenser: unfaithful,
+                     if he has not the common good in view; imprudent, if he ignores the reasons for granting dispensations. Hence Our Lord says
+                     (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q97_A4-p6.3" href="./asv.html#Luke.12.42" target="asv">Lk. 12:42</a>): "Who, thinkest thou, is the faithful and wise dispenser [Douay: steward], whom his lord setteth over his family?"
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q97_A4-p7">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> When a person is dispensed from observing the general law, this should not be done to the prejudice of, but with the intention
+                     of benefiting, the common good.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q97_A4-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> It is not respect of persons if unequal measures are served out to those who are themselves unequal. Wherefore when the condition
+                     of any person requires that he should reasonably receive special treatment, it is not respect of persons if he be the object
+                     of special favor.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q97_A4-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Natural law, so far as it contains general precepts, which never fail, does not allow of dispensations. In other precepts,
+                     however, which are as conclusions of the general precepts, man sometimes grants a dispensation: for instance, that a loan
+                     should not be paid back to the betrayer of his country, or something similar. But to the Divine law each man stands as a private
+                     person to the public law to which he is subject. Wherefore just as none can
+                     dispense from public human law, except the man from whom the law derives its authority, or his delegate; so, in the precepts
+                     of the Divine law, which are from God, none can dispense but God, or the man to whom He may give special power for that purpose.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q97_A4-p10"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q97_A4-p11"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q97_A3.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q98.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <a href="summa.FS_Q96_A6.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.FS_Q97_A1.html"></a>
+            </div>
+            <div id="FS_Q98" class="div3">
+               <a href="summa.FS_Q97_A4.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.FS_Q98_A1.html"></a>
+               <h3 id="FS_Q98-p0.1">OF THE OLD LAW (SIX ARTICLES)</h3>
+               <p id="FS_Q98-p1"></p>
+               <p id="FS_Q98-p2"> In due sequence we must now consider the Old Law; and (1) The Law itself; (2) Its precepts. Under the first head there are
+                  six points of inquiry:
+               </p>
+               <p id="FS_Q98-p3"> (1) Whether the Old Law was good?</p>
+               <p id="FS_Q98-p4"> (2) Whether it was from God?</p>
+               <p id="FS_Q98-p5"> (3) Whether it came from Him through the angels?</p>
+               <p id="FS_Q98-p6"> (4) Whether it was given to all?</p>
+               <p id="FS_Q98-p7"> (5) Whether it was binding on all?</p>
+               <p id="FS_Q98-p8"> (6) Whether it was given at a suitable time?</p>
+               <div id="FS_Q98_A1" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q98.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q98_A2.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="FS_Q98_A1-p0.1">Whether the Old Law was good?</h4>
+                  <p id="FS_Q98_A1-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q98_A1-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the Old Law was not good. For it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q98_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Ezek.20.25" target="asv">Ezech. 20:25</a>): "I gave them statutes that were not good, and judgments in which they shall not live." But a law is not said to be good
+                     except on account of the goodness of the precepts that it contains. Therefore the Old Law was not good.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q98_A1-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it belongs to the goodness of a law that it conduce to the common welfare, as Isidore says (Etym. v, 3). But the
+                     Old Law was not salutary; rather was it deadly and hurtful. For the Apostle says (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q98_A1-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.7.8" target="asv">Rom. 7:8</a>, seqq.): "Without the law sin was dead. And I lived some time without the law. But when the commandment came sin revived;
+                     and I died." Again he says (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q98_A1-p3.2" href="./asv.html#Rom.5.20" target="asv">Rom. 5:20</a>): "Law entered in that sin might abound." Therefore the Old Law was not
+                     good.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q98_A1-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, it belongs to the goodness of the law that it should be possible to obey it, both according to nature, and according
+                     to human custom. But such the Old Law was not: since Peter said (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q98_A1-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Acts.15.10" target="asv">Acts 15:10</a>): "Why tempt you (God) to put a yoke on the necks of the disciples, which neither our fathers nor we have been able to bear?"
+                     Therefore it seems that the Old Law was not good.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q98_A1-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle says (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q98_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.7.12" target="asv">Rom. 7:12</a>): "Wherefore the law indeed is holy, and the commandment holy, and just, and good."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q98_A1-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> Without any doubt, the Old Law was good. For just as a doctrine is shown to be good by the fact that it accords with right
+                     reason, so is a law proved to be good if it accords with reason. Now the Old Law was in accordance with reason. Because it
+                     repressed concupiscence which is in conflict with reason, as evidenced by the commandment, "Thou shalt not covet thy neighbor's
+                     goods" (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q98_A1-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Exod.20.17" target="asv">Ex. 20:17</a>). Moreover the same law forbade all kinds of sin;
+                     and these too are contrary to reason. Consequently it is evident that it was a good law. The Apostle argues in the same way
+                     (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q98_A1-p6.2" href="./asv.html#Rom.7" target="asv">Rom. 7</a>): "I am delighted," says he (verse 22), "with the law of God, according to the inward man": and again (verse 16): "I consent
+                     to the law, that is good."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q98_A1-p7"> But it must be noted that the good has various degrees, as Dionysius states (Div. Nom. iv): for there is a perfect good,
+                     and an imperfect good. In things ordained to an end, there is perfect goodness when a thing is such that it is sufficient
+                     in itself to conduce to the end: while there is imperfect goodness when a thing is of some assistance in attaining the end,
+                     but is not sufficient for the realization thereof. Thus a medicine is perfectly good, if it gives health to a man;
+                     but it is imperfect, if it helps to cure him, without being able to bring him back to health. Again it must be observed that
+                     the end of human law is different from the end of Divine law. For the end of human law is the temporal tranquillity of the
+                     state, which end law effects by directing external actions, as regards those evils which might disturb the peaceful condition
+                     of the state. On the other hand, the end of the Divine law is to bring man to that end which is everlasting happiness; which
+                     end is hindered by any sin, not only of external, but also of internal action. Consequently that which suffices for the perfection
+                     of human law, viz. the prohibition and punishment of sin, does not suffice for the perfection of the Divine law: but it is
+                     requisite that it should make man altogether fit to partake of everlasting happiness. Now this cannot be done save by the
+                     grace of the Holy Ghost, whereby "charity" which fulfilleth the law . . . "is spread abroad in our hearts" (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q98_A1-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.5.5" target="asv">Rom.
+                        5:5
+                     </a>): since "the grace of God is life everlasting" (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q98_A1-p7.2" href="./asv.html#Rom.6.23" target="asv">Rom. 6:23</a>). But the Old Law could not confer this grace, for this was reserved to Christ; because, as it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q98_A1-p7.3" href="./asv.html#John.1.17" target="asv">Jn. 1:17</a>), the law was given "by Moses, grace and truth came by Jesus Christ." Consequently the Old Law was good indeed, but imperfect,
+                     according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q98_A1-p7.4" href="./asv.html#Heb.7.19" target="asv"> Heb. 7:19</a>: "The law brought nothing to perfection."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q98_A1-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The Lord refers there to the ceremonial precepts; which are said not to be good, because they did not confer grace unto the
+                     remission of sins, although by fulfilling these precepts man confessed himself a sinner. Hence it is said pointedly, "and
+                     judgments in which they shall not live"; i.e. whereby they are unable to obtain life; and so the text goes on: "And I polluted
+                     them," i.e. showed them to be polluted, "in their own gifts, when they offered all
+                     that opened the womb, for their offenses."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q98_A1-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The law is said to have been deadly, as being not the cause, but the occasion of death, on account of its imperfection: in
+                     so far as it did not confer grace enabling man to fulfil what is prescribed, and to avoid what it forbade. Hence this occasion
+                     was not given to men, but taken by them. Wherefore the Apostle says (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q98_A1-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.5.11" target="asv">Rom. 5:11</a>): "Sin, taking occasion by the commandment, seduced me, and by it killed me." In the same sense when it is
+                     said that "the law entered in that sin might abound," the conjunction "that" must be taken as consecutive and not final: in
+                     so far as men, taking occasion from the law, sinned all the more, both because a sin became more grievous after law had forbidden
+                     it, and because concupiscence increased, since we desire a thing the more from its being forbidden.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q98_A1-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The yoke of the law could not be borne without the help of grace, which the law did not confer: for it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q98_A1-p10.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.9.16" target="asv">Rom. 9:16</a>): "It is not him that willeth, nor of him that runneth," viz. that he wills and runs in the commandments of God, "but of
+                     God that showeth mercy." Wherefore it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q98_A1-p10.2" href="./asv.html#Ps.118.32" target="asv">Ps. 118:32</a>): "I have run the way of Thy commandments, when Thou didst enlarge my heart," i.e. by giving me grace and
+                     charity.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q98_A1-p11"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q98_A1-p12"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q98.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q98_A2.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="FS_Q98_A2" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q98_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q98_A3.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="FS_Q98_A2-p0.1">Whether the Old Law was from God?</h4>
+                  <p id="FS_Q98_A2-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q98_A2-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the Old Law was not from God. For it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q98_A2-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Deut.32.4" target="asv">Dt. 32:4</a>): "The works of God are perfect." But the Law was imperfect, as stated above 
+                     <a id="FS_Q98_A2-p2.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q98_A1.html">(A[1])</a>. Therefore the Old Law was not from God.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q98_A2-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q98_A2-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Eccl.3.14" target="asv">Eccles. 3:14</a>): "I have learned that all the works which God hath made continue for ever." But the Old Law does not continue for ever:
+                     since the Apostle says (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q98_A2-p3.2" href="./asv.html#Heb.7.18" target="asv">Heb. 7:18</a>): "There is indeed a setting aside of the former commandment, because of the weakness and unprofitableness thereof." Therefore
+                     the Old Law was not from God.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q98_A2-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, a wise lawgiver should remove, not only evil, but also the occasions of evil. But the Old Law was an occasion of
+                     sin, as stated above (A[1], ad 2). Therefore the giving of such a law does not pertain to God, to Whom "none is like among
+                     the lawgivers" (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q98_A2-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Job.36.22" target="asv">Job 36:22</a>).
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q98_A2-p5">
+                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q98_A2-p5.1" href="./asv.html#iTim.2.4" target="asv">1 Tim. 2:4</a>) that God "will have all men to be saved." But the Old Law did not suffice to save man, as stated above 
+                     <a id="FS_Q98_A2-p5.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q98_A1.html">(A[1])</a>. Therefore the giving of such a law did not appertain to God. Therefore the Old Law was not from God.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q98_A2-p6">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Our Lord said (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q98_A2-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.15.6" target="asv">Mat. 15:6</a>) while speaking to the Jews, to whom the Law was given: "You have made void the commandment of God for your tradition." And
+                     shortly before (verse 4) He had said: "Honor thy father and mother," which is contained expressly in the Old Law (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q98_A2-p6.2" href="./asv.html#Exod.20.12" target="asv">Ex. 20:12</a>;
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q98_A2-p6.3" href="./asv.html#Deut.5.16" target="asv"> Dt. 5:16</a>). Therefore the Old Law was from God.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q98_A2-p7">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> The Old Law was given by the good God, Who is the Father of Our Lord Jesus Christ. For the Old Law ordained men to Christ
+                     in two ways. First by bearing witness to Christ; wherefore He Himself says (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q98_A2-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Luke.24.44" target="asv">Lk. 24:44</a>): "All things must needs be fulfilled, which are written in the law . . . and in the prophets, and in the psalms, concerning
+                     Me": and (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q98_A2-p7.2" href="./asv.html#John.5.46" target="asv">Jn. 5:46</a>): "If you did believe Moses, you would perhaps believe Me also; for he wrote of Me." Secondly, as a kind of
+                     disposition, since by withdrawing men from idolatrous worship, it enclosed [concludebat] them in the worship of one God, by
+                     Whom the human race was to be saved through Christ. Wherefore the Apostle says (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q98_A2-p7.3" href="./asv.html#Gal.3.23" target="asv">Gal. 3:23</a>): "Before the faith came, we were kept under the law shut up [conclusi], unto that faith which was to be revealed." Now it
+                     is evident that the same thing it is, which gives a disposition to the end, and which brings to the end; and when I say "the
+                     same," I mean
+                     that it does so either by itself or through its subjects. For the devil would not make a law whereby men would be led to Christ,
+                     Who was to cast him out, according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q98_A2-p7.4" href="./asv.html#Matt.12.26" target="asv"> Mat. 12:26</a>: "If Satan cast out Satan, his kingdom is divided" [Vulg.: 'he is divided against himself']. Therefore the Old Law was given
+                     by the same God, from Whom came salvation to man, through the grace of Christ.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q98_A2-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Nothing prevents a thing being not perfect simply, and yet perfect in respect of time: thus a boy is said to be perfect,
+                     not simply, but with regard to the condition of time. So, too, precepts that are given to children are perfect in comparison
+                     with the condition of those to whom they are given, although they are not perfect simply. Hence the Apostle says (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q98_A2-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Gal.3.24" target="asv">Gal. 3:24</a>): "The law was our pedagogue in Christ."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q98_A2-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Those works of God endure for ever which God so made that they would endure for ever; and these are His perfect works. But
+                     the Old Law was set aside when there came the perfection of grace; not as though it were evil, but as being weak and useless
+                     for this time; because, as the Apostle goes on to say, "the law brought nothing to perfection": hence he says (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q98_A2-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Gal.3.25" target="asv">Gal. 3:25</a>): "After the faith is come, we are no longer under a
+                     pedagogue."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q98_A2-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As stated above (
+                     <a id="FS_Q98_A2-p10.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q79_A4.html">Q[79], A[4]</a>), God sometimes permits certain ones to fall into sin, that they may thereby be humbled. So also did He wish to give such
+                     a law as men by their own forces could not fulfill, so that, while presuming on their own powers, they might find themselves
+                     to be sinners, and being humbled might have recourse to the help of grace.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q98_A2-p11">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Although the Old Law did not suffice to save man, yet another help from God besides the Law was available for man, viz. faith
+                     in the Mediator, by which the fathers of old were justified even as we were. Accordingly God did not fail man by giving him
+                     insufficient aids to salvation.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q98_A2-p12"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q98_A2-p13"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q98_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q98_A3.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="FS_Q98_A3" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q98_A2.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q98_A4.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="FS_Q98_A3-p0.1">Whether the Old Law was given through the angels?</h4>
+                  <p id="FS_Q98_A3-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q98_A3-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the Old Law was not given through the angels, but immediately by God. For an angel means a "messenger"; so
+                     that the word "angel" denotes ministry, not lordship, according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q98_A3-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.102.20" target="asv"> Ps. 102:20,21</a>: "Bless the Lord, all ye His Angels . . . you ministers of His." But the Old Law is related to have been given by the Lord:
+                     for it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q98_A3-p2.2" href="./asv.html#Exod.20.1" target="asv">Ex. 20:1</a>): "And the Lord spoke . . . these words," and further on: "I am the Lord Thy God."
+                     Moreover the same expression is often repeated in Exodus, and the later books of the Law. Therefore the Law was given by God
+                     immediately.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q98_A3-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q98_A3-p3.1" href="./asv.html#John.1.17" target="asv"> Jn. 1:17, </a> "the Law was given by Moses." But Moses received it from God immediately: for it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q98_A3-p3.2" href="./asv.html#Exod.33.11" target="asv">Ex. 33:11</a>): "The Lord spoke to Moses face to face, as a man is wont to speak to his friend." Therefore the Old Law was given by God
+                     immediately.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q98_A3-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, it belongs to the sovereign alone to make a law, as stated above (
+                     <a id="FS_Q98_A3-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q90_A3.html">Q[90], A[3]</a>). But God alone is Sovereign as regards the salvation of souls: while the angels are the "ministering spirits," as stated
+                     in
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q98_A3-p4.2" href="./asv.html#Heb.1.14" target="asv"> Heb. 1:14.</a> Therefore it was not meet for the Law to be given through the angels, since it is ordained to the salvation of souls.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q98_A3-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle said (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q98_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Gal.3.19" target="asv">Gal. 3:19</a>) that the Law was "given [Vulg.: 'ordained'] by angels in the hand of a Mediator." And Stephen said (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q98_A3-p5.2" href="./asv.html#Acts.7.53" target="asv">Acts 7:53</a>): "(Who) have received the Law by the disposition of angels."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q98_A3-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> The Law was given by God through the angels. And besides the general reason given by Dionysius (Coel. Hier. iv), viz. that
+                     "the gifts of God should be brought to men by means of the angels," there is a special reason why the Old Law should have
+                     been given through them. For it has been stated (
+                     <a id="FS_Q98_A3-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q98_A1.html">AA[1]</a>,2) that the Old Law was imperfect, and yet disposed man to that perfect salvation of the human race, which was to come through
+                     Christ.
+                     Now it is to be observed that wherever there is an order of powers or arts, he that holds the highest place, himself exercises
+                     the principal and perfect acts; while those things which dispose to the ultimate perfection are effected by him through his
+                     subordinates: thus the ship-builder himself rivets the planks together, but prepares the material by means of the workmen
+                     who assist him under his direction. Consequently it was fitting that the perfect law of the New Testament should be given
+                     by
+                     the incarnate God immediately; but that the Old Law should be given to men by the ministers of God, i.e. by the angels. It
+                     is thus that the Apostle at the beginning of his epistle to the Hebrews (1:2) proves the excellence of the New Law over the
+                     Old; because in the New Testament "God . . . hath spoken to us by His Son," whereas in the Old Testament "the word was spoken
+                     by angels" (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q98_A3-p6.2" href="./asv.html#Heb.2.2" target="asv">Heb. 2:2</a>).
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q98_A3-p7">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As Gregory says at the beginning of his Morals (Praef. chap. i), "the angel who is described to have appeared to Moses, is
+                     sometimes mentioned as an angel, sometimes as the Lord: an angel, in truth, in respect of that which was subservient to the
+                     external delivery; and the Lord, because He was the Director within, Who supported the effectual power of speaking." Hence
+                     also it is that the angel spoke as personating the Lord.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q98_A3-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 27), it is stated in Exodus that "the Lord spoke to Moses face to face"; and shortly
+                     afterwards we read, "Show me Thy glory. Therefore He perceived what he saw and he desired what he saw not." Hence he did not
+                     see the very Essence of God; and consequently he was not taught by Him immediately. Accordingly when Scripture states that
+                     "He spoke to him face to face," this is to be understood as expressing the opinion of
+                     the people, who thought that Moses was speaking with God mouth to mouth, when God spoke and appeared to him, by means of a
+                     subordinate creature, i.e. an angel and a cloud. Again we may say that this vision "face to face" means some kind of sublime
+                     and familiar contemplation, inferior to the vision of the Divine Essence.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q98_A3-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> It is for the sovereign alone to make a law by his own authority; but sometimes after making a law, he promulgates it through
+                     others. Thus God made the Law by His own authority, but He promulgated it through the angels.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q98_A3-p10"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q98_A3-p11"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q98_A2.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q98_A4.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="FS_Q98_A4" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q98_A3.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q98_A5.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="FS_Q98_A4-p0.1">Whether the Old Law should have been given to the Jews alone?</h4>
+                  <p id="FS_Q98_A4-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q98_A4-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the Old Law should not have been given to the Jews alone. For the Old Law disposed men for the salvation
+                     which was to come through Christ, as stated above (
+                     <a id="FS_Q98_A4-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q98_A2.html">AA[2]</a>,3). But that salvation was to come not to the Jews alone but to all nations, according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q98_A4-p2.2" href="./asv.html#Isa.49.6" target="asv"> Is. 49:6</a>: "It is a small thing that thou shouldst be my servant to raise up the tribes of Jacob, and to convert the dregs of Israel.
+                     Behold I have
+                     given thee to be the light of the Gentiles, that thou mayest be My salvation, even to the farthest part of the earth." Therefore
+                     the Old Law should have been given to all nations, and not to one people only.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q98_A4-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q98_A4-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Acts.10.34" target="asv"> Acts 10:34,35, </a> "God is not a respecter of persons: but in every nation, he that feareth Him, and worketh justice, is acceptable to Him."
+                     Therefore the way of salvation should not have been opened to one people more than to another.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q98_A4-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the law was given through the angels, as stated above 
+                     <a id="FS_Q98_A4-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q98_A3.html">(A[3])</a>. But God always vouchsafed the ministrations of the angels not to the Jews alone, but to all nations: for it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q98_A4-p4.2" href="./asv.html#Sir.17.14" target="asv">Ecclus. 17:14</a>): "Over every nation He set a ruler." Also on all nations He bestows temporal goods, which are of less account with God than
+                     spiritual goods. Therefore He should have given the Law also to all peoples.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q98_A4-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q98_A4-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.3.1" target="asv">Rom. 3:1,2</a>): "What advantage then hath the Jew? . . . Much every way. First indeed, because the words of God were committed to them":
+                     and (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q98_A4-p5.2" href="./asv.html#Ps.147.9" target="asv">Ps. 147:9</a>): "He hath not done in like manner to every nation: and His judgments He hath not made manifest unto them."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q98_A4-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> It might be assigned as a reason for the Law being given to the Jews rather than to other peoples, that the Jewish people
+                     alone remained faithful to the worship of one God, while the others turned away to idolatry; wherefore the latter were unworthy
+                     to receive the Law, lest a holy thing should be given to dogs.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q98_A4-p7"> But this reason does not seem fitting: because that people turned to idolatry, even after the Law had been made, which was
+                     more grievous, as is clear from 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q98_A4-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Exod.32" target="asv">Ex. 32</a> and from
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q98_A4-p7.2" href="./asv.html#Amos.5.25" target="asv"> Amos 5:25,26</a>: "Did you offer victims and sacrifices to Me in the desert for forty years, O house of Israel? But you carried a tabernacle
+                     for your Moloch, and the image of your idols, the star of your god, which you made to yourselves." Moreover it is stated expressly
+                     (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q98_A4-p7.3" href="./asv.html#Deut.9.6" target="asv">Dt.
+                        9:6
+                     </a>): "Know therefore that the Lord thy God giveth thee not this excellent land in possession for thy justices, for thou art
+                     a very stiff-necked people": but the real reason is given in the preceding verse: "That the Lord might accomplish His word,
+                     which He promised by oath to thy fathers Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q98_A4-p8"> What this promise was is shown by the Apostle, who says (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q98_A4-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Gal.3.16" target="asv">Gal. 3:16</a>) that "to Abraham were the promises made and to his seed. He saith not, 'And to his seeds,' as of many: but as of one, 'And
+                     to thy seed,' which is Christ." And so God vouchsafed both the Law and other special boons to that people, on account of the
+                     promised made to their fathers that Christ should be born of them. For it was fitting that the people, of whom Christ was
+                     to be born, should be
+                     signalized by a special sanctification, according to the words of
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q98_A4-p8.2" href="./asv.html#Lev.19.2" target="asv"> Lev. 19:2</a>: "Be ye holy, because I . . . am holy." Nor again was it on account of the merit of Abraham himself that this promise was
+                     made to him, viz. that Christ should be born of his seed: but of gratuitous election and vocation. Hence it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q98_A4-p8.3" href="./asv.html#Isa.41.2" target="asv">Is. 41:2</a>): "Who hath raised up the just one form the east, hath called him to follow him?"
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q98_A4-p9"> It is therefore evident that it was merely from gratuitous election that the patriarchs received the promise, and that the
+                     people sprung from them received the law; according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q98_A4-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Deut.4.36" target="asv"> Dt. 4:36, 37</a>: "Ye did [Vulg.: 'Thou didst'] hear His words out of the midst of the fire, because He loved thy fathers, and chose their
+                     seed after them." And if again it asked why He chose this people, and not another, that Christ might be born thereof; a fitting
+                     answer is given by
+                     Augustine (Tract. super Joan. xxvi): "Why He draweth one and draweth not another, seek not thou to judge, if thou wish not
+                     to err."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q98_A4-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Although the salvation, which was to come through Christ, was prepared for all nations, yet it was necessary that Christ
+                     should be born of one people, which, for this reason, was privileged above other peoples; according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q98_A4-p10.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.9.4" target="asv"> Rom. 9:4</a>: "To whom," namely the Jews, "belongeth the adoption as of children (of God) . . . and the testament, and the giving of the
+                     Law . . . whose are the fathers, and of whom is Christ according to the
+                     flesh."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q98_A4-p11">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Respect of persons takes place in those things which are given according to due; but it has no place in those things which
+                     are bestowed gratuitously. Because he who, out of generosity, gives of his own to one and not to another, is not a respecter
+                     of persons: but if he were a dispenser of goods held in common, and were not to distribute them according to personal merits,
+                     he would be a respecter of persons. Now God bestows the benefits of salvation on
+                     the human race gratuitously: wherefore He is not a respecter of persons, if He gives them to some rather than to others. Hence
+                     Augustine says (De Praedest. Sanct. viii): "All whom God teaches, he teaches out of pity; but whom He teaches not, out of
+                     justice He teaches not": for this is due to the condemnation of the human race for the sin of the first parent.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q98_A4-p12">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The benefits of grace are forfeited by man on account of sin: but not the benefits of nature. Among the latter are the ministries
+                     of the angels, which the very order of various natures demands, viz. that the lowest beings be governed through the intermediate
+                     beings: and also bodily aids, which God vouchsafes not only to men, but also to beasts, according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q98_A4-p12.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.35.7" target="asv"> Ps. 35:7</a>: "Men and beasts Thou wilt preserve, O Lord."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q98_A4-p13"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q98_A4-p14"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q98_A3.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q98_A5.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="FS_Q98_A5" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q98_A4.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q98_A6.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="FS_Q98_A5-p0.1">Whether all men were bound to observe the Old Law?</h4>
+                  <p id="FS_Q98_A5-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q98_A5-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that all men were bound to observe the Old Law. Because whoever is subject to the king, must needs be subject
+                     to his law. But the Old Law was given by God, Who is "King of all the earth" (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q98_A5-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.46.8" target="asv">Ps. 46:8</a>). Therefore all the inhabitants of the earth were bound to observe the Law.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q98_A5-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the Jews could not be saved without observing the Old Law: for it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q98_A5-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Deut.27.26" target="asv">Dt. 27:26</a>): "Cursed be he that abideth not in the words of this law, and fulfilleth them not in work." If therefore other men could
+                     be saved without the observance of the Old Law, the Jews would be in a worse plight than other men.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q98_A5-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the Gentiles were admitted to the Jewish ritual and to the observances of the Law: for it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q98_A5-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Exod.12.48" target="asv">Ex. 12:48</a>): "If any stranger be willing to dwell among you, and to keep the Phase of the Lord, all his males shall first be circumcised,
+                     and then shall he celebrate it according to the manner; and he shall be as he that is born in the land." But it would have
+                     been useless to admit strangers to the legal observances according to
+                     Divine ordinance, if they could have been saved without the observance of the Law. Therefore none could be saved without observing
+                     the Law.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q98_A5-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. ix) that many of the Gentiles were brought back to God by the angels. But it is clear that the
+                     Gentiles did not observe the Law. Therefore some could be saved without observing the Law.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q98_A5-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> The Old Law showed forth the precepts of the natural law, and added certain precepts of its own. Accordingly, as to those
+                     precepts of the natural law contained in the Old Law, all were bound to observe the Old Law; not because they belonged to
+                     the Old Law, but because they belonged to the natural law. But as to those precepts which were added by the Old Law, they
+                     were not binding on save the Jewish people alone.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q98_A5-p7"> The reason of this is because the Old Law, as stated above 
+                     <a id="FS_Q98_A5-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q98_A4.html">(A[4])</a>, was given to the Jewish people, that it might receive a prerogative of holiness, in reverence for Christ Who was to be born
+                     of that people. Now whatever laws are enacted for the special sanctification of certain ones, are binding on them alone: thus
+                     clerics who are set aside for the service of God are bound to certain obligations to which the laity are not bound; likewise
+                     religious are
+                     bound by their profession to certain works of perfection, to which people living in the world are not bound. In like manner
+                     this people was bound to certain special observances, to which other peoples were not bound. Wherefore it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q98_A5-p7.2" href="./asv.html#Deut.18.13" target="asv">Dt. 18:13</a>): "Thou shalt be perfect and without spot before the Lord thy God": and for this reason they used a kind of form of profession,
+                     as appears from
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q98_A5-p7.3" href="./asv.html#Deut.26.3" target="asv"> Dt. 26:3</a>: "I profess this day before the Lord thy God,"
+                     etc.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q98_A5-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Whoever are subject to a king, are bound to observe his law which he makes for all in general. But if he orders certain things
+                     to be observed by the servants of his household, others are not bound thereto.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q98_A5-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The more a man is united to God, the better his state becomes: wherefore the more the Jewish people were bound to the worship
+                     of God, the greater their excellence over other peoples. Hence it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q98_A5-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Deut.4.8" target="asv">Dt. 4:8</a>): "What other nation is there so renowned that hath ceremonies and just judgments, and all the law?" In like manner, from
+                     this point of view, the state of clerics is better than that of the laity, and the state of
+                     religious than that of folk living in the world.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q98_A5-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The Gentiles obtained salvation more perfectly and more securely under the observances of the Law than under the mere natural
+                     law: and for this reason they were admitted to them. So too the laity are now admitted to the ranks of the clergy, and secular
+                     persons to those of the religious, although they can be saved without this.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q98_A5-p11"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q98_A5-p12"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q98_A4.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q98_A6.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="FS_Q98_A6" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q98_A5.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q99.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="FS_Q98_A6-p0.1">Whether the Old Law was suitably given at the time of Moses?</h4>
+                  <p id="FS_Q98_A6-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q98_A6-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the Old Law was not suitably given at the time of Moses. Because the Old Law disposed man for the salvation
+                     which was to come through Christ, as stated above (
+                     <a id="FS_Q98_A6-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q98_A2.html">AA[2]</a>,3). But man needed this salutary remedy immediately after he had sinned. Therefore the Law should have been given immediately
+                     after sin.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q98_A6-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the Old Law was given for the sanctification of those from whom Christ was to be born. Now the promise concerning
+                     the "seed, which is Christ" (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q98_A6-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Gal.3.16" target="asv">Gal. 3:16</a>) was first made to Abraham, as related in 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q98_A6-p3.2" href="./asv.html#Gen.12.7" target="asv">Gn. 12:7</a>. Therefore the Law should have been given at once at the time of Abraham.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q98_A6-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, as Christ was born of those alone who descended from Noe through Abraham, to whom the promise was made; so was He
+                     born of no other of the descendants of Abraham but David, to whom the promise was renewed, according to 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q98_A6-p4.1" href="./asv.html#iiKgdms.23.1" target="asv">2 Kings 23:1</a>: "The man to whom it was appointed concerning the Christ of the God of Jacob . . . said." Therefore the Old Law should have
+                     been given after David, just as it was given after Abraham.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q98_A6-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle says (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q98_A6-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Gal.3.19" target="asv">Gal. 3:19</a>) that the Law "was set because of transgressions, until the seed should come, to whom He made the promise, being ordained
+                     by angels in the hand of a Mediator": ordained, i.e. "given in orderly fashion," as the gloss explains. Therefore it was fitting
+                     that the Old Law should be given in this order of time.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q98_A6-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> It was most fitting for the Law to be given at the time of Moses. The reason for this may be taken from two things in respect
+                     of which every law is imposed on two kinds of men. Because it is imposed on some men who are hard-hearted and proud, whom
+                     the law restrains and tames: and it is imposed on good men, who, through being instructed by the law, are helped to fulfil
+                     what they desire to do. Hence it was fitting that the Law should be given at such a time as
+                     would be appropriate for the overcoming of man's pride. For man was proud of two things, viz. of knowledge and of power. He
+                     was proud of his knowledge, as though his natural reason could suffice him for salvation: and accordingly, in order that his
+                     pride might be overcome in this matter, man was left to the guidance of his reason without the help of a written law: and
+                     man was able to learn from experience that his reason was deficient, since about the time of Abraham man had fallen headlong
+                     into idolatry and the most shameful vices. Wherefore, after those times, it was necessary for a written law to be given as
+                     a remedy for human ignorance: because "by the Law is the knowledge of sin" (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q98_A6-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.3.20" target="asv">Rom. 3:20</a>). But, after man had been instructed by the Law, his pride was convinced of his weakness, through his being unable to fulfil
+                     what he knew. Hence, as the Apostle concludes (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q98_A6-p6.2" href="./asv.html#Rom.8.3" target="asv">Rom. 8:3,4</a>), "what the Law could not do in that it was weak through the flesh,
+                     God sent [Vulg.: 'sending'] His own Son . . . that the justification of the Law might be fulfilled in us."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q98_A6-p7"> With regard to good men, the Law was given to them as a help; which was most needed by the people, at the time when the natural
+                     law began to be obscured on account of the exuberance of sin: for it was fitting that this help should be bestowed on men
+                     in an orderly manner, so that they might be led from imperfection to perfection; wherefore it was becoming that the Old Law
+                     should be given between the law of nature and the law of grace.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q98_A6-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> It was not fitting for the Old Law to be given at once after the sin of the first man: both because man was so confident
+                     in his own reason, that he did not acknowledge his need of the Old Law; because as yet the dictate of the natural law was
+                     not darkened by habitual sinning.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q98_A6-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> A law should not be given save to the people, since it is a general precept, as stated above (
+                     <a id="FS_Q98_A6-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q90_A2.html">Q[90], AA[2]</a>,3); wherefore at the time of Abraham God gave men certain familiar, and, as it were, household precepts: but when Abraham's
+                     descendants had multiplied, so as to form a people, and when they had been freed from slavery, it was fitting that they should
+                     be given a law; for "slaves are not that part of the people or state to
+                     which it is fitting for the law to be directed," as the Philosopher says (Polit. iii, 2,4,5).
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q98_A6-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Since the Law had to be given to the people, not only those, of whom Christ was born, received the Law, but the whole people,
+                     who were marked with the seal of circumcision, which was the sign of the promise made to Abraham, and in which he believed,
+                     according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q98_A6-p10.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.4.11" target="asv"> Rom. 4:11</a>: hence even before David, the Law had to be given to that people as soon as they were collected together.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q98_A6-p11"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q98_A6-p12"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q98_A5.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q99.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <a href="summa.FS_Q97_A4.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.FS_Q98_A1.html"></a>
+            </div>
+            <div id="FS_Q99" class="div3">
+               <a href="summa.FS_Q98_A6.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.FS_Q99_A1.html"></a>
+               <h3 id="FS_Q99-p0.1">OF THE PRECEPTS OF THE OLD LAW (SIX ARTICLES)</h3>
+               <p id="FS_Q99-p1"></p>
+               <p id="FS_Q99-p2"> We must now consider the precepts of the Old Law; and (1) how they are distinguished from one another; (2) each kind of precept.
+                  Under the first head there are six points of inquiry:
+               </p>
+               <p id="FS_Q99-p3"> (1) Whether the Old Law contains several precepts or only one?</p>
+               <p id="FS_Q99-p4"> (2) Whether the Old Law contains any moral precepts?</p>
+               <p id="FS_Q99-p5"> (3) Whether it contains ceremonial precepts in addition to the moral precepts?</p>
+               <p id="FS_Q99-p6"> (4) Whether besides these it contains judicial precepts?</p>
+               <p id="FS_Q99-p7"> (5) Whether it contains any others besides these?</p>
+               <p id="FS_Q99-p8"> (6) How the Old Law induced men to keep its precepts.</p>
+               <div id="FS_Q99_A1" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q99.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q99_A2.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="FS_Q99_A1-p0.1">Whether the Old Law contains only one precept?</h4>
+                  <p id="FS_Q99_A1-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q99_A1-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the Old Law contains but one precept. Because a law is nothing else than a precept, as stated above (
+                     <a id="FS_Q99_A1-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q90_A2.html">Q[90], AA[2]</a>,3). Now there is but one Old Law. Therefore it contains but one precept.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q99_A1-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the Apostle says (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q99_A1-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.13.9" target="asv">Rom. 13:9</a>): "If there be any other commandment, it is comprised in this word: Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself." But this is
+                     only one commandment. Therefore the Old Law contained but one commandment.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q99_A1-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q99_A1-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.7.12" target="asv">Mat. 7:12</a>): "All things . . . whatsoever you would that men should do to you, do you also to them. For this is the Law and the prophets."
+                     But the whole of the Old Law is comprised in the Law and the prophets. Therefore the whole of the Old Law contains but one
+                     commandment.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q99_A1-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle says (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q99_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Eph.2.15" target="asv">Eph. 2:15</a>): "Making void the Law of commandments contained in decrees": where he is referring to the Old Law, as the gloss comments,
+                     on the passage. Therefore the Old Law comprises many commandments.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q99_A1-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> Since a precept of law is binding, it is about something which must be done: and, that a thing must be done, arises from
+                     the necessity of some end. Hence it is evident that a precept implies, in its very idea, relation to an end, in so far as
+                     a thing is commanded as being necessary or expedient to an end. Now many things may happen to be necessary or expedient to
+                     an end; and, accordingly, precepts may be given about various things as being ordained to one
+                     end. Consequently we must say that all the precepts of the Old Law are one in respect of their relation to one end: and yet
+                     they are many in respect of the diversity of those things that are ordained to that end.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q99_A1-p7">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The Old Law is said to be one as being ordained to one end: yet it comprises various precepts, according to the diversity
+                     of the things which it directs to the end. Thus also the art of building is one according to the unity of its end, because
+                     it aims at the building of a house: and yet it contains various rules, according to the variety of acts ordained thereto.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q99_A1-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As the Apostle says (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q99_A1-p8.1" href="./asv.html#iTim.1.5" target="asv">1 Tim. 1:5</a>), "the end of the commandment is charity"; since every law aims at establishing friendship, either between man and man, or
+                     between man and God. Wherefore the whole Law is comprised in this one commandment, "Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself,"
+                     as expressing the end of all commandments: because love of one's neighbor includes love of God, when we love our neighbor
+                     for God's sake. Hence the
+                     Apostle put this commandment in place of the two which are about the love of God and of one's neighbor, and of which Our Lord
+                     said (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q99_A1-p8.2" href="./asv.html#Matt.22.40" target="asv">Mat. 22:40</a>): "On these two commandments dependeth the whole Law and the prophets."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q99_A1-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As stated in Ethic. ix, 8, "friendship towards another arises from friendship towards oneself," in so far as man looks on
+                     another as on himself. Hence when it is said, "All things whatsoever you would that men should do to you, do you also to them,"
+                     this is an explanation of the rule of neighborly love contained implicitly in the words, "Thou shalt love thy neighbor as
+                     thyself": so that it is an explanation of this commandment.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q99_A1-p10"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q99_A1-p11"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q99.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q99_A2.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="FS_Q99_A2" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q99_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q99_A3.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="FS_Q99_A2-p0.1">Whether the Old Law contains moral precepts?</h4>
+                  <p id="FS_Q99_A2-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q99_A2-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the Old Law contains no moral precepts. For the Old Law is distinct from the law of nature, as stated
+                     above (
+                     <a id="FS_Q99_A2-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q91_A4.html">Q[91], AA[4]</a>,5;
+                     <a id="FS_Q99_A2-p2.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q98_A5.html"> Q[98], A[5]</a>). But the moral precepts belong to the law of nature. Therefore they do not belong to the Old Law.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q99_A2-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the Divine Law should have come to man's assistance where human reason fails him: as is evident in regard to things
+                     that are of faith, which are above reason. But man's reason seems to suffice for the moral precepts. Therefore the moral precepts
+                     do not belong to the Old Law, which is a Divine law.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q99_A2-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the Old Law is said to be "the letter that killeth" (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q99_A2-p4.1" href="./asv.html#iiCor.3.6" target="asv">2 Cor. 3:6</a>). But the moral precepts do not kill, but quicken, according to 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q99_A2-p4.2" href="./asv.html#Ps.118.93" target="asv"> Ps. 118:93</a>: "Thy justifications I will never forget, for by them Thou hast given me life." Therefore the moral precepts do not belong
+                     to the Old Law.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q99_A2-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q99_A2-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.17.9" target="asv">Ecclus. 17:9</a>): "Moreover, He gave them discipline [Douay: 'instructions'] and the law of life for an inheritance." Now discipline belongs
+                     to morals; for this gloss on 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q99_A2-p5.2" href="./asv.html#Heb.12.11" target="asv">Heb. 12:11</a>: "Now all chastisement [disciplina]," etc., says: "Discipline is an exercise in morals by means of difficulties." Therefore
+                     the Law which was given by God comprised moral precepts.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q99_A2-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> The Old Law contained some moral precepts; as is evident from
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q99_A2-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Exod.20.13" target="asv">Ex. 20:13</a>, 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q99_A2-p6.2" href="./asv.html#Exod.20.15" target="asv">15</a>: "Thou shalt not kill, Thou shalt not steal." This was reasonable: because, just as the principal intention of human law
+                     is to created friendship between man and man; so the chief intention of the Divine law is to establish man in friendship with
+                     God. Now since likeness is the reason of love, according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q99_A2-p6.3" href="./asv.html#Sir.13.19" target="asv"> Ecclus. 13:19</a>: "Every beast loveth its
+                     like"; there cannot possibly be any friendship of man to God, Who is supremely good, unless man become good: wherefore it
+                     is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q99_A2-p6.4" href="./asv.html#Lev.19.2" target="asv">Lev. 19:2</a>; 11:45): "You shall be holy, for I am holy." But the goodness of man is virtue, which "makes its possessor good" (Ethic.
+                     ii, 6). Therefore it was necessary for the Old Law to include precepts about acts of virtue: and these are the moral precepts
+                     of the Law.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q99_A2-p7">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The Old Law is distinct from the natural law, not as being altogether different from it, but as something added thereto.
+                     For just as grace presupposes nature, so must the Divine law presuppose the natural law.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q99_A2-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> It was fitting that the Divine law should come to man's assistance not only in those things for which reason is insufficient,
+                     but also in those things in which human reason may happen to be impeded. Now human reason could not go astray in the abstract,
+                     as to the universal principles of the natural law; but through being habituated to sin, it became obscured in the point of
+                     things to be done in detail. But with regard to the other moral precepts, which
+                     are like conclusions drawn from the universal principles of the natural law, the reason of many men went astray, to the extend
+                     of judging to be lawful, things that are evil in themselves. Hence there was need for the authority of the Divine law to rescue
+                     man from both these defects. Thus among the articles of faith not only are those things set forth to which reason cannot reach,
+                     such as the Trinity of the Godhead; but also those to which right reason can attain, such as the Unity of the
+                     Godhead; in order to remove the manifold errors to which reason is liable.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q99_A2-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As Augustine proves (De Spiritu et Litera xiv), even the letter of the law is said to be the occasion of death, as to the
+                     moral precepts; in so far as, to wit, it prescribes what is good, without furnishing the aid of grace for its fulfilment.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q99_A2-p10"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q99_A2-p11"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q99_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q99_A3.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="FS_Q99_A3" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q99_A2.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q99_A4.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="FS_Q99_A3-p0.1">Whether the Old Law comprises ceremonial, besides moral, precepts?</h4>
+                  <p id="FS_Q99_A3-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q99_A3-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the Old Law does not comprise ceremonial, besides moral, precepts. For every law that is given to man
+                     is for the purpose of directing human actions. Now human actions are called moral, as stated above (
+                     <a id="FS_Q99_A3-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q1_A3.html">Q[1], A[3]</a>). Therefore it seems that the Old Law given to men should not comprise other than moral precepts.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q99_A3-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, those precepts that are styled ceremonial seem to refer to the Divine worship. But Divine worship is the act of
+                     a virtue, viz. religion, which, as Tully says (De Invent. ii) "offers worship and ceremony to the Godhead." Since, then, the
+                     moral precepts are about acts of virtue, as stated above 
+                     <a id="FS_Q99_A3-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q99_A2.html">(A[2])</a>, it seems that the ceremonial precepts should not be distinct from the moral.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q99_A3-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the ceremonial precepts seem to be those which signify something figuratively. But, as Augustine observes (De Doctr.
+                     Christ. ii, 3,4), "of all signs employed by men words hold the first place." Therefore there is no need for the Law to contain
+                     ceremonial precepts about certain figurative actions.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q99_A3-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q99_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Deut.4.13" target="asv">Dt. 4:13,14</a>): "Ten words . . . He wrote in two tables of stone; and He commanded me at that time that I should teach you the ceremonies
+                     and judgments which you shall do." But the ten commandments of the Law are moral precepts. Therefore besides the moral precepts
+                     there are others which are ceremonial.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q99_A3-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above 
+                     <a id="FS_Q99_A3-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q99_A2.html">(A[2])</a>, the Divine law is instituted chiefly in order to direct men to God; while human law is instituted chiefly in order to direct
+                     men in relation to one another. Hence human laws have not concerned themselves with the institution of anything relating to
+                     Divine worship except as affecting the common good of mankind: and for this reason they have devised many institutions relating
+                     to Divine matters, according as it
+                     seemed expedient for the formation of human morals; as may be seen in the rites of the Gentiles. On the other hand the Divine
+                     law directed men to one another according to the demands of that order whereby man is directed to God, which order was the
+                     chief aim of that law. Now man is directed to God not only by the interior acts of the mind, which are faith, hope, and love,
+                     but also by certain external works, whereby man makes profession of his subjection to God: and it is these works that are
+                     said to belong to the Divine worship. This worship is called "ceremony" [the munia, i.e. gifts] of Ceres (who was the goddess
+                     of fruits), as some say: because, at first, offerings were made to God from the fruits: or because, as Valerius Maximus states
+                     [*Fact. et Dict. Memor. i, 1], the word "ceremony" was introduced among the Latins, to signify the Divine worship, being derived
+                     from a town near Rome called "Caere": since, when Rome was taken by the Gauls, the sacred chattels of the Romans were
+                     taken thither and most carefully preserved. Accordingly those precepts of the Law which refer to the Divine worship are specially
+                     called ceremonial.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q99_A3-p7">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Human acts extend also to the Divine worship: and therefore the Old Law given to man contains precepts about these matters
+                     also.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q99_A3-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As stated above (
+                     <a id="FS_Q99_A3-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q91_A3.html">Q[91], A[3]</a>), the precepts of the natural law are general, and require to be determined: and they are determined both by human law and
+                     by Divine law. And just as these very determinations which are made by human law are said to be, not of natural, but of positive
+                     law; so the determinations of the precepts of the natural law, effected by the Divine law, are distinct from the moral precepts
+                     which belong to the
+                     natural law. Wherefore to worship God, since it is an act of virtue, belongs to a moral precept; but the determination of
+                     this precept, namely that He is to be worshipped by such and such sacrifices, and such and such offerings, belongs to the
+                     ceremonial precepts. Consequently the ceremonial precepts are distinct from the moral precepts.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q99_A3-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. i), the things of God cannot be manifested to men except by means of sensible similitudes.
+                     Now these similitudes move the soul more when they are not only expressed in words, but also offered to the senses. Wherefore
+                     the things of God are set forth in the Scriptures not only by similitudes expressed in words, as in the case of metaphorical
+                     expressions; but also by similitudes of things set before the eyes, which pertains
+                     to the ceremonial precepts.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q99_A3-p10"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q99_A3-p11"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q99_A2.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q99_A4.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="FS_Q99_A4" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q99_A3.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q99_A5.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="FS_Q99_A4-p0.1">Whether, besides the moral and ceremonial precepts, there are also judicial precepts?</h4>
+                  <p id="FS_Q99_A4-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q99_A4-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that there are no judicial precepts in addition to the moral and ceremonial precepts in the Old Law. For Augustine
+                     says (Contra Faust. vi, 2) that in the Old Law there are "precepts concerning the life we have to lead, and precepts regarding
+                     the life that is foreshadowed." Now the precepts of the life we have to lead are moral precepts; and the precepts of the life
+                     that is foreshadowed are ceremonial. Therefore besides these two kinds of precepts
+                     we should not put any judicial precepts in the Law.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q99_A4-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, a gloss on
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q99_A4-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.118.102" target="asv"> Ps. 118:102, </a> "I have not declined from Thy judgments," says, i.e. "from the rule of life Thou hast set for me." But a rule of life belongs
+                     to the moral precepts. Therefore the judicial precepts should not be considered as distinct from the moral precepts.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q99_A4-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, judgment seems to be an act of justice, according to 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q99_A4-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.93.15" target="asv">Ps. 93:15</a>: "Until justice be turned into judgment." But acts of justice, like the acts of other virtues, belong to the moral precepts.
+                     Therefore the moral precepts include the judicial precepts, and consequently should not be held as distinct from them.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q99_A4-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q99_A4-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Deut.6.1" target="asv">Dt. 6:1</a>): "These are the precepts and ceremonies, and judgments": where "precepts" stands for "moral precepts" antonomastically.
+                     Therefore there are judicial precepts besides moral and ceremonial precepts.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q99_A4-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above (
+                     <a id="FS_Q99_A4-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q99_A2.html">AA[2]</a>,3), it belongs to the Divine law to direct men to one another and to God. Now each of these belongs in the abstract to the
+                     dictates of the natural law, to which dictates the moral precepts are to be referred: yet each of them has to be determined
+                     by Divine or human law, because naturally known principles are universal, both in speculative and in practical matters. Accordingly
+                     just as the determination of the
+                     universal principle about Divine worship is effected by the ceremonial precepts, so the determination of the general precepts
+                     of that justice which is to be observed among men is effected by the judicial precepts.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q99_A4-p7"> We must therefore distinguish three kinds of precept in the Old Law; viz. "moral" precepts, which are dictated by the natural
+                     law; "ceremonial" precepts, which are determinations of the Divine worship; and "judicial" precepts, which are determinations
+                     of the justice to be maintained among men. Wherefore the Apostle (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q99_A4-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.7.12" target="asv">Rom. 7:12</a>) after saying that the "Law is holy," adds that "the commandment is just, and holy, and good": "just," in respect of the
+                     judicial
+                     precepts; "holy," with regard to the ceremonial precepts (since the word "sanctus"---"holy"---is applied to that which is
+                     consecrated to God); and "good," i.e. conducive to virtue, as to the moral precepts.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q99_A4-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Both the moral and the judicial precepts aim at the ordering of human life: and consequently they are both comprised under
+                     one of the heads mentioned by Augustine, viz. under the precepts of the life we have to lead.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q99_A4-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Judgment denotes execution of justice, by an application of the reason to individual cases in a determinate way. Hence the
+                     judicial precepts have something in common with the moral precepts, in that they are derived from reason; and something in
+                     common with the ceremonial precepts, in that they are determinations of general precepts. This explains why sometimes "judgments"
+                     comprise both judicial and moral precepts, as in
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q99_A4-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Deut.5.1" target="asv"> Dt. 5:1</a>:
+                     "Hear, O Israel, the ceremonies and judgments"; and sometimes judicial and ceremonial precepts, as in
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q99_A4-p9.2" href="./asv.html#Lev.18.4" target="asv"> Lev. 18:4</a>: "You shall do My judgments, and shall observe My precepts," where "precepts" denotes moral precepts, while "judgments" refers
+                     to judicial and ceremonial precepts.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q99_A4-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The act of justice, in general, belongs to the moral precepts; but its determination to some special kind of act belongs
+                     to the judicial precepts.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q99_A4-p11"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q99_A4-p12"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q99_A3.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q99_A5.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="FS_Q99_A5" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q99_A4.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q99_A6.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="FS_Q99_A5-p0.1">Whether the Old Law contains any others besides the moral, judicial, and ceremonial precepts?</h4>
+                  <p id="FS_Q99_A5-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q99_A5-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the Old Law contains others besides the moral, judicial, and ceremonial precepts. Because the judicial
+                     precepts belong to the act of justice, which is between man and man; while the ceremonial precepts belong to the act of religion,
+                     whereby God is worshipped. Now besides these there are many other virtues, viz. temperance, fortitude, liberality, and several
+                     others, as stated above (
+                     <a id="FS_Q99_A5-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q60_A5.html">Q[60], A[5]</a>). Therefore besides the
+                     aforesaid precepts, the Old Law should comprise others.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q99_A5-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q99_A5-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Deut.11.1" target="asv">Dt. 11:1</a>): "Love the Lord thy God, and observe His precepts and ceremonies, His judgments and commandments." Now precepts concern
+                     moral matters, as stated above 
+                     <a id="FS_Q99_A5-p3.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q99_A4.html">(A[4])</a>. Therefore besides the moral, judicial and ceremonial precepts, the Law contains others which are called "commandments."
+                     [*The "commandments" (mandata) spoken of here and in the body of this article are not to be confused with
+                     the Commandments (praecepta) in the ordinary acceptance of the word.]
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q99_A5-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q99_A5-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Deut.6.17" target="asv">Dt. 6:17</a>): "Keep the precepts of the Lord thy God, and the testimonies and ceremonies which I have [Vulg.: 'He hath'] commanded thee."
+                     Therefore in addition to the above, the Law comprises "testimonies."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q99_A5-p5">
+                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q99_A5-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.118.93" target="asv">Ps. 118:93</a>): "Thy justifications (i.e. "Thy Law," according to a gloss) I will never forget." Therefore in the Old Law there are not
+                     only moral, ceremonial and judicial precepts, but also others, called "justifications."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q99_A5-p6">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q99_A5-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Deut.6.1" target="asv">Dt. 6:1</a>): "These are the precepts and ceremonies and judgments which the Lord your God commanded . . . you." And these words are
+                     placed at the beginning of the Law. Therefore all the precepts of the Law are included under them.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q99_A5-p7">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> Some things are included in the Law by way of precept; other things, as being ordained to the fulfilment of the precepts.
+                     Now the precepts refer to things which have to be done: and to their fulfilment man is induced by two considerations, viz.
+                     the authority of the lawgiver, and the benefit derived from the fulfilment, which benefit consists in the attainment of some
+                     good, useful, pleasurable or virtuous, or in the avoidance of some contrary evil. Hence it
+                     was necessary that in the Old Law certain things should be set forth to indicate the authority of God the lawgiver: e.g.
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q99_A5-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Deut.6.4" target="asv"> Dt. 6:4</a>: "Hear, O Israel, the Lord our God is one Lord"; and
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q99_A5-p7.2" href="./asv.html#Gen.1.1" target="asv"> Gn. 1:1</a>: "In the beginning God created heaven and earth": and these are called "testimonies." Again it was necessary that in the
+                     Law certain rewards should be appointed for those who observe the Law, and punishments for those who transgress; as it may
+                     be seen in 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q99_A5-p7.3" href="./asv.html#Deut.28" target="asv">Dt. 28</a>: "If
+                     thou wilt hear the voice of the Lord thy God . . . He will make thee higher than all the nations," etc.: and these are called
+                     "justifications," according as God punishes or rewards certain ones justly.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q99_A5-p8"> The things that have to be done do not come under the precept except in so far as they have the character of a duty. Now
+                     a duty is twofold: one according to the rule of reason; the other according to the rule of a law which prescribes that duty:
+                     thus the Philosopher distinguishes a twofold just---moral and legal (Ethic. v, 7).
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q99_A5-p9"> Moral duty is twofold: because reason dictates that something must be done, either as being so necessary that without it
+                     the order of virtue would be destroyed; or as being useful for the better maintaining of the order of virtue. And in this
+                     sense some of the moral precepts are expressed by way of absolute command or prohibition, as "Thou shalt not kill, Thou shalt
+                     not steal": and these are properly called "precepts." Other things are prescribed or forbidden, not as an absolute
+                     duty, but as something better to be done. These may be called "commandments"; because they are expressed by way of inducement
+                     and persuasion: an example whereof is seen in
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q99_A5-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Exod.22.26" target="asv"> Ex. 22:26</a>: "If thou take of thy neighbor a garment in pledge, thou shalt give it him again before sunset"; and in other like cases.
+                     Wherefore Jerome (Praefat. in Comment. super Marc.) says that "justice is in the precepts, charity in the commandments." Duty
+                     as fixed by the Law, belongs to the judicial
+                     precepts, as regards human affairs; to the "ceremonial" precepts, as regards Divine matters.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q99_A5-p10"> Nevertheless those ordinances also which refer to punishments and rewards may be called "testimonies," in so far as they
+                     testify to the Divine justice. Again all the precepts of the Law may be styled "justifications," as being executions of legal
+                     justice. Furthermore the commandments may be distinguished from the precepts, so that those things be called "precepts" which
+                     God Himself prescribed; and those things "commandments" which He enjoined [mandavit] through others, as the
+                     very word seems to denote.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q99_A5-p11"> From this it is clear that all the precepts of the Law are either moral, ceremonial, or judicial; and that other ordinances
+                     have not the character of a precept, but are directed to the observance of the precepts, as stated above.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q99_A5-p12">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Justice alone, of all the virtues, implies the notion of duty. Consequently moral matters are determinable by law in so far
+                     as they belong to justice: of which virtue religion is a part, as Tully says (De Invent. ii). Wherefore the legal just cannot
+                     be anything foreign to the ceremonial and judicial precepts.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q99_A5-p13"> The Replies to the other Objections are clear from what has been said.</p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q99_A5-p14"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q99_A5-p15"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q99_A4.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q99_A6.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="FS_Q99_A6" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q99_A5.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q100.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="FS_Q99_A6-p0.1">Whether the Old Law should have induced men to the observance of its precepts, by means of temporal promises and threats?</h4>
+                  <p id="FS_Q99_A6-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q99_A6-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the Old Law should not have induced men to the observance of its precepts, by means of temporal promises
+                     and threats. For the purpose of the Divine law is to subject man to God by fear and love: hence it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q99_A6-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Deut.10.12" target="asv">Dt. 10:12</a>): "And now, Israel, what doth the Lord thy God require of thee, but that thou fear the Lord thy God, and walk in His ways,
+                     and love Him?" But the desire for temporal goods leads man away from God:
+                     for Augustine says (Qq. lxxxiii, qu. 36), that "covetousness is the bane of charity." Therefore temporal promises and threats
+                     seem to be contrary to the intention of a lawgiver: and this makes a law worthy of rejection, as the Philosopher declares
+                     (Polit. ii, 6).
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q99_A6-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the Divine law is more excellent than human law. Now, in sciences, we notice that the loftier the science, the higher
+                     the means of persuasion that it employs. Therefore, since human law employs temporal threats and promises, as means of persuading
+                     man, the Divine law should have used, not these, but more lofty means.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q99_A6-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the reward of righteousness and the punishment of guilt cannot be that which befalls equally the good and the wicked.
+                     But as stated in
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q99_A6-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Eccl.9.2" target="asv"> Eccles. 9:2, </a> "all" temporal "things equally happen to the just and to the wicked, to the good and the evil, to the clean and to the unclean,
+                     to him that offereth victims, and to him that despiseth sacrifices." Therefore temporal goods or evils are not suitably set
+                     forth as punishments or rewards of
+                     the commandments of the Divine law.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q99_A6-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q99_A6-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.1.19" target="asv">Is. 1:19,20</a>): "If you be willing, and will hearken to Me, you shall eat the good things of the land. But if you will not, and will provoke
+                     Me to wrath: the sword shall devour you."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q99_A6-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> As in speculative sciences men are persuaded to assent to the conclusions by means of syllogistic arguments, so too in every
+                     law, men are persuaded to observe its precepts by means of punishments and rewards. Now it is to be observed that, in speculative
+                     sciences, the means of persuasion are adapted to the conditions of the pupil: wherefore the process of argument in sciences
+                     should be ordered becomingly, so that the instruction is based on principles more
+                     generally known. And thus also he who would persuade a man to the observance of any precepts, needs to move him at first by
+                     things for which he has an affection; just as children are induced to do something, by means of little childish gifts. Now
+                     it has been said above (
+                     <a id="FS_Q99_A6-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q98_A1.html">Q[98], AA[1]</a>,2,3) that the Old Law disposed men to (the coming of) Christ, as the imperfect in comparison disposes to the perfect, wherefore
+                     it was given to a people as yet imperfect in comparison to the
+                     perfection which was to result from Christ's coming: and for this reason, that people is compared to a child that is still
+                     under a pedagogue (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q99_A6-p6.2" href="./asv.html#Gal.3.24" target="asv">Gal. 3:24</a>). But the perfection of man consists in his despising temporal things and cleaving to things spiritual, as is clear from
+                     the words of the Apostle (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q99_A6-p6.3" href="./asv.html#Phil.3.13" target="asv">Phil. 3:13</a>, 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q99_A6-p6.4" href="./asv.html#Phil.3.15" target="asv">15</a>): "Forgetting the things that are behind, I stretch [Vulg.: 'and stretching'] forth myself to those that are before . . .
+                     Let us therefore, as
+                     many as are perfect, be thus minded." Those who are yet imperfect desire temporal goods, albeit in subordination to God: whereas
+                     the perverse place their end in temporalities. It was therefore fitting that the Old Law should conduct men to God by means
+                     of temporal goods for which the imperfect have an affection.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q99_A6-p7">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Covetousness whereby man places his end in temporalities, is the bane of charity. But the attainment of temporal goods which
+                     man desires in subordination to God is a road leading the imperfect to the love of God, according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q99_A6-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.48.19" target="asv"> Ps. 48:19</a>: "He will praise Thee, when Thou shalt do well to him."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q99_A6-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Human law persuades men by means of temporal rewards or punishments to be inflicted by men: whereas the Divine law persuades
+                     men by meas of rewards or punishments to be received from God. In this respect it employs higher means.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q99_A6-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As any one can see, who reads carefully the story of the Old Testament, the common weal of the people prospered under the
+                     Law as long as they obeyed it; and as soon as they departed from the precepts of the Law they were overtaken by many calamities.
+                     But certain individuals, although they observed the justice of the Law, met with misfortunes---either because they had already
+                     become spiritual (so that misfortune might withdraw them all the more from
+                     attachment to temporal things, and that their virtue might be tried)---or because, while outwardly fulfilling the works of
+                     the Law, their heart was altogether fixed on temporal goods, and far removed from God, according to 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q99_A6-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.29.13" target="asv">Is. 29:13</a> (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q99_A6-p9.2" href="./asv.html#Matt.15.8" target="asv">Mat. 15:8</a>): "This people honoreth Me with their lips; but their hearts is far from Me."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q99_A6-p10"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q99_A6-p11"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q99_A5.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q100.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <a href="summa.FS_Q98_A6.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.FS_Q99_A1.html"></a>
+            </div>
+            <div id="FS_Q100" class="div3">
+               <a href="summa.FS_Q99_A6.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.FS_Q100_A1.html"></a>
+               <h3 id="FS_Q100-p0.1">OF THE MORAL PRECEPTS OF THE OLD LAW (TWELVE ARTICLES)</h3>
+               <p id="FS_Q100-p1"></p>
+               <p id="FS_Q100-p2"> We must now consider each kind of precept of the Old Law: and (1) the moral precepts, (2) the ceremonial precepts, (3) the
+                  judicial precepts. Under the first head there are twelve points of inquiry:
+               </p>
+               <p id="FS_Q100-p3"> (1) Whether all the moral precepts of the Old Law belong to the law of nature?</p>
+               <p id="FS_Q100-p4"> (2) Whether the moral precepts of the Old Law are about the acts of all the virtues?</p>
+               <p id="FS_Q100-p5"> (3) Whether all the moral precepts of the Old Law are reducible to the ten precepts of the decalogue?</p>
+               <p id="FS_Q100-p6"> (4) How the precepts of the decalogue are distinguished from one another?</p>
+               <p id="FS_Q100-p7"> (5) Their number;</p>
+               <p id="FS_Q100-p8"> (6) Their order;</p>
+               <p id="FS_Q100-p9"> (7) The manner in which they were given;</p>
+               <p id="FS_Q100-p10"> (8) Whether they are dispensable?</p>
+               <p id="FS_Q100-p11"> (9) Whether the mode of observing a virtue comes under the precept of the Law?</p>
+               <p id="FS_Q100-p12"> (10) Whether the mode of charity comes under the precept?</p>
+               <p id="FS_Q100-p13"> (11) The distinction of other moral precepts;</p>
+               <p id="FS_Q100-p14"> (12) Whether the moral precepts of the Old Law justified man?</p>
+               <div id="FS_Q100_A1" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q100.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q100_A2.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="FS_Q100_A1-p0.1">Whether all the moral precepts of the Old Law belong to the law of nature?</h4>
+                  <p id="FS_Q100_A1-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q100_A1-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that not all the moral precepts belong to the law of nature. For it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q100_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.17.9" target="asv">Ecclus. 17:9</a>): "Moreover He gave them instructions, and the law of life for an inheritance." But instruction is in contradistinction to
+                     the law of nature; since the law of nature is not learnt, but instilled by natural instinct. Therefore not all the moral precepts
+                     belong to the natural law.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q100_A1-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the Divine law is more perfect than human law. But human law adds certain things concerning good morals, to those
+                     that belong to the law of nature: as is evidenced by the fact that the natural law is the same in all men, while these moral
+                     institutions are various for various people. Much more reason therefore was there why the Divine law should add to the law
+                     of nature, ordinances pertaining to good morals.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q100_A1-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, just as natural reason leads to good morals in certain matters, so does faith: hence it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q100_A1-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Gal.5.6" target="asv">Gal. 5:6</a>) that faith "worketh by charity." But faith is not included in the law of nature; since that which is of faith is above nature.
+                     Therefore not all the moral precepts of the Divine law belong to the law of nature.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q100_A1-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle says (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q100_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.2.14" target="asv">Rom. 2:14</a>) that "the Gentiles, who have not the Law, do by nature those things that are of the Law": which must be understood of things
+                     pertaining to good morals. Therefore all the moral precepts of the Law belong to the law of nature.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q100_A1-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> The moral precepts, distinct from the ceremonial and judicial precepts, are about things pertaining of their very nature
+                     to good morals. Now since human morals depend on their relation to reason, which is the proper principle of human acts, those
+                     morals are called good which accord with reason, and those are called bad which are discordant from reason. And as every judgment
+                     of speculative reason proceeds from the natural knowledge of first principles, so
+                     every judgment of practical reason proceeds from principles known naturally, as stated above (
+                     <a id="FS_Q100_A1-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q94_A2.html">Q[94], AA[2]</a>,4): from which principles one may proceed in various ways to judge of various matters. For some matters connected with human
+                     actions are so evident, that after very little consideration one is able at once to approve or disapprove of them by means
+                     of these general first principles: while some matters cannot be the subject of judgment without much consideration of
+                     the various circumstances, which all are not competent to do carefully, but only those who are wise: just as it is not possible
+                     for all to consider the particular conclusions of sciences, but only for those who are versed in philosophy: and lastly there
+                     are some matters of which man cannot judge unless he be helped by Divine instruction; such as the articles of faith.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q100_A1-p7"> It is therefore evident that since the moral precepts are about matters which concern good morals; and since good morals
+                     are those which are in accord with reason; and since also every judgment of human reason must needs by derived in some way
+                     from natural reason; it follows, of necessity, that all the moral precepts belong to the law of nature; but not all in the
+                     same way. For there are certain things which the natural reason of every man, of its own accord and at once, judges
+                     to be done or not to be done: e.g. "Honor thy father and thy mother," and "Thou shalt not kill, Thou shalt not steal": and
+                     these belong to the law of nature absolutely. And there are certain things which, after a more careful consideration, wise
+                     men deem obligatory. Such belong to the law of nature, yet so that they need to be inculcated, the wiser teaching the less
+                     wise: e.g. "Rise up before the hoary head, and honor the person of the aged man," and the like. And there are some things,
+                     to
+                     judge of which, human reason needs Divine instruction, whereby we are taught about the things of God: e.g. "Thou shalt not
+                     make to thyself a graven thing, nor the likeness of anything; Thou shalt not take the name of the Lord thy God in vain."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q100_A1-p8"> This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.</p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q100_A1-p9"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q100_A1-p10"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q100.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q100_A2.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="FS_Q100_A2" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q100_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q100_A3.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="FS_Q100_A2-p0.1">Whether the moral precepts of the Law are about all the acts of virtue?</h4>
+                  <p id="FS_Q100_A2-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q100_A2-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the moral precepts of the Law are not about all the acts of virtue. For observance of the precepts of
+                     the Old Law is called justification, according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q100_A2-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.118.8" target="asv"> Ps. 118:8</a>: "I will keep Thy justifications." But justification is the execution of justice. Therefore the moral precepts are only about
+                     acts of justice.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q100_A2-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, that which comes under a precept has the character of a duty. But the character of duty belongs to justice alone
+                     and to none of the other virtues, for the proper act of justice consists in rendering to each one his due. Therefore the precepts
+                     of the moral law are not about the acts of the other virtues, but only about the acts of justice.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q100_A2-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, every law is made for the common good, as Isidore says (Etym. v, 21). But of all the virtues justice alone regards
+                     the common good, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 1). Therefore the moral precepts are only about the acts of justice.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q100_A2-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Ambrose says (De Paradiso viii) that "a sin is a transgression of the Divine law, and a disobedience to the commandments
+                     of heaven." But there are sins contrary to all the acts of virtue. Therefore it belongs to Divine law to direct all the acts
+                     of virtue.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q100_A2-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> Since the precepts of the Law are ordained to the common good, as stated above (
+                     <a id="FS_Q100_A2-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q90_A2.html">Q[90], A[2]</a>), the precepts of the Law must needs be diversified according to the various kinds of community: hence the Philosopher (Polit.
+                     iv, 1) teaches that the laws which are made in a state which is ruled by a king must be different from the laws of a state
+                     which is ruled by the people, or by a few powerful men in the state. Now human law is ordained
+                     for one kind of community, and the Divine law for another kind. Because human law is ordained for the civil community, implying
+                     mutual duties of man and his fellows: and men are ordained to one another by outward acts, whereby men live in communion with
+                     one another. This life in common of man with man pertains to justice, whose proper function consists in directing the human
+                     community. Wherefore human law makes precepts only about acts of justice; and if it commands acts of other virtues, this
+                     is only in so far as they assume the nature of justice, as the Philosopher explains (Ethic. v, 1).
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q100_A2-p7"> But the community for which the Divine law is ordained, is that of men in relation to God, either in this life or in the
+                     life to come. And therefore the Divine law proposes precepts about all those matters whereby men are well ordered in their
+                     relations to God. Now man is united to God by his reason or mind, in which is God's image. Wherefore the Divine law proposes
+                     precepts about all those matters whereby human reason is well ordered. But this is effected by the acts of all the
+                     virtues: since the intellectual virtues set in good order the acts of the reason in themselves: while the moral virtues set
+                     in good order the acts of the reason in reference to the interior passions and exterior actions. It is therefore evident that
+                     the Divine law fittingly proposes precepts about the acts of all the virtues: yet so that certain matters, without which the
+                     order of virtue, which is the order of reason, cannot even exist, come under an obligation of precept; while other matters,
+                     which pertain to the well-being of perfect virtue, come under an admonition of counsel.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q100_A2-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The fulfilment of the commandments of the Law, even of those which are about the acts of the other virtues, has the character
+                     of justification, inasmuch as it is just that man should obey God: or again, inasmuch as it is just that all that belongs
+                     to man should be subject to reason.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q100_A2-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Justice properly so called regards the duty of one man to another: but all the other virtues regard the duty of the lower
+                     powers to reason. It is in relation to this latter duty that the Philosopher speaks (Ethic. v, 11) of a kind of metaphorical
+                     justice.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q100_A2-p10"> The Reply to the Third Objection is clear from what has been said about the different kinds of community.</p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q100_A2-p11"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q100_A2-p12"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q100_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q100_A3.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="FS_Q100_A3" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q100_A2.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q100_A4.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="FS_Q100_A3-p0.1">Whether all the moral precepts of the Old Law are reducible to the ten precepts of the decalogue?</h4>
+                  <p id="FS_Q100_A3-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q100_A3-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that not all the moral precepts of the Old Law are reducible to the ten precepts of the decalogue. For the
+                     first and principal precepts of the Law are, "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God," and "Thou shalt love thy neighbor," as stated
+                     in
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q100_A3-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.22.37" target="asv"> Mat. 22:37,39.</a> But these two are not contained in the precepts of the decalogue. Therefore not all the moral precepts are contained in the
+                     precepts of the decalogue.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q100_A3-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the moral precepts are not reducible to the ceremonial precepts, but rather vice versa. But among the precepts of
+                     the decalogue, one is ceremonial, viz. "Remember that thou keep holy the Sabbath-day." Therefore the moral precepts are not
+                     reducible to all the precepts of the decalogue.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q100_A3-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the moral precepts are about all the acts of virtue. But among the precepts of the decalogue are only such as regard
+                     acts of justice; as may be seen by going through them all. Therefore the precepts of the decalogue do not include all the
+                     moral precepts.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q100_A3-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The gloss on
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q100_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.5.11" target="asv"> Mat. 5:11</a>: "Blessed are ye when they shall revile you," etc. says that "Moses, after propounding the ten precepts, set them out in
+                     detail." Therefore all the precepts of the Law are so many parts of the precepts of the decalogue.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q100_A3-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> The precepts of the decalogue differ from the other precepts of the Law, in the fact that God Himself is said to have given
+                     the precepts of the decalogue; whereas He gave the other precepts to the people through Moses. Wherefore the decalogue includes
+                     those precepts the knowledge of which man has immediately from God. Such are those which with but slight reflection can be
+                     gathered at once from the first general principles: and those also which become known
+                     to man immediately through divinely infused faith. Consequently two kinds of precepts are not reckoned among the precepts
+                     of the decalogue: viz. first general principles, for they need no further promulgation after being once imprinted on the natural
+                     reason to which they are self-evident; as, for instance, that one should do evil to no man, and other similar principles:
+                     and again those which the careful reflection of wise men shows to be in accord with reason; since the people receive these
+                     principles from God, through being taught by wise men. Nevertheless both kinds of precepts are contained in the precepts of
+                     the decalogue; yet in different ways. For the first general principles are contained in them, as principles in their proximate
+                     conclusions; while those which are known through wise men are contained, conversely, as conclusions in their principles.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q100_A3-p7">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Those two principles are the first general principles of the natural law, and are self-evident to human reason, either through
+                     nature or through faith. Wherefore all the precepts of the decalogue are referred to these, as conclusions to general principles.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q100_A3-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The precept of the Sabbath observance is moral in one respect, in so far as it commands man to give some time to the things
+                     of God, according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q100_A3-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.45.11" target="asv"> Ps. 45:11</a>: "Be still and see that I am God." In this respect it is placed among the precepts of the decalogue: but not as to the fixing
+                     of the time, in which respect it is a ceremonial precept.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q100_A3-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The notion of duty is not so patent in the other virtues as it is in justice. Hence the precepts about the acts of the other
+                     virtues are not so well known to the people as are the precepts about acts of justice. Wherefore the acts of justice especially
+                     come under the precepts of the decalogue, which are the primary elements of the Law.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q100_A3-p10"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q100_A3-p11"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q100_A2.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q100_A4.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="FS_Q100_A4" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q100_A3.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q100_A5.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="FS_Q100_A4-p0.1">Whether the precepts of the decalogue are suitably distinguished from one another?</h4>
+                  <p id="FS_Q100_A4-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q100_A4-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the precepts of the decalogue are unsuitably distinguished from one another. For worship is a virtue distinct
+                     from faith. Now the precepts are about acts of virtue. But that which is said at the beginning of the decalogue, "Thou shalt
+                     not have strange gods before Me," belongs to faith: and that which is added, "Thou shalt not make . . . any graven thing,"
+                     etc. belongs to worship. Therefore these are not one precept, as Augustine asserts (Qq.
+                     in Exod. qu. lxxi), but two.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q100_A4-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the affirmative precepts in the Law are distinct from the negative precepts; e.g. "Honor thy father and thy mother,"
+                     and, "Thou shalt not kill." But this, "I am the Lord thy God," is affirmative: and that which follows, "Thou shalt not have
+                     strange gods before Me," is negative. Therefore these are two precepts, and do not, as Augustine says (Qq. in Exod. qu. lxxi),
+                     make one.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q100_A4-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the Apostle says (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q100_A4-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.7.7" target="asv">Rom. 7:7</a>): "I had not known concupiscence, if the Law did not say: 'Thou shalt not covet.'" Hence it seems that this precept, "Thou
+                     shalt not covet," is one precept; and, therefore, should not be divided into two.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q100_A4-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> stands the authority of Augustine who, in commenting on Exodus (Qq. in Exod. qu. lxxi) distinguishes three precepts as referring
+                     to God, and seven as referring to our neighbor.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q100_A4-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> The precepts of the decalogue are differently divided by different authorities. For Hesychius commenting on
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q100_A4-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Lev.26.26" target="asv"> Lev. 26:26, </a> "Ten women shall bake your bread in one oven," says that the precept of the Sabbath-day observance is not one of the ten
+                     precepts, because its observance, in the letter, is not binding for all time. But he distinguishes four precepts pertaining
+                     to God, the first being, "I am the Lord thy God"; the second, "Thou shalt
+                     not have strange gods before Me," (thus also Jerome distinguishes these two precepts, in his commentary on 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q100_A4-p6.2" href="./asv.html#Hos.10.10" target="asv"> Osee 10:10, </a> "On thy" [Vulg.: "their"] "two iniquities"); the third precept according to him is, "Thou shalt not make to thyself any graven
+                     thing"; and the fourth, "Thou shalt not take the name of the Lord thy God in vain." He states that there are six precepts
+                     pertaining to our neighbor; the first, "Honor thy father and thy mother"; the second, "Thou shalt not kill";
+                     the third, "Thou shalt not commit adultery"; the fourth, "Thou shalt not steal"; the fifth, "Thou shalt not bear false witness";
+                     the sixth, "Thou shalt not covet."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q100_A4-p7"> But, in the first place, it seems unbecoming for the precept of the Sabbath-day observance to be put among the precepts of
+                     the decalogue, if it nowise belonged to the decalogue. Secondly, because, since it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q100_A4-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.6.24" target="asv">Mat. 6:24</a>), "No man can serve two masters," the two statements, "I am the Lord thy God," and, "Thou shalt not have strange gods before
+                     Me" seem to be of the same nature and to form one precept. Hence Origen (Hom. viii in Exod.) who also
+                     distinguishes four precepts as referring to God, unites these two under one precept; and reckons in the second place, "Thou
+                     shalt not make . . . any graven thing"; as third, "Thou shalt not take the name of the Lord thy God in vain"; and as fourth,
+                     "Remember that thou keep holy the Sabbath-day." The other six he reckons in the same way as Hesychius.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q100_A4-p8"> Since, however, the making of graven things or the likeness of anything is not forbidden except as to the point of their
+                     being worshipped as gods---for God commanded an image of the Seraphim [Vulg.: Cherubim] to be made and placed in the tabernacle,
+                     as related in
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q100_A4-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Exod.25.18" target="asv"> Ex. 25:18</a>---Augustine more fittingly unites these two, "Thou shalt not have strange gods before Me," and, "Thou shalt not make . .
+                     . any graven thing," into one precept. Likewise to covet another's
+                     wife, for the purpose of carnal knowledge, belongs to the concupiscence of the flesh; whereas, to covet other things, which
+                     are desired for the purpose of possession, belongs to the concupiscence of the eyes; wherefore Augustine reckons as distinct
+                     precepts, that which forbids the coveting of another's goods, and that which prohibits the coveting of another's wife. Thus
+                     he distinguishes three precepts as referring to God, and seven as referring to our neighbor. And this is better.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q100_A4-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Worship is merely a declaration of faith: wherefore the precepts about worship should not be reckoned as distinct from those
+                     about faith. Nevertheless precepts should be given about worship rather than about faith, because the precept about faith
+                     is presupposed to the precepts of the decalogue, as is also the precept of charity. For just as the first general principles
+                     of the natural law are self-evident to a subject having natural reason, and need no
+                     promulgation; so also to believe in God is a first and self-evident principle to a subject possessed of faith: "for he that
+                     cometh to God, must believe that He is" (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q100_A4-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Heb.11.6" target="asv">Heb. 11:6</a>). Hence it needs no other promulgation that the infusion of faith.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q100_A4-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The affirmative precepts are distinct from the negative, when one is not comprised in the other: thus that man should honor
+                     his parents does not include that he should not kill another man; nor does the latter include the former. But when an affirmative
+                     precept is included in a negative, or vice versa, we do not find that two distinct precepts are given: thus there is not one
+                     precept saying that "Thou shalt not steal," and another binding one to keep
+                     another's property intact, or to give it back to its owner. In the same way there are not different precepts about believing
+                     in God, and about not believing in strange gods.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q100_A4-p11">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> All covetousness has one common ratio: and therefore the Apostle speaks of the commandment about covetousness as though it
+                     were one. But because there are various special kinds of covetousness, therefore Augustine distinguishes different prohibitions
+                     against coveting: for covetousness differs specifically in respect of the diversity of actions or things coveted, as the Philosopher
+                     says (Ethic. x, 5).
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q100_A4-p12"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q100_A4-p13"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q100_A3.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q100_A5.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="FS_Q100_A5" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q100_A4.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q100_A6.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="FS_Q100_A5-p0.1">Whether the precepts of the decalogue are suitably set forth?</h4>
+                  <p id="FS_Q100_A5-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q100_A5-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the precepts of the decalogue are unsuitably set forth. Because sin, as stated by Ambrose (De Paradiso
+                     viii), is "a transgression of the Divine law and a disobedience to the commandments of heaven." But sins are distinguished
+                     according as man sins against God, or his neighbor, or himself. Since, then, the decalogue does not include any precepts directing
+                     man in his relations to himself, but only such as direct him in his relations to God and
+                     himself, it seems that the precepts of the decalogue are insufficiently enumerated.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q100_A5-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, just as the Sabbath-day observance pertained to the worship of God, so also did the observance of other solemnities,
+                     and the offering of sacrifices. But the decalogue contains a precept about the Sabbath-day observance. Therefore it should
+                     contain others also, pertaining to the other solemnities, and to the sacrificial rite.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q100_A5-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, as sins against God include the sin of perjury, so also do they include blasphemy, or other ways of lying against
+                     the teaching of God. But there is a precept forbidding perjury, "Thou shalt not take the name of the Lord thy God in vain."
+                     Therefore there should be also a precept of the decalogue forbidding blasphemy and false doctrine.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q100_A5-p5">
+                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, just as man has a natural affection for his parents, so has he also for his children. Moreover the commandment of
+                     charity extends to all our neighbors. Now the precepts of the decalogue are ordained unto charity, according to 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q100_A5-p5.1" href="./asv.html#iTim.1.5" target="asv">1 Tim. 1:5</a>: "The end of the commandment is charity." Therefore as there is a precept referring to parents, so should there have been
+                     some precepts referring to children and other neighbors.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q100_A5-p6">
+                     <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, in every kind of sin, it is possible to sin in thought or in deed. But in some kinds of sin, namely in theft and
+                     adultery, the prohibition of sins of deed, when it is said, "Thou shalt not commit adultery, Thou shalt not steal," is distinct
+                     from the prohibition of the sin of thought, when it is said, "Thou shalt not covet thy neighbor's goods," and, "Thou shalt
+                     not covet thy neighbor's wife." Therefore the same should have been done in regard to the
+                     sins of homicide and false witness.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q100_A5-p7">
+                     <b>Objection 6:</b> Further, just as sin happens through disorder of the concupiscible faculty, so does it arise through disorder of the irascible
+                     part. But some precepts forbid inordinate concupiscence, when it is said, "Thou shalt not covet." Therefore the decalogue
+                     should have included some precepts forbidding the disorders of the irascible faculty. Therefore it seems that the ten precepts
+                     of the decalogue are unfittingly enumerated.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q100_A5-p8">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q100_A5-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Deut.4.13" target="asv">Dt. 4:13</a>): "He shewed you His covenant, which He commanded you to do, and the ten words that He wrote in two tablets of stone."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q100_A5-p9">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above 
+                     <a id="FS_Q100_A5-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q100_A2.html">(A[2])</a>, just as the precepts of human law direct man in his relations to the human community, so the precepts of the Divine law
+                     direct man in his relations to a community or commonwealth of men under God. Now in order that any man may dwell aright in
+                     a community, two things are required: the first is that he behave well to the head of the community; the other is that he
+                     behave well to those who are his fellows and
+                     partners in the community. It is therefore necessary that the Divine law should contain in the first place precepts ordering
+                     man in his relations to God; and in the second place, other precepts ordering man in his relations to other men who are his
+                     neighbors and live with him under God.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q100_A5-p10"> Now man owes three things to the head of the community: first, fidelity; secondly, reverence; thirdly, service. Fidelity
+                     to his master consists in his not giving sovereign honor to another: and this is the sense of the first commandment, in the
+                     words "Thou shalt not have strange gods." Reverence to his master requires that he should do nothing injurious to him: and
+                     this is conveyed by the second commandment, "Thou shalt not take the name of the Lord thy God in vain." Service is
+                     due to the master in return for the benefits which his subjects receive from him: and to this belongs the third commandment
+                     of the sanctification of the Sabbath in memory of the creation of all things.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q100_A5-p11"> To his neighbors a man behaves himself well both in particular and in general. In particular, as to those to whom he is indebted,
+                     by paying his debts: and in this sense is to be taken the commandment about honoring one's parents. In general, as to all
+                     men, by doing harm to none, either by deed, or by word, or by thought. By deed, harm is done to one's neighbor---sometimes
+                     in his person, i.e. as to his personal existence; and this is forbidden by the words, "Thou shalt not kill":
+                     sometimes in a person united to him, as to the propagation of offspring; and this is prohibited by the words, "Thou shalt
+                     not commit adultery": sometimes in his possessions, which are directed to both the aforesaid; and with this regard to this
+                     it is said, "Thou shalt not steal." Harm done by word is forbidden when it is said, "Thou shalt not bear false witness against
+                     thy neighbor": harm done by thought is forbidden in the words, "Thou shalt not covet."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q100_A5-p12"> The three precepts that direct man in his behavior towards God may also be differentiated in this same way. For the first
+                     refers to deeds; wherefore it is said, "Thou shalt not make . . . a graven thing": the second, to words; wherefore it is said,
+                     "Thou shalt not take the name of the Lord thy God in vain": the third, to thoughts; because the sanctification of the Sabbath,
+                     as the subject of a moral precept, requires repose of the heart in God. Or, according to Augustine (In 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q100_A5-p12.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.32" target="asv">Ps.
+                        32
+                     </a>: Conc. 1), by the first commandment we reverence the unity of the First Principle; by the second, the Divine truth; by the
+                     third, His goodness whereby we are sanctified, and wherein we rest as in our last end.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q100_A5-p13">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This objection may be answered in two ways. First, because the precepts of the decalogue can be reduced to the precepts of
+                     charity. Now there was need for man to receive a precept about loving God and his neighbor, because in this respect the natural
+                     law had become obscured on account of sin: but not about the duty of loving oneself, because in this respect the natural law
+                     retained its vigor: or again, because love of oneself is contained in the love
+                     of God and of one's neighbor: since true self-love consists in directing oneself to God. And for this reason the decalogue
+                     includes those precepts only which refer to our neighbor and to God.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q100_A5-p14"> Secondly, it may be answered that the precepts of the decalogue are those which the people received from God immediately;
+                     wherefore it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q100_A5-p14.1" href="./asv.html#Deut.10.4" target="asv">Dt. 10:4</a>): "He wrote in the tables, according as He had written before, the ten words, which the Lord spoke to you." Hence the precepts
+                     of the decalogue need to be such as the people can understand at once. Now a precept implies the notion of duty. But it is
+                     easy for a man, especially for a believer, to understand
+                     that, of necessity, he owes certain duties to God and to his neighbor. But that, in matters which regard himself and not another,
+                     man has, of necessity, certain duties to himself, is not so evident: for, at the first glance, it seems that everyone is free
+                     in matters that concern himself. And therefore the precepts which prohibit disorders of a man with regard to himself, reach
+                     the people through the instruction of men who are versed through the instruction of men who are versed in such matters;
+                     and, consequently, they are not contained in the decalogue.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q100_A5-p15">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> All the solemnities of the Old Law were instituted in celebration of some Divine favor, either in memory of past favors,
+                     or in sign of some favor to come: in like manner all the sacrifices were offered up with the same purpose. Now of all the
+                     Divine favors to be commemorated the chief was that of the Creation, which was called to mind by the sanctification of the
+                     Sabbath; wherefore the reason for this precept is given in
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q100_A5-p15.1" href="./asv.html#Exod.20.11" target="asv"> Ex.
+                        20:11
+                     </a>: "In six days the Lord made heaven and earth," etc. And of all future blessings, the chief and final was the repose of the
+                     mind in God, either, in the present life, by grace, or, in the future life, by glory; which repose was also foreshadowed in
+                     the Sabbath-day observance: wherefore it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q100_A5-p15.2" href="./asv.html#Isa.58.13" target="asv">Is. 58:13</a>): "If thou turn away thy foot from the Sabbath, from doing thy own will in My holy day, and call the Sabbath delightful,
+                     and the holy of the Lord
+                     glorious." Because these favors first and chiefly are borne in mind by men, especially by the faithful. But other solemnities
+                     were celebrated on account of certain particular favors temporal and transitory, such as the celebration of the Passover in
+                     memory of the past favor of the delivery from Egypt, and as a sign of the future Passion of Christ, which though temporal
+                     and transitory, brought us to the repose of the spiritual Sabbath. Consequently, the Sabbath alone, and none of the other
+                     solemnities and sacrifices, is mentioned in the precepts of the decalogue.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q100_A5-p16">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As the Apostle says (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q100_A5-p16.1" href="./asv.html#Heb.6.16" target="asv">Heb. 6:16</a>), "men swear by one greater than themselves; and an oath for confirmation is the end of all their controversy." Hence, since
+                     oaths are common to all, inordinate swearing is the matter of a special prohibition by a precept of the decalogue. According
+                     to one interpretation, however, the words, "Thou shalt not take the name of the Lord thy God in vain," are a prohibition of
+                     false doctrine, for one gloss
+                     expounds them thus: "Thou shalt not say that Christ is a creature."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q100_A5-p17">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> That a man should not do harm to anyone is an immediate dictate of his natural reason: and therefore the precepts that forbid
+                     the doing of harm are binding on all men. But it is not an immediate dictate of natural reason that a man should do one thing
+                     in return for another, unless he happen to be indebted to someone. Now a son's debt to his father is so evident that one cannot
+                     get away from it by denying it: since the father is the principle of
+                     generation and being, and also of upbringing and teaching. Wherefore the decalogue does not prescribe deeds of kindness or
+                     service to be done to anyone except to one's parents. On the other hand parents do not seem to be indebted to their children
+                     for any favors received, but rather the reverse is the case. Again, a child is a part of his father; and "parents love their
+                     children as being a part of themselves," as the Philosopher states (Ethic. viii, 12). Hence, just as the decalogue contains
+                     no
+                     ordinance as to man's behavior towards himself, so, for the same reason, it includes no precept about loving one's children.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q100_A5-p18">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> The pleasure of adultery and the usefulness of wealth, in so far as they have the character of pleasurable or useful good,
+                     are of themselves, objects of appetite: and for this reason they needed to be forbidden not only in the deed but also in the
+                     desire. But murder and falsehood are, of themselves, objects of repulsion (since it is natural for man to love his neighbor
+                     and the truth): and are desired only for the sake of something else. Consequently
+                     with regard to sins of murder and false witness, it was necessary to proscribe, not sins of thought, but only sins of deed.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q100_A5-p19">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 6:</b> As stated above (
+                     <a id="FS_Q100_A5-p19.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q25_A1.html">Q[25], A[1]</a>), all the passions of the irascible faculty arise from the passions of the concupiscible part. Hence, as the precepts of
+                     the decalogue are, as it were, the first elements of the Law, there was no need for mention of the irascible passions, but
+                     only of the concupiscible passions.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q100_A5-p20"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q100_A5-p21"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q100_A4.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q100_A6.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="FS_Q100_A6" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q100_A5.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q100_A7.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="FS_Q100_A6-p0.1">Whether the ten precepts of the decalogue are set in proper order?</h4>
+                  <p id="FS_Q100_A6-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q100_A6-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the ten precepts of the decalogue are not set in proper order. Because love of one's neighbor is seemingly
+                     previous to love of God, since our neighbor is better known to us than God is; according to 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q100_A6-p2.1" href="./asv.html#iJohn.4.20" target="asv">1 Jn. 4:20</a>: "He that loveth not his brother, whom he seeth, how can he love God, Whom he seeth not?" But the first three precepts belong
+                     to the love of God, while the other seven pertain to the love of our neighbor. Therefore
+                     the precepts of the decalogue are not set in proper order.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q100_A6-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the acts of virtue are prescribed by the affirmative precepts, and acts of vice are forbidden by the negative precepts.
+                     But according to Boethius in his commentary on the Categories [*Lib. iv, cap. De Oppos.], vices should be uprooted before
+                     virtues are sown. Therefore among the precepts concerning our neighbor, the negative precepts should have preceded the affirmative.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q100_A6-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the precepts of the Law are about men's actions. But actions of thought precede actions of word or outward deed.
+                     Therefore the precepts about not coveting, which regard our thoughts, are unsuitably placed last in order.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q100_A6-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle says (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q100_A6-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.13.1" target="asv">Rom. 13:1</a>): "The things that are of God, are well ordered" [Vulg.: 'Those that are, are ordained of God']. But the precepts of the
+                     decalogue were given immediately by God, as stated above 
+                     <a id="FS_Q100_A6-p5.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q100_A3.html">(A[3])</a>. Therefore they are arranged in becoming order.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q100_A6-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above (
+                     <a id="FS_Q100_A6-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q100_A3.html">AA[3]</a>,5, ad 1), the precepts of the decalogue are such as the mind of man is ready to grasp at once. Now it is evident that a thing
+                     is so much the more easily grasped by the reason, as its contrary is more grievous and repugnant to reason. Moreover, it is
+                     clear, since the order of reason begins with the end, that, for a man to be inordinately disposed towards his end, is supremely
+                     contrary to reason. Now the end of
+                     human life and society is God. Consequently it was necessary for the precepts of the decalogue, first of all, to direct man
+                     to God; since the contrary to this is most grievous. Thus also, in an army, which is ordained to the commander as to its end,
+                     it is requisite first that the soldier should be subject to the commander, and the opposite of this is most grievous; and
+                     secondly it is requisite that he should be in coordination with the other soldiers.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q100_A6-p7"> Now among those things whereby we are ordained to God, the first is that man should be subjected to Him faithfully, by having
+                     nothing in common with His enemies. The second is that he should show Him reverence: the third that he should offer Him service.
+                     Thus, in an army, it is a greater sin for a soldier to act treacherously and make a compact with the foe, than to be insolent
+                     to his commander: and this last is more grievous than if he be found wanting in some point of service
+                     to him.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q100_A6-p8"> As to the precepts that direct man in his behavior towards his neighbor, it is evident that it is more repugnant to reason,
+                     and a more grievous sin, if man does not observe the due order as to those persons to whom he is most indebted. Consequently,
+                     among those precepts that direct man in his relations to his neighbor, the first place is given to that one which regards
+                     his parents. Among the other precepts we again find the order to be according to the gravity of sin. For it is
+                     more grave and more repugnant to reason, to sin by deed than by word; and by word than by thought. And among sins of deed,
+                     murder which destroys life in one already living is more grievous than adultery, which imperils the life of the unborn child;
+                     and adultery is more grave than theft, which regards external goods.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q100_A6-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Although our neighbor is better known than God by the way of the senses, nevertheless the love of God is the reason for the
+                     love of our neighbor, as shall be declared later on (
+                     <a id="FS_Q100_A6-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q25_A1.html">SS, Q[25], A[1]</a>; 
+                     <a id="FS_Q100_A6-p9.2" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q26_A2.html">SS, Q[26], A[2]</a>). Hence the precepts ordaining man to God demanded precedence of the others.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q100_A6-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Just as God is the universal principle of being in respect of all things, so is a father a principle of being in respect
+                     of his son. Therefore the precept regarding parents was fittingly placed after the precepts regarding God. This argument holds
+                     in respect of affirmative and negative precepts about the same kind of deed: although even then it is not altogether cogent.
+                     For although in the order of execution, vices should be uprooted before virtues
+                     are sown, according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q100_A6-p10.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.33.15" target="asv"> Ps. 33:15</a>: "Turn away from evil, and do good," and
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q100_A6-p10.2" href="./asv.html#Isa.1.16" target="asv"> Is. 1:16,17</a>: "Cease to do perversely; learn to do well"; yet, in the order of knowledge, virtue precedes vice, because "the crooked line
+                     is known by the straight" (De Anima i): and "by the law is the knowledge of sin" (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q100_A6-p10.3" href="./asv.html#Rom.3.20" target="asv">Rom. 3:20</a>). Wherefore the affirmation precept demanded the first place. However, this is not the reason for the order, but that which
+                     is given
+                     above. Because in the precepts regarding God, which belongs to the first table, an affirmative precept is placed last, since
+                     its transgression implies a less grievous sin.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q100_A6-p11">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Although sin of thought stands first in the order of execution, yet its prohibition holds a later position in the order of
+                     reason.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q100_A6-p12"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q100_A6-p13"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q100_A5.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q100_A7.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="FS_Q100_A7" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q100_A6.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q100_A8.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="FS_Q100_A7-p0.1">Whether the precepts of the decalogue are suitably formulated?</h4>
+                  <p id="FS_Q100_A7-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q100_A7-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the precepts of the decalogue are unsuitably formulated. Because the affirmative precepts direct man to
+                     acts of virtue, while the negative precepts withdraw him from acts of vice. But in every matter there are virtues and vices
+                     opposed to one another. Therefore in whatever matter there is an ordinance of a precept of the decalogue, there should have
+                     been an affirmative and a negative precept. Therefore it was unfitting that affirmative
+                     precepts should be framed in some matters, and negative precepts in others.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q100_A7-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Isidore says (Etym. ii, 10) that every law is based on reason. But all the precepts of the decalogue belong to the
+                     Divine law. Therefore the reason should have been pointed out in each precept, and not only in the first and third.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q100_A7-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, by observing the precepts man deserves to be rewarded by God. But the Divine promises concern the rewards of the
+                     precepts. Therefore the promise should have been included in each precept, and not only in the second and fourth.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q100_A7-p5">
+                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, the Old Law is called "the law of fear," in so far as it induced men to observe the precepts, by means of the threat
+                     of punishments. But all the precepts of the decalogue belong to the Old Law. Therefore a threat of punishment should have
+                     been included in each, and not only in the first and second.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q100_A7-p6">
+                     <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, all the commandments of God should be retained in the memory: for it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q100_A7-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Prov.3.3" target="asv">Prov. 3:3</a>): "Write them in the tables of thy heart." Therefore it was not fitting that mention of the memory should be made in the
+                     third commandment only. Consequently it seems that the precepts of the decalogue are unsuitably formulated.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q100_A7-p7">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q100_A7-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.11.21" target="asv">Wis. 11:21</a>) that "God made all things, in measure, number and weight." Much more therefore did He observe a suitable manner in formulating
+                     His Law.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q100_A7-p8">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> The highest wisdom is contained in the precepts of the Divine law: wherefore it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q100_A7-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Deut.4.6" target="asv">Dt. 4:6</a>): "This is your wisdom and understanding in the sight of nations." Now it belongs to wisdom to arrange all things in due
+                     manner and order. Therefore it must be evident that the precepts of the Law are suitably set forth.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q100_A7-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Affirmation of one thing always leads to the denial of its opposite: but the denial of one opposite does not always lead
+                     to the affirmation of the other. For it follows that if a thing is white, it is not black: but it does not follow that if
+                     it is not black, it is white: because negation extends further than affirmation. And hence too, that one ought not to do harm
+                     to another, which pertains to the negative precepts, extends to more persons, as a
+                     primary dictate of reason, than that one ought to do someone a service or kindness. Nevertheless it is a primary dictate of
+                     reason that man is a debtor in the point of rendering a service or kindness to those from whom he has received kindness, if
+                     he has not yet repaid the debt. Now there are two whose favors no man can sufficiently repay, viz. God and man's father, as
+                     stated in Ethic. viii, 14. Therefore it is that there are only two affirmative precepts; one about the honor due to parents,
+                     the other about the celebration of the Sabbath in memory of the Divine favor.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q100_A7-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The reasons for the purely moral precepts are manifest; hence there was no need to add the reason. But some of the precepts
+                     include ceremonial matter, or a determination of a general moral precept; thus the first precept includes the determination,
+                     "Thou shalt not make a graven thing"; and in the third precept the Sabbath-day is fixed. Consequently there was need to state
+                     the reason in each case.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q100_A7-p11">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Generally speaking, men direct their actions to some point of utility. Consequently in those precepts in which it seemed
+                     that there would be no useful result, or that some utility might be hindered, it was necessary to add a promise of reward.
+                     And since parents are already on the way to depart from us, no benefit is expected from them: wherefore a promise of reward
+                     is added to the precept about honoring one's parents. The same applies to the precept
+                     forbidding idolatry: since thereby it seemed that men were hindered from receiving the apparent benefit which they think they
+                     can get by entering into a compact with the demons.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q100_A7-p12">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Punishments are necessary against those who are prone to evil, as stated in Ethic. x, 9. Wherefore a threat of punishment
+                     is only affixed to those precepts of the law which forbade evils to which men were prone. Now men were prone to idolatry by
+                     reason of the general custom of the nations. Likewise men are prone to perjury on account of the frequent use of oaths. Hence
+                     it is that a threat is affixed to the first two precepts.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q100_A7-p13">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> The commandment about the Sabbath was made in memory of a past blessing. Wherefore special mention of the memory is made
+                     therein. Or again, the commandment about the Sabbath has a determination affixed to it that does not belong to the natural
+                     law, wherefore this precept needed a special admonition.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q100_A7-p14"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q100_A7-p15"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q100_A6.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q100_A8.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="FS_Q100_A8" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q100_A7.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q100_A9.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="FS_Q100_A8-p0.1">Whether the precepts of the decalogue are dispensable?</h4>
+                  <p id="FS_Q100_A8-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q100_A8-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the precepts of the decalogue are dispensable. For the precepts of the decalogue belong to the natural
+                     law. But the natural law fails in some cases and is changeable, like human nature, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 7).
+                     Now the failure of law to apply in certain particular cases is a reason for dispensation, as stated above (
+                     <a id="FS_Q100_A8-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q96_A6.html">Q[96], A[6]</a>;
+                     <a id="FS_Q100_A8-p2.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q97_A4.html"> Q[97], A[4]</a>). Therefore a dispensation can be
+                     granted in the precepts of the decalogue.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q100_A8-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, man stands in the same relation to human law as God does to Divine law. But man can dispense with the precepts of
+                     a law made by man. Therefore, since the precepts of the decalogue are ordained by God, it seems that God can dispense with
+                     them. Now our superiors are God's viceregents on earth; for the Apostle says (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q100_A8-p3.1" href="./asv.html#iiCor.2.10" target="asv">2 Cor. 2:10</a>): "For what I have pardoned, if I have pardoned anything, for your sakes have I done it in the person of
+                     Christ." Therefore superiors can dispense with the precepts of the decalogue.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q100_A8-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, among the precepts of the decalogue is one forbidding murder. But it seems that a dispensation is given by men in
+                     this precept: for instance, when according to the prescription of human law, such as evil-doers or enemies are lawfully slain.
+                     Therefore the precepts of the decalogue are dispensable.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q100_A8-p5">
+                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, the observance of the Sabbath is ordained by a precept of the decalogue. But a dispensation was granted in this
+                     precept; for it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q100_A8-p5.1" href="./asv.html#iMacc.2.4" target="asv">1 Macc. 2:4</a>): "And they determined in that day, saying: Whosoever shall come up to fight against us on the Sabbath-day, we will fight
+                     against him." Therefore the precepts of the decalogue are dispensable.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q100_A8-p6">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> are the words of
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q100_A8-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.24.5" target="asv"> Is. 24:5, </a> where some are reproved for that "they have changed the ordinance, they have broken the everlasting covenant"; which, seemingly,
+                     apply principally to the precepts of the decalogue. Therefore the precepts of the decalogue cannot be changed by dispensation.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q100_A8-p7">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above (
+                     <a id="FS_Q100_A8-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q96_A6.html">Q[96], A[6]</a>;
+                     <a id="FS_Q100_A8-p7.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q97_A4.html"> Q[97], A[4]</a>), precepts admit of dispensation, when there occurs a particular case in which, if the letter of the law be observed, the
+                     intention of the lawgiver is frustrated. Now the intention of every lawgiver is directed first and chiefly to the common good;
+                     secondly, to the order of justice and virtue, whereby the common good is preserved and attained. If therefore there by
+                     any precepts which contain the very preservation of the common good, or the very order of justice and virtue, such precepts
+                     contain the intention of the lawgiver, and therefore are indispensable. For instance, if in some community a law were enacted,
+                     such as this---that no man should work for the destruction of the commonwealth, or betray the state to its enemies, or that
+                     no man should do anything unjust or evil, such precepts would not admit of dispensation. But if other precepts were enacted,
+                     subordinate to the above, and determining certain special modes of procedure, these latter precepts would admit of dispensation,
+                     in so far as the omission of these precepts in certain cases would not be prejudicial to the former precepts which contain
+                     the intention of the lawgiver. For instance if, for the safeguarding of the commonwealth, it were enacted in some city that
+                     from each ward some men should keep watch as sentries in case of siege, some might be dispensed from this on account of
+                     some greater utility.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q100_A8-p8"> Now the precepts of the decalogue contain the very intention of the lawgiver, who is God. For the precepts of the first table,
+                     which direct us to God, contain the very order to the common and final good, which is God; while the precepts of the second
+                     table contain the order of justice to be observed among men, that nothing undue be done to anyone, and that each one be given
+                     his due; for it is in this sense that we are to take the precepts of the decalogue. Consequently the
+                     precepts of the decalogue admit of no dispensation whatever.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q100_A8-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The Philosopher is not speaking of the natural law which contains the very order of justice: for it is a never-failing principle
+                     that "justice should be preserved." But he is speaking in reference to certain fixed modes of observing justice, which fail
+                     to apply in certain cases.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q100_A8-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As the Apostle says (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q100_A8-p10.1" href="./asv.html#iiTim.2.13" target="asv">2 Tim. 2:13</a>), "God continueth faithful, He cannot deny Himself." But He would deny Himself if He were to do away with the very order
+                     of His own justice, since He is justice itself. Wherefore God cannot dispense a man so that it be lawful for him not to direct
+                     himself to God, or not to be subject to His justice, even in those matters in which men are directed to one another.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q100_A8-p11">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The slaying of a man is forbidden in the decalogue, in so far as it bears the character of something undue: for in this sense
+                     the precept contains the very essence of justice. Human law cannot make it lawful for a man to be slain unduly. But it is
+                     not undue for evil-doers or foes of the common weal to be slain: hence this is not contrary to the precept of the decalogue;
+                     and such a killing is no murder as forbidden by that precept, as Augustine
+                     observes (De Lib. Arb. i, 4). In like manner when a man's property is taken from him, if it be due that he should lose it,
+                     this is not theft or robbery as forbidden by the decalogue.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q100_A8-p12"> Consequently when the children of Israel, by God's command, took away the spoils of the Egyptians, this was not theft; since
+                     it was due to them by the sentence of God. Likewise when Abraham consented to slay his son, he did not consent to murder,
+                     because his son was due to be slain by the command of God, Who is Lord of life and death: for He it is Who inflicts the punishment
+                     of death on all men, both godly and ungodly, on account of the sin of our first parent, and if a man be
+                     the executor of that sentence by Divine authority, he will be no murderer any more than God would be. Again Osee, by taking
+                     unto himself a wife of fornications, or an adulterous woman, was not guilty either of adultery or of fornication: because
+                     he took unto himself one who was his by command of God, Who is the Author of the institution of marriage.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q100_A8-p13"> Accordingly, therefore, the precepts of the decalogue, as to the essence of justice which they contain, are unchangeable:
+                     but as to any determination by application to individual actions---for instance, that this or that be murder, theft or adultery,
+                     or not---in this point they admit of change; sometimes by Divine authority alone, namely, in such matters as are exclusively
+                     of Divine institution, as marriage and the like; sometimes also by human authority, namely in such matters
+                     as are subject to human jurisdiction: for in this respect men stand in the place of God: and yet not in all respects.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q100_A8-p14">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> This determination was an interpretation rather than a dispensation. For a man is not taken to break the Sabbath, if he does
+                     something necessary for human welfare; as Our Lord proves (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q100_A8-p14.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.12.3" target="asv">Mat. 12:3, </a> seqq.).
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q100_A8-p15"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q100_A8-p16"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q100_A7.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q100_A9.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="FS_Q100_A9" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q100_A8.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q100_A10.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="FS_Q100_A9-p0.1">Whether the mode of virtue falls under the precept of the law?</h4>
+                  <p id="FS_Q100_A9-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q100_A9-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the mode of virtue falls under the precept of the law. For the mode of virtue is that deeds of justice
+                     should be done justly, that deeds of fortitude should be done bravely, and in like manner as to the other virtues. But it
+                     is commanded (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q100_A9-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Deut.26.20" target="asv">Dt. 26:20</a>) that "thou shalt follow justly after that which is just." Therefore the mode of virtue falls under the precept.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q100_A9-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, that which belongs to the intention of the lawgiver comes chiefly under the precept. But the intention of the lawgiver
+                     is directed chiefly to make men virtuous, as stated in Ethic. ii: and it belongs to a virtuous man to act virtuously. Therefore
+                     the mode of virtue falls under the precept.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q100_A9-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the mode of virtue seems to consist properly in working willingly and with pleasure. But this falls under a precept
+                     of the Divine law, for it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q100_A9-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.99.2" target="asv">Ps. 99:2</a>): "Serve ye the Lord with gladness"; and (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q100_A9-p4.2" href="./asv.html#iiCor.9.7" target="asv">2 Cor. 9:7</a>): "Not with sadness or necessity: for God loveth a cheerful giver"; whereupon the gloss says: "Whatever ye do, do gladly;
+                     and then you will do it well; whereas if you do it sorrowfully, it is done
+                     in thee, not by thee." Therefore the mode of virtue falls under the precept of the law.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q100_A9-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> No man can act as a virtuous man acts unless he has the habit of virtue, as the Philosopher explains (Ethic. ii, 4; v, 8).
+                     Now whoever transgresses a precept of the law, deserves to be punished. Hence it would follow that a man who has not the habit
+                     of virtue, would deserve to be punished, whatever he does. But this is contrary to the intention of the law, which aims at
+                     leading man to virtue, by habituating him to good works. Therefore the mode of virtue
+                     does not fall under the precept.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q100_A9-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above (
+                     <a id="FS_Q100_A9-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q90_A3.html">Q[90], A[3]</a>, ad 2), a precept of law has compulsory power. Hence that on which the compulsion of the law is brought to bear, falls directly
+                     under the precept of the law. Now the law compels through fear of punishment, as stated in Ethic. x, 9, because that properly
+                     falls under the precept of the law, for which the penalty of the law is inflicted. But Divine law and human law are differently
+                     situated as to the
+                     appointment of penalties; since the penalty of the law is inflicted only for those things which come under the judgment of
+                     the lawgiver; for the law punishes in accordance with the verdict given. Now man, the framer of human law, is competent to
+                     judge only of outward acts; because "man seeth those things that appear," according to 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q100_A9-p6.2" href="./asv.html#iKgs.16.7" target="asv">1 Kings 16:7</a>: while God alone, the framer of the Divine law, is competent to judge of the inward movements of wills, according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q100_A9-p6.3" href="./asv.html#Ps.7.10" target="asv"> Ps.
+                        7:10
+                     </a>: "The searcher of hearts and reins is God."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q100_A9-p7"> Accordingly, therefore, we must say that the mode of virtue is in some sort regarded both by human and by Divine law; in
+                     some respect it is regarded by the Divine, but not by the human law; and in another way, it is regarded neither by the human
+                     nor by the Divine law. Now the mode of virtue consists in three things, as the Philosopher states in Ethic. ii. The first
+                     is that man should act "knowingly": and this is subject to the judgment of both Divine and human law; because what
+                     a man does in ignorance, he does accidentally. Hence according to both human and Divine law, certain things are judged in
+                     respect of ignorance to be punishable or pardonable.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q100_A9-p8"> The second point is that a man should act "deliberately," i.e. "from choice, choosing that particular action for its own
+                     sake"; wherein a twofold internal movement is implied, of volition and of intention, about which we have spoken above (QQ[8],
+                     12): and concerning these two, Divine law alone, and not human law, is competent to judge. For human law does not punish the
+                     man who wishes to slay, and slays not: whereas the Divine law does, according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q100_A9-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.5.22" target="asv"> Mat. 5:22</a>:
+                     "Whosoever is angry with his brother, shall be in danger of the judgment."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q100_A9-p9"> The third point is that he should "act from a firm and immovable principle": which firmness belongs properly to a habit,
+                     and implies that the action proceeds from a rooted habit. In this respect, the mode of virtue does not fall under the precept
+                     either of Divine or of human law, since neither by man nor by God is he punished as breaking the law, who gives due honor
+                     to his parents and yet has not the habit of filial piety.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q100_A9-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The mode of doing acts of justice, which falls under the precept, is that they be done in accordance with right; but not
+                     that they be done from the habit of justice.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q100_A9-p11">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The intention of the lawgiver is twofold. His aim, in the first place, is to lead men to something by the precepts of the
+                     law: and this is virtue. Secondly, his intention is brought to bear on the matter itself of the precept: and this is something
+                     leading or disposing to virtue, viz. an act of virtue. For the end of the precept and the matter of the precept are not the
+                     same: just as neither in other things is the end the same as that which conduces
+                     to the end.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q100_A9-p12">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> That works of virtue should be done without sadness, falls under the precept of the Divine law; for whoever works with sadness
+                     works unwillingly. But to work with pleasure, i.e. joyfully or cheerfully, in one respect falls under the precept, viz. in
+                     so far as pleasure ensues from the love of God and one's neighbor (which love falls under the precept), and love causes pleasure:
+                     and in another respect does not fall under the precept, in so far as
+                     pleasure ensues from a habit; for "pleasure taken in a work proves the existence of a habit," as stated in Ethic. ii, 3. For
+                     an act may give pleasure either on account of its end, or through its proceeding from a becoming habit.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q100_A9-p13"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q100_A9-p14"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q100_A8.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q100_A10.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="FS_Q100_A10" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q100_A9.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q100_A11.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="FS_Q100_A10-p0.1">Whether the mode of charity falls under the precept of the Divine law?</h4>
+                  <p id="FS_Q100_A10-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q100_A10-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the mode of charity falls under the precept of the Divine law. For it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q100_A10-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.19.17" target="asv">Mat. 19:17</a>): "If thou wilt enter into life, keep the commandments": whence it seems to follow that the observance of the commandments
+                     suffices for entrance into life. But good works do not suffice for entrance into life, except they be done from charity: for
+                     it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q100_A10-p2.2" href="./asv.html#iCor.13.3" target="asv">1 Cor. 13:3</a>): "If I should distribute all my
+                     goods to feed the poor, and if I should deliver my body to be burned, and have not charity, it profiteth me nothing." Therefore
+                     the mode of charity is included in the commandment.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q100_A10-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the mode of charity consists properly speaking in doing all things for God. But this falls under the precept; for
+                     the Apostle says (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q100_A10-p3.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.10.31" target="asv">1 Cor. 10:31</a>): "Do all to the glory of God." Therefore the mode of charity falls under the precept.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q100_A10-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if the mode of charity does not fall under the precept, it follows that one can fulfil the precepts of the law without
+                     having charity. Now what can be done without charity can be done without grace, which is always united to charity. Therefore
+                     one can fulfil the precepts of the law without grace. But this is the error of Pelagius, as Augustine declares (De Haeres.
+                     lxxxviii). Therefore the mode of charity is included in the commandment.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q100_A10-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Whoever breaks a commandment sins mortally. If therefore the mode of charity falls under the precept, it follows that whoever
+                     acts otherwise than from charity sins mortally. But whoever has not charity, acts otherwise than from charity. Therefore it
+                     follows that whoever has not charity, sins mortally in whatever he does, however good this may be in itself: which is absurd.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q100_A10-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> Opinions have been contrary on this question. For some have said absolutely that the mode of charity comes under the precept;
+                     and yet that it is possible for one not having charity to fulfil this precept: because he can dispose himself to receive charity
+                     from God. Nor (say they) does it follow that a man not having charity sins mortally whenever he does something good of its
+                     kind: because it is an affirmative precept that binds one to act from charity, and
+                     is binding not for all time, but only for such time as one is in a state of charity. On the other hand, some have said that
+                     the mode of charity is altogether outside the precept.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q100_A10-p7"> Both these opinions are true up to a certain point. Because the act of charity can be considered in two ways. First, as an
+                     act by itself: and thus it falls under the precept of the law which specially prescribes it, viz. "Thou shalt love the Lord
+                     thy God," and "Thou shalt love thy neighbor." In this sense, the first opinion is true. Because it is not impossible to observe
+                     this precept which regards the act of charity; since man can dispose himself to possess charity, and when he
+                     possesses it, he can use it. Secondly, the act of charity can be considered as being the mode of the acts of the other virtues,
+                     i.e. inasmuch as the acts of the other virtues are ordained to charity, which is "the end of the commandment," as stated in
+                     1 Tim. i, 5: for it has been said above (
+                     <a id="FS_Q100_A10-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q12_A4.html">Q[12], A[4]</a>) that the intention of the end is a formal mode of the act ordained to that end. In this sense the second opinion is true
+                     in saying that the mode of charity does not
+                     fall under the precept, that is to say that this commandment, "Honor thy father," does not mean that a man must honor his
+                     father from charity, but merely that he must honor him. Wherefore he that honors his father, yet has not charity, does not
+                     break this precept: although he does break the precept concerning the act of charity, for which reason he deserves to be punished.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q100_A10-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Our Lord did not say, "If thou wilt enter into life, keep one commandment"; but "keep" all "the commandments": among which
+                     is included the commandment concerning the love of God and our neighbor.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q100_A10-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The precept of charity contains the injunction that God should be loved from our whole heart, which means that all things
+                     would be referred to God. Consequently man cannot fulfil the precept of charity, unless he also refer all things to God. Wherefore
+                     he that honors his father and mother, is bound to honor them from charity, not in virtue of the precept, "Honor thy father
+                     and mother," but in virtue of the precept, "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God
+                     with thy whole heart." And since these are two affirmative precepts, not binding for all times, they can be binding, each
+                     one at a different time: so that it may happen that a man fulfils the precept of honoring his father and mother, without at
+                     the same time breaking the precept concerning the omission of the mode of charity.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q100_A10-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Man cannot fulfil all the precepts of the law, unless he fulfil the precept of charity, which is impossible without charity.
+                     Consequently it is not possible, as Pelagius maintained, for man to fulfil the law without grace.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q100_A10-p11"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q100_A10-p12"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q100_A9.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q100_A11.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="FS_Q100_A11" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q100_A10.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q100_A12.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="FS_Q100_A11-p0.1">Whether it is right to distinguish other moral precepts of the law besides the decalogue?</h4>
+                  <p id="FS_Q100_A11-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q100_A11-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that it is wrong to distinguish other moral precepts of the law besides the decalogue. Because, as Our Lord
+                     declared (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q100_A11-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.22.40" target="asv">Mat. 22:40</a>), "on these two commandments" of charity "dependeth the whole law and the prophets." But these two commandments are explained
+                     by the ten commandments of the decalogue. Therefore there is no need for other moral precepts.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q100_A11-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the moral precepts are distinct from the judicial and ceremonial precepts, as stated above (Q[99], AA[3],4). But
+                     the determinations of the general moral precepts belong to the judicial and ceremonial precepts: and the general moral precepts
+                     are contained in the decalogue, or are even presupposed to the decalogue, as stated above 
+                     <a id="FS_Q100_A11-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q100_A3.html">(A[3])</a>. Therefore it was unsuitable to lay down other moral precepts besides the decalogue.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q100_A11-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the moral precepts are about the acts of all the virtues, as stated above 
+                     <a id="FS_Q100_A11-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q100_A2.html">(A[2])</a>. Therefore, as the Law contains, besides the decalogue, moral precepts pertaining to religion, liberality, mercy, and chastity;
+                     so there should have been added some precepts pertaining to the other virtues, for instance, fortitude, sobriety, and so forth.
+                     And yet such is not the case. It is therefore unbecoming to distinguish other moral precepts
+                     in the Law besides those of the decalogue.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q100_A11-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q100_A11-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.18.8" target="asv">Ps. 18:8</a>): "The law of the Lord is unspotted, converting souls." But man is preserved from the stain of sin, and his soul is converted
+                     to God by other moral precepts besides those of the decalogue. Therefore it was right for the Law to include other moral precepts.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q100_A11-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> As is evident from what has been stated (Q[99], AA[3],4), the judicial and ceremonial precepts derive their force from their
+                     institution alone: since before they were instituted, it seemed of no consequence whether things were done in this or that
+                     way. But the moral precepts derive their efficacy from the very dictate of natural reason, even if they were never included
+                     in the Law. Now of these there are three grades: for some are most certain, and so evident
+                     as to need no promulgation; such as the commandments of the love of God and our neighbor, and others like these, as stated
+                     above 
+                     <a id="FS_Q100_A11-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q100_A3.html">(A[3])</a>, which are, as it were, the ends of the commandments; wherefore no man can have an erroneous judgment about them. Some precepts
+                     are more detailed, the reason of which even an uneducated man can easily grasp; and yet they need to be promulgated, because
+                     human judgment, in a few instances, happens to be led astray concerning them: these
+                     are the precepts of the decalogue. Again, there are some precepts the reason of which is not so evident to everyone, but only
+                     the wise; these are moral precepts added to the decalogue, and given to the people by God through Moses and Aaron.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q100_A11-p7"> But since the things that are evident are the principles whereby we know those that are not evident, these other moral precepts
+                     added to the decalogue are reducible to the precepts of the decalogue, as so many corollaries. Thus the first commandment
+                     of the decalogue forbids the worship of strange gods: and to this are added other precepts forbidding things relating to worship
+                     of idols: thus it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q100_A11-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Deut.18.10" target="asv">Dt. 18:10,11</a>): "Neither let there be found among you
+                     anyone that shall expiate his son or daughter, making them to pass through the fire: . . . neither let there by any wizard
+                     nor charmer, nor anyone that consulteth pythonic spirits, or fortune-tellers, or that seeketh the truth from the dead." The
+                     second commandment forbids perjury. To this is added the prohibition of blasphemy (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q100_A11-p7.2" href="./asv.html#Lev.24.15" target="asv">Lev. 24:15, </a> seqq) and the prohibition of false doctrine (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q100_A11-p7.3" href="./asv.html#Deut.13" target="asv">Dt. 13</a>). To the third commandment are added all the ceremonial precepts. To the fourth
+                     commandment prescribing the honor due to parents, is added the precept about honoring the aged, according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q100_A11-p7.4" href="./asv.html#Lev.19.32" target="asv"> Lev. 19:32</a>: "Rise up before the hoary head, and honor the person of the aged man"; and likewise all the precepts prescribing the reverence
+                     to be observed towards our betters, or kindliness towards our equals or inferiors. To the fifth commandment, which forbids
+                     murder, is added the prohibition of hatred and of any kind of violence inflicted on our neighbor, according
+                     to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q100_A11-p7.5" href="./asv.html#Lev.19.16" target="asv"> Lev. 19:16</a>: "Thou shalt not stand against the blood of thy neighbor": likewise the prohibition against hating one's brother (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q100_A11-p7.6" href="./asv.html#Lev.19.17" target="asv">Lev. 19:17</a>): "Thou shalt not hate thy brother in thy heart." To the sixth commandment which forbids adultery, is added the prohibition
+                     about whoredom, according to 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q100_A11-p7.7" href="./asv.html#Deut.23.17" target="asv"> Dt. 23:17</a>: "There shall be no whore among the daughters of Israel, nor whoremonger among the sons of Israel"; and the prohibition against
+                     unnatural sins, according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q100_A11-p7.8" href="./asv.html#Lev.28.22" target="asv"> Lev. 28:22,23</a>: "Thou shalt not lie with mankind . . . thou shalt not copulate with any beast." To the seventh commandment which prohibits
+                     theft, is added the precept forbidding usury, according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q100_A11-p7.9" href="./asv.html#Deut.23.19" target="asv"> Dt. 23:19</a>: "Thou shalt not lend to thy brother money to usury"; and the prohibition against fraud, according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q100_A11-p7.10" href="./asv.html#Deut.25.13" target="asv"> Dt. 25:13</a>: "Thou shalt not have divers weights in thy bag"; and universally all prohibitions
+                     relating to peculations and larceny. To the eighth commandment, forbidding false testimony, is added the prohibition against
+                     false judgment, according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q100_A11-p7.11" href="./asv.html#Exod.23.2" target="asv"> Ex. 23:2</a>: "Neither shalt thou yield in judgment, to the opinion of the most part, to stray from the truth"; and the prohibition against
+                     lying (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q100_A11-p7.12" href="./asv.html#Exod.23.7" target="asv">Ex. 23:7</a>): "Thou shalt fly lying," and the prohibition against detraction, according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q100_A11-p7.13" href="./asv.html#Lev.19.16" target="asv"> Lev. 19:16</a>: "Thou shalt not be a detractor, nor a
+                     whisperer among the people." To the other two commandments no further precepts are added, because thereby are forbidden all
+                     kinds of evil desires.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q100_A11-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The precepts of the decalogue are ordained to the love of God and our neighbor as pertaining evidently to our duty towards
+                     them; but the other precepts are so ordained as pertaining thereto less evidently.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q100_A11-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> It is in virtue of their institution that the ceremonial and judicial precepts "are determinations of the precepts of the
+                     decalogue," not by reason of a natural instinct, as in the case of the superadded moral precepts.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q100_A11-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The precepts of a law are ordained for the common good, as stated above (
+                     <a id="FS_Q100_A11-p10.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q90_A2.html">Q[90], A[2]</a>). And since those virtues which direct our conduct towards others pertain directly to the common good, as also does the virtue
+                     of chastity, in so far as the generative act conduces to the common good of the species; hence precepts bearing directly on
+                     these virtues are given, both in the decalogue and in addition thereto. As to the act of
+                     fortitude there are the order to be given by the commanders in the war, which is undertaken for the common good: as is clear
+                     from 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q100_A11-p10.2" href="./asv.html#Deut.20.3" target="asv">Dt. 20:3</a>, where the priest is commanded (to speak thus): "Be not afraid, do not give back." In like manner the prohibition of acts
+                     of gluttony is left to paternal admonition, since it is contrary to the good of the household; hence it is said (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q100_A11-p10.3" href="./asv.html#Deut.21.20" target="asv">Dt. 21:20</a>) in the person of parents: "He slighteth hearing our admonitions, he giveth himself to
+                     revelling, and to debauchery and banquetings."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q100_A11-p11"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q100_A11-p12"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q100_A10.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q100_A12.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="FS_Q100_A12" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q100_A11.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q101.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="FS_Q100_A12-p0.1">Whether the moral precepts of the Old Law justified man?</h4>
+                  <p id="FS_Q100_A12-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q100_A12-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the moral precepts of the Old Law justified man. Because the Apostle says (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q100_A12-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.2.13" target="asv">Rom. 2:13</a>): "For not the hearers of the Law are justified before God, but the doers of the Law shall be justified." But the doers of
+                     the Law are those who fulfil the precepts of the Law. Therefore the fulfilling of the precepts of the Law was a cause of justification.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q100_A12-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q100_A12-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Lev.18.5" target="asv">Lev. 18:5</a>): "Keep My laws and My judgments, which if a man do, he shall live in them." But the spiritual life of man is through justice.
+                     Therefore the fulfilling of the precepts of the Law was a cause of justification.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q100_A12-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the Divine law is more efficacious than human law. But human law justifies man; since there is a kind of justice
+                     consisting in fulfilling the precepts of law. Therefore the precepts of the Law justified man.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q100_A12-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle says (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q100_A12-p5.1" href="./asv.html#iiCor.3.6" target="asv">2 Cor. 3:6</a>): "The letter killeth": which, according to Augustine (De Spir. et Lit. xiv), refers even to the moral precepts. Therefore
+                     the moral precepts did not cause justice.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q100_A12-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> Just as "healthy" is said properly and first of that which is possessed of health, and secondarily of that which is a sign
+                     or a safeguard of health; so justification means first and properly the causing of justice; while secondarily and improperly,
+                     as it were, it may denote a sign of justice or a disposition thereto. If justice be taken in the last two ways, it is evident
+                     that it was conferred by the precepts of the Law; in so far, to wit, as they disposed
+                     men to the justifying grace of Christ, which they also signified, because as Augustine says (Contra Faust. xxii, 24), "even
+                     the life of that people foretold and foreshadowed Christ."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q100_A12-p7"> But if we speak of justification properly so called, then we must notice that it can be considered as in the habit or as
+                     in the act: so that accordingly justification may be taken in two ways. First, according as man is made just, by becoming
+                     possessed of the habit of justice: secondly, according as he does works of justice, so that in this sense justification is
+                     nothing else than the execution of justice. Now justice, like the other virtues, may denote either the acquired or
+                     the infused virtue, as is clear from what has been stated (
+                     <a id="FS_Q100_A12-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q63_A4.html">Q[63], A[4]</a>). The acquired virtue is caused by works; but the infused virtue is caused by God Himself through His grace. The latter is
+                     true justice, of which we are speaking now, and in this respect of which a man is said to be just before God, according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q100_A12-p7.2" href="./asv.html#Rom.4.2" target="asv"> Rom. 4:2</a>: "If Abraham were justified by works, he hath whereof to glory, but not before God." Hence this justice could not be caused
+                     by
+                     moral precepts, which are about human actions: wherefore the moral precepts could not justify man by causing justice.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q100_A12-p8"> If, on the other hand, by justification we understand the execution of justice, thus all the precepts of the Law justified
+                     man, but in various ways. Because the ceremonial precepts taken as a whole contained something just in itself, in so far as
+                     they aimed at offering worship to God; whereas taken individually they contained that which is just, not in itself, but by
+                     being a determination of the Divine law. Hence it is said of these precepts that they did not justify man save
+                     through the devotion and obedience of those who complied with them. On the other hand the moral and judicial precepts, either
+                     in general or also in particular, contained that which is just in itself: but the moral precepts contained that which is just
+                     in itself according to that "general justice" which is "every virtue" according to Ethic. v, 1: whereas the judicial precepts
+                     belonged to "special justice," which is about contracts connected with the human mode of life, between one man and
+                     another.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q100_A12-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The Apostle takes justification for the execution of justice.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q100_A12-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The man who fulfilled the precepts of the Law is said to live in them, because he did not incur the penalty of death, which
+                     the Law inflicted on its transgressors: in this sense the Apostle quotes this passage (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q100_A12-p10.1" href="./asv.html#Gal.3.12" target="asv">Gal. 3:12</a>).
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q100_A12-p11">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The precepts of human law justify man by acquired justice: it is not about this that we are inquiring now, but only about
+                     that justice which is before God.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q100_A12-p12"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q100_A12-p13"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q100_A11.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q101.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <a href="summa.FS_Q99_A6.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.FS_Q100_A1.html"></a>
+            </div>
+            <div id="FS_Q101" class="div3">
+               <a href="summa.FS_Q100_A12.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.FS_Q101_A1.html"></a>
+               <h3 id="FS_Q101-p0.1">OF THE CEREMONIAL PRECEPTS IN THEMSELVES (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3>
+               <p id="FS_Q101-p1"></p>
+               <p id="FS_Q101-p2"> We must now consider the ceremonial precepts: and first we must consider them in themselves; secondly, their cause; thirdly,
+                  their duration. Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:
+               </p>
+               <p id="FS_Q101-p3"> (1) The nature of the ceremonial precepts;</p>
+               <p id="FS_Q101-p4"> (2) Whether they are figurative?</p>
+               <p id="FS_Q101-p5"> (3) Whether there should have been many of them?</p>
+               <p id="FS_Q101-p6"> (4) Of their various kinds.</p>
+               <div id="FS_Q101_A1" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q101.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q101_A2.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="FS_Q101_A1-p0.1">Whether the nature of the ceremonial precepts consists in their pertaining to the worship of God?</h4>
+                  <p id="FS_Q101_A1-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q101_A1-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the nature of the ceremonial precepts does not consist in their pertaining to the worship of God. Because,
+                     in the Old Law, the Jews were given certain precepts about abstinence from food (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q101_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Lev.11" target="asv">Lev. 11</a>); and about refraining from certain kinds of clothes, e.g. (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q101_A1-p2.2" href="./asv.html#Lev.19.19" target="asv">Lev. 19:19</a>): "Thou shalt not wear a garment that is woven of two sorts"; and again (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q101_A1-p2.3" href="./asv.html#Num.15.38" target="asv">Num. 15:38</a>): "To make to themselves fringes in the corners of their garments." But
+                     these are not moral precepts; since they do not remain in the New Law. Nor are they judicial precepts; since they do not pertain
+                     to the pronouncing of judgment between man and man. Therefore they are ceremonial precepts. Yet they seem in no way to pertain
+                     to the worship of God. Therefore the nature of the ceremonial precepts does not consist in their pertaining to Divine worship.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q101_A1-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, some state that the ceremonial precepts are those which pertain to solemnities; as though they were so called from
+                     the "cerei" [candles] which are lit up on those occasions. But many other things besides solemnities pertain to the worship
+                     of God. Therefore it does not seem that the ceremonial precepts are so called from their pertaining to the Divine worship.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q101_A1-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, some say that the ceremonial precepts are patterns, i.e. rules, of salvation: because the Greek {chaire} is the
+                     same as the Latin "salve." But all the precepts of the Law are rules of salvation, and not only those that pertain to the
+                     worship of God. Therefore not only those precepts which pertain to Divine worship are called ceremonial.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q101_A1-p5">
+                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, Rabbi Moses says (Doct. Perplex. iii) that the ceremonial precepts are those for which there is no evident reason.
+                     But there is evident reason for many things pertaining to the worship of God; such as the observance of the Sabbath, the feasts
+                     of the Passover and of the Tabernacles, and many other things, the reason for which is set down in the Law. Therefore the
+                     ceremonial precepts are not those which pertain to the worship of God.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q101_A1-p6">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q101_A1-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Exod.18.19" target="asv">Ex. 18:19,20</a>): "Be thou to the people in those things that pertain to God . . . and . . . shew the people the ceremonies and the manner
+                     of worshipping."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q101_A1-p7">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above (
+                     <a id="FS_Q101_A1-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q99_A4.html">Q[99], A[4]</a>), the ceremonial precepts are determinations of the moral precepts whereby man is directed to God, just as the judicial precepts
+                     are determinations of the moral precepts whereby he is directed to his neighbor. Now man is directed to God by the worship
+                     due to Him. Wherefore those precepts are properly called ceremonial, which pertain to the Divine worship. The reason for their
+                     being so called was given
+                     above (
+                     <a id="FS_Q101_A1-p7.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q99_A3.html">Q[99], A[3]</a>), when we established the distinction between the ceremonial and the other precepts.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q101_A1-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The Divine worship includes not only sacrifices and the like, which seem to be directed to God immediately, but also those
+                     things whereby His worshippers are duly prepared to worship Him: thus too in other matters, whatever is preparatory to the
+                     end comes under the science whose object is the end. Accordingly those precepts of the Law which regard the clothing and food
+                     of God's worshippers, and other such matters, pertain to a certain preparation of
+                     the ministers, with the view of fitting them for the Divine worship: just as those who administer to a king make use of certain
+                     special observances. Consequently such are contained under the ceremonial precepts.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q101_A1-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The alleged explanation of the name does not seem very probable: especially as the Law does not contain many instances of
+                     the lighting of candles in solemnities; since, even the lamps of the Candlestick were furnished with "oil of olives," as stated
+                     in
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q101_A1-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Lev.24.2" target="asv"> Lev. 24:2.</a> Nevertheless we may say that all things pertaining to the Divine worship were more carefully observed on solemn festivals:
+                     so that all ceremonial precepts may be included
+                     under the observance of solemnities.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q101_A1-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Neither does this explanation of the name appear to be very much to the point, since the word "ceremony" is not Greek but
+                     Latin. We may say, however, that, since man's salvation is from God, those precepts above all seem to be rules of salvation,
+                     which direct man to God: and accordingly those which refer to Divine worship are called ceremonial precepts.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q101_A1-p11">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> This explanation of the ceremonial precepts has a certain amount of probability: not that they are called ceremonial precisely
+                     because there is no evident reason for them; this is a kind of consequence. For, since the precepts referring to the Divine
+                     worship must needs be figurative, as we shall state further on 
+                     <a id="FS_Q101_A1-p11.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q101_A2.html">(A[2])</a>, the consequence is that the reason for them is not so very evident.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q101_A1-p12"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q101_A1-p13"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q101.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q101_A2.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="FS_Q101_A2" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q101_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q101_A3.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="FS_Q101_A2-p0.1">Whether the ceremonial precepts are figurative?</h4>
+                  <p id="FS_Q101_A2-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q101_A2-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the ceremonial precepts are not figurative. For it is the duty of every teacher to express himself in
+                     such a way as to be easily understood, as Augustine states (De Doctr. Christ. iv, 4,10) and this seems very necessary in the
+                     framing of a law: because precepts of law are proposed to the populace; for which reason a law should be manifest, as Isidore
+                     declares (Etym. v, 21). If therefore the precepts of the Law were given as figures of
+                     something, it seems unbecoming that Moses should have delivered these precepts without explaining what they signified.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q101_A2-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, whatever is done for the worship of God, should be entirely free from unfittingness. But the performance of actions
+                     in representation of others, seems to savor of the theatre or of the drama: because formerly the actions performed in theatres
+                     were done to represent the actions of others. Therefore it seems that such things should not be done for the worship of God.
+                     But the ceremonial precepts are ordained to the Divine worship, as stated above
+                     
+                     <a id="FS_Q101_A2-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q101_A1.html">(A[1])</a>. Therefore they should not be figurative.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q101_A2-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Augustine says (Enchiridion iii, iv) that "God is worshipped chiefly by faith, hope, and charity." But the precepts
+                     of faith, hope, and charity are not figurative. Therefore the ceremonial precepts should not be figurative.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q101_A2-p5">
+                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, Our Lord said (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q101_A2-p5.1" href="./asv.html#John.4.24" target="asv">Jn. 4:24</a>): "God is a spirit, and they that adore Him, must adore Him in spirit and in truth." But a figure is not the very truth:
+                     in fact one is condivided with the other. Therefore the ceremonial precepts, which refer to the Divine worship, should not
+                     be figurative.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q101_A2-p6">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle says (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q101_A2-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Col.2.16" target="asv">Col. 2:16,17</a>): "Let no man . . . judge you in meat or in drink, or in respect of a festival day, or of the new moon, or of the sabbaths,
+                     which are a shadow of things to come."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q101_A2-p7">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above 
+                     <a id="FS_Q101_A2-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q101_A1.html">(A[1];</a> Q[99], AA[3],4), the ceremonial precepts are those which refer to the worship of God. Now the Divine worship is twofold:
+                     internal, and external. For since man is composed of soul and body, each of these should be applied to the worship of God;
+                     the soul by an interior worship; the body by an outward worship: hence it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q101_A2-p7.2" href="./asv.html#Ps.83.3" target="asv">Ps. 83:3</a>): "My heart and my flesh have rejoiced in the living
+                     God." And as the body is ordained to God through the soul, so the outward worship is ordained to the internal worship. Now
+                     interior worship consists in the soul being united to God by the intellect and affections. Wherefore according to the various
+                     ways in which the intellect and affections of the man who worships God are rightly united to God, his external actions are
+                     applied in various ways to the Divine worship.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q101_A2-p8"> For in the state of future bliss, the human intellect will gaze on the Divine Truth in Itself. Wherefore the external worship
+                     will not consist in anything figurative, but solely in the praise of God, proceeding from the inward knowledge and affection,
+                     according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q101_A2-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.51.3" target="asv"> Is. 51:3</a>: "Joy and gladness shall be found therein, thanksgiving and the voice of praise."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q101_A2-p9"> But in the present state of life, we are unable to gaze on the Divine Truth in Itself, and we need the ray of Divine light
+                     to shine upon us under the form of certain sensible figures, as Dionysius states (Coel. Hier. i); in various ways, however,
+                     according to the various states of human knowledge. For under the Old Law, neither was the Divine Truth manifest in Itself,
+                     nor was the way leading to that manifestation as yet opened out, as the Apostle declares (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q101_A2-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Heb.9.8" target="asv">Heb.
+                        9:8
+                     </a>). Hence the external worship of the Old Law needed to be figurative not only of the future truth to be manifested in our
+                     heavenly country, but also of Christ, Who is the way leading to that heavenly manifestation. But under the New Law this way
+                     is already revealed: and therefore it needs no longer to be foreshadowed as something future, but to be brought to our minds
+                     as something past or present: and the truth of the glory to come, which is not yet revealed, alone needs to be
+                     foreshadowed. This is what the Apostle says (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q101_A2-p9.2" href="./asv.html#Heb.11.1" target="asv">Heb. 11:1</a>): "The Law has [Vulg.: 'having'] a shadow of the good things to come, not the very image of the things": for a shadow is
+                     less than an image; so that the image belongs to the New Law, but the shadow to the Old.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q101_A2-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The things of God are not to be revealed to man except in proportion to his capacity: else he would be in danger of downfall,
+                     were he to despise what he cannot grasp. Hence it was more beneficial that the Divine mysteries should be revealed to uncultured
+                     people under a veil of figures, that thus they might know them at least implicitly by using those figures to the honor of
+                     God.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q101_A2-p11">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Just as human reason fails to grasp poetical expressions on account of their being lacking in truth, so does it fail to grasp
+                     Divine things perfectly, on account of the sublimity of the truth they contain: and therefore in both cases there is need
+                     of signs by means of sensible figures.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q101_A2-p12">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Augustine is speaking there of internal worship; to which, however, external worship should be ordained, as stated above.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q101_A2-p13"> The same answer applies to the Fourth Objection: because men were taught by Him to practice more perfectly the spiritual
+                     worship of God.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q101_A2-p14"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q101_A2-p15"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q101_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q101_A3.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="FS_Q101_A3" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q101_A2.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q101_A4.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="FS_Q101_A3-p0.1">Whether there should have been man ceremonial precepts?</h4>
+                  <p id="FS_Q101_A3-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q101_A3-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that there should not have been many ceremonial precepts. For those things which conduce to an end should be
+                     proportionate to that end. But the ceremonial precepts, as stated above (
+                     <a id="FS_Q101_A3-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q101_A1.html">AA[1]</a>,2), are ordained to the worship of God, and to the foreshadowing of Christ. Now "there is but one God, of Whom are all things
+                     . . . and one Lord Jesus Christ, by Whom are all things" (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q101_A3-p2.2" href="./asv.html#iCor.8.6" target="asv">1 Cor. 8:6</a>). Therefore there
+                     should not have been many ceremonial precepts.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q101_A3-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the great number of the ceremonial precepts was an occasion of transgression, according to the words of Peter (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q101_A3-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Acts.15.10" target="asv">Acts 15:10</a>): "Why tempt you God, to put a yoke upon the necks of the disciples, which neither our fathers nor we have been able to bear?"
+                     Now the transgression of the Divine precepts is an obstacle to man's salvation. Since, therefore, every law should conduce
+                     to man's salvation, as Isidore says (Etym. v, 3), it seems
+                     that the ceremonial precepts should not have been given in great number.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q101_A3-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the ceremonial precepts referred to the outward and bodily worship of God, as stated above 
+                     <a id="FS_Q101_A3-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q101_A2.html">(A[2])</a>. But the Law should have lessened this bodily worship: since it directed men to Christ, Who taught them to worship God "in
+                     spirit and in truth," as stated in
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q101_A3-p4.2" href="./asv.html#John.4.23" target="asv"> Jn. 4:23.</a> Therefore there should not have been many ceremonial precepts.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q101_A3-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q101_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Hos.8.12" target="asv">Osee 8:12</a>): "I shall write to them [Vulg.: 'him'] My manifold laws"; and (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q101_A3-p5.2" href="./asv.html#Job.11.6" target="asv">Job 11:6</a>): "That He might show thee the secrets of His wisdom, and that His Law is manifold."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q101_A3-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above (
+                     <a id="FS_Q101_A3-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q96_A1.html">Q[96], A[1]</a>), every law is given to a people. Now a people contains two kinds of men: some, prone to evil, who have to be coerced by
+                     the precepts of the law, as stated above (
+                     <a id="FS_Q101_A3-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q95_A1.html">Q[95], A[1]</a>); some, inclined to good, either from nature or from custom, or rather from grace; and the like have to be taught and improved
+                     by means of the precepts of the law. Accordingly, with regard to both kinds of
+                     the law. Accordingly, with regard to both kinds of men it was expedient that the Old Law should contain many ceremonial precepts.
+                     For in that people there were many prone to idolatry; wherefore it was necessary to recall them by means of ceremonial precepts
+                     from the worship of idols to the worship of God. And since men served idols in many ways, it was necessary on the other hand
+                     to devise many means of repressing every single one: and again, to lay many obligations on such like men, in order
+                     that being burdened, as it were, by their duties to the Divine worship, they might have no time for the service of idols.
+                     As to those who were inclined to good, it was again necessary that there should be many ceremonial precepts; both because
+                     thus their mind turned to God in many ways, and more continually; and because the mystery of Christ, which was foreshadowed
+                     by these ceremonial precepts, brought many boons to the world, and afforded men many considerations, which needed to be signified
+                     by various ceremonies.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q101_A3-p7">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> When that which conduces to an end is sufficient to conduce thereto, then one such thing suffices for one end: thus one remedy,
+                     if it be efficacious, suffices sometimes to restore men to health, and then the remedy needs not to be repeated. But when
+                     that which conduces to an end is weak and imperfect, it needs to be multiplied: thus many remedies are given to a sick man,
+                     when one is not enough to heal him. Now the ceremonies of the Old Law were weak
+                     and imperfect, both for representing the mystery of Christ, on account of its surpassing excellence; and for subjugating men's
+                     minds to God. Hence the Apostle says (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q101_A3-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Heb.7.18" target="asv">Heb. 7:18,19</a>): "There is a setting aside of the former commandment because of the weakness and unprofitableness thereof, for the law brought
+                     nothing to perfection." Consequently these ceremonies needed to be in great number.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q101_A3-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> A wise lawgiver should suffer lesser transgressions, that the greater may be avoided. And therefore, in order to avoid the
+                     sin of idolatry, and the pride which would arise in the hearts of the Jews, were they to fulfil all the precepts of the Law,
+                     the fact that they would in consequence find many occasions of disobedience did not prevent God from giving them many ceremonial
+                     precepts.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q101_A3-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The Old Law lessened bodily worship in many ways. Thus it forbade sacrifices to be offered in every place and by any person.
+                     Many such like things did it enact for the lessening of bodily worship; as Rabbi Moses, the Egyptian testifies (Doct. Perplex.
+                     iii). Nevertheless it behooved not to attenuate the bodily worship of God so much as to allow men to fall away into the worship
+                     of idols.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q101_A3-p10"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q101_A3-p11"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q101_A2.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q101_A4.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="FS_Q101_A4" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q101_A3.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q102.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="FS_Q101_A4-p0.1">Whether the ceremonies of the Old Law are suitably divided into sacrifices, sacred things, sacraments, and observances?</h4>
+                  <p id="FS_Q101_A4-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q101_A4-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the ceremonies of the Old Law are unsuitably divided into "sacrifices, sacred things, sacraments, and
+                     observances." For the ceremonies of the Old Law foreshadowed Christ. But this was done only by the sacrifices, which foreshadowed
+                     the sacrifice in which Christ "delivered Himself an oblation and a sacrifice to God" (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q101_A4-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Eph.5.2" target="asv">Eph. 5:2</a>). Therefore none but the sacrifices were ceremonies.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q101_A4-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the Old Law was ordained to the New. But in the New Law the sacrifice is the Sacrament of the Altar. Therefore in
+                     the Old Law there should be no distinction between "sacrifices" and "sacraments."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q101_A4-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, a "sacred thing" is something dedicated to God: in which sense the tabernacle and its vessels were said to be consecrated.
+                     But all the ceremonial precepts were ordained to the worship of God, as stated above 
+                     <a id="FS_Q101_A4-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q101_A1.html">(A[1])</a>. Therefore all ceremonies were sacred things. Therefore "sacred things" should not be taken as a part of the ceremonies.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q101_A4-p5">
+                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, "observances" are so called from having to be observed. But all the precepts of the Law had to be observed: for
+                     it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q101_A4-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Deut.8.11" target="asv">Dt. 8:11</a>): "Observe [Douay: 'Take heed'] and beware lest at any time thou forget the Lord thy God, and neglect His commandments and
+                     judgments and ceremonies." Therefore the "observances" should not be considered as a part of the ceremonies.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q101_A4-p6">
+                     <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, the solemn festivals are reckoned as part of the ceremonial: since they were a shadow of things to come (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q101_A4-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Col.2.16" target="asv">Col. 2:16,17</a>): and the same may be said of the oblations and gifts, as appears from the words of the Apostle (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q101_A4-p6.2" href="./asv.html#Heb.9.9" target="asv">Heb. 9:9</a>): and yet these do not seem to be inclined in any of those mentioned above. Therefore the above division of ceremonies is
+                     unsuitable.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q101_A4-p7">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> In the Old Law each of the above is called a ceremony. For the sacrifices are called ceremonies (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q101_A4-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Num.15.24" target="asv">Num. 15:24</a>): "They shall offer a calf . . . and the sacrifices and libations thereof, as the ceremonies require." Of the sacrament of
+                     Order it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q101_A4-p7.2" href="./asv.html#Lev.7.35" target="asv">Lev. 7:35</a>): "This is the anointing of Aaron and his sons in the ceremonies." Of sacred things also it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q101_A4-p7.3" href="./asv.html#Exod.38.21" target="asv">Ex. 38:21</a>): "These are the
+                     instruments of the tabernacle of the testimony . . . in the ceremonies of the Levites." And again of the observances it is
+                     written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q101_A4-p7.4" href="./asv.html#." target="asv">3 Kings 9:6</a>): "If you . . . shall turn away from following Me, and will not observe [Douay: 'keep'] My . . . ceremonies which I have
+                     set before you."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q101_A4-p8">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above (
+                     <a id="FS_Q101_A4-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q101_A1.html">AA[1]</a>,2), the ceremonial precepts are ordained to the Divine worship. Now in this worship we may consider the worship itself, the
+                     worshippers, and the instruments of worship. The worship consists specially in "sacrifices," which are offered up in honor
+                     of God. The instruments of worship refer to the "sacred things," such as the tabernacle, the vessels and so forth. With regard
+                     to the worshippers two points may be
+                     considered. The first point is their preparation for Divine worship, which is effected by a sort of consecration either of
+                     the people or of the ministers; and to this the "sacraments" refer. The second point is their particular mode of life, whereby
+                     they are distinguished from those who do not worship God: and to this pertain the "observances," for instance, in matters
+                     of food, clothing, and so forth.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q101_A4-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> It was necessary for the sacrifices to be offered both in some certain place and by some certain men: and all this pertained
+                     to the worship of God. Wherefore just as their sacrifices signified Christ the victim, so too their sacraments and sacred
+                     things of the New Law; while their observances foreshadowed the mode of life of the people under the New Law: all of which
+                     things pertain to Christ.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q101_A4-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The sacrifice of the New Law, viz. the Eucharist, contains Christ Himself, the Author of our Sanctification: for He sanctified
+                     "the people by His own blood" (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q101_A4-p10.1" href="./asv.html#Heb.13.12" target="asv">Heb. 13:12</a>). Hence this Sacrifice is also a sacrament. But the sacrifices of the Old Law did not contain Christ, but foreshadowed Him;
+                     hence they are not called sacraments. In order to signify this there were certain sacraments apart from the sacrifices of
+                     the Old Law, which
+                     sacraments were figures of the sanctification to come. Nevertheless to certain consecrations certain sacrifices were united.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q101_A4-p11">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The sacrifices and sacraments were of course sacred things. But certain things were sacred, through being dedicated to the
+                     Divine worship, and yet were not sacrifices or sacraments: wherefore they retained the common designation of sacred things.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q101_A4-p12">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Those things which pertained to the mode of life of the people who worshipped God, retained the common designation of observances,
+                     in so far as they fell short of the above. For they were not called sacred things, because they had no immediate connection
+                     with the worship of God, such as the tabernacle and its vessels had. But by a sort of consequence they were matters of ceremony,
+                     in so far as they affected the fitness of the people who worshipped
+                     God.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q101_A4-p13">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> Just as the sacrifices were offered in a fixed place, so were they offered at fixed times: for which reason the solemn festivals
+                     seem to be reckoned among the sacred things. The oblations and gifts are counted together with the sacrifices; hence the Apostle
+                     says (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q101_A4-p13.1" href="./asv.html#Heb.5.1" target="asv">Heb. 5:1</a>): "Every high-priest taken from among men, is ordained for men in things that appertain to God, that he may offer up gifts
+                     and sacrifices."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q101_A4-p14"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q101_A4-p15"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q101_A3.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q102.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <a href="summa.FS_Q100_A12.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.FS_Q101_A1.html"></a>
+            </div>
+            <div id="FS_Q102" class="div3">
+               <a href="summa.FS_Q101_A4.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.FS_Q102_A1.html"></a>
+               <h3 id="FS_Q102-p0.1">OF THE CAUSES OF THE CEREMONIAL PRECEPTS (SIX ARTICLES)</h3>
+               <p id="FS_Q102-p1"></p>
+               <p id="FS_Q102-p2"> We must now consider the causes of the ceremonial precepts: under which head there are six points of inquiry:</p>
+               <p id="FS_Q102-p3"> (1) Whether there was any cause for the ceremonial precepts?</p>
+               <p id="FS_Q102-p4"> (2) Whether the cause of the ceremonial precepts was literal or figurative?</p>
+               <p id="FS_Q102-p5"> (3) The causes of the sacrifices;</p>
+               <p id="FS_Q102-p6"> (4) The causes of the sacrifices;</p>
+               <p id="FS_Q102-p7"> (5) The causes of the sacred things;</p>
+               <p id="FS_Q102-p8"> (6) The causes of the observances.</p>
+               <div id="FS_Q102_A1" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q102.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q102_A2.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="FS_Q102_A1-p0.1">Whether there was any cause for the ceremonial precepts?</h4>
+                  <p id="FS_Q102_A1-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q102_A1-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that there was no cause for the ceremonial precepts. Because on
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Eph.2.15" target="asv"> Eph. 2:15, </a> "Making void the law of the commandments," the gloss says, (i.e.) "making void the Old Law as to the carnal observances,
+                     by substituting decrees, i.e. evangelical precepts, which are based on reason." But if the observances of the Old Law were
+                     based on reason, it would have been useless to void them by the reasonable decrees of the New Law. Therefore
+                     there was no reason for the ceremonial observances of the Old Law.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q102_A1-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the Old Law succeeded the law of nature. But in the law of nature there was a precept for which there was no reason
+                     save that man's obedience might be tested; as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. viii, 6,13), concerning the prohibition about the
+                     tree of life. Therefore in the Old Law there should have been some precepts for the purpose of testing man's obedience, having
+                     no reason in themselves.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q102_A1-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, man's works are called moral according as they proceed from reason. If therefore there is any reason for the ceremonial
+                     precepts, they would not differ from the moral precepts. It seems therefore that there was no cause for the ceremonial precepts:
+                     for the reason of a precept is taken from some cause.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q102_A1-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.18.9" target="asv">Ps. 18:9</a>): "The commandment of the Lord is lightsome, enlightening the eyes." But the ceremonial precepts are commandments of God.
+                     Therefore they are lightsome: and yet they would not be so, if they had no reasonable cause. Therefore the ceremonial precepts
+                     have a reasonable cause.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q102_A1-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> Since, according to the Philosopher (Metaph. i, 2), it is the function of a "wise man to do everything in order," those things
+                     which proceed from the Divine wisdom must needs be well ordered, as the Apostle states (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A1-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.13.1" target="asv">Rom. 13:1</a>). Now there are two conditions required for things to be well ordered. First, that they be ordained to their due end, which
+                     is the principle of the whole order in matters of action: since those things that happen by
+                     chance outside the intention of the end, or which are not done seriously but for fun, are said to be inordinate. Secondly,
+                     that which is done in view of the end should be proportionate to the end. From this it follows that the reason for whatever
+                     conduces to the end is taken from the end: thus the reason for the disposition of a saw is taken from cutting, which is its
+                     end, as stated in Phys. ii, 9. Now it is evident that the ceremonial precepts, like all the other precepts of the Law, were
+                     institutions of Divine wisdom: hence it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A1-p6.2" href="./asv.html#Deut.4.6" target="asv">Dt. 4:6</a>): "This is your wisdom and understanding in the sight of nations." Consequently we must needs say that the ceremonial precepts
+                     were ordained to a certain end, wherefrom their reasonable causes can be gathered.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q102_A1-p7">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> It may be said there was no reason for the observances of the Old Law, in the sense that there was no reason in the very
+                     nature of the thing done: for instance that a garment should not be made of wool and linen. But there could be a reason for
+                     them in relation to something else: namely, in so far as something was signified or excluded thereby. On the other hand, the
+                     decrees of the New Law, which refer chiefly to faith and the love of God, are
+                     reasonable from the very nature of the act.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q102_A1-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The reason for the prohibition concerning the tree of knowledge of good and evil was not that this tree was naturally evil:
+                     and yet this prohibition was reasonable in its relation to something else, in as much as it signified something. And so also
+                     the ceremonial precepts of the Old Law were reasonable on account of their relation to something else.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q102_A1-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The moral precepts in their very nature have reasonable causes: as for instance, "Thou shalt not kill, Thou shalt not steal."
+                     But the ceremonial precepts have a reasonable cause in their relation to something else, as stated above.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q102_A1-p10"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q102_A1-p11"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q102.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q102_A2.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="FS_Q102_A2" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q102_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q102_A3.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="FS_Q102_A2-p0.1">Whether the ceremonial precepts have a literal cause or merely a figurative cause?</h4>
+                  <p id="FS_Q102_A2-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q102_A2-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the ceremonial precepts have not a literal, but merely a figurative cause. For among the ceremonial precepts,
+                     the chief was circumcision and the sacrifice of the paschal lamb. But neither of these had any but a figurative cause: because
+                     each was given as a sign. For it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A2-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.17.11" target="asv">Gn. 17:11</a>): "You shall circumcise the flesh of your foreskin, that it may be a sign of the covenant between Me and you": and of the
+                     celebration of the Passover it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A2-p2.2" href="./asv.html#Exod.13.9" target="asv">Ex. 13:9</a>): "It shall be as a sign in thy hand, and as a memorial before thy eyes." Therefore much more did the other ceremonial precepts
+                     have none but a figurative reason.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q102_A2-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, an effect is proportionate to its cause. But all the ceremonial precepts are figurative, as stated above (
+                     <a id="FS_Q102_A2-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q101_A2.html">Q[101], A[2]</a>). Therefore they have no other than a figurative cause.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q102_A2-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if it be a matter of indifference whether a certain thing, considered in itself, be done in a particular way or
+                     not, it seems that it has not a literal cause. Now there are certain points in the ceremonial precepts, which appear to be
+                     a matter of indifference, as to whether they be done in one way or in another: for instance, the number of animals to be offered,
+                     and other such particular circumstances. Therefore there is no literal cause for the
+                     precepts of the Old Law.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q102_A2-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Just as the ceremonial precepts foreshadowed Christ, so did the stories of the Old Testament: for it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A2-p5.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.10.11" target="asv">1 Cor. 10:11</a>) that "all (these things) happened to them in figure." Now in the stories of the Old Testament, besides the mystical or figurative,
+                     there is the literal sense. Therefore the ceremonial precepts had also literal, besides their figurative causes.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q102_A2-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above 
+                     <a id="FS_Q102_A2-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q102_A1.html">(A[1])</a>, the reason for whatever conduces to an end must be taken from that end. Now the end of the ceremonial precepts was twofold:
+                     for they were ordained to the Divine worship, for that particular time, and to the foreshadowing of Christ; just as the words
+                     of the prophets regarded the time being in such a way as to be utterances figurative of the time to come, as Jerome says on
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A2-p6.2" href="./asv.html#Hos.1.3" target="asv"> Osee 1:3.</a>
+                     Accordingly the reasons for the ceremonial precepts of the Old Law can be taken in two ways. First, in respect of the Divine
+                     worship which was to be observed for that particular time: and these reasons are literal: whether they refer to the shunning
+                     of idolatry; or recall certain Divine benefits; or remind men of the Divine excellence; or point out the disposition of mind
+                     which was then required in those who worshipped God. Secondly, their reasons can be gathered from the point of view of their
+                     being ordained to foreshadow Christ: and thus their reasons are figurative and mystical: whether they be taken from Christ
+                     Himself and the Church, which pertains to the allegorical sense; or to the morals of the Christian people, which pertains
+                     to the moral sense; or to the state of future glory, in as much as we are brought thereto by Christ, which refers to the anagogical
+                     sense.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q102_A2-p7">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Just as the use of metaphorical expressions in Scripture belongs to the literal sense, because the words are employed in
+                     order to convey that particular meaning; so also the meaning of those legal ceremonies which commemorated certain Divine benefits,
+                     on account of which they were instituted, and of others similar which belonged to that time, does not go beyond the order
+                     of literal causes. Consequently when we assert that the cause of the celebration
+                     of the Passover was its signification of the delivery from Egypt, or that circumcision was a sign of God's covenant with Abraham,
+                     we assign the literal cause.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q102_A2-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> This argument would avail if the ceremonial precepts had been given merely as figures of things to come, and not for the
+                     purpose of worshipping God then and there.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q102_A2-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As we have stated when speaking of human laws (
+                     <a id="FS_Q102_A2-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q96_A1.html">Q[96], AA[1]</a> ,6), there is a reason for them in the abstract, but not in regard to particular conditions, which depend on the judgment
+                     of those who frame them; so also many particular determinations in the ceremonies of the Old Law have no literal cause, but
+                     only a figurative cause; whereas in the abstract they have a literal cause.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q102_A2-p10"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q102_A2-p11"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q102_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q102_A3.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="FS_Q102_A3" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q102_A2.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q102_A4.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="FS_Q102_A3-p0.1">Whether a suitable cause can be assigned for the ceremonies which pertained to sacrifices?</h4>
+                  <p id="FS_Q102_A3-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q102_A3-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that no suitable cause can be assigned for the ceremonies pertaining to sacrifices. For those things which
+                     were offered in sacrifice, are those which are necessary for sustaining human life: such as certain animals and certain loaves.
+                     But God needs no such sustenance; according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A3-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.49.13" target="asv"> Ps. 49:13</a>: "Shall I eat the flesh of bullocks? Or shall I drink the blood of goats?" Therefore such sacrifices were unfittingly offered
+                     to God.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q102_A3-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, only three kinds of quadrupeds were offered in sacrifice to God, viz. oxen, sheep and goats; of birds, generally
+                     the turtledove and the dove; but specially, in the cleansing of a leper, an offering was made of sparrows. Now many other
+                     animals are more noble than these. Since therefore whatever is best should be offered to God, it seems that not only of these
+                     three should sacrifices have been offered to Him.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q102_A3-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, just as man has received from God the dominion over birds and beasts, so also has he received dominion over fishes.
+                     Consequently it was unfitting for fishes to be excluded from the divine sacrifices.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q102_A3-p5">
+                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, turtledoves and doves indifferently are commanded to be offered up. Since then the young of the dove are commanded
+                     to be offered, so also should the young of the turtledove.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q102_A3-p6">
+                     <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, God is the Author of life, not only of men, but also of animals, as is clear from
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A3-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.1.20" target="asv"> Gn. 1:20, </a> seqq. Now death is opposed to life. Therefore it was fitting that living animals rather than slain animals should be offered
+                     to God, especially as the Apostle admonishes us (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A3-p6.2" href="./asv.html#Rom.12.1" target="asv">Rom. 12:1</a>), to present our bodies "a living sacrifice, holy, pleasing unto God."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q102_A3-p7">
+                     <b>Objection 6:</b> Further, if none but slain animals were offered in sacrifice to God, it seems that it mattered not how they were slain. Therefore
+                     it was unfitting that the manner of immolation should be determined, especially as regards birds (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A3-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Lev.1.15" target="asv">Lev. 1:15, </a> seqq.).
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q102_A3-p8">
+                     <b>Objection 7:</b> Further, every defect in an animal is a step towards corruption and death. If therefore slain animals were offered to God,
+                     it was unreasonable to forbid the offering of an imperfect animal, e.g. a lame, or a blind, or otherwise defective animal.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q102_A3-p9">
+                     <b>Objection 8:</b> Further, those who offer victims to God should partake thereof, according to the words of the Apostle (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A3-p9.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.10.18" target="asv">1 Cor. 10:18</a>): "Are not they that eat of the sacrifices partakers of the altar?" It was therefore unbecoming for the offerers to be denied
+                     certain parts of the victims, namely, the blood, the fat, the breastbone and the right shoulder.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q102_A3-p10">
+                     <b>Objection 9:</b> Further, just as holocausts were offered up in honor of God, so also were the peace-offerings and sin-offerings. But no female
+                     animals was offered up to God as a holocaust, although holocausts were offered of both quadrupeds and birds. Therefore it
+                     was inconsistent that female animals should be offered up in peace-offerings and sin-offerings, and that nevertheless birds
+                     should not be offered up in peace-offerings.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q102_A3-p11">
+                     <b>Objection 10:</b> Further, all the peace-offerings seem to be of one kind. Therefore it was unfitting to make a distinction among them, so
+                     that it was forbidden to eat the flesh of certain peace-offerings on the following day, while it was allowed to eat the flesh
+                     of other peace-offerings, as laid down in
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A3-p11.1" href="./asv.html#Lev.7.15" target="asv"> Lev. 7:15, </a> seqq.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q102_A3-p12">
+                     <b>Objection 11:</b> Further, all sins agree in turning us from God. Therefore, in order to reconcile us to God, one kind of sacrifice should
+                     have been offered up for all sins.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q102_A3-p13">
+                     <b>Objection 12:</b> Further, all animals that were offered up in sacrifice, were offered up in one way, viz. slain. Therefore it does not seem
+                     to be suitable that products of the soil should be offered up in various ways; for sometimes an offering was made of ears
+                     of corn, sometimes of flour, sometimes of bread, this being baked sometimes in an oven, sometimes in a pan, sometimes on a
+                     gridiron.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q102_A3-p14">
+                     <b>Objection 13:</b> Further, whatever things are serviceable to us should be recognized as coming from God. It was therefore unbecoming that
+                     besides animals, nothing but bread, wine, oil, incense, and salt should be offered to God.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q102_A3-p15">
+                     <b>Objection 14:</b> Further, bodily sacrifices denote the inward sacrifice of the heart, whereby man offers his soul to God. But in the inward
+                     sacrifice, the sweetness, which is denoted by honey, surpasses the pungency which salt represents; for it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A3-p15.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.24.27" target="asv">Ecclus. 24:27</a>): "My spirit is sweet above honey." Therefore it was unbecoming that the use of honey, and of leaven which makes bread savory,
+                     should be forbidden in a sacrifice; while the use was
+                     prescribed, of salt which is pungent, and of incense which has a bitter taste. Consequently it seems that things pertaining
+                     to the ceremonies of the sacrifices have no reasonable cause.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q102_A3-p16">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A3-p16.1" href="./asv.html#Lev.1.13" target="asv">Lev. 1:13</a>): "The priest shall offer it all and burn it all upon the altar, for a holocaust, and most sweet savor to the Lord." Now
+                     according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A3-p16.2" href="./asv.html#Wis.7.28" target="asv"> Wis. 7:28, </a> "God loveth none but him that dwelleth with wisdom": whence it seems to follow that whatever is acceptable to God is wisely
+                     done. Therefore these ceremonies of the sacrifices were wisely done, as having reasonable causes.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q102_A3-p17">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above 
+                     <a id="FS_Q102_A3-p17.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q102_A2.html">(A[2])</a>, the ceremonies of the Old Law had a twofold cause, viz. a literal cause, according as they were intended for Divine worship;
+                     and a figurative or mystical cause, according as they were intended to foreshadow Christ: and on either hand the ceremonies
+                     pertaining to the sacrifices can be assigned to a fitting cause.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q102_A3-p18"> For, according as the ceremonies of the sacrifices were intended for the divine worship, the causes of the sacrifices can
+                     be taken in two ways. First, in so far as the sacrifice represented the directing of the mind to God, to which the offerer
+                     of the sacrifice was stimulated. Now in order to direct his mind to God aright, man must recognize that whatever he has is
+                     from God as from its first principle, and direct it to God as its last end. This was denoted in the offerings and
+                     sacrifices, by the fact that man offered some of his own belongings in honor of God, as though in recognition of his having
+                     received them from God, according to the saying of David (1 Paral. xxix, 14): "All things are Thine: and we have given Thee
+                     what we received of Thy hand." Wherefore in offering up sacrifices man made protestation that God is the first principle of
+                     the creation of all things, and their last end, to which all things must be directed. And since, for the human mind to be
+                     directed to God aright, it must recognize no first author of things other than God, nor place its end in any other; for this
+                     reason it was forbidden in the Law to offer sacrifice to any other but God, according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A3-p18.1" href="./asv.html#Exod.22.20" target="asv"> Ex. 22:20</a>: "He that sacrificeth to gods, shall be put to death, save only to the Lord." Wherefore another reasonable cause may be assigned
+                     to the ceremonies of the sacrifices, from the fact that thereby men were withdrawn from offering sacrifices to idols. Hence
+                     too it is that the precepts about the sacrifices were not given to the Jewish people until after they had fallen into idolatry,
+                     by worshipping the molten calf: as though those sacrifices were instituted, that the people, being ready to offer sacrifices,
+                     might offer those sacrifices to God rather than to idols. Thus it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A3-p18.2" href="./asv.html#Jer.7.22" target="asv">Jer. 7:22</a>): "I spake not to your fathers and I commanded them not, in the day that I brought them out of the land of Egypt, concerning
+                     the matter
+                     of burnt-offerings and sacrifices."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q102_A3-p19"> Now of all the gifts which God vouchsafed to mankind after they had fallen away by sin, the chief is that He gave His Son;
+                     wherefore it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A3-p19.1" href="./asv.html#John.3.16" target="asv">Jn. 3:16</a>): "God so loved the world, as to give His only-begotten Son; that whosoever believeth in Him, may not perish, but may have
+                     life everlasting." Consequently the chief sacrifice is that whereby Christ Himself "delivered Himself . . . to God for an
+                     odor of sweetness" (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A3-p19.2" href="./asv.html#Eph.5.2" target="asv">Eph. 5:2</a>). And for this reason all the
+                     other sacrifices of the Old Law were offered up in order to foreshadow this one individual and paramount sacrifice---the imperfect
+                     forecasting the perfect. Hence the Apostle says (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A3-p19.3" href="./asv.html#Heb.10.11" target="asv">Heb. 10:11</a>) that the priest of the Old Law "often" offered "the same sacrifices, which can never take away sins: but" Christ offered
+                     "one sacrifice for sins, for ever." And since the reason of the figure is taken from that which the figure represents, therefore
+                     the reasons of the figurative
+                     sacrifices of the Old Law should be taken from the true sacrifice of Christ.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q102_A3-p20">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> God did not wish these sacrifices to be offered to Him on account of the things themselves that were offered, as though He
+                     stood in need of them: wherefore it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A3-p20.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.1.11" target="asv">Is. 1:11</a>): "I desire not holocausts of rams, and fat of fatlings, and blood of calves and lambs and buckgoats." But, as stated above,
+                     He wished them to be offered to Him, in order to prevent idolatry; in order to signify the right ordering of man's mind to
+                     God;
+                     and in order to represent the mystery of the Redemption of man by Christ.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q102_A3-p21">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> In all the respects mentioned above (ad 1), there was a suitable reason for these animals, rather than others, being offered
+                     in sacrifice to God. First, in order to prevent idolatry. Because idolaters offered all other animals to their gods, or made
+                     use of them in their sorceries: while the Egyptians (among whom the people had been dwelling) considered it abominable to
+                     slay these animals, wherefore they used not to offer them in sacrifice to their
+                     gods. Hence it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A3-p21.1" href="./asv.html#Exod.8.26" target="asv">Ex. 8:26</a>): "We shall sacrifice the abominations of the Egyptians to the Lord our God." For they worshipped the sheep; they reverenced
+                     the ram (because demons appeared under the form thereof); while they employed oxen for agriculture, which was reckoned by
+                     them as something sacred.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q102_A3-p22"> Secondly, this was suitable for the aforesaid right ordering of man's mind to God: and in two ways. First, because it is
+                     chiefly by means of these animals that human life is sustained: and moreover they are most clean, and partake of a most clean
+                     food: whereas other animals are either wild, and not deputed to ordinary use among men: or, if they be tame, they have unclean
+                     food, as pigs and geese: and nothing but what is clean should be offered to God. These birds especially were
+                     offered in sacrifice because there were plenty of them in the land of promise. Secondly, because the sacrificing of these
+                     animals represented purity of heart. Because as the gloss says on 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A3-p22.1" href="./asv.html#Lev.1" target="asv">Lev. 1</a>, "We offer a calf, when we overcome the pride of the flesh; a lamb, when we restrain our unreasonable motions; a goat, when
+                     we conquer wantonness; a turtledove, when we keep chaste; unleavened bread, when we feast on the unleavened bread of sincerity."
+                     And it is evident that the dove denotes charity and
+                     simplicity of heart.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q102_A3-p23"> Thirdly, it was fitting that these animals should be offered, that they might foreshadow Christ. Because, as the gloss observes,
+                     "Christ is offered in the calf, to denote the strength of the cross; in the lamb, to signify His innocence; in the ram, to
+                     foreshadow His headship; and in the goat, to signify the likeness of 'sinful flesh' [*An allusion to 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A3-p23.1" href="./asv.html#Col.2.11" target="asv">Col. 2:11</a> (Textus Receptus)]. The turtledove and dove denoted the union of the two natures"; or else the turtledove signified
+                     chastity; while the dove was a figure of charity. "The wheat-flour foreshadowed the sprinkling of believers with the water
+                     of Baptism."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q102_A3-p24">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Fish through living in water are further removed from man than other animals, which, like man, live in the air. Again, fish
+                     die as soon as they are taken out of water; hence they could not be offered in the temple like other animals.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q102_A3-p25">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Among turtledoves the older ones are better than the young; while with doves the case is the reverse. Wherefore, as Rabbi
+                     Moses observes (Doct. Perplex. iii), turtledoves and young doves are commanded to be offered, because nothing should be offered
+                     to God but what is best.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q102_A3-p26">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> The animals which were offered in sacrifice were slain, because it is by being killed that they become useful to man, forasmuch
+                     as God gave them to man for food. Wherefore also they were burnt with fire: because it is by being cooked that they are made
+                     fit for human consumption. Moreover the slaying of the animals signified the destruction of sins: and also that man deserved
+                     death on account of his sins; as though those animals were slain in man's
+                     stead, in order to betoken the expiation of sins. Again the slaying of these animals signified the slaying of Christ.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q102_A3-p27">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 6:</b> The Law fixed the special manner of slaying the sacrificial animals in order to exclude other ways of killing, whereby idolaters
+                     sacrificed animals to idols. Or again, as Rabbi Moses says (Doct. Perplex. iii), "the Law chose that manner of slaying which
+                     was least painful to the slain animal." This excluded cruelty on the part of the offerers, and any mangling of the animals
+                     slain.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q102_A3-p28">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 7:</b> It is because unclean animals are wont to be held in contempt among men, that it was forbidden to offer them in sacrifice
+                     to God: and for this reason too they were forbidden (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A3-p28.1" href="./asv.html#Deut.23.18" target="asv">Dt. 23:18</a>) to offer "the hire of a strumpet or the price of a dog in the house of . . . God." For the same reason they did not offer
+                     animals before the seventh day, because such were abortive as it were, the flesh being not yet firm on account of its
+                     exceeding softness.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q102_A3-p29">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 8:</b> There were three kinds of sacrifices. There was one in which the victim was entirely consumed by fire: this was called "a
+                     holocaust, i.e. all burnt." For this kind of sacrifice was offered to God specially to show reverence to His majesty, and
+                     love of His goodness: and typified the state of perfection as regards the fulfilment of the counsels. Wherefore the whole
+                     was burnt up: so that as the whole animal by being dissolved into vapor soared aloft, so
+                     it might denote that the whole man, and whatever belongs to him, are subject to the authority of God, and should be offered
+                     to Him.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q102_A3-p30"> Another sacrifice was the "sin-offering," which was offered to God on account of man's need for the forgiveness of sin: and
+                     this typifies the state of penitents in satisfying for sins. It was divided into two parts: for one part was burnt; while
+                     the other was granted to the use of the priests to signify that remission of sins is granted by God through the ministry of
+                     His priests. When, however, this sacrifice was offered for the sins of the whole people, or specially for the sin
+                     of the priest, the whole victim was burnt up. For it was not fitting that the priests should have the use of that which was
+                     offered for their own sins, to signify that nothing sinful should remain in them. Moreover, this would not be satisfaction
+                     for sin: for if the offering were granted to the use of those for whose sins it was offered, it would seem to be the same
+                     as if it had not been offered.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q102_A3-p31"> The third kind of sacrifice was called the "peace-offering," which was offered to God, either in thanksgiving, or for the
+                     welfare and prosperity of the offerers, in acknowledgment of benefits already received or yet to be received: and this typifies
+                     the state of those who are proficient in the observance of the commandments. These sacrifices were divided into three parts:
+                     for one part was burnt in honor of God; another part was allotted to the use of the priests; and the third
+                     part to the use of the offerers; in order to signify that man's salvation is from God, by the direction of God's ministers,
+                     and through the cooperation of those who are saved.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q102_A3-p32"> But it was the universal rule that the blood and fat were not allotted to the use either of the priests or of the offerers:
+                     the blood being poured out at the foot of the altar, in honor of God, while the fat was burnt upon the altar (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A3-p32.1" href="./asv.html#Lev.9.9" target="asv">Lev. 9:9,10</a>). The reason for this was, first, in order to prevent idolatry: because idolaters used to drink the blood and eat the fat
+                     of the victims, according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A3-p32.2" href="./asv.html#Deut.32.38" target="asv"> Dt. 32:38</a>: "Of whose victims they eat the
+                     fat, and drank the wine of their drink-offerings." Secondly, in order to form them to a right way of living. For they were
+                     forbidden the use of the blood that they might abhor the shedding of human blood; wherefore it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A3-p32.3" href="./asv.html#Gen.9.4" target="asv">Gn. 9:4,5</a>): "Flesh with blood you shall not eat: for I will require the blood of your lives": and they were forbidden to eat the fat,
+                     in order to withdraw them from lasciviousness; hence it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A3-p32.4" href="./asv.html#Ezek.34.3" target="asv">Ezech. 34:3</a>): "You have
+                     killed that which was fat." Thirdly, on account of the reverence due to God: because blood is most necessary for life, for
+                     which reason "life" is said to be "in the blood" (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A3-p32.5" href="./asv.html#Lev.17.11" target="asv">Lev. 17:11</a>, 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A3-p32.6" href="./asv.html#Lev.17.14" target="asv">14</a>): while fat is a sign of abundant nourishment. Wherefore, in order to show that to God we owe both life and a sufficiency
+                     of all good things, the blood was poured out, and the fat burnt up in His honor. Fourthly, in order to foreshadow the shedding
+                     of Christ's blood, and the abundance of His charity, whereby He
+                     offered Himself to God for us.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q102_A3-p33"> In the peace-offerings, the breast-bone and the right shoulder were allotted to the use of the priest, in order to prevent
+                     a certain kind of divination which is known as "spatulamantia," so called because it was customary in divining to use the
+                     shoulder-blade [spatula], and the breast-bone of the animals offered in sacrifice; wherefore these things were taken away
+                     from the offerers. This is also denoted the priest's need of wisdom in the heart, to instruct the people---this was
+                     signified by the breast-bone, which covers the heart; and his need of fortitude, in order to bear with human frailty---and
+                     this was signified by the right shoulder.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q102_A3-p34">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 9:</b> Because the holocaust was the most perfect kind of sacrifice, therefore none but a male was offered for a holocaust: because
+                     the female is an imperfect animal. The offering of turtledoves and doves was on account of the poverty of the offerers, who
+                     were unable to offer bigger animals. And since peace-victims were offered freely, and no one was bound to offer them against
+                     his will, hence these birds were offered not among the peace-victims, but among
+                     the holocausts and victims for sin, which man was obliged to offer at times. Moreover these birds, on account of their lofty
+                     flight, while befitting the perfection of the holocausts: and were suitable for sin-offerings because their song is doleful.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q102_A3-p35">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 10:</b> The holocaust was the chief of all the sacrifices: because all were burnt in honor of God, and nothing of it was eaten. The
+                     second place in holiness, belongs to the sacrifice for sins, which was eaten in the court only, and on the very day of the
+                     sacrifice (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A3-p35.1" href="./asv.html#Lev.7.6" target="asv">Lev. 7:6</a>, 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A3-p35.2" href="./asv.html#Lev.7.15" target="asv">15</a>). The third place must be given to the peace-offerings of thanksgiving, which were eaten on the same day, but anywhere in
+                     Jerusalem. Fourth in order were the
+                     "ex-voto" peace-offerings, the flesh of which could be eaten even on the morrow. The reason for this order is that man is
+                     bound to God, chiefly on account of His majesty; secondly, on account of the sins he has committed; thirdly, because of the
+                     benefits he has already received from Him; fourthly, by reason of the benefits he hopes to receive from Him.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q102_A3-p36">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 11:</b> Sins are more grievous by reason of the state of the sinner, as stated above (
+                     <a id="FS_Q102_A3-p36.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q73_A10.html">Q[73], A[10]</a>): wherefore different victims are commanded to be offered for the sin of a priest, or of a prince, or of some other private
+                     individual. "But," as Rabbi Moses says (Doct. Perplex. iii), "we must take note that the more grievous the sin, the lower
+                     the species of animals offered for it. Wherefore the goat, which is a very base animal, was
+                     offered for idolatry; while a calf was offered for a priest's ignorance, and a ram for the negligence of a prince."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q102_A3-p37">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 12:</b> In the matter of sacrifices the Law had in view the poverty of the offerers; so that those who could not have a four-footed
+                     animal at their disposal, might at least offer a bird; and that he who could not have a bird might at least offer bread; and
+                     that if a man had not even bread he might offer flour or ears of corn.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q102_A3-p38"> The figurative cause is that the bread signifies Christ Who is the "living bread" (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A3-p38.1" href="./asv.html#John.6.41" target="asv">Jn. 6:41</a>, 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A3-p38.2" href="./asv.html#John.6.51" target="asv">51</a>). He was indeed an ear of corn, as it were, during the state of the law of nature, in the faith of the patriarchs; He was
+                     like flour in the doctrine of the Law of the prophets; and He was like perfect bread after He had taken human nature; baked
+                     in the fire, i.e. formed by the Holy Ghost in the oven of the virginal womb; baked again in a pan by the toils which He
+                     suffered in the world; and consumed by fire on the cross as on a gridiron.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q102_A3-p39">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 13:</b> The products of the soil are useful to man, either as food, and of these bread was offered; or as drink, and of these wine
+                     was offered; or as seasoning, and of these oil and salt were offered; or as healing, and of these they offered incense, which
+                     both smells sweetly and binds easily together.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q102_A3-p40"> Now the bread foreshadowed the flesh of Christ; and the wine, His blood, whereby we were redeemed; oil betokens the grace
+                     of Christ; salt, His knowledge; incense, His prayer.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q102_A3-p41">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 14:</b> Honey was not offered in the sacrifices to God, both because it was wont to be offered in the sacrifices to idols; and in
+                     order to denote the absence of all carnal sweetness and pleasure from those who intend to sacrifice to God. Leaven was not
+                     offered, to denote the exclusion of corruption. Perhaps too, it was wont to be offered in the sacrifices to idols.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q102_A3-p42"> Salt, however, was offered, because it wards off the corruption of putrefaction: for sacrifices offered to God should be
+                     incorrupt. Moreover, salt signifies the discretion of wisdom, or again, mortification of the flesh.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q102_A3-p43"> Incense was offered to denote devotion of the heart, which is necessary in the offerer; and again, to signify the odor of
+                     a good name: for incense is composed of matter, both rich and fragrant. And since the sacrifice "of jealousy" did not proceed
+                     from devotion, but rather from suspicion, therefore incense was not offered therein (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A3-p43.1" href="./asv.html#Num.5.15" target="asv">Num. 5:15</a>).
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q102_A3-p44"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q102_A3-p45"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q102_A2.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q102_A4.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="FS_Q102_A4" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q102_A3.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q102_A5.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="FS_Q102_A4-p0.1">Whether sufficient reason can be assigned for the ceremonies pertaining to holy things?</h4>
+                  <p id="FS_Q102_A4-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q102_A4-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that no sufficient reason can be assigned for the ceremonies of the Old Law that pertain to holy things. For
+                     Paul said (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A4-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Acts.17.24" target="asv">Acts 17:24</a>): "God Who made the world and all things therein; He being Lord of heaven and earth, dwelleth not in temples made by hands."
+                     It was therefore unfitting that in the Old Law a tabernacle or temple should be set up for the worship of God.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q102_A4-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the state of the Old Law was not changed except by Christ. But the tabernacle denoted the state of the Old Law.
+                     Therefore it should not have been changed by the building of a temple.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q102_A4-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the Divine Law, more than any other indeed, should lead man to the worship of God. But an increase of divine worship
+                     requires multiplication of altars and temples; as is evident in regard to the New Law. Therefore it seems that also under
+                     the Old Law there should have been not only one tabernacle or temple, but many.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q102_A4-p5">
+                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, the tabernacle or temple was ordained to the worship of God. But in God we should worship above all His unity and
+                     simplicity. Therefore it seems unbecoming for the tabernacle or temple to be divided by means of veils.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q102_A4-p6">
+                     <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, the power of the First Mover, i.e. God, appears first of all in the east, for it is in that quarter that the first
+                     movement begins. But the tabernacle was set up for the worship of God. Therefore it should have been built so as to point
+                     to the east rather than the west.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q102_A4-p7">
+                     <b>Objection 6:</b> Further, the Lord commanded (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A4-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Exod.20.4" target="asv">Ex. 20:4</a>) that they should "not make . . . a graven thing, nor the likeness of anything." It was therefore unfitting for graven images
+                     of the cherubim to be set up in the tabernacle or temple. In like manner, the ark, the propitiatory, the candlestick, the
+                     table, the two altars, seem to have been placed there without reasonable cause.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q102_A4-p8">
+                     <b>Objection 7:</b> Further, the Lord commanded (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A4-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Exod.20.24" target="asv">Ex. 20:24</a>): "You shall make an altar of earth unto Me": and again (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A4-p8.2" href="./asv.html#Exod.20.26" target="asv">Ex. 20:26</a>): "Thou shalt not go up by steps unto My altar." It was therefore unfitting that subsequently they should be commanded to
+                     make an altar of wood laid over with gold or brass; and of such a height that it was impossible to go up to it except by steps.
+                     For it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A4-p8.3" href="./asv.html#Exod.27.1" target="asv">Ex. 27:1,2</a>): "Thou shalt
+                     make also an altar of setim wood, which shall be five cubits long, and as many broad . . . and three cubits high . . . and
+                     thou shalt cover it with brass": and (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A4-p8.4" href="./asv.html#Exod.30.1" target="asv">Ex. 30:1</a>, 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A4-p8.5" href="./asv.html#Exod.30.3" target="asv">3</a>): "Thou shalt make . . . an altar to burn incense, of setim wood . . . and thou shalt overlay it with the purest gold."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q102_A4-p9">
+                     <b>Objection 8:</b> Further, in God's works nothing should be superfluous; for not even in the works of nature is anything superfluous to be
+                     found. But one cover suffices for one tabernacle or house. Therefore it was unbecoming to furnish the tabernacle with many
+                     coverings, viz. curtains, curtains of goats' hair, rams' skins dyed red, and violet-colored skins (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A4-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Exod.26" target="asv">Ex. 26</a>).
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q102_A4-p10">
+                     <b>Objection 9:</b> Further, exterior consecration signifies interior holiness, the subject of which is the soul. It was therefore unsuitable
+                     for the tabernacle and its vessels to be consecrated, since they were inanimate things.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q102_A4-p11">
+                     <b>Objection 10:</b> Further, it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A4-p11.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.33.2" target="asv">Ps. 33:2</a>): "I will bless the Lord at all times, His praise shall always be in my mouth." But the solemn festivals were instituted
+                     for the praise of God. Therefore it was not fitting that certain days should be fixed for keeping solemn festivals; so that
+                     it seems that there was no suitable cause for the ceremonies relating to holy things.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q102_A4-p12">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle says (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A4-p12.1" href="./asv.html#Heb.8.4" target="asv">Heb. 8:4</a>) that those who "offer gifts according to the law . . . serve unto the example and shadow of heavenly things. As it was answered
+                     to Moses, when he was to finish the tabernacle: See, says He, that thou make all things according to the pattern which was
+                     shown thee on the mount." But that is most reasonable, which presents a likeness to heavenly things. Therefore the ceremonies
+                     relating to holy things had a
+                     reasonable cause.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q102_A4-p13">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> The chief purpose of the whole external worship is that man may give worship to God. Now man's tendency is to reverence less
+                     those things which are common, and indistinct from other things; whereas he admires and reveres those things which are distinct
+                     from others in some point of excellence. Hence too it is customary among men for kings and princes, who ought to be reverenced
+                     by their subjects, to be clothed in more precious garments, and to possess vaster
+                     and more beautiful abodes. And for this reason it behooved special times, a special abode, special vessels, and special ministers
+                     to be appointed for the divine worship, so that thereby the soul of man might be brought to greater reverence for God.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q102_A4-p14"> In like manner the state of the Old Law, as observed above 
+                     <a id="FS_Q102_A4-p14.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q102_A2.html">(A[2];</a> Q[100] , A[12]; Q[101], A[2]), was instituted that it might foreshadow the mystery of Christ. Now that which foreshadows
+                     something should be determinate, so that it may present some likeness thereto. Consequently, certain special points had to
+                     be observed in matters pertaining to the worship of God.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q102_A4-p15">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The divine worship regards two things: namely, God Who is worshipped; and men, who worship Him. Accordingly God, Who is worshipped,
+                     is confined to no bodily place: wherefore there was no need, on His part, for a tabernacle or temple to be set up. But men,
+                     who worship Him, are corporeal beings: and for their sake there was need for a special tabernacle or temple to be set up for
+                     the worship of God, for two reasons. First, that through coming together
+                     with the thought that the place was set aside for the worship of God, they might approach thither with greater reverence.
+                     Secondly, that certain things relating to the excellence of Christ's Divine or human nature might be signified by the arrangement
+                     of various details in such temple or tabernacle.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q102_A4-p16"> To this Solomon refers (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A4-p16.1" href="./asv.html#." target="asv">3 Kings 8:27</a>) when he says: "If heaven and the heavens of heavens cannot contain Thee, how much less this house which I have built" for
+                     Thee? And further on (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A4-p16.2" href="./asv.html#." target="asv">3 Kings 8:29</a>, 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A4-p16.3" href="./asv.html#." target="asv">20</a>) he adds: "That Thy eyes may be open upon this house . . . of which Thou hast said: My name shall be there; . . . that Thou
+                     mayest hearken to the supplication of Thy servant and of Thy people Israel." From this it is evident that the house of
+                     the sanctuary was set up, not in order to contain God, as abiding therein locally, but that God might be made known there
+                     by means of things done and said there; and that those who prayed there might, through reverence for the place, pray more
+                     devoutly, so as to be heard more readily.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q102_A4-p17">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Before the coming of Christ, the state of the Old Law was not changed as regards the fulfilment of the Law, which was effected
+                     in Christ alone: but it was changed as regards the condition of the people that were under the Law. Because, at first, the
+                     people were in the desert, having no fixed abode: afterwards they were engaged in various wars with the neighboring nations;
+                     and lastly, at the time of David and Solomon, the state of that people was one
+                     of great peace. And then for the first time the temple was built in the place which Abraham, instructed by God, had chosen
+                     for the purpose of sacrifice. For it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A4-p17.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.22.2" target="asv">Gn. 22:2</a>) that the Lord commanded Abraham to "offer" his son "for a holocaust upon one of the mountains which I will show thee": and
+                     it is related further on (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A4-p17.2" href="./asv.html#Gen.22.14" target="asv">Gn. 22:14</a>) that "he calleth the name of that place, The Lord seeth," as though, according to the Divine prevision, that place
+                     were chosen for the worship of God. Hence it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A4-p17.3" href="./asv.html#Deut.12.5" target="asv">Dt. 12:5,6</a>): "You shall come to the place which the Lord your God shall choose . . . and you shall offer . . . your holocausts and victims."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q102_A4-p18"> Now it was not meet for that place to be pointed out by the building of the temple before the aforesaid time; for three reasons
+                     assigned by Rabbi Moses. First, lest the Gentiles might seize hold of that place. Secondly, lest the Gentiles might destroy
+                     it. The third reason is lest each tribe might wish that place to fall to their lot, and strifes and quarrels be the result.
+                     Hence the temple was not built until they had a king who would be able to quell such quarrels. Until that
+                     time a portable tabernacle was employed for divine worship, no place being as yet fixed for the worship of God. This is the
+                     literal reason for the distinction between the tabernacle and the temple.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q102_A4-p19"> The figurative reason may be assigned to the fact that they signify a twofold state. For the tabernacle, which was changeable,
+                     signifies the state of the present changeable life: whereas the temple, which was fixed and stable, signifies the state of
+                     future life which is altogether unchangeable. For this reason it is said that in the building of the temple no sound was heard
+                     of hammer or saw, to signify that all movements of disturbance will be far removed from the future state.
+                     Or else the tabernacle signifies the state of the Old Law; while the temple built by Solomon betokens the state of the New
+                     Law. Hence the Jews alone worked at the building of the tabernacle; whereas the temple was built with the cooperation of the
+                     Gentiles, viz. the Tyrians and Sidonians.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q102_A4-p20">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The reason for the unity of the temple or tabernacle may be either literal or figurative. The literal reason was the exclusion
+                     of idolatry. For the Gentiles put up various times to various gods: and so, to strengthen in the minds of men their belief
+                     in the unity of the Godhead, God wished sacrifices to be offered to Him in one place only. Another reason was in order to
+                     show that bodily worship is not acceptable of itself: and so they restrained from
+                     offering sacrifices anywhere and everywhere. But the worship of the New Law, in the sacrifice whereof spiritual grace is contained,
+                     is of itself acceptable to God; and consequently the multiplication of altars and temples is permitted in the New Law.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q102_A4-p21"> As to those matters that regarded the spiritual worship of God, consisting in the teaching of the Law and the Prophets, there
+                     were, even under the Old Law, various places, called synagogues, appointed for the people to gather together for the praise
+                     of God; just as now there are places called churches in which the Christian people gather together for the divine worship.
+                     Thus our church takes the place of both temple and synagogue: since the very sacrifice of the Church is
+                     spiritual; wherefore with us the place of sacrifice is not distinct from the place of teaching. The figurative reason may
+                     be that hereby is signified the unity of the Church, whether militant or triumphant.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q102_A4-p22">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Just as the unity of the temple or tabernacle betokened the unity of God, or the unity of the Church, so also the division
+                     of the tabernacle or temple signified the distinction of those things that are subject to God, and from which we arise to
+                     the worship of God. Now the tabernacle was divided into two parts: one was called the "Holy of Holies," and was placed to
+                     the west; the other was called the "Holy Place" [*Or 'Sanctuary'. The Douay version uses
+                     both expressions], which was situated to the east. Moreover there was a court facing the tabernacle. Accordingly there are
+                     two reasons for this distinction. One is in respect of the tabernacle being ordained to the worship of God. Because the different
+                     parts of the world are thus betokened by the division of the tabernacle. For that part which was called the Holy of Holies
+                     signified the higher world, which is that of spiritual substances: while that part which is called the Holy Place signified
+                     the corporeal world. Hence the Holy Place was separated from the Holy of Holies by a veil, which was of four different colors
+                     (denoting the four elements), viz. of linen, signifying earth, because linen, i.e. flax, grows out of the earth; purple, signifying
+                     water, because the purple tint was made from certain shells found in the sea; violet, signifying air, because it has the color
+                     of the air; and scarlet twice dyed, signifying fire: and this because matter composed of the four elements is a
+                     veil between us and incorporeal substances. Hence the high-priest alone, and that once a year, entered into the inner tabernacle,
+                     i.e. the Holy of Holies: whereby we are taught that man's final perfection consists in his entering into that (higher) world:
+                     whereas into the outward tabernacle, i.e. the Holy Place, the priests entered every day: whereas the people were only admitted
+                     to the court; because the people were able to perceived material things, the inner nature of which only wise men by
+                     dint of study are able to discover.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q102_A4-p23"> But regard to the figurative reason, the outward tabernacle, which was called the Holy Place, betokened the state of the
+                     Old Law, as the Apostle says (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A4-p23.1" href="./asv.html#Heb.9.6" target="asv">Heb. 9:6, </a> seqq.): because into that tabernacle "the priests always entered accomplishing the offices of sacrifices." But the inner
+                     tabernacle, which was called the Holy of Holies, signified either the glory of heaven or the spiritual state of the New Law
+                     to come. To the latter state Christ brought us; and this
+                     was signified by the high-priest entering alone, once a year, into the Holy of Holies. The veil betokened the concealing of
+                     the spiritual sacrifices under the sacrifices of old. This veil was adorned with four colors: viz. that of linen, to designate
+                     purity of the flesh; purple, to denote the sufferings which the saints underwent for God; scarlet twice dyed, signifying the
+                     twofold love of God and our neighbor; and violet, in token of heavenly contemplation. With regard to the state of the Old
+                     Law the people and the priests were situated differently from one another. For the people saw the mere corporeal sacrifices
+                     which were offered in the court: whereas the priests were intent on the inner meaning of the sacrifices, because their faith
+                     in the mysteries of Christ was more explicit. Hence they entered into the outer tabernacle. This outer tabernacle was divided
+                     from the court by a veil; because some matters relating to the mystery of Christ were hidden from the people, while they
+                     were known to the priests: though they were not fully revealed to them, as they were subsequently in the New Testament (cf.
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A4-p23.2" href="./asv.html#Eph.3.5" target="asv"> Eph. 3:5</a>).
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q102_A4-p24">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> Worship towards the west was introduced in the Law to the exclusion of idolatry: because all the Gentiles, in reverence to
+                     the sun, worshipped towards the east; hence it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A4-p24.1" href="./asv.html#Ezek.8.16" target="asv">Ezech. 8:16</a>) that certain men "had their backs towards the temple of the Lord, and their faces to the east, and they adored towards the
+                     rising of the sun." Accordingly, in order to prevent this, the tabernacle had the Holy of Holies to westward, that
+                     they might adore toward the west. A figurative reason may also be found in the fact that the whole state of the first tabernacle
+                     was ordained to foreshadow the death of Christ, which is signified by the west, according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A4-p24.2" href="./asv.html#Ps.67.5" target="asv"> Ps. 67:5</a>: "Who ascendeth unto the west; the Lord is His name."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q102_A4-p25">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 6:</b> Both literal and figurative reasons may be assigned for the things contained in the tabernacle. The literal reason is in
+                     connection with the divine worship. And because, as already observed (ad 4), the inner tabernacle, called the Holy of Holies,
+                     signified the higher world of spiritual substances, hence that tabernacle contained three things, viz. "the ark of the testament
+                     in which was a golden pot that had manna, and the rod of Aaron that had
+                     blossomed, and the tables" (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A4-p25.1" href="./asv.html#Heb.9.4" target="asv">Heb. 9:4</a>) on which were written the ten commandments of the Law. Now the ark stood between two "cherubim" that looked one towards
+                     the other: and over the ark was a table, called the "propitiatory," raised above the wings of the cherubim, as though it were
+                     held up by them; and appearing, to the imagination, to be the very seat of God. For this reason it was called the "propitiatory,"
+                     as though the people received propitiation thence at the prayers
+                     of the high-priest. And so it was held up, so to speak, by the cherubim, in obedience, as it were, to God: while the ark of
+                     the testament was like the foot-stool to Him that sat on the propitiatory. These three things denote three things in that
+                     higher world: namely, God Who is above all, and incomprehensible to any creature. Hence no likeness of Him was set up; to
+                     denote His invisibility. But there was something to represent his seat; since, to wit, the creature, which is beneath God,
+                     as the
+                     seat under the sitter, is comprehensible. Again in that higher world there are spiritual substances called angels. These are
+                     signified by the two cherubim, looking one towards the other, to show that they are at peace with one another, according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A4-p25.2" href="./asv.html#Job.25.2" target="asv"> Job 25:2</a>: "Who maketh peace in . . . high places." For this reason, too, there was more than one cherub, to betoken the multitude
+                     of heavenly spirits, and to prevent their receiving worship from those who had been commanded to
+                     worship but one God. Moreover there are, enclosed as it were in that spiritual world, the intelligible types of whatsoever
+                     takes place in this world, just as in every cause are enclosed the types of its effects, and in the craftsman the types of
+                     the works of his craft. This was betokened by the ark, which represented, by means of the three things it contained, the three
+                     things of greatest import in human affairs. These are wisdom, signified by the tables of the testament; the power of
+                     governing, betokened by the rod of Aaron; and life, betokened by the manna which was the means of sustenance. Or else these
+                     three things signified the three Divine attributes, viz. wisdom, in the tables; power, in the rod; goodness, in the manna---both
+                     by reason of its sweetness, and because it was through the goodness of God that it was granted to man, wherefore it was preserved
+                     as a memorial of the Divine mercy. Again, these three things were represented in Isaias' vision. For he "saw the
+                     Lord sitting upon a throne high and elevated"; and the seraphim standing by; and that the house was filled with the glory
+                     of the Lord; wherefrom the seraphim cried out: "All the earth is full of His glory" (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A4-p25.3" href="./asv.html#Isa.6.1" target="asv">Is. 6:1</a>, 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A4-p25.4" href="./asv.html#Isa.6.3" target="asv">3</a>). And so the images of the seraphim were set up, not to be worshipped, for this was forbidden by the first commandment; but
+                     as a sign of their function, as stated above.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q102_A4-p26"> The outer tabernacle, which denotes this present world, also contained three things, viz. the "altar of incense," which was
+                     directly opposite the ark; the "table of proposition," with the twelve loaves of proposition on it, which stood on the northern
+                     side; and the "candlestick," which was placed towards the south. These three things seem to correspond to the three which
+                     were enclosed in the ark; and they represented the same things as the latter, but more clearly: because, in
+                     order that wise men, denoted by the priests entering the temple, might grasp the meaning of these types, it was necessary
+                     to express them more manifestly than they are in the Divine or angelic mind. Accordingly the candlestick betokened, as a sensible
+                     sign thereof, the wisdom which was expressed on the tables (of the Law) in intelligible words. The altar of incense signified
+                     the office of the priest, whose duty it was to bring the people to God: and this was signified also by the rod: because
+                     on that altar the sweet-smelling incense was burnt, signifying the holiness of the people acceptable to God: for it is written
+                     (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A4-p26.1" href="./asv.html#Rev.8.3" target="asv">Apoc. 8:3</a>) that the smoke of the sweet-smelling spices signifies the "justifications of the saints" (cf.
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A4-p26.2" href="./asv.html#Rev.19.8" target="asv"> Apoc. 19:8</a>). Moreover it was fitting that the dignity of the priesthood should be denoted, in the ark, by the rod, and, in the outer
+                     tabernacle, by the altar of incense: because the priest is the mediator between God and the
+                     people, governing the people by Divine power, denoted by the rod; and offering to God the fruit of His government, i.e. the
+                     holiness of the people, on the altar of incense, so to speak. The table signified the sustenance of life, just as the manna
+                     did: but the former, a more general and a coarser kind of nourishment; the latter, a sweeter and more delicate. Again, the
+                     candlestick was fittingly placed on the southern side, while the table was placed to the north: because the south is the
+                     right-hand side of the world, while the north is the left-hand side, as stated in De Coelo et Mundo ii; and wisdom, like other
+                     spiritual goods, belongs to the right hand, while temporal nourishment belongs on the left, according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A4-p26.3" href="./asv.html#Prov.3.16" target="asv"> Prov. 3:16</a>: "In her left hand (are) riches and glory." And the priestly power is midway between temporal goods and spiritual wisdom;
+                     because thereby both spiritual wisdom and temporal goods are dispensed.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q102_A4-p27"> Another literal signification may be assigned. For the ark contained the tables of the Law, in order to prevent forgetfulness
+                     of the Law, wherefore it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A4-p27.1" href="./asv.html#Exod.24.12" target="asv">Ex. 24:12</a>): "I will give thee two tables of stone, and the Law, and the commandments which I have written: that thou mayest teach them"
+                     to the children of Israel. The rod of Aaron was placed there to restrain the people from insubordination to the priesthood
+                     of Aaron; wherefore it is written
+                     (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A4-p27.2" href="./asv.html#Num.17.10" target="asv">Num. 17:10</a>): "Carry back the rod of Aaron into the tabernacle of the testimony, that it may be kept there for a token of the rebellious
+                     children of Israel." The manna was kept in the ark to remind them of the benefit conferred by God on the children of Israel
+                     in the desert; wherefore it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A4-p27.3" href="./asv.html#Exod.16.32" target="asv">Ex. 16:32</a>): "Fill a gomor of it, and let it be kept unto generations to come hereafter, that they may know the bread wherewith I fed
+                     you in the wilderness."
+                     The candlestick was set up to enhance the beauty of the temple, for the magnificence of a house depends on its being well
+                     lighted. Now the candlestick had seven branches, as Josephus observes (Antiquit. iii, 7,8), to signify the seven planets,
+                     wherewith the whole world is illuminated. Hence the candlestick was placed towards the south; because for us the course of
+                     the planets is from that quarter. The altar of incense was instituted that there might always be in the tabernacle a sweet-smelling
+                     smoke; both through respect for the tabernacle, and as a remedy for the stenches arising from the shedding of blood and the
+                     slaying of animals. For men despise evil-smelling things as being vile, whereas sweet-smelling things are much appreciated.
+                     The table was place there to signify that the priests who served the temple should take their food in the temple: wherefore,
+                     as stated in
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A4-p27.4" href="./asv.html#Matt.12.4" target="asv"> Mat. 12:4, </a> it was lawful for none but the priests to eat the twelve loaves which were put on
+                     the table in memory of the twelve tribes. And the table was not placed in the middle directly in front of the propitiatory,
+                     in order to exclude an idolatrous rite: for the Gentiles, on the feasts of the moon, set up a table in front of the idol of
+                     the moon, wherefore it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A4-p27.5" href="./asv.html#Jer.7.18" target="asv">Jer. 7:18</a>): "The women knead the dough, to make cakes to the queen of heaven."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q102_A4-p28"> In the court outside the tabernacle was the altar of holocausts, on which sacrifices of those things which the people possessed
+                     were offered to God: and consequently the people who offered these sacrifices to God by the hands of the priest could be present
+                     in the court. But the priests alone, whose function it was to offer the people to God, could approach the inner altar, whereon
+                     the very devotion and holiness of the people was offered to God. And this altar was put up outside
+                     the tabernacle and in the court, to the exclusion of idolatrous worship: for the Gentiles placed altars inside the temples
+                     to offer up sacrifices thereon to idols.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q102_A4-p29"> The figurative reason for all these things may be taken from the relation of the tabernacle to Christ, who was foreshadowed
+                     therein. Now it must be observed that to show the imperfection of the figures of the Law, various figures were instituted
+                     in the temple to betoken Christ. For He was foreshadowed by the "propitiatory," since He is "a propitiation for our sins"
+                     (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A4-p29.1" href="./asv.html#iJohn.2.2" target="asv">1 Jn. 2:2</a>). This propitiatory was fittingly carried by cherubim, since of Him it is written
+                     (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A4-p29.2" href="./asv.html#Heb.1.6" target="asv">Heb. 1:6</a>): "Let all the angels of God adore Him." He is also signified by the ark: because just as the ark was made of setim-wood,
+                     so was Christ's body composed of most pure members. More over it was gilded: for Christ was full of wisdom and charity, which
+                     are betokened by gold. And in the ark was a golden pot, i.e. His holy soul, having manna, i.e. "all the fulness of the Godhead"
+                     (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A4-p29.3" href="./asv.html#Col.2.9" target="asv">Col. 2:9</a>). Also there was a rod in the ark, i.e. His priestly power:
+                     for "He was made a . . . priest for ever" (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A4-p29.4" href="./asv.html#Heb.6.20" target="asv">Heb. 6:20</a>). And therein were the tables of the Testament, to denote that Christ Himself is a lawgiver. Again, Christ was signified
+                     by the candlestick, for He said Himself (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A4-p29.5" href="./asv.html#John.8.12" target="asv">Jn. 8:12</a>): "I am the Light of the world"; while the seven lamps denoted the seven gifts of the Holy Ghost. He is also betokened in
+                     the table, because He is our spiritual food, according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A4-p29.6" href="./asv.html#John.6.41" target="asv">Jn. 6:41</a>, 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A4-p29.7" href="./asv.html#John.6.51" target="asv">51</a>: "I am the living bread": and the twelve
+                     loaves signified the twelve apostles, or their teaching. Or again, the candlestick and table may signify the Church's teaching,
+                     and faith, which also enlightens and refreshes. Again, Christ is signified by the two altars of holocausts and incense. Because
+                     all works of virtue must be offered to us to God through Him; both those whereby we afflict the body, which are offered, as
+                     it were, on the altar of holocausts; and those which, with greater perfection of mind, are offered to God in Christ, by
+                     the spiritual desires of the perfect, on the altar of incense, as it were, according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A4-p29.8" href="./asv.html#Heb.13.15" target="asv"> Heb. 13:15</a>: "By Him therefore let us offer the sacrifice of praise always to God."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q102_A4-p30">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 7:</b> The Lord commanded an altar to be made for the offering of sacrifices and gifts, in honor of God, and for the upkeep of the
+                     ministers who served the tabernacle. Now concerning the construction of the altar the Lord issued a twofold precept. One was
+                     at the beginning of the Law (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A4-p30.1" href="./asv.html#Exod.20.24" target="asv">Ex. 20:24, </a> seqq.) when the Lord commanded them to make "an altar of earth," or at least "not of hewn stones"; and again, not to make
+                     the altar high, so as
+                     to make it necessary to "go up" to it "by steps." This was in detestation of idolatrous worship: for the Gentiles made their
+                     altars ornate and high, thinking that there was something holy and divine in such things. For this reason, too, the Lord commanded
+                     (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A4-p30.2" href="./asv.html#Deut.16.21" target="asv">Dt. 16:21</a>): "Thou shalt plant no grove, nor any tree near the altar of the Lord thy God": since idolaters were wont to offer sacrifices
+                     beneath trees, on account of the pleasantness and shade afforded by them. There was
+                     also a figurative reason for these precepts. Because we must confess that in Christ, Who is our altar, there is the true nature
+                     of flesh, as regards His humanity---and this is to make an altar of earth; and again, in regard to His Godhead, we must confess
+                     His equality with the Father---and this is "not to go up" to the altar by steps. Moreover we should not couple the doctrine
+                     of Christ to that of the Gentiles, which provokes men to lewdness.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q102_A4-p31"> But when once the tabernacle had been constructed to the honor of God, there was no longer reason to fear these occasions
+                     of idolatry. Wherefore the Lord commanded the altar of holocausts to be made of brass, and to be conspicuous to all the people;
+                     and the altar of incense, which was visible to none but the priests. Nor was brass so precious as to give the people an occasion
+                     for idolatry.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q102_A4-p32"> Since, however, the reason for the precept, "Thou shalt not go up by steps unto My altar" (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A4-p32.1" href="./asv.html#Exod.20.26" target="asv">Ex. 20:26</a>) is stated to have been "lest thy nakedness be discovered," it should be observed that this too was instituted with the purpose
+                     of preventing idolatry, for in the feasts of Priapus the Gentiles uncovered their nakedness before the people. But later on
+                     the priests were prescribed the use of loin-cloths for the sake of decency: so that without any danger the
+                     altar could be placed so high that the priests when offering sacrifices would go up by steps of wood, not fixed but movable.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q102_A4-p33">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 8:</b> The body of the tabernacle consisted of boards placed on end, and covered on the inside with curtains of four different colors,
+                     viz. twisted linen, violet, purple, and scarlet twice dyed. These curtains, however, covered the sides only of the tabernacle;
+                     and the roof of the tabernacle was covered with violet-colored skins; and over this there was another covering of rams' skins
+                     dyed red; and over this there was a third curtain made of goats' hair,
+                     which covered not only the roof of the tabernacle, but also reached to the ground and covered the boards of the tabernacle
+                     on the outside. The literal reason of these coverings taken altogether was the adornment and protection of the tabernacle,
+                     that it might be an object of respect. Taken singly, according to some, the curtains denoted the starry heaven, which is adorned
+                     with various stars; the curtain (of goats' skin) signified the waters which are above the firmament; the skins dyed red
+                     denoted the empyrean heaven, where the angels are; the violet skins, the heaven of the Blessed Trinity.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q102_A4-p34"> The figurative meaning of these things is that the boards of which the tabernacle was constructed signify the faithful of
+                     Christ, who compose the Church. The boards were covered on the inner side by curtains of four colors: because the faithful
+                     are inwardly adorned with the four virtues: for "the twisted linen," as the gloss observes, "signifies the flesh refulgent
+                     with purity; violet signifies the mind desirous of heavenly things; purple denotes the flesh subject to passions;
+                     the twice dyed scarlet betokens the mind in the midst of the passions enlightened by the love of God and our neighbor." The
+                     coverings of the building designate prelates and doctors, who ought to be conspicuous for their heavenly manner of life, signified
+                     by the violet colored skins: and who should also be ready to suffer martyrdom, denoted by the skins dyed red; and austere
+                     of life and patient in adversity, betokened by the curtains of goats' hair, which were exposed to wind and rain, as the
+                     gloss observes.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q102_A4-p35">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 9:</b> The literal reason for the sanctification of the tabernacle and vessels was that they might be treated with greater reverence,
+                     being deputed, as it were, to the divine worship by this consecration. The figurative reason is that this sanctification signified
+                     the sanctification of the living tabernacle, i.e. the faithful of whom the Church of Christ is composed.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q102_A4-p36">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 10:</b> Under the Old Law there were seven temporal solemnities, and one continual solemnity, as may be gathered from 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A4-p36.1" href="./asv.html#Num.28" target="asv">Num. 28</a>, 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A4-p36.2" href="./asv.html#Num.29" target="asv">29</a>. There was a continual feast, since the lamb was sacrificed every day, morning and evening: and this continual feast of an
+                     abiding sacrifice signified the perpetuity of Divine bliss. Of the temporal feasts the first was that which was repeated every
+                     week. This was the solemnity of the "Sabbath," celebrated in memory of the work of
+                     the creation of the universe. Another solemnity, viz. the "New Moon," was repeated every month, and was observed in memory
+                     of the work of the Divine government. For the things of this lower world owe their variety chiefly to the movement of the
+                     moon; wherefore this feast was kept at the new moon: and not at the full moon, to avoid the worship of idolaters who used
+                     to offer sacrifices to the moon at that particular time. And these two blessings are bestowed in common on the whole human
+                     race; and
+                     hence they were repeated more frequently.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q102_A4-p37"> The other five feasts were celebrated once a year: and they commemorated the benefits which had been conferred especially
+                     on that people. For there was the feast of the "Passover" in the first month to commemorate the blessing of being delivered
+                     out of Egypt. The feast of "Pentecost" was celebrated fifty days later, to recall the blessing of the giving of the Law. The
+                     other three feasts were kept in the seventh month, nearly the whole of which was solemnized by them, just as the
+                     seventh day. For on the first of the seventh month was the feast of "Trumpets," in memory of the delivery of Isaac, when Abraham
+                     found the ram caught by its horns, which they represented by the horns which they blew. The feast of Trumpets was a kind of
+                     invitation whereby they prepared themselves to keep the following feast which was kept on the tenth day. This was the feast
+                     of "Expiation," in memory of the blessing whereby, at the prayer of Moses, God forgave the people's sin of worshipping the
+                     calf. After this was the feast of "Scenopegia" or of "Tents," which was kept for seven days, to commemorate the blessing of
+                     being protected and led by God through the desert, where they lived in tents. Hence during this feast they had to take "the
+                     fruits of the fairest tree," i.e. the citron, "and the trees of dense foliage" [*Douay and A. V. and R. V. read: 'Boughs of
+                     thick trees'], i.e. the myrtle, which is fragrant, "and the branches of palm-trees, and willows of the brook," which retain
+                     their greenness a long time; and these are to be found in the Land of promise; to signify that God had brought them through
+                     the arid land of the wilderness to a land of delights. On the eighth day another feast was observed, of "Assembly and Congregation,"
+                     on which the people collected the expenses necessary for the divine worship: and it signified the uniting of the people and
+                     the peace granted to them in the Land of promise.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q102_A4-p38"> The figurative reason for these feasts was that the continual sacrifice of the lamb foreshadowed the perpetuity of Christ,
+                     Who is the "Lamb of God," according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A4-p38.1" href="./asv.html#Heb.13.8" target="asv"> Heb. 13:8</a>: "Jesus Christ yesterday and today, and the same for ever." The Sabbath signified the spiritual rest bestowed by Christ,
+                     as stated in 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A4-p38.2" href="./asv.html#Heb.4" target="asv">Heb. 4</a>. The Neomenia, which is the beginning of the new moon, signified the enlightening of the primitive Church by Christ's preaching
+                     and miracles. The
+                     feast of Pentecost signified the Descent of the Holy Ghost on the apostles. The feast of Trumpets signified the preaching
+                     of the apostles. The feast of Expiation signified the cleansing of the Christian people from sins: and the feast of Tabernacles
+                     signified their pilgrimage in this world, wherein they walk by advancing in virtue. The feast of Assembly or Congregation
+                     foreshadowed the assembly of the faithful in the kingdom of heaven: wherefore this feast is described as "most holy"
+                     (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A4-p38.3" href="./asv.html#Lev.23.36" target="asv">Lev. 23:36</a>). These three feasts followed immediately on one another, because those who expiate their vices should advance in virtue,
+                     until they come to see God, as stated in
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A4-p38.4" href="./asv.html#Ps.83.8" target="asv"> Ps. 83:8.</a>
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q102_A4-p39"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q102_A4-p40"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q102_A3.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q102_A5.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="FS_Q102_A5" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q102_A4.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q102_A6.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="FS_Q102_A5-p0.1">Whether there can be any suitable cause for the sacraments of the Old Law?</h4>
+                  <p id="FS_Q102_A5-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q102_A5-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that there can be no suitable cause for the sacraments of the Old Law. Because those things that are done for
+                     the purpose of divine worship should not be like the observances of idolaters: since it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A5-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Deut.12.31" target="asv">Dt. 12:31</a>): "Thou shalt not do in like manner to the Lord thy God: for they have done to their gods all the abominations which the
+                     Lord abhorreth." Now worshippers of idols used to knive themselves to the shedding of
+                     blood: for it is related (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A5-p2.2" href="./asv.html#." target="asv">3 Kings 18:28</a>) that they "cut themselves after their manner with knives and lancets, till they were all covered with blood." For this reason
+                     the Lord commanded (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A5-p2.3" href="./asv.html#Deut.14.1" target="asv">Dt. 14:1</a>): "You shall not cut yourselves nor make any baldness for the dead." Therefore it was unfitting for circumcision to be prescribed
+                     by the Law (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A5-p2.4" href="./asv.html#Lev.12.3" target="asv">Lev. 12:3</a>).
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q102_A5-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, those things which are done for the worship of God should be marked with decorum and gravity; according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A5-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.34.18" target="asv"> Ps. 34:18</a>: "I will praise Thee in a grave [Douay: 'strong'] people." But it seems to savor of levity for a man to eat with haste. Therefore
+                     it was unfittingly commanded (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A5-p3.2" href="./asv.html#Exod.12.11" target="asv">Ex. 12:11</a>) that they should eat the Paschal lamb "in haste." Other things too relative to the eating of the lamb were prescribed, which
+                     seem altogether unreasonable.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q102_A5-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the sacraments of the Old Law were figures of the sacraments of the New Law. Now the Paschal lamb signified the
+                     sacrament of the Eucharist, according to 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A5-p4.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.5.7" target="asv">1 Cor. 5:7</a>: "Christ our Pasch is sacrificed." Therefore there should also have been some sacraments of the Old Law to foreshadow the
+                     other sacraments of the New Law, such as Confirmation, Extreme Unction, and Matrimony, and so forth.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q102_A5-p5">
+                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, purification can scarcely be done except by removing something impure. But as far as God is concerned, no bodily
+                     thing is reputed impure, because all bodies are God's creatures; and "every creature of God is good, and nothing to be rejected
+                     that is received with thanksgiving" (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A5-p5.1" href="./asv.html#iTim.4.4" target="asv">1 Tim. 4:4</a>). It was therefore unfitting for them to be purified after contact with a corpse, or any similar corporeal infection.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q102_A5-p6">
+                     <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A5-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.34.4" target="asv">Ecclus. 34:4</a>): "What can be made clean by the unclean?" But the ashes of the red heifer [*Cf.
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A5-p6.2" href="./asv.html#Heb.9.13" target="asv"> Heb. 9:13</a>] which was burnt, were unclean, since they made a man unclean: for it is stated (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A5-p6.3" href="./asv.html#Num.19.7" target="asv">Num. 19:7, </a> seqq.) that the priest who immolated her was rendered unclean "until the evening"; likewise he that burnt her; and he that
+                     gathered up her ashes. Therefore it was unfittingly
+                     prescribed there that the unclean should be purified by being sprinkled with those cinders.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q102_A5-p7">
+                     <b>Objection 6:</b> Further, sins are not something corporeal that can be carried from one place to another: nor can man be cleansed from sin
+                     by means of something unclean. It was therefore unfitting for the purpose of expiating the sins of the people that the priest
+                     should confess the sins of the children of Israel on one of the buck-goats, that it might carry them away into the wilderness:
+                     while they were rendered unclean by the other, which they used for the purpose of
+                     purification, by burning it together with the calf outside the camp; so that they had to wash their clothes and their bodies
+                     with water (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A5-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Lev.16" target="asv">Lev. 16</a>).
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q102_A5-p8">
+                     <b>Objection 7:</b> Further, what is already cleansed should not be cleansed again. It was therefore unfitting to apply a second purification
+                     to a man cleansed from leprosy, or to a house; as laid down in 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A5-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Lev.14" target="asv">Lev. 14</a>.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q102_A5-p9">
+                     <b>Objection 8:</b> Further, spiritual uncleanness cannot be cleansed by material water or by shaving the hair. Therefore it seems unreasonable
+                     that the Lord ordered (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A5-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Exod.30.18" target="asv">Ex. 30:18, </a> seqq.) the making of a brazen laver with its foot, that the priests might wash their hands and feet before entering the temple;
+                     and that He commanded (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A5-p9.2" href="./asv.html#Num.8.7" target="asv">Num. 8:7</a>) the Levites to be sprinkled with the water of purification, and to shave all the hairs of their
+                     flesh.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q102_A5-p10">
+                     <b>Objection 9:</b> Further, that which is greater cannot be cleansed by that which is less. Therefore it was unfitting that, in the Law, the
+                     higher and lower priests, as stated in 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A5-p10.1" href="./asv.html#Lev.8" target="asv">Lev. 8</a> [*Cf. 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A5-p10.2" href="./asv.html#Exod.29" target="asv">Ex. 29</a>], and the Levites, according to 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A5-p10.3" href="./asv.html#Num.8" target="asv">Num. 8</a>, should be consecrated with any bodily anointing, bodily sacrifices, and bodily oblations.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q102_A5-p11">
+                     <b>Objection 10:</b> Further, as stated in 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A5-p11.1" href="./asv.html#iKgs.16.7" target="asv">1 Kings 16:7, </a> "Man seeth those things that appear, but the Lord beholdeth the heart." But those things that appear outwardly in man are
+                     the dispositions of his body and his clothes. Therefore it was unfitting for certain special garments to be appointed to the
+                     higher and lower priests, as related in 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A5-p11.2" href="./asv.html#Exod.28" target="asv">Ex. 28</a> [*Cf.
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A5-p11.3" href="./asv.html#Lev.8.7" target="asv"> Lev. 8:7, </a> seqq.]. It seems, moreover, unreasonable that anyone should be debarred from
+                     the priesthood on account of defects in the body, as stated in 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A5-p11.4" href="./asv.html#Lev.21.17" target="asv">Lev. 21:17</a>, seqq.: "Whosoever of thy seed throughout their families, hath a blemish, he shall not offer bread to his God . . . if he
+                     be blind, if he be lame," etc. It seems, therefore, that the sacraments of the Old Law were unreasonable.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q102_A5-p12">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A5-p12.1" href="./asv.html#Lev.20.8" target="asv">Lev. 20:8</a>): "I am the Lord that sanctify you." But nothing unreasonable is done by God, for it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A5-p12.2" href="./asv.html#Ps.103.24" target="asv">Ps. 103:24</a>): "Thou hast made all things in wisdom." Therefore there was nothing without a reasonable cause in the sacraments of the
+                     Old Law, which were ordained to the sanctification of man.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q102_A5-p13">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above (
+                     <a id="FS_Q102_A5-p13.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q101_A4.html">Q[101], A[4]</a>), the sacraments are, properly speaking, things applied to the worshippers of God for their consecration so as, in some way,
+                     to depute them to the worship of God. Now the worship of God belonged in a general way to the whole people; but in a special
+                     way, it belonged to the priests and Levites, who were the ministers of divine worship. Consequently, in these sacraments of
+                     the Old Law, certain things
+                     concerned the whole people in general; while others belonged to the ministers.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q102_A5-p14"> In regard to both, three things were necessary. The first was to be established in the state of worshipping God: and this
+                     institution was brought about---for all in general, by circumcision, without which no one was admitted to any of the legal
+                     observances---and for the priests, by their consecration. The second thing required was the use of those things that pertain
+                     to divine worship. And thus, as to the people, there was the partaking of the paschal banquet, to which no
+                     uncircumcised man was admitted, as is clear from
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A5-p14.1" href="./asv.html#Exod.12.43" target="asv"> Ex. 12:43, </a> seqq.: and, as to the priests, the offering of the victims, and the eating of the loaves of proposition and of other things
+                     that were allotted to the use of the priests. The third thing required was the removal of all impediments to divine worship,
+                     viz. of uncleannesses. And then, as to the people, certain purifications were instituted for the removal of certain external
+                     uncleannesses; and also expiations from
+                     sins; while, as to the priests and Levites, the washing of hands and feet and the shaving of the hair were instituted.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q102_A5-p15"> And all these things had reasonable causes, both literal, in so far as they were ordained to the worship of God for the time
+                     being, and figurative, in so far as they were ordained to foreshadow Christ: as we shall see by taking them one by one.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q102_A5-p16">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The chief literal reason for circumcision was in order that man might profess his belief in one God. And because Abraham
+                     was the first to sever himself from the infidels, by going out from his house and kindred, for this reason he was the first
+                     to receive circumcision. This reason is set forth by the Apostle (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A5-p16.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.4.9" target="asv">Rom. 4:9, </a> seqq.) thus: "He received the sign of circumcision, a seal of the justice of the faith which he had, being
+                     uncircumcised"; because, to wit, we are told that "unto Abraham faith was reputed to justice," for the reason that "against
+                     hope he believed in hope," i.e. against the hope that is of nature he believed in the hope that is of grace, "that he might
+                     be made the father of many nations," when he was an old man, and his wife an old and barren woman. And in order that this
+                     declaration, and imitation of Abraham's faith, might be fixed firmly in the hearts of the Jews, they received in their flesh
+                     such
+                     a sign as they could not forget, wherefore it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A5-p16.2" href="./asv.html#Gen.17.13" target="asv">Gn. 17:13</a>): "My covenant shall be in your flesh for a perpetual covenant." This was done on the eighth day, because until then a child
+                     is very tender, and so might be seriously injured; and is considered as something not yet consolidated: wherefore neither
+                     are animals offered before the eighth day. And it was not delayed after that time, lest some might refuse the sign of circumcision
+                     on account of the pain: and also lest the parents,
+                     whose love for their children increases as they become used to their presence and as they grow older, should withdraw their
+                     children from circumcision. A second reason may have been the weakening of concupiscence in that member. A third motive may
+                     have been to revile the worship of Venus and Priapus, which gave honor to that part of the body. The Lord's prohibition extended
+                     only to the cutting of oneself in honor of idols: and such was not the circumcision of which we have been speaking.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q102_A5-p17"> The figurative reason for circumcision was that it foreshadowed the removal of corruption, which was to be brought about
+                     by Christ, and will be perfectly fulfilled in the eighth age, which is the age of those who rise from the dead. And since
+                     all corruption of guilt and punishment comes to us through our carnal origin, from the sin of our first parent, therefore
+                     circumcision was applied to the generative member. Hence the Apostle says (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A5-p17.1" href="./asv.html#Col.2.11" target="asv">Col. 2:11</a>): "You are
+                     circumcised" in Christ "with circumcision not made by hand in despoiling of the body of the flesh, but in the circumcision
+                     of" Our Lord Jesus "Christ."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q102_A5-p18">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The literal reason of the paschal banquet was to commemorate the blessing of being led by God out of Egypt. Hence by celebrating
+                     this banquet they declared that they belonged to that people which God had taken to Himself out of Egypt. For when they were
+                     delivered from Egypt, they were commanded to sprinkle the lamb's blood on the transoms of their house doors, as though declaring
+                     that they were averse to the rites of the Egyptians who worshipped the
+                     ram. Wherefore they were delivered by the sprinkling or rubbing of the blood of the lamb on the door-posts, from the danger
+                     of extermination which threatened the Egyptians.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q102_A5-p19"> Now two things are to be observed in their departure from Egypt: namely, their haste in going, for the Egyptians pressed
+                     them to go forth speedily, as related in
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A5-p19.1" href="./asv.html#Exod.12.33" target="asv"> Ex. 12:33</a>; and there was danger that anyone who did not hasten to go with the crowd might be slain by the Egyptians. Their haste was
+                     shown in two ways. First by what they ate. For they were commanded to eat unleavened bread, as a sign "that it could not be
+                     leavened, the Egyptians pressing them to
+                     depart"; and to eat roast meat, for this took less time to prepare; and that they should not break a bone thereof, because
+                     in their haste there was no time to break bones. Secondly, as to the manner of eating. For it is written: "You shall gird
+                     your reins, and you shall have shoes on your feet, holding staves in your hands, and you shall eat in haste": which clearly
+                     designates men at the point of starting on a journey. To this also is to be referred the command: "In one house shall it be
+                     eaten,
+                     neither shall you carry forth of the flesh thereof out of the house": because, to wit, on account of their haste, they could
+                     not send any gifts of it.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q102_A5-p20"> The stress they suffered while in Egypt was denoted by the wild lettuces. The figurative reason is evident, because the sacrifice
+                     of the paschal lamb signified the sacrifice of Christ according to 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A5-p20.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.5.7" target="asv">1 Cor. 5:7</a>: "Christ our pasch is sacrificed." The blood of the lamb, which ensured deliverance from the destroyer, by being sprinkled
+                     on the transoms, signified faith in Christ's Passion, in the hearts and on the lips of the faithful, by which same Passion
+                     we are
+                     delivered from sin and death, according to 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A5-p20.2" href="./asv.html#iPet.1.18" target="asv">1 Pet. 1:18</a>: "You were . . . redeemed . . . with the precious blood . . . of a lamb unspotted." The partaking of its flesh signified
+                     the eating of Christ's body in the Sacrament; and the flesh was roasted at the fire to signify Christ's Passion or charity.
+                     And it was eaten with unleavened bread to signify the blameless life of the faithful who partake of Christ's body, according
+                     to 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A5-p20.3" href="./asv.html#iCor.5.8" target="asv">1 Cor. 5:8</a>: "Let us feast . .
+                     . with the unleavened bread of sincerity and truth." The wild lettuces were added to denote repentance for sins, which is
+                     required of those who receive the body of Christ. Their loins were girt in sign of chastity: and the shoes of their feet are
+                     the examples of our dead ancestors. The staves they were to hold in their hands denoted pastoral authority: and it was commanded
+                     that the paschal lamb should be eaten in one house, i.e. in a catholic church, and not in the conventicles of heretics.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q102_A5-p21">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Some of the sacraments of the New Law had corresponding figurative sacraments in the Old Law. For Baptism, which is the sacrament
+                     of Faith, corresponds to circumcision. Hence it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A5-p21.1" href="./asv.html#Col.2.11" target="asv">Col. 2:11,12</a>): "You are circumcised . . . in the circumcision of" Our Lord Jesus "Christ: buried with Him in Baptism." In the New Law
+                     the sacrament of the Eucharist corresponds to the banquet of the paschal lamb. The sacrament of Penance in the New Law corresponds
+                     to all the purifications of the Old Law. The sacrament of Orders corresponds to the consecration of the pontiff and of the
+                     priests. To the sacrament of Confirmation, which is the sacrament of the fulness of grace, there would be no corresponding
+                     sacrament of the Old Law, because the time of fulness had not yet come, since "the Law brought no man [Vulg.: 'nothing'] to
+                     perfection" (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A5-p21.2" href="./asv.html#Heb.7.19" target="asv">Heb. 7:19</a>). The same applies to the sacrament of Extreme Unction, which is an immediate
+                     preparation for entrance into glory, to which the way was not yet opened out in the Old Law, since the price had not yet been
+                     paid. Matrimony did indeed exist under the Old Law, as a function of nature, but not as the sacrament of the union of Christ
+                     with the Church, for that union was not as yet brought about. Hence under the Old Law it was allowable to give a bill of divorce,
+                     which is contrary to the nature of the sacrament.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q102_A5-p22">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> As already stated, the purifications of the Old Law were ordained for the removal of impediments to the divine worship: which
+                     worship is twofold; viz. spiritual, consisting in devotion of the mind to God; and corporal, consisting in sacrifices, oblations,
+                     and so forth. Now men are hindered in the spiritual worship by sins, whereby men were said to be polluted, for instance, by
+                     idolatry, murder, adultery, or incest. From such pollutions men were
+                     purified by certain sacrifices, offered either for the whole community in general, or also for the sins of individuals; not
+                     that those carnal sacrifices had of themselves the power of expiating sin; but that they signified that expiation of sins
+                     which was to be effected by Christ, and of which those of old became partakers by protesting their faith in the Redeemer,
+                     while taking part in the figurative sacrifices.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q102_A5-p23"> The impediments to external worship consisted in certain bodily uncleannesses; which were considered in the first place as
+                     existing in man, and consequently in other animals also, and in man's clothes, dwelling-place, and vessels. In man himself
+                     uncleanness was considered as arising partly from himself and partly from contact with unclean things. Anything proceeding
+                     from man was reputed unclean that was already subject to corruption, or exposed thereto: and consequently since
+                     death is a kind of corruption, the human corpse was considered unclean. In like manner, since leprosy arises from corruption
+                     of the humors, which break out externally and infect other persons, therefore were lepers also considered unclean; and, again,
+                     women suffering from a flow of blood, whether from weakness, or from nature (either at the monthly course or at the time of
+                     conception); and, for the same reason, men were reputed unclean if they suffered from a flow of seed, whether due to
+                     weakness, to nocturnal pollution, or to sexual intercourse. Because every humor issuing from man in the aforesaid ways involves
+                     some unclean infection. Again, man contracted uncleanness by touching any unclean thing whatever.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q102_A5-p24"> Now there was both a literal and a figurative reason for these uncleannesses. The literal reason was taken from the reverence
+                     due to those things that belong to the divine worship: both because men are not wont, when unclean, to touch precious things:
+                     and in order that by rarely approaching sacred things they might have greater respect for them. For since man could seldom
+                     avoid all the aforesaid uncleannesses, the result was that men could seldom approach to touch things
+                     belonging to the worship of God, so that when they did approach, they did so with greater reverence and humility. Moreover,
+                     in some of these the literal reason was that men should not be kept away from worshipping God through fear of coming in contact
+                     with lepers and others similarly afflicted with loathsome and contagious diseases. In others, again, the reason was to avoid
+                     idolatrous worship: because in their sacrificial rites the Gentiles sometimes employed human blood and seed. All these
+                     bodily uncleannesses were purified either by the mere sprinkling of water, or, in the case of those which were more grievous,
+                     by some sacrifice of expiation for the sin which was the occasion of the uncleanness in question.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q102_A5-p25"> The figurative reason for these uncleannesses was that they were figures of various sins. For the uncleanness of any corpse
+                     signifies the uncleanness of sin, which is the death of the soul. The uncleanness of leprosy betokened the uncleanness of
+                     heretical doctrine: both because heretical doctrine is contagious just as leprosy is, and because no doctrine is so false
+                     as not to have some truth mingled with error, just as on the surface of a leprous body one may distinguish the
+                     healthy parts from those that are infected. The uncleanness of a woman suffering from a flow of blood denotes the uncleanness
+                     of idolatry, on account of the blood which is offered up. The uncleanness of the man who has suffered seminal loss signifies
+                     the uncleanness of empty words, for "the seed is the word of God." The uncleanness of sexual intercourse and of the woman
+                     in child-birth signifies the uncleanness of original sin. The uncleanness of the woman in her periods signifies the
+                     uncleanness of a mind that is sensualized by pleasure. Speaking generally, the uncleanness contracted by touching an unclean
+                     thing denotes the uncleanness arising from consent in another's sin, according to 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A5-p25.1" href="./asv.html#iiCor.6.17" target="asv">2 Cor. 6:17</a>: "Go out from among them, and be ye separate . . . and touch not the unclean thing."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q102_A5-p26"> Moreover, this uncleanness arising from the touch was contracted even by inanimate objects; for whatever was touched in any
+                     way by an unclean man, became itself unclean. Wherein the Law attenuated the superstition of the Gentiles, who held that uncleanness
+                     was contracted not only by touch, but also by speech or looks, as Rabbi Moses states (Doct. Perplex. iii) of a woman in her
+                     periods. The mystical sense of this was that "to God the wicked and his wickedness are hateful alike"
+                     (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A5-p26.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.14.9" target="asv">Wis. 14:9</a>).
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q102_A5-p27"> There was also an uncleanness of inanimate things considered in themselves, such as the uncleanness of leprosy in a house
+                     or in clothes. For just as leprosy occurs in men through a corrupt humor causing putrefaction and corruption in the flesh;
+                     so, too, through some corruption and excess of humidity or dryness, there arises sometimes a kind of corruption in the stones
+                     with which a house is built, or in clothes. Hence the Law called this corruption by the name of leprosy, whereby
+                     a house or a garment was deemed to be unclean: both because all corruption savored of uncleanness, as stated above, and because
+                     the Gentiles worshipped their household gods as a preservative against this corruption. Hence the Law prescribed such houses,
+                     where this kind of corruption was of a lasting nature, to be destroyed; and such garments to be burnt, in order to avoid all
+                     occasion of idolatry. There was also an uncleanness of vessels, of which it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A5-p27.1" href="./asv.html#Num.19.15" target="asv">Num.
+                        19:15
+                     </a>): "The vessel that hath no cover, and binding over it, shall be unclean." The cause of this uncleanness was that anything
+                     unclean might easily drop into such vessels, so as to render them unclean. Moreover, this command aimed at the prevention
+                     of idolatry. For idolaters believed that if mice, lizards, or the like, which they used to sacrifice to the idols, fell into
+                     the vessels or into the water, these became more pleasing to the gods. Even now some women let down uncovered
+                     vessels in honor of the nocturnal deities which they call "Janae."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q102_A5-p28"> The figurative reason of these uncleannesses is that the leprosy of a house signified the uncleanness of the assembly of
+                     heretics; the leprosy of a linen garment signified an evil life arising from bitterness of mind; the leprosy of a woolen garment
+                     denoted the wickedness of flatterers; leprosy in the warp signified the vices of the soul; leprosy on the woof denoted sins
+                     of the flesh, for as the warp is in the woof, so is the soul in the body. The vessel that has neither cover
+                     nor binding, betokens a man who lacks the veil of taciturnity, and who is unrestrained by any severity of discipline.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q102_A5-p29">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> As stated above (ad 4), there was a twofold uncleanness in the Law; one by way of corruption in the mind or in the body;
+                     and this was the graver uncleanness; the other was by mere contact with an unclean thing, and this was less grave, and was
+                     more easily expiated. Because the former uncleanness was expiated by sacrifices for sins, since all corruption is due to sin,
+                     and signifies sin: whereas the latter uncleanness was expiated by the mere sprinkling
+                     of a certain water, of which water we read in 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A5-p29.1" href="./asv.html#Num.19" target="asv">Num. 19</a>. For there God commanded them to take a red cow in memory of the sin they had committed in worshipping a calf. And a cow
+                     is mentioned rather than a calf, because it was thus that the Lord was wont to designate the synagogue, according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A5-p29.2" href="./asv.html#Hos.4.16" target="asv"> Osee 4:16</a>: "Israel hath gone astray like a wanton heifer": and this was, perhaps, because they worshipped heifers after the custom
+                     of Egypt, according to 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A5-p29.3" href="./asv.html#Hos.10.5" target="asv">Osee 10:5</a>: "(They) have
+                     worshipped the kine of Bethaven." And in detestation of the sin of idolatry it was sacrificed outside the camp; in fact, whenever
+                     sacrifice was offered up in expiation of the multitude of sins, it was all burnt outside the camp. Moreover, in order to show
+                     that this sacrifice cleansed the people from all their sins, "the priest" dipped "his finger in her blood," and sprinkled
+                     "it over against the door of the tabernacle seven times"; for the number seven signified universality. Further, the very
+                     sprinkling of blood pertained to the detestation of idolatry, in which the blood that was offered up was not poured out, but
+                     was collected together, and men gathered round it to eat in honor of the idols. Likewise it was burnt by fire, either because
+                     God appeared to Moses in a fire, and the Law was given from the midst of fire; or to denote that idolatry, together with all
+                     that was connected therewith, was to be extirpated altogether; just as the cow was burnt "with her skin and her flesh, her
+                     blood and dung being delivered to the flames." To this burning were added "cedar-wood, and hyssop, and scarlet twice dyed,"
+                     to signify that just as cedar-wood is not liable to putrefaction, and scarlet twice dyed does not easily lose its color, and
+                     hyssop retains its odor after it has been dried; so also was this sacrifice for the preservation of the whole people, and
+                     for their good behavior and devotion. Hence it is said of the ashes of the cow: "That they may be reserved for the multitude
+                     of
+                     the children of Israel." Or, according to Josephus (Antiq. iii, 8,9,10), the four elements are indicated here: for "cedar-wood"
+                     was added to the fire, to signify the earth, on account of its earthiness; "hyssop," to signify the air, on account of its
+                     smell; "scarlet twice dyed," to signify water, for the same reason as purple, on account of the dyes which are taken out of
+                     the water: thus denoting the fact that this sacrifice was offered to the Creator of the four elements. And since this
+                     sacrifice was offered for the sin of idolatry, both "he that burned her," and "he that gathered up the ashes," and "he that
+                     sprinkled the water" in which the ashes were placed, were deemed unclean in detestation of that sin, in order to show that
+                     whatever was in any way connected with idolatry should be cast aside as being unclean. From this uncleanness they were purified
+                     by the mere washing of their clothes; nor did they need to be sprinkled with the water on account of this kind of
+                     uncleanness, because otherwise the process would have been unending, since he that sprinkled the water became unclean, so
+                     that if he were to sprinkle himself he would remain unclean; and if another were to sprinkle him, that one would have become
+                     unclean, and in like manner, whoever might sprinkle him, and so on indefinitely.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q102_A5-p30"> The figurative reason of this sacrifice was that the red cow signified Christ in respect his assumed weakness, denoted by
+                     the female sex; while the color of the cow designated the blood of His Passion. And the "red cow was of full age," because
+                     all Christ's works are perfect, "in which there" was "no blemish"; "and which" had "not carried the yoke," because Christ
+                     was innocent, nor did He carry the yoke of sin. It was commanded to be taken to Moses, because they blamed Him for
+                     transgressing the law of Moses by breaking the Sabbath. And it was commanded to be delivered "to Eleazar the priest," because
+                     Christ was delivered into the hands of the priests to be slain. It was immolated "without the camp," because Christ "suffered
+                     outside the gate" (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A5-p30.1" href="./asv.html#Heb.13.12" target="asv">Heb. 13:12</a>). And the priest dipped "his finger in her blood," because the mystery of Christ's Passion should be considered and imitated.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q102_A5-p31"> It was sprinkled "over against . . . the tabernacle," which denotes the synagogue, to signify either the condemnation of
+                     the unbelieving Jews, or the purification of believers; and this "seven times," in token either of the seven gifts of the
+                     Holy Ghost, or of the seven days wherein all time is comprised. Again, all things that pertain to the Incarnation of Christ
+                     should be burnt with fire, i.e. they should be understood spiritually; for the "skin" and "flesh" signified Christ's
+                     outward works; the "blood" denoted the subtle inward force which quickened His external deeds; the "dung" betokened His weariness,
+                     His thirst, and all such like things pertaining to His weakness. Three things were added, viz. "cedar-wood," which denotes
+                     the height of hope or contemplation; "hyssop," in token of humility or faith; "scarlet twice dyed," which denotes twofold
+                     charity; for it is by these three that we should cling to Christ suffering. The ashes of this burning were gathered by "a
+                     man that is clean," because the relics of the Passion came into the possession of the Gentiles, who were not guilty of Christ's
+                     death. The ashes were put into water for the purpose of expiation, because Baptism receives from Christ's Passion the power
+                     of washing away sins. The priest who immolated and burned the cow, and he who burned, and he who gathered together the ashes,
+                     were unclean, as also he that sprinkled the water: either because the Jews became unclean through putting Christ to
+                     death, whereby our sins are expiated; and this, until the evening, i.e. until the end of the world, when the remnants of Israel
+                     will be converted; or else because they who handle sacred things with a view to the cleansing of others contract certain uncleannesses,
+                     as Gregory says (Pastor. ii, 5); and this until the evening, i.e. until the end of this life.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q102_A5-p32">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 6:</b> As stated above (ad 5), an uncleanness which was caused by corruption either of mind or of body was expiated by sin-offerings.
+                     Now special sacrifices were wont to be offered for the sins of individuals: but since some were neglectful about expiating
+                     such sins and uncleannesses; or, through ignorance, failed to offer this expiation; it was laid down that once a year, on
+                     the tenth day of the seventh month, a sacrifice of expiation should be offered for
+                     the whole people. And because, as the Apostle says (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A5-p32.1" href="./asv.html#Heb.7.28" target="asv">Heb. 7:28</a>), "the Law maketh men priests, who have infirmity," it behooved the priest first of all to offer a calf for his own sins,
+                     in memory of Aaron's sin in fashioning the molten calf; and besides, to offer a ram for a holocaust, which signified that
+                     the priestly sovereignty denoted by the ram, who is the head of the flock, was to be ordained to the glory of God. Then he
+                     offered two he-goats for the people: one of which
+                     was offered in expiation of the sins of the multitude. For the he-goat is an evil-smelling animal; and from its skin clothes
+                     are made having a pungent odor; to signify the stench, uncleanness and the sting of sin. After this he-goat had been immolated,
+                     its blood was taken, together with the blood of the calf, into the Holy of Holies, and the entire sanctuary was sprinkled
+                     with it; to signify that the tabernacle was cleansed from the uncleanness of the children of Israel. But the corpses of the
+                     he-goat and calf which had been offered up for sin had to be burnt, to denote the destruction of sins. They were not, however,
+                     burnt on the altar: since none but holocausts were burnt thereon; but it was prescribed that they should be burnt without
+                     the camp, in detestation of sin: for this was done whenever sacrifice was offered for a grievous sin, or for the multitude
+                     of sins. The other goat was let loose into the wilderness: not indeed to offer it to the demons, whom the Gentiles worshipped
+                     in desert places, because it was unlawful to offer aught to them; but in order to point out the effect of the sacrifice which
+                     had been offered up. Hence the priest put his hand on its head, while confessing the sins of the children of Israel: as though
+                     that goat were to carry them away into the wilderness, where it would be devoured by wild beasts, because it bore the punishment
+                     of the people's sins. And it was said to bear the sins of the people, either because the forgiveness of the people's
+                     sins was signified by its being let loose, or because on its head written lists of sins were fastened.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q102_A5-p33"> The figurative reason of these things was that Christ was foreshadowed both by the calf, on account of His power; and by
+                     the ram, because He is the Head of the faithful; and by the he-goat, on account of "the likeness of sinful flesh" (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A5-p33.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.8.3" target="asv">Rom. 8:3</a>). Moreover, Christ was sacrificed for the sins of both priests and people: since both those of high and those of low degree
+                     are cleansed from sin by His Passion. The blood of the calf and of the goat was brought into
+                     the Holies by the priest, because the entrance to the kingdom of heaven was opened to us by the blood of Christ's Passion.
+                     Their bodies were burnt without the camp, because "Christ suffered without the gate," as the Apostle declares (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A5-p33.2" href="./asv.html#Heb.13.12" target="asv">Heb. 13:12</a>). The scape-goat may denote either Christ's Godhead Which went away into solitude when the Man Christ suffered, not by going
+                     to another place, but by restraining His power: or it may signify the base concupiscence which we ought to
+                     cast away from ourselves, while we offer up to Our Lord acts of virtue.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q102_A5-p34"> With regard to the uncleanness contracted by those who burnt these sacrifices, the reason is the same as that which we assigned
+                     (ad 5) to the sacrifice of the red heifer.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q102_A5-p35">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 7:</b> The legal rite did not cleanse the leper of his deformity, but declared him to be cleansed. This is shown by the words of
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A5-p35.1" href="./asv.html#Lev.14.3" target="asv"> Lev. 14:3, </a> seqq., where it was said that the priest, "when he shall find that the leprosy is cleansed," shall command "him that is to
+                     be purified": consequently, the leper was already healed: but he was said to be purified in so far as the verdict of the priest
+                     restored him to the society of men and to the
+                     worship of God. It happened sometimes, however, that bodily leprosy was miraculously cured by the legal rite, when the priest
+                     erred in his judgment.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q102_A5-p36"> Now this purification of a leper was twofold: for, in the first place, he was declared to be clean; and, secondly, he was
+                     restored, as clean, to the society of men and to the worship of God, to wit, after seven days. At the first purification the
+                     leper who sought to be cleansed offered for himself "two living sparrows . . . cedar-wood, and scarlet, and hyssop," in such
+                     wise that a sparrow and the hyssop should be tied to the cedar-wood with a scarlet thread, so that the
+                     cedar-wood was like the handle of an aspersory: while the hyssop and sparrow were that part of the aspersory which was dipped
+                     into the blood of the other sparrow which was "immolated . . . over living waters." These things he offered as an antidote
+                     to the four defects of leprosy: for cedar-wood, which is not subject to putrefaction, was offered against the putrefaction;
+                     hyssop, which is a sweet-smelling herb, was offered up against the stench; a living sparrow was offered up against numbness;
+                     and scarlet, which has a vivid color, was offered up against the repulsive color of leprosy. The living sparrow was let loose
+                     to fly away into the plain, because the leper was restored to his former liberty.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q102_A5-p37"> On the eighth day he was admitted to divine worship, and was restored to the society of men; but only after having shaved
+                     all the hair of his body, and washed his clothes, because leprosy rots the hair, infects the clothes, and gives them an evil
+                     smell. Afterwards a sacrifice was offered for his sin, since leprosy was frequently a result of sin: and some of the blood
+                     of the sacrifice was put on the tip of the ear of the man that was to be cleansed, "and on the thumb of his right
+                     hand, and the great toe of his right foot"; because it is in these parts that leprosy is first diagnosed and felt. In this
+                     rite, moreover, three liquids were employed: viz. blood, against the corruption of the blood; oil, to denote the healing of
+                     the disease; and living waters, to wash away the filth.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q102_A5-p38"> The figurative reason was that the Divine and human natures in Christ were denoted by the two sparrows, one of which, in
+                     likeness of His human nature, was offered up in an earthen vessel over living waters, because the waters of Baptism are sanctified
+                     by Christ's Passion. The other sparrow, in token of His impassible Godhead, remained living, because the Godhead cannot die:
+                     hence it flew away, for the Godhead could not be encompassed by the Passion. Now this living sparrow,
+                     together with the cedar-wood and scarlet or cochineal, and hyssop, i.e. faith, hope and charity, as stated above (ad 5), was
+                     put into the water for the purpose of sprinkling, because we are baptized in the faith of the God-Man. By the waters of Baptism
+                     or of his tears man washes his clothes, i.e. his works, and all his hair, i.e. his thoughts. The tip of the right ear of the
+                     man to be cleansed is moistened with some the blood and oil, in order to strengthen his hearing against harmful words;
+                     and the thumb and toe of his right hand and foot are moistened that his deeds may be holy. Other matters pertaining to this
+                     purification, or to that also of any other uncleannesses, call for no special remark, beyond what applies to other sacrifices,
+                     whether for sins or for trespasses.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q102_A5-p39"> Reply OBJ 8 and 9: Just as the people were initiated by circumcision to the divine worship, so were the ministers by some
+                     special purification or consecration: wherefore they are commanded to be separated from other men, as being specially deputed,
+                     rather than others, to the ministry of the divine worship. And all that was done touching them in their consecration or institution,
+                     was with a view to show that they were in possession of a prerogative of purity, power and dignity.
+                     Hence three things were done in the institution of ministers: for first, they were purified; secondly, they were adorned [*'Ornabantur.'
+                     Some editions have 'ordinabantur'---'were ordained': the former reading is a reference to 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A5-p39.1" href="./asv.html#Lev.8.7" target="asv"> Lev. 8:7-9</a>] and consecrated; thirdly, they were employed in the ministry. All in general used to be purified by washing in water, and
+                     by certain sacrifices; but the Levites in particular shaved all the hair of their bodies, as stated in 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A5-p39.2" href="./asv.html#Lev.8" target="asv">Lev. 8</a> (cf.
+                     
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A5-p39.3" href="./asv.html#Num.8" target="asv">Num. 8</a>).
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q102_A5-p40"> With regard to the high-priests and priests the consecration was performed as follows. First, when they had been washed,
+                     they were clothed with certain special garments in designation of their dignity. In particular, the high-priest was anointed
+                     on the head with the oil of unction: to denote that the power of consecration was poured forth by him on to others, just as
+                     oil flows from the head on to the lower parts of the body; according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A5-p40.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.132.2" target="asv"> Ps. 132:2</a>: "Like the
+                     precious ointment on the head that ran down upon the beard, the beard of Aaron." But the Levites received no other consecration
+                     besides being offered to the Lord by the children of Israel through the hands of the high-priest, who prayed for them. The
+                     lesser priests were consecrated on the hands only, which were to be employed in the sacrifices. The tip of their right ear
+                     and the thumb of their right hand, and the great toe of their right foot were tinged with the blood of the sacrificial
+                     animal, to denote that they should be obedient to God's law in offering the sacrifices (this is denoted by touching their
+                     right ear); and that they should be careful and ready in performing the sacrifices (this is signified by the moistening of
+                     the right foot and hand). They themselves and their garments were sprinkled with the blood of the animal that had been sacrificed,
+                     in memory of the blood of the lamb by which they had been delivered in Egypt. At their consecration the following
+                     sacrifices were offered: a calf, for sin, in memory of Aaron's sin in fashioning the molten calf; a ram, for a holocaust,
+                     in memory of the sacrifice of Abraham, whose obedience it behooved the high-priest to imitate; again, a ram of consecration,
+                     which was a peace-offering, in memory of the delivery form Egypt through the blood of the lamb; and a basket of bread, in
+                     memory of the manna vouchsafed to the people.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q102_A5-p41"> In reference to their being destined to the ministry, the fat of the ram, one roll of bread, and the right shoulder were
+                     placed on their hands, to show that they received the power of offering these things to the Lord: while the Levites were initiated
+                     to the ministry by being brought into the tabernacle of the covenant, as being destined to the ministry touching the vessels
+                     of the sanctuary.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q102_A5-p42"> The figurative reason of these things was that those who are to be consecrated to the spiritual ministry of Christ, should
+                     be first of all purified by the waters of Baptism, and by the waters of tears, in their faith in Christ's Passion, which is
+                     a sacrifice both of expiation and of purification. They have also to shave all the hair of their body, i.e. all evil thoughts.
+                     They should, moreover, be decked with virtues, and be consecrated with the oil of the Holy Ghost, and with
+                     the sprinkling of Christ's blood. And thus they should be intent on the fulfilment of their spiritual ministry.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q102_A5-p43">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 10:</b> As already stated 
+                     <a id="FS_Q102_A5-p43.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q102_A4.html">(A[4])</a>, the purpose of the Law was to induce men to have reverence for the divine worship: and this in two ways; first, by excluding
+                     from the worship of God whatever might be an object of contempt; secondly, by introducing into the divine worship all that
+                     seemed to savor of reverence. And, indeed, if this was observed in regard to the tabernacle and its vessels, and in the animals
+                     to be sacrificed, much
+                     more was it to be observed in the very ministers. Wherefore, in order to obviate contempt for the ministers, it was prescribed
+                     that they should have no bodily stain or defect: since men so deformed are wont to be despised by others. For the same reason
+                     it was also commanded that the choice of those who were to be destined to the service of God was not to be made in a broadcast
+                     manner from any family, but according to their descent from one particular stock, thus giving them distinction and
+                     nobility.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q102_A5-p44"> In order that they might be revered, special ornate vestments were appointed for their use, and a special form of consecration.
+                     This indeed is the general reason of ornate garments. But the high-priest in particular had eight vestments. First, he had
+                     a linen tunic. Secondly, he had a purple tunic; round the bottom of which were placed "little bells" and "pomegranates of
+                     violet, and purple, and scarlet twice dyed." Thirdly, he had the ephod, which covered his shoulders and his
+                     breast down to the girdle; and it was made of gold, and violet and purple, and scarlet twice dyed and twisted linen: and on
+                     his shoulders he bore two onyx stones, on which were graven the names of the children of Israel. Fourthly, he had the rational,
+                     made of the same material; it was square in shape, and was worn on the breast, and was fastened to the ephod. On this rational
+                     there were twelve precious stones set in four rows, on which also were graven the names of the children of Israel, in
+                     token that the priest bore the burden of the whole people, since he bore their names on his shoulders; and that it was his
+                     duty ever to think of their welfare, since he wore them on his breast, bearing them in his heart, so to speak. And the Lord
+                     commanded the "Doctrine and Truth" to be put in the rational: for certain matters regarding moral and dogmatic truth were
+                     written on it. The Jews indeed pretend that on the rational was placed a stone which changed color according to the various
+                     things
+                     which were about to happen to the children of Israel: and this they call the "Truth and Doctrine." Fifthly, he wore a belt
+                     or girdle made of the four colors mentioned above. Sixthly, there was the tiara or mitre which was made of linen. Seventhly,
+                     there was the golden plate which hung over his forehead; on it was inscribed the Lord's name. Eighthly, there were "the linen
+                     breeches to cover the flesh of their nakedness," when they went up to the sanctuary or altar. Of these eight vestments the
+                     lesser priests had four, viz. the linen tunic and breeches, the belt and the tiara.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q102_A5-p45"> According to some, the literal reason for these vestments was that they denoted the disposition of the terrestrial globe;
+                     as though the high-priest confessed himself to be the minister of the Creator of the world, wherefore it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A5-p45.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.18.24" target="asv">Wis. 18:24</a>): "In the robe" of Aaron "was the whole world" described. For the linen breeches signified the earth out of which the flax
+                     grows. The surrounding belt signified the ocean which surrounds the earth. The violet
+                     tunic denoted the air by its color: its little bells betoken the thunder; the pomegranates, the lightning. The ephod, by its
+                     many colors, signified the starry heaven; the two onyx stones denoted the two hemispheres, or the sun and moon. The twelve
+                     precious stones on the breast are the twelve signs of the zodiac: and they are said to have been placed on the rational because
+                     in heaven, are the types [rationes] of earthly things, according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A5-p45.2" href="./asv.html#Job.38.33" target="asv"> Job 38:33</a>: "Dost thou know the
+                     order of heaven, and canst thou set down the reason [rationem] thereof on the earth?" The turban or tiara signified the empyrean:
+                     the golden plate was a token of God, the governor of the universe.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q102_A5-p46"> The figurative reason is evident. Because bodily stains or defects wherefrom the priests had to be immune, signify the various
+                     vices and sins from which they should be free. Thus it is forbidden that he should be blind, i.e. he ought not to be ignorant:
+                     he must not be lame, i.e. vacillating and uncertain of purpose: that he must have "a little, or a great, or a crooked nose,"
+                     i.e. that he should not, from lack of discretion, exceed in one direction or in another, or even
+                     exercise some base occupation: for the nose signifies discretion, because it discerns odors. It is forbidden that he should
+                     have "a broken foot" or "hand," i.e. he should not lose the power of doing good works or of advancing in virtue. He is rejected,
+                     too, if he have a swelling either in front or behind [Vulg.: 'if he be crook-backed']: by which is signified too much love
+                     of earthly things: if he be blear-eyed, i.e. if his mind is darkened by carnal affections: for running of the eyes is
+                     caused by a flow of matter. He is also rejected if he had "a pearl in his eye," i.e. if he presumes in his own estimation
+                     that he is clothed in the white robe of righteousness. Again, he is rejected "if he have a continued scab," i.e. lustfulness
+                     of the flesh: also, if he have "a dry scurf," which covers the body without giving pain, and is a blemish on the comeliness
+                     of the members; which denotes avarice. Lastly, he is rejected "if he have a rupture" or hernia; through baseness rending his
+                     heart, though it appear not in his deeds.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q102_A5-p47"> The vestments denote the virtues of God's ministers. Now there are four things that are necessary to all His ministers, viz.
+                     chastity denoted by the breeches; a pure life, signified by the linen tunic; the moderation of discretion, betokened by the
+                     girdle; and rectitude of purpose, denoted by the mitre covering the head. But the high-priests needed four other things in
+                     addition to these. First, a continual recollection of God in their thoughts; and this was signified by the
+                     golden plate worn over the forehead, with the name of God engraved thereon. Secondly, they had to bear with the shortcomings
+                     of the people: this was denoted by the ephod which they bore on their shoulders. Thirdly, they had to carry the people in
+                     their mind and heart by the solicitude of charity, in token of which they wore the rational. Fourthly, they had to lead a
+                     godly life by performing works of perfection; and this was signified by the violet tunic. Hence little golden bells were fixed
+                     to
+                     the bottom of the violet tunic, which bells signified the teaching of divine things united in the high-priest to his godly
+                     mode of life. In addition to these were the pomegranates, signifying unity of faith and concord in good morals: because his
+                     doctrine should hold together in such a way that it should not rend asunder the unity of faith and peace.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q102_A5-p48"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q102_A5-p49"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q102_A4.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q102_A6.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="FS_Q102_A6" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q102_A5.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q103.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="FS_Q102_A6-p0.1">Whether there was any reasonable cause for the ceremonial observances?</h4>
+                  <p id="FS_Q102_A6-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q102_A6-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that there was no reasonable cause for the ceremonial observances. Because, as the Apostle says (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A6-p2.1" href="./asv.html#iTim.4.4" target="asv">1 Tim. 4:4</a>), "every creature of God is good, and nothing to be rejected that is received with thanksgiving." It was therefore unfitting
+                     that they should be forbidden to eat certain foods, as being unclean according to 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A6-p2.2" href="./asv.html#Lev.11" target="asv">Lev. 11</a> [*Cf. 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A6-p2.3" href="./asv.html#Deut.14" target="asv">Dt. 14</a>].
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q102_A6-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, just as animals are given to man for food, so also are herbs: wherefore it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A6-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.9.3" target="asv">Gn. 9:3</a>): "As the green herbs have I delivered all" flesh "to you." But the Law did not distinguish any herbs from the rest as being
+                     unclean, although some are most harmful, for instance, those that are poisonous. Therefore it seems that neither should any
+                     animals have been prohibited as being unclean.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q102_A6-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if the matter from which a thing is generated be unclean, it seems that likewise the thing generated therefrom is
+                     unclean. But flesh is generated from blood. Since therefore all flesh was not prohibited as unclean, it seems that in like
+                     manner neither should blood have been forbidden as unclean; nor the fat which is engendered from blood.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q102_A6-p5">
+                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, Our Lord said (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A6-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.10.28" target="asv">Mat. 10:28</a>; cf.
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A6-p5.2" href="./asv.html#Luke.12.4" target="asv"> Lk. 12:4</a>), that those should not be feared "that kill the body," since after death they "have no more that they can do": which would
+                     not be true if after death harm might come to man through anything done with his body. Much less therefore does it matter
+                     to an animal already dead how its flesh be cooked. Consequently there seems to be no reason in what is said, 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A6-p5.3" href="./asv.html#Exod.23.19" target="asv">Ex. 23:19</a>: "Thou
+                     shalt not boil a kid in the milk of its dam."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q102_A6-p6">
+                     <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, all that is first brought forth of man and beast, as being most perfect, is commanded to be offered to the Lord
+                     (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A6-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Exod.13" target="asv">Ex. 13</a>). Therefore it is an unfitting command that is set forth in
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A6-p6.2" href="./asv.html#Lev.19.23" target="asv"> Lev. 19:23</a>: "when you shall be come into the land, and shall have planted in it fruit trees, you shall take away the uncircumcision
+                     [*'Praeputia,' which Douay version renders 'first fruits'] of them," i.e. the first crops, and they "shall be unclean to
+                     you, neither shall you eat of them."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q102_A6-p7">
+                     <b>Objection 6:</b> Further, clothing is something extraneous to man's body. Therefore certain kinds of garments should not have been forbidden
+                     to the Jews: for instance (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A6-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Lev.19.19" target="asv">Lev. 19:19</a>): "Thou shalt not wear a garment that is woven of two sorts": and (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A6-p7.2" href="./asv.html#Deut.22.5" target="asv">Dt. 22:5</a>): "A woman shall not be clothed with man's apparel, neither shall a man use woman's apparel": and further on (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A6-p7.3" href="./asv.html#Deut.22.11" target="asv">Dt. 22:11</a>): "Thou shalt not wear a garment that is
+                     woven of woolen and linen together."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q102_A6-p8">
+                     <b>Objection 7:</b> Further, to be mindful of God's commandments concerns not the body but the heart. Therefore it is unsuitably prescribed (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A6-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Deut.6.8" target="asv">Dt. 6:8, </a> seqq.) that they should "bind" the commandments of God "as a sign" on their hands; and that they should "write them in the
+                     entry"; and (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A6-p8.2" href="./asv.html#Num.15.38" target="asv">Num. 15:38</a>, seqq.) that they should "make to themselves fringes in the corners of their garments, putting in them ribands of blue .
+                     . . they may remember . . . the commandments
+                     of the Lord."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q102_A6-p9">
+                     <b>Objection 8:</b> Further, the Apostle says (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A6-p9.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.9.9" target="asv">1 Cor. 9:9</a>) that God does not "take care for oxen," and, therefore, neither of other irrational animals. Therefore without reason is
+                     it commanded (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A6-p9.2" href="./asv.html#Deut.22.6" target="asv">Dt. 22:6</a>): "If thou find, as thou walkest by the way, a bird's nest in a tree . . . thou shalt not take the dam with her young"; and
+                     (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A6-p9.3" href="./asv.html#Deut.25.4" target="asv">Dt. 25:4</a>): "Thou shalt not muzzle the ox that treadeth out thy corn"; and (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A6-p9.4" href="./asv.html#Lev.19.19" target="asv">Lev.
+                        19:19
+                     </a>): "Thou shalt not make thy cattle to gender with beasts of any other kind."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q102_A6-p10">
+                     <b>Objection 9:</b> Further, no distinction was made between clean and unclean plants. Much less therefore should any distinction have been made
+                     about the cultivation of plants. Therefore it was unfittingly prescribed (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A6-p10.1" href="./asv.html#Lev.19.19" target="asv">Lev. 19:19</a>): "Thou shalt not sow thy field with different seeds"; and (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A6-p10.2" href="./asv.html#Deut.22.9" target="asv">Dt. 22:9</a>, seqq.): "Thou shalt sow thy vineyard with divers seeds"; and: "Thou shalt not plough with an ox and an ass together."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q102_A6-p11">
+                     <b>Objection 10:</b> Further, it is apparent that inanimate things are most of all subject to the power of man. Therefore it was unfitting to
+                     debar man from taking silver and gold of which idols were made, or anything they found in the houses of idols, as expressed
+                     in the commandment of the Law (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A6-p11.1" href="./asv.html#Deut.7.25" target="asv">Dt. 7:25, </a> seqq.). It also seems an absurd commandment set forth in 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A6-p11.2" href="./asv.html#Deut.23.13" target="asv">Dt. 23:13</a>, that they should "dig round about and . . . cover with earth that which they were eased
+                     of."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q102_A6-p12">
+                     <b>Objection 11:</b> Further, piety is required especially in priests. But it seems to be an act of piety to assist at the burial of one's friends:
+                     wherefore Tobias is commended for so doing (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A6-p12.1" href="./asv.html#Tob.1.20" target="asv">Tob. 1:20, </a> seqq.). In like manner it is sometimes an act of piety to marry a loose woman, because she is thereby delivered from sin
+                     and infamy. Therefore it seems inconsistent for these things to be forbidden to priests (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A6-p12.2" href="./asv.html#Lev.21" target="asv">Lev. 21</a>).
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q102_A6-p13">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A6-p13.1" href="./asv.html#Deut.18.14" target="asv">Dt. 18:14</a>): "But thou art otherwise instructed by the Lord thy God": from which words we may gather that these observances were instituted
+                     by God to be a special prerogative of that people. Therefore they are not without reason or cause.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q102_A6-p14">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> The Jewish people, as stated above 
+                     <a id="FS_Q102_A6-p14.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q102_A5.html">(A[5])</a>, were specially chosen for the worship of God, and among them the priests themselves were specially set apart for that purpose.
+                     And just as other things that are applied to the divine worship, need to be marked in some particular way so that they be
+                     worthy of the worship of God; so too in that people's, and especially the priests', mode of life, there needed to be certain
+                     special things
+                     befitting the divine worship, whether spiritual or corporal. Now the worship prescribed by the Law foreshadowed the mystery
+                     of Christ: so that whatever they did was a figure of things pertaining to Christ, according to 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A6-p14.2" href="./asv.html#iCor.10.11" target="asv">1 Cor. 10:11</a>: "All these things happened to them in figures." Consequently the reasons for these observances may be taken in two ways,
+                     first according to their fittingness to the worship of God; secondly, according as they foreshadow something touching the
+                     Christian mode of life.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q102_A6-p15">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As stated above (A[5], ad 4,5), the Law distinguished a twofold pollution or uncleanness; one, that of sin, whereby the soul
+                     was defiled; and another consisting in some kind of corruption, whereby the body was in some way infected. Speaking then of
+                     the first-mentioned uncleanness, no kind of food is unclean, or can defile a man, by reason of its nature; wherefore we read
+                     (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A6-p15.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.15.11" target="asv">Mat. 15:11</a>): "Not that which goeth into the mouth defileth a
+                     man; but what cometh out of the mouth, this defileth a man": which words are explained (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A6-p15.2" href="./asv.html#Matt.15.17" target="asv">Mat. 15:17</a>) as referring to sins. Yet certain foods can defile the soul accidentally; in so far as man partakes of them against obedience
+                     or a vow, or from excessive concupiscence; or through their being an incentive to lust, for which reason some refrain from
+                     wine and flesh-meat.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q102_A6-p16"> If, however, we speak of bodily uncleanness, consisting in some kind of corruption, the flesh of certain animals is unclean,
+                     either because like the pig they feed on unclean things; or because their life is among unclean surroundings: thus certain
+                     animals, like moles and mice and such like, live underground, whence they contract a certain unpleasant smell; or because
+                     their flesh, through being too moist or too dry, engenders corrupt humors in the human body. Hence they were
+                     forbidden to eat the flesh of flat-footed animals, i.e. animals having an uncloven hoof, on account of their earthiness; and
+                     in like manner they were forbidden to eat the flesh of animals that have many clefts in their feet, because such are very
+                     fierce and their flesh is very dry, such as the flesh of lions and the like. For the same reason they were forbidden to eat
+                     certain birds of prey the flesh of which is very dry, and certain water-fowl on account of their exceeding humidity. In like
+                     manner certain fish lacking fins and scales were prohibited on account of their excessive moisture; such as eels and the like.
+                     They were, however, allowed to eat ruminants and animals with a divided hoof, because in such animals the humors are well
+                     absorbed, and their nature well balanced: for neither are they too moist, as is indicated by the hoof; nor are they too earthly,
+                     which is shown by their having not a flat but a cloven hoof. Of fishes they were allowed to partake of the drier kinds,
+                     of which the fins and scales are an indication, because thereby the moist nature of the fish is tempered. Of birds they were
+                     allowed to eat the tamer kinds, such as hens, partridges, and the like. Another reason was detestation of idolatry: because
+                     the Gentiles, and especially the Egyptians, among whom they had grown up, offered up these forbidden animals to their idols,
+                     or employed them for the purpose of sorcery: whereas they did not eat those animals which the Jews were allowed to eat, but
+                     worshipped them as gods, or abstained, for some other motive, from eating them, as stated above (A[3], ad 2). The third reason
+                     was to prevent excessive care about food: wherefore they were allowed to eat those animals which could be procured easily
+                     and promptly.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q102_A6-p17"> With regard to blood and fat, they were forbidden to partake of those of any animals whatever without exception. Blood was
+                     forbidden, both in order to avoid cruelty, that they might abhor the shedding of human blood, as stated above (A[3], ad 8);
+                     and in order to shun idolatrous rite whereby it was customary for men to collect the blood and to gather together around it
+                     for a banquet in honor of the idols, to whom they held the blood to be most acceptable. Hence the Lord commanded
+                     the blood to be poured out and to be covered with earth (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A6-p17.1" href="./asv.html#Lev.17.13" target="asv">Lev. 17:13</a>). For the same reason they were forbidden to eat animals that had been suffocated or strangled: because the blood of these
+                     animals would not be separated from the body: or because this form of death is very painful to the victim; and the Lord wished
+                     to withdraw them from cruelty even in regard to irrational animals, so as to be less inclined to be cruel to other men, through
+                     being used to be kind to beasts.
+                     They were forbidden to eat the fat: both because idolaters ate it in honor of their gods; and because it used to be burnt
+                     in honor of God; and, again, because blood and fat are not nutritious, which is the cause assigned by Rabbi Moses (Doct. Perplex.
+                     iii). The reason why they were forbidden to eat the sinews is given in 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A6-p17.2" href="./asv.html#Gen.32.32" target="asv"> Gn. 32:32, </a> where it is stated that "the children of Israel . . . eat not the sinew . . . because he touched the sinew of" Jacob's "thing
+                     and it shrank."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q102_A6-p18"> The figurative reason for these things is that all these animals signified certain sins, in token of which those animals
+                     were prohibited. Hence Augustine says (Contra Faustum iv, 7): "If the swine and lamb be called in question, both are clean
+                     by nature, because all God's creatures are good: yet the lamb is clean, and the pig is unclean in a certain signification.
+                     Thus if you speak of a foolish, and of a wise man, each of these expressions is clean considered in the nature of
+                     the sound, letters and syllables of which it is composed: but in signification, the one is clean, the other unclean." The
+                     animal that chews the cud and has a divided hoof, is clean in signification. Because division of the hoof is a figure of the
+                     two Testaments: or of the Father and Son: or of the two natures in Christ: of the distinction of good and evil. While chewing
+                     the cud signifies meditation on the Scriptures and a sound understanding thereof; and whoever lacks either of these is
+                     spiritually unclean. In like manner those fish that have scales and fins are clean in signification. Because fins signify
+                     the heavenly or contemplative life; while scales signify a life of trials, each of which is required for spiritual cleanness.
+                     Of birds certain kinds were forbidden. In the eagle which flies at a great height, pride is forbidden: in the griffon which
+                     is hostile to horses and men, cruelty of powerful men is prohibited. The osprey, which feeds on very small birds, signifies
+                     those who oppress the poor. The kite, which is full of cunning, denotes those who are fraudulent in their dealings. The vulture,
+                     which follows an army, expecting to feed on the carcases of the slain, signifies those who like others to die or to fight
+                     among themselves that they may gain thereby. Birds of the raven kind signify those who are blackened by their lusts; or those
+                     who lack kindly feelings, for the raven did not return when once it had been let loose from the ark. The ostrich which,
+                     though a bird, cannot fly, and is always on the ground, signifies those who fight God's cause, and at the same time are taken
+                     up with worldly business. The owl, which sees clearly at night, but cannot see in the daytime, denotes those who are clever
+                     in temporal affairs, but dull in spiritual matters. The gull, which flies both in the air and swims in the water, signifies
+                     those who are partial both to Circumcision and to Baptism: or else it denotes those who would fly by contemplation, yet dwell
+                     in the waters of sensual delights. The hawk, which helps men to seize the prey, is a figure of those who assist the strong
+                     to prey on the poor. The screech-owl, which seeks its food by night but hides by day, signifies the lustful man who seeks
+                     to lie hidden in his deeds of darkness. The cormorant, so constituted that it can stay a long time under water, denotes the
+                     glutton who plunges into the waters of pleasure. The ibis is an African bird with a long beak, and feeds on snakes; and perhaps
+                     it
+                     is the same as the stork: it signifies the envious man, who refreshes himself with the ills of others, as with snakes. The
+                     swan is bright in color, and by the aid of its long neck extracts its food from deep places on land or water: it may denote
+                     those who seek earthly profit though an external brightness of virtue. The bittern is a bird of the East: it has a long beak,
+                     and its jaws are furnished with follicules, wherein it stores its food at first, after a time proceeding to digest it: it
+                     is a
+                     figure of the miser, who is excessively careful in hoarding up the necessaries of life. The coot [*Douay: 'porphyrion.' St.
+                     Thomas' description tallies with the coot or moorhen: though of course he is mistaken about the feet differing from one another.]
+                     has this peculiarity apart from other birds, that it has a webbed foot for swimming, and a cloven foot for walking: for it
+                     swims like a duck in the water, and walks like a partridge on land: it drinks only when it bites, since it dips all its
+                     food in water: it is a figure of a man who will not take advice, and does nothing but what is soaked in the water of his own
+                     will. The heron [*Vulg.: 'herodionem'], commonly called a falcon, signifies those whose "feet are swift to shed blood" (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A6-p18.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.13.3" target="asv">Ps. 13:3</a>). The plover [*Here, again, the Douay translators transcribed from the Vulgate: 'charadrion'; 'charadrius' is the generic
+                     name for all plovers.], which is a garrulous bird, signifies the gossip. The hoopoe, which builds its
+                     nest on dung, feeds on foetid ordure, and whose song is like a groan, denotes worldly grief which works death in those who
+                     are unclean. The bat, which flies near the ground, signifies those who being gifted with worldly knowledge, seek none but
+                     earthly things. Of fowls and quadrupeds those alone were permitted which have the hind-legs longer than the forelegs, so that
+                     they can leap: whereas those were forbidden which cling rather to the earth: because those who abuse the doctrine of the four
+                     Evangelists, so that they are not lifted up thereby, are reputed unclean. By the prohibition of blood, fat and nerves, we
+                     are to understand the forbidding of cruelty, lust, and bravery in committing sin.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q102_A6-p19">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Men were wont to eat plants and other products of the soil even before the deluge: but the eating of flesh seems to have
+                     been introduced after the deluge; for it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A6-p19.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.9.3" target="asv">Gn. 9:3</a>): "Even as the green herbs have I delivered . . . all" flesh "to you." The reason for this was that the eating of the products
+                     of the soil savors rather of a simple life; whereas the eating of flesh savors of delicate and over-careful living. For the
+                     soil gives birth to the herb of its own accord; and such like products of the earth may be had in great quantities with very
+                     little effort: whereas no small trouble is necessary either to rear or to catch an animal. Consequently God being wishful
+                     to bring His people back to a more simple way of living, forbade them to eat many kinds of animals, but not those things that
+                     are produced by the soil. Another reason may be that animals were offered to idols, while the products of the soil were
+                     not.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q102_A6-p20"> The Reply to the Third Objection is clear from what has been said (ad 1).</p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q102_A6-p21">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Although the kid that is slain has no perception of the manner in which its flesh is cooked, yet it would seem to savor of
+                     heartlessness if the dam's milk, which was intended for the nourishment of her offspring, were served up on the same dish.
+                     It might also be said that the Gentiles in celebrating the feasts of their idols prepared the flesh of kids in this manner,
+                     for the purpose of sacrifice or banquet: hence (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A6-p21.1" href="./asv.html#Exod.23" target="asv">Ex. 23</a>) after the solemnities to be
+                     celebrated under the Law had been foretold, it is added: "Thou shalt not boil a kid in the milk of its dam." The figurative
+                     reason for this prohibition is this: the kid, signifying Christ, on account of "the likeness of sinful flesh" (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A6-p21.2" href="./asv.html#Rom.8.3" target="asv">Rom. 8:3</a>), was not to be seethed, i.e. slain, by the Jews, "in the milk of its dam," i.e. during His infancy. Or else it signifies
+                     that the kid, i.e. the sinner, should not be boiled in the milk of its dam, i.e. should not be cajoled by flattery.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q102_A6-p22">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> The Gentiles offered their gods the first-fruits, which they held to bring them good luck: or they burnt them for the purpose
+                     of secrecy. Consequently (the Israelites) were commanded to look upon the fruits of the first three years as unclean: for
+                     in that country nearly all the trees bear fruit in three years' time; those trees, to wit, that are cultivated either from
+                     seed, or from a graft, or from a cutting: but it seldom happens that the
+                     fruit-stones or seeds encased in a pod are sown: since it would take a longer time for these to bear fruit: and the Law considered
+                     what happened most frequently. The fruits, however, of the fourth year, as being the firstlings of clean fruits, were offered
+                     to God: and from the fifth year onward they were eaten.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q102_A6-p23"> The figurative reason was that this foreshadowed the fact that after the three states of the Law (the first lasting from
+                     Abraham to David, the second, until they were carried away to Babylon, the third until the time of Christ), the Fruit of the
+                     Law, i.e. Christ, was to be offered to God. Or again, that we must mistrust our first efforts, on account of their imperfection.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q102_A6-p24">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 6:</b> It is said of a man in
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A6-p24.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.19.27" target="asv"> Ecclus. 19:27, </a> that "the attire of the body . . . " shows "what he is." Hence the Lord wished His people to be distinguished from other
+                     nations, not only by the sign of the circumcision, which was in the flesh, but also by a certain difference of attire. Wherefore
+                     they were forbidden to wear garments woven of woolen and linen together, and for a woman to be clothed with man's apparel,
+                     or vice versa, for two
+                     reasons. First, to avoid idolatrous worship. Because the Gentiles, in their religious rites, used garments of this sort, made
+                     of various materials. Moreover in the worship of Mars, women put on men's armor; while, conversely, in the worship of Venus
+                     men donned women's attire. The second reason was to preserve them from lust: because the employment of various materials in
+                     the making of garments signified inordinate union of sexes, while the use of male attire by a woman, or vice versa, has an
+                     incentive to evil desires, and offers an occasion of lust. The figurative reason is that the prohibition of wearing a garment
+                     woven of woolen and linen signified that it was forbidden to unite the simplicity of innocence, denoted by wool, with the
+                     duplicity of malice, betokened by linen. It also signifies that woman is forbidden to presume to teach, or perform other duties
+                     of men: or that man should not adopt the effeminate manners of a woman.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q102_A6-p25">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 7:</b> As Jerome says on
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A6-p25.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.23.6" target="asv"> Mat. 23:6, </a> "the Lord commanded them to make violet-colored fringes in the four corners of their garments, so that the Israelites might
+                     be distinguished from other nations." Hence, in this way, they professed to be Jews: and consequently the very sight of this
+                     sign reminded them of their law.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q102_A6-p26"> When we read: "Thou shalt bind them on thy hand, and they shall be ever before thy eyes [Vulg.: 'they shall be and shall
+                     move between thy eyes'], the Pharisees gave a false interpretation to these words, and wrote the decalogue of Moses on a parchment,
+                     and tied it on their foreheads like a wreath, so that it moved in front of their eyes": whereas the intention of the Lord
+                     in giving this commandment was that they should be bound in their hands, i.e. in their works; and that they
+                     should be before their eyes, i.e. in their thoughts. The violet-colored fillets which were inserted in their cloaks signify
+                     the godly intention which should accompany our every deed. It may, however, be said that, because they were a carnal-minded
+                     and stiff-necked people, it was necessary for them to be stirred by these sensible things to the observance of the Law.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q102_A6-p27">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 8:</b> Affection in man is twofold: it may be an affection of reason, or it may be an affection of passion. If a man's affection
+                     be one of reason, it matters not how man behaves to animals, because God has subjected all things to man's power, according
+                     to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A6-p27.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.8.8" target="asv"> Ps. 8:8</a>: "Thou hast subjected all things under his feet": and it is in this sense that the Apostle says that "God has no care for
+                     oxen"; because God does not ask of man what he does
+                     with oxen or other animals.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q102_A6-p28"> But if man's affection be one of passion, then it is moved also in regard to other animals: for since the passion of pity
+                     is caused by the afflictions of others; and since it happens that even irrational animals are sensible to pain, it is possible
+                     for the affection of pity to arise in a man with regard to the sufferings of animals. Now it is evident that if a man practice
+                     a pitiful affection for animals, he is all the more disposed to take pity on his fellow-men: wherefore it
+                     is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A6-p28.1" href="./asv.html#Prov.11.10" target="asv">Prov. 11:10</a>): "The just regardeth the lives of his beasts: but the bowels of the wicked are cruel." Consequently the Lord, in order to
+                     inculcate pity to the Jewish people, who were prone to cruelty, wished them to practice pity even with regard to dumb animals,
+                     and forbade them to do certain things savoring of cruelty to animals. Hence He prohibited them to "boil a kid in the milk
+                     of its dam"; and to "muzzle the ox that treadeth out the corn"; and to slay "the dam with her young."
+                     It may, nevertheless, be also said that these prohibitions were made in hatred of idolatry. For the Egyptians held it to be
+                     wicked to allow the ox to eat of the grain while threshing the corn. Moreover certain sorcerers were wont to ensnare the mother
+                     bird with her young during incubation, and to employ them for the purpose of securing fruitfulness and good luck in bringing
+                     up children: also because it was held to be a good omen to find the mother sitting on her young.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q102_A6-p29"> As to the mingling of animals of divers species, the literal reason may have been threefold. The first was to show detestation
+                     for the idolatry of the Egyptians, who employed various mixtures in worshipping the planets, which produce various effects,
+                     and on various kinds of things according to their various conjunctions. The second reason was in condemnation of unnatural
+                     sins. The third reason was the entire removal of all occasions of concupiscence. Because animals of different
+                     species do not easily breed, unless this be brought about by man; and movements of lust are aroused by seeing such things.
+                     Wherefore in the Jewish traditions we find it prescribed as stated by Rabbi Moses that men shall turn away their eyes from
+                     such sights.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q102_A6-p30"> The figurative reason for these things is that the necessities of life should not be withdrawn from the ox that treadeth
+                     the corn, i.e. from the preacher bearing the sheaves of doctrine, as the Apostle states (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A6-p30.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.9.4" target="asv">1 Cor. 9:4</a>, seqq.). Again, we should not take the dam with her young: because in certain things we have to keep the spiritual senses,
+                     i.e. the offspring, and set aside the observance of the letter, i.e. the mother, for instance, in all the ceremonies of the
+                     Law. It is also
+                     forbidden that beast of burden, i.e. any of the common people, should be allowed to engender, i.e. to have any connection,
+                     with animals of another kind, i.e. with Gentiles or Jews.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q102_A6-p31">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 9:</b> All these minglings were forbidden in agriculture; literally, in detestation of idolatry. For the Egyptians in worshipping
+                     the stars employed various combinations of seeds, animals and garments, in order to represent the various connections of the
+                     stars. Or else all these minglings were forbidden in detestation of the unnatural vice.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q102_A6-p32"> They have, however, a figurative reason. For the prohibition: "Thou shalt not sow thy field with different seeds," is to
+                     be understood, in the spiritual sense, of the prohibition to sow strange doctrine in the Church, which is a spiritual vineyard.
+                     Likewise "the field," i.e. the Church, must not be sown "with different seeds," i.e. with Catholic and heretical doctrines.
+                     Neither is it allowed to plough "with an ox and an ass together"; thus a fool should not accompany a wise man
+                     in preaching, for one would hinder the other.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q102_A6-p33">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 10:</b> [*The Reply to the Tenth Objection is lacking in the codices. The solution given here is found in some editions, and was
+                     supplied by Nicolai.] Silver and gold were reasonably forbidden (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A6-p33.1" href="./asv.html#Deut.7" target="asv">Dt. 7</a>) not as though they were not subject to the power of man, but because, like the idols themselves, all materials out of which
+                     idols were made, were anathematized as hateful in God's sight. This is clear from the same chapter, where we read further
+                     on
+                     (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A6-p33.2" href="./asv.html#Deut.7.26" target="asv">Dt. 7:26</a>): "Neither shalt thou bring anything of the idol into thy house, lest thou become an anathema like it." Another reason was
+                     lest, by taking silver and gold, they should be led by avarice into idolatry to which the Jews were inclined. The other precept
+                     (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A6-p33.3" href="./asv.html#Deut.23" target="asv">Dt. 23</a>) about covering up excretions, was just and becoming, both for the sake of bodily cleanliness; and in order to keep the air
+                     wholesome; and by reason of the respect due to the tabernacle of the covenant which
+                     stood in the midst of the camp, wherein the Lord was said to dwell; as is clearly set forth in the same passage, where after
+                     expressing the command, the reason thereof is at once added, to wit: "For the Lord thy God walketh in the midst of thy camp,
+                     to deliver thee, and to give up thy enemies to thee, and let thy camp be holy [i.e. clean], and let no uncleanness appear
+                     therein." The figurative reason for this precept, according to Gregory (Moral. xxxi), is that sins which are the fetid
+                     excretions of the mind should be covered over by repentance, that we may become acceptable to God, according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A6-p33.4" href="./asv.html#Ps.31.1" target="asv"> Ps. 31:1</a>: "Blessed are they whose iniquities are forgiven, and whose sins are covered." Or else according to a gloss, that we should
+                     recognize the unhappy condition of human nature, and humbly cover and purify the stains of a puffed-up and proud spirit in
+                     the deep furrow of self-examination.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q102_A6-p34">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 11:</b> Sorcerers and idolatrous priests made use, in their rites, of the bones and flesh of dead men. Wherefore, in order to extirpate
+                     the customs of idolatrous worship, the Lord commanded that the priests of inferior degree, who at fixed times served in the
+                     temple, should not "incur an uncleanness at the death" of anyone except of those who were closely related to them, viz. their
+                     father or mother, and others thus near of kin to them. But the high-priest
+                     had always to be ready for the service of the sanctuary; wherefore he was absolutely forbidden to approach the dead, however
+                     nearly related to him. They were also forbidden to marry a "harlot" or "one that has been put away," or any other than a virgin:
+                     both on account of the reverence due to the priesthood, the honor of which would seem to be tarnished by such a marriage:
+                     and for the sake of the children who would be disgraced by the mother's shame: which was most of all to be avoided when the
+                     priestly dignity was passed on from father to son. Again, they were commanded to shave neither head nor beard, and not to
+                     make incisions in their flesh, in order to exclude the rites of idolatry. For the priests of the Gentiles shaved both head
+                     and beard, wherefore it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A6-p34.1" href="./asv.html#Bar.6.30" target="asv">Bar 6:30</a>): "Priests sit in their temples having their garments rent, and their heads and beards shaven." Moreover, in worshipping
+                     their idols "they cut themselves with knives and lancets"
+                     (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q102_A6-p34.2" href="./asv.html#." target="asv">3 Kings 18:28</a>). For this reason the priests of the Old Law were commanded to do the contrary.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q102_A6-p35"> The spiritual reason for these things is that priests should be entirely free from dead works, i.e. sins. And they should
+                     not shave their heads, i.e. set wisdom aside; nor should they shave their beards, i.e. set aside the perfection of wisdom;
+                     nor rend their garments or cut their flesh, i.e. they should not incur the sin of schism.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q102_A6-p36"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q102_A6-p37"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q102_A5.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q103.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <a href="summa.FS_Q101_A4.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.FS_Q102_A1.html"></a>
+            </div>
+            <div id="FS_Q103" class="div3">
+               <a href="summa.FS_Q102_A6.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.FS_Q103_A1.html"></a>
+               <h3 id="FS_Q103-p0.1">OF THE DURATION OF THE CEREMONIAL PRECEPTS (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3>
+               <p id="FS_Q103-p1"></p>
+               <p id="FS_Q103-p2"> We must now consider the duration of the ceremonial precepts: under which head there are four points of inquiry:</p>
+               <p id="FS_Q103-p3"> (1) Whether the ceremonial precepts were in existence before the Law?</p>
+               <p id="FS_Q103-p4"> (2) Whether at the time of the Law the ceremonies of the Old Law had any power of justification?</p>
+               <p id="FS_Q103-p5"> (3) Whether they ceased at the coming of Christ?</p>
+               <p id="FS_Q103-p6"> (4) Whether it is a mortal sin to observe them after the coming of Christ?</p>
+               <div id="FS_Q103_A1" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q103.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q103_A2.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="FS_Q103_A1-p0.1">Whether the ceremonies of the Law were in existence before the Law?</h4>
+                  <p id="FS_Q103_A1-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q103_A1-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the ceremonies of the Law were in existence before the Law. For sacrifices and holocausts were ceremonies
+                     of the Old Law, as stated above (
+                     <a id="FS_Q103_A1-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q101_A4.html">Q[101], A[4]</a>). But sacrifices and holocausts preceded the Law: for it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q103_A1-p2.2" href="./asv.html#Gen.4.3" target="asv">Gn. 4:3,4</a>) that "Cain offered, of the fruits of the earth, gifts to the Lord," and that "Abel offered of the firstlings of his flock,
+                     and of their fat." Noe also "offered
+                     holocausts" to the Lord (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q103_A1-p2.3" href="./asv.html#Gen.18.20" target="asv">Gn. 18:20</a>), and Abraham did in like manner (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q103_A1-p2.4" href="./asv.html#Gen.22.13" target="asv">Gn. 22:13</a>). Therefore the ceremonies of the Old Law preceded the Law.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q103_A1-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the erecting and consecrating of the altar were part of the ceremonies relating to holy things. But these preceded
+                     the Law. For we read (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q103_A1-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.13.18" target="asv">Gn. 13:18</a>) that "Abraham . . . built . . . an altar to the Lord"; and (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q103_A1-p3.2" href="./asv.html#Gen.28.18" target="asv">Gn. 28:18</a>) that "Jacob . . . took the stone . . . and set it up for a title, pouring oil upon the top of it." Therefore the legal ceremonies
+                     preceded the Law.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q103_A1-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the first of the legal sacraments seems to have been circumcision. But circumcision preceded the Law, as appears
+                     from 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q103_A1-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.17" target="asv">Gn. 17</a>. In like manner the priesthood preceded the Law; for it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q103_A1-p4.2" href="./asv.html#Gen.14.18" target="asv">Gn. 14:18</a>) that "Melchisedech . . . was the priest of the most high God." Therefore the sacramental ceremonies preceded the Law.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q103_A1-p5">
+                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, the distinction of clean from unclean animals belongs to the ceremonies of observances, as stated above (Q[100],
+                     2, A[6], ad 1). But this distinction preceded the Law; for it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q103_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.7.2" target="asv">Gn. 7:2,3</a>): "Of all clean beasts take seven and seven . . . but of the beasts that are unclean, two and two." Therefore the legal ceremonies
+                     preceded the Law.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q103_A1-p6">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q103_A1-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Deut.6.1" target="asv">Dt. 6:1</a>): "These are the precepts and ceremonies . . . which the Lord your God commanded that I should teach you." But they would
+                     not have needed to be taught about these things, if the aforesaid ceremonies had been already in existence. Therefore the
+                     legal ceremonies did not precede the Law.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q103_A1-p7">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> As is clear from what has been said (
+                     <a id="FS_Q103_A1-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q101_A2.html">Q[101], A[2]</a>;
+                     <a id="FS_Q103_A1-p7.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q102_A2.html"> Q[102] , A[2]</a>), the legal ceremonies were ordained for a double purpose; the worship of God, and the foreshadowing of Christ. Now whoever
+                     worships God must needs worship Him by means of certain fixed things pertaining to external worship. But the fixing of the
+                     divine worship belongs to the ceremonies; just as the determining of our relations with our
+                     neighbor is a matter determined by the judicial precepts, as stated above (
+                     <a id="FS_Q103_A1-p7.3" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q99_A4.html">Q[99], A[4]</a>). Consequently, as among men in general there were certain judicial precepts, not indeed established by Divine authority,
+                     but ordained by human reason; so also there were some ceremonies fixed, not by the authority of any law, but according to
+                     the will and devotion of those that worship God. Since, however, even before the Law some of the leading men were gifted with
+                     the spirit of
+                     prophecy, it is to be believed that a heavenly instinct, like a private law, prompted them to worship God in a certain definite
+                     way, which would be both in keeping with the interior worship, and a suitable token of Christ's mysteries, which were foreshadowed
+                     also by other things that they did, according to 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q103_A1-p7.4" href="./asv.html#iCor.10.11" target="asv">1 Cor. 10:11</a>: "All . . . things happened to them in figure." Therefore there were some ceremonies before the Law, but they were not legal
+                     ceremonies, because they were not as yet established
+                     by legislation.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q103_A1-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The patriarchs offered up these oblations, sacrifices and holocausts previously to the Law, out of a certain devotion of
+                     their own will, according as it seemed proper to them to offer up in honor of God those things which they had received from
+                     Him, and thus to testify that they worshipped God Who is the beginning and end of all.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q103_A1-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> They also established certain sacred things, because they thought that the honor due to God demanded that certain places
+                     should be set apart from others for the purpose of divine worship.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q103_A1-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The sacrament of circumcision was established by command of God before the Law. Hence it cannot be called a sacrament of
+                     the Law as though it were an institution of the Law, but only as an observance included in the Law. Hence Our Lord said (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q103_A1-p10.1" href="./asv.html#John.7.20" target="asv">Jn. 7:20</a>) that circumcision was "not of Moses, but of his fathers." Again, among those who worshipped God, the priesthood was in existence
+                     before the Law by human appointment, for the Law
+                     allotted the priestly dignity to the firstborn.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q103_A1-p11">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> The distinction of clean from unclean animals was in vogue before the Law, not with regard to eating them, since it is written
+                     (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q103_A1-p11.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.9.3" target="asv">Gn. 9:3</a>): "Everything that moveth and liveth shall be meat for you": but only as to the offering of sacrifices because they used
+                     only certain animals for that purpose. If, however, they did make any distinction in regard to eating; it was not that it
+                     was considered illegal to eat such animals, since this was not forbidden by
+                     any law, but from dislike or custom: thus even now we see that certain foods are looked upon with disgust in some countries,
+                     while people partake of them in others.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q103_A1-p12"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q103_A1-p13"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q103.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q103_A2.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="FS_Q103_A2" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q103_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q103_A3.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="FS_Q103_A2-p0.1">Whether, at the time of the Law, the ceremonies of the Old Law had any power of justification?</h4>
+                  <p id="FS_Q103_A2-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q103_A2-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the ceremonies of the Old Law had the power of justification at the time of the Law. Because expiation
+                     from sin and consecration pertains to justification. But it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q103_A2-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Exod.39.21" target="asv">Ex. 39:21</a>) that the priests and their apparel were consecrated by the sprinkling of blood and the anointing of oil; and (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q103_A2-p2.2" href="./asv.html#Lev.16.16" target="asv">Lev. 16:16</a>) that, by sprinkling the blood of the calf, the priest expiated "the sanctuary from the
+                     uncleanness of the children of Israel, and from their transgressions and . . . their sins." Therefore the ceremonies of the
+                     Old Law had the power of justification.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q103_A2-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, that by which man pleases God pertains to justification, according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q103_A2-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.10.8" target="asv"> Ps. 10:8</a>: "The Lord is just and hath loved justice." But some pleased God by means of ceremonies, according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q103_A2-p3.2" href="./asv.html#Lev.10.19" target="asv"> Lev. 10:19</a>: "How could I . . . please the Lord in the ceremonies, having a sorrowful heart?" Therefore the ceremonies of the Old Law
+                     had the power of justification.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q103_A2-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, things relating to the divine worship regard the soul rather than the body, according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q103_A2-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.18.8" target="asv"> Ps. 18:8</a>: "The Law of the Lord is unspotted, converting souls." But the leper was cleansed by means of the ceremonies of the Old Law,
+                     as stated in 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q103_A2-p4.2" href="./asv.html#Lev.14" target="asv">Lev. 14</a>. Much more therefore could the ceremonies of the Old Law cleanse the soul by justifying it.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q103_A2-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle says (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q103_A2-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Gal.2" target="asv">Gal. 2</a>) [*The first words of the quotation are from 3:21: St. Thomas probably quoting from memory, substituted them for 2:21, which
+                     runs thus: 'If justice be by the Law, then Christ died in vain.']: "If there had been a law given which could justify [Vulg.:
+                     'give life'], Christ died in vain," i.e. without cause. But this is inadmissible. Therefore the ceremonies of the Old Law
+                     did not confer justice.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q103_A2-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above (
+                     <a id="FS_Q103_A2-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q102_A5.html">Q[102], A[5]</a>, ad 4), a twofold uncleanness was distinguished in the Old Law. One was spiritual and is the uncleanness of sin. The other
+                     was corporal, which rendered a man unfit for divine worship; thus a leper, or anyone that touched carrion, was said to be
+                     unclean: and thus uncleanness was nothing but a kind of irregularity. From this uncleanness, then, the ceremonies of the Old
+                     Law had the power to cleanse:
+                     because they were ordered by the Law to be employed as remedies for the removal of the aforesaid uncleannesses which were
+                     contracted in consequence of the prescription of the Law. Hence the Apostle says (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q103_A2-p6.2" href="./asv.html#Heb.9.13" target="asv">Heb. 9:13</a>) that "the blood of goats and of oxen, and the ashes of a heifer, being sprinkled, sanctify such as are defiled, to the cleansing
+                     of the flesh." And just as this uncleanness which was washed away by such like ceremonies, affected the flesh rather than
+                     the soul, so
+                     also the ceremonies themselves are called by the Apostle shortly before (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q103_A2-p6.3" href="./asv.html#Heb.9.10" target="asv">Heb. 9:10</a>) justices of the flesh: "justices of the flesh," says he, "being laid on them until the time of correction."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q103_A2-p7"> On the other hand, they had no power of cleansing from uncleanness of the soul, i.e. from the uncleanness of sin. The reason
+                     of this was that at no time could there be expiation from sin, except through Christ, "Who taketh away the sins [Vulg.: 'sin']
+                     of the world" (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q103_A2-p7.1" href="./asv.html#John.1.29" target="asv">Jn. 1:29</a>). And since the mystery of Christ's Incarnation and Passion had not yet really taken place, those ceremonies of the Old Law
+                     could not really contain in themselves a power flowing from
+                     Christ already incarnate and crucified, such as the sacraments of the New Law contain. Consequently they could not cleanse
+                     from sin: thus the Apostle says (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q103_A2-p7.2" href="./asv.html#Heb.10.4" target="asv">Heb. 10:4</a>) that "it is impossible that with the blood of oxen and goats sin should be taken away"; and for this reason he calls them
+                     (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q103_A2-p7.3" href="./asv.html#Gal.4.9" target="asv">Gal. 4:9</a>) "weak and needy elements": weak indeed, because they cannot take away sin; but this weakness results from their being needy,
+                     i.e. from the fact that they do
+                     not contain grace within themselves.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q103_A2-p8"> However, it was possible at the time of the Law, for the minds of the faithful, to be united by faith to Christ incarnate
+                     and crucified; so that they were justified by faith in Christ: of which faith the observance of these ceremonies was a sort
+                     of profession, inasmuch as they foreshadowed Christ. Hence in the Old Law certain sacrifices were offered up for sins, not
+                     as though the sacrifices themselves washed sins away, but because they were professions of faith which cleansed
+                     from sin. In fact, the Law itself implies this in the terms employed: for it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q103_A2-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Lev.4.26" target="asv">Lev. 4:26</a>; 5:16) that in offering the sacrifice for sin "the priest shall pray for him . . . and it shall be forgiven him," as though
+                     the sin were forgiven, not in virtue of the sacrifices, but through the faith and devotion of those who offered them. It must
+                     be observed, however, that the very fact that the ceremonies of the Old Law washed away uncleanness of the body, was a figure
+                     of
+                     that expiation from sins which was effected by Christ.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q103_A2-p9"> It is therefore evident that under the state of the Old Law the ceremonies had no power of justification.</p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q103_A2-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> That sanctification of priests and their sons, and of their apparel or of anything else belonging to them, by sprinkling
+                     them with blood, had no other effect but to appoint them to the divine worship, and to remove impediments from them, "to the
+                     cleansing of the flesh," as the Apostle states (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q103_A2-p10.1" href="./asv.html#Heb.9.13" target="asv">Heb. 9:13</a>) in token of that sanctification whereby "Jesus" sanctified "the people by His own blood" (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q103_A2-p10.2" href="./asv.html#Heb.13.12" target="asv">Heb. 13:12</a>).
+                     Moreover, the expiation must be understood as referring to the removal of these bodily uncleannesses, not to the forgiveness
+                     of sin. Hence even the sanctuary which could not be the subject of sin is stated to be expiated.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q103_A2-p11">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The priests pleased God in the ceremonies by their obedience and devotion, and by their faith in the reality foreshadowed;
+                     not by reason of the things considered in themselves.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q103_A2-p12">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Those ceremonies which were prescribed in the cleansing of a leper, were not ordained for the purpose of taking away the
+                     defilement of leprosy. This is clear from the fact that these ceremonies were not applied to a man until he was already healed:
+                     hence it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q103_A2-p12.1" href="./asv.html#Lev.14.3" target="asv">Lev. 14:3,4</a>) that the priest, "going out of the camp, when he shall find that the leprosy is cleansed, shall command him that is to be
+                     purified to offer," etc.; whence it is evident
+                     that the priest was appointed the judge of leprosy, not before, but after cleansing. But these ceremonies were employed for
+                     the purpose of taking away the uncleanness of irregularity. They do say, however, that if a priest were to err in his judgment,
+                     the leper would be cleansed miraculously by the power of God, but not in virtue of the sacrifice. Thus also it was by miracle
+                     that the thigh of the adulterous woman rotted, when she had drunk the water "on which" the priest had "heaped curses," as
+                     stated in
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q103_A2-p12.2" href="./asv.html#Num.5.19" target="asv"> Num. 5:19-27.</a>
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q103_A2-p13"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q103_A2-p14"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q103_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q103_A3.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="FS_Q103_A3" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q103_A2.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q103_A4.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="FS_Q103_A3-p0.1">Whether the ceremonies of the Old Law ceased at the coming of Christ?</h4>
+                  <p id="FS_Q103_A3-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q103_A3-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the ceremonies of the Old Law did not cease at the coming of Christ. For it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q103_A3-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Bar.4.1" target="asv">Bar 4:1</a>): "This is the book of the commandments of God, and the law that is for ever." But the legal ceremonies were part of the
+                     Law. Therefore the legal ceremonies were to last for ever.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q103_A3-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the offering made by a leper after being cleansed was a ceremony of the Law. But the Gospel commands the leper,
+                     who has been cleansed, to make this offering (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q103_A3-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.8.4" target="asv">Mat. 8:4</a>). Therefore the ceremonies of the Old Law did not cease at Christ's coming.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q103_A3-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, as long as the cause remains, the effect remains. But the ceremonies of the Old Law had certain reasonable causes,
+                     inasmuch as they were ordained to the worship of God, besides the fact that they were intended to be figures of Christ. Therefore
+                     the ceremonies of the Old Law should not have ceased.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q103_A3-p5">
+                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, circumcision was instituted as a sign of Abraham's faith: the observance of the sabbath, to recall the blessing
+                     of creation: and other solemnities, in memory of other Divine favors, as state above (
+                     <a id="FS_Q103_A3-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q102_A4.html">Q[102], A[4]</a>, ad 10; A[5], ad 1). But Abraham's faith is ever to be imitated even by us: and the blessing of creation and other Divine
+                     favors should never be forgotten. Therefore at least circumcision and the other legal
+                     solemnities should not have ceased.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q103_A3-p6">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle says (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q103_A3-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Col.2.16" target="asv">Col. 2:16,17</a>): "Let no man . . . judge you in meat or in drink, or in respect of a festival day, or of the new moon, or of the sabbaths,
+                     which are a shadow of things to come": and (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q103_A3-p6.2" href="./asv.html#Heb.8.13" target="asv">Heb. 8:13</a>): "In saying a new (testament), he hath made the former old: and that which decayeth and groweth old, is near its end."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q103_A3-p7">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> All the ceremonial precepts of the Old Law were ordained to the worship of God as stated above (
+                     <a id="FS_Q103_A3-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q101_A1.html">Q[101], AA[1]</a>,2). Now external worship should be in proportion to the internal worship, which consists in faith, hope and charity. Consequently
+                     exterior worship had to be subject to variations according to the variations in the internal worship, in which a threefold
+                     state may be distinguished. One state was in respect of faith and hope,
+                     both in heavenly goods, and in the means of obtaining them---in both of these considered as things to come. Such was the state
+                     of faith and hope in the Old Law. Another state of interior worship is that in which we have faith and hope in heavenly goods
+                     as things to come; but in the means of obtaining heavenly goods, as in things present or past. Such is the state of the New
+                     Law. The third state is that in which both are possessed as present; wherein nothing is believed in as lacking, nothing
+                     hoped for as being yet to come. Such is the state of the Blessed.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q103_A3-p8"> In this state of the Blessed, then, nothing in regard to worship of God will be figurative; there will be naught but "thanksgiving
+                     and voice of praise" (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q103_A3-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.51.3" target="asv">Is. 51:3</a>). Hence it is written concerning the city of the Blessed (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q103_A3-p8.2" href="./asv.html#Rev.21.22" target="asv">Apoc. 21:22</a>): "I saw no temple therein: for the Lord God Almighty is the temple thereof, and the Lamb." Proportionately, therefore, the
+                     ceremonies of the first-mentioned state which foreshadowed the second and third
+                     states, had need to cease at the advent of the second state; and other ceremonies had to be introduced which would be in keeping
+                     with the state of divine worship for that particular time, wherein heavenly goods are a thing of the future, but the Divine
+                     favors whereby we obtain the heavenly boons are a thing of the present.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q103_A3-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The Old Law is said to be "for ever" simply and absolutely, as regards its moral precepts; but as regards the ceremonial
+                     precepts it lasts for even in respect of the reality which those ceremonies foreshadowed.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q103_A3-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The mystery of the redemption of the human race was fulfilled in Christ's Passion: hence Our Lord said then: "It is consummated"
+                     (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q103_A3-p10.1" href="./asv.html#John.19.30" target="asv">Jn. 19:30</a>). Consequently the prescriptions of the Law must have ceased then altogether through their reality being fulfilled. As a
+                     sign of this, we read that at the Passion of Christ "the veil of the temple was rent" (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q103_A3-p10.2" href="./asv.html#Matt.27.51" target="asv">Mat. 27:51</a>). Hence, before Christ's Passion, while Christ was
+                     preaching and working miracles, the Law and the Gospel were concurrent, since the mystery of Christ had already begun, but
+                     was not as yet consummated. And for this reason Our Lord, before His Passion, commanded the leper to observe the legal ceremonies.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q103_A3-p11">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The literal reasons already given (
+                     <a id="FS_Q103_A3-p11.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q102.html">Q[102])</a> for the ceremonies refer to the divine worship, which was founded on faith in that which was to come. Hence, at the advent
+                     of Him Who was to come, both that worship ceased, and all the reasons referring thereto.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q103_A3-p12">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> The faith of Abraham was commended in that he believed in God's promise concerning his seed to come, in which all nations
+                     were to blessed. Wherefore, as long as this seed was yet to come, it was necessary to make profession of Abraham's faith by
+                     means of circumcision. But now that it is consummated, the same thing needs to be declared by means of another sign, viz.
+                     Baptism, which, in this respect, took the place of circumcision, according to the
+                     saying of the Apostle (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q103_A3-p12.1" href="./asv.html#Col.2.11" target="asv">Col. 2:11, 12</a>): "You are circumcised with circumcision not made by hand, in despoiling of the body of the flesh, but in the circumcision
+                     of Christ, buried with Him in Baptism."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q103_A3-p13"> As to the sabbath, which was a sign recalling the first creation, its place is taken by the "Lord's Day," which recalls the
+                     beginning of the new creature in the Resurrection of Christ. In like manner other solemnities of the Old Law are supplanted
+                     by new solemnities: because the blessings vouchsafed to that people, foreshadowed the favors granted us by Christ. Hence the
+                     feast of the Passover gave place to the feast of Christ's Passion and Resurrection: the feast of Pentecost
+                     when the Old Law was given, to the feast of Pentecost on which was given the Law of the living spirit: the feast of the New
+                     Moon, to Lady Day, when appeared the first rays of the sun, i.e. Christ, by the fulness of grace: the feast of Trumpets, to
+                     the feasts of the Apostles: the feast of Expiation, to the feasts of Martyrs and Confessors: the feast of Tabernacles, to
+                     the feast of the Church Dedication: the feast of the Assembly and Collection, to feast of the Angels, or else to the feast
+                     of All
+                     Hallows.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q103_A3-p14"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q103_A3-p15"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q103_A2.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q103_A4.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="FS_Q103_A4" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q103_A3.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q104.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="FS_Q103_A4-p0.1">Whether since Christ's Passion the legal ceremonies can be observed without committing mortal sin?</h4>
+                  <p id="FS_Q103_A4-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q103_A4-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that since Christ's Passion the legal ceremonies can be observed without committing mortal sin. For we must
+                     not believe that the apostles committed mortal sin after receiving the Holy Ghost: since by His fulness they were "endued
+                     with power from on high" (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q103_A4-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Luke.24.49" target="asv">Lk. 24:49</a>). But the apostles observed the legal ceremonies after the coming of the Holy Ghost: for it is stated (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q103_A4-p2.2" href="./asv.html#Acts.16.3" target="asv">Acts 16:3</a>) that Paul circumcised Timothy: and
+                     (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q103_A4-p2.3" href="./asv.html#Acts.21.26" target="asv">Acts 21:26</a>) that Paul, at the advice of James, "took the men, and . . . being purified with them, entered into the temple, giving notice
+                     of the accomplishment of the days of purification, until an oblation should be offered for every one of them." Therefore the
+                     legal ceremonies can be observed since the Passion of Christ without mortal sin.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q103_A4-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, one of the legal ceremonies consisted in shunning the fellowship of Gentiles. But the first Pastor of the Church
+                     complied with this observance; for it is stated (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q103_A4-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Gal.2.12" target="asv">Gal. 2:12</a>) that, "when" certain men "had come" to Antioch, Peter "withdrew and separated himself" from the Gentiles. Therefore the
+                     legal ceremonies can be observed since Christ's Passion without committing mortal sin.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q103_A4-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the commands of the apostles did not lead men into sin. But it was commanded by apostolic decree that the Gentiles
+                     should observe certain ceremonies of the Law: for it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q103_A4-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Acts.15.28" target="asv">Acts 15:28,29</a>): "It hath seemed good to the Holy Ghost and to us, to lay no further burden upon you than these necessary things: that you
+                     abstain from things sacrificed to idols, and from blood, and from things strangled, and from fornication." Therefore
+                     the legal ceremonies can be observed since Christ's Passion without committing mortal sin.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q103_A4-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle says (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q103_A4-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Gal.5.2" target="asv">Gal. 5:2</a>): "If you be circumcised, Christ shall profit you nothing." But nothing save mortal sin hinders us from receiving Christ's
+                     fruit. Therefore since Christ's Passion it is a mortal sin to be circumcised, or to observe the other legal ceremonies.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q103_A4-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> All ceremonies are professions of faith, in which the interior worship of God consists. Now man can make profession of his
+                     inward faith, by deeds as well as by words: and in either profession, if he make a false declaration, he sins mortally. Now,
+                     though our faith in Christ is the same as that of the fathers of old; yet, since they came before Christ, whereas we come
+                     after Him, the same faith is expressed in different words, by us and by them. For by them
+                     was it said: "Behold a virgin shall conceive and bear a son," where the verbs are in the future tense: whereas we express
+                     the same by means of verbs in the past tense, and say that she "conceived and bore." In like manner the ceremonies of the
+                     Old Law betokened Christ as having yet to be born and to suffer: whereas our sacraments signify Him as already born and having
+                     suffered. Consequently, just as it would be a mortal sin now for anyone, in making a profession of faith, to say that Christ
+                     is
+                     yet to be born, which the fathers of old said devoutly and truthfully; so too it would be a mortal sin now to observe those
+                     ceremonies which the fathers of old fulfilled with devotion and fidelity. Such is the teaching Augustine (Contra Faust. xix,
+                     16), who says: "It is no longer promised that He shall be born, shall suffer and rise again, truths of which their sacraments
+                     were a kind of image: but it is declared that He is already born, has suffered and risen again; of which our sacraments, in
+                     which Christians share, are the actual representation."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q103_A4-p7">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> On this point there seems to have been a difference of opinion between Jerome and Augustine. For Jerome (Super Galat. ii,
+                     11, seqq.) distinguished two periods of time. One was the time previous to Christ's Passion, during which the legal ceremonies
+                     were neither dead, since they were obligatory, and did expiate in their own fashion; nor deadly, because it was not sinful
+                     to observe them. But immediately after Christ's Passion they began to be not only
+                     dead, so as no longer to be either effectual or binding; but also deadly, so that whoever observed them was guilty of mortal
+                     sin. Hence he maintained that after the Passion the apostles never observed the legal ceremonies in real earnest; but only
+                     by a kind of pious pretense, lest, to wit, they should scandalize the Jews and hinder their conversion. This pretense, however,
+                     is to be understood, not as though they did not in reality perform those actions, but in the sense that they performed them
+                     without the mind to observe the ceremonies of the Law: thus a man might cut away his foreskin for health's sake, not with
+                     the intention of observing legal circumcision.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q103_A4-p8"> But since it seems unbecoming that the apostles, in order to avoid scandal, should have hidden things pertaining to the truth
+                     of life and doctrine, and that they should have made use of pretense, in things pertaining to the salvation of the faithful;
+                     therefore Augustine (Epist. lxxxii) more fittingly distinguished three periods of time. One was the time that preceded the
+                     Passion of Christ, during which the legal ceremonies were neither deadly nor dead: another period was after
+                     the publication of the Gospel, during which the legal ceremonies are both dead and deadly. The third is a middle period, viz.
+                     from the Passion of Christ until the publication of the Gospel, during which the legal ceremonies were dead indeed, because
+                     they had neither effect nor binding force; but were not deadly, because it was lawful for the Jewish converts to Christianity
+                     to observe them, provided they did not put their trust in them so as to hold them to be necessary unto salvation, as though
+                     faith in Christ could not justify without the legal observances. On the other hand, there was no reason why those who were
+                     converted from heathendom to Christianity should observe them. Hence Paul circumcised Timothy, who was born of a Jewish mother;
+                     but was unwilling to circumcise Titus, who was of heathen nationality.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q103_A4-p9"> The reason why the Holy Ghost did not wish the converted Jews to be debarred at once from observing the legal ceremonies,
+                     while converted heathens were forbidden to observe the rites of heathendom, was in order to show that there is a difference
+                     between these rites. For heathenish ceremonial was rejected as absolutely unlawful, and as prohibited by God for all time;
+                     whereas the legal ceremonial ceased as being fulfilled through Christ's Passion, being instituted by God as a
+                     figure of Christ.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q103_A4-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> According to Jerome, Peter withdrew himself from the Gentiles by pretense, in order to avoid giving scandal to the Jews,
+                     of whom he was the Apostle. Hence he did not sin at all in acting thus. On the other hand, Paul in like manner made a pretense
+                     of blaming him, in order to avoid scandalizing the Gentiles, whose Apostle he was. But Augustine disapproves of this solution:
+                     because in the canonical Scripture (viz.
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q103_A4-p10.1" href="./asv.html#Gal.2.11" target="asv"> Gal. 2:11</a>),
+                     wherein we must not hold anything to be false, Paul says that Peter "was to be blamed." Consequently it is true that Peter
+                     was at fault: and Paul blamed him in very truth and not with pretense. Peter, however, did not sin, by observing the legal
+                     ceremonial for the time being; because this was lawful for him who was a converted Jew. But he did sin by excessive minuteness
+                     in the observance of the legal rites lest he should scandalize the Jews, the result being that he gave scandal to the
+                     Gentiles.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q103_A4-p11">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Some have held that this prohibition of the apostles is not to be taken literally, but spiritually: namely, that the prohibition
+                     of blood signifies the prohibition of murder; the prohibition of things strangled, that of violence and rapine; the prohibition
+                     of things offered to idols, that of idolatry; while fornication is forbidden as being evil in itself: which opinion they gathered
+                     from certain glosses, which expound these prohibitions in a mystical
+                     sense. Since, however, murder and rapine were held to be unlawful even by the Gentiles, there would have been no need to give
+                     this special commandment to those who were converted to Christ from heathendom. Hence others maintain that those foods were
+                     forbidden literally, not to prevent the observance of legal ceremonies, but in order to prevent gluttony. Thus Jerome says
+                     on Ezech. 44:31 ("The priest shall not eat of anything that is dead"): "He condemns those priests who from gluttony did not
+                     keep these precepts."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q103_A4-p12"> But since certain foods are more delicate than these and more conducive to gluttony, there seems no reason why these should
+                     have been forbidden more than the others.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q103_A4-p13"> We must therefore follow the third opinion, and hold that these foods were forbidden literally, not with the purpose of enforcing
+                     compliance with the legal ceremonies, but in order to further the union of Gentiles and Jews living side by side. Because
+                     blood and things strangled were loathsome to the Jews by ancient custom; while the Jews might have suspected the Gentiles
+                     of relapse into idolatry if the latter had partaken of things offered to idols. Hence these things were
+                     prohibited for the time being, during which the Gentiles and Jews were to become united together. But as time went on, with
+                     the lapse of the cause, the effect lapsed also, when the truth of the Gospel teaching was divulged, wherein Our Lord taught
+                     that "not that which entereth into the mouth defileth a man" (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q103_A4-p13.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.15.11" target="asv">Mat. 15:11</a>); and that "nothing is to be rejected that is received with thanksgiving" (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q103_A4-p13.2" href="./asv.html#iTim.4.4" target="asv">1 Tim. 4:4</a>). With regard to fornication a special prohibition
+                     was made, because the Gentiles did not hold it to be sinful.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q103_A4-p14"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q103_A4-p15"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q103_A3.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q104.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <a href="summa.FS_Q102_A6.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.FS_Q103_A1.html"></a>
+            </div>
+            <div id="FS_Q104" class="div3">
+               <a href="summa.FS_Q103_A4.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.FS_Q104_A1.html"></a>
+               <h3 id="FS_Q104-p0.1">OF THE JUDICIAL PRECEPTS (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3>
+               <p id="FS_Q104-p1"></p>
+               <p id="FS_Q104-p2"> We must now consider the judicial precepts: and first of all we shall consider them in general; in the second place we shall
+                  consider their reasons. Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:
+               </p>
+               <p id="FS_Q104-p3"> (1) What is meant by the judicial precepts?</p>
+               <p id="FS_Q104-p4"> (2) Whether they are figurative?</p>
+               <p id="FS_Q104-p5"> (3) Their duration;</p>
+               <p id="FS_Q104-p6"> (4) Their division.</p>
+               <div id="FS_Q104_A1" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q104.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q104_A2.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="FS_Q104_A1-p0.1">Whether the judicial precepts were those which directed man in relation to his neighbor?</h4>
+                  <p id="FS_Q104_A1-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q104_A1-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the judicial precepts were not those which directed man in his relations to his neighbor. For judicial
+                     precepts take their name from "judgment." But there are many things that direct man as to his neighbor, which are not subordinate
+                     to judgment. Therefore the judicial precepts were not those which directed man in his relations to his neighbor.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q104_A1-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the judicial precepts are distinct from the moral precepts, as stated above (
+                     <a id="FS_Q104_A1-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q99_A4.html">Q[99], A[4]</a>). But there are many moral precepts which direct man as to his neighbor: as is evidently the case with the seven precepts
+                     of the second table. Therefore the judicial precepts are not so called from directing man as to his neighbor.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q104_A1-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, as the ceremonial precepts relate to God, so do the judicial precepts relate to one's neighbor, as stated above
+                     (
+                     <a id="FS_Q104_A1-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q99_A4.html">Q[99], A[4]</a>;
+                     <a id="FS_Q104_A1-p4.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q101_A1.html"> Q[101], A[1]</a>). But among the ceremonial precepts there are some which concern man himself, such as observances in matter of food and apparel,
+                     of which we have already spoken (
+                     <a id="FS_Q104_A1-p4.3" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q102_A6.html">Q[102], A[6]</a>, ad 1,6). Therefore the judicial precepts are not so called from
+                     directing man as to his neighbor.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q104_A1-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is reckoned (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q104_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Ezek.18.8" target="asv">Ezech. 18:8</a>) among other works of a good and just man, that "he hath executed true judgment between man and man." But judicial precepts
+                     are so called from "judgment." Therefore it seems that the judicial precepts were those which directed the relations between
+                     man and man.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q104_A1-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> As is evident from what we have stated above (
+                     <a id="FS_Q104_A1-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q95_A2.html">Q[95], A[2]</a> ;
+                     <a id="FS_Q104_A1-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q99_A4.html"> Q[99], A[4]</a>), in every law, some precepts derive their binding force from the dictate of reason itself, because natural reason dictates
+                     that something ought to be done or to be avoided. These are called "moral" precepts: since human morals are based on reason.
+                     At the same time there are other precepts which derive their binding force, not from the
+                     very dictate of reason (because, considered in themselves, they do not imply an obligation of something due or undue); but
+                     from some institution, Divine or human: and such are certain determinations of the moral precepts. When therefore the moral
+                     precepts are fixed by Divine institution in matters relating to man's subordination to God, they are called "ceremonial" precepts:
+                     but when they refer to man's relations to other men, they are called "judicial" precepts. Hence there are two conditions
+                     attached to the judicial precepts: viz. first, that they refer to man's relations to other men; secondly, that they derive
+                     their binding force not from reason alone, but in virtue of their institution.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q104_A1-p7">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Judgments emanate through the official pronouncement of certain men who are at the head of affairs, and in whom the judicial
+                     power is vested. Now it belongs to those who are at the head of affairs to regulate not only litigious matters, but also voluntary
+                     contracts which are concluded between man and man, and whatever matters concern the community at large and the government
+                     thereof. Consequently the judicial precepts are not only those which concern
+                     actions at law; but also all those that are directed to the ordering of one man in relation to another, which ordering is
+                     subject to the direction of the sovereign as supreme judge.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q104_A1-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> This argument holds in respect of those precepts which direct man in his relations to his neighbor, and derive their binding
+                     force from the mere dictate of reason.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q104_A1-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Even in those precepts which direct us to God, some are moral precepts, which the reason itself dictates when it is quickened
+                     by faith; such as that God is to be loved and worshipped. There are also ceremonial precepts, which have no binding force
+                     except in virtue of their Divine institution. Now God is concerned not only with the sacrifices that are offered to Him, but
+                     also with whatever relates to the fitness of those who offer sacrifices to Him and
+                     worship Him. Because men are ordained to God as to their end; wherefore it concerns God and, consequently, is a matter of
+                     ceremonial precept, that man should show some fitness for the divine worship. On the other hand, man is not ordained to his
+                     neighbor as to his end, so as to need to be disposed in himself with regard to his neighbor, for such is the relationship
+                     of a slave to his master, since a slave "is his master's in all that he is," as the Philosopher says (Polit. i, 2). Hence
+                     there are
+                     no judicial precepts ordaining man in himself; all such precepts are moral: because the reason, which is the principal in
+                     moral matters, holds the same position, in man, with regard to things that concern him, as a prince or judge holds in the
+                     state. Nevertheless we must take note that, since the relations of man to his neighbor are more subject to reason than the
+                     relations of man to God, there are more precepts whereby man is directed in his relations to his neighbor, than whereby he
+                     is
+                     directed to God. For the same reason there had to be more ceremonial than judicial precepts in the Law.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q104_A1-p10"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q104_A1-p11"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q104.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q104_A2.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="FS_Q104_A2" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q104_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q104_A3.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="FS_Q104_A2-p0.1">Whether the judicial precepts were figurative?</h4>
+                  <p id="FS_Q104_A2-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q104_A2-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the judicial precepts were not figurative. Because it seems proper to the ceremonial precepts to be instituted
+                     as figures of something else. Therefore, if the judicial precepts are figurative, there will be no difference between the
+                     judicial and ceremonial precepts.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q104_A2-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, just as certain judicial precepts were given to the Jewish people, so also were some given to other heathen peoples.
+                     But the judicial precepts given to other peoples were not figurative, but stated what had to be done. Therefore it seems that
+                     neither were the judicial precepts of the Old Law figures of anything.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q104_A2-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, those things which relate to the divine worship had to be taught under certain figures, because the things of God
+                     are above our reason, as stated above (
+                     <a id="FS_Q104_A2-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q101_A2.html">Q[101], A[2]</a>, ad 2). But things concerning our neighbor are not above our reason. Therefore the judicial precepts which direct us in relation
+                     to our neighbor should not have been figurative.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q104_A2-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The judicial precepts are expounded both in the allegorical and in the moral sense (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q104_A2-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Exod.21" target="asv">Ex. 21</a>).
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q104_A2-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> A precept may be figurative in two ways. First, primarily and in itself: because, to wit, it is instituted principally that
+                     it may be the figure of something. In this way the ceremonial precepts are figurative; since they were instituted for the
+                     very purpose that they might foreshadow something relating to the worship of God and the mystery of Christ. But some precepts
+                     are figurative, not primarily and in themselves, but consequently. In this way the
+                     judicial precepts of the Old Law are figurative. For they were not instituted for the purpose of being figurative, but in
+                     order that they might regulate the state of that people according to justice and equity. Nevertheless they did foreshadow
+                     something consequently: since, to wit, the entire state of that people, who were directed by these precepts, was figurative,
+                     according to 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q104_A2-p6.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.10.11" target="asv">1 Cor. 10:11</a>: "All . . . things happened to them in figure."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q104_A2-p7">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The ceremonial precepts are not figurative in the same way as the judicial precepts, as explained above.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q104_A2-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The Jewish people were chosen by God that Christ might be born of them. Consequently the entire state of that people had
+                     to be prophetic and figurative, as Augustine states (Contra Faust. xxii, 24). For this reason even the judicial precepts that
+                     were given to this people were more figurative that those which were given to other nations. Thus, too, the wars and deeds
+                     of this people are expounded in the mystical sense: but not the wars and deeds of the
+                     Assyrians or Romans, although the latter are more famous in the eyes of men.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q104_A2-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> In this people the direction of man in regard to his neighbor, considered in itself, was subject to reason. But in so far
+                     as it was referred to the worship of God, it was above reason: and in this respect it was figurative.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q104_A2-p10"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q104_A2-p11"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q104_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q104_A3.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="FS_Q104_A3" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q104_A2.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q104_A4.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="FS_Q104_A3-p0.1">Whether the judicial precepts of the Old Law bind for ever?</h4>
+                  <p id="FS_Q104_A3-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q104_A3-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the judicial precepts of the Old Law bind for ever. Because the judicial precepts relate to the virtue
+                     of justice: since a judgment is an execution of the virtue of justice. Now "justice is perpetual and immortal" (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q104_A3-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.1.15" target="asv">Wis. 1:15</a>). Therefore the judicial precepts bind for ever.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q104_A3-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Divine institutions are more enduring than human institutions. But the judicial precepts of human laws bind for
+                     ever. Therefore much more do the judicial precepts of the Divine Law.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q104_A3-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the Apostle says (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q104_A3-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Heb.7.18" target="asv">Heb. 7:18</a>) that "there is a setting aside of the former commandment, because of the weakness and unprofitableness thereof." Now this
+                     is true of the ceremonial precept, which "could [Vulg.: 'can'] not, as to the conscience, make him perfect that serveth only
+                     in meats and in drinks, and divers washings and justices of the flesh," as the Apostle declares (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q104_A3-p4.2" href="./asv.html#Heb.9.9" target="asv">Heb. 9:9,10</a>). On the other hand, the
+                     judicial precepts were useful and efficacious in respect of the purpose for which they were instituted, viz. to establish
+                     justice and equity among men. Therefore the judicial precepts of the Old Law are not set aside, but still retain their efficacy.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q104_A3-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle says (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q104_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Heb.7.12" target="asv">Heb. 7:12</a>) that "the priesthood being translated it is necessary that a translation also be made of the Law." But the priesthood was
+                     transferred from Aaron to Christ. Therefore the entire Law was also transferred. Therefore the judicial precepts are no longer
+                     in force.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q104_A3-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> The judicial precepts did not bind for ever, but were annulled by the coming of Christ: yet not in the same way as the ceremonial
+                     precepts. For the ceremonial precepts were annulled so far as to be not only "dead," but also deadly to those who observe
+                     them since the coming of Christ, especially since the promulgation of the Gospel. On the other hand, the judicial precepts
+                     are dead indeed, because they have no binding force: but they are not deadly. For if a
+                     sovereign were to order these judicial precepts to be observed in his kingdom, he would not sin: unless perchance they were
+                     observed, or ordered to be observed, as though they derived their binding force through being institutions of the Old Law:
+                     for it would be a deadly sin to intend to observe them thus.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q104_A3-p7"> The reason for this difference may be gathered from what has been said above 
+                     <a id="FS_Q104_A3-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q104_A2.html">(A[2])</a>. For it has been stated that the ceremonial precepts are figurative primarily and in themselves, as being instituted chiefly
+                     for the purpose of foreshadowing the mysteries of Christ to come. On the other hand, the judicial precepts were not instituted
+                     that they might be figures, but that they might shape the state of that people who were directed to Christ. Consequently,
+                     when the state of that people changed with the coming of Christ, the judicial precepts lost their binding force: for the Law
+                     was a pedagogue, leading men to Christ, as stated in 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q104_A3-p7.2" href="./asv.html#Gal.3.24" target="asv"> Gal. 3:24.</a> Since, however, these judicial precepts are instituted, not for the purpose of being figures, but for the performance of
+                     certain deeds, the observance thereof is not prejudicial to the truth of faith. But the intention of observing them, as though
+                     one were bound by the Law, is
+                     prejudicial to the truth of faith: because it would follow that the former state of the people still lasts, and that Christ
+                     has not yet come.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q104_A3-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The obligation of observing justice is indeed perpetual. But the determination of those things that are just, according to
+                     human or Divine institution, must needs be different, according to the different states of mankind.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q104_A3-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The judicial precepts established by men retain their binding force for ever, so long as the state of government remains
+                     the same. But if the state or nation pass to another form of government, the laws must needs be changed. For democracy, which
+                     is government by the people, demands different laws from those of oligarchy, which is government by the rich, as the Philosopher
+                     shows (Polit. iv, 1). Consequently when the state of that people changed, the
+                     judicial precepts had to be changed also.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q104_A3-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Those judicial precepts directed the people to justice and equity, in keeping with the demands of that state. But after the
+                     coming of Christ, there had to be a change in the state of that people, so that in Christ there was no distinction between
+                     Gentile and Jew, as there had been before. For this reason the judicial precepts needed to be changed also.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q104_A3-p11"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q104_A3-p12"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q104_A2.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q104_A4.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="FS_Q104_A4" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q104_A3.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q105.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="FS_Q104_A4-p0.1">Whether it is possible to assign a distinct division of the judicial precepts?</h4>
+                  <p id="FS_Q104_A4-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q104_A4-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that it is impossible to assign a distinct division of the judicial precepts. Because the judicial precepts
+                     direct men in their relations to one another. But those things which need to be directed, as pertaining to the relationship
+                     between man and man, and which are made use of by men, are not subject to division, since they are infinite in number. Therefore
+                     it is not possible to assign a distinct division of the judicial precepts.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q104_A4-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the judicial precepts are decisions on moral matters. But moral precepts do not seem to be capable of division,
+                     except in so far as they are reducible to the precepts of the decalogue. Therefore there is no distinct division of the judicial
+                     precepts.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q104_A4-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, because there is a distinct division of the ceremonial precepts, the Law alludes to this division, by describing
+                     some as "sacrifices," others as "observances." But the Law contains no allusion to a division of the judicial precepts. Therefore
+                     it seems that they have no distinct division.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q104_A4-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Wherever there is order there must needs be division. But the notion of order is chiefly applicable to the judicial precepts,
+                     since thereby that people was ordained. Therefore it is most necessary that they should have a distinct division.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q104_A4-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> Since law is the art, as it were, of directing or ordering the life of man, as in every art there is a distinct division
+                     in the rules of art, so, in every law, there must be a distinct division of precepts: else the law would be rendered useless
+                     by confusion. We must therefore say that the judicial precepts of the Old Law, whereby men were directed in their relations
+                     to one another, are subject to division according to the divers ways in which man is
+                     directed.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q104_A4-p7"> Now in every people a fourfold order is to be found: one, of the people's sovereign to his subjects; a second of the subjects
+                     among themselves; a third, of the citizens to foreigners; a fourth, of members of the same household, such as the order of
+                     the father to his son; of the wife to her husband; of the master to his servant: and according to these four orders we may
+                     distinguish different kinds of judicial precepts in the Old Law. For certain precepts are laid down concerning
+                     the institution of the sovereign and relating to his office, and about the respect due to him: this is one part of the judicial
+                     precepts. Again, certain precepts are given in respect of a man to his fellow citizens: for instance, about buying and selling,
+                     judgments and penalties: this is the second part of the judicial precepts. Again, certain precepts are enjoined with regard
+                     to foreigners: for instance, about wars waged against their foes, and about the way to receive travelers and strangers:
+                     this is the third part of the judicial precepts. Lastly, certain precepts are given relating to home life: for instance, about
+                     servants, wives and children: this is the fourth part of the judicial precepts.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q104_A4-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Things pertaining to the ordering of relations between one man and another are indeed infinite in number: yet they are reducible
+                     to certain distinct heads, according to the different relations in which one man stands to another, as stated above.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q104_A4-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The precepts of the decalogue held the first place in the moral order, as stated above (
+                     <a id="FS_Q104_A4-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q100_A3.html">Q[100], A[3]</a>): and consequently it is fitting that other moral precepts should be distinguished in relation to them. But the judicial
+                     and ceremonial precepts have a different binding force, derived, not from natural reason, but from their institution alone.
+                     Hence there is a distinct reason for distinguishing them.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q104_A4-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The Law alludes to the division of the judicial precepts in the very things themselves which are prescribed by the judicial
+                     precepts of the Law.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q104_A4-p11"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q104_A4-p12"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q104_A3.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q105.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <a href="summa.FS_Q103_A4.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.FS_Q104_A1.html"></a>
+            </div>
+            <div id="FS_Q105" class="div3">
+               <a href="summa.FS_Q104_A4.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.FS_Q105_A1.html"></a>
+               <h3 id="FS_Q105-p0.1">OF THE REASON FOR THE JUDICIAL PRECEPTS (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3>
+               <p id="FS_Q105-p1"></p>
+               <p id="FS_Q105-p2"> We must now consider the reason for the judicial precepts: under which head there are four points of inquiry:</p>
+               <p id="FS_Q105-p3"> (1) Concerning the reason for the judicial precepts relating to the rulers;</p>
+               <p id="FS_Q105-p4"> (2) Concerning the fellowship of one man with another;</p>
+               <p id="FS_Q105-p5"> (3) Concerning matters relating to foreigners;</p>
+               <p id="FS_Q105-p6"> (4) Concerning things relating to domestic matters.</p>
+               <div id="FS_Q105_A1" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q105.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q105_A2.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="FS_Q105_A1-p0.1">Whether the Old Law enjoined fitting precepts concerning rulers?</h4>
+                  <p id="FS_Q105_A1-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q105_A1-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the Old Law made unfitting precepts concerning rulers. Because, as the Philosopher says (Polit. iii, 4),
+                     "the ordering of the people depends mostly on the chief ruler." But the Law contains no precept relating to the institution
+                     of the chief ruler; and yet we find therein prescriptions concerning the inferior rulers: firstly (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Exod.18.21" target="asv">Ex. 18:21</a>): "Provide out of all the people wise [Vulg.: 'able'] men," etc.; again (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A1-p2.2" href="./asv.html#Num.11.16" target="asv">Num. 11:16</a>):
+                     "Gather unto Me seventy men of the ancients of Israel"; and again (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A1-p2.3" href="./asv.html#Deut.1.13" target="asv">Dt. 1:13</a>): "Let Me have from among you wise and understanding men," etc. Therefore the Law provided insufficiently in regard to the
+                     rulers of the people.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q105_A1-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, "The best gives of the best," as Plato states (Tim. ii). Now the best ordering of a state or of any nation is to
+                     be ruled by a king: because this kind of government approaches nearest in resemblance to the Divine government, whereby God
+                     rules the world from the beginning. Therefore the Law should have set a king over the people, and they should not have been
+                     allowed a choice in the matter, as indeed they were allowed (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A1-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Deut.17.14" target="asv">Dt.
+                        17:14,15
+                     </a>): "When thou . . . shalt say: I will set a king over me . . . thou shalt set him," etc.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q105_A1-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A1-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.12.25" target="asv"> Mat. 12:25</a>: "Every kingdom divided against itself shall be made desolate": a saying which was verified in the Jewish people, whose destruction
+                     was brought about by the division of the kingdom. But the Law should aim chiefly at things pertaining to the general well-being
+                     of the people. Therefore it should have forbidden the kingdom to be divided under two kings: nor should this have been introduced
+                     even by Divine
+                     authority; as we read of its being introduced by the authority of the prophet Ahias the Silonite (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A1-p4.2" href="./asv.html#." target="asv">3 Kings 11:29, </a> seqq.).
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q105_A1-p5">
+                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, just as priests are instituted for the benefit of the people in things concerning God, as stated in
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Heb.5.1" target="asv"> Heb. 5:1</a>; so are rulers set up for the benefit of the people in human affairs. But certain things were allotted as a means of livelihood
+                     for the priests and Levites of the Law: such as the tithes and first-fruits, and many like things. Therefore in like manner
+                     certain things should have been determined for the livelihood of the
+                     rulers of the people: the more that they were forbidden to accept presents, as is clearly stated in
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A1-p5.2" href="./asv.html#Exod.23.8" target="asv"> Ex. 23:8</a>: "You shall not [Vulg.: 'Neither shalt thou'] take bribes, which even blind the wise, and pervert the words of the just."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q105_A1-p6">
+                     <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, as a kingdom is the best form of government, so is tyranny the most corrupt. But when the Lord appointed the king,
+                     He established a tyrannical law; for it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A1-p6.1" href="./asv.html#iKgs.8.11" target="asv">1 Kings 8:11</a>): "This will be the right of the king, that shall reign over you: He will take your sons," etc. Therefore the Law made unfitting
+                     provision with regard to the institution of rulers.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q105_A1-p7">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The people of Israel is commended for the beauty of its order (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A1-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Num.24.5" target="asv">Num. 24:5</a>): "How beautiful are thy tabernacles, O Jacob, and thy tents." But the beautiful ordering of a people depends on the right
+                     establishment of its rulers. Therefore the Law made right provision for the people with regard to its rulers.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q105_A1-p8">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> Two points are to be observed concerning the right ordering of rulers in a state or nation. One is that all should take some
+                     share in the government: for this form of constitution ensures peace among the people, commends itself to all, and is most
+                     enduring, as stated in Polit. ii, 6. The other point is to be observed in respect of the kinds of government, or the different
+                     ways in which the constitutions are established. For whereas these differ in kind, as
+                     the Philosopher states (Polit. iii, 5), nevertheless the first place is held by the "kingdom," where the power of government
+                     is vested in one; and "aristocracy," which signifies government by the best, where the power of government is vested in a
+                     few. Accordingly, the best form of government is in a state or kingdom, where one is given the power to preside over all;
+                     while under him are others having governing powers: and yet a government of this kind is shared by all, both because all are
+                     eligible to govern, and because the rules are chosen by all. For this is the best form of polity, being partly kingdom, since
+                     there is one at the head of all; partly aristocracy, in so far as a number of persons are set in authority; partly democracy,
+                     i.e. government by the people, in so far as the rulers can be chosen from the people, and the people have the right to choose
+                     their rulers.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q105_A1-p9"> Such was the form of government established by the Divine Law. For Moses and his successors governed the people in such a
+                     way that each of them was ruler over all; so that there was a kind of kingdom. Moreover, seventy-two men were chosen, who
+                     were elders in virtue: for it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A1-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Deut.1.15" target="asv">Dt. 1:15</a>): "I took out of your tribes wise and honorable, and appointed them rulers": so that there was an element of aristocracy.
+                     But it was a democratical government in so
+                     far as the rulers were chosen from all the people; for it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A1-p9.2" href="./asv.html#Exod.18.21" target="asv">Ex. 18:21</a>): "Provide out of all the people wise [Vulg.: 'able'] men," etc.; and, again, in so far as they were chosen by the people;
+                     wherefore it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A1-p9.3" href="./asv.html#Deut.1.13" target="asv">Dt. 1:13</a>): "Let me have from among you wise [Vulg.: 'able'] men," etc. Consequently it is evident that the ordering of the rulers
+                     was well provided for by the Law.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q105_A1-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This people was governed under the special care of God: wherefore it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A1-p10.1" href="./asv.html#Deut.7.6" target="asv">Dt. 7:6</a>): "The Lord thy God hath chosen thee to be His peculiar people": and this is why the Lord reserved to Himself the institution
+                     of the chief ruler. For this too did Moses pray (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A1-p10.2" href="./asv.html#Num.27.16" target="asv">Num. 27:16</a>): "May the Lord the God of the spirits of all the flesh provide a man, that may be over this multitude." Thus by God's orders
+                     Josue was
+                     set at the head in place of Moses; and we read about each of the judges who succeeded Josue that God "raised . . . up a saviour"
+                     for the people, and that "the spirit of the Lord was" in them (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A1-p10.3" href="./asv.html#Judg.3.9" target="asv">Judges 3:9</a>, 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A1-p10.4" href="./asv.html#Judg.3.10" target="asv">10</a>, 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A1-p10.5" href="./asv.html#Judg.3.15" target="asv">15</a>). Hence the Lord did not leave the choice of a king to the people; but reserved this to Himself, as appears from
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A1-p10.6" href="./asv.html#Deut.17.15" target="asv"> Dt. 17:15</a>: "Thou shalt set him whom the Lord thy God shall choose."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q105_A1-p11">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> A kingdom is the best form of government of the people, so long as it is not corrupt. But since the power granted to a king
+                     is so great, it easily degenerates into tyranny, unless he to whom this power is given be a very virtuous man: for it is only
+                     the virtuous man that conducts himself well in the midst of prosperity, as the Philosopher observes (Ethic. iv, 3). Now perfect
+                     virtue is to be found in few: and especially were the Jews inclined to
+                     cruelty and avarice, which vices above all turn men into tyrants. Hence from the very first the Lord did not set up the kingly
+                     authority with full power, but gave them judges and governors to rule them. But afterwards when the people asked Him to do
+                     so, being indignant with them, so to speak, He granted them a king, as is clear from His words to Samuel (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A1-p11.1" href="./asv.html#iKgs.8.7" target="asv">1 Kings 8:7</a>): "They have not rejected thee, but Me, that I should not reign over them."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q105_A1-p12"> Nevertheless, as regards the appointment of a king, He did establish the manner of election from the very beginning (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A1-p12.1" href="./asv.html#Deut.17.14" target="asv">Dt. 17:14, </a> seqq.): and then He determined two points: first, that in choosing a king they should wait for the Lord's decision; and that
+                     they should not make a man of another nation king, because such kings are wont to take little interest in the people they
+                     are set over, and consequently to have no care for their welfare: secondly, He
+                     prescribed how the king after his appointment should behave, in regard to himself; namely, that he should not accumulate chariots
+                     and horses, nor wives, nor immense wealth: because through craving for such things princes become tyrants and forsake justice.
+                     He also appointed the manner in which they were to conduct themselves towards God: namely, that they should continually read
+                     and ponder on God's Law, and should ever fear and obey God. Moreover, He decided how they should behave towards their
+                     subjects: namely, that they should not proudly despise them, or ill-treat them, and that they should not depart from the paths
+                     of justice.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q105_A1-p13">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The division of the kingdom, and a number of kings, was rather a punishment inflicted on that people for their many dissensions,
+                     specially against the just rule of David, than a benefit conferred on them for their profit. Hence it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A1-p13.1" href="./asv.html#Hos.13.11" target="asv">Osee 13:11</a>): "I will give thee a king in My wrath"; and (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A1-p13.2" href="./asv.html#Hos.8.4" target="asv">Osee 8:4</a>): "They have reigned, but not by Me: they have been princes, and I knew not."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q105_A1-p14">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> The priestly office was bequeathed by succession from father to son: and this, in order that it might be held in greater
+                     respect, if not any man from the people could become a priest: since honor was given to them out of reverence for the divine
+                     worship. Hence it was necessary to put aside certain things for them both as to tithes and as to first-fruits, and, again,
+                     as to oblations and sacrifices, that they might be afforded a means of livelihood. On
+                     the other hand, the rulers, as stated above, were chosen from the whole people; wherefore they had their own possessions,
+                     from which to derive a living: and so much the more, since the Lord forbade even a king to have superabundant wealth to make
+                     too much show of magnificence: both because he could scarcely avoid the excesses of pride and tyranny, arising from such things,
+                     and because, if the rulers were not very rich, and if their office involved much work and anxiety, it would not tempt the
+                     ambition of the common people; and would not become an occasion of sedition.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q105_A1-p15">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> That right was not given to the king by Divine institution: rather was it foretold that kings would usurp that right, by
+                     framing unjust laws, and by degenerating into tyrants who preyed on their subjects. This is clear from the context that follows:
+                     "And you shall be his slaves [Douay: 'servants']": which is significative of tyranny, since a tyrant rules is subjects as
+                     though they were his slaves. Hence Samuel spoke these words to deter them from
+                     asking for a king; since the narrative continues: "But the people would not hear the voice of Samuel." It may happen, however,
+                     that even a good king, without being a tyrant, may take away the sons, and make them tribunes and centurions; and may take
+                     many things from his subjects in order to secure the common weal.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q105_A1-p16"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q105_A1-p17"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q105.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q105_A2.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="FS_Q105_A2" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q105_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q105_A3.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="FS_Q105_A2-p0.1">Whether the judicial precepts were suitably framed as to the relations of one man with another?</h4>
+                  <p id="FS_Q105_A2-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q105_A2-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the judicial precepts were not suitably framed as regards the relations of one man with another. Because
+                     men cannot live together in peace, if one man takes what belongs to another. But this seems to have been approved by the Law:
+                     since it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A2-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Deut.23.24" target="asv">Dt. 23:24</a>): "Going into thy neighbor's vineyard, thou mayest eat as many grapes as thou pleasest." Therefore the Old Law did not make
+                     suitable provisions for man's
+                     peace.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q105_A2-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, one of the chief causes of the downfall of states has been the holding of property by women, as the Philosopher
+                     says (Polit. ii, 6). But this was introduced by the Old Law; for it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A2-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Num.27.8" target="asv">Num. 27:8</a>): "When a man dieth without a son, his inheritance shall pass to his daughter." Therefore the Law made unsuitable provision
+                     for the welfare of the people.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q105_A2-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, it is most conducive to the preservation of human society that men may provide themselves with necessaries by buying
+                     and selling, as stated in Polit. i. But the Old Law took away the force of sales; since it prescribes that in the 50th year
+                     of the jubilee all that is sold shall return to the vendor (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A2-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Lev.25.28" target="asv">Lev. 25:28</a>). Therefore in this matter the Law gave the people an unfitting command.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q105_A2-p5">
+                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, man's needs require that men should be ready to lend: which readiness ceases if the creditors do not return the
+                     pledges: hence it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A2-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.29.10" target="asv">Ecclus. 29:10</a>): "Many have refused to lend, not out of wickedness, but they were afraid to be defrauded without cause." And yet this was
+                     encouraged by the Law. First, because it prescribed (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A2-p5.2" href="./asv.html#Deut.15.2" target="asv">Dt. 15:2</a>): "He to whom any thing is owing from his friend or neighbor or brother,
+                     cannot demand it again, because it is the year of remission of the Lord"; and (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A2-p5.3" href="./asv.html#Exod.22.15" target="asv">Ex. 22:15</a>) it is stated that if a borrowed animal should die while the owner is present, the borrower is not bound to make restitution.
+                     Secondly, because the security acquired through the pledge is lost: for it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A2-p5.4" href="./asv.html#Deut.24.10" target="asv">Dt. 24:10</a>): "When thou shalt demand of thy neighbor any thing that he oweth thee, thou shalt not go into his house to take away a pledge";
+                     and again
+                     (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A2-p5.5" href="./asv.html#Deut.24.12" target="asv">Dt. 24:12,13</a>): "The pledge shall not lodge with thee that night, but thou shalt restore it to him presently." Therefore the Law made insufficient
+                     provision in the matter of loans.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q105_A2-p6">
+                     <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, considerable risk attaches to goods deposited with a fraudulent depositary: wherefore great caution should be observed
+                     in such matters: hence it is stated in 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A2-p6.1" href="./asv.html#iiMacc.3.15" target="asv">2 Mac. 3:15 </a>that "the priests . . . called upon Him from heaven, Who made the law concerning things given to be kept, that He would preserve
+                     them safe, for them that had deposited them." But the precepts of the Old Law observed little caution in regard to deposits:
+                     since it
+                     is prescribed (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A2-p6.2" href="./asv.html#Exod.22.10" target="asv">Ex. 22:10,11</a>) that when goods deposited are lost, the owner is to stand by the oath of the depositary. Therefore the Law made unsuitable
+                     provision in this matter.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q105_A2-p7">
+                     <b>Objection 6:</b> Further, just as a workman offers his work for hire, so do men let houses and so forth. But there is no need for the tenant
+                     to pay his rent as soon as he takes a house. Therefore it seems an unnecessarily hard prescription (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A2-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Lev.19.13" target="asv">Lev. 19:13</a>) that "the wages of him that hath been hired by thee shall not abide with thee until morning."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q105_A2-p8">
+                     <b>Objection 7:</b> Further, since there is often pressing need for a judge, it should be easy to gain access to one. It was therefore unfitting
+                     that the Law (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A2-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Deut.17.8" target="asv">Dt. 17:8,9</a>) should command them to go to a fixed place to ask for judgment on doubtful matters.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q105_A2-p9">
+                     <b>Objection 8:</b> Further, it is possible that not only two, but three or more, should agree to tell a lie. Therefore it is unreasonably stated
+                     (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A2-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Deut.19.15" target="asv">Dt. 19:15</a>) that "in the mouth of two or three witnesses every word shall stand."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q105_A2-p10">
+                     <b>Objection 9:</b> Further, punishment should be fixed according to the gravity of the fault: for which reason also it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A2-p10.1" href="./asv.html#Deut.25.2" target="asv">Dt. 25:2</a>): "According to the measure of the sin, shall the measure also of the stripes be." Yet the Law fixed unequal punishments
+                     for certain faults: for it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A2-p10.2" href="./asv.html#Exod.22.1" target="asv">Ex. 22:1</a>) that the thief "shall restore five oxen for one ox, and four sheep for one sheep." Moreover, certain slight offenses are
+                     severely
+                     punished: thus (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A2-p10.3" href="./asv.html#Num.15.32" target="asv">Num. 15:32, </a> seqq.) a man is stoned for gathering sticks on the sabbath day: and (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A2-p10.4" href="./asv.html#Deut.21.18" target="asv">Dt. 21:18, </a> seqq.) the unruly son is commanded to be stoned on account of certain small transgressions, viz. because "he gave himself
+                     to revelling . . . and banquetings." Therefore the Law prescribed punishments in an unreasonable manner.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q105_A2-p11">
+                     <b>Objection 10:</b> Further, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xxi, 11), "Tully writes that the laws recognize eight forms of punishment, indemnity,
+                     prison, stripes, retaliation, public disgrace, exile, death, slavery." Now some of these were prescribed by the Law. "Indemnity,"
+                     as when a thief was condemned to make restitution fivefold or fourfold. "Prison," as when (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A2-p11.1" href="./asv.html#Num.15.34" target="asv">Num. 15:34</a>) a certain man is ordered to be imprisoned. "Stripes"; thus (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A2-p11.2" href="./asv.html#Deut.25.2" target="asv">Dt.
+                        25:2
+                     </a>), "if they see that the offender be worthy of stripes; they shall lay him down, and shall cause him to be beaten before them."
+                     "Public disgrace" was brought on to him who refused to take to himself the wife of his deceased brother, for she took "off
+                     his shoe from his foot, and" did "spit in his face" (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A2-p11.3" href="./asv.html#Deut.25.9" target="asv">Dt. 25:9</a>). It prescribed the "death" penalty, as is clear from (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A2-p11.4" href="./asv.html#Lev.20.9" target="asv">Lev. 20:9</a>): "He that curseth his father, or mother, dying let him die."
+                     The Law also recognized the "lex talionis," by prescribing (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A2-p11.5" href="./asv.html#Exod.21.24" target="asv">Ex. 21:24</a>): "Eye for eye, tooth for tooth." Therefore it seems unreasonable that the Law should not have inflicted the two other punishments,
+                     viz. "exile" and "slavery."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q105_A2-p12">
+                     <b>Objection 11:</b> Further, no punishment is due except for a fault. But dumb animals cannot commit a fault. Therefore the Law is unreasonable
+                     in punishing them (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A2-p12.1" href="./asv.html#Exod.21.29" target="asv">Ex. 21:29</a>): "If the ox . . . shall kill a man or a woman," it "shall be stoned": and (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A2-p12.2" href="./asv.html#Lev.20.16" target="asv">Lev. 20:16</a>): "The woman that shall lie under any beast, shall be killed together with the same." Therefore it seems that matters pertaining
+                     to the relations of one man with another were
+                     unsuitably regulated by the Law.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q105_A2-p13">
+                     <b>Objection 12:</b> Further, the Lord commanded (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A2-p13.1" href="./asv.html#Exod.21.12" target="asv">Ex. 21:12</a>) a murderer to be punished with death. But the death of a dumb animal is reckoned of much less account than the slaying of
+                     a man. Hence murder cannot be sufficiently punished by the slaying of a dumb animal. Therefore it is unfittingly prescribed
+                     (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A2-p13.2" href="./asv.html#Deut.21.1" target="asv">Dt. 21:1</a>, 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A2-p13.3" href="./asv.html#Deut.21.4" target="asv">4</a>) that "when there shall be found . . . the corpse of a man slain, and it is not known who is guilty of the murder . . . the
+                     ancients" of the nearest city "shall take a heifer of the herd, that hath not drawn in the yoke, nor ploughed the ground,
+                     and they shall bring her into a rough and stony valley, that never was ploughed, nor sown; and there they shall strike off
+                     the head of the heifer."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q105_A2-p14">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is recalled as a special blessing (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A2-p14.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.147.20" target="asv">Ps. 147:20</a>) that "He hath not done in like manner to every nation; and His judgments He hath not made manifest to them."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q105_A2-p15">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei ii, 21), quoting Tully, "a nation is a body of men united together by consent to the law and
+                     by community of welfare." Consequently it is of the essence of a nation that the mutual relations of the citizens be ordered
+                     by just laws. Now the relations of one man with another are twofold: some are effected under the guidance of those in authority:
+                     others are effected by the will of private individuals. And since whatever is
+                     subject to the power of an individual can be disposed of according to his will, hence it is that the decision of matters between
+                     one man and another, and the punishment of evildoers, depend on the direction of those in authority, to whom men are subject.
+                     On the other hand, the power of private persons is exercised over the things they possess: and consequently their dealings
+                     with one another, as regards such things, depend on their own will, for instance in buying, selling, giving, and so
+                     forth. Now the Law provided sufficiently in respect of each of these relations between one man and another. For it established
+                     judges, as is clearly indicated in
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A2-p15.1" href="./asv.html#Deut.16.18" target="asv"> Dt. 16:18</a>: "Thou shalt appoint judges and magistrates in all its [Vulg.: 'thy'] gates . . . that they may judge the people with just
+                     judgment." It is also directed the manner of pronouncing just judgments, according to 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A2-p15.2" href="./asv.html#Deut.1.16" target="asv">Dt. 1:16,17</a>: "Judge that which is just, whether he be one of your own country or a stranger:
+                     there shall be no difference of persons." It also removed an occasion of pronouncing unjust judgment, by forbidding judges
+                     to accept bribes (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A2-p15.3" href="./asv.html#Exod.23.8" target="asv">Ex. 23:8</a>;
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A2-p15.4" href="./asv.html#Deut.16.19" target="asv"> Dt. 16:19</a>). It prescribed the number of witnesses, viz. two or three: and it appointed certain punishments to certain crimes, as we
+                     shall state farther on (ad 10).
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q105_A2-p16"> But with regard to possessions, it is a very good thing, says the Philosopher (Polit. ii, 2) that the things possessed should
+                     be distinct, and the use thereof should be partly common, and partly granted to others by the will of the possessors. These
+                     three points were provided for by the Law. Because, in the first place, the possessions themselves were divided among individuals:
+                     for it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A2-p16.1" href="./asv.html#Num.33.53" target="asv">Num. 33:53,54</a>): "I have given you" the land "for a possession:
+                     and you shall divide it among you by lot." And since many states have been ruined through want of regulations in the matter
+                     of possessions, as the Philosopher observes (Polit. ii, 6); therefore the Law provided a threefold remedy against the regularity
+                     of possessions. The first was that they should be divided equally, wherefore it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A2-p16.2" href="./asv.html#Num.33.54" target="asv">Num. 33:54</a>): "To the more you shall give a larger part, and to the fewer, a lesser." A second remedy was that possessions could not
+                     be alienated for ever, but after a certain lapse of time should return to their former owner, so as to avoid confusion of
+                     possessions (cf. ad 3). The third remedy aimed at the removal of this confusion, and provided that the dead should be succeeded
+                     by their next of kin: in the first place, the son; secondly, the daughter; thirdly, the brother; fourthly, the father's brother;
+                     fifthly, any other next of kin. Furthermore, in order to preserve the distinction of property, the Law enacted that
+                     heiresses should marry within their own tribe, as recorded in
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A2-p16.3" href="./asv.html#Num.36.6" target="asv"> Num. 36:6.</a>
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q105_A2-p17"> Secondly, the Law commanded that, in some respects, the use of things should belong to all in common. Firstly, as regards
+                     the care of them; for it was prescribed (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A2-p17.1" href="./asv.html#Deut.22.1" target="asv">Dt. 22:1-4</a>): "Thou shalt not pass by, if thou seest thy brother's ox or his sheep go astray; but thou shalt bring them back to thy brother,"
+                     and in like manner as to other things. Secondly, as regards fruits. For all alike were allowed on entering a friend's vineyard
+                     to eat of the fruit, but not to
+                     take any away. And, specially, with respect to the poor, it was prescribed that the forgotten sheaves, and the bunches of
+                     grapes and fruit, should be left behind for them (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A2-p17.2" href="./asv.html#Lev.19.9" target="asv">Lev. 19:9</a>;
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A2-p17.3" href="./asv.html#Deut.24.19" target="asv"> Dt. 24:19</a>). Moreover, whatever grew in the seventh year was common property, as stated in
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A2-p17.4" href="./asv.html#Exod.23.11" target="asv"> Ex. 23:11 </a>and
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A2-p17.5" href="./asv.html#Lev.25.4" target="asv"> Lev. 25:4.</a>
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q105_A2-p18"> Thirdly, the law recognized the transference of goods by the owner. There was a purely gratuitous transfer: thus it is written
+                     (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A2-p18.1" href="./asv.html#Deut.14.28" target="asv">Dt. 14:28,29</a>): "The third day thou shalt separate another tithe . . . and the Levite . . . and the stranger, and the fatherless, and the
+                     widow . . . shall come and shall eat and be filled." And there was a transfer for a consideration, for instance, by selling
+                     and buying, by letting out and hiring, by loan and also by deposit, concerning all of which we
+                     find that the Law made ample provision. Consequently it is clear that the Old Law provided sufficiently concerning the mutual
+                     relations of one man with another.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q105_A2-p19">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As the Apostle says (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A2-p19.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.13.8" target="asv">Rom. 13:8</a>), "he that loveth his neighbor hath fulfilled the Law": because, to wit, all the precepts of the Law, chiefly those concerning
+                     our neighbor, seem to aim at the end that men should love one another. Now it is an effect of love that men give their own
+                     goods to others: because, as stated in 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A2-p19.2" href="./asv.html#iJohn.3.17" target="asv">1 Jn. 3:17</a>: "He that . . . shall see his brother in need, and shall shut up his bowels from
+                     him: how doth the charity of God abide in him?" Hence the purpose of the Law was to accustom men to give of their own to others
+                     readily: thus the Apostle (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A2-p19.3" href="./asv.html#iTim.6.18" target="asv">1 Tim. 6:18</a>) commands the rich "to give easily and to communicate to others." Now a man does not give easily to others if he will not
+                     suffer another man to take some little thing from him without any great injury to him. And so the Law laid down that it should
+                     be lawful for a man, on entering his neighbor's vineyard, to
+                     eat of the fruit there: but not to carry any away, lest this should lead to the infliction of a grievous harm, and cause a
+                     disturbance of the peace: for among well-behaved people, the taking of a little does not disturb the peace; in fact, it rather
+                     strengthens friendship and accustoms men to give things to one another.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q105_A2-p20">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The Law did not prescribe that women should succeed to their father's estate except in default of male issue: failing which
+                     it was necessary that succession should be granted to the female line in order to comfort the father, who would have been
+                     sad to think that his estate would pass to strangers. Nevertheless the Law observed due caution in the matter, by providing
+                     that those women who succeeded to their father's estate, should marry within their
+                     own tribe, in order to avoid confusion of tribal possessions, as stated in
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A2-p20.1" href="./asv.html#Num.36.7" target="asv"> Num. 36:7,8.</a>
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q105_A2-p21">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As the Philosopher says (Polit. ii, 4), the regulation of possessions conduces much to the preservation of a state or nation.
+                     Consequently, as he himself observes, it was forbidden by the law in some of the heathen states, "that anyone should sell
+                     his possessions, except to avoid a manifest loss." For if possessions were to be sold indiscriminately, they might happen
+                     to come into the hands of a few: so that it might become necessary for a state or
+                     country to become void of inhabitants. Hence the Old Law, in order to remove this danger, ordered things in such a way that
+                     while provision was made for men's needs, by allowing the sale of possessions to avail for a certain period, at the same time
+                     the said danger was removed, by prescribing the return of those possessions after that period had elapsed. The reason for
+                     this law was to prevent confusion of possessions, and to ensure the continuance of a definite distinction among the tribes.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q105_A2-p22"> But as the town houses were not allotted to distinct estates, therefore the Law allowed them to be sold in perpetuity, like
+                     movable goods. Because the number of houses in a town was not fixed, whereas there was a fixed limit to the amount of estates,
+                     which could not be exceeded, while the number of houses in a town could be increased. On the other hand, houses situated not
+                     in a town, but "in a village that hath no walls," could not be sold in perpetuity: because such houses are
+                     built merely with a view to the cultivation and care of possessions; wherefore the Law rightly made the same prescription
+                     in regard to both (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A2-p22.1" href="./asv.html#Lev.25" target="asv">Lev. 25</a>).
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q105_A2-p23">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> As stated above (ad 1), the purpose of the Law was to accustom men to its precepts, so as to be ready to come to one another's
+                     assistance: because this is a very great incentive to friendship. The Law granted these facilities for helping others in the
+                     matter not only of gratuitous and absolute donations, but also of mutual transfers: because the latter kind of succor is more
+                     frequent and benefits the greater number: and it granted facilities for this
+                     purpose in many ways. First of all by prescribing that men should be ready to lend, and that they should not be less inclined
+                     to do so as the year of remission drew nigh, as stated in
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A2-p23.1" href="./asv.html#Deut.15.7" target="asv"> Dt. 15:7, </a> seqq. Secondly, by forbidding them to burden a man to whom they might grant a loan, either by exacting usury, or by accepting
+                     necessities of life in security; and by prescribing that when this had been done they should be restored at once. For it is
+                     written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A2-p23.2" href="./asv.html#Deut.23.19" target="asv">Dt.
+                        23:19
+                     </a>): "Thou shalt not lend to thy brother money to usury": and (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A2-p23.3" href="./asv.html#Deut.24.6" target="asv">Dt. 24:6</a>): "Thou shalt not take the nether nor the upper millstone to pledge; for he hath pledged his life to thee": and (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A2-p23.4" href="./asv.html#Exod.22.26" target="asv">Ex. 22:26</a>): "If thou take of thy neighbor a garment in pledge, thou shalt give it him again before sunset." Thirdly, by forbidding
+                     them to be importunate in exacting payment. Hence it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A2-p23.5" href="./asv.html#Exod.22.25" target="asv">Ex. 22:25</a>): "If thou lend money to any of
+                     my people that is poor that dwelleth with thee, thou shalt not be hard upon them as an extortioner." For this reason, too,
+                     it is enacted (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A2-p23.6" href="./asv.html#Deut.24.10" target="asv">Dt. 24:10,11</a>): "When thou shalt demand of thy neighbor anything that he oweth thee, thou shalt not go into his house to take away a pledge,
+                     but thou shalt stand without, and he shall bring out to thee what he hath": both because a man's house is his surest refuge,
+                     wherefore it is offensive to a man to be set upon in his own house; and because the Law does not
+                     allow the creditor to take away whatever he likes in security, but rather permits the debtor to give what he needs least.
+                     Fourthly, the Law prescribed that debts should cease together after the lapse of seven years. For it was probable that those
+                     who could conveniently pay their debts, would do so before the seventh year, and would not defraud the lender without cause.
+                     But if they were altogether insolvent, there was the same reason for remitting the debt from love for them, as there was for
+                     renewing the loan on account of their need.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q105_A2-p24"> As regards animals granted in loan, the Law enacted that if, through the neglect of the person to whom they were lent, they
+                     perished or deteriorated in his absence, he was bound to make restitution. But if they perished or deteriorated while he was
+                     present and taking proper care of them, he was not bound to make restitution, especially if they were hired for a consideration:
+                     because they might have died or deteriorated in the same way if they had remained in possession of the
+                     lender, so that if the animal had been saved through being lent, the lender would have gained something by the loan which
+                     would no longer have been gratuitous. And especially was this to be observed when animals were hired for a consideration:
+                     because then the owner received a certain price for the use of the animals; wherefore he had no right to any profit, by receiving
+                     indemnity for the animal, unless the person who had charge of it were negligent. In the case, however, of animals not hired
+                     for a consideration, equity demanded that he should receive something by way of restitution at least to the value of the hire
+                     of the animal that had perished or deteriorated.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q105_A2-p25">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> The difference between a loan and a deposit is that a loan is in respect of goods transferred for the use of the person to
+                     whom they are transferred, whereas a deposit is for the benefit of the depositor. Hence in certain cases there was a stricter
+                     obligation of returning a loan than of restoring goods held in deposit. Because the latter might be lost in two ways. First,
+                     unavoidably: i.e. either through a natural cause, for instance if an animal held
+                     in deposit were to die or depreciate in value; or through an extrinsic cause, for instance, if it were taken by an enemy,
+                     or devoured by a beast (in which case, however, a man was bound to restore to the owner what was left of the animal thus slain):
+                     whereas in the other cases mentioned above, he was not bound to make restitution; but only to take an oath in order to clear
+                     himself of suspicion. Secondly, the goods deposited might be lost through an avoidable cause, for instance by theft: and
+                     then the depositary was bound to restitution on account of his neglect. But, as stated above (ad 4), he who held an animal
+                     on loan, was bound to restitution, even if he were absent when it depreciated or died: because he was held responsible for
+                     less negligence than a depositary, who was only held responsible in case of theft.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q105_A2-p26">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 6:</b> Workmen who offer their labor for hire, are poor men who toil for their daily bread: and therefore the Law commanded wisely
+                     that they should be paid at once, lest they should lack food. But they who offer other commodities for hire, are wont to be
+                     rich: nor are they in such need of their price in order to gain a livelihood: and consequently the comparison does not hold.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q105_A2-p27">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 7:</b> The purpose for which judges are appointed among men, is that they may decide doubtful points in matters of justice. Now
+                     a matter may be doubtful in two ways. First, among simple-minded people: and in order to remove doubts of this kind, it was
+                     prescribed (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A2-p27.1" href="./asv.html#Deut.16.18" target="asv">Dt. 16:18</a>) that "judges and magistrates" should be appointed in each tribe, "to judge the people with just judgment." Secondly, a matter
+                     may be doubtful even among experts: and
+                     therefore, in order to remove doubts of this kind, the Law prescribed that all should foregather in some chief place chosen
+                     by God, where there would be both the high-priest, who would decide doubtful matters relating to the ceremonies of divine
+                     worship; and the chief judge of the people, who would decide matters relating to the judgments of men: just as even now cases
+                     are taken from a lower to a higher court either by appeal or by consultation. Hence it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A2-p27.2" href="./asv.html#Deut.17.8" target="asv">Dt.
+                        17:8,9
+                     </a>): "If thou perceive that there be among you a hard and doubtful matter in judgment . . . and thou see that the words of the
+                     judges within thy gates do vary; arise and go up to the place, which the Lord thy God shall choose; and thou shalt come to
+                     the priests of the Levitical race, and to the judge that shall be at that time." But such like doubtful matters did not often
+                     occur for judgment: wherefore the people were not burdened on this account.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q105_A2-p28">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 8:</b> In the business affairs of men, there is no such thing as demonstrative and infallible proof, and we must be content with
+                     a certain conjectural probability, such as that which an orator employs to persuade. Consequently, although it is quite possible
+                     for two or three witnesses to agree to a falsehood, yet it is neither easy nor probable that they succeed in so doing: wherefore
+                     their testimony is taken as being true, especially if they do not waver in
+                     giving it, or are not otherwise suspect. Moreover, in order that witnesses might not easily depart from the truth, the Law
+                     commanded that they should be most carefully examined, and that those who were found untruthful should be severely punished,
+                     as stated in
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A2-p28.1" href="./asv.html#Deut.19.16" target="asv"> Dt. 19:16, </a> seqq.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q105_A2-p29"> There was, however, a reason for fixing on this particular number, in token of the unerring truth of the Divine Persons,
+                     Who are sometimes mentioned as two, because the Holy Ghost is the bond of the other two Persons; and sometimes as three: as
+                     Augustine observes on
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A2-p29.1" href="./asv.html#John.8.17" target="asv"> Jn. 8:17</a>: "In your law it is written that the testimony of two men is true."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q105_A2-p30">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 9:</b> A severe punishment is inflicted not only on account of the gravity of a fault, but also for other reasons. First, on account
+                     of the greatness of the sin, because a greater sin, other things being equal, deserves a greater punishment. Secondly, on
+                     account of a habitual sin, since men are not easily cured of habitual sin except by severe punishments. Thirdly, on account
+                     of a great desire for or a great pleasure in the sin: for men are not easily
+                     deterred from such sins unless they be severely punished. Fourthly, on account of the facility of committing a sin and of
+                     concealing it: for such like sins, when discovered, should be more severely punished in order to deter others from committing
+                     them.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q105_A2-p31"> Again, with regard to the greatness of a sin, four degrees may be observed, even in respect of one single deed. The first
+                     is when a sin is committed unwillingly; because then, if the sin be altogether involuntary, man is altogether excused from
+                     punishment; for it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A2-p31.1" href="./asv.html#Deut.22.25" target="asv">Dt. 22:25, </a> seqq.) that a damsel who suffers violence in a field is not guilty of death, because "she cried, and there was no man to
+                     help her." But if a man sinned in any way voluntarily,
+                     and yet through weakness, as for instance when a man sins from passion, the sin is diminished: and the punishment, according
+                     to true judgment, should be diminished also; unless perchance the common weal requires that the sin be severely punished in
+                     order to deter others from committing such sins, as stated above. The second degree is when a man sins through ignorance:
+                     and then he was held to be guilty to a certain extent, on account of his negligence in acquiring knowledge: yet he was not
+                     punished by the judges but expiated his sin by sacrifices. Hence it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A2-p31.2" href="./asv.html#Lev.4.2" target="asv">Lev. 4:2</a>): "The soul that sinneth through ignorance," etc. This is, however, to be taken as applying to ignorance of fact; and not
+                     to ignorance of the Divine precept, which all were bound to know. The third degree was when a man sinned from pride, i.e.
+                     through deliberate choice or malice: and then he was punished according to the greatness of the sin [*Cf.
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A2-p31.3" href="./asv.html#Deut.25.2" target="asv"> Dt. 25:2</a>]. The
+                     fourth degree was when a man sinned from stubbornness or obstinacy: and then he was to be utterly cut off as a rebel and a
+                     destroyer of the commandment of the Law [*Cf.
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A2-p31.4" href="./asv.html#Num.15.30" target="asv"> Num. 15:30,31</a>].
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q105_A2-p32"> Accordingly we must say that, in appointing the punishment for theft, the Law considered what would be likely to happen most
+                     frequently (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A2-p32.1" href="./asv.html#Exod.22.1" target="asv">Ex. 22:1-9</a>): wherefore, as regards theft of other things which can easily be safeguarded from a thief, the thief restored only twice
+                     their value. But sheep cannot be easily safeguarded from a thief, because they graze in the fields: wherefore it happened
+                     more frequently that sheep were stolen in the fields. Consequently the Law inflicted a
+                     heavier penalty, by ordering four sheep to be restored for the theft of one. As to cattle, they were yet more difficult to
+                     safeguard, because they are kept in the fields, and do not graze in flocks as sheep do; wherefore a yet more heavy penalty
+                     was inflicted in their regard, so that five oxen were to be restored for one ox. And this I say, unless perchance the animal
+                     itself were discovered in the thief's possession: because in that case he had to restore only twice the number, as in the
+                     case
+                     of other thefts: for there was reason to presume that he intended to restore the animal, since he kept it alive. Again, we
+                     might say, according to a gloss, that "a cow is useful in five ways: it may be used for sacrifice, for ploughing, for food,
+                     for milk, and its hide is employed for various purposes": and therefore for one cow five had to be restored. But the sheep
+                     was useful in four ways: "for sacrifice, for meat, for milk, and for its wool." The unruly son was slain, not because he ate
+                     and
+                     drank: but on account of his stubbornness and rebellion, which was always punished by death, as stated above. As to the man
+                     who gathered sticks on the sabbath, he was stoned as a breaker of the Law, which commanded the sabbath to be observed, to
+                     testify the belief in the newness of the world, as stated above (
+                     <a id="FS_Q105_A2-p32.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q100_A5.html">Q[100], A[5]</a>): wherefore he was slain as an unbeliever.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q105_A2-p33">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 10:</b> The Old Law inflicted the death penalty for the more grievous crimes, viz. for those which are committed against God, and
+                     for murder, for stealing a man, irreverence towards one's parents, adultery and incest. In the case of thief of other things
+                     it inflicted punishment by indemnification: while in the case of blows and mutilation it authorized punishment by retaliation;
+                     and likewise for the sin of bearing false witness. In other faults of less
+                     degree it prescribed the punishment of stripes or of public disgrace.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q105_A2-p34"> The punishment of slavery was prescribed by the Law in two cases. First, in the case of a slave who was unwilling to avail
+                     himself of the privilege granted by the Law, whereby he was free to depart in the seventh year of remission: wherefore he
+                     was punished by remaining a slave for ever. Secondly, in the case of a thief, who had not wherewith to make restitution, as
+                     stated in
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A2-p34.1" href="./asv.html#Exod.22.3" target="asv"> Ex. 22:3.</a>
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q105_A2-p35"> The punishment of absolute exile was not prescribed by the Law: because God was worshipped by that people alone, whereas
+                     all other nations were given to idolatry: wherefore if any man were exiled from that people absolutely, he would be in danger
+                     of falling into idolatry. For this reason it is related (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A2-p35.1" href="./asv.html#iKgs.26.19" target="asv">1 Kings 26:19</a>) that David said to Saul: "They are cursed in the sight of the Lord, who have case me out this day, that I should not dwell
+                     in the inheritance of
+                     the Lord, saying: Go, serve strange gods." There was, however, a restricted sort of exile: for it is written in
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A2-p35.2" href="./asv.html#Deut.19.4" target="asv"> Dt. 19:4</a> [*Cf.
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A2-p35.3" href="./asv.html#Num.35.25" target="asv"> Num. 35:25</a>] that "he that striketh [Vulg.: 'killeth'] his neighbor ignorantly, and is proved to have had no hatred against him, shall
+                     flee to one of the cities" of refuge and "abide there until the death of the high-priest." For then it became lawful for him
+                     to return home, because when the whole people thus suffered a loss they
+                     forgot their private quarrels, so that the next of kin of the slain were not so eager to kill the slayer.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q105_A2-p36">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 11:</b> Dumb animals were ordered to be slain, not on account of any fault of theirs; but as a punishment to their owners, who had
+                     not safeguarded their beasts from these offenses. Hence the owner was more severely punished if his ox had butted anyone "yesterday
+                     or the day before" (in which case steps might have been taken to butting suddenly). Or again, the animal was slain in detestation
+                     of the sin; and lest men should be horrified at the sight
+                     thereof.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q105_A2-p37">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 12:</b> The literal reason for this commandment, as Rabbi Moses declares (Doct. Perplex. iii), was because the slayer was frequently
+                     from the nearest city: wherefore the slaying of the calf was a means of investigating the hidden murder. This was brought
+                     about in three ways. In the first place the elders of the city swore that they had taken every measure for safeguarding the
+                     roads. Secondly, the owner of the heifer was indemnified for the slaying of his
+                     beast, and if the murder was previously discovered, the beast was not slain. Thirdly, the place, where the heifer was slain,
+                     remained uncultivated. Wherefore, in order to avoid this twofold loss, the men of the city would readily make known the murderer,
+                     if they knew who he was: and it would seldom happen but that some word or sign would escape about the matter. Or again, this
+                     was done in order to frighten people, in detestation of murder. Because the slaying of a heifer, which is a useful
+                     animal and full of strength, especially before it has been put under the yoke, signified that whoever committed murder, however
+                     useful and strong he might be, was to forfeit his life; and that, by a cruel death, which was implied by the striking off
+                     of its head; and that the murderer, as vile and abject, was to be cut off from the fellowship of men, which was betokened
+                     by the fact that the heifer after being slain was left to rot in a rough and uncultivated place.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q105_A2-p38"> Mystically, the heifer taken from the herd signifies the flesh of Christ; which had not drawn a yoke, since it had done no
+                     sin; nor did it plough the ground, i.e. it never knew the stain of revolt. The fact of the heifer being killed in an uncultivated
+                     valley signified the despised death of Christ, whereby all sins are washed away, and the devil is shown to be the arch-murderer.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q105_A2-p39"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q105_A2-p40"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q105_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q105_A3.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="FS_Q105_A3" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q105_A2.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q105_A4.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="FS_Q105_A3-p0.1">Whether the judicial precepts regarding foreigners were framed in a suitable manner?</h4>
+                  <p id="FS_Q105_A3-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q105_A3-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the judicial precepts regarding foreigners were not suitably framed. For Peter said (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A3-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Acts.10.34" target="asv">Acts 10:34,35</a>): "In very deed I perceive that God is not a respecter of persons, but in every nation, he that feareth Him and worketh justice
+                     is acceptable to Him." But those who are acceptable to God should not be excluded from the Church of God. Therefore it is
+                     unsuitably commanded (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A3-p2.2" href="./asv.html#Deut.23.3" target="asv">Dt. 23:3</a>) that "the Ammonite and
+                     the Moabite, even after the tenth generation, shall not enter into the church of the Lord for ever": whereas, on the other
+                     hand, it is prescribed (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A3-p2.3" href="./asv.html#Deut.23.7" target="asv">Dt. 23:7</a>) to be observed with regard to certain other nations: "Thou shalt not abhor the Edomite, because he is thy brother; nor the
+                     Egyptian because thou wast a stranger in his land."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q105_A3-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, we do not deserve to be punished for those things which are not in our power. But it is not in man's power to be
+                     an eunuch, or born of a prostitute. Therefore it is unsuitably commanded (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A3-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Deut.23.1" target="asv">Dt. 23:1,2</a>) that "an eunuch and one born of a prostitute shalt not enter into the church of the Lord."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q105_A3-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the Old Law mercifully forbade strangers to be molested: for it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A3-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Exod.22.21" target="asv">Ex. 22:21</a>): "Thou shalt not molest a stranger, nor afflict him; for yourselves also were strangers in the land of Egypt": and (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A3-p4.2" href="./asv.html#Exod.23.9" target="asv">Ex. 23:9</a>): "Thou shalt not molest a stranger, for you know the hearts of strangers, for you also were strangers in the land of Egypt."
+                     But it is an affliction to be burdened with usury. Therefore the Law
+                     unsuitably permitted them (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A3-p4.3" href="./asv.html#Deut.23.19" target="asv">Dt. 23:19,20</a>) to lend money to the stranger for usury.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q105_A3-p5">
+                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, men are much more akin to us than trees. But we should show greater care and love for these things that are nearest
+                     to us, according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.13.19" target="asv"> Ecclus. 13:19</a>: "Every beast loveth its like: so also every man him that is nearest to himself." Therefore the Lord unsuitably commanded
+                     (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A3-p5.2" href="./asv.html#Deut.20.13" target="asv">Dt. 20:13-19</a>) that all the inhabitants of a captured hostile city were to be slain, but that the fruit-trees should not be cut down.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q105_A3-p6">
+                     <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, every one should prefer the common good of virtue to the good of the individual. But the common good is sought in
+                     a war which men fight against their enemies. Therefore it is unsuitably commanded (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A3-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Deut.20.5" target="asv">Dt. 20:5-7</a>) that certain men should be sent home, for instance a man that had built a new house, or who had planted a vineyard, or who
+                     had married a wife.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q105_A3-p7">
+                     <b>Objection 6:</b> Further, no man should profit by his own fault. But it is a man's fault if he be timid or faint-hearted: since this is contrary
+                     to the virtue of fortitude. Therefore the timid and faint-hearted are unfittingly excused from the toil of battle (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A3-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Deut.20.8" target="asv">Dt. 20:8</a>).
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q105_A3-p8">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Divine Wisdom declares (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A3-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Prov.8.8" target="asv">Prov. 8:8</a>): "All my words are just, there is nothing wicked nor perverse in them."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q105_A3-p9">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> Man's relations with foreigners are twofold: peaceful, and hostile: and in directing both kinds of relation the Law contained
+                     suitable precepts. For the Jews were offered three opportunities of peaceful relations with foreigners. First, when foreigners
+                     passed through their land as travelers. Secondly, when they came to dwell in their land as newcomers. And in both these respects
+                     the Law made kind provision in its precepts: for it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A3-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Exod.22.21" target="asv">Ex.
+                        22:21
+                     </a>): "Thou shalt not molest a stranger [advenam]"; and again (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A3-p9.2" href="./asv.html#Exod.22.9" target="asv">Ex. 22:9</a>): "Thou shalt not molest a stranger [peregrino]." Thirdly, when any foreigners wished to be admitted entirely to their fellowship
+                     and mode of worship. With regard to these a certain order was observed. For they were not at once admitted to citizenship:
+                     just as it was law with some nations that no one was deemed a citizen except after two or three generations, as the Philosopher
+                     says (Polit.
+                     iii, 1). The reason for this was that if foreigners were allowed to meddle with the affairs of a nation as soon as they settled
+                     down in its midst, many dangers might occur, since the foreigners not yet having the common good firmly at heart might attempt
+                     something hurtful to the people. Hence it was that the Law prescribed in respect of certain nations that had close relations
+                     with the Jews (viz., the Egyptians among whom they were born and educated, and the Idumeans, the children of Esau,
+                     Jacob's brother), that they should be admitted to the fellowship of the people after the third generation; whereas others
+                     (with whom their relations had been hostile, such as the Ammonites and Moabites) were never to be admitted to citizenship;
+                     while the Amalekites, who were yet more hostile to them, and had no fellowship of kindred with them, were to be held as foes
+                     in perpetuity: for it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A3-p9.3" href="./asv.html#Exod.17.16" target="asv">Ex. 17:16</a>): "The war of the Lord shall be against Amalec from generation
+                     to generation."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q105_A3-p10"> In like manner with regard to hostile relations with foreigners, the Law contained suitable precepts. For, in the first place,
+                     it commanded that war should be declared for a just cause: thus it is commanded (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A3-p10.1" href="./asv.html#Deut.20.10" target="asv">Dt. 20:10</a>) that when they advanced to besiege a city, they should at first make an offer of peace. Secondly, it enjoined that when
+                     once they had entered on a war they should undauntedly persevere in it, putting their trust in God. And in order that they
+                     might be the more heedful of this command, it ordered that on the approach of battle the priest should hearten them by promising
+                     them God's aid. Thirdly, it prescribed the removal of whatever might prove an obstacle to the fight, and that certain men,
+                     who might be in the way, should be sent home. Fourthly, it enjoined that they should use moderation in pursuing the advantage
+                     of victory, by sparing women and children, and by not cutting down fruit-trees of that country.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q105_A3-p11">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The Law excluded the men of no nation from the worship of God and from things pertaining to the welfare of the soul: for
+                     it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A3-p11.1" href="./asv.html#Exod.12.48" target="asv">Ex. 12:48</a>): "If any stranger be willing to dwell among you, and to keep the Phase of the Lord; all his males shall first be circumcised,
+                     and then shall he celebrate it according to the manner, and he shall be as that which is born in the land." But in temporal
+                     matters concerning the public life of
+                     the people, admission was not granted to everyone at once, for the reason given above: but to some, i.e. the Egyptians and
+                     Idumeans, in the third generation; while others were excluded in perpetuity, in detestation of their past offense, i.e. the
+                     peoples of Moab, Ammon, and Amalec. For just as one man is punished for a sin committed by him, in order that others seeing
+                     this may be deterred and refrain from sinning; so too may one nation or city be punished for a crime, that others may refrain
+                     from similar crimes.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q105_A3-p12"> Nevertheless it was possible by dispensation for a man to be admitted to citizenship on account of some act of virtue: thus
+                     it is related (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A3-p12.1" href="./asv.html#Jdt.14.6" target="asv">Judith 14:6</a>) that Achior, the captain of the children of Ammon, "was joined to the people of Israel, with all the succession of his kindred."
+                     The same applies to Ruth the Moabite who was "a virtuous woman" (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A3-p12.2" href="./asv.html#Ruth.3.11" target="asv">Ruth 3:11</a>): although it may be said that this prohibition regarded men and not women, who are not competent to be
+                     citizens absolutely speaking.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q105_A3-p13">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As the Philosopher says (Polit. iii, 3), a man is said to be a citizen in two ways: first, simply; secondly, in a restricted
+                     sense. A man is a citizen simply if he has all the rights of citizenship, for instance, the right of debating or voting in
+                     the popular assembly. On the other hand, any man may be called citizen, only in a restricted sense, if he dwells within the
+                     state, even common people or children or old men, who are not fit to enjoy power in
+                     matters pertaining to the common weal. For this reason bastards, by reason of their base origin, were excluded from the "ecclesia,"
+                     i.e. from the popular assembly, down to the tenth generation. The same applies to eunuchs, who were not competent to receive
+                     the honor due to a father, especially among the Jews, where the divine worship was continued through carnal generation: for
+                     even among the heathens, those who had many children were marked with special honor, as the Philosopher remarks
+                     (Polit. ii, 6). Nevertheless, in matters pertaining to the grace of God, eunuchs were not discriminated from others, as neither
+                     were strangers, as already stated: for it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A3-p13.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.56.3" target="asv">Isa. 56:3</a>): "Let not the son of the stranger that adhereth to the Lord speak, saying: The Lord will divide and separate me from His
+                     people. And let not the eunuch say: Behold I am a dry tree."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q105_A3-p14">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> It was not the intention of the Law to sanction the acceptance of usury from strangers, but only to tolerate it on account
+                     of the proneness of the Jews to avarice; and in order to promote an amicable feeling towards those out of whom they made a
+                     profit.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q105_A3-p15">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> A distinction was observed with regard to hostile cities. For some of them were far distant, and were not among those which
+                     had been promised to them. When they had taken these cities, they killed all the men who had fought against God's people;
+                     whereas the women and children were spared. But in the neighboring cities which had been promised to them, all were ordered
+                     to be slain, on account of their former crimes, to punish which God sent the
+                     Israelites as executor of Divine justice: for it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A3-p15.1" href="./asv.html#Deut.9.5" target="asv">Dt. 9:5</a>) "because they have done wickedly, they are destroyed at thy coming in." The fruit-trees were commanded to be left untouched,
+                     for the use of the people themselves, to whom the city with its territory was destined to be subjected.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q105_A3-p16">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> The builder of a new house, the planter of a vineyard, the newly married husband, were excluded from fighting, for two reasons.
+                     First, because man is wont to give all his affection to those things which he has lately acquired, or is on the point of having,
+                     and consequently he is apt to dread the loss of these above other things. Wherefore it was likely enough that on account of
+                     this affection they would fear death all the more, and be so much the less
+                     brave in battle. Secondly, because, as the Philosopher says (Phys. ii, 5), "it is a misfortune for a man if he is prevented
+                     from obtaining something good when it is within his grasp." And so lest the surviving relations should be the more grieved
+                     at the death of these men who had not entered into the possession of the good things prepared for them; and also lest the
+                     people should be horror-stricken at the sight of their misfortune: these men were taken away from the danger of death by being
+                     removed from the battle.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q105_A3-p17">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 6:</b> The timid were sent back home, not that they might be the gainers thereby; but lest the people might be the losers by their
+                     presence, since their timidity and flight might cause others to be afraid and run away.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q105_A3-p18"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q105_A3-p19"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q105_A2.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q105_A4.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="FS_Q105_A4" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q105_A3.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q106.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="FS_Q105_A4-p0.1">Whether the Old Law set forth suitable precepts about the members of the household?</h4>
+                  <p id="FS_Q105_A4-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q105_A4-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the Old Law set forth unsuitable precepts about the members of the household. For a slave "is in every
+                     respect his master's property," as the Philosopher states (Polit. i, 2). But that which is a man's property should be his
+                     always. Therefore it was unfitting for the Law to command (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A4-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Exod.21.2" target="asv">Ex. 21:2</a>) that slaves should "go out free" in the seventh year.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q105_A4-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, a slave is his master's property, just as an animal, e.g. an ass or an ox. But it is commanded (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A4-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Deut.22.1" target="asv">Dt. 22:1-3</a>) with regard to animals, that they should be brought back to the owner if they be found going astray. Therefore it was unsuitably
+                     commanded (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A4-p3.2" href="./asv.html#Deut.23.15" target="asv">Dt. 23:15</a>): "Thou shalt not deliver to his master the servant that is fled to thee."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q105_A4-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the Divine Law should encourage mercy more even than the human law. But according to human laws those who ill-treat
+                     their servants and maidservants are severely punished: and the worse treatment of all seems to be that which results in death.
+                     Therefore it is unfittingly commanded (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A4-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Exod.21.20" target="asv">Ex. 21:20,21</a>) that "he that striketh his bondman or bondwoman with a rod, and they die under his hands . . . if the party remain alive
+                     a day . . . he
+                     shall not be subject to the punishment, because it is his money."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q105_A4-p5">
+                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, the dominion of a master over his slave differs from that of the father over his son (Polit. i, 3). But the dominion
+                     of master over slave gives the former the right to sell his servant or maidservant. Therefore it was unfitting for the Law
+                     to allow a man to sell his daughter to be a servant or handmaid (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A4-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Exod.21.7" target="asv">Ex. 21:7</a>).
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q105_A4-p6">
+                     <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, a father has power over his son. But he who has power over the sinner has the right to punish him for his offenses.
+                     Therefore it is unfittingly commanded (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A4-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Deut.21.18" target="asv">Dt. 21:18, </a> seqq.) that a father should bring his son to the ancients of the city for punishment.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q105_A4-p7">
+                     <b>Objection 6:</b> Further, the Lord forbade them (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A4-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Deut.7.3" target="asv">Dt. 7:3, </a> seqq.) to make marriages with strange nations; and commanded the dissolution of such as had been contracted (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A4-p7.2" href="./asv.html#iEsd.10" target="asv">1 Esdras 10</a>). Therefore it was unfitting to allow them to marry captive women from strange nations (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A4-p7.3" href="./asv.html#Deut.21.10" target="asv">Dt. 21:10, </a> seqq.).
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q105_A4-p8">
+                     <b>Objection 7:</b> Further, the Lord forbade them to marry within certain degrees of consanguinity and affinity, according to 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A4-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Lev.18" target="asv">Lev. 18</a>. Therefore it was unsuitably commanded (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A4-p8.2" href="./asv.html#Deut.25.5" target="asv">Dt. 25:5</a>) that if any man died without issue, his brother should marry his wife.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q105_A4-p9">
+                     <b>Objection 8:</b> Further, as there is the greatest familiarity between man and wife, so should there be the staunchest fidelity. But this
+                     is impossible if the marriage bond can be sundered. Therefore it was unfitting for the Lord to allow (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A4-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Deut.24.1" target="asv">Dt. 24:1-4</a>) a man to put his wife away, by writing a bill of divorce; and besides, that he could not take her again to wife.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q105_A4-p10">
+                     <b>Objection 9:</b> Further, just as a wife can be faithless to her husband, so can a slave be to his master, and a son to his father. But the
+                     Law did not command any sacrifice to be offered in order to investigate the injury done by a servant to his master, or by
+                     a son to his father. Therefore it seems to have been superfluous for the Law to prescribe the "sacrifice of jealousy" in order
+                     to investigate a wife's adultery (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A4-p10.1" href="./asv.html#Num.5.12" target="asv">Num. 5:12, </a> seqq.). Consequently it
+                     seems that the Law put forth unsuitable judicial precepts about the members of the household.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q105_A4-p11">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A4-p11.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.18.10" target="asv">Ps. 18:10</a>): "The judgments of the Lord are true, justified in themselves."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q105_A4-p12">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> The mutual relations of the members of a household regard everyday actions directed to the necessities of life, as the Philosopher
+                     states (Polit. i, 1). Now the preservation of man's life may be considered from two points of view. First, from the point
+                     of view of the individual, i.e. in so far as man preserves his individuality: and for the purpose of the preservation of life,
+                     considered from this standpoint, man has at his service external goods, by means
+                     of which he provides himself with food and clothing and other such necessaries of life: in the handling of which he has need
+                     of servants. Secondly man's life is preserved from the point of view of the species, by means of generation, for which purpose
+                     man needs a wife, that she may bear him children. Accordingly the mutual relations of the members of a household admit of
+                     a threefold combination: viz. those of master and servant, those of husband and wife, and those of father and son: and in
+                     respect of all these relationships the Old Law contained fitting precepts. Thus, with regard to servants, it commanded them
+                     to be treated with moderation---both as to their work, lest, to wit, they should be burdened with excessive labor, wherefore
+                     the Lord commanded (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A4-p12.1" href="./asv.html#Deut.5.14" target="asv">Dt. 5:14</a>) that on the Sabbath day "thy manservant and thy maidservant" should "rest even as thyself"---and also as to the infliction
+                     of punishment, for it ordered those who maimed their servants, to set them
+                     free (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A4-p12.2" href="./asv.html#Exod.21.26" target="asv">Ex. 21:26,27</a>). Similar provision was made in favor of a maidservant when married to anyone (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A4-p12.3" href="./asv.html#Exod.21.7" target="asv">Ex. 21:7, </a> seqq.). Moreover, with regard to those servants in particular who were taken from among the people, the Law prescribed that
+                     they should go out free in the seventh year taking whatever they brought with them, even their clothes (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A4-p12.4" href="./asv.html#Exod.21.2" target="asv">Ex. 21:2, </a> seqq.): and furthermore it was commanded (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A4-p12.5" href="./asv.html#Deut.15.13" target="asv">Dt. 15:13</a>) that they should
+                     be given provision for the journey.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q105_A4-p13"> With regard to wives the Law made certain prescriptions as to those who were to be taken in marriage: for instance, that
+                     they should marry a wife from their own tribe (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A4-p13.1" href="./asv.html#Num.36.6" target="asv">Num. 36:6</a>): and this lest confusion should ensue in the property of various tribes. Also that a man should marry the wife of his deceased
+                     brother when the latter died without issue, as prescribed in 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A4-p13.2" href="./asv.html#Deut.25.5" target="asv"> Dt. 25:5,6</a>: and this in order that he who could not have successors
+                     according to carnal origin, might at least have them by a kind of adoption, and that thus the deceased might not be entirely
+                     forgotten. It also forbade them to marry certain women; to wit, women of strange nations, through fear of their losing their
+                     faith; and those of their near kindred, on account of the natural respect due to them. Furthermore it prescribed in what way
+                     wives were to be treated after marriage. To wit, that they should not be slandered without grave reason: wherefore it
+                     ordered punishment to be inflicted on the man who falsely accused his wife of a crime (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A4-p13.3" href="./asv.html#Deut.22.13" target="asv">Dt. 22:13, </a> seqq.). Also that a man's hatred of his wife should not be detrimental to his son (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A4-p13.4" href="./asv.html#Deut.21.15" target="asv">Dt. 21:15, </a> seqq.). Again, that a man should not ill-use his wife through hatred of her, but rather that he should write a bill of divorce
+                     and send her away (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A4-p13.5" href="./asv.html#Deut.24.1" target="asv">Dt. 24:1</a>). Furthermore, in order to foster conjugal love from the very outset, it was prescribed
+                     that no public duties should be laid on a recently married man, so that he might be free to rejoice with his wife.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q105_A4-p14"> With regard to children, the Law commanded parents to educate them by instructing them in the faith: hence it is written
+                     (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A4-p14.1" href="./asv.html#Exod.12.26" target="asv">Ex. 12:26, </a> seqq.): "When your children shall say to you: What is the meaning of this service? You shall say to them: It is the victim
+                     of the passage of the Lord." Moreover, they are commanded to teach them the rules of right conduct: wherefore it is written
+                     (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A4-p14.2" href="./asv.html#Deut.21.20" target="asv">Dt. 21:20</a>) that the parents had to say: "He slighteth
+                     hearing our admonitions, he giveth himself to revelling and to debauchery."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q105_A4-p15">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As the children of Israel had been delivered by the Lord from slavery, and for this reason were bound to the service of God,
+                     He did not wish them to be slaves in perpetuity. Hence it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A4-p15.1" href="./asv.html#Lev.25.39" target="asv">Lev. 25:39</a>, seqq.): "If thy brother, constrained by poverty, sell himself to thee, thou shalt not oppress him with the service of bondservants:
+                     but he shall be as a hireling and a sojourner . . . for they are My servants, and I brought them out of the land of
+                     Egypt: let them not be sold as bondmen": and consequently, since they were slaves, not absolutely but in a restricted sense,
+                     after a lapse of time they were set free.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q105_A4-p16">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> This commandment is to be understood as referring to a servant whom his master seeks to kill, or to help him in committing
+                     some sin.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q105_A4-p17">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> With regard to the ill-treatment of servants, the Law seems to have taken into consideration whether it was certain or not:
+                     since if it were certain, the Law fixed a penalty: for maiming, the penalty was forfeiture of the servant, who was ordered
+                     to be given his liberty: while for slaying, the punishment was that of a murderer, when the slave died under the blow of his
+                     master. If, however, the hurt was not certain, but only probable, the Law did not
+                     impose any penalty as regards a man's own servant: for instance if the servant did not die at once after being struck, but
+                     after some days: for it would be uncertain whether he died as a result of the blows he received. For when a man struck a free
+                     man, yet so that he did not die at once, but "walked abroad again upon his staff," he that struck him was quit of murder,
+                     even though afterwards he died. Nevertheless he was bound to pay the doctor's fees incurred by the victim of his assault.
+                     But
+                     this was not the case if a man killed his own servant: because whatever the servant had, even his very person, was the property
+                     of his master. Hence the reason for his not being subject to a pecuniary penalty is set down as being "because it is his money."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q105_A4-p18">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> As stated above (ad 1), no Jew could own a Jew as a slave absolutely: but only in a restricted sense, as a hireling for a
+                     fixed time. And in this way the Law permitted that through stress of poverty a man might sell his son or daughter. This is
+                     shown by the very words of the Law, where we read: "If any man sell his daughter to be a servant, she shall not go out as
+                     bondwomen are wont to go out." Moreover, in this way a man might sell not only his son,
+                     but even himself, rather as a hireling than as a slave, according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A4-p18.1" href="./asv.html#Lev.25.39" target="asv"> Lev. 25:39,40</a>: "If thy brother, constrained by poverty, sell himself to thee, thou shalt not oppress him with the service of bondservants:
+                     but he shall be as a hireling and a sojourner."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q105_A4-p19">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> As the Philosopher says (Ethic. x, 9), the paternal authority has the power only of admonition; but not that of coercion,
+                     whereby rebellious and headstrong persons can be compelled. Hence in this case the Lord commanded the stubborn son to be punished
+                     by the rulers of the city.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q105_A4-p20">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 6:</b> The Lord forbade them to marry strange women on account of the danger of seduction, lest they should be led astray into idolatry.
+                     And specially did this prohibition apply with respect to those nations who dwelt near them, because it was more probable that
+                     they would adopt their religious practices. When, however, the woman was willing to renounce idolatry, and become an adherent
+                     of the Law, it was lawful to take her in marriage: as was the case with
+                     Ruth whom Booz married. Wherefore she said to her mother-in-law (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A4-p20.1" href="./asv.html#Ruth.1.16" target="asv">Ruth 1:16</a>): "Thy people shall be my people, and thy God my God." Accordingly it was not permitted to marry a captive woman unless she
+                     first shaved her hair, and pared her nails, and put off the raiment wherein she was taken, and mourned for her father and
+                     mother, in token that she renounced idolatry for ever.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q105_A4-p21">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 7:</b> As Chrysostom says (Hom. xlviii super Matth.), "because death was an unmitigated evil for the Jews, who did everything with
+                     a view to the present life, it was ordained that children should be born to the dead man through his brother: thus affording
+                     a certain mitigation to his death. It was not, however, ordained that any other than his brother or one next of kin should
+                     marry the wife of the deceased, because" the offspring of this union "would not be
+                     looked upon as that of the deceased: and moreover, a stranger would not be under the obligation to support the household of
+                     the deceased, as his brother would be bound to do from motives of justice on account of his relationship." Hence it is evident
+                     that in marrying the wife of his dead brother, he took his dead brother's place.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q105_A4-p22">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 8:</b> The Law permitted a wife to be divorced, not as though it were just absolutely speaking, but on account of the Jews' hardness
+                     of heart, as Our Lord declared (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A4-p22.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.19.8" target="asv">Mat. 19:8</a>). Of this, however, we must speak more fully in the treatise on Matrimony (
+                     <a id="FS_Q105_A4-p22.2" shape="rect" href="summa.SP_Q67.html">SP, Q[67])</a>.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q105_A4-p23">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 9:</b> Wives break their conjugal faith by adultery, both easily, for motives of pleasure, and hiddenly, since "the eye of the adulterer
+                     observeth darkness" (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q105_A4-p23.1" href="./asv.html#Job.24.15" target="asv">Job 24:15</a>). But this does not apply to a son in respect of his father, or to a servant in respect of his master: because the latter
+                     infidelity is not the result of the lust of pleasure, but rather of malice: nor can it remain hidden like the infidelity of
+                     an adulterous woman.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q105_A4-p24"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q105_A4-p25"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q105_A3.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q106.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <a href="summa.FS_Q104_A4.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.FS_Q105_A1.html"></a>
+            </div>
+            <div id="FS_Q106" class="div3">
+               <a href="summa.FS_Q105_A4.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.FS_Q106_A1.html"></a>
+               <h3 id="FS_Q106-p0.1">OF THE LAW OF THE GOSPEL, CALLED THE NEW LAW, CONSIDERED IN ITSELF (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3>
+               <p id="FS_Q106-p1"></p>
+               <p id="FS_Q106-p2"> In proper sequence we have to consider now the Law of the Gospel which is called the New Law: and in the first place we must
+                  consider it in itself; secondly, in comparison with the Old Law; thirdly, we shall treat of those things that are contained
+                  in the New Law. Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:
+               </p>
+               <p id="FS_Q106-p3"> (1) What kind of law is it? i.e. Is it a written law or is it instilled in the heart?</p>
+               <p id="FS_Q106-p4"> (2) Of its efficacy, i.e. does it justify?</p>
+               <p id="FS_Q106-p5"> (3) Of its beginning: should it have been given at the beginning of the world?</p>
+               <p id="FS_Q106-p6"> (4) Of its end: i.e. whether it will last until the end, or will another law take its place?</p>
+               <div id="FS_Q106_A1" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q106.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q106_A2.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="FS_Q106_A1-p0.1">Whether the New Law is a written law?</h4>
+                  <p id="FS_Q106_A1-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q106_A1-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the New Law is a written law. For the New Law is just the same as the Gospel. But the Gospel is set forth
+                     in writing, according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q106_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#John.20.31" target="asv"> Jn. 20:31</a>: "But these are written that you may believe." Therefore the New Law is a written law.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q106_A1-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the law that is instilled in the heart is the natural law, according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q106_A1-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.2.14" target="asv"> Rom. 2:14,15</a>: "(The Gentiles) do by nature those things that are of the law . . . who have [Vulg.: 'show'] the work of the law written
+                     in their hearts." If therefore the law of the Gospel were instilled in our hearts, it would not be distinct from the law of
+                     nature.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q106_A1-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the law of the Gospel is proper to those who are in the state of the New Testament. But the law that is instilled
+                     in the heart is common to those who are in the New Testament and to those who are in the Old Testament: for it is written
+                     (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q106_A1-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.7.27" target="asv">Wis. 7:27</a>) that Divine Wisdom "through nations conveyeth herself into holy souls, she maketh the friends of God and prophets." Therefore
+                     the New Law is not instilled in our hearts.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q106_A1-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The New Law is the law of the New Testament. But the law of the New Testament is instilled in our hearts. For the Apostle,
+                     quoting the authority of
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q106_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Jer.31.31" target="asv">Jeremiah 31:31</a>, 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q106_A1-p5.2" href="./asv.html#Jer.31.33" target="asv">33</a>: "Behold the days shall come, saith the Lord; and I will perfect unto the house of Israel, and unto the house of Judah, a
+                     new testament," says, explaining what this statement is (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q106_A1-p5.3" href="./asv.html#Heb.8.8" target="asv">Heb. 8:8</a>, 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q106_A1-p5.4" href="./asv.html#Heb.8.10" target="asv">10</a>): "For this is the testament which I will make to the house
+                     of Israel . . . by giving [Vulg.: 'I will give'] My laws into their mind, and in their heart will I write them." Therefore
+                     the New Law is instilled in our hearts.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q106_A1-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> "Each thing appears to be that which preponderates in it," as the Philosopher states (Ethic. ix, 8). Now that which is preponderant
+                     in the law of the New Testament, and whereon all its efficacy is based, is the grace of the Holy Ghost, which is given through
+                     faith in Christ. Consequently the New Law is chiefly the grace itself of the Holy Ghost, which is given to those who believe
+                     in Christ. This is manifestly stated by the Apostle who says (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q106_A1-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.3.27" target="asv">Rom.
+                        3:27
+                     </a>): "Where is . . . thy boasting? It is excluded. By what law? Of works? No, but by the law of faith": for he calls the grace
+                     itself of faith "a law." And still more clearly it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q106_A1-p6.2" href="./asv.html#Rom.8.2" target="asv">Rom. 8:2</a>): "The law of the spirit of life, in Christ Jesus, hath delivered me from the law of sin and of death." Hence Augustine says
+                     (De Spir. et Lit. xxiv) that "as the law of deeds was written on tables of stone, so is the law of faith inscribed on the
+                     hearts of the
+                     faithful": and elsewhere, in the same book (xxi): "What else are the Divine laws written by God Himself on our hearts, but
+                     the very presence of His Holy Spirit?"
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q106_A1-p7"> Nevertheless the New Law contains certain things that dispose us to receive the grace of the Holy Ghost, and pertaining to
+                     the use of that grace: such things are of secondary importance, so to speak, in the New Law; and the faithful need to be instructed
+                     concerning them, both by word and writing, both as to what they should believe and as to what they should do. Consequently
+                     we must say that the New Law is in the first place a law that is inscribed on our hearts, but that
+                     secondarily it is a written law.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q106_A1-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The Gospel writings contain only such things as pertain to the grace of the Holy Ghost, either by disposing us thereto, or
+                     by directing us to the use thereof. Thus with regard to the intellect, the Gospel contains certain matters pertaining to the
+                     manifestation of Christ's Godhead or humanity, which dispose us by means of faith through which we receive the grace of the
+                     Holy Ghost: and with regard to the affections, it contains matters touching the
+                     contempt of the world, whereby man is rendered fit to receive the grace of the Holy Ghost: for "the world," i.e. worldly men,
+                     "cannot receive" the Holy Ghost (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q106_A1-p8.1" href="./asv.html#John.14.17" target="asv">Jn. 14:17</a>). As to the use of spiritual grace, this consists in works of virtue to which the writings of the New Testament exhort men
+                     in divers ways.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q106_A1-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> There are two ways in which a thing may be instilled into man. First, through being part of his nature, and thus the natural
+                     law is instilled into man. Secondly, a thing is instilled into man by being, as it were, added on to his nature by a gift
+                     of grace. In this way the New Law is instilled into man, not only by indicating to him what he should do, but also by helping
+                     him to accomplish it.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q106_A1-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> No man ever had the grace of the Holy Ghost except through faith in Christ either explicit or implicit: and by faith in Christ
+                     man belongs to the New Testament. Consequently whoever had the law of grace instilled into them belonged to the New Testament.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q106_A1-p11"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q106_A1-p12"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q106.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q106_A2.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="FS_Q106_A2" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q106_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q106_A3.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="FS_Q106_A2-p0.1">Whether the New Law justifies?</h4>
+                  <p id="FS_Q106_A2-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q106_A2-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the New Law does not justify. For no man is justified unless he obeys God's law, according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q106_A2-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Heb.5.9" target="asv"> Heb. 5:9</a>: "He," i.e. Christ, "became to all that obey Him the cause of eternal salvation." But the Gospel does not always cause men
+                     to believe in it: for it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q106_A2-p2.2" href="./asv.html#Rom.10.16" target="asv">Rom. 10:16</a>): "All do not obey the Gospel." Therefore the New Law does not justify.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q106_A2-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the Apostle proves in his epistle to the Romans that the Old Law did not justify, because transgression increased
+                     at its advent: for it is stated (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q106_A2-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.4.15" target="asv">Rom. 4:15</a>): "The Law worketh wrath: for where there is no law, neither is there transgression." But much more did the New Law increase
+                     transgression: since he who sins after the giving of the New Law deserves greater punishment, according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q106_A2-p3.2" href="./asv.html#Heb.10.28" target="asv"> Heb. 10:28,29</a>: "A man
+                     making void the Law of Moses dieth without any mercy under two or three witnesses. How much more, do you think, he deserveth
+                     worse punishments, who hath trodden underfoot the Son of God," etc.? Therefore the New Law, like the Old Law, does not justify.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q106_A2-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, justification is an effect proper to God, according to 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q106_A2-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.8.33" target="asv"> Rom. 8:33</a>: "God that justifieth." But the Old Law was from God just as the New Law. Therefore the New Law does not justify any more
+                     than the Old Law.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q106_A2-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle says (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q106_A2-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.1.16" target="asv">Rom. 1:16</a>): "I am not ashamed of the Gospel: for it is in the power of God unto salvation to everyone that believeth." But there is
+                     no salvation but to those who are justified. Therefore the Law of the Gospel justifies.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q106_A2-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above 
+                     <a id="FS_Q106_A2-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q106_A1.html">(A[1])</a>, there is a twofold element in the Law of the Gospel. There is the chief element, viz. the grace of the Holy Ghost bestowed
+                     inwardly. And as to this, the New Law justifies. Hence Augustine says (De Spir. et Lit. xvii): "There," i.e. in the Old Testament,
+                     "the Law was set forth in an outward fashion, that the ungodly might be afraid"; "here," i.e. in the New Testament, "it is
+                     given in an inward manner, that
+                     they may be justified." The other element of the Evangelical Law is secondary: namely, the teachings of faith, and those commandments
+                     which direct human affections and human actions. And as to this, the New Law does not justify. Hence the Apostle says (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q106_A2-p6.2" href="./asv.html#iiCor.3.6" target="asv">2 Cor. 3:6</a>) "The letter killeth, but the spirit quickeneth": and Augustine explains this (De Spir. et Lit. xiv, xvii) by saying that
+                     the letter denotes any writing external to man, even that of the moral precepts such as are
+                     contained in the Gospel. Wherefore the letter, even of the Gospel would kill, unless there were the inward presence of the
+                     healing grace of faith.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q106_A2-p7">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This argument holds true of the New Law, not as to its principal, but as to its secondary element: i.e. as to the dogmas
+                     and precepts outwardly put before man either in words or in writing.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q106_A2-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Although the grace of the New Testament helps man to avoid sin, yet it does not so confirm man in good that he cannot sin:
+                     for this belongs to the state of glory. Hence if a man sin after receiving the grace of the New Testament, he deserves greater
+                     punishment, as being ungrateful for greater benefits, and as not using the help given to him. And this is why the New Law
+                     is not said to "work wrath": because as far as it is concerned it gives man
+                     sufficient help to avoid sin.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q106_A2-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The same God gave both the New and the Old Law, but in different ways. For He gave the Old Law written on tables of stone:
+                     whereas He gave the New Law written "in the fleshly tables of the heart," as the Apostle expresses it (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q106_A2-p9.1" href="./asv.html#iiCor.3.3" target="asv">2 Cor. 3:3</a>). Wherefore, as Augustine says (De Spir. et Lit. xviii), "the Apostle calls this letter which is written outside man, a ministration
+                     of death and a ministration of condemnation: whereas he calls
+                     the other letter, i.e. the Law of the New Testament, the ministration of the spirit and the ministration of justice: because
+                     through the gift of the Spirit we work justice, and are delivered from the condemnation due to transgression."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q106_A2-p10"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q106_A2-p11"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q106_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q106_A3.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="FS_Q106_A3" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q106_A2.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q106_A4.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="FS_Q106_A3-p0.1">Whether the New Law should have been given from the beginning of the world?</h4>
+                  <p id="FS_Q106_A3-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q106_A3-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the New Law should have been given from the beginning of the world. "For there is no respect of persons
+                     with God" (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q106_A3-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.2.11" target="asv">Rom. 2:11</a>). But "all" men "have sinned and do need the glory of God" (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q106_A3-p2.2" href="./asv.html#Rom.3.23" target="asv">Rom. 3:23</a>). Therefore the Law of the Gospel should have been given from the beginning of the world, in order that it might bring succor
+                     to all.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q106_A3-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, as men dwell in various places, so do they live in various times. But God, "Who will have all men to be saved" (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q106_A3-p3.1" href="./asv.html#iTim.2.4" target="asv">1 Tim. 2:4</a>), commanded the Gospel to be preached in all places, as may be seen in the last chapters of Matthew and Mark. Therefore the
+                     Law of the Gospel should have been at hand for all times, so as to be given from the beginning of the world.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q106_A3-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, man needs to save his soul, which is for all eternity, more than to save his body, which is a temporal matter. But
+                     God provided man from the beginning of the world with things that are necessary for the health of his body, by subjecting
+                     to his power whatever was created for the sake of man (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q106_A3-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.1.26" target="asv">Gn. 1:26-29</a>). Therefore the New Law also, which is very necessary for the health of the soul, should have been given to man from the
+                     beginning
+                     of the world.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q106_A3-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle says (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q106_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.15.46" target="asv">1 Cor. 15:46</a>): "That was not first which is spiritual, but that which is natural." But the New Law is highly spiritual. Therefore it was
+                     not fitting for it to be given from the beginning of the world.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q106_A3-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> Three reasons may be assigned why it was not fitting for the New Law to be given from the beginning of the world. The first
+                     is because the New Law, as stated above 
+                     <a id="FS_Q106_A3-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q106_A1.html">(A[1])</a>, consists chiefly in the grace of the Holy Ghost: which it behoved not to be given abundantly until sin, which is an obstacle
+                     to grace, had been cast out of man through the accomplishment of his redemption by Christ: wherefore it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q106_A3-p6.2" href="./asv.html#John.7.39" target="asv">Jn.
+                        7:39
+                     </a>): "As yet the Spirit was not given, because Jesus was not yet glorified." This reason the Apostle states clearly (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q106_A3-p6.3" href="./asv.html#Rom.8.2" target="asv">Rom. 8:2, </a> seqq.) where, after speaking of "the Law of the Spirit of life," he adds: "God sending His own Son, in the likeness of sinful
+                     flesh, of sin* hath condemned sin in the flesh, that the justification of the Law might be fulfilled in us." [*St. Thomas,
+                     quoting perhaps from memory, omits the "et" (and), after "sinful flesh." The text quoted
+                     should read thus: "in the likeness of sinful flesh, and a sin offering ({peri hamartias}), hath," etc.]
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q106_A3-p7"> A second reason may be taken from the perfection of the New Law. Because a thing is not brought to perfection at once from
+                     the outset, but through an orderly succession of time; thus one is at first a boy, and then a man. And this reason is stated
+                     by the Apostle (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q106_A3-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Gal.3.24" target="asv">Gal. 3:24,25</a>): "The Law was our pedagogue in Christ that we might be justified by faith. But after the faith is come, we are no longer
+                     under a pedagogue."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q106_A3-p8"> The third reason is found in the fact that the New Law is the law of grace: wherefore it behoved man first of all to be left
+                     to himself under the state of the Old Law, so that through falling into sin, he might realize his weakness, and acknowledge
+                     his need of grace. This reason is set down by the Apostle (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q106_A3-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.5.20" target="asv">Rom. 5:20</a>): "The Law entered in, that sin might abound: and when sin abounded grace did more abound."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q106_A3-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Mankind on account of the sin of our first parents deserved to be deprived of the aid of grace: and so "from whom it is withheld
+                     it is justly withheld, and to whom it is given, it is mercifully given," as Augustine states (De Perfect. Justit. iv) [*Cf.
+                     Ep. ccvii; De Pecc. Mer. et Rem. ii, 19]. Consequently it does not follow that there is respect of persons with God, from
+                     the fact that He did not offer the Law of grace to all from the beginning of the
+                     world, which Law was to be published in due course of time, as stated above.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q106_A3-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The state of mankind does not vary according to diversity of place, but according to succession of time. Hence the New Law
+                     avails for all places, but not for all times: although at all times there have been some persons belonging to the New Testament,
+                     as stated above (A[1], ad 3).
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q106_A3-p11">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Things pertaining to the health of the body are of service to man as regards his nature, which sin does not destroy: whereas
+                     things pertaining to the health of the soul are ordained to grace, which is forfeit through sin. Consequently the comparison
+                     will not hold.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q106_A3-p12"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q106_A3-p13"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q106_A2.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q106_A4.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="FS_Q106_A4" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q106_A3.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q107.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="FS_Q106_A4-p0.1">Whether the New Law will last till the end of the world?</h4>
+                  <p id="FS_Q106_A4-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q106_A4-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the New Law will not last until the end of the world. Because, as the Apostle says (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q106_A4-p2.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.13.10" target="asv">1 Cor. 13:10</a>), "when that which is perfect is come, that which is in part shall be done away." But the New Law is "in part," since the
+                     Apostle says (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q106_A4-p2.2" href="./asv.html#iCor.13.9" target="asv">1 Cor. 13:9</a>): "We know in part and we prophesy in part." Therefore the New Law is to be done away, and will be succeeded by a more perfect
+                     state.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q106_A4-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Our Lord (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q106_A4-p3.1" href="./asv.html#John.16.13" target="asv">Jn. 16:13</a>) promised His disciples the knowledge of all truth when the Holy Ghost, the Comforter, should come. But the Church knows
+                     not yet all truth in the state of the New Testament. Therefore we must look forward to another state, wherein all truth will
+                     be revealed by the Holy Ghost.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q106_A4-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, just as the Father is distinct from the Son and the Son from the Father, so is the Holy Ghost distinct from the
+                     Father and the Son. But there was a state corresponding with the Person of the Father, viz. the state of the Old Law, wherein
+                     men were intent on begetting children: and likewise there is a state corresponding to the Person of the Son: viz. the state
+                     of the New Law, wherein the clergy who are intent on wisdom (which is appropriated to the
+                     Son) hold a prominent place. Therefore there will be a third state corresponding to the Holy Ghost, wherein spiritual men
+                     will hold the first place.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q106_A4-p5">
+                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, Our Lord said (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q106_A4-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.24.14" target="asv">Mat. 24:14</a>): "This Gospel of the kingdom shall be preached in the whole world . . . and then shall the consummation come." But the Gospel
+                     of Christ is already preached throughout the whole world: and yet the consummation has not yet come. Therefore the Gospel
+                     of Christ is not the Gospel of the kingdom, but another Gospel, that of the Holy Ghost, is to come yet, like unto another
+                     Law.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q106_A4-p6">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Our Lord said (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q106_A4-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.24.34" target="asv">Mat. 24:34</a>): "I say to you that this generation shall not pass till all (these) things be done": which passage Chrysostom (Hom. lxxvii)
+                     explains as referring to "the generation of those that believe in Christ." Therefore the state of those who believe in Christ
+                     will last until the consummation of the world.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q106_A4-p7">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> The state of the world may change in two ways. In one way, according to a change of law: and thus no other state will succeed
+                     this state of the New Law. Because the state of the New Law succeeded the state of the Old Law, as a more perfect law a less
+                     perfect one. Now no state of the present life can be more perfect that the state of the New Law: since nothing can approach
+                     nearer to the last end than that which is the immediate cause of our being brought to
+                     the last end. But the New Law does this: wherefore the Apostle says (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q106_A4-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Heb.10.19" target="asv">Heb. 10:19-22</a>): "Having therefore, brethren, a confidence in the entering into the Holies by the blood of Christ, a new . . . way which
+                     He hath dedicated for us . . . let us draw near." Therefore no state of the present life can be more perfect than that of
+                     the New Law, since the nearer a thing is to the last end the more perfect it is.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q106_A4-p8"> In another way the state of mankind may change according as man stands in relation to one and the same law more or less perfectly.
+                     And thus the state of the Old Law underwent frequent changes, since at times the laws were very well kept, and at other times
+                     were altogether unheeded. Thus, too, the state of the New Law is subject to change with regard to various places, times, and
+                     persons, according as the grace of the Holy Ghost dwells in man more or less perfectly. Nevertheless
+                     we are not to look forward to a state wherein man is to possess the grace of the Holy Ghost more perfectly than he has possessed
+                     it hitherto, especially the apostles who "received the firstfruits of the Spirit, i.e. sooner and more abundantly than others,"
+                     as a gloss expounds on
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q106_A4-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.8.23" target="asv"> Rom. 8:23.</a>
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q106_A4-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As Dionysius says (Eccl. Hier. v), there is a threefold state of mankind; the first was under the Old Law; the second is
+                     that of the New Law; the third will take place not in this life, but in heaven. But as the first state is figurative and imperfect
+                     in comparison with the state of the Gospel; so is the present state figurative and imperfect in comparison with the heavenly
+                     state, with the advent of which the present state will be done away as
+                     expressed in that very passage (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q106_A4-p9.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.13.12" target="asv">1 Cor. 13:12</a>): "We see now through a glass in a dark manner; but then face to face."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q106_A4-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As Augustine says (Contra Faust. xix, 31), Montanus and Priscilla pretended that Our Lord's promise to give the Holy Ghost
+                     was fulfilled, not in the apostles, but in themselves. In like manner the Manicheans maintained that it was fulfilled in Manes
+                     whom they held to be the Paraclete. Hence none of the above received the Acts of the Apostles, where it is clearly shown that
+                     the aforesaid promise was fulfilled in the apostles: just as Our Lord promised
+                     them a second time (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q106_A4-p10.1" href="./asv.html#Acts.1.5" target="asv">Acts 1:5</a>): "You shall be baptized with the Holy Ghost, not many days hence": which we read as having been fulfilled in 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q106_A4-p10.2" href="./asv.html#Acts.2" target="asv">Acts 2</a>. However, these foolish notions are refuted by the statement (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q106_A4-p10.3" href="./asv.html#John.7.39" target="asv">Jn. 7:39</a>) that "as yet the Spirit was not given, because Jesus was not yet glorified"; from which we gather that the Holy Ghost was
+                     given as soon as Christ was glorified in His Resurrection and Ascension. Moreover, this puts out of court the
+                     senseless idea that the Holy Ghost is to be expected to come at some other time.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q106_A4-p11"> Now the Holy Ghost taught the apostles all truth in respect of matters necessary for salvation; those things, to wit, that
+                     we are bound to believe and to do. But He did not teach them about all future events: for this did not regard them according
+                     to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q106_A4-p11.1" href="./asv.html#Acts.1.7" target="asv"> Acts 1:7</a>: "It is not for you to know the times or moments which the Father hath put in His own power."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q106_A4-p12">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The Old Law corresponded not only to the Father, but also to the Son: because Christ was foreshadowed in the Old Law. Hence
+                     Our Lord said (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q106_A4-p12.1" href="./asv.html#John.5.46" target="asv">Jn. 5:46</a>): "If you did believe Moses, you would perhaps believe me also; for he wrote of Me." In like manner the New Law corresponds
+                     not only to Christ, but also to the Holy Ghost; according to 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q106_A4-p12.2" href="./asv.html#Rom.8.2" target="asv"> Rom. 8:2</a>: "The Law of the Spirit of life in Christ Jesus," etc. Hence we are not
+                     to look forward to another law corresponding to the Holy Ghost.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q106_A4-p13">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Since Christ said at the very outset of the preaching of the Gospel: "The kingdom of heaven is at hand" (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q106_A4-p13.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.4.17" target="asv">Mat. 4:17</a>), it is most absurd to say that the Gospel of Christ is not the Gospel of the kingdom. But the preaching of the Gospel of
+                     Christ may be understood in two ways. First, as denoting the spreading abroad of the knowledge of Christ: and thus the Gospel
+                     was preached throughout the world even at the time of the apostles, as
+                     Chrysostom states (Hom. lxxv in Matth.). And in this sense the words that follow---"and then shall the consummation come,"
+                     refer to the destruction of Jerusalem, of which He was speaking literally. Secondly, the preaching of the Gospel may be understood
+                     as extending throughout the world and producing its full effect, so that, to wit, the Church would be founded in every nation.
+                     And in these sense, as Augustine writes to Hesychius (Epist. cxcix), the Gospel is not preached to the whole world
+                     yet, but, when it is, the consummation of the world will come.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q106_A4-p14"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q106_A4-p15"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q106_A3.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q107.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <a href="summa.FS_Q105_A4.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.FS_Q106_A1.html"></a>
+            </div>
+            <div id="FS_Q107" class="div3">
+               <a href="summa.FS_Q106_A4.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.FS_Q107_A1.html"></a>
+               <h3 id="FS_Q107-p0.1">OF THE NEW LAW AS COMPARED WITH THE OLD (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3>
+               <p id="FS_Q107-p1"></p>
+               <p id="FS_Q107-p2"> We must now consider the New Law as compared with the Old: under which head there are four points of inquiry:</p>
+               <p id="FS_Q107-p3"> (1) Whether the New Law is distinct from the Old Law?</p>
+               <p id="FS_Q107-p4"> (2) Whether the New Law fulfils the Old?</p>
+               <p id="FS_Q107-p5"> (3) Whether the New Law is contained in the Old?</p>
+               <p id="FS_Q107-p6"> (4) Which is the more burdensome, the New or the Old Law?</p>
+               <div id="FS_Q107_A1" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q107.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q107_A2.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="FS_Q107_A1-p0.1">Whether the New Law is distinct from the Old Law?</h4>
+                  <p id="FS_Q107_A1-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q107_A1-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the New Law is not distinct from the Old. Because both these laws were given to those who believe in God:
+                     since "without faith it is impossible to please God," according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q107_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Heb.11.6" target="asv"> Heb. 11:6.</a> But the faith of olden times and of nowadays is the same, as the gloss says on
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q107_A1-p2.2" href="./asv.html#Matt.21.9" target="asv"> Mat. 21:9.</a> Therefore the law is the same also.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q107_A1-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Augustine says (Contra Adamant. Manich. discip. xvii) that "there is little difference between the Law and Gospel"
+                     [*The 'little difference' refers to the Latin words 'timor' and 'amor']---"fear and love." But the New and Old Laws cannot
+                     be differentiated in respect of these two things: since even the Old Law comprised precepts of charity: "Thou shalt love thy
+                     neighbor" (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q107_A1-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Lev.19.18" target="asv">Lev. 19:18</a>), and: "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God"
+                     (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q107_A1-p3.2" href="./asv.html#Deut.6.5" target="asv">Dt. 6:5</a>). In like manner neither can they differ according to the other difference which Augustine assigns (Contra Faust. iv, 2),
+                     viz. that "the Old Testament contained temporal promises, whereas the New Testament contains spiritual and eternal promises":
+                     since even the New Testament contains temporal promises, according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q107_A1-p3.3" href="./asv.html#Mark.10.30" target="asv"> Mk. 10:30</a>: He shall receive "a hundred times as much . . . in this time, houses and brethren," etc.: while in the Old Testament
+                     they hoped in promises spiritual and eternal, according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q107_A1-p3.4" href="./asv.html#Heb.11.16" target="asv"> Heb. 11:16</a>: "But now they desire a better, that is to say, a heavenly country," which is said of the patriarchs. Therefore it seems
+                     that the New Law is not distinct from the Old.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q107_A1-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the Apostle seems to distinguish both laws by calling the Old Law "a law of works," and the New Law "a law of faith"
+                     (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q107_A1-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.3.27" target="asv">Rom. 3:27</a>). But the Old Law was also a law of faith, according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q107_A1-p4.2" href="./asv.html#Heb.11.39" target="asv"> Heb. 11:39</a>: "All were [Vulg.: 'All these being'] approved by the testimony of faith," which he says of the fathers of the Old Testament.
+                     In like manner the New Law is a law of works: since it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q107_A1-p4.3" href="./asv.html#Matt.5.44" target="asv">Mat. 5:44</a>): "Do good to
+                     them that hate you"; and (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q107_A1-p4.4" href="./asv.html#Luke.22.19" target="asv">Lk. 22:19</a>): "Do this for a commemoration of Me." Therefore the New Law is not distinct from the Old.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q107_A1-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> the Apostle says (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q107_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Heb.7.12" target="asv">Heb. 7:12</a>): "The priesthood being translated it is necessary that a translation also be made of the Law." But the priesthood of the
+                     New Testament is distinct from that of the Old, as the Apostle shows in the same place. Therefore the Law is also distinct.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q107_A1-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above (
+                     <a id="FS_Q107_A1-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q90_A2.html">Q[90], A[2]</a>;
+                     <a id="FS_Q107_A1-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q91_A4.html"> Q[91], A[4]</a>), every law ordains human conduct to some end. Now things ordained to an end may be divided in two ways, considered from
+                     the point of view of the end. First, through being ordained to different ends: and this difference will be specific, especially
+                     if such ends are proximate. Secondly, by reason of being closely or remotely connected with the end. Thus it is clear
+                     that movements differ in species through being directed to different terms: while according as one part of a movement is nearer
+                     to the term than another part, the difference of perfect and imperfect movement is assessed.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q107_A1-p7"> Accordingly then two laws may be distinguished from one another in two ways. First, through being altogether diverse, from
+                     the fact that they are ordained to diverse ends: thus a state-law ordained to democratic government, would differ specifically
+                     from a law ordained to government by the aristocracy. Secondly, two laws may be distinguished from one another, through one
+                     of them being more closely connected with the end, and the other more remotely: thus in one and the same
+                     state there is one law enjoined on men of mature age, who can forthwith accomplish that which pertains to the common good;
+                     and another law regulating the education of children who need to be taught how they are to achieve manly deeds later on.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q107_A1-p8"> We must therefore say that, according to the first way, the New Law is not distinct from the Old Law: because they both have
+                     the same end, namely, man's subjection to God; and there is but one God of the New and of the Old Testament, according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q107_A1-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.3.30" target="asv"> Rom. 3:30</a>: "It is one God that justifieth circumcision by faith, and uncircumcision through faith." According to the second way, the
+                     New Law is distinct from the Old Law: because the Old Law is like a pedagogue of
+                     children, as the Apostle says (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q107_A1-p8.2" href="./asv.html#Gal.3.24" target="asv">Gal. 3:24</a>), whereas the New Law is the law of perfection, since it is the law of charity, of which the Apostle says (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q107_A1-p8.3" href="./asv.html#Col.3.14" target="asv">Col. 3:14</a>) that it is "the bond of perfection."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q107_A1-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The unity of faith under both Testaments witnesses to the unity of end: for it has been stated above (
+                     <a id="FS_Q107_A1-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q62_A2.html">Q[62], A[2]</a>) that the object of the theological virtues, among which is faith, is the last end. Yet faith had a different state in the
+                     Old and in the New Law: since what they believed as future, we believe as fact.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q107_A1-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> All the differences assigned between the Old and New Laws are gathered from their relative perfection and imperfection. For
+                     the precepts of every law prescribe acts of virtue. Now the imperfect, who as yet are not possessed of a virtuous habit, are
+                     directed in one way to perform virtuous acts, while those who are perfected by the possession of virtuous habits are directed
+                     in another way. For those who as yet are not endowed with virtuous habits, are
+                     directed to the performance of virtuous acts by reason of some outward cause: for instance, by the threat of punishment, or
+                     the promise of some extrinsic rewards, such as honor, riches, or the like. Hence the Old Law, which was given to men who were
+                     imperfect, that is, who had not yet received spiritual grace, was called the "law of fear," inasmuch as it induced men to
+                     observe its commandments by threatening them with penalties; and is spoken of as containing temporal promises. On the other
+                     hand, those who are possessed of virtue, are inclined to do virtuous deeds through love of virtue, not on account of some
+                     extrinsic punishment or reward. Hence the New Law which derives its pre-eminence from the spiritual grace instilled into our
+                     hearts, is called the "Law of love": and it is described as containing spiritual and eternal promises, which are objects of
+                     the virtues, chiefly of charity. Accordingly such persons are inclined of themselves to those objects, not as to something
+                     foreign but as to something of their own. For this reason, too, the Old Law is described as "restraining the hand, not the
+                     will" [*Peter Lombard, Sent. iii, D, 40]; since when a man refrains from some sins through fear of being punished, his will
+                     does not shrink simply from sin, as does the will of a man who refrains from sin through love of righteousness: and hence
+                     the New Law, which is the Law of love, is said to restrain the will.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q107_A1-p11"> Nevertheless there were some in the state of the Old Testament who, having charity and the grace of the Holy Ghost, looked
+                     chiefly to spiritual and eternal promises: and in this respect they belonged to the New Law. In like manner in the New Testament
+                     there are some carnal men who have not yet attained to the perfection of the New Law; and these it was necessary, even under
+                     the New Testament, to lead to virtuous action by the fear of punishment and by temporal promises.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q107_A1-p12"> But although the Old Law contained precepts of charity, nevertheless it did not confer the Holy Ghost by Whom "charity .
+                     . . is spread abroad in our hearts" (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q107_A1-p12.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.5.5" target="asv">Rom. 5:5</a>).
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q107_A1-p13">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As stated above (
+                     <a id="FS_Q107_A1-p13.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q106_A1.html">Q[106], AA[1]</a>,2), the New Law is called the law of faith, in so far as its pre-eminence is derived from that very grace which is given
+                     inwardly to believers, and for this reason is called the grace of faith. Nevertheless it consists secondarily in certain deeds,
+                     moral and sacramental: but the New Law does not consist chiefly in these latter things, as did the Old Law. As to those under
+                     the Old Testament who
+                     through faith were acceptable to God, in this respect they belonged to the New Testament: for they were not justified except
+                     through faith in Christ, Who is the Author of the New Testament. Hence of Moses the Apostle says (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q107_A1-p13.2" href="./asv.html#Heb.11.26" target="asv">Heb. 11:26</a>) that he esteemed "the reproach of Christ greater riches than the treasure of the Egyptians."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q107_A1-p14"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q107_A1-p15"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q107.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q107_A2.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="FS_Q107_A2" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q107_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q107_A3.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="FS_Q107_A2-p0.1">Whether the New Law fulfils the Old?</h4>
+                  <p id="FS_Q107_A2-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q107_A2-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the New Law does not fulfil the Old. Because to fulfil and to void are contrary. But the New Law voids
+                     or excludes the observances of the Old Law: for the Apostle says (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q107_A2-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Gal.5.2" target="asv">Gal. 5:2</a>): "If you be circumcised, Christ shall profit you nothing." Therefore the New Law is not a fulfilment of the Old.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q107_A2-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, one contrary is not the fulfilment of another. But Our Lord propounded in the New Law precepts that were contrary
+                     to precepts of the Old Law. For we read (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q107_A2-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.5.27" target="asv">Mat. 5:27-32</a>): You have heard that it was said to them of old: . . . "Whosoever shall put away his wife, let him give her a bill of divorce.
+                     But I say to you that whosoever shall put away his wife . . . maketh her to commit adultery." Furthermore, the same evidently
+                     applies to
+                     the prohibition against swearing, against retaliation, and against hating one's enemies. In like manner Our Lord seems to
+                     have done away with the precepts of the Old Law relating to the different kinds of foods (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q107_A2-p3.2" href="./asv.html#Matt.15.11" target="asv">Mat. 15:11</a>): "Not that which goeth into the mouth defileth the man: but what cometh out of the mouth, this defileth a man." Therefore
+                     the New Law is not a fulfilment of the Old.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q107_A2-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, whoever acts against a law does not fulfil the law. But Christ in certain cases acted against the Law. For He touched
+                     the leper (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q107_A2-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.8.3" target="asv">Mat. 8:3</a>), which was contrary to the Law. Likewise He seems to have frequently broken the sabbath; since the Jews used to say of Him
+                     (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q107_A2-p4.2" href="./asv.html#John.9.16" target="asv">Jn. 9:16</a>): "This man is not of God, who keepeth not the sabbath." Therefore Christ did not fulfil the Law: and so the New Law given
+                     by Christ is not a fulfilment of the
+                     Old.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q107_A2-p5">
+                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, the Old Law contained precepts, moral, ceremonial, and judicial, as stated above (
+                     <a id="FS_Q107_A2-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q99_A4.html">Q[99], A[4]</a>). But Our Lord (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q107_A2-p5.2" href="./asv.html#Matt.5" target="asv">Mat. 5</a>) fulfilled the Law in some respects, but without mentioning the judicial and ceremonial precepts. Therefore it seems that
+                     the New Law is not a complete fulfilment of the Old.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q107_A2-p6">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Our Lord said (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q107_A2-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.5.17" target="asv">Mat. 5:17</a>): "I am not come to destroy, but to fulfil": and went on to say (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q107_A2-p6.2" href="./asv.html#Matt.5.18" target="asv">Mat. 5:18</a>): "One jot or one tittle shall not pass of the Law till all be fulfilled."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q107_A2-p7">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above 
+                     <a id="FS_Q107_A2-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q107_A1.html">(A[1])</a>, the New Law is compared to the Old as the perfect to the imperfect. Now everything perfect fulfils that which is lacking
+                     in the imperfect. And accordingly the New Law fulfils the Old by supplying that which was lacking in the Old Law.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q107_A2-p8"> Now two things of every law is to make men righteous and virtuous, as was stated above (
+                     <a id="FS_Q107_A2-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q92_A1.html">Q[92], A[1]</a>): and consequently the end of the Old Law was the justification of men. The Law, however, could not accomplish this: but
+                     foreshadowed it by certain ceremonial actions, and promised it in words. And in this respect, the New Law fulfils the Old
+                     by justifying men through the power of Christ's Passion. This is what the Apostle says (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q107_A2-p8.2" href="./asv.html#Rom.8.3" target="asv">Rom.
+                        8:3,4
+                     </a>): "What the Law could not do . . . God sending His own Son in the likeness of sinful flesh . . . hath condemned sin in the
+                     flesh, that the justification of the Law might be fulfilled in us." And in this respect, the New Law gives what the Old Law
+                     promised, according to 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q107_A2-p8.3" href="./asv.html#iiCor.1.20" target="asv">2 Cor. 1:20</a>: "Whatever are the promises of God, in Him," i.e. in Christ, "they are 'Yea'." [*The Douay version reads thus: "All the promises
+                     of God are in Him, 'It is'."] Again, in this respect, it also fulfils
+                     what the Old Law foreshadowed. Hence it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q107_A2-p8.4" href="./asv.html#Col.2.17" target="asv">Col. 2:17</a>) concerning the ceremonial precepts that they were "a shadow of things to come, but the body is of Christ"; in other words,
+                     the reality is found in Christ. Wherefore the New Law is called the law of reality; whereas the Old Law is called the law
+                     of shadow or of figure.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q107_A2-p9"> Now Christ fulfilled the precepts of the Old Law both in His works and in His doctrine. In His works, because He was willing
+                     to be circumcised and to fulfil the other legal observances, which were binding for the time being; according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q107_A2-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Gal.4.4" target="asv"> Gal. 4:4</a>: "Made under the Law." In His doctrine He fulfilled the precepts of the Law in three ways. First, by explaining the true
+                     sense of the Law. This is clear in the case of murder and adultery, the prohibition of which
+                     the Scribes and Pharisees thought to refer only to the exterior act: wherefore Our Lord fulfilled the Law by showing that
+                     the prohibition extended also to the interior acts of sins. Secondly, Our Lord fulfilled the precepts of the Law by prescribing
+                     the safest way of complying with the statutes of the Old Law. Thus the Old Law forbade perjury: and this is more safely avoided,
+                     by abstaining altogether from swearing, save in cases of urgency. Thirdly, Our Lord fulfilled the precepts of the Law,
+                     by adding some counsels of perfection: this is clearly seen in
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q107_A2-p9.2" href="./asv.html#Matt.19.21" target="asv"> Mat. 19:21, </a> where Our Lord said to the man who affirmed that he had kept all the precepts of the Old Law: "One thing is wanting to thee:
+                     If thou wilt be perfect, go, sell whatsoever thou hast," etc. [*St. Thomas combines
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q107_A2-p9.3" href="./asv.html#Matt.19.21" target="asv"> Mat. 19:21 </a>with
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q107_A2-p9.4" href="./asv.html#Mark.10.21" target="asv"> Mk. 10:21</a>].
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q107_A2-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The New Law does not void observance of the Old Law except in the point of ceremonial precepts, as stated above (
+                     <a id="FS_Q107_A2-p10.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q103_A3.html">Q[103], AA[3]</a>,4). Now the latter were figurative of something to come. Wherefore from the very fact that the ceremonial precepts were fulfilled
+                     when those things were accomplished which they foreshadowed, it follows that they are no longer to be observed: for it they
+                     were to be observed, this would mean that
+                     something is still to be accomplished and is not yet fulfilled. Thus the promise of a future gift holds no longer when it
+                     has been fulfilled by the presentation of the gift. In this way the legal ceremonies are abolished by being fulfilled.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q107_A2-p11">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As Augustine says (Contra Faust. xix, 26), those precepts of Our Lord are not contrary to the precepts of the Old Law. For
+                     what Our Lord commanded about a man not putting away his wife, is not contrary to what the Law prescribed. "For the Law did
+                     not say: 'Let him that wills, put his wife away': the contrary of which would be not to put her away. On the contrary, the
+                     Law was unwilling that a man should put away his wife, since it prescribed a delay,
+                     so that excessive eagerness for divorce might cease through being weakened during the writing of the bill. Hence Our Lord,
+                     in order to impress the fact that a wife ought not easily to be put away, allowed no exception save in the case of fornication."
+                     The same applies to the prohibition about swearing, as stated above. The same is also clear with respect to the prohibition
+                     of retaliation. For the Law fixed a limit to revenge, by forbidding men to seek vengeance unreasonably: whereas Our Lord
+                     deprived them of vengeance more completely by commanding them to abstain from it altogether. With regard to the hatred of
+                     one's enemies, He dispelled the false interpretation of the Pharisees, by admonishing us to hate, not the person, but his
+                     sin. As to discriminating between various foods, which was a ceremonial matter, Our Lord did not forbid this to be observed:
+                     but He showed that no foods are naturally unclean, but only in token of something else, as stated above (
+                     <a id="FS_Q107_A2-p11.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q102_A6.html">Q[102], A[6]</a>, ad 1).
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q107_A2-p12">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> It was forbidden by the Law to touch a leper; because by doing so, man incurred a certain uncleanness of irregularity, as
+                     also by touching the dead, as stated above (
+                     <a id="FS_Q107_A2-p12.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q102_A5.html">Q[102], A[5]</a>, ad 4). But Our Lord, Who healed the leper, could not contract an uncleanness. By those things which He did on the sabbath,
+                     He did not break the sabbath in reality, as the Master Himself shows in the Gospel: both because He worked miracles by His
+                     Divine power, which is ever active among things; and because He worked miracles by His Divine power, which is ever active
+                     among things; and because His works were concerned with the salvation of man, while the Pharisees were concerned for the well-being
+                     of animals even on the sabbath; and again because on account of urgency He excused His disciples for gathering the ears of
+                     corn on the sabbath. But He did seem to break the sabbath according to the superstitious interpretation of the Pharisees,
+                     who thought that man ought to abstain from doing even works of kindness on the sabbath; which was contrary to the intention
+                     of the Law.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q107_A2-p13">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> The reason why the ceremonial precepts of the Law are not mentioned in 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q107_A2-p13.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.5" target="asv">Mat. 5</a> is because, as stated above (ad 1), their observance was abolished by their fulfilment. But of the judicial precepts He mentioned
+                     that of retaliation: so that what He said about it should refer to all the others. With regard to this precept, He taught
+                     that the intention of the Law was that retaliation should be sought out of love of justice, and not as a punishment out of
+                     revengeful spite, which He forbade, admonishing man to be ready to suffer yet greater insults; and this remains still in the
+                     New Law.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q107_A2-p14"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q107_A2-p15"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q107_A2-p16"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q107_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q107_A3.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="FS_Q107_A3" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q107_A2.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q107_A4.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="FS_Q107_A3-p0.1">Whether the New Law is contained in the Old?</h4>
+                  <p id="FS_Q107_A3-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q107_A3-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the New Law is not contained in the Old. Because the New Law consists chiefly in faith: wherefore it is
+                     called the "law of faith" (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q107_A3-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.3.27" target="asv">Rom. 3:27</a>). But many points of faith are set forth in the New Law, which are not contained in the Old. Therefore the New Law is not
+                     contained in the Old.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q107_A3-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, a gloss says on
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q107_A3-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.5.19" target="asv"> Mat. 5:19, </a> "He that shall break one of these least commandments," that the lesser commandments are those of the Law, and the greater
+                     commandments, those contained in the Gospel. Now the greater cannot be contained in the lesser. Therefore the New Law is not
+                     contained in the Old.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q107_A3-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, who holds the container holds the contents. If, therefore, the New Law is contained in the Old, it follows that
+                     whoever had the Old Law had the New: so that it was superfluous to give men a New Law when once they had the Old. Therefore
+                     the New Law is not contained in the Old.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q107_A3-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> As expressed in
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q107_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Ezek.1.16" target="asv"> Ezech. 1:16, </a> there was "a wheel in the midst of a wheel," i.e. "the New Testament within the Old," according to Gregory's exposition.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q107_A3-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> One thing may be contained in another in two ways. First, actually; as a located thing is in a place. Secondly, virtually;
+                     as an effect in its cause, or as the complement in that which is incomplete; thus a genus contains its species, and a seed
+                     contains the whole tree, virtually. It is in this way that the New Law is contained in the Old: for it has been stated 
+                     <a id="FS_Q107_A3-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q107_A1.html">(A[1])</a> that the New Law is compared to the Old as perfect to imperfect.
+                     Hence Chrysostom, expounding
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q107_A3-p6.2" href="./asv.html#Mark.4.28" target="asv"> Mk. 4:28, </a> "The earth of itself bringeth forth fruit, first the blade, then the ear, afterwards the full corn in the ear," expresses
+                     himself as follows: "He brought forth first the blade, i.e. the Law of Nature; then the ear, i.e. the Law of Moses; lastly,
+                     the full corn, i.e. the Law of the Gospel." Hence then the New Law is in the Old as the corn in the ear.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q107_A3-p7">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Whatsoever is set down in the New Testament explicitly and openly as a point of faith, is contained in the Old Testament
+                     as a matter of belief, but implicitly, under a figure. And accordingly, even as to those things which we are bound to believe,
+                     the New Law is contained in the Old.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q107_A3-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The precepts of the New Law are said to be greater than those of the Old Law, in the point of their being set forth explicitly.
+                     But as to the substance itself of the precepts of the New Testament, they are all contained in the Old. Hence Augustine says
+                     (Contra Faust. xix, 23,28) that "nearly all Our Lord's admonitions or precepts, where He expressed Himself by saying: 'But
+                     I say unto you,' are to be found also in those ancient books. Yet, since they
+                     thought that murder was only the slaying of the human body, Our Lord declared to them that every wicked impulse to hurt our
+                     brother is to be looked on as a kind of murder." And it is in the point of declarations of this kind that the precepts of
+                     the New Law are said to be greater than those of the Old. Nothing, however, prevents the greater from being contained in the
+                     lesser virtually; just as a tree is contained in the seed.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q107_A3-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> What is set forth implicitly needs to be declared explicitly. Hence after the publishing of the Old Law, a New Law also had
+                     to be given.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q107_A3-p10"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q107_A3-p11"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q107_A2.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q107_A4.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="FS_Q107_A4" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q107_A3.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q108.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="FS_Q107_A4-p0.1">Whether the New Law is more burdensome than the Old?</h4>
+                  <p id="FS_Q107_A4-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q107_A4-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the New Law is more burdensome than the Old. For Chrysostom (Opus Imp. in Matth., Hom. x [*The work of
+                     an unknown author]) say: "The commandments given to Moses are easy to obey: Thou shalt not kill; Thou shalt not commit adultery:
+                     but the commandments of Christ are difficult to accomplish, for instance: Thou shalt not give way to anger, or to lust." Therefore
+                     the New Law is more burdensome than the Old.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q107_A4-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it is easier to make use of earthly prosperity than to suffer tribulations. But in the Old Testament observance
+                     of the Law was followed by temporal prosperity, as may be gathered from
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q107_A4-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Deut.28.1" target="asv"> Dt. 28:1-14</a>; whereas many kinds of trouble ensue to those who observe the New Law, as stated in 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q107_A4-p3.2" href="./asv.html#iiCor.6.4" target="asv">2 Cor. 6:4-10</a>: "Let us exhibit ourselves as the ministers of God, in much patience, in tribulation, in necessities, in distresses,"
+                     etc. Therefore the New Law is more burdensome than the Old.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q107_A4-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> The more one has to do, the more difficult it is. But the New Law is something added to the Old. For the Old Law forbade
+                     perjury, while the New Law proscribed even swearing: the Old Law forbade a man to cast off his wife without a bill of divorce,
+                     while the New Law forbade divorce altogether; as is clearly stated in
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q107_A4-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.5.31" target="asv"> Mat. 5:31, </a> seqq., according to Augustine's expounding. Therefore the New Law is more burdensome than the Old.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q107_A4-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q107_A4-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.11.28" target="asv">Mat. 11:28</a>): "Come to Me, all you that labor and are burdened": which words are expounded by Hilary thus: "He calls to Himself all those
+                     that labor under the difficulty of observing the Law, and are burdened with the sins of this world." And further on He says
+                     of the yoke of the Gospel: "For My yoke is sweet and My burden light." Therefore the New Law is a lighter burden than the
+                     Old.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q107_A4-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> A twofold difficult may attach to works of virtue with which the precepts of the Law are concerned. One is on the part of
+                     the outward works, which of themselves are, in a way, difficult and burdensome. And in this respect the Old Law is a much
+                     heavier burden than the New: since the Old Law by its numerous ceremonies prescribed many more outward acts than the New Law,
+                     which, in the teaching of Christ and the apostles, added very few precepts to those of the
+                     natural law; although afterwards some were added, through being instituted by the holy Fathers. Even in these Augustine says
+                     that moderation should be observed, lest good conduct should become a burden to the faithful. For he says in reply to the
+                     queries of Januarius (Ep. lv) that, "whereas God in His mercy wished religion to be a free service rendered by the public
+                     solemnization of a small number of most manifest sacraments, certain persons make it a slave's burden; so much so that the
+                     state
+                     of the Jews who were subject to the sacraments of the Law, and not to the presumptuous devices of man, was more tolerable."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q107_A4-p7"> The other difficulty attaches to works of virtue as to interior acts: for instance, that a virtuous deed be done with promptitude
+                     and pleasure. It is this difficulty that virtue solves: because to act thus is difficult for a man without virtue: but through
+                     virtue it becomes easy for him. In this respect the precepts of the New Law are more burdensome than those of the Old; because
+                     the New Law prohibits certain interior movements of the soul, which were not expressly forbidden in
+                     the Old Law in all cases, although they were forbidden in some, without, however, any punishment being attached to the prohibition.
+                     Now this is very difficult to a man without virtue: thus even the Philosopher states (Ethic. v, 9) that it is easy to do what
+                     a righteous man does; but that to do it in the same way, viz. with pleasure and promptitude, is difficult to a man who is
+                     not righteous. Accordingly we read also (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q107_A4-p7.1" href="./asv.html#iJohn.5.3" target="asv">1 Jn. 5:3</a>) that "His commandments are not heavy": which
+                     words Augustine expounds by saying that "they are not heavy to the man that loveth; whereas they are a burden to him that
+                     loveth not."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q107_A4-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The passage quoted speaks expressly of the difficulty of the New Law as to the deliberate curbing of interior movements.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q107_A4-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The tribulations suffered by those who observe the New Law are not imposed by the Law itself. Moreover they are easily borne,
+                     on account of the love in which the same Law consists: since, as Augustine says (De Verb. Dom., Serm. lxx), "love makes light
+                     and nothing of things that seem arduous and beyond our power."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q107_A4-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The object of these additions to the precepts of the Old Law was to render it easier to do what it prescribed, as Augustine
+                     states [*De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 17,21; xix, 23,26]. Accordingly this does not prove that the New Law is more burdensome,
+                     but rather that it is a lighter burden.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q107_A4-p11"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q107_A4-p12"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q107_A3.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q108.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <a href="summa.FS_Q106_A4.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.FS_Q107_A1.html"></a>
+            </div>
+            <div id="FS_Q108" class="div3">
+               <a href="summa.FS_Q107_A4.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.FS_Q108_A1.html"></a>
+               <h3 id="FS_Q108-p0.1">OF THOSE THINGS THAT ARE CONTAINED IN THE NEW LAW (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3>
+               <p id="FS_Q108-p1"></p>
+               <p id="FS_Q108-p2"> We must now consider those things that are contained in the New Law: under which head there are four points of inquiry:</p>
+               <p id="FS_Q108-p3"> (1) Whether the New Law ought to prescribe or to forbid any outward works?</p>
+               <p id="FS_Q108-p4"> (2) Whether the New Law makes sufficient provision in prescribing and forbidding external acts?</p>
+               <p id="FS_Q108-p5"> (3) Whether in the matter of internal acts it directs man sufficiently?</p>
+               <p id="FS_Q108-p6"> (4) Whether it fittingly adds counsels to precepts?</p>
+               <div id="FS_Q108_A1" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q108.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q108_A2.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="FS_Q108_A1-p0.1">Whether the New Law ought to prescribe or prohibit any external acts?</h4>
+                  <p id="FS_Q108_A1-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q108_A1-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the New Law should not prescribe or prohibit any external acts. For the New Law is the Gospel of the kingdom,
+                     according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q108_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.24.14" target="asv"> Mat. 24:14</a>: "This Gospel of the kingdom shall be preached in the whole world." But the kingdom of God consists not in exterior, but
+                     only in interior acts, according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q108_A1-p2.2" href="./asv.html#Luke.17.21" target="asv"> Lk. 17:21</a>: "The kingdom of God is within you"; and
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q108_A1-p2.3" href="./asv.html#Rom.14.17" target="asv"> Rom. 14:17</a>: "The kingdom of God is not
+                     meat and drink; but justice and peace and joy in the Holy Ghost." Therefore the New Law should not prescribe or forbid any
+                     external acts.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q108_A1-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the New Law is "the law of the Spirit" (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q108_A1-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.8.2" target="asv">Rom. 8:2</a>). But "where the Spirit of the Lord is, there is liberty" (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q108_A1-p3.2" href="./asv.html#iiCor.3.17" target="asv">2 Cor. 3:17</a>). Now there is no liberty when man is bound to do or avoid certain external acts. Therefore the New Law does not prescribe
+                     or forbid any external acts.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q108_A1-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, all external acts are understood as referable to the hand, just as interior acts belong to the mind. But this is
+                     assigned as the difference between the New and Old Laws that the "Old Law restrains the hand, whereas the New Law curbs the
+                     will" [*Peter Lombard, Sent. iii, D, 40]. Therefore the New Law should not contain prohibitions and commands about exterior
+                     deeds, but only about interior acts.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q108_A1-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Through the New Law, men are made "children of light": wherefore it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q108_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#John.12.36" target="asv">Jn. 12:36</a>): "Believe in the light that you may be the children of light." Now it is becoming that children of the light should do deeds
+                     of light and cast aside deeds of darkness, according to 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q108_A1-p5.2" href="./asv.html#Eph.5.8" target="asv"> Eph. 5:8</a>: "You were heretofore darkness, but now light in the Lord. Walk . . . as children of the light." Therefore the New Law had
+                     to forbid
+                     certain external acts and prescribe others.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q108_A1-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above (
+                     <a id="FS_Q108_A1-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q106_A1.html">Q[106], AA[1]</a>,2), the New Law consists chiefly in the grace of the Holy Ghost, which is shown forth by faith that worketh through love.
+                     Now men become receivers of this grace through God's Son made man, Whose humanity grace filled first, and thence flowed forth
+                     to us. Hence it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q108_A1-p6.2" href="./asv.html#John.1.14" target="asv">Jn. 1:14</a>): "The Word was made flesh," and afterwards: "full of grace and truth"; and further on: "Of His
+                     fulness we all have received, and grace for grace." Hence it is added that "grace and truth came by Jesus Christ." Consequently
+                     it was becoming that the grace flows from the incarnate Word should be given to us by means of certain external sensible objects;
+                     and that from this inward grace, whereby the flesh is subjected to the Spirit, certain external works should ensue.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q108_A1-p7"> Accordingly external acts may have a twofold connection with grace. In the first place, as leading in some way to grace.
+                     Such are the sacramental acts which are instituted in the New Law, e.g. Baptism, the Eucharist, and the like.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q108_A1-p8"> In the second place there are those external acts which ensue from the promptings of grace: and herein we must observe a
+                     difference. For there are some which are necessarily in keeping with, or in opposition to inward grace consisting in faith
+                     that worketh through love. Such external works are prescribed or forbidden in the New Law; thus confession of faith is prescribed,
+                     and denial of faith is forbidden; for it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q108_A1-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.10.32" target="asv">Mat. 10:32,33</a>) "(Every one) that
+                     shall confess Me before men, I will also confess him before My Father . . . But he that shall deny Me before men, I will also
+                     deny him before My Father." On the other hand, there are works which are not necessarily opposed to, or in keeping with faith
+                     that worketh through love. Such works are not prescribed or forbidden in the New Law, by virtue of its primitive institution;
+                     but have been left by the Lawgiver, i.e. Christ, to the discretion of each individual. And so to each one it is free to
+                     decide what he should do or avoid; and to each superior, to direct his subjects in such matters as regards what they must
+                     do or avoid. Wherefore also in this respect the Gospel is called the "law of liberty" [*Cf. Reply OBJ[2]]: since the Old Law
+                     decided many points and left few to man to decide as he chose.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q108_A1-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The kingdom of God consists chiefly in internal acts: but as a consequence all things that are essential to internal acts
+                     belong also to the kingdom of God. Thus if the kingdom of God is internal righteousness, peace, and spiritual joy, all external
+                     acts that are incompatible with righteousness, peace, and spiritual joy, are in opposition to the kingdom of God; and consequently
+                     should be forbidden in the Gospel of the kingdom. On the other hand, those
+                     things that are indifferent as regards the aforesaid, for instance, to eat of this or that food, are not part of the kingdom
+                     of God; wherefore the Apostle says before the words quoted: "The kingdom of God is not meat and drink."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q108_A1-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> According to the Philosopher (Metaph. i, 2), what is "free is cause of itself." Therefore he acts freely, who acts of his
+                     own accord. Now man does of his own accord that which he does from a habit that is suitable to his nature: since a habit inclines
+                     one as a second nature. If, however, a habit be in opposition to nature, man would not act according to his nature, but according
+                     to some corruption affecting that nature. Since then the grace of the
+                     Holy Ghost is like an interior habit bestowed on us and inclining us to act aright, it makes us do freely those things that
+                     are becoming to grace, and shun what is opposed to it.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q108_A1-p11"> Accordingly the New Law is called the law of liberty in two respects. First, because it does not bind us to do or avoid certain
+                     things, except such as are of themselves necessary or opposed to salvation, and come under the prescription or prohibition
+                     of the law. Secondly, because it also makes us comply freely with these precepts and prohibitions, inasmuch as we do so through
+                     the promptings of grace. It is for these two reasons that the New Law is called "the law of perfect
+                     liberty" (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q108_A1-p11.1" href="./asv.html#Jas.1.25" target="asv">James 1:25</a>).
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q108_A1-p12">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The New Law, by restraining the mind from inordinate movements, must needs also restrain the hand from inordinate acts, which
+                     ensue from inward movements.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q108_A1-p13"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q108_A1-p14"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q108.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q108_A2.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="FS_Q108_A2" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q108_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q108_A3.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="FS_Q108_A2-p0.1">Whether the New Law made sufficient ordinations about external acts?</h4>
+                  <p id="FS_Q108_A2-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q108_A2-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the New Law made insufficient ordinations about external acts. Because faith that worketh through charity
+                     seems chiefly to belong to the New Law, according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q108_A2-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Gal.5.6" target="asv"> Gal. 5:6</a>: "In Christ Jesus neither circumcision availeth anything, nor uncircumcision: but faith that worketh through charity." But
+                     the New Law declared explicitly certain points of faith which were not set forth explicitly in the Old Law; for instance,
+                     belief in
+                     the Trinity. Therefore it should also have added certain outward moral deeds, which were not fixed in the Old Law.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q108_A2-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, in the Old Law not only were sacraments instituted, but also certain sacred things, as stated above (
+                     <a id="FS_Q108_A2-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q101_A4.html">Q[101], A[4]</a>;
+                     <a id="FS_Q108_A2-p3.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q102_A4.html"> Q[102], A[4]</a>). But in the New Law, although certain sacraments are instituted by Our Lord; for instance, pertaining either to the sanctification
+                     of a temple or of the vessels, or to the celebration of some particular feast. Therefore the New Law made insufficient ordinations
+                     about
+                     external matters.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q108_A2-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, in the Old Law, just as there were certain observances pertaining to God's ministers, so also were there certain
+                     observances pertaining to the people: as was stated above when we were treating of the ceremonial of the Old Law (
+                     <a id="FS_Q108_A2-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q101_A4.html">Q[101], A[4]</a>;
+                     <a id="FS_Q108_A2-p4.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q102_A6.html"> Q[102], A[6]</a>). Now in the New Law certain observances seem to have been prescribed to the ministers of God; as may be gathered from
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q108_A2-p4.3" href="./asv.html#Matt.10.9" target="asv"> Mat. 10:9</a>:
+                     "Do not possess gold, nor silver, nor money in your purses," nor other things which are mentioned here and 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q108_A2-p4.4" href="./asv.html#Luke.9" target="asv">Lk. 9</a>, 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q108_A2-p4.5" href="./asv.html#Luke.10" target="asv">10</a>. Therefore certain observances pertaining to the faithful should also have been instituted in the New Law.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q108_A2-p5">
+                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, in the Old Law, besides moral and ceremonial precepts, there were certain judicial precepts. But in the New Law
+                     there are no judicial precepts. Therefore the New Law made insufficient ordinations about external works.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q108_A2-p6">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Our Lord said (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q108_A2-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.7.24" target="asv">Mat. 7:24</a>): "Every one . . . that heareth these My words, and doth them, shall be likened to a wise man that built his house upon a
+                     rock." But a wise builder leaves out nothing that is necessary to the building. Therefore Christ's words contain all things
+                     necessary for man's salvation.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q108_A2-p7">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> as stated above 
+                     <a id="FS_Q108_A2-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q108_A1.html">(A[1])</a>, the New Law had to make such prescriptions or prohibitions alone as are essential for the reception or right use of grace.
+                     And since we cannot of ourselves obtain grace, but through Christ alone, hence Christ of Himself instituted the sacraments
+                     whereby we obtain grace: viz. Baptism, Eucharist, Orders of the ministers of the New Law, by the institution of the apostles
+                     and seventy-two disciples, Penance, and
+                     indissoluble Matrimony. He promised Confirmation through the sending of the Holy Ghost: and we read that by His institution
+                     the apostles healed the sick by anointing them with oil (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q108_A2-p7.2" href="./asv.html#Mark.6.13" target="asv">Mk. 6:13</a>). These are the sacraments of the New Law.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q108_A2-p8"> The right use of grace is by means of works of charity. These, in so far as they are essential to virtue, pertain to the
+                     moral precepts, which also formed part of the Old Law. Hence, in this respect, the New Law had nothing to add as regards external
+                     action. The determination of these works in their relation to the divine worship, belongs to the ceremonial precepts of the
+                     Law; and, in relation to our neighbor, to the judicial precepts, as stated above (
+                     <a id="FS_Q108_A2-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q99_A4.html">Q[99], A[4]</a>). And therefore, since these determinations are not in themselves necessarily connected with inward grace wherein the Law
+                     consists, they do not come under a precept of the New Law, but are left to the decision of man; some relating to inferiors---as
+                     when a precept is given to an individual; others, relating to superiors, temporal or spiritual, referring, namely, to the
+                     common good.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q108_A2-p9"> Accordingly the New Law had no other external works to determine, by prescribing or forbidding, except the sacraments, and
+                     those moral precepts which have a necessary connection with virtue, for instance, that one must not kill, or steal, and so
+                     forth.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q108_A2-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Matters of faith are above human reason, and so we cannot attain to them except through grace. Consequently, when grace came
+                     to be bestowed more abundantly, the result was an increase in the number of explicit points of faith. On the other hand, it
+                     is through human reason that we are directed to works of virtue, for it is the rule of human action, as stated above (
+                     <a id="FS_Q108_A2-p10.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q19_A3.html">Q[19], A[3]</a>;
+                     <a id="FS_Q108_A2-p10.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q63_A2.html"> Q[63], A[2]</a>). Wherefore
+                     in such matters as these there was no need for any precepts to be given besides the moral precepts of the Law, which proceed
+                     from the dictate of reason.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q108_A2-p11">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> In the sacraments of the New Law grace is bestowed, which cannot be received except through Christ: consequently they had
+                     to be instituted by Him. But in the sacred things no grace is given: for instance, in the consecration of a temple, an altar
+                     or the like, or, again, in the celebration of feasts. Wherefore Our Lord left the institution of such things to the discretion
+                     of the faithful, since they have not of themselves any necessary connection with
+                     inward grace.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q108_A2-p12">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Our Lord gave the apostles those precepts not as ceremonial observances, but as moral statutes: and they can be understood
+                     in two ways. First, following Augustine (De Consensu Evang. 30), as being not commands but permissions. For He permitted them
+                     to set forth to preach without scrip or stick, and so on, since they were empowered to accept their livelihood from those
+                     to whom they preached: wherefore He goes on to say: "For the laborer is worthy of
+                     his hire." Nor is it a sin, but a work of supererogation for a preacher to take means of livelihood with him, without accepting
+                     supplies from those to whom he preaches; as Paul did (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q108_A2-p12.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.9.4" target="asv">1 Cor. 9:4, </a> seqq.).
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q108_A2-p13"> Secondly, according to the explanation of other holy men, they may be considered as temporal commands laid upon the apostles
+                     for the time during which they were sent to preach in Judea before Christ's Passion. For the disciples, being yet as little
+                     children under Christ's care, needed to receive some special commands from Christ, such as all subjects receive from their
+                     superiors: and especially so, since they were to be accustomed little by little to renounce the care of
+                     temporalities, so as to become fitted for the preaching of the Gospel throughout the whole world. Nor must we wonder if He
+                     established certain fixed modes of life, as long as the state of the Old Law endured and the people had not as yet achieved
+                     the perfect liberty of the Spirit. These statutes He abolished shortly before His Passion, as though the disciples had by
+                     their means become sufficiently practiced. Hence He said (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q108_A2-p13.1" href="./asv.html#Luke.22.35" target="asv">Lk. 22:35,36</a>) "When I sent you without purse and
+                     scrip and shoes, did you want anything? But they said: Nothing. Then said He unto them: But now, he that hath a purse, let
+                     him take it, and likewise a scrip." Because the time of perfect liberty was already at hand, when they would be left entirely
+                     to their own judgment in matters not necessarily connected with virtue.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q108_A2-p14">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Judicial precepts also, are not essential to virtue in respect of any particular determination, but only in regard to the
+                     common notion of justice. Consequently Our Lord left the judicial precepts to the discretion of those who were to have spiritual
+                     or temporal charge of others. But as regards the judicial precepts of the Old Law, some of them He explained, because they
+                     were misunderstood by the Pharisees, as we shall state later on (A[3], ad 2).
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q108_A2-p15"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q108_A2-p16"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q108_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q108_A3.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="FS_Q108_A3" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q108_A2.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q108_A4.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="FS_Q108_A3-p0.1">Whether the New Law directed man sufficiently as regards interior actions?</h4>
+                  <p id="FS_Q108_A3-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q108_A3-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the New Law directed man insufficiently as regards interior actions. For there are ten commandments of
+                     the decalogue directing man to God and his neighbor. But Our Lord partly fulfilled only three of them: as regards, namely,
+                     the prohibition of murder, of adultery, and of perjury. Therefore it seems that, by omitting to fulfil the other precepts,
+                     He directed man insufficiently.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q108_A3-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, as regards the judicial precepts, Our Lord ordained nothing in the Gospel, except in the matter of divorcing of
+                     wife, of punishment by retaliation, and of persecuting one's enemies. But there are many other judicial precepts of the Old
+                     Law, as stated above (
+                     <a id="FS_Q108_A3-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q104_A4.html">Q[104], A[4]</a>;
+                     <a id="FS_Q108_A3-p3.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q105.html"> Q[105])</a>. Therefore, in this respect, He directed human life insufficiently.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q108_A3-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, in the Old Law, besides moral and judicial, there were ceremonial precepts about which Our Lord made no ordination.
+                     Therefore it seems that He ordained insufficiently.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q108_A3-p5">
+                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, in order that the mind be inwardly well disposed, man should do no good deed for any temporal whatever. But there
+                     are many other temporal goods besides the favor of man: and there are many other good works besides fasting, alms-deeds, and
+                     prayer. Therefore Our Lord unbecomingly taught that only in respect of these three works, and of no other earthly goods ought
+                     we to shun the glory of human favor.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q108_A3-p6">
+                     <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, solicitude for the necessary means of livelihood is by nature instilled into man, and this solicitude even other
+                     animals share with man: wherefore it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q108_A3-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Prov.6.6" target="asv">Prov. 6:6</a>, 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q108_A3-p6.2" href="./asv.html#Prov.6.8" target="asv">8</a>): "Go to the ant, O sluggard, and consider her ways . . . she provideth her meat for herself in the summer, and gathereth
+                     her food in the harvest." But every command issued against the inclination of nature is an unjust command, forasmuch as it
+                     is contrary to
+                     the law of nature. Therefore it seems that Our Lord unbecomingly forbade solicitude about food and raiment.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q108_A3-p7">
+                     <b>Objection 6:</b> Further, no act of virtue should be the subject of a prohibition. Now judgment is an act of justice, according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q108_A3-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.18.15" target="asv"> Ps. 18:15</a>: "Until justice be turned into judgment." Therefore it seems that Our Lord unbecomingly forbade judgment: and consequently
+                     that the New Law directed man insufficiently in the matter of interior acts.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q108_A3-p8">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 1): We should take note that, when He said: "'He that heareth these My words,'
+                     He indicates clearly that this sermon of the Lord is replete with all the precepts whereby a Christian's life is formed."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q108_A3-p9">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> As is evident from Augustine's words just quoted, the sermon, contains the whole process of forming the life of a Christian.
+                     Therein man's interior movements are ordered. Because after declaring that his end is Beatitude; and after commending the
+                     authority of the apostles, through whom the teaching of the Gospel was to be promulgated, He orders man's interior movements,
+                     first in regard to man himself, secondly in regard to his neighbor.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q108_A3-p10"> This he does in regard to man himself, in two ways, corresponding to man's two interior movements in respect of any prospective
+                     action, viz. volition of what has to be done, and intention of the end. Wherefore, in the first place, He directs man's will
+                     in respect of the various precepts of the Law: by prescribing that man should refrain not merely from those external works
+                     that are evil in themselves, but also from internal acts, and from the occasions of evil deeds. In the
+                     second place He directs man's intention, by teaching that in our good works, we should seek neither human praise, nor worldly
+                     riches, which is to lay up treasures on earth.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q108_A3-p11"> Afterwards He directs man's interior movement in respect of his neighbor, by forbidding us, on the one hand, to judge him
+                     rashly, unjustly, or presumptuously; and, on the other, to entrust him too readily with sacred things if he be unworthy.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q108_A3-p12"> Lastly, He teaches us how to fulfil the teaching of the Gospel; viz. by imploring the help of God; by striving to enter by
+                     the narrow door of perfect virtue; and by being wary lest we be led astray by evil influences. Moreover, He declares that
+                     we must observe His commandments, and that it is not enough to make profession of faith, or to work miracles, or merely to
+                     hear His words.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q108_A3-p13">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Our Lord explained the manner of fulfilling those precepts which the Scribes and Pharisees did not rightly understand: and
+                     this affected chiefly those precepts of the decalogue. For they thought that the prohibition of adultery and murder covered
+                     the external act only, and not the internal desire. And they held this opinion about murder and adultery rather than about
+                     theft and false witness, because the movement of anger tending to murder, and the
+                     movement of desire tending to adultery, seem to be in us from nature somewhat, but not the desire of stealing or bearing false
+                     witness. They held a false opinion about perjury, for they thought that perjury indeed was a sin; but that oaths were of themselves
+                     to be desired and to be taken frequently, since they seem to proceed from reverence to God. Hence Our Lord shows that an oath
+                     is not desirable as a good thing; and that it is better to speak without oaths, unless necessity forces us to have
+                     recourse to them.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q108_A3-p14">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The Scribes and Pharisees erred about the judicial precepts in two ways. First, because they considered certain matters contained
+                     in the Law of Moses by way of permission, to be right in themselves: namely, divorce of a wife, and the taking of usury from
+                     strangers. Wherefore Our Lord forbade a man to divorce his wife (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q108_A3-p14.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.5.32" target="asv">Mat. 5:32</a>); and to receive usury (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q108_A3-p14.2" href="./asv.html#Luke.6.35" target="asv">Lk. 6:35</a>), when He said: "Lend, hoping for nothing
+                     thereby."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q108_A3-p15"> In another way they erred by thinking that certain things which the Old Law commanded to be done for justice's sake, should
+                     be done out of desire for revenge, or out of lust for temporal goods, or out of hatred of one's enemies; and this in respect
+                     of three precepts. For they thought that desire for revenge was lawful, on account of the precept concerning punishment by
+                     retaliation: whereas this precept was given that justice might be safeguarded, not that man might seek revenge.
+                     Wherefore, in order to do away with this, Our Lord teaches that man should be prepared in his mind to suffer yet more if necessary.
+                     They thought that movements of covetousness were lawful on account of those judicial precepts which prescribed restitution
+                     of what had been purloined, together with something added thereto, as stated above (
+                     <a id="FS_Q108_A3-p15.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q105_A2.html">Q[105], A[2]</a>, ad 9); whereas the Law commanded this to be done in order to safeguard justice, not to encourage covetousness. Wherefore
+                     Our Lord teaches that we should not demand our goods from motives of cupidity, and that we should be ready to give yet more
+                     if necessary. They thought that the movement of hatred was lawful, on account of the commandments of the Law about the slaying
+                     of one's enemies: whereas the Law ordered this for the fulfilment of justice, as stated above (
+                     <a id="FS_Q108_A3-p15.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q105_A3.html">Q[105], A[3]</a>, ad 4), not to satisfy hatred. Wherefore Our Lord teaches us that we ought to love our enemies, and to be ready to
+                     do good to them if necessary. For these precepts are to be taken as binding "the mind to be prepared to fulfil them," as Augustine
+                     says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 19).
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q108_A3-p16">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The moral precepts necessarily retained their force under the New Law, because they are of themselves essential to virtue:
+                     whereas the judicial precepts did not necessarily continue to bind in exactly the same way as had been fixed by the Law: this
+                     was left to man to decide in one way or another. Hence Our Lord directed us becomingly with regard to these two kinds of precepts.
+                     On the other hand, the observance of the ceremonial precepts was totally
+                     abolished by the advent of the reality; wherefore in regard to these precepts He commanded nothing on this occasion when He
+                     was giving the general points of His doctrine. Elsewhere, however, He makes it clear that the entire bodily worship which
+                     was fixed by the Law, was to be changed into spiritual worship: as is evident from
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q108_A3-p16.1" href="./asv.html#John.4.21" target="asv"> Jn. 4:21,23, </a> where He says: "The hour cometh when you shall neither on this mountain, nor in Jerusalem adore the Father . . . but . .
+                     . the true
+                     adorers shall adore the Father in spirit and in truth."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q108_A3-p17">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> All worldly goods may be reduced to three---honors, riches, and pleasures; according to 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q108_A3-p17.1" href="./asv.html#iJohn.2.16" target="asv">1 Jn. 2:16</a>: "All that is in the world is the concupiscence of the flesh," which refers to pleasures of the flesh, "and the concupiscence
+                     of the eyes," which refers to riches, "and the pride of life," which refers to ambition for renown and honor. Now the Law
+                     did not promise an abundance of carnal pleasures; on the contrary, it forbade them. But
+                     it did promise exalted honors and abundant riches; for it is written in reference to the former (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q108_A3-p17.2" href="./asv.html#Deut.28.1" target="asv">Dt. 28:1</a>): "If thou wilt hear the voice of the Lord thy God . . . He will make thee higher than all the nations"; and in reference
+                     to the latter, we read a little further on (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q108_A3-p17.3" href="./asv.html#Deut.28.11" target="asv">Dt. 28:11</a>): "He will make thee abound with all goods." But the Jews so distorted the true meaning of these promises, as to think that
+                     we ought to serve God, with these things as the end
+                     in view. Wherefore Our Lord set this aside by teaching, first of all, that works of virtue should not be done for human glory.
+                     And He mentions three works, to which all others may be reduced: since whatever a man does in order to curb his desires, comes
+                     under the head of fasting; and whatever a man does for the love of his neighbor, comes under the head of alms-deeds; and whatever
+                     a man does for the worship of God, comes under the head of prayer. And He mentions these three specifically, as
+                     they hold the principal place, and are most often used by men in order to gain glory. In the second place He taught us that
+                     we must not place our end in riches, when He said: "Lay not up to yourselves treasures on earth" (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q108_A3-p17.4" href="./asv.html#Matt.6.19" target="asv">Mat. 6:19</a>).
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q108_A3-p18">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> Our Lord forbade, not necessary, but inordinate solicitude. Now there is a fourfold solicitude to be avoided in temporal
+                     matters. First, we must not place our end in them, nor serve God for the sake of the necessities of food and raiment. Wherefore
+                     He says: "Lay not up for yourselves," etc. Secondly, we must not be so anxious about temporal things, as to despair of God's
+                     help: wherefore Our Lord says (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q108_A3-p18.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.6.32" target="asv">Mat. 6:32</a>): "Your Father
+                     knoweth that you have need of all these things." Thirdly, we must not add presumption to our solicitude; in other words, we
+                     must not be confident of getting the necessaries of life by our own efforts without God's help: such solicitude Our Lord sets
+                     aside by saying that a man cannot add anything to his stature (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q108_A3-p18.2" href="./asv.html#Matt.6.27" target="asv">Mat. 6:27</a>). We must not anticipate the time for anxiety; namely, by being solicitous now, for the needs, not of the present, but of
+                     a future time: wherefore He says
+                     (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q108_A3-p18.3" href="./asv.html#Matt.6.34" target="asv">Mat. 6:34</a>): "Be not . . . solicitous for tomorrow."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q108_A3-p19">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 6:</b> Our Lord did not forbid the judgment of justice, without which holy things could not be withdrawn from the unworthy. But
+                     he forbade inordinate judgment, as stated above.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q108_A3-p20"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q108_A3-p21"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q108_A2.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q108_A4.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="FS_Q108_A4" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q108_A3.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS.vii.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="FS_Q108_A4-p0.1">Whether certain definite counsels are fittingly proposed in the New Law?</h4>
+                  <p id="FS_Q108_A4-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q108_A4-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that certain definite counsels are not fittingly proposed in the New Law. For counsels are given about that
+                     which is expedient for an end, as we stated above, when treating of counsel (
+                     <a id="FS_Q108_A4-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q14_A2.html">Q[14] , A[2]</a>). But the same things are not expedient for all. Therefore certain definite counsels should not be proposed to all.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q108_A4-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, counsels regard a greater good. But there are no definite degrees to the greater good. Therefore definite counsels
+                     should not be given.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q108_A4-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, counsels pertain to the life of perfection. But obedience pertains to the life of perfection. Therefore it was unfitting
+                     that no counsel of obedience should be contained in the Gospel.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q108_A4-p5">
+                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, many matters pertaining to the life of perfection are found among the commandments, as, for instance, "Love your
+                     enemies" (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q108_A4-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.5.44" target="asv">Mat. 5:44</a>), and those precepts which Our Lord gave His apostles (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q108_A4-p5.2" href="./asv.html#Matt.10" target="asv">Mat. 10</a>). Therefore the counsels are unfittingly given in the New Law: both because they are not all mentioned; and because they
+                     are not distinguished from the commandments.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q108_A4-p6">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The counsels of a wise friend are of great use, according to Prov. (27:9): "Ointment and perfumes rejoice the heart: and
+                     the good counsels of a friend rejoice the soul." But Christ is our wisest and greatest friend. Therefore His counsels are
+                     supremely useful and becoming.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q108_A4-p7">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> The difference between a counsel and a commandment is that a commandment implies obligation, whereas a counsel is left to
+                     the option of the one to whom it is given. Consequently in the New Law, which is the law of liberty, counsels are added to
+                     the commandments, and not in the Old Law, which is the law of bondage. We must therefore understand the commandments of the
+                     New Law to have been given about matters that are necessary to gain the end of eternal bliss,
+                     to which end the New Law brings us forthwith: but that the counsels are about matters that render the gaining of this end
+                     more assured and expeditious.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q108_A4-p8"> Now man is placed between the things of this world, and spiritual goods wherein eternal happiness consists: so that the more
+                     he cleaves to the one, the more he withdraws from the other, and conversely. Wherefore he that cleaves wholly to the things
+                     of this world, so as to make them his end, and to look upon them as the reason and rule of all he does, falls away altogether
+                     from spiritual goods. Hence this disorder is removed by the commandments. Nevertheless, for man to gain the
+                     end aforesaid, he does not need to renounce the things of the world altogether: since he can, while using the things of this
+                     world, attain to eternal happiness, provided he does not place his end in them: but he will attain more speedily thereto by
+                     giving up the goods of this world entirely: wherefore the evangelical counsels are given for this purpose.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q108_A4-p9"> Now the goods of this world which come into use in human life, consist in three things: viz. in external wealth pertaining
+                     to the "concupiscence of the eyes"; carnal pleasures pertaining to the "concupiscence of the flesh"; and honors, which pertain
+                     to the "pride of life," according to 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q108_A4-p9.1" href="./asv.html#iJohn.2.16" target="asv">1 Jn. 2:16</a>: and it is in renouncing these altogether, as far as possible, that the evangelical counsels consist. Moreover, every form
+                     of the religious life that professes the
+                     state of perfection is based on these three: since riches are renounced by poverty; carnal pleasures by perpetual chastity;
+                     and the pride of life by the bondage of obedience.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q108_A4-p10"> Now if a man observe these absolutely, this is in accordance with the counsels as they stand. But if a man observe any one
+                     of them in a particular case, this is taking that counsel in a restricted sense, namely, as applying to that particular case.
+                     For instance, when anyone gives an alms to a poor man, not being bound so to do, he follows the counsels in that particular
+                     case. In like manner, when a man for some fixed time refrains from carnal pleasures that he may give himself
+                     to prayer, he follows the counsel for that particular time. And again, when a man follows not his will as to some deed which
+                     he might do lawfully, he follows the counsel in that particular case: for instance, if he do good to his enemies when he is
+                     not bound to, or if he forgive an injury of which he might justly seek to be avenged. In this way, too, all particular counsels
+                     may be reduced to these three general and perfect counsels.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q108_A4-p11">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The aforesaid counsels, considered in themselves, are expedient to all; but owing to some people being ill-disposed, it happens
+                     that some of them are inexpedient, because their disposition is not inclined to such things. Hence Our Lord, in proposing
+                     the evangelical counsels, always makes mention of man's fitness for observing the counsels. For in giving the counsel of perpetual
+                     poverty (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q108_A4-p11.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.19.21" target="asv">Mat. 19:21</a>), He begins with the words: "If
+                     thou wilt be perfect," and then He adds: "Go, sell all [Vulg.: 'what'] thou hast." In like manner when He gave the counsel
+                     of perpetual chastity, saying (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q108_A4-p11.2" href="./asv.html#Matt.19.12" target="asv">Mat. 19:12</a>): "There are eunuchs who have made themselves eunuchs for the kingdom of heaven," He adds straightway: "He that can take,
+                     let him take it." And again, the Apostle (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q108_A4-p11.3" href="./asv.html#iCor.7.35" target="asv">1 Cor. 7:35</a>), after giving the counsel of virginity, says: "And this I speak for your profit; not to cast a snare upon you."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q108_A4-p12">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The greater goods are not definitely fixed in the individual; but those which are simply and absolutely the greater good
+                     in general are fixed: and to these all the above particular goods may be reduced, as stated above.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q108_A4-p13">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Even the counsel of obedience is understood to have been given by Our Lord in the words: "And [let him] follow Me." For we
+                     follow Him not only by imitating His works, but also by obeying His commandments, according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q108_A4-p13.1" href="./asv.html#John.10.27" target="asv"> Jn. 10:27</a>: "My sheep hear My voice . . . and they follow Me."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q108_A4-p14">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Those things which Our Lord prescribed about the true love of our enemies, and other similar sayings (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q108_A4-p14.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.5" target="asv">Mat. 5</a>; 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q108_A4-p14.2" href="./asv.html#Luke.6" target="asv">Lk. 6</a>), may be referred to the preparation of the mind, and then they are necessary for salvation; for instance, that man be prepared
+                     to do good to his enemies, and other similar actions, when there is need. Hence these things are placed among the precepts.
+                     But that anyone should actually and promptly behave thus towards an enemy when there is
+                     no special need, is to be referred to the particular counsels, as stated above. As to those matters which are set down in
+                     
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q108_A4-p14.3" href="./asv.html#Matt.10" target="asv">Mat. 10</a> and 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q108_A4-p14.4" href="./asv.html#Luke.9" target="asv">Lk. 9</a> and 10, they were either disciplinary commands for that particular time, or concessions, as stated above (A[2], ad 3). Hence
+                     they are not set down among the counsels.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q108_A4-p15"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q108_A4-p16"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q108_A3.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS.vii.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <a href="summa.FS_Q107_A4.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.FS_Q108_A1.html"></a>
+            </div>
+            <a href="summa.FS_Q89_A6.html"></a>
+            <a href="summa.FS_Q90.html"></a>
+         `
+     </div>
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