Mercurial > hg > Aquinas
diff summa/english/FS_iii.html @ 64:11682db9b870
from auto-split
| author | ht |
|---|---|
| date | Sun, 03 Jan 2010 14:43:02 +0000 |
| parents | |
| children | 5cef55a2686a |
line wrap: on
line diff
--- /dev/null Thu Jan 01 00:00:00 1970 +0000 +++ b/summa/english/FS_iii.html Sun Jan 03 14:43:02 2010 +0000 @@ -0,0 +1,8402 @@ +<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" id="FS.iii" class="div2"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q21_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q22.html"></a> + <h2 id="FS.iii-p0.1">TREATISE ON THE PASSIONS (QQ[22]-48)</h2> + <div id="FS_Q22" class="div3"> + <a href="summa.FS.iii.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q22_A1.html"></a> + <h3 id="FS_Q22-p0.1">OF THE SUBJECT OF THE SOUL'S PASSIONS (THREE ARTICLES)</h3> + <p id="FS_Q22-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q22-p2"> We must now consider the passions of the soul: first, in general; secondly, in particular. Taking them in general, there + are four things to be considered: (1) Their subject: (2) The difference between them: (3) Their mutual relationship: (4) Their + malice and goodness. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q22-p3"> Under the first head there are three points of inquiry:</p> + <p id="FS_Q22-p4"> (1) Whether there is any passion in the soul?</p> + <p id="FS_Q22-p5"> (2) Whether passion is in the appetitive rather than in the apprehensive part?</p> + <p id="FS_Q22-p6"> (3) Whether passion is in the sensitive appetite rather than in the intellectual appetite, which is called the will?</p> + <div id="FS_Q22_A1" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q22.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q22_A2.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q22_A1-p0.1">Whether any passion is in the soul?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q22_A1-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q22_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that there is no passion in the soul. Because passivity belongs to matter. But the soul is not composed of + matter and form, as stated in the + <a id="FS_Q22_A1-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q75_A5.html">FP, Q[75], A[5]</a>. Therefore there is no passion in the soul. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q22_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, passion is movement, as is stated in Phys. iii, 3. But the soul is not moved, as is proved in De Anima i, 3. Therefore + passion is not in the soul. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q22_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, passion is the road to corruption; since "every passion, when increased, alters the substance," as is stated in + Topic. vi, 6. But the soul is incorruptible. Therefore no passion is in the soul. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q22_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q22_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.7.5" target="asv">Rom. 7:5</a>): "When we were in the flesh, the passions of sins which were by the law, did the work in our members." Now sins are, properly + speaking, in the soul. Therefore passions also, which are described as being "of sins," are in the soul. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q22_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The word "passive" is used in three ways. First, in a general way, according as whatever receives something is passive, although + nothing is taken from it: thus we may say that the air is passive when it is lit up. But this is to be perfected rather than + to be passive. Secondly, the word "passive" is employed in its proper sense, when something is received, while something else + is taken away: and this happens in two ways. For sometimes that which is lost is + unsuitable to the thing: thus when an animal's body is healed, and loses sickness. At other times the contrary occurs: thus + to ail is to be passive; because the ailment is received and health is lost. And here we have passion in its most proper acceptation. + For a thing is said to be passive from its being drawn to the agent: and when a thing recedes from what is suitable to it, + then especially does it appear to be drawn to something else. Moreover in De Generat. i, 3 it is stated that when a + more excellent thing is generated from a less excellent, we have generation simply, and corruption in a particular respect: + whereas the reverse is the case, when from a more excellent thing, a less excellent is generated. In these three ways it happens + that passions are in the soul. For in the sense of mere reception, we speak of "feeling and understanding as being a kind + of passion" (De Anima i, 5). But passion, accompanied by the loss of something, is only in respect of a bodily + transmutation; wherefore passion properly so called cannot be in the soul, save accidentally, in so far, to wit, as the "composite" + is passive. But here again we find a difference; because when this transmutation is for the worse, it has more of the nature + of a passion, than when it is for the better: hence sorrow is more properly a passion than joy. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q22_A1-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> It belongs to matter to be passive in such a way as to lose something and to be transmuted: hence this happens only in those + things that are composed of matter and form. But passivity, as implying mere reception, need not be in matter, but can be + in anything that is in potentiality. Now, though the soul is not composed of matter and form, yet it has something of potentiality, + in respect of which it is competent to receive or to be passive, according + as the act of understanding is a kind of passion, as stated in De Anima iii, 4. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q22_A1-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Although it does not belong to the soul in itself to be passive and to be moved, yet it belongs accidentally as stated in + De Anima i, 3. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q22_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This argument is true of passion accompanied by transmutation to something worse. And passion, in this sense, is not found + in the soul, except accidentally: but the composite, which is corruptible, admits of it by reason of its own nature. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q22_A1-p10"></p> + <p id="FS_Q22_A1-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q22.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q22_A2.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q22_A2" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q22_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q22_A3.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q22_A2-p0.1">Whether passion is in the appetitive rather than in the apprehensive part?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q22_A2-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q22_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that passion is in the apprehensive part of the soul rather than in the appetitive. Because that which is first + in any genus, seems to rank first among all things that are in that genus, and to be their cause, as is stated in Metaph. + ii, 1. Now passion is found to be in the apprehensive, before being in the appetitive part: for the appetitive part is not + affected unless there be a previous passion in the apprehensive part. Therefore passion is in + the apprehensive part more than in the appetitive. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q22_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, what is more active is less passive; for action is contrary to passion. Now the appetitive part is more active than + the apprehensive part. Therefore it seems that passion is more in the apprehensive part. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q22_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, just as the sensitive appetite is the power of a corporeal organ, so is the power of sensitive apprehension. But + passion in the soul occurs, properly speaking, in respect of a bodily transmutation. Therefore passion is not more in the + sensitive appetitive than in the sensitive apprehensive part. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q22_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Civ. Dei ix, 4) that "the movement of the soul, which the Greeks called {pathe}, are styled by some of + our writers, Cicero [*Those things which the Greeks call {pathe}, we prefer to call disturbances rather than diseases (Tusc. + iv. 5)] for instance, disturbances; by some, affections or emotions; while others rendering the Greek more accurately, call + them passions." From this it is evident that the passions of the soul are the same as + affections. But affections manifestly belong to the appetitive, and not to the apprehensive part. Therefore the passions are + in the appetitive rather than in the apprehensive part. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q22_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As we have already stated + <a id="FS_Q22_A2-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q22_A1.html">(A[1])</a> the word "passion" implies that the patient is drawn to that which belongs to the agent. Now the soul is drawn to a thing + by the appetitive power rather than by the apprehensive power: because the soul has, through its appetitive power, an order + to things as they are in themselves: hence the Philosopher says (Metaph. vi, 4) that "good and evil," i.e. the objects of + the appetitive power, "are in things + themselves." On the other hand the apprehensive power is not drawn to a thing, as it is in itself; but knows it by reason + of an "intention" of the thing, which "intention" it has in itself, or receives in its own way. Hence we find it stated (Metaph. + vi, 4) that "the true and the false," which pertain to knowledge, "are not in things, but in the mind." Consequently it is + evident that the nature of passion is consistent with the appetitive, rather than with the apprehensive part. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q22_A2-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> In things relating to perfection the case is the opposite, in comparison to things that pertain to defect. Because in things + relating to perfection, intensity is in proportion to the approach to one first principle; to which the nearer a thing approaches, + the more intense it is. Thus the intensity of a thing possessed of light depends on its approach to something endowed with + light in a supreme degree, to which the nearer a thing approaches the more + light it possesses. But in things that relate to defect, intensity depends, not on approach to something supreme, but in receding + from that which is perfect; because therein consists the very notion of privation and defect. Wherefore the less a thing recedes + from that which stands first, the less intense it is: and the result is that at first we always find some small defect, which + afterwards increases as it goes on. Now passion pertains to defect, because it belongs to a thing according as it + is in potentiality. Wherefore in those things that approach to the Supreme Perfection, i.e. to God, there is but little potentiality + and passion: while in other things, consequently, there is more. Hence also, in the supreme, i.e. the apprehensive, power + of the soul, passion is found less than in the other powers. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q22_A2-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The appetitive power is said to be more active, because it is, more than the apprehensive power, the principle of the exterior + action: and this for the same reason that it is more passive, namely, its being related to things as existing in themselves: + since it is through the external action that we come into contact with things. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q22_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As stated in the + <a id="FS_Q22_A2-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q78_A3.html">FP, Q[78], A[3]</a> the organs of the soul can be changed in two ways. First, by a spiritual change, in respect of which the organ receives an + "intention" of the object. And this is essential to the act of the sensitive apprehension: thus is the eye changed by the + object visible, not by being colored, but by receiving an intention of color. But the organs are receptive of another and + natural change, which affects + their natural disposition; for instance, when they become hot or cold, or undergo some similar change. And whereas this kind + of change is accidental to the act of the sensitive apprehension; for instance, if the eye be wearied through gazing intently + at something or be overcome by the intensity of the object: on the other hand, it is essential to the act of the sensitive + appetite; wherefore the material element in the definitions of the movements of the appetitive part, is the natural change + of + the organ; for instance, "anger is" said to be "a kindling of the blood about the heart." Hence it is evident that the notion + of passion is more consistent with the act of the sensitive appetite, than with that of the sensitive apprehension, although + both are actions of a corporeal organ. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q22_A2-p10"></p> + <p id="FS_Q22_A2-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q22_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q22_A3.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q22_A3" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q22_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q23.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q22_A3-p0.1">Whether passion is in the sensitive appetite rather than in the intellectual appetite, which is called the will?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q22_A3-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q22_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that passion is not more in the sensitive than in the intellectual appetite. For Dionysius declares (Div. Nom. + ii) Hierotheus "to be taught by a kind of yet more Godlike instruction; not only by learning Divine things, but also by suffering + [patiens] them." But the sensitive appetite cannot "suffer" Divine things, since its object is the sensible good. Therefore + passion is in the intellectual appetite, just as it is also in the sensitive + appetite. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q22_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the more powerful the active force, the more intense the passion. But the object of the intellectual appetite, which + is the universal good, is a more powerful active force than the object of the sensitive appetite, which is a particular good. + Therefore passion is more consistent with the intellectual than with the sensitive appetite. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q22_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, joy and love are said to be passions. But these are to be found in the intellectual and not only in the sensitive + appetite: else they would not be ascribed by the Scriptures to God and the angels. Therefore the passions are not more in + the sensitive than in the intellectual appetite. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q22_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 22), while describing the animal passions: "Passion is a movement of the sensitive appetite + when we imagine good or evil: in other words, passion is a movement of the irrational soul, when we think of good or evil." + </p> + <p id="FS_Q22_A3-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above + <a id="FS_Q22_A3-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q22_A1.html">(A[1])</a> passion is properly to be found where there is corporeal transmutation. This corporeal transmutation is found in the act + of the sensitive appetite, and is not only spiritual, as in the sensitive apprehension, but also natural. Now there is no + need for corporeal transmutation in the act of the intellectual appetite: because this appetite is not exercised by means + of a corporeal organ. It is therefore evident + that passion is more properly in the act of the sensitive appetite, than in that of the intellectual appetite; and this is + again evident from the definitions of Damascene quoted above. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q22_A3-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> By "suffering" Divine things is meant being well affected towards them, and united to them by love: and this takes place + without any alteration in the body. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q22_A3-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Intensity of passion depends not only on the power of the agent, but also on the passibility of the patient: because things + that are disposed to passion, suffer much even from petty agents. Therefore although the object of the intellectual appetite + has greater activity than the object of the sensitive appetite, yet the sensitive appetite is more passive. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q22_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> When love and joy and the like are ascribed to God or the angels, or to man in respect of his intellectual appetite, they + signify simple acts of the will having like effects, but without passion. Hence Augustine says (De Civ. Dei ix, 5): "The holy + angels feel no anger while they punish . . . no fellow-feeling with misery while they relieve the unhappy: and yet ordinary + human speech is wont to ascribe to them also these passions by name, because, + although they have none of our weakness, their acts bear a certain resemblance to ours." + </p> + <p id="FS_Q22_A3-p10"></p> + <p id="FS_Q22_A3-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q22_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q23.html"></a> + </div> + <a href="summa.FS.iii.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q22_A1.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q23" class="div3"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q22_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q23_A1.html"></a> + <h3 id="FS_Q23-p0.1">HOW THE PASSIONS DIFFER FROM ONE ANOTHER (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3> + <p id="FS_Q23-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q23-p2"> We must now consider how the passions differ from one another: and under this head there are four points of inquiry:</p> + <p id="FS_Q23-p3"> (1) Whether the passions of the concupiscible part are different from those of the irascible part?</p> + <p id="FS_Q23-p4"> (2) Whether the contrariety of passions in the irascible part is based on the contrariety of good and evil?</p> + <p id="FS_Q23-p5"> (3) Whether there is any passion that has no contrary?</p> + <p id="FS_Q23-p6"> (4) Whether, in the same power, there are any passions, differing in species, but not contrary to one another?</p> + <div id="FS_Q23_A1" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q23.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q23_A2.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q23_A1-p0.1">Whether the passions of the concupiscible part are different from those of the irascible part?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q23_A1-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q23_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the same passions are in the irascible and concupiscible parts. For the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 5) + that the passions of the soul are those emotions "which are followed by joy or sorrow." But joy and sorrow are in the concupiscible + part. Therefore all the passions are in the concupiscible part, and not some in the irascible, others in the concupiscible + part. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q23_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, on the words of + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q23_A1-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.13.33" target="asv"> Mat. 13:33, </a> "The kingdom of heaven is like to leaven," etc., Jerome's gloss says: "We should have prudence in the reason; hatred of vice + in the irascible faculty; desire of virtue, in the concupiscible part." But hatred is in the concupiscible faculty, as also + is love, of which it is the contrary, as is stated in Topic. ii, 7. Therefore the same passion is in the concupiscible and + irascible faculties. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q23_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, passions and actions differ specifically according to their objects. But the objects of the irascible and concupiscible + passions are the same, viz. good and evil. Therefore the same passions are in the irascible and concupiscible faculties. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q23_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The acts of the different powers differ in species; for instance, to see, and to hear. But the irascible and the concupiscible + are two powers into which the sensitive appetite is divided, as stated in the + <a id="FS_Q23_A1-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q81_A2.html">FP, Q[81], A[2]</a>. Therefore, since the passions are movements of the sensitive appetite, as stated above (Q[22], A[3]), the passions of the + irascible faculty are specifically distinct from those of the concupiscible part. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q23_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The passions of the irascible part differ in species from those of the concupiscible faculty. For since different powers + have different objects, as stated in the + <a id="FS_Q23_A1-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q77_A3.html">FP, Q[77], A[3]</a>, the passions of different powers must of necessity be referred to different objects. Much more, therefore, do the passions + of different faculties differ in species; since a greater difference in the object is required to diversify the species of + the powers, + than to diversify the species of passions or actions. For just as in the physical order, diversity of genus arises from diversity + in the potentiality of matter, while diversity of species arises from diversity of form in the same matter; so in the acts + of the soul, those that belong to different powers, differ not only in species but also in genus, while acts and passions + regarding different specific objects, included under the one common object of a single power, differ as the species of that + genus. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q23_A1-p7"> In order, therefore, to discern which passions are in the irascible, and which in the concupiscible, we must take the object + of each of these powers. For we have stated in the + <a id="FS_Q23_A1-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q81_A2.html">FP, Q[81], A[2]</a>, that the object of the concupiscible power is sensible good or evil, simply apprehended as such, which causes pleasure or + pain. But, since the soul must, of necessity, experience difficulty or struggle at times, in acquiring some such good, or + in avoiding some such + evil, in so far as such good or evil is more than our animal nature can easily acquire or avoid; therefore this very good + or evil, inasmuch as it is of an arduous or difficult nature, is the object of the irascible faculty. Therefore whatever passions + regard good or evil absolutely, belong to the concupiscible power; for instance, joy, sorrow, love, hatred, and such like: + whereas those passions which regard good or bad as arduous, through being difficult to obtain or avoid, belong to the + irascible faculty; such are daring, fear, hope and the like. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q23_A1-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As stated in the + <a id="FS_Q23_A1-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q81_A2.html">FP, Q[81], A[2]</a>, the irascible faculty is bestowed on animals, in order to remove the obstacles that hinder the concupiscible power from + tending towards its object, either by making some good difficult to obtain, or by making some evil hard to avoid. The result + is that all the irascible passions terminate in the concupiscible passions: and thus it is that even the passions which are + in the irascible faculty + are followed by joy and sadness which are in the concupiscible faculty. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q23_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Jerome ascribes hatred of vice to the irascible faculty, not by reason of hatred, which is properly a concupiscible passion; + but on account of the struggle, which belongs to the irascible power. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q23_A1-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Good, inasmuch as it is delightful, moves the concupiscible power. But if it prove difficult to obtain, from this very fact + it has a certain contrariety to the concupiscible power: and hence the need of another power tending to that good. The same + applies to evil. And this power is the irascible faculty. Consequently the concupiscible passions are specifically different + from the irascible passions. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q23_A1-p11"></p> + <p id="FS_Q23_A1-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q23.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q23_A2.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q23_A2" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q23_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q23_A3.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q23_A2-p0.1">Whether the contrariety of the irascible passions is based on the contrariety of good and evil?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q23_A2-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q23_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the contrariety of the irascible passions is based on no other contrariety than that of good and evil. + For the irascible passions are ordained to the concupiscible passions, as stated above (A[1], ad 1). But the contrariety of + the concupiscible passions is no other than that of good and evil; take, for instance, love and hatred, joy and sorrow. Therefore + the same applies to the irascible passions. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q23_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, passions differ according to their objects; just as movements differ according to their termini. But there is no + other contrariety of movements, except that of the termini, as is stated in Phys. v, 3. Therefore there is no other contrariety + of passions, save that of the objects. Now the object of the appetite is good or evil. Therefore in no appetitive power can + there be contrariety of passions other than that of good and evil. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q23_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, "every passion of the soul is by way of approach and withdrawal," as Avicenna declares in his sixth book of Physics. + Now approach results from the apprehension of good; withdrawal, from the apprehension of evil: since just as "good is what + all desire" (Ethic. i, 1), so evil is what all shun. Therefore, in the passions of the soul, there can be no other contrariety + than that of good and evil. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q23_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Fear and daring are contrary to one another, as stated in Ethic. iii, 7. But fear and daring do not differ in respect of + good and evil: because each regards some kind of evil. Therefore not every contrariety of the irascible passions is that of + good and evil. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q23_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Passion is a kind of movement, as stated in Phys. iii, 3. Therefore contrariety of passions is based on contrariety of movements + or changes. Now there is a twofold contrariety in changes and movements, as stated in Phys. v, 5. One is according to approach + and withdrawal in respect of the same term: and this contrariety belongs properly to changes, i.e. to generation, which is + a change "to being," and to corruption, which is a change "from being." The other + contrariety is according to opposition of termini, and belongs properly to movements: thus whitening, which is movement from + black to white, is contrary to blackening, which is movement from white to black. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q23_A2-p7"> Accordingly there is a twofold contrariety in the passions of the soul: one, according to contrariety of objects, i.e. of + good and evil; the other, according to approach and withdrawal in respect of the same term. In the concupiscible passions + the former contrariety alone is to be found; viz. that which is based on the objects: whereas in the irascible passions, we + find both forms of contrariety. The reason of this is that the object of the concupiscible faculty, as stated above + + <a id="FS_Q23_A2-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q23_A1.html">(A[1])</a>, is sensible good or evil considered absolutely. Now good, as such, cannot be a term wherefrom, but only a term whereto, + since nothing shuns good as such; on the contrary, all things desire it. In like manner, nothing desires evil, as such; but + all things shun it: wherefore evil cannot have the aspect of a term whereto, but only of a term wherefrom. Accordingly every + concupiscible passion in respect of good, tends to it, as love, desire and joy; while every + concupiscible passion in respect of evil, tends from it, as hatred, avoidance or dislike, and sorrow. Wherefore, in the concupiscible + passions, there can be no contrariety of approach and withdrawal in respect of the same object. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q23_A2-p8"> On the other hand, the object of the irascible faculty is sensible good or evil, considered not absolutely, but under the + aspect of difficulty or arduousness. Now the good which is difficult or arduous, considered as good, is of such a nature as + to produce in us a tendency to it, which tendency pertains to the passion of "hope"; whereas, considered as arduous or difficult, + it makes us turn from it; and this pertains to the passion of "despair." In like manner the arduous evil, + considered as an evil, has the aspect of something to be shunned; and this belongs to the passion of "fear": but it also contains + a reason for tending to it, as attempting something arduous, whereby to escape being subject to evil; and this tendency is + called "daring." Consequently, in the irascible passions we find contrariety in respect of good and evil (as between hope + and fear): and also contrariety according to approach and withdrawal in respect of the same term (as between daring and + fear). + </p> + <p id="FS_Q23_A2-p9"> From what has been said the replies to the objections are evident.</p> + <p id="FS_Q23_A2-p10"></p> + <p id="FS_Q23_A2-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q23_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q23_A3.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q23_A3" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q23_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q23_A4.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q23_A3-p0.1">Whether any passion of the soul has no contrariety?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q23_A3-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q23_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that every passion of the soul has a contrary. For every passion of the soul is either in the irascible or + in the concupiscible faculty, as stated above + <a id="FS_Q23_A3-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q23_A1.html">(A[1])</a>. But both kinds of passion have their respective modes of contrariety. Therefore every passion of the soul has its contrary. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q23_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, every passion of the soul has either good or evil for its object; for these are the common objects of the appetitive + part. But a passion having good for its object, is contrary to a passion having evil for its object. Therefore every passion + has a contrary. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q23_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, every passion of the soul is in respect of approach or withdrawal, as stated above + <a id="FS_Q23_A3-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q23_A2.html">(A[2])</a>. But every approach has a corresponding contrary withdrawal, and vice versa. Therefore every passion of the soul has a contrary. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q23_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Anger is a passion of the soul. But no passion is set down as being contrary to anger, as stated in Ethic. iv, 5. Therefore + not every passion has a contrary. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q23_A3-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The passion of anger is peculiar in this, that it cannot have a contrary, either according to approach and withdrawal, or + according to the contrariety of good and evil. For anger is caused by a difficult evil already present: and when such an evil + is present, the appetite must needs either succumb, so that it does not go beyond the limits of "sadness," which is a concupiscible + passion; or else it has a movement of attack on the hurtful evil, which movement + is that of "anger." But it cannot have a movement of withdrawal: because the evil is supposed to be already present or past. + Thus no passion is contrary to anger according to contrariety of approach and withdrawal. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q23_A3-p7"> In like manner neither can there be according to contrariety of good and evil. Because the opposite of present evil is good + obtained, which can be no longer have the aspect of arduousness or difficulty. Nor, when once good is obtained, does there + remain any other movement, except the appetite's repose in the good obtained; which repose belongs to joy, which is a passion + of the concupiscible faculty. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q23_A3-p8"> Accordingly no movement of the soul can be contrary to the movement of anger, and nothing else than cessation from its movement + is contrary thereto; thus the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 3) that "calm is contrary to anger," by opposition not of contrariety + but of negation or privation. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q23_A3-p9"> From what has been said the replies to the objections are evident.</p> + <p id="FS_Q23_A3-p10"></p> + <p id="FS_Q23_A3-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q23_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q23_A4.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q23_A4" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q23_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q24.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q23_A4-p0.1">Whether in the same power, there are any passions, specifically different, but not contrary to one another?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q23_A4-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q23_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that there cannot be, in the same power, specifically different passions that are not contrary to one another. + For the passions of the soul differ according to their objects. Now the objects of the soul's passions are good and evil; + and on this distinction is based the contrariety of the passions. Therefore no passions of the same power, that are not contrary + to one another, differ specifically. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q23_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, difference of species implies a difference of form. But every difference of form is in respect of some contrariety, + as stated in Metaph. x, 8. Therefore passions of the same power, that are not contrary to one another, do not differ specifically. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q23_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, since every passion of the soul consists in approach or withdrawal in respect of good or evil, it seems that every + difference in the passions of the soul must needs arise from the difference of good and evil; or from the difference of approach + and withdrawal; or from degrees in approach or withdrawal. Now the first two differences cause contrariety in the passions + of the soul, as stated above + <a id="FS_Q23_A4-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q23_A2.html">(A[2])</a>: whereas the third + difference does not diversify the species; else the species of the soul's passions would be infinite. Therefore it is not + possible for passions of the same power to differ in species, without being contrary to one another. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q23_A4-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Love and joy differ in species, and are in the concupiscible power; and yet they are not contrary to one another; rather, + in fact, one causes the other. Therefore in the same power there are passions that differ in species without being contrary + to one another. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q23_A4-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Passions differ in accordance with their active causes, which, in the case of the passions of the soul, are their objects. + Now, the difference in active causes may be considered in two ways: first, from the point of view of their species or nature, + as fire differs from water; secondly, from the point of view of the difference in their active power. In the passions of the + soul we can treat the difference of their active or motive causes in respect of their + motive power, as if they were natural agents. For every mover, in a fashion, either draws the patient to itself, or repels + it from itself. Now in drawing it to itself, it does three things in the patient. Because, in the first place, it gives the + patient an inclination or aptitude to tend to the mover: thus a light body, which is above, bestows lightness on the body + generated, so that it has an inclination or aptitude to be above. Secondly, if the generated body be outside its proper place, + the + mover gives it movement towards that place. Thirdly, it makes it to rest, when it shall have come to its proper place: since + to the same cause are due, both rest in a place, and the movement to that place. The same applies to the cause of repulsion. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q23_A4-p7"> Now, in the movements of the appetitive faculty, good has, as it were, a force of attraction, while evil has a force of repulsion. + In the first place, therefore, good causes, in the appetitive power, a certain inclination, aptitude or connaturalness in + respect of good: and this belongs to the passion of "love": the corresponding contrary of which is "hatred" in respect of + evil. Secondly, if the good be not yet possessed, it causes in the appetite a movement towards the + attainment of the good beloved: and this belongs to the passion of "desire" or "concupiscence": and contrary to it, in respect + of evil, is the passion of "aversion" or "dislike." Thirdly, when the good is obtained, it causes the appetite to rest, as + it were, in the good obtained: and this belongs to the passion of "delight" or "joy"; the contrary of which, in respect of + evil, is "sorrow" or "sadness." + </p> + <p id="FS_Q23_A4-p8"> On the other hand, in the irascible passions, the aptitude, or inclination to seek good, or to shun evil, is presupposed + as arising from the concupiscible faculty, which regards good or evil absolutely. And in respect of good not yet obtained, + we have "hope" and "despair." In respect of evil not yet present we have "fear" and "daring." But in respect of good obtained + there is no irascible passion: because it is no longer considered in the light of something arduous, as stated + above + <a id="FS_Q23_A4-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q23_A3.html">(A[3])</a>. But evil already present gives rise to the passion of "anger." + </p> + <p id="FS_Q23_A4-p9"> Accordingly it is clear that in the concupiscible faculty there are three couples of passions; viz. love and hatred, desire + and aversion, joy and sadness. In like manner there are three groups in the irascible faculty; viz. hope and despair, fear + and daring, and anger which has not contrary passion. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q23_A4-p10"> Consequently there are altogether eleven passions differing specifically; six in the concupiscible faculty, and five in the + irascible; and under these all the passions of the soul are contained. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q23_A4-p11"> From this the replies to the objections are evident.</p> + <p id="FS_Q23_A4-p12"></p> + <p id="FS_Q23_A4-p13"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q23_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q24.html"></a> + </div> + <a href="summa.FS_Q22_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q23_A1.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q24" class="div3"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q23_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q24_A1.html"></a> + <h3 id="FS_Q24-p0.1">OF GOOD AND EVIL IN THE PASSIONS OF THE SOUL (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3> + <p id="FS_Q24-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q24-p2"> We must now consider good and evil in the passions of the soul: and under this head there are four points of inquiry:</p> + <p id="FS_Q24-p3"> (1) Whether moral good and evil can be found in the passions of the soul?</p> + <p id="FS_Q24-p4"> (2) Whether every passion of the soul is morally evil?</p> + <p id="FS_Q24-p5"> (3) Whether every passion increases or decreases the goodness of malice of an act?</p> + <p id="FS_Q24-p6"> (4) Whether any passion is good or evil specifically?</p> + <div id="FS_Q24_A1" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q24.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q24_A2.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q24_A1-p0.1">Whether moral good and evil can be found in the passions of the soul?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q24_A1-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q24_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that no passion of the soul is morally good or evil. For moral good and evil are proper to man: since "morals + are properly predicated of man," as Ambrose says (Super Luc. Prolog.). But passions are not proper to man, for he has them + in common with other animals. Therefore no passion of the soul is morally good or evil. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q24_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the good or evil of man consists in "being in accord, or in disaccord with reason," as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. + iv). Now the passions of the soul are not in the reason, but in the sensitive appetite, as stated above ( + <a id="FS_Q24_A1-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q22_A3.html">Q[22], A[3]</a>). Therefore they have no connection with human, i.e. moral, good or evil. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q24_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 5) that "we are neither praised nor blamed for our passions." But we are praised + and blamed for moral good and evil. Therefore the passions are not morally good or evil. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q24_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 7) while speaking of the passions of the soul: "They are evil if our love is evil; good + if our love is good." + </p> + <p id="FS_Q24_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> We may consider the passions of the soul in two ways: first, in themselves; secondly, as being subject to the command of + the reason and will. If then the passions be considered in themselves, to wit, as movements of the irrational appetite, thus + there is no moral good or evil in them, since this depends on the reason, as stated above ( + <a id="FS_Q24_A1-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q18_A5.html">Q[18] , A[5]</a>). If, however, they be considered as subject to the command of the reason and will, + then moral good and evil are in them. Because the sensitive appetite is nearer than the outward members to the reason and + will; and yet the movements and actions of the outward members are morally good or evil, inasmuch as they are voluntary. Much + more, therefore, may the passions, in so far as they are voluntary, be called morally good or evil. And they are said to be + voluntary, either from being commanded by the will, or from not being checked by the will. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q24_A1-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> These passions, considered in themselves, are common to man and other animals: but, as commanded by the reason, they are + proper to man. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q24_A1-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Even the lower appetitive powers are called rational, in so far as "they partake of reason in some sort" (Ethic. i, 13). + </p> + <p id="FS_Q24_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The Philosopher says that we are neither praised nor blamed for our passions considered absolutely; but he does not exclude + their becoming worthy of praise or blame, in so far as they are subordinate to reason. Hence he continues: "For the man who + fears or is angry, is not praised . . . or blamed, but the man who is angry in a certain way, i.e. according to, or against + reason." + </p> + <p id="FS_Q24_A1-p10"></p> + <p id="FS_Q24_A1-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q24.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q24_A2.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q24_A2" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q24_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q24_A3.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q24_A2-p0.1">Whether every passion of the soul is evil morally?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q24_A2-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q24_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that all the passions of the soul are morally evil. For Augustine says (De Civ. Dei ix, 4) that "some call + the soul's passions diseases or disturbances of the soul" [*Those things which the Greeks call {pathe}, we prefer to call + disturbances rather than diseases (Tusc. iv. 5)]. But every disease or disturbance of the soul is morally evil. Therefore + every passion of the soul is evil morally. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q24_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 22) that "movement in accord with nature is an action, but movement contrary to + nature is passion." But in movements of the soul, what is against nature is sinful and morally evil: hence he says elsewhere + (De Fide Orth. ii, 4) that "the devil turned from that which is in accord with nature to that which is against nature." Therefore + these passions are morally evil. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q24_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, whatever leads to sin, has an aspect of evil. But these passions lead to sin: wherefore they are called "the passions + of sins" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q24_A2-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.7.5" target="asv">Rom. 7:5</a>). Therefore it seems that they are morally evil. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q24_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 9) that "all these emotions are right in those whose love is rightly placed . . . For they + fear to sin, they desire to persevere; they grieve for sin, they rejoice in good works." + </p> + <p id="FS_Q24_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> On this question the opinion of the Stoics differed from that of the Peripatetics: for the Stoics held that all passions + are evil, while the Peripatetics maintained that moderate passions are good. This difference, although it appears great in + words, is nevertheless, in reality, none at all, or but little, if we consider the intent of either school. For the Stoics + did not discern between sense and intellect; and consequently neither between the intellectual + and sensitive appetite. Hence they did not discriminate the passions of the soul from the movements of the will, in so far + as the passions of the soul are in the sensitive appetite, while the simple movements of the will are in the intellectual + appetite: but every rational movement of the appetitive part they call will, while they called passion, a movement that exceeds + the limits of reason. Wherefore Cicero, following their opinion (De Tusc. Quaest. iii, 4) calls all passions "diseases of + the + soul": whence he argues that "those who are diseased are unsound; and those who are unsound are wanting in sense." Hence we + speak of those who are wanting in sense of being "unsound." + </p> + <p id="FS_Q24_A2-p7"> On the other hand, the Peripatetics give the name of "passions" to all the movements of the sensitive appetite. Wherefore + they esteem them good, when they are controlled by reason; and evil when they are not controlled by reason. Hence it is evident + that Cicero was wrong in disapproving (De Tusc. Quaest. iii, 4) of the Peripatetic theory of a mean in the passions, when + he says that "every evil, though moderate, should be shunned; for, just as a body, though it be moderately + ailing, is not sound; so, this mean in the diseases or passions of the soul, is not sound." For passions are not called "diseases" + or "disturbances" of the soul, save when they are not controlled by reason. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q24_A2-p8"> Hence the reply to the First Objection is evident.</p> + <p id="FS_Q24_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> In every passion there is an increase or decrease in the natural movement of the heart, according as the heart is moved more + or less intensely by contraction and dilatation; and hence it derives the character of passion. But there is no need for passion + to deviate always from the order of natural reason. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q24_A2-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The passions of the soul, in so far as they are contrary to the order of reason, incline us to sin: but in so far as they + are controlled by reason, they pertain to virtue. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q24_A2-p11"></p> + <p id="FS_Q24_A2-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q24_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q24_A3.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q24_A3" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q24_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q24_A4.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q24_A3-p0.1">Whether passion increases or decreases the goodness or malice of an act?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q24_A3-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q24_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that every passion decreases the goodness of a moral action. For anything that hinders the judgment of reason, + on which depends the goodness of a moral act, consequently decreases the goodness of the moral act. But every passion hinders + the judgment of reason: for Sallust says (Catilin.): "All those that take counsel about matters of doubt, should be free from + hatred, anger, friendship and pity." Therefore passion decreases the goodness of a + moral act. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q24_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the more a man's action is like to God, the better it is: hence the Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q24_A3-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Eph.5.1" target="asv">Eph. 5:1</a>): "Be ye followers of God, as most dear children." But "God and the holy angels feel no anger when they punish . . . no fellow-feeling + with misery when they relieve the unhappy," as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei ix, 5). Therefore it is better to do such like + deeds without than with a passion of the soul. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q24_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, just as moral evil depends on its relation to reason, so also does moral good. But moral evil is lessened by passion: + for he sins less, who sins from passion, than he who sins deliberately. Therefore he does a better deed, who does well without + passion, than he who does with passion. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q24_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Civ. Dei ix, 5) that "the passion of pity is obedient to reason, when pity is bestowed without violating + right, as when the poor are relieved, or the penitent forgiven." But nothing that is obedient to reason lessens the moral + good. Therefore a passion of the soul does not lessen moral good. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q24_A3-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As the Stoics held that every passion of the soul is evil, they consequently held that every passion of the soul lessens + the goodness of an act; since the admixture of evil either destroys good altogether, or makes it to be less good. And this + is true indeed, if by passions we understand none but the inordinate movements of the sensitive appetite, considered as disturbances + or ailments. But if we give the name of passions to all the movements of the + sensitive appetite, then it belongs to the perfection of man's good that his passions be moderated by reason. For since man's + good is founded on reason as its root, that good will be all the more perfect, according as it extends to more things pertaining + to man. Wherefore no one questions the fact that it belongs to the perfection of moral good, that the actions of the outward + members be controlled by the law of reason. Hence, since the sensitive appetite can obey reason, as stated above ( + <a id="FS_Q24_A3-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q17_A7.html">Q[17], A[7]</a>), it belongs to the perfection of moral or human good, that the passions themselves also should be controlled by reason. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q24_A3-p7"> Accordingly just as it is better that man should both will good and do it in his external act; so also does it belong to + the perfection of moral good, that man should be moved unto good, not only in respect of his will, but also in respect of + his sensitive appetite; according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q24_A3-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.83.3" target="asv"> Ps. 83:3</a>: "My heart and my flesh have rejoiced in the living God": where by "heart" we are to understand the intellectual appetite, + and by "flesh" the sensitive appetite. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q24_A3-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The passions of the soul may stand in a twofold relation to the judgment of reason. First, antecedently: and thus, since + they obscure the judgment of reason, on which the goodness of the moral act depends, they diminish the goodness of the act; + for it is more praiseworthy to do a work of charity from the judgment of reason than from the mere passion of pity. In the + second place, consequently: and this in two ways. First, by way of redundance: because, + to wit, when the higher part of the soul is intensely moved to anything, the lower part also follows that movement: and thus + the passion that results in consequence, in the sensitive appetite, is a sign of the intensity of the will, and so indicates + greater moral goodness. Secondly, by way of choice; when, to wit, a man, by the judgment of his reason, chooses to be affected + by a passion in order to work more promptly with the co-operation of the sensitive appetite. And thus a passion of the + soul increases the goodness of an action. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q24_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> In God and the angels there is no sensitive appetite, nor again bodily members: and so in them good does not depend on the + right ordering of passions or of bodily actions, as it does in us. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q24_A3-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> A passion that tends to evil, and precedes the judgment of reason, diminishes sin; but if it be consequent in either of the + ways mentioned above (Reply OBJ 1), it aggravates the sin, or else it is a sign of its being more grievous. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q24_A3-p11"></p> + <p id="FS_Q24_A3-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q24_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q24_A4.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q24_A4" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q24_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q25.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q24_A4-p0.1">Whether any passion is good or evil in its species?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q24_A4-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q24_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that no passion of the soul is good or evil morally according to its species. Because moral good and evil depend + on reason. But the passions are in the sensitive appetite; so that accordance with reason is accidental to them. Since, therefore, + nothing accidental belongs to a thing's species, it seems that no passion is good or evil according to its species. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q24_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, acts and passions take their species from their object. If, therefore, any passion were good or evil, according + to its species, it would follow that those passions the object of which is good, are specifically good, such as love, desire + and joy: and that those passions, the object of which is evil, are specifically evil, as hatred, fear and sadness. But this + is clearly false. Therefore no passion is good or evil according to its species. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q24_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, there is no species of passion that is not to be found in other animals. But moral good is in man alone. Therefore + no passion of the soul is good or evil according to its species. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q24_A4-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Civ. Dei ix, 5) that "pity is a kind of virtue." Moreover, the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 7) that modesty + is a praiseworthy passion. Therefore some passions are good or evil according to their species. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q24_A4-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> We ought, seemingly, to apply to passions what has been said in regard to acts ( + <a id="FS_Q24_A4-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q18_A5.html">Q[18], AA[5]</a>,6; + <a id="FS_Q24_A4-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q20_A1.html"> Q[20], A[1]</a>)---viz. that the species of a passion, as the species of an act, can be considered from two points of view. First, according + to its natural genus; and thus moral good and evil have no connection with the species of an act or passion. Secondly, according + to its moral genus, inasmuch as it is voluntary + and controlled by reason. In this way moral good and evil can belong to the species of a passion, in so far as the object + to which a passion tends, is, of itself, in harmony or in discord with reason: as is clear in the case of "shame" which is + base fear; and of "envy" which is sorrow for another's good: for thus passions belong to the same species as the external + act. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q24_A4-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This argument considers the passions in their natural species, in so far as the sensitive appetite is considered in itself. + But in so far as the sensitive appetite obeys reason, good and evil of reason are no longer accidentally in the passions of + the appetite, but essentially. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q24_A4-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Passions having a tendency to good, are themselves good, if they tend to that which is truly good, and in like manner, if + they turn away from that which is truly evil. On the other hand, those passions which consist in aversion from good, and a + tendency to evil, are themselves evil. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q24_A4-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> In irrational animals the sensitive appetite does not obey reason. Nevertheless, in so far as they are led by a kind of estimative + power, which is subject to a higher, i.e. the Divine reason, there is a certain likeness of moral good in them, in regard + to the soul's passions. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q24_A4-p10"></p> + <p id="FS_Q24_A4-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q24_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q25.html"></a> + </div> + <a href="summa.FS_Q23_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q24_A1.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q25" class="div3"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q24_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q25_A1.html"></a> + <h3 id="FS_Q25-p0.1">OF THE ORDER OF THE PASSIONS TO ONE ANOTHER (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3> + <p id="FS_Q25-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q25-p2"> We must now consider the order of the passions to one another: and under this head there are four points of inquiry:</p> + <p id="FS_Q25-p3"> (1) The relation of the irascible passions to the concupiscible passions;</p> + <p id="FS_Q25-p4"> (2) The relation of the concupiscible passions to one another;</p> + <p id="FS_Q25-p5"> (3) The relation of the irascible passions to one another;</p> + <p id="FS_Q25-p6"> (4) The four principal passions.</p> + <div id="FS_Q25_A1" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q25.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q25_A2.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q25_A1-p0.1">Whether the irascible passions precede the concupiscible passions, or vice versa?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q25_A1-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q25_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the irascible passions precede the concupiscible passions. For the order of the passions is that of their + objects. But the object of the irascible faculty is the difficult good, which seems to be the highest good. Therefore the + irascible passions seem to precede the concupiscible passions. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q25_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the mover precedes that which is moved. But the irascible faculty is compared to the concupiscible, as mover to + that which is moved: since it is given to animals, for the purposed of removing the obstacles that hinder the concupiscible + faculty from enjoying its object, as stated above (Q[23], A[1], ad 1; + <a id="FS_Q25_A1-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q81_A2.html">FP, Q[81], A[2]</a> ). Now "that which removes an obstacle, is a kind of mover" (Phys. viii, 4). Therefore the irascible + passions precede the concupiscible passions. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q25_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, joy and sadness are concupiscible passions. But joy and sadness succeed to the irascible passions: for the Philosopher + says (Ethic. iv, 5) that"retaliation causes anger to cease, because it produces pleasure instead of the previous pain." Therefore + the concupiscible passions follow the irascible passions. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q25_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The concupiscible passions regard the absolute good, while the irascible passions regard a restricted, viz. the difficult, + good. Since, therefore, the absolute good precedes the restricted good, it seems that the concupiscible passions precede the + irascible. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q25_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> In the concupiscible passions there is more diversity than in the passions of the irascible faculty. For in the former we + find something relating to movement---e.g. desire; and something belonging to repose, e.g. joy and sadness. But in the irascible + passions there is nothing pertaining to repose, and only that which belongs to movement. The reason of this is that when we + find rest in a thing, we no longer look upon it as something difficult or arduous; + whereas such is the object of the irascible faculty. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q25_A1-p7"> Now since rest is the end of movement, it is first in the order of intention, but last in the order of execution. If, therefore, + we compare the passions of the irascible faculty with those concupiscible passions that denote rest in good, it is evident + that in the order of execution, the irascible passions take precedence of such like passions of the concupiscible faculty: + thus hope precedes joy, and hence causes it, according to the Apostle ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q25_A1-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.12.12" target="asv">Rom. 12:12</a>): + "Rejoicing in hope." But the concupiscible passion which denotes rest in evil, viz. sadness, comes between two irascible passions: + because it follows fear; since we become sad when we are confronted by the evil that we feared: while it precedes the movement + of anger; since the movement of self-vindication, that results from sadness, is the movement of anger. And because it is looked + upon as a good thing to pay back the evil done to us; when the angry man has achieved this he rejoices. Thus it + is evident that every passion of the irascible faculty terminates in a concupiscible passion denoting rest, viz. either in + joy or in sadness. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q25_A1-p8"> But if we compare the irascible passions to those concupiscible passions that denote movement, then it is clear that the + latter take precedence: because the passions of the irascible faculty add something to those of the concupiscible faculty; + just as the object of the irascible adds the aspect of arduousness or difficulty to the object of the concupiscible faculty. + Thus hope adds to desire a certain effort, and a certain raising of the spirits to the realization of the arduous + good. In like manner fear adds to aversion or detestation a certain lowness of spirits, on account of difficulty in shunning + the evil. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q25_A1-p9"> Accordingly the passions of the irascible faculty stand between those concupiscible passions that denote movement towards + good or evil, and those concupiscible passions that denote rest in good or evil. And it is therefore evident that the irascible + passions both arise from and terminate in the passions of the concupiscible faculty. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q25_A1-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This argument would prove, if the formal object of the concupiscible faculty were something contrary to the arduous, just + as the formal object of the irascible faculty is that which is arduous. But because the object of the concupiscible faculty + is good absolutely, it naturally precedes the object of the irascible, as the common precedes the proper. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q25_A1-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The remover of an obstacle is not a direct but an accidental mover: and here we are speaking of passions as directly related + to one another. Moreover, the irascible passion removes the obstacle that hinders the concupiscible from resting in its object. + Wherefore it only follows that the irascible passions precede those concupiscible passions that connote rest. The third object + leads to the same conclusion. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q25_A1-p12"></p> + <p id="FS_Q25_A1-p13"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q25.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q25_A2.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q25_A2" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q25_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q25_A3.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q25_A2-p0.1">Whether love is the first of the concupiscible passions?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q25_A2-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q25_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that love is not the first of the concupiscible passions. For the concupiscible faculty is so called from concupiscence, + which is the same passion as desire. But "things are named from their chief characteristic" (De Anima ii, 4). Therefore desire + takes precedence of love. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q25_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, love implies a certain union; since it is a "uniting and binding force," as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv). But concupiscence + or desire is a movement towards union with the thing coveted or desired. Therefore desire precedes love. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q25_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the cause precedes its effect. But pleasure is sometimes the cause of love: since some love on account of pleasure + (Ethic. viii, 3,4). Therefore pleasure precedes love; and consequently love is not the first of the concupiscible passions. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q25_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 7,9) that all the passions are caused by love: since "love yearning for the beloved object, + is desire; and, having and enjoying it, is joy." Therefore love is the first of the concupiscible passions. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q25_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Good and evil are the object of the concupiscible faculty. Now good naturally precedes evil; since evil is privation of good. + Wherefore all the passions, the object of which is good, are naturally before those, the object of which is evil---that is + to say, each precedes its contrary passion: because the quest of a good is the reason for shunning the opposite evil. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q25_A2-p7"> Now good has the aspect of an end, and the end is indeed first in the order of intention, but last in the order of execution. + Consequently the order of the concupiscible passions can be considered either in the order of intention or in the order of + execution. In the order of execution, the first place belongs to that which takes place first in the thing that tends to the + end. Now it is evident that whatever tends to an end, has, in the first place, an aptitude or proportion to + that end, for nothing tends to a disproportionate end; secondly, it is moved to that end; thirdly, it rests in the end, after + having attained it. And this very aptitude or proportion of the appetite to good is love, which is complacency in good; while + movement towards good is desire or concupiscence; and rest in good is joy or pleasure. Accordingly in this order, love precedes + desire, and desire precedes pleasure. But in the order of intention, it is the reverse: because the pleasure intended + causes desire and love. For pleasure is the enjoyment of the good, which enjoyment is, in a way, the end, just as the good + itself is, as stated above ( + <a id="FS_Q25_A2-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q11_A3.html">Q[11], A[3]</a>, ad 3). + </p> + <p id="FS_Q25_A2-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> We name a thing as we understand it, for "words are signs of thoughts," as the Philosopher states (Peri Herm. i, 1). Now + in most cases we know a cause by its effect. But the effect of love, when the beloved object is possessed, is pleasure: when + it is not possessed, it is desire or concupiscence: and, as Augustine says (De Trin. x, 12), "we are more sensible to love, + when we lack that which we love." Consequently of all the concupiscible passions, + concupiscence is felt most; and for this reason the power is named after it. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q25_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The union of lover and beloved is twofold. There is real union, consisting in the conjunction of one with the other. This + union belongs to joy or pleasure, which follows desire. There is also an affective union, consisting in an aptitude or proportion, + in so far as one thing, from the very fact of its having an aptitude for and an inclination to another, partakes of it: and + love betokens such a union. This union precedes the movement of desire. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q25_A2-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Pleasure causes love, in so far as it precedes love in the order of intention. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q25_A2-p11"></p> + <p id="FS_Q25_A2-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q25_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q25_A3.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q25_A3" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q25_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q25_A4.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q25_A3-p0.1">Whether hope is the first of the irascible passions?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q25_A3-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q25_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that hope is not the first of the irascible passions. Because the irascible faculty is denominated from anger. + Since, therefore, "things are names from their chief characteristic" (cf. A[2], OBJ[1]), it seems that anger precedes and + surpasses hope. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q25_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the object of the irascible faculty is something arduous. Now it seems more arduous to strive to overcome a contrary + evil that threatens soon to overtake us, which pertains to daring; or an evil actually present, which pertains to anger; than + to strive simply to obtain some good. Again, it seems more arduous to strive to overcome a present evil, than a future evil. + Therefore anger seems to be a stronger passion than daring, and daring, than hope. And + consequently it seems that hope does not precede them. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q25_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, when a thing is moved towards an end, the movement of withdrawal precedes the movement of approach. But fear and + despair imply withdrawal from something; while daring and hope imply approach towards something. Therefore fear and despair + precede hope and daring. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q25_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The nearer a thing is to the first, the more it precedes others. But hope is nearer to love, which is the first of the passions. + Therefore hope is the first of the passions in the irascible faculty. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q25_A3-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above + <a id="FS_Q25_A3-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q25_A1.html">(A[1])</a> all irascible passions imply movement towards something. Now this movement of the irascible faculty towards something may + be due to two causes: one is the mere aptitude or proportion to the end; and this pertains to love or hatred, those whose + object is good, or evil; and this belongs to sadness or joy. As a matter of fact, the presence of good produces no passion + in the irascible, as stated above (Q[23], + AA[3],4); but the presence of evil gives rise to the passion of anger. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q25_A3-p7"> Since then in order of generation or execution, proportion or aptitude to the end precedes the achievement of the end; it + follows that, of all the irascible passions, anger is the last in the order of generation. And among the other passions of + the irascible faculty, which imply a movement arising from love of good or hatred of evil, those whose object is good, viz. + hope and despair, must naturally precede those whose object is evil, viz. daring and fear: yet so that hope + precedes despair; since hope is a movement towards good as such, which is essentially attractive, so that hope tends to good + directly; whereas despair is a movement away from good, a movement which is consistent with good, not as such, but in respect + of something else, wherefore its tendency from good is accidental, as it were. In like manner fear, through being a movement + from evil, precedes daring. And that hope and despair naturally precede fear and daring is evident from this---that as the + desire of good is the reason for avoiding evil, so hope and despair are the reason for fear and daring: because daring arises + from the hope of victory, and fear arises from the despair of overcoming. Lastly, anger arises from daring: for no one is + angry while seeking vengeance, unless he dare to avenge himself, as Avicenna observes in the sixth book of his Physics. Accordingly, + it is evident that hope is the first of all the irascible passions. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q25_A3-p8"> And if we wish to know the order of all the passions in the way of generation, love and hatred are first; desire and aversion, + second; hope and despair, third; fear and daring, fourth; anger, fifth; sixth and last, joy and sadness, which follow from + all the passions, as stated in Ethic. ii, 5: yet so that love precedes hatred; desire precedes aversion; hope precedes despair; + fear precedes daring; and joy precedes sadness, as may be gathered from what has been stated above. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q25_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Because anger arises from the other passions, as an effect from the causes that precede it, it is from anger, as being more + manifest than the other passions, that the power takes its name. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q25_A3-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> It is not the arduousness but the good that is the reason for approach or desire. Consequently hope, which regards good more + directly, takes precedence: although at times daring or even anger regards something more arduous. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q25_A3-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The movement of the appetite is essentially and directly towards the good as towards its proper object; its movement from + evil results from this. For the movement of the appetitive part is in proportion, not to natural movement, but to the intention + of nature, which intends the end before intending the removal of a contrary, which removal is desired only for the sake of + obtaining the end. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q25_A3-p12"></p> + <p id="FS_Q25_A3-p13"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q25_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q25_A4.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q25_A4" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q25_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q26.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q25_A4-p0.1">Whether these are the four principal passions: joy, sadness, hope and fear?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q25_A4-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q25_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that joy, sadness, hope and fear are not the four principal passions. For Augustine (De Civ. Dei xiv, 3,[7] + sqq.) omits hope and puts desire in its place. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q25_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, there is a twofold order in the passions of the soul: the order of intention, and the order of execution or generation. + The principal passions should therefore be taken, either in the order of intention; and thus joy and sadness, which are the + final passions, will be the principal passions; or in the order of execution or generation, and thus love will be the principal + passion. Therefore joy and sadness, hope and fear should in no way be called the + four principal passions. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q25_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, just as daring is caused by hope, so fear is caused by despair. Either, therefore, hope and despair should be reckoned + as principal passions, since they cause others: or hope and daring, from being akin to one another. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q25_A4-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Boethius (De Consol. i) in enumerating the four principal passions, says: + </p> + <p id="FS_Q25_A4-p6"> "Banish joys: banish fears:</p> + <p id="FS_Q25_A4-p7"> Away with hope: away with tears."</p> + <p id="FS_Q25_A4-p8"> + <b>I answer that,</b> These four are commonly called the principal passions. Two of them, viz. joy and sadness, are said to be principal because + in them all the other passions have their completion and end; wherefore they arise from all the other passions, as is stated + in Ethic. ii, 5. Fear and hope are principal passions, not because they complete the others simply, but because they complete + them as regards the movement of the appetite towards something: for in respect of good, + movement begins in love, goes forward to desire, and ends in hope; while in respect of evil, it begins in hatred, goes on + to aversion, and ends in fear. Hence it is customary to distinguish these four passions in relation to the present and the + future: for movement regards the future, while rest is in something present: so that joy relates to present good, sadness + relates to present evil; hope regards future good, and fear, future evil. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q25_A4-p9"> As to the other passions that regard good or evil, present or future, they all culminate in these four. For this reason some + have said that these four are the principal passions, because they are general passions; and this is true, provided that by + hope and fear we understand the appetite's common tendency to desire or shun something. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q25_A4-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Augustine puts desire or covetousness in place of hope, in so far as they seem to regard the same object, viz. some future + good. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q25_A4-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> These are called principal passions, in the order of intention and completion. And though fear and hope are not the last + passions simply, yet they are the last of those passions that tend towards something as future. Nor can the argument be pressed + any further except in the case of anger: yet neither can anger be reckoned a principal passion, because it is an effect of + daring, which cannot be a principal passion, as we shall state further on (Reply + OBJ 3). + </p> + <p id="FS_Q25_A4-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Despair implies movement away from good; and this is, as it were, accidental: and daring implies movement towards evil; and + this too is accidental. Consequently these cannot be principal passions; because that which is accidental cannot be said to + be principal. And so neither can anger be called a principal passion, because it arises from daring. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q25_A4-p13"></p> + <p id="FS_Q25_A4-p14"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q25_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q26.html"></a> + </div> + <a href="summa.FS_Q24_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q25_A1.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q26" class="div3"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q25_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q26_A1.html"></a> + <h3 id="FS_Q26-p0.1">OF THE PASSIONS OF THE SOUL IN PARTICULAR: AND FIRST, OF LOVE (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3> + <p id="FS_Q26-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q26-p2"> We have now to consider the soul's passions in particular, and (1) the passions of the concupiscible faculty; (2) the passions + of the irascible faculty. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q26-p3"> The first of these considerations will be threefold: since we shall consider (1) Love and hatred; (2) Desire and aversion; + (3) Pleasure and sadness. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q26-p4"> Concerning love, three points must be considered: (1) Love itself; (2) The cause of love; (3) The effects of love. Under + the first head there are four points of inquiry: + </p> + <p id="FS_Q26-p5"> (1) Whether love is in the concupiscible power?</p> + <p id="FS_Q26-p6"> (2) Whether love is a passion?</p> + <p id="FS_Q26-p7"> (3) Whether love is the same as dilection?</p> + <p id="FS_Q26-p8"> (4) Whether love is properly divided into love of friendship, and love of concupiscence?</p> + <div id="FS_Q26_A1" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q26.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q26_A2.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q26_A1-p0.1">Whether love is in the concupiscible power?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q26_A1-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q26_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that love is not in the concupiscible power. For it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q26_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.8.2" target="asv">Wis. 8:2</a>): "Her," namely wisdom, "have I loved, and have sought her out from my youth." But the concupiscible power, being a part + of the sensitive appetite, cannot tend to wisdom, which is not apprehended by the senses. Therefore love is not in the concupiscible + power. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q26_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, love seems to be identified with every passion: for Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 7): "Love, yearning for the + object beloved, is desire; having and enjoying it, is joy; fleeing what is contrary to it, is fear; and feeling what is contrary + to it, is sadness." But not every passion is in the concupiscible power; indeed, fear, which is mentioned in this passage, + is in the irascible power. Therefore we must not say absolutely that love is in the + concupiscible power. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q26_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv) mentions a "natural love." But natural love seems to pertain rather to the natural powers, + which belong to the vegetal soul. Therefore love is not simply in the concupiscible power. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q26_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Topic. ii, 7) that "love is in the concupiscible power." + </p> + <p id="FS_Q26_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Love is something pertaining to the appetite; since good is the object of both. Wherefore love differs according to the difference + of appetites. For there is an appetite which arises from an apprehension existing, not in the subject of the appetite, but + in some other: and this is called the "natural appetite." Because natural things seek what is suitable to them according to + their nature, by reason of an apprehension which is not in them, but in the Author + of their nature, as stated in the + <a id="FS_Q26_A1-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q6_A1.html">FP, Q[6], A[1]</a>, ad 2; + <a id="FS_Q26_A1-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q103_A1.html">FP, Q[103], A[1]</a>, ad 1,3. And there is another appetite arising from an apprehension in the subject of the appetite, but from necessity and + not from free-will. Such is, in irrational animals, the "sensitive appetite," which, however, in man, has a certain share + of liberty, in so far as it obeys reason. Again, there is another appetite following freely from an apprehension in the subject + of + the appetite. And this is the rational or intellectual appetite, which is called the "will." + </p> + <p id="FS_Q26_A1-p7"> Now in each of these appetites, the name "love" is given to the principle movement towards the end loved. In the natural + appetite the principle of this movement is the appetitive subject's connaturalness with the thing to which it tends, and may + be called "natural love": thus the connaturalness of a heavy body for the centre, is by reason of its weight and may be called + "natural love." In like manner the aptitude of the sensitive appetite or of the will to some good, that is to + say, its very complacency in good is called "sensitive love," or "intellectual" or "rational love." So that sensitive love + is in the sensitive appetite, just as intellectual love is in the intellectual appetite. And it belongs to the concupiscible + power, because it regards good absolutely, and not under the aspect of difficulty, which is the object of the irascible faculty. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q26_A1-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The words quoted refer to intellectual or rational love. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q26_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Love is spoken of as being fear, joy, desire and sadness, not essentially but causally. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q26_A1-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Natural love is not only in the powers of the vegetal soul, but in all the soul's powers, and also in all the parts of the + body, and universally in all things: because, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv), "Beauty and goodness are beloved by all things"; + since each single thing has a connaturalness with that which is naturally suitable to it. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q26_A1-p11"></p> + <p id="FS_Q26_A1-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q26.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q26_A2.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q26_A2" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q26_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q26_A3.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q26_A2-p0.1">Whether love is a passion?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q26_A2-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q26_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that love is not a passion. For no power is a passion. But every love is a power, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. + iv). Therefore love is not a passion. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q26_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, love is a kind of union or bond, as Augustine says (De Trin. viii, 10). But a union or bond is not a passion, but + rather a relation. Therefore love is not a passion. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q26_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 22) that passion is a movement. But love does not imply the movement of the appetite; + for this is desire, of which movement love is the principle. Therefore love is not a passion. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q26_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Ethic. viii, 5) that "love is a passion." + </p> + <p id="FS_Q26_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Passion is the effect of the agent on the patient. Now a natural agent produces a twofold effect on the patient: for in the + first place it gives it the form; and secondly it gives it the movement that results from the form. Thus the generator gives + the generated body both weight and the movement resulting from weight: so that weight, from being the principle of movement + to the place, which is connatural to that body by reason of its weight, can, in a way, be + called "natural love." In the same way the appetible object gives the appetite, first, a certain adaptation to itself, which + consists in complacency in that object; and from this follows movement towards the appetible object. For "the appetitive movement + is circular," as stated in De Anima iii, 10; because the appetible object moves the appetite, introducing itself, as it were, + into its intention; while the appetite moves towards the realization of the appetible object, so that the movement + ends where it began. Accordingly, the first change wrought in the appetite by the appetible object is called "love," and is + nothing else than complacency in that object; and from this complacency results a movement towards that same object, and this + movement is "desire"; and lastly, there is rest which is "joy." Since, therefore, love consists in a change wrought in the + appetite by the appetible object, it is evident that love is a passion: properly so called, according as it is in the + concupiscible faculty; in a wider and extended sense, according as it is in the will. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q26_A2-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Since power denotes a principle of movement or action, Dionysius calls love a power, in so far as it is a principle of movement + in the appetite. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q26_A2-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Union belongs to love in so far as by reason of the complacency of the appetite, the lover stands in relation to that which + he loves, as though it were himself or part of himself. Hence it is clear that love is not the very relation of union, but + that union is a result of love. Hence, too, Dionysius says that "love is a unitive force" (Div. Nom. iv), and the Philosopher + says (Polit. ii, 1) that union is the work of love. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q26_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Although love does not denote the movement of the appetite in tending towards the appetible object, yet it denotes that movement + whereby the appetite is changed by the appetible object, so as to have complacency therein. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q26_A2-p10"></p> + <p id="FS_Q26_A2-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q26_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q26_A3.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q26_A3" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q26_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q26_A4.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q26_A3-p0.1">Whether love is the same as dilection?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q26_A3-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q26_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that love is the same as dilection. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that love is to dilection, "as four is + to twice two, and as a rectilinear figure is to one composed of straight lines." But these have the same meaning. Therefore + love and dilection denote the same thing. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q26_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the movements of the appetite differ by reason of their objects. But the objects of dilection and love are the same. + Therefore these are the same. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q26_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if dilection and love differ, it seems that it is chiefly in the fact that "dilection refers to good things, love + to evil things, as some have maintained," according to Augustine (De Civ. Dei xiv, 7). But they do not differ thus; because + as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 7) the holy Scripture uses both words in reference to either good or bad things. Therefore + love and dilection do not differ: thus indeed Augustine concludes (De Civ. Dei xiv, 7) + that "it is not one thing to speak of love, and another to speak of dilection." + </p> + <p id="FS_Q26_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that "some holy men have held that love means something more Godlike than dilection does." + </p> + <p id="FS_Q26_A3-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> We find four words referring in a way, to the same thing: viz. love, dilection, charity and friendship. They differ, however, + in this, that "friendship," according to the Philosopher (Ethic. viii, 5), "is like a habit," whereas "love" and "dilection" + are expressed by way of act or passion; and "charity" can be taken either way. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q26_A3-p7"> Moreover these three express act in different ways. For love has a wider signification than the others, since every dilection + or charity is love, but not vice versa. Because dilection implies, in addition to love, a choice [electionem] made beforehand, + as the very word denotes: and therefore dilection is not in the concupiscible power, but only in the will, and only in the + rational nature. Charity denotes, in addition to love, a certain perfection of love, in so far as that + which is loved is held to be of great price, as the word itself implies [*Referring to the Latin "carus" (dear)]. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q26_A3-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Dionysius is speaking of love and dilection, in so far as they are in the intellectual appetite; for thus love is the same + as dilection. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q26_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The object of love is more general than the object of dilection: because love extends to more than dilection does, as stated + above. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q26_A3-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Love and dilection differ, not in respect of good and evil, but as stated. Yet in the intellectual faculty love is the same + as dilection. And it is in this sense that Augustine speaks of love in the passage quoted: hence a little further on he adds + that "a right will is well-directed love, and a wrong will is ill-directed love." However, the fact that love, which is concupiscible + passion, inclines many to evil, is the reason why some assigned the + difference spoken of. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q26_A3-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> The reason why some held that, even when applied to the will itself, the word "love" signifies something more Godlike than + "dilection," was because love denotes a passion, especially in so far as it is in the sensitive appetite; whereas dilection + presupposes the judgment of reason. But it is possible for man to tend to God by love, being as it were passively drawn by + Him, more than he can possibly be drawn thereto by his reason, which pertains to the + nature of dilection, as stated above. And consequently love is more Godlike than dilection. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q26_A3-p12"></p> + <p id="FS_Q26_A3-p13"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q26_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q26_A4.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q26_A4" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q26_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q27.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q26_A4-p0.1">Whether love is properly divided into love of friendship and love of concupiscence?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q26_A4-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q26_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that love is not properly divided into love of friendship and love of concupiscence. For "love is a passion, + while friendship is a habit," according to the Philosopher (Ethic. viii, 5). But habit cannot be the member of a division + of passions. Therefore love is not properly divided into love of concupiscence and love of friendship. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q26_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, a thing cannot be divided by another member of the same division; for man is not a member of the same division as + "animal." But concupiscence is a member of the same division as love, as a passion distinct from love. Therefore concupiscence + is not a division of love. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q26_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. viii, 3) friendship is threefold, that which is founded on "usefulness," that + which is founded on "pleasure," and that which is founded on "goodness." But useful and pleasant friendship are not without + concupiscence. Therefore concupiscence should not be contrasted with friendship. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q26_A4-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> We are said to love certain things, because we desire them: thus "a man is said to love wine, on account of its sweetness + which he desires"; as stated in Topic. ii, 3. But we have no friendship for wine and suchlike things, as stated in Ethic. + viii, 2. Therefore love of concupiscence is distinct from love of friendship. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q26_A4-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 4), "to love is to wish good to someone." Hence the movement of love has a twofold tendency: + towards the good which a man wishes to someone (to himself or to another) and towards that to which he wishes some good. Accordingly, + man has love of concupiscence towards the good that he wishes to another, and love of friendship towards him to whom he wishes + good. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q26_A4-p7"> Now the members of this division are related as primary and secondary: since that which is loved with the love of friendship + is loved simply and for itself; whereas that which is loved with the love of concupiscence, is loved, not simply and for itself, + but for something else. For just as that which has existence, is a being simply, while that which exists in another is a relative + being; so, because good is convertible with being, the good, which itself has goodness, is good + simply; but that which is another's good, is a relative good. Consequently the love with which a thing is loved, that it may + have some good, is love simply; while the love, with which a thing is loved, that it may be another's good, is relative love. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q26_A4-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Love is not divided into friendship and concupiscence, but into love of friendship, and love of concupiscence. For a friend + is, properly speaking, one to whom we wish good: while we are said to desire, what we wish for ourselves. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q26_A4-p9"> Hence the Reply to the Second Objection.</p> + <p id="FS_Q26_A4-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> When friendship is based on usefulness or pleasure, a man does indeed wish his friend some good: and in this respect the + character of friendship is preserved. But since he refers this good further to his own pleasure or use, the result is that + friendship of the useful or pleasant, in so far as it is connected with love of concupiscence, loses the character to true + friendship. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q26_A4-p11"></p> + <p id="FS_Q26_A4-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q26_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q27.html"></a> + </div> + <a href="summa.FS_Q25_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q26_A1.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q27" class="div3"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q26_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q27_A1.html"></a> + <h3 id="FS_Q27-p0.1">OF THE CAUSE OF LOVE (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3> + <p id="FS_Q27-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q27-p2"> We must now consider the cause of love: and under this head there are four points of inquiry:</p> + <p id="FS_Q27-p3"> (1) Whether good is the only cause of love?</p> + <p id="FS_Q27-p4"> (2) Whether knowledge is a cause of love?</p> + <p id="FS_Q27-p5"> (3) Whether likeness is a cause of love?</p> + <p id="FS_Q27-p6"> (4) Whether any other passion of the soul is a cause of love?</p> + <div id="FS_Q27_A1" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q27.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q27_A2.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q27_A1-p0.1">Whether good is the only cause of love?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q27_A1-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q27_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that good is not the only cause of love. For good does not cause love, except because it is loved. But it happens + that evil also is loved, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q27_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.10.6" target="asv"> Ps. 10:6</a>: "He that loveth iniquity, hateth his own soul": else, every love would be good. Therefore good is not the only cause of + love. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q27_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 4) that "we love those who acknowledge their evils." Therefore it seems that evil + is the cause of love. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q27_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that not "the good" only but also "the beautiful is beloved by all." + </p> + <p id="FS_Q27_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Trin. viii, 3): "Assuredly the good alone is beloved." Therefore good alone is the cause of love. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q27_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above ( + <a id="FS_Q27_A1-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q26_A1.html">Q[26], A[1]</a>), Love belongs to the appetitive power which is a passive faculty. Wherefore its object stands in relation to it as the cause + of its movement or act. Therefore the cause of love must needs be love's object. Now the proper object of love is the good; + because, as stated above ( + <a id="FS_Q27_A1-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q26_A1.html">Q[26], AA[1]</a>,2), love implies a certain connaturalness or complacency of the lover for the thing beloved, + and to everything, that thing is a good, which is akin and proportionate to it. It follows, therefore, that good is the proper + cause of love. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q27_A1-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Evil is never loved except under the aspect of good, that is to say, in so far as it is good in some respect, and is considered + as being good simply. And thus a certain love is evil, in so far as it tends to that which is not simply a true good. It is + in this way that man "loves iniquity," inasmuch as, by means of iniquity, some good is gained; pleasure, for instance, or + money, or such like. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q27_A1-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Those who acknowledge their evils, are beloved, not for their evils, but because they acknowledge them, for it is a good + thing to acknowledge one's faults, in so far as it excludes insincerity or hypocrisy. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q27_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The beautiful is the same as the good, and they differ in aspect only. For since good is what all seek, the notion of good + is that which calms the desire; while the notion of the beautiful is that which calms the desire, by being seen or known. + Consequently those senses chiefly regard the beautiful, which are the most cognitive, viz. sight and hearing, as ministering + to reason; for we speak of beautiful sights and beautiful sounds. But in reference to + the other objects of the other senses, we do not use the expression "beautiful," for we do not speak of beautiful tastes, + and beautiful odors. Thus it is evident that beauty adds to goodness a relation to the cognitive faculty: so that "good" means + that which simply pleases the appetite; while the "beautiful" is something pleasant to apprehend. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q27_A1-p10"></p> + <p id="FS_Q27_A1-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q27.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q27_A2.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q27_A2" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q27_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q27_A3.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q27_A2-p0.1">Whether knowledge is a cause of love?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q27_A2-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q27_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that knowledge is not a cause of love. For it is due to love that a thing is sought. But some things are sought + without being known, for instance, the sciences; for since "to have them is the same as to know them," as Augustine says (QQ[83], + qu. 35), if we knew them we should have them, and should not seek them. Therefore knowledge is not the cause of love. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q27_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, to love what we know not seems like loving something more than we know it. But some things are loved more than they + are known: thus in this life God can be loved in Himself, but cannot be known in Himself. Therefore knowledge is not the cause + of love. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q27_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if knowledge were the cause of love, there would be no love, where there is no knowledge. But in all things there + is love, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv); whereas there is not knowledge in all things. Therefore knowledge is not the cause + of love. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q27_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine proves (De Trin. x, 1,2) that "none can love what he does not know." + </p> + <p id="FS_Q27_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above + <a id="FS_Q27_A2-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q27_A1.html">(A[1])</a>, good is the cause of love, as being its object. But good is not the object of the appetite, except as apprehended. And therefore + love demands some apprehension of the good that is loved. For this reason the Philosopher (Ethic. ix, 5,12) says that bodily + sight is the beginning of sensitive love: and in like manner the contemplation of spiritual beauty or goodness is the beginning + of spiritual love. Accordingly + knowledge is the cause of love for the same reason as good is, which can be loved only if known. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q27_A2-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> He who seeks science, is not entirely without knowledge thereof: but knows something about it already in some respect, either + in a general way, or in some one of its effects, or from having heard it commended, as Augustine says (De Trin. x, 1,2). But + to have it is not to know it thus, but to know it perfectly. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q27_A2-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Something is required for the perfection of knowledge, that is not requisite for the perfection of love. For knowledge belongs + to the reason, whose function it is to distinguish things which in reality are united, and to unite together, after a fashion, + things that are distinct, by comparing one with another. Consequently the perfection of knowledge requires that man should + know distinctly all that is in a thing, such as its parts, powers, and + properties. On the other hand, love is in the appetitive power, which regards a thing as it is in itself: wherefore it suffices, + for the perfection of love, that a thing be loved according as it is known in itself. Hence it is, therefore, that a thing + is loved more than it is known; since it can be loved perfectly, even without being perfectly known. This is most evident + in regard to the sciences, which some love through having a certain general knowledge of them: for instance, they know that + rhetoric is a science that enables man to persuade others; and this is what they love in rhetoric. The same applies to the + love of God. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q27_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Even natural love, which is in all things, is caused by a kind of knowledge, not indeed existing in natural things themselves, + but in Him Who created their nature, as stated above (Q[26], A[1]; cf. + <a id="FS_Q27_A2-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q6_A1.html">FP, Q[6], A[1]</a>, ad 2). + </p> + <p id="FS_Q27_A2-p10"></p> + <p id="FS_Q27_A2-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q27_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q27_A3.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q27_A3" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q27_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q27_A4.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q27_A3-p0.1">Whether likeness is a cause of love?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q27_A3-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q27_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that likeness is not a cause of love. For the same thing is not the cause of contraries. But likeness is the + cause of hatred; for it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q27_A3-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Prov.13.10" target="asv">Prov. 13:10</a>) that "among the proud there are always contentions"; and the Philosopher says (Ethic. viii, 1) that "potters quarrel with + one another." Therefore likeness is not a cause of love. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q27_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Augustine says (Confess. iv, 14) that "a man loves in another that which he would not be himself: thus he loves + an actor, but would not himself be an actor." But it would not be so, if likeness were the proper cause of love; for in that + case a man would love in another, that which he possesses himself, or would like to possess. Therefore likeness is not a cause + of love. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q27_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, everyone loves that which he needs, even if he have it not: thus a sick man loves health, and a poor man loves riches. + But in so far as he needs them and lacks them, he is unlike them. Therefore not only likeness but also unlikeness is a cause + of love. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q27_A3-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 4) that "we love those who bestow money and health on us; and also those who retain + their friendship for the dead." But all are not such. Therefore likeness is not a cause of love. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q27_A3-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q27_A3-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.13.19" target="asv">Ecclus. 13:19</a>): "Every beast loveth its like." + </p> + <p id="FS_Q27_A3-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Likeness, properly speaking, is a cause of love. But it must be observed that likeness between things is twofold. One kind + of likeness arises from each thing having the same quality actually: for example, two things possessing the quality of whiteness + are said to be alike. Another kind of likeness arises from one thing having potentially and by way of inclination, a quality + which the other has actually: thus we may say that a heavy body existing outside its + proper place is like another heavy body that exists in its proper place: or again, according as potentiality bears a resemblance + to its act; since act is contained, in a manner, in the potentiality itself. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q27_A3-p8"> Accordingly the first kind of likeness causes love of friendship or well-being. For the very fact that two men are alike, + having, as it were, one form, makes them to be, in a manner, one in that form: thus two men are one thing in the species of + humanity, and two white men are one thing in whiteness. Hence the affections of one tend to the other, as being one with him; + and he wishes good to him as to himself. But the second kind of likeness causes love of concupiscence, or + friendship founded on usefulness or pleasure: because whatever is in potentiality, as such, has the desire for its act; and + it takes pleasure in its realization, if it be a sentient and cognitive being. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q27_A3-p9"> Now it has been stated above ( + <a id="FS_Q27_A3-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q26_A4.html">Q[26], A[4]</a>), that in the love of concupiscence, the lover, properly speaking, loves himself, in willing the good that he desires. But + a man loves himself more than another: because he is one with himself substantially, whereas with another he is one only in + the likeness of some form. Consequently, if this other's likeness to him arising from the participation of a form, hinders + him from gaining the good that he loves, he + becomes hateful to him, not for being like him, but for hindering him from gaining his own good. This is why "potters quarrel + among themselves," because they hinder one another's gain: and why "there are contentions among the proud," because they hinder + one another in attaining the position they covet. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q27_A3-p10"> Hence the Reply to the First Objection is evident.</p> + <p id="FS_Q27_A3-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Even when a man loves in another what he loves not in himself, there is a certain likeness of proportion: because as the + latter is to that which is loved in him, so is the former to that which he loves in himself: for instance, if a good singer + love a good writer, we can see a likeness of proportion, inasmuch as each one has that which is becoming to him in respect + of his art. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q27_A3-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> He that loves what he needs, bears a likeness to what he loves, as potentiality bears a likeness to its act, as stated above. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q27_A3-p13"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> According to the same likeness of potentiality to its act, the illiberal man loves the man who is liberal, in so far as he + expects from him something which he desires. The same applies to the man who is constant in his friendship as compared to + one who is inconstant. For in either case friendship seems to be based on usefulness. We might also say that although not + all men have these virtues in the complete habit, yet they have them according to + certain seminal principles in the reason, in force of which principles the man who is not virtuous loves the virtuous man, + as being in conformity with his own natural reason. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q27_A3-p14"></p> + <p id="FS_Q27_A3-p15"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q27_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q27_A4.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q27_A4" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q27_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q28.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q27_A4-p0.1">Whether any other passion of the soul is a cause of love?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q27_A4-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q27_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that some other passion can be the cause of love. For the Philosopher (Ethic. viii, 3) says that some are loved + for the sake of the pleasure they give. But pleasure is a passion. Therefore another passion is a cause of love. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q27_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, desire is a passion. But we love some because we desire to receive something from them: as happens in every friendship + based on usefulness. Therefore another passion is a cause of love. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q27_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Augustine says (De Trin. x, 1): "When we have no hope of getting a thing, we love it but half-heartedly or not at + all, even if we see how beautiful it is." Therefore hope too is a cause of love. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q27_A4-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> All the other emotions of the soul are caused by love, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 7,9). + </p> + <p id="FS_Q27_A4-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> There is no other passion of the soul that does not presuppose love of some kind. The reason is that every other passion + of the soul implies either movement towards something, or rest in something. Now every movement towards something, or rest + in something, arises from some kinship or aptness to that thing; and in this does love consist. Therefore it is not possible + for any other passion of the soul to be universally the cause of every love. But it may + happen that some other passion is the cause of some particular love: just as one good is the cause of another. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q27_A4-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> When a man loves a thing for the pleasure it affords, his love is indeed caused by pleasure; but that very pleasure is caused, + in its turn, by another preceding love; for none takes pleasure save in that which is loved in some way. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q27_A4-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Desire for a thing always presupposes love for that thing. But desire of one thing can be the cause of another thing's being + loved; thus he that desires money, for this reason loves him from whom he receives it. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q27_A4-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Hope causes or increases love; both by reason of pleasure, because it causes pleasure; and by reason of desire, because hope + strengthens desire, since we do not desire so intensely that which we have no hope of receiving. Nevertheless hope itself + is of a good that is loved. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q27_A4-p10"></p> + <p id="FS_Q27_A4-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q27_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q28.html"></a> + </div> + <a href="summa.FS_Q26_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q27_A1.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q28" class="div3"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q27_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q28_A1.html"></a> + <h3 id="FS_Q28-p0.1">OF THE EFFECTS OF LOVE (SIX ARTICLES)</h3> + <p id="FS_Q28-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q28-p2"> We now have to consider the effects of love: under which head there are six points of inquiry:</p> + <p id="FS_Q28-p3"> (1) Whether union is an effect of love?</p> + <p id="FS_Q28-p4"> (2) Whether mutual indwelling is an effect of love?</p> + <p id="FS_Q28-p5"> (3) Whether ecstasy is an effect of love?</p> + <p id="FS_Q28-p6"> (4) Whether zeal is an effect of love?</p> + <p id="FS_Q28-p7"> (5) Whether love is a passion that is hurtful to the lover?</p> + <p id="FS_Q28-p8"> (6) Whether love is cause of all that the lover does?</p> + <div id="FS_Q28_A1" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q28.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q28_A2.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q28_A1-p0.1">Whether union is an effect of love?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q28_A1-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q28_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that union is not an effect of love. For absence is incompatible with union. But love is compatible with absence; + for the Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q28_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Gal.4.18" target="asv">Gal. 4:18</a>): "Be zealous for that which is good in a good thing always" (speaking of himself, according to a gloss), "and not only when + I am present with you." Therefore union is not an effect of love. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q28_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, every union is either according to essence, thus form is united to matter, accident to subject, and a part to the + whole, or to another part in order to make up the whole: or according to likeness, in genus, species, or accident. But love + does not cause union of essence; else love could not be between things essentially distinct. On the other hand, love does + not cause union of likeness, but rather is caused by it, as stated above ( + <a id="FS_Q28_A1-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q27_A3.html">Q[27], A[3]</a>). Therefore union is not an effect of love. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q28_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the sense in act is the sensible in act, and the intellect in act is the thing actually understood. But the lover + in act is not the beloved in act. Therefore union is the effect of knowledge rather than of love. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q28_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that every love is a "unitive love." + </p> + <p id="FS_Q28_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The union of lover and beloved is twofold. The first is real union; for instance, when the beloved is present with the lover. + The second is union of affection: and this union must be considered in relation to the preceding apprehension; since movement + of the appetite follows apprehension. Now love being twofold, viz. love of concupiscence and love of friendship; each of these + arises from a kind of apprehension of the oneness of the thing loved with the + lover. For when we love a thing, by desiring it, we apprehend it as belonging to our well-being. In like manner when a man + loves another with the love of friendship, he wills good to him, just as he wills good to himself: wherefore he apprehends + him as his other self, in so far, to wit, as he wills good to him as to himself. Hence a friend is called a man's "other self" + (Ethic. ix, 4), and Augustine says (Confess. iv, 6), "Well did one say to his friend: Thou half of my soul." + </p> + <p id="FS_Q28_A1-p7"> The first of these unions is caused "effectively" by love; because love moves man to desire and seek the presence of the + beloved, as of something suitable and belonging to him. The second union is caused "formally" by love; because love itself + is this union or bond. In this sense Augustine says (De Trin. viii, 10) that "love is a vital principle uniting, or seeking + to unite two together, the lover, to wit, and the beloved." For in describing it as "uniting" he refers to the + union of affection, without which there is no love: and in saying that "it seeks to unite," he refers to real union. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q28_A1-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This argument is true of real union. That is necessary to pleasure as being its cause; desire implies the real absence of + the beloved: but love remains whether the beloved be absent or present. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q28_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Union has a threefold relation to love. There is union which causes love; and this is substantial union, as regards the love + with which one loves oneself; while as regards the love wherewith one loves other things, it is the union of likeness, as + stated above ( + <a id="FS_Q28_A1-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q27_A3.html">Q[27], A[3]</a>). There is also a union which is essentially love itself. This union is according to a bond of affection, and is likened + to substantial union, inasmuch as + the lover stands to the object of his love, as to himself, if it be love of friendship; as to something belonging to himself, + if it be love of concupiscence. Again there is a union, which is the effect of love. This is real union, which the lover seeks + with the object of his love. Moreover this union is in keeping with the demands of love: for as the Philosopher relates (Polit. + ii, 1), "Aristophanes stated that lovers would wish to be united both into one," but since "this would result in + either one or both being destroyed," they seek a suitable and becoming union---to live together, speak together, and be united + together in other like things. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q28_A1-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Knowledge is perfected by the thing known being united, through its likeness, to the knower. But the effect of love is that + the thing itself which is loved, is, in a way, united to the lover, as stated above. Consequently the union caused by love + is closer than that which is caused by knowledge. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q28_A1-p11"></p> + <p id="FS_Q28_A1-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q28.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q28_A2.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q28_A2" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q28_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q28_A3.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q28_A2-p0.1">Whether mutual indwelling is an effect of love?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q28_A2-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q28_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that love does not cause mutual indwelling, so that the lover be in the beloved and vice versa. For that which + is in another is contained in it. But the same cannot be container and contents. Therefore love cannot cause mutual indwelling, + so that the lover be in the beloved and vice versa. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q28_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, nothing can penetrate within a whole, except by means of a division of the whole. But it is the function of the + reason, not of the appetite where love resides, to divide things that are really united. Therefore mutual indwelling is not + an effect of love. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q28_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if love involves the lover being in the beloved and vice versa, it follows that the beloved is united to the lover, + in the same way as the lover is united to the beloved. But the union itself is love, as stated above + <a id="FS_Q28_A2-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q28_A1.html">(A[1])</a>. Therefore it follows that the lover is always loved by the object of his love; which is evidently false. Therefore mutual + indwelling is not an effect of love. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q28_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q28_A2-p5.1" href="./asv.html#iJohn.4.16" target="asv">1 Jn. 4:16</a>): "He that abideth in charity abideth in God, and God in him." Now charity is the love of God. Therefore, for the same reason, + every love makes the beloved to be in the lover, and vice versa. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q28_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> This effect of mutual indwelling may be understood as referring both to the apprehensive and to the appetitive power. Because, + as to the apprehensive power, the beloved is said to be in the lover, inasmuch as the beloved abides in the apprehension of + the lover, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q28_A2-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Phil.1.7" target="asv"> Phil. 1:7, </a> "For that I have you in my heart": while the lover is said to be in the beloved, according to apprehension, inasmuch as the + lover is not satisfied with a + superficial apprehension of the beloved, but strives to gain an intimate knowledge of everything pertaining to the beloved, + so as to penetrate into his very soul. Thus it is written concerning the Holy Ghost, Who is God's Love, that He "searcheth + all things, yea the deep things of God" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q28_A2-p6.2" href="./asv.html#iCor.2.10" target="asv">1 Cor. 2:10</a>). + </p> + <p id="FS_Q28_A2-p7"> As the appetitive power, the object loved is said to be in the lover, inasmuch as it is in his affections, by a kind of complacency: + causing him either to take pleasure in it, or in its good, when present; or, in the absence of the object loved, by his longing, + to tend towards it with the love of concupiscence, or towards the good that he wills to the beloved, with the love of friendship: + not indeed from any extrinsic cause (as when we desire one thing on account of another, or + wish good to another on account of something else), but because the complacency in the beloved is rooted in the lover's heart. + For this reason we speak of love as being "intimate"; and "of the bowels of charity." On the other hand, the lover is in the + beloved, by the love of concupiscence and by the love of friendship, but not in the same way. For the love of concupiscence + is not satisfied with any external or superficial possession or enjoyment of the beloved; but seeks to possess the beloved + perfectly, by penetrating into his heart, as it were. Whereas, in the love of friendship, the lover is in the beloved, inasmuch + as he reckons what is good or evil to his friend, as being so to himself; and his friend's will as his own, so that it seems + as though he felt the good or suffered the evil in the person of his friend. Hence it is proper to friends "to desire the + same things, and to grieve and rejoice at the same," as the Philosopher says (Ethic. ix, 3 and Rhet. ii, 4). Consequently + in + so far as he reckons what affects his friend as affecting himself, the lover seems to be in the beloved, as though he were + become one with him: but in so far as, on the other hand, he wills and acts for his friend's sake as for his own sake, looking + on his friend as identified with himself, thus the beloved is in the lover. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q28_A2-p8"> In yet a third way, mutual indwelling in the love of friendship can be understood in regard to reciprocal love: inasmuch + as friends return love for love, and both desire and do good things for one another. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q28_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The beloved is contained in the lover, by being impressed on his heart and thus becoming the object of his complacency. On + the other hand, the lover is contained in the beloved, inasmuch as the lover penetrates, so to speak, into the beloved. For + nothing hinders a thing from being both container and contents in different ways: just as a genus is contained in its species, + and vice versa. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q28_A2-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The apprehension of the reason precedes the movement of love. Consequently, just as the reason divides, so does the movement + of love penetrate into the beloved, as was explained above. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q28_A2-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This argument is true of the third kind of mutual indwelling, which is not to be found in every kind of love. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q28_A2-p12"></p> + <p id="FS_Q28_A2-p13"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q28_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q28_A3.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q28_A3" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q28_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q28_A4.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q28_A3-p0.1">Whether ecstasy is an effect of love?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q28_A3-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q28_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that ecstasy is not an effect of love. For ecstasy seems to imply loss of reason. But love does not always + result in loss of reason: for lovers are masters of themselves at times. Therefore love does not cause ecstasy. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q28_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the lover desires the beloved to be united to him. Therefore he draws the beloved to himself, rather than betakes + himself into the beloved, going forth out from himself as it were. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q28_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, love unites the beloved to the lover, as stated above + <a id="FS_Q28_A3-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q28_A1.html">(A[1])</a>. If, therefore, the lover goes out from himself, in order to betake himself into the beloved, it follows that the lover always + loves the beloved more than himself: which is evidently false. Therefore ecstasy is not an effect of love. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q28_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that "the Divine love produces ecstasy," and that "God Himself suffered ecstasy through love." + Since therefore according to the same author (Div. Nom. iv), every love is a participated likeness of the Divine Love, it + seems that every love causes ecstasy. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q28_A3-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> To suffer ecstasy means to be placed outside oneself. This happens as to the apprehensive power and as to the appetitive + power. As to the apprehensive power, a man is said to be placed outside himself, when he is placed outside the knowledge proper + to him. This may be due to his being raised to a higher knowledge; thus, a man is said to suffer ecstasy, inasmuch as he is + placed outside the connatural apprehension of his sense and reason, when he is raised up + so as to comprehend things that surpass sense and reason: or it may be due to his being cast down into a state of debasement; + thus a man may be said to suffer ecstasy, when he is overcome by violent passion or madness. As to the appetitive power, a + man is said to suffer ecstasy, when that power is borne towards something else, so that it goes forth out from itself, as + it were. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q28_A3-p7"> The first of these ecstasies is caused by love dispositively in so far, namely, as love makes the lover dwell on the beloved, + as stated above + <a id="FS_Q28_A3-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q28_A2.html">(A[2])</a>, and to dwell intently on one thing draws the mind from other things. The second ecstasy is caused by love directly; by love + of friendship, simply; by love of concupiscence not simply but in a restricted sense. Because in love of concupiscence, the + lover is carried out of himself, in a certain sense; in so + far, namely, as not being satisfied with enjoying the good that he has, he seeks to enjoy something outside himself. But since + he seeks to have this extrinsic good for himself, he does not go out from himself simply, and this movement remains finally + within him. On the other hand, in the love of friendship, a man's affection goes out from itself simply; because he wishes + and does good to his friend, by caring and providing for him, for his sake. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q28_A3-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This argument is true of the first kind of ecstasy. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q28_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> This argument applies to love of concupiscence, which, as stated above, does not cause ecstasy simply. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q28_A3-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> He who loves, goes out from himself, in so far as he wills the good of his friend and works for it. Yet he does not will + the good of his friend more than his own good: and so it does not follow that he loves another more than himself. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q28_A3-p11"></p> + <p id="FS_Q28_A3-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q28_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q28_A4.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q28_A4" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q28_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q28_A5.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q28_A4-p0.1">Whether zeal is an effect of love?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q28_A4-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q28_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that zeal is not an effect of love. For zeal is a beginning of contention; wherefore it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q28_A4-p2.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.3.3" target="asv">1 Cor. 3:3</a>): "Whereas there is among you zeal [Douay: 'envying'] and contention," etc. But contention is incompatible with love. Therefore + zeal is not an effect of love. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q28_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the object of love is the good, which communicates itself to others. But zeal is opposed to communication; since + it seems an effect of zeal, that a man refuses to share the object of his love with another: thus husbands are said to be + jealous of [zelare] their wives, because they will not share them with others. Therefore zeal is not an effect of love. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q28_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, there is no zeal without hatred, as neither is there without love: for it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q28_A4-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.72.3" target="asv">Ps. 72:3</a>): "I had a zeal on occasion of the wicked." Therefore it should not be set down as an effect of love any more than of hatred. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q28_A4-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv): "God is said to be a zealot, on account of his great love for all things." + </p> + <p id="FS_Q28_A4-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Zeal, whatever way we take it, arises from the intensity of love. For it is evident that the more intensely a power tends + to anything, the more vigorously it withstands opposition or resistance. Since therefore love is "a movement towards the object + loved," as Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 35), an intense love seeks to remove everything that opposes it. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q28_A4-p7"> But this happens in different ways according to love of concupiscence, and love of friendship. For in love of concupiscence + he who desires something intensely, is moved against all that hinders his gaining or quietly enjoying the object of his love. + It is thus that husbands are said to be jealous of their wives, lest association with others prove a hindrance to their exclusive + individual rights. In like manner those who seek to excel, are moved against those who seem to excel, + as though these were a hindrance to their excelling. And this is the zeal of envy, of which it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q28_A4-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.36.1" target="asv">Ps. 36:1</a>): "Be not emulous of evil doers, nor envy [zelaveris] them that work iniquity." + </p> + <p id="FS_Q28_A4-p8"> On the other hand, love of friendship seeks the friend's good: wherefore, when it is intense, it causes a man to be moved + against everything that opposes the friend's good. In this respect, a man is said to be zealous on behalf of his friend, when + he makes a point of repelling whatever may be said or done against the friend's good. In this way, too, a man is said to be + zealous on God's behalf, when he endeavors, to the best of his means, to repel whatever is contrary to the + honor or will of God; according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q28_A4-p8.1" href="./asv.html#." target="asv">3 Kings 19:14</a>: "With zeal I have been zealous for the Lord of hosts." Again on the words of + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q28_A4-p8.2" href="./asv.html#John.2.17" target="asv"> Jn. 2:17</a>: "The zeal of Thy house hath eaten me up," a gloss says that "a man is eaten up with a good zeal, who strives to remedy whatever + evil he perceives; and if he cannot, bears with it and laments it." + </p> + <p id="FS_Q28_A4-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The Apostle is speaking in this passage of the zeal of envy; which is indeed the cause of contention, not against the object + of love, but for it, and against that which is opposed to it. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q28_A4-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Good is loved inasmuch as it can be communicated to the lover. Consequently whatever hinders the perfection of this communication, + becomes hateful. Thus zeal arises from love of good. But through defect of goodness, it happens that certain small goods cannot, + in their entirety, be possessed by many at the same time: and from the love of such things arises the zeal of envy. But it + does not arise, properly speaking, in the case of those things which, in + their entirety, can be possessed by many: for no one envies another the knowledge of truth, which can be known entirely by + many; except perhaps one may envy another his superiority in the knowledge of it. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q28_A4-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The very fact that a man hates whatever is opposed to the object of his love, is the effect of love. Hence zeal is set down + as an effect of love rather than of hatred. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q28_A4-p12"></p> + <p id="FS_Q28_A4-p13"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q28_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q28_A5.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q28_A5" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q28_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q28_A6.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q28_A5-p0.1">Whether love is a passion that wounds the lover?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q28_A5-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q28_A5-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that love wounds the lover. For languor denotes a hurt in the one that languishes. But love causes languor: + for it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q28_A5-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Song.2.5" target="asv">Cant 2:5</a>): "Stay me up with flowers, compass me about with apples; because I languish with love." Therefore love is a wounding passion. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q28_A5-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, melting is a kind of dissolution. But love melts that in which it is: for it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q28_A5-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Song.5.6" target="asv">Cant 5:6</a>): "My soul melted when my beloved spoke." Therefore love is a dissolvent: therefore it is a corruptive and a wounding passion. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q28_A5-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, fervor denotes a certain excess of heat; which excess has a corruptive effect. But love causes fervor: for Dionysius + (Coel. Hier. vii) in reckoning the properties belonging to the Seraphim's love, includes "hot" and "piercing" and "most fervent." + Moreover it is said of love ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q28_A5-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Song.8.6" target="asv">Cant 8:6</a>) that "its lamps are fire and flames." Therefore love is a wounding and corruptive passion. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q28_A5-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that "everything loves itself with a love that holds it together," i.e. that preserves it. + Therefore love is not a wounding passion, but rather one that preserves and perfects. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q28_A5-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above ( + <a id="FS_Q28_A5-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q26_A1.html">Q[26], AA[1]</a>,2; + <a id="FS_Q28_A5-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q27_A1.html"> Q[27], A[1]</a>), love denotes a certain adapting of the appetitive power to some good. Now nothing is hurt by being adapted to that which + is suitable to it; rather, if possible, it is perfected and bettered. But if a thing be adapted to that which is not suitable + to it, it is hurt and made worse thereby. Consequently love of a suitable good perfects and betters the lover; but + love of a good which is unsuitable to the lover, wounds and worsens him. Wherefore man is perfected and bettered chiefly by + the love of God: but is wounded and worsened by the love of sin, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q28_A5-p6.3" href="./asv.html#Hos.9.10" target="asv"> Osee 9:10</a>: "They became abominable, as those things which they loved." + </p> + <p id="FS_Q28_A5-p7"> And let this be understood as applying to love in respect of its formal element, i.e. in regard to the appetite. But in respect + of the material element in the passion of love, i.e. a certain bodily change, it happens that love is hurtful, by reason of + this change being excessive: just as it happens in the senses, and in every act of a power of the soul that is exercised through + the change of some bodily organ. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q28_A5-p8"> In reply to the objections, it is to be observed that four proximate effects may be ascribed to love: viz. melting, enjoyment, + languor, and fervor. Of these the first is "melting," which is opposed to freezing. For things that are frozen, are closely + bound together, so as to be hard to pierce. But it belongs to love that the appetite is fitted to receive the good which is + loved, inasmuch as the object loved is in the lover, as stated above + <a id="FS_Q28_A5-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q28_A2.html">(A[2])</a>. + Consequently the freezing or hardening of the heart is a disposition incompatible with love: while melting denotes a softening + of the heart, whereby the heart shows itself to be ready for the entrance of the beloved. If, then, the beloved is present + and possessed, pleasure or enjoyment ensues. But if the beloved be absent, two passions arise; viz. sadness at its absence, + which is denoted by "languor" (hence Cicero in De Tusc. Quaest. iii, 11 applies the term "ailment" chiefly to sadness); and + an intense desire to possess the beloved, which is signified by "fervor." And these are the effects of love considered formally, + according to the relation of the appetitive power to its object. But in the passion of love, other effects ensue, proportionate + to the above, in respect of a change in the organ. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q28_A5-p9"></p> + <p id="FS_Q28_A5-p10"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q28_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q28_A6.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q28_A6" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q28_A5.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q29.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q28_A6-p0.1">Whether love is cause of all that the lover does?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q28_A6-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q28_A6-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the lover does not do everything from love. For love is a passion, as stated above ( + <a id="FS_Q28_A6-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q26_A2.html">Q[26], A[2]</a>). But man does not do everything from passion: but some things he does from choice, and some things from ignorance, as stated + in Ethic. v, 8. Therefore not everything that a man does, is done from love. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q28_A6-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the appetite is a principle of movement and action in all animals, as stated in De Anima iii, 10. If, therefore, + whatever a man does is done from love, the other passions of the appetitive faculty are superfluous. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q28_A6-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, nothing is produced at one and the same time by contrary causes. But some things are done from hatred. Therefore + all things are not done from love. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q28_A6-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that "all things, whatever they do, they do for the love of good." + </p> + <p id="FS_Q28_A6-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Every agent acts for an end, as stated above ( + <a id="FS_Q28_A6-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q1_A2.html">Q[1], A[2]</a> ). Now the end is the good desired and loved by each one. Wherefore it is evident that every agent, whatever it be, does + every action from love of some kind. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q28_A6-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This objection takes love as a passion existing in the sensitive appetite. But here we are speaking of love in a general + sense, inasmuch as it includes intellectual, rational, animal, and natural love: for it is in this sense that Dionysius speaks + of love in chapter iv of De Divinis Nominibus. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q28_A6-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As stated above + <a id="FS_Q28_A6-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q28_A5.html">(A[5];</a> Q[27], A[4]) desire, sadness and pleasure, and consequently all the other passions of the soul, result from love. Wherefore + every act proceeds from any passion, proceeds also from love as from a first cause: and so the other passions, which are proximate + causes, are not superfluous. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q28_A6-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Hatred also is a result of love, as we shall state further on ( + <a id="FS_Q28_A6-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q29_A2.html">Q[29], A[2]</a>). + </p> + <p id="FS_Q28_A6-p10"></p> + <p id="FS_Q28_A6-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q28_A5.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q29.html"></a> + </div> + <a href="summa.FS_Q27_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q28_A1.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q29" class="div3"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q28_A6.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q29_A1.html"></a> + <h3 id="FS_Q29-p0.1">OF HATRED (SIX ARTICLES)</h3> + <p id="FS_Q29-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q29-p2"> We must now consider hatred: concerning which there are six points of inquiry:</p> + <p id="FS_Q29-p3"> (1) Whether evil is the cause and the object of hatred?</p> + <p id="FS_Q29-p4"> (2) Whether love is the cause of hatred?</p> + <p id="FS_Q29-p5"> (3) Whether hatred is stronger than love?</p> + <p id="FS_Q29-p6"> (4) Whether a man can hate himself?</p> + <p id="FS_Q29-p7"> (5) Whether a man can hate the truth?</p> + <p id="FS_Q29-p8"> (6) Whether a thing can be the object of universal hatred?</p> + <div id="FS_Q29_A1" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q29.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q29_A2.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q29_A1-p0.1">Whether evil is the cause and object of hatred?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q29_A1-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q29_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that evil is not the object and cause of hatred. For everything that exists, as such, is good. If therefore + evil be the object of hatred, it follows that nothing but the lack of something can be the object of hatred: which is clearly + untrue. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q29_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, hatred of evil is praise-worthy; hence ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q29_A1-p3.1" href="./asv.html#iiMacc.3.1" target="asv">2 Macc 3:1</a>) some are praised for that "the laws were very well kept, because of the godliness of Onias the high-priest, and the hatred + of their souls [Douay: 'his soul'] had no evil." If, therefore, nothing but evil be the object of hatred, it would follow + that all hatred is commendable: and this is clearly false. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q29_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the same thing is not at the same time both good and evil. But the same thing is lovable and hateful to different + subjects. Therefore hatred is not only of evil, but also of good. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q29_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Hatred is the opposite of love. But the object of love is good, as stated above ( + <a id="FS_Q29_A1-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q26_A1.html">Q[26], A[1]</a>; + <a id="FS_Q29_A1-p5.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q27_A1.html"> Q[27], A[1]</a>). Therefore the object of hatred is evil. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q29_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Since the natural appetite is the result of apprehension (though this apprehension is not in the same subject as the natural + appetite), it seems that what applies to the inclination of the natural appetite, applies also to the animal appetite, which + does result from an apprehension in the same subject, as stated above ( + <a id="FS_Q29_A1-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q26_A1.html">Q[26], A[1]</a>). Now, with regard to the natural appetite, it is evident, that just as each thing is naturally attuned + and adapted to that which is suitable to it, wherein consists natural love; so has it a natural dissonance from that which + opposes and destroys it; and this is natural hatred. So, therefore, in the animal appetite, or in the intellectual appetite, + love is a certain harmony of the appetite with that which is apprehended as suitable; while hatred is dissonance of the appetite + from that which is apprehended as repugnant and hurtful. Now, just as whatever is suitable, as such, bears the aspect of + good; so whatever is repugnant, as such, bears the aspect of evil. And therefore, just as good is the object of love, so evil + is the object of hatred. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q29_A1-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Being, as such, has not the aspect of repugnance but only of fittingness; because being is common to all things. But being, + inasmuch as it is this determinate being, has an aspect of repugnance to some determinate being. And in this way, one being + is hateful to another, and is evil; though not in itself, but by comparison with something else. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q29_A1-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Just as a thing may be apprehended as good, when it is not truly good; so a thing may be apprehended as evil, whereas it + is not truly evil. Hence it happens sometimes that neither hatred of evil nor love of good is good. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q29_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> To different things the same thing may be lovable or hateful: in respect of the natural appetite, owing to one and the same + thing being naturally suitable to one thing, and naturally unsuitable to another: thus heat is becoming to fire and unbecoming + to water: and in respect of the animal appetite, owing to one and the same thing being apprehended by one as good, by another + as bad. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q29_A1-p10"></p> + <p id="FS_Q29_A1-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q29.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q29_A2.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q29_A2" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q29_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q29_A3.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q29_A2-p0.1">Whether love is a cause of hatred?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q29_A2-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q29_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that love is not a cause of hatred. For "the opposite members of a division are naturally simultaneous" (Praedic. + x). But love and hatred are opposite members of a division, since they are contrary to one another. Therefore they are naturally + simultaneous. Therefore love is not the cause of hatred. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q29_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, of two contraries, one is not the cause of the other. But love and hatred are contraries. Therefore love is not + the cause of hatred. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q29_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, that which follows is not the cause of that which precedes. But hatred precedes love, seemingly: since hatred implies + a turning away from evil, whereas love implies a turning towards good. Therefore love is not the cause of hatred. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q29_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 7,9) that all emotions are caused by love. Therefore hatred also, since it is an emotion + of the soul, is caused by love. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q29_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above + <a id="FS_Q29_A2-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q29_A1.html">(A[1])</a>, love consists in a certain agreement of the lover with the object loved, while hatred consists in a certain disagreement + or dissonance. Now we should consider in each thing, what agrees with it, before that which disagrees: since a thing disagrees + with another, through destroying or hindering that which agrees with it. Consequently love must needs precede hatred; and + nothing is hated, save through being + contrary to a suitable thing which is loved. And hence it is that every hatred is caused by love. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q29_A2-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The opposite members of a division are sometimes naturally simultaneous, both really and logically; e.g. two species of animal, + or two species of color. Sometimes they are simultaneous logically, while, in reality, one precedes, and causes the other; + e.g. the species of numbers, figures and movements. Sometimes they are not simultaneous either really or logically; e.g. substance + and accident; for substance is in reality the cause of accident; and + being is predicated of substance before it is predicated of accident, by a priority of reason, because it is not predicated + of accident except inasmuch as the latter is in substance. Now love and hatred are naturally simultaneous, logically but not + really. Wherefore nothing hinders love from being the cause of hatred. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q29_A2-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Love and hatred are contraries if considered in respect of the same thing. But if taken in respect of contraries, they are + not themselves contrary, but consequent to one another: for it amounts to the same that one love a certain thing, or that + one hate its contrary. Thus love of one thing is the cause of one's hating its contrary. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q29_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> In the order of execution, the turning away from one term precedes the turning towards the other. But the reverse is the + case in the order of intention: since approach to one term is the reason for turning away from the other. Now the appetitive + movement belongs rather to the order of intention than to that of execution. Wherefore love precedes hatred: because each + is an appetitive movement. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q29_A2-p10"></p> + <p id="FS_Q29_A2-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q29_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q29_A3.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q29_A3" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q29_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q29_A4.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q29_A3-p0.1">Whether hatred is stronger than love?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q29_A3-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q29_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that hatred is stronger than love. For Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 36): "There is no one who does not flee + from pain, more than he desires pleasure." But flight from pain pertains to hatred; while desire for pleasure belongs to love. + Therefore hatred is stronger than love. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q29_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the weaker is overcome by the stronger. But love is overcome by hatred: when, that is to say, love is turned into + hatred. Therefore hatred is stronger than love. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q29_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the emotions of the soul are shown by their effects. But man insists more on repelling what is hateful, than on + seeking what is pleasant: thus also irrational animals refrain from pleasure for fear of the whip, as Augustine instances + (QQ. 83, qu. 36). Therefore hatred is stronger than love. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q29_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Good is stronger than evil; because "evil does nothing except in virtue of good," as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv). But hatred + and love differ according to the difference of good and evil. Therefore love is stronger than hatred. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q29_A3-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> It is impossible for an effect to be stronger than its cause. Now every hatred arises from some love as its cause, as above + stated + <a id="FS_Q29_A3-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q29_A2.html">(A[2])</a>. Therefore it is impossible for hatred to be stronger than love absolutely. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q29_A3-p7"> But furthermore, love must needs be, absolutely speaking, stronger than hatred. Because a thing is moved to the end more + strongly than to the means. Now turning away from evil is directed as a means to the gaining of good. Wherefore, absolutely + speaking, the soul's movement in respect of good is stronger than its movement in respect of evil. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q29_A3-p8"> Nevertheless hatred sometimes seems to be stronger than love, for two reasons. First, because hatred is more keenly felt + than love. For, since the sensitive perception is accompanied by a certain impression; when once the impression has been received + it is not felt so keenly as in the moment of receiving it. Hence the heat of a hectic fever, though greater, is nevertheless + not felt so much as the heat of tertian fever; because the heat of the hectic fever is habitual and like a + second nature. For this reason, love is felt more keenly in the absence of the object loved; thus Augustine says (De Trin. + x, 12) that "love is felt more keenly when we lack what we love." And for the same reason, the unbecomingness of that which + is hated is felt more keenly than the becomingness of that which is loved. Secondly, because comparison is made between a + hatred and a love which are not mutually corresponding. Because, according to different degrees of good there are different + degrees of love to which correspond different degrees of hatred. Wherefore a hatred that corresponds to a greater love, moves + us more than a lesser love. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q29_A3-p9"> Hence it is clear how to reply to the First Objection. For the love of pleasure is less than the love of self-preservation, + to which corresponds flight from pain. Wherefore we flee from pain more than we love pleasure. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q29_A3-p10"></p> + <p id="FS_Q29_A3-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q29_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q29_A4.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q29_A4" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q29_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q29_A5.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q29_A4-p0.1">Whether a man can hate himself?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q29_A4-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q29_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that a man can hate himself. For it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q29_A4-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.10.6" target="asv">Ps. 10:6</a>): "He that loveth iniquity, hateth his own soul." But many love iniquity. Therefore many hate themselves. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q29_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, him we hate, to whom we wish and work evil. But sometimes a man wishes and works evil to himself, e.g. a man who + kills himself. Therefore some men hate themselves. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q29_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Boethius says (De Consol. ii) that "avarice makes a man hateful"; whence we may conclude that everyone hates a miser. + But some men are misers. Therefore they hate themselves. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q29_A4-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q29_A4-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Eph.5.29" target="asv">Eph. 5:29</a>) that "no man ever hated his own flesh." + </p> + <p id="FS_Q29_A4-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Properly speaking, it is impossible for a man to hate himself. For everything naturally desires good, nor can anyone desire + anything for himself, save under the aspect of good: for "evil is outside the scope of the will," as Dionysius says (Div. + Nom. iv). Now to love a man is to will good to him, as stated above ( + <a id="FS_Q29_A4-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q26_A4.html">Q[26], A[4]</a>). Consequently, a man must, of necessity, love himself; and it is impossible for a man to hate himself, + properly speaking. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q29_A4-p7"> But accidentally it happens that a man hates himself: and this in two ways. First, on the part of the good which a man wills + to himself. For it happens sometimes that what is desired as good in some particular respect, is simply evil; and in this + way, a man accidentally wills evil to himself; and thus hates himself. Secondly, in regard to himself, to whom he wills good. + For each thing is that which is predominant in it; wherefore the state is said to do what the king does, as if + the king were the whole state. Now it is clear that man is principally the mind of man. And it happens that some men account + themselves as being principally that which they are in their material and sensitive nature. Wherefore they love themselves + according to what they take themselves to be, while they hate that which they really are, by desiring what is contrary to + reason. And in both these ways, "he that loveth iniquity hateth" not only "his own soul," but also himself. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q29_A4-p8"> Wherefore the reply to the First Objection is evident.</p> + <p id="FS_Q29_A4-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> No man wills and works evil to himself, except he apprehend it under the aspect of good. For even they who kill themselves, + apprehend death itself as a good, considered as putting an end to some unhappiness or pain. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q29_A4-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The miser hates something accidental to himself, but not for that reason does he hate himself: thus a sick man hates his + sickness for the very reason that he loves himself. Or we may say that avarice makes man hateful to others, but not to himself. + In fact, it is caused by inordinate self-love, in respect of which, man desires temporal goods for himself more than he should. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q29_A4-p11"></p> + <p id="FS_Q29_A4-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q29_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q29_A5.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q29_A5" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q29_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q29_A6.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q29_A5-p0.1">Whether a man can hate the truth?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q29_A5-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q29_A5-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that a man cannot hate the truth. For good, true, and being are convertible. But a man cannot hate good. Neither, + therefore, can he hate the truth. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q29_A5-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, "All men have a natural desire for knowledge," as stated in the beginning of the Metaphysics i, 1. But knowledge + is only of truth. Therefore truth is naturally desired and loved. But that which is in a thing naturally, is always in it. + Therefore no man can hate the truth. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q29_A5-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 4) that "men love those who are straightforward." But there can be no other motive + for this save truth. Therefore man loves the truth naturally. Therefore he cannot hate it. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q29_A5-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q29_A5-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Gal.4.16" target="asv">Gal. 4:16</a>): "Am I become your enemy because I tell you the truth?" [*St. Thomas quotes the passage, probably from memory, as though + it were an assertion: "I am become," etc.] + </p> + <p id="FS_Q29_A5-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Good, true and being are the same in reality, but differ as considered by reason. For good is considered in the light of + something desirable, while being and true are not so considered: because good is "what all things seek." Wherefore good, as + such, cannot be the object of hatred, neither in general nor in particular. Being and truth in general cannot be the object + of hatred: because disagreement is the cause of hatred, and agreement is the cause of love; + while being and truth are common to all things. But nothing hinders some particular being or some particular truth being an + object of hatred, in so far as it is considered as hurtful and repugnant; since hurtfulness and repugnance are not incompatible + with the notion of being and truth, as they are with the notion of good. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q29_A5-p7"> Now it may happen in three ways that some particular truth is repugnant or hurtful to the good we love. First, according + as truth is in things as in its cause and origin. And thus man sometimes hates a particular truth, when he wishes that what + is true were not true. Secondly, according as truth is in man's knowledge, which hinders him from gaining the object loved: + such is the case of those who wish not to know the truth of faith, that they may sin freely; in whose person it is + said ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q29_A5-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Job.21.14" target="asv">Job 21:14</a>): "We desire not the knowledge of Thy ways." Thirdly, a particular truth is hated, as being repugnant, inasmuch as it is + in the intellect of another man: as, for instance, when a man wishes to remain hidden in his sin, he hates that anyone should + know the truth about his sin. In this respect, Augustine says (Confess. x, 23) that men "love truth when it enlightens, they + hate it when it reproves." This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q29_A5-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The knowledge of truth is lovable in itself: hence Augustine says that men love it when it enlightens. But accidentally, + the knowledge of truth may become hateful, in so far as it hinders one from accomplishing one's desire. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q29_A5-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The reason why we love those who are straightforward is that they make known the truth, and the knowledge of the truth, considered + in itself, is a desirable thing. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q29_A5-p10"></p> + <p id="FS_Q29_A5-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q29_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q29_A6.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q29_A6" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q29_A5.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q30.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q29_A6-p0.1">Whether anything can be an object of universal hatred?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q29_A6-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q29_A6-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that a thing cannot be an object of universal hatred. Because hatred is a passion of the sensitive appetite, + which is moved by an apprehension in the senses. But the senses cannot apprehend the universal. Therefore a thing cannot be + an object of universal hatred. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q29_A6-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, hatred is caused by disagreement; and where there is disagreement, there is nothing in common. But the notion of + universality implies something in common. Therefore nothing can be the object of universal hatred. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q29_A6-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the object of hatred is evil. But "evil is in things, and not in the mind" (Metaph. vi, 4). Since therefore the + universal is in the mind only, which abstracts the universal from the particular, it would seem that hatred cannot have a + universal object. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q29_A6-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 4) that "anger is directed to something singular, whereas hatred is also directed to a thing + in general; for everybody hates the thief and the backbiter." + </p> + <p id="FS_Q29_A6-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> There are two ways of speaking of the universal: first, as considered under the aspect of universality; secondly, as considered + in the nature to which it is ascribed: for it is one thing to consider the universal man, and another to consider a man as + man. If, therefore, we take the universal, in the first way, no sensitive power, whether of apprehension or of appetite, can + attain the universal: because the universal is obtained by abstraction from individual + matter, on which every sensitive power is based. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q29_A6-p7"> Nevertheless the sensitive powers, both of apprehension and of appetite, can tend to something universally. Thus we say that + the object of sight is color considered generically; not that the sight is cognizant of universal color, but because the fact + that color is cognizant by the sight, is attributed to color, not as being this particular color, but simply because it is + color. Accordingly hatred in the sensitive faculty can regard something universally: because this thing, by + reason of its common nature, and not merely as an individual, is hostile to the animal---for instance, a wolf in regard to + a sheep. Hence a sheep hates the wolf universally. On the other hand, anger is always caused by something in particular: because + it is caused by some action of the one that hurts us; and actions proceed from individuals. For this reason the Philosopher + says (Rhet. ii, 4) that "anger is always directed to something singular, whereas hatred can be directed to a thing in + general." + </p> + <p id="FS_Q29_A6-p8"> But according as hatred is in the intellectual part, since it arises from the universal apprehension of the intellect, it + can regard the universal in both ways. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q29_A6-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The senses do not apprehend the universal, as such: but they apprehend something to which the character of universality is + given by abstraction. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q29_A6-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> That which is common to all cannot be a reason of hatred. But nothing hinders a thing from being common to many, and at variance + with others, so as to be hateful to them. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q29_A6-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This argument considers the universal under the aspect of universality: and thus it does not come under the sensitive apprehension + or appetite. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q29_A6-p12"></p> + <p id="FS_Q29_A6-p13"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q29_A5.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q30.html"></a> + </div> + <a href="summa.FS_Q28_A6.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q29_A1.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q30" class="div3"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q29_A6.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q30_A1.html"></a> + <h3 id="FS_Q30-p0.1">OF CONCUPISCENCE (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3> + <p id="FS_Q30-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q30-p2"> We have now to consider concupiscence: under which head there are four points of inquiry:</p> + <p id="FS_Q30-p3"> (1) Whether concupiscence is in the sensitive appetite only?</p> + <p id="FS_Q30-p4"> (2) Whether concupiscence is a specific passion?</p> + <p id="FS_Q30-p5"> (3) Whether some concupiscences are natural, and some not natural?</p> + <p id="FS_Q30-p6"> (4) Whether concupiscence is infinite?</p> + <div id="FS_Q30_A1" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q30.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q30_A2.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q30_A1-p0.1">Whether concupiscence is in the sensitive appetite only?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q30_A1-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q30_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that concupiscence is not only in the sensitive appetite. For there is a concupiscence of wisdom, according + to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q30_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.6.21" target="asv"> Wis. 6:21</a>: "The concupiscence [Douay: 'desire'] of wisdom bringeth to the everlasting kingdom." But the sensitive appetite can have + no tendency to wisdom. Therefore concupiscence is not only in the sensitive appetite. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q30_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the desire for the commandments of God is not in the sensitive appetite: in fact the Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q30_A1-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.7.18" target="asv">Rom. 7:18</a>): "There dwelleth not in me, that is to say, in my flesh, that which is good." But desire for God's commandments is an act + of concupiscence, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q30_A1-p3.2" href="./asv.html#Ps.118.20" target="asv"> Ps. 118:20</a>: "My soul hath coveted [concupivit] to long for thy justifications." Therefore concupiscence is not only in the sensitive + appetite. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q30_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, to each power, its proper good is a matter of concupiscence. Therefore concupiscence is in each power of the soul, + and not only in the sensitive appetite. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q30_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 12) that "the irrational part which is subject and amenable to reason, is divided into + the faculties of concupiscence and anger. This is the irrational part of the soul, passive and appetitive." Therefore concupiscence + is in the sensitive appetite. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q30_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As the Philosopher says (Rhet. i, 11), "concupiscence is a craving for that which is pleasant." Now pleasure is twofold, + as we shall state later on ( + <a id="FS_Q30_A1-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q31_A3.html">Q[31], AA[3]</a>,4): one is in the intelligible good, which is the good of reason; the other is in good perceptible to the senses. The former + pleasure seems to belong to soul alone: whereas the latter belongs to both soul and body: because the sense is a power seated + in a bodily organ: + wherefore sensible good is the good of the whole composite. Now concupiscence seems to be the craving for this latter pleasure, + since it belongs to the united soul and body, as is implied by the Latin word "concupiscentia." Therefore, properly speaking, + concupiscence is in the sensitive appetite, and in the concupiscible faculty, which takes its name from it. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q30_A1-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The craving for wisdom, or other spiritual goods, is sometimes called concupiscence; either by reason of a certain likeness; + or on account of the craving in the higher part of the soul being so vehement that it overflows into the lower appetite, so + that the latter also, in its own way, tends to the spiritual good, following the lead of the higher appetite, the result being + that the body itself renders its service in spiritual matters, according + to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q30_A1-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.83.3" target="asv"> Ps. 83:3</a>: "My heart and my flesh have rejoiced in the living God." + </p> + <p id="FS_Q30_A1-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Properly speaking, desire may be not only in the lower, but also in the higher appetite. For it does not imply fellowship + in craving, as concupiscence does; but simply movement towards the thing desired. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q30_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> It belongs to each power of the soul to seek its proper good by the natural appetite, which does not arise from apprehension. + But the craving for good, by the animal appetite, which arises from apprehension, belongs to the appetitive power alone. And + to crave a thing under the aspect of something delightful to the senses, wherein concupiscence properly consists, belongs + to the concupiscible power. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q30_A1-p10"></p> + <p id="FS_Q30_A1-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q30.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q30_A2.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q30_A2" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q30_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q30_A3.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q30_A2-p0.1">Whether concupiscence is a specific passion?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q30_A2-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q30_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that concupiscence is not a specific passion of the concupiscible power. For passions are distinguished by + their objects. But the object of the concupiscible power is something delightful to the senses; and this is also the object + of concupiscence, as the Philosopher declares (Rhet. i, 11). Therefore concupiscence is not a specific passion of the concupiscible + faculty. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q30_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 33) that "covetousness is the love of transitory things": so that it is not distinct + from love. But all specific passions are distinct from one another. Therefore concupiscence is not a specific passion in the + concupiscible faculty. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q30_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, to each passion of the concupiscible faculty there is a specific contrary passion in that faculty, as stated above + ( + <a id="FS_Q30_A2-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q23_A4.html">Q[23], A[4]</a>). But no specific passion of the concupiscible faculty is contrary to concupiscence. For Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, + 12) that "good when desired gives rise to concupiscence; when present, it gives joy: in like manner, the evil we apprehend + makes us fear, the evil that is present makes us sad": + from which we gather that as sadness is contrary to joy, so is fear contrary to concupiscence. But fear is not in the concupiscible, + but in the irascible part. Therefore concupiscence is not a specific passion of the concupiscible faculty. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q30_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Concupiscence is caused by love, and tends to pleasure, both of which are passions of the concupiscible faculty. Hence it + is distinguished from the other concupiscible passions, as a specific passion. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q30_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above + <a id="FS_Q30_A2-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q30_A1.html">(A[1];</a> Q[23], A[1]), the good which gives pleasure to the senses is the common object of the concupiscible faculty. Hence the various + concupiscible passions are distinguished according to the differences of that good. Now the diversity of this object can arise + from the very nature of the object, or from a diversity in its active power. The diversity, derived from the nature of the + active object, causes a material + difference of passions: while the difference in regard to its active power causes a formal diversity of passions, in respect + of which the passions differ specifically. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q30_A2-p7"> Now the nature of the motive power of the end or of the good, differs according as it is really present, or absent: because, + according as it is present, it causes the faculty to find rest in it; whereas, according as it is absent, it causes the faculty + to be moved towards it. Wherefore the object of sensible pleasure causes love, inasmuch as, so to speak, it attunes and conforms + the appetite to itself; it causes concupiscence, inasmuch as, when absent, it draws the faculty to + itself; and it causes pleasure, inasmuch as, when present, it makes the faculty to find rest in itself. Accordingly, concupiscence + is a passion differing "in species" from both love and pleasure. But concupiscences of this or that pleasurable object differ + "in number." + </p> + <p id="FS_Q30_A2-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Pleasurable good is the object of concupiscence, not absolutely, but considered as absent: just as the sensible, considered + as past, is the object of memory. For these particular conditions diversify the species of passions, and even of the powers + of the sensitive part, which regards particular things. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q30_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> In the passage quoted we have causal, not essential predication: for covetousness is not essentially love, but an effect + of love. We may also say that Augustine is taking covetousness in a wide sense, for any movement of the appetite in respect + of good to come: so that it includes both love and hope. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q30_A2-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The passion which is directly contrary to concupiscence has no name, and stands in relation to evil, as concupiscence in + regard to good. But since, like fear, it regards the absent evil; sometimes it goes by the name of fear, just as hope is sometimes + called covetousness. For a small good or evil is reckoned as though it were nothing: and consequently every movement of the + appetite in future good or evil is called hope or fear, which regard good and + evil as arduous. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q30_A2-p11"></p> + <p id="FS_Q30_A2-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q30_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q30_A3.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q30_A3" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q30_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q30_A4.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q30_A3-p0.1">Whether some concupiscences are natural, and some not natural?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q30_A3-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q30_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that concupiscences are not divided into those which are natural and those which are not. For concupiscence + belongs to the animal appetite, as stated above (A[1], ad 3). But the natural appetite is contrasted with the animal appetite. + Therefore no concupiscence is natural. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q30_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, material differences makes no difference of species, but only numerical difference; a difference which is outside + the purview of science. But if some concupiscences are natural, and some not, they differ only in respect of their objects; + which amounts to a material difference, which is one of number only. Therefore concupiscences should not be divided into those + that are natural and those that are not. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q30_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, reason is contrasted with nature, as stated in Phys. ii, 5. If therefore in man there is a concupiscence which is + not natural, it must needs be rational. But this is impossible: because, since concupiscence is a passion, it belongs to the + sensitive appetite, and not to the will, which is the rational appetite. Therefore there are no concupiscences which are not + natural. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q30_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 11 and Rhetor. i, 11) distinguishes natural concupiscences from those that are not natural. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q30_A3-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above + <a id="FS_Q30_A3-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q30_A1.html">(A[1])</a>, concupiscence is the craving for pleasurable good. Now a thing is pleasurable in two ways. First, because it is suitable + to the nature of the animal; for example, food, drink, and the like: and concupiscence of such pleasurable things is said + to be natural. Secondly, a thing is pleasurable because it is apprehended as suitable to the animal: as when one apprehends + something as good and suitable, and + consequently takes pleasure in it: and concupiscence of such pleasurable things is said to be not natural, and is more wont + to be called "cupidity." + </p> + <p id="FS_Q30_A3-p7"> Accordingly concupiscences of the first kind, or natural concupiscences, are common to men and other animals: because to + both is there something suitable and pleasurable according to nature: and in these all men agree; wherefore the Philosopher + (Ethic. iii, 11) calls them "common" and "necessary." But concupiscences of the second kind are proper to men, to whom it + is proper to devise something as good and suitable, beyond that which nature requires. Hence the Philosopher says + (Rhet. i, 11) that the former concupiscences are "irrational," but the latter, "rational." And because different men reason + differently, therefore the latter are also called (Ethic. iii, 11) "peculiar and acquired," i.e. in addition to those that + are natural. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q30_A3-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The same thing that is the object of the natural appetite, may be the object of the animal appetite, once it is apprehended. + And in this way there may be an animal concupiscence of food, drink, and the like, which are objects of the natural appetite. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q30_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The difference between those concupiscences that are natural and those that are not, is not merely a material difference; + it is also, in a way, formal, in so far as it arises from a difference in the active object. Now the object of the appetite + is the apprehended good. Hence diversity of the active object follows from diversity of apprehension: according as a thing + is apprehended as suitable, either by absolute apprehension, whence arise natural + concupiscences, which the Philosopher calls "irrational" (Rhet. i, 11); or by apprehension together with deliberation, whence + arise those concupiscences that are not natural, and which for this very reason the Philosopher calls "rational" (Rhet. i, + 11). + </p> + <p id="FS_Q30_A3-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Man has not only universal reason, pertaining to the intellectual faculty; but also particular reason pertaining to the sensitive + faculty, as stated in the + <a id="FS_Q30_A3-p10.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q78_A4.html">FP, Q[78], A[4]</a>; + <a id="FS_Q30_A3-p10.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q81_A3.html">FP, Q[81], A[3]</a>: so that even rational concupiscence may pertain to the sensitive appetite. Moreover the sensitive appetite can be moved + by the universal reason also, through the medium of the particular imagination. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q30_A3-p11"></p> + <p id="FS_Q30_A3-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q30_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q30_A4.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q30_A4" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q30_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q31.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q30_A4-p0.1">Whether concupiscence is infinite?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q30_A4-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q30_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that concupiscence is not infinite. For the object of concupiscence is good, which has the aspect of an end. + But where there is infinity there is no end (Metaph. ii, 2). Therefore concupiscence cannot be infinite. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q30_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, concupiscence is of the fitting good, since it proceeds from love. But the infinite is without proportion, and therefore + unfitting. Therefore concupiscence cannot be infinite. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q30_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, there is no passing through infinite things: and thus there is no reaching an ultimate term in them. But the subject + of concupiscence is not delighted until he attain the ultimate term. Therefore, if concupiscence were infinite, no delight + would ever ensue. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q30_A4-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Polit. i, 3) that "since concupiscence is infinite, men desire an infinite number of things." + </p> + <p id="FS_Q30_A4-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above + <a id="FS_Q30_A4-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q30_A3.html">(A[3])</a>, concupiscence is twofold; one is natural, the other is not natural. Natural concupiscence cannot be actually infinite: because + it is of that which nature requires; and nature ever tends to something finite and fixed. Hence man never desires infinite + meat, or infinite drink. But just as in nature there is potential successive infinity, so can this kind of concupiscence be + infinite successively; so that, for + instance, after getting food, a man may desire food yet again; and so of anything else that nature requires: because these + bodily goods, when obtained, do not last for ever, but fail. Hence Our Lord said to the woman of Samaria ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q30_A4-p6.2" href="./asv.html#John.4.13" target="asv">Jn. 4:13</a>): "Whosever drinketh of this water, shall thirst again." + </p> + <p id="FS_Q30_A4-p7"> But non-natural concupiscence is altogether infinite. Because, as stated above + <a id="FS_Q30_A4-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q30_A3.html">(A[3])</a>, it follows from the reason, and it belongs to the reason to proceed to infinity. Hence he that desires riches, may desire + to be rich, not up to a certain limit, but to be simply as rich as possible. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q30_A4-p8"> Another reason may be assigned, according to the Philosopher (Polit. i, 3), why a certain concupiscence is finite, and another + infinite. Because concupiscence of the end is always infinite: since the end is desired for its own sake, e.g. health: and + thus greater health is more desired, and so on to infinity; just as, if a white thing of itself dilates the sight, that which + is more white dilates yet more. On the other hand, concupiscence of the means is not infinite, because the + concupiscence of the means is in suitable proportion to the end. Consequently those who place their end in riches have an + infinite concupiscence of riches; whereas those who desire riches, on account of the necessities of life, desire a finite + measure of riches, sufficient for the necessities of life, as the Philosopher says (Polit. i, 3). The same applies to the + concupiscence of any other things. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q30_A4-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Every object of concupiscence is taken as something finite: either because it is finite in reality, as being once actually + desired; or because it is finite as apprehended. For it cannot be apprehended as infinite, since the infinite is that "from + which, however much we may take, there always remains something to be taken" (Phys. iii, 6). + </p> + <p id="FS_Q30_A4-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The reason is possessed of infinite power, in a certain sense, in so far as it can consider a thing infinitely, as appears + in the addition of numbers and lines. Consequently, the infinite, taken in a certain way, is proportionate to reason. In fact + the universal which the reason apprehends, is infinite in a sense, inasmuch as it contains potentially an infinite number + of singulars. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q30_A4-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> In order that a man be delighted, there is no need for him to realize all that he desires: for he delights in the realization + of each object of his concupiscence. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q30_A4-p12"></p> + <p id="FS_Q30_A4-p13"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q30_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q31.html"></a> + </div> + <a href="summa.FS_Q29_A6.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q30_A1.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q31" class="div3"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q30_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q31_A1.html"></a> + <h3 id="FS_Q31-p0.1">OF DELIGHT CONSIDERED IN ITSELF [*Or, Pleasure] (EIGHT ARTICLES)</h3> + <p id="FS_Q31-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q31-p2"> We must now consider delight and sadness. Concerning delight four things must be considered: (1) Delight in itself; (2) The + causes of delight; (3) Its effects; (4) Its goodness and malice. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q31-p3"> Under the first head there are eight points of inquiry:</p> + <p id="FS_Q31-p4"> (1) Whether delight is a passion?</p> + <p id="FS_Q31-p5"> (2) Whether delight is subject to time?</p> + <p id="FS_Q31-p6"> (3) Whether it differs from joy?</p> + <p id="FS_Q31-p7"> (4) Whether it is in the intellectual appetite?</p> + <p id="FS_Q31-p8"> (5) Of the delights of the higher appetite compared with the delight of the lower;</p> + <p id="FS_Q31-p9"> (6) Of sensible delights compared with one another;</p> + <p id="FS_Q31-p10"> (7) Whether any delight is non-natural?</p> + <p id="FS_Q31-p11"> (8) Whether one delight can be contrary to another?</p> + <div id="FS_Q31_A1" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q31.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q31_A2.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q31_A1-p0.1">Whether delight is a passion?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q31_A1-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q31_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that delight is not a passion. For Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 22) distinguishes operation from passion, and + says that "operation is a movement in accord with nature, while passion is a movement contrary to nature." But delight is + an operation, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 12; x, 5). Therefore delight is not a passion. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q31_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, "To be passive is to be moved," as stated in Phys. iii, 3. But delight does not consist in being moved, but in having + been moved; for it arises from good already gained. Therefore delight is not a passion. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q31_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, delight is a kind of a perfection of the one who is delighted; since it "perfects operation," as stated in Ethic. + x, 4,5. But to be perfected does not consist in being passive or in being altered, as stated in Phys. vii, 3 and De Anima + ii, 5. Therefore delight is not a passion. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q31_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine (De Civ. Dei ix, 2; xiv, 5 seqq) reckons delight, joy, or gladness among the other passions of the soul. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q31_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The movements of the sensitive appetite, are properly called passions, as stated above ( + <a id="FS_Q31_A1-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q22_A3.html">Q[22], A[3]</a>). Now every emotion arising from a sensitive apprehension, is a movement of the sensitive appetite: and this must needs be + said of delight, since, according to the Philosopher (Rhet. i, 11) "delight is a certain movement of the soul and a sensible + establishing thereof all at once, in keeping with the nature of the thing." + </p> + <p id="FS_Q31_A1-p7"> In order to understand this, we must observe that just as in natural things some happen to attain to their natural perfections, + so does this happen in animals. And though movement towards perfection does not occur all at once, yet the attainment of natural + perfection does occur all at once. Now there is this difference between animals and other natural things, that when these + latter are established in the state becoming their nature, they do not perceive it, whereas animals do. + And from this perception there arises a certain movement of the soul in the sensitive appetite; which movement is called delight. + Accordingly by saying that delight is "a movement of the soul," we designate its genus. By saying that it is "an establishing + in keeping with the thing's nature," i.e. with that which exists in the thing, we assign the cause of delight, viz. the presence + of a becoming good. By saying that this establishing is "all at once," we mean that this establishing is to be + understood not as in the process of establishment, but as in the fact of complete establishment, in the term of the movement, + as it were: for delight is not a "becoming" as Plato [*Phileb. 32,33] maintained, but a "complete fact," as stated in Ethic. + vii, 12. Lastly, by saying that this establishing is "sensible," we exclude the perfections of insensible things wherein there + is no delight. It is therefore evident that, since delight is a movement of the animal appetite arising from an + apprehension of sense, it is a passion of the soul. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q31_A1-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Connatural operation, which is unhindered, is a second perfection, as stated in De Anima ii, 1: and therefore when a thing + is established in its proper connatural and unhindered operation, delight follows, which consists in a state of completion, + as observed above. Accordingly when we say that delight is an operation, we designate, not its essence, but its cause. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q31_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> A twofold movement is to be observed in an animal: one, according to the intention of the end, and this belongs to the appetite; + the other, according to the execution, and this belongs to the external operation. And so, although in him who has already + gained the good in which he delights, the movement of execution ceases, by which the tends to the end; yet the movement of + the appetitive faculty does not cease, since, just as before it desired that + which it had not, so afterwards does it delight in that which is possesses. For though delight is a certain repose of the + appetite, if we consider the presence of the pleasurable good that satisfies the appetite, nevertheless there remains the + impression made on the appetite by its object, by reason of which delight is a kind of movement. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q31_A1-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Although the name of passion is more appropriate to those passions which have a corruptive and evil tendency, such as bodily + ailments, as also sadness and fear in the soul; yet some passions have a tendency to something good, as stated above ( + <a id="FS_Q31_A1-p10.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q23_A1.html">Q[23], AA[1]</a>,4): and in this sense delight is called a passion. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q31_A1-p11"></p> + <p id="FS_Q31_A1-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q31.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q31_A2.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q31_A2" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q31_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q31_A3.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q31_A2-p0.1">Whether delight is in time?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q31_A2-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q31_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that delight is in time. For "delight is a kind of movement," as the Philosopher says (Rhet. i, 11). But all + movement is in time. Therefore delight is in time. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q31_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, a thing is said to last long and to be morose in respect of time. But some pleasures are called morose. Therefore + pleasure is in time. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q31_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the passions of the soul are of one same genus. But some passions of the soul are in time. Therefore delight is + too. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q31_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Ethic. x, 4) that "no one takes pleasure according to time." + </p> + <p id="FS_Q31_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> A thing may be in time in two ways: first, by itself; secondly, by reason of something else, and accidentally as it were. + For since time is the measure of successive things, those things are of themselves said to be in time, to which succession + or something pertaining to succession is essential: such are movement, repose, speech and such like. On the other hand, those + things are said to be in time, by reason of something else and not of themselves, to which + succession is not essential, but which are subject to something successive. Thus the fact of being a man is not essentially + something successive; since it is not a movement, but the term of a movement or change, viz. of this being begotten: yet, + because human being is subject to changeable causes, in this respect, to be a man is in time. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q31_A2-p7"> Accordingly, we must say that delight, of itself indeed, is not in time: for it regards good already gained, which is, as + it were, the term of the movement. But if this good gained be subject to change, the delight therein will be in time accidentally: + whereas if it be altogether unchangeable, the delight therein will not be in time, either by reason of itself or accidentally. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q31_A2-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As stated in De Anima iii, 7, movement is twofold. One is "the act of something imperfect, i.e. of something existing in + potentiality, as such": this movement is successive and is in time. Another movement is "the act of something perfect, i.e. + of something existing in act," e.g. to understand, to feel, and to will and such like, also to have delight. This movement + is not successive, nor is it of itself in time. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q31_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Delight is said to be long lasting or morose, according as it is accidentally in time. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q31_A2-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Other passions have not for their object a good obtained, as delight has. Wherefore there is more of the movement of the + imperfect in them than in delight. And consequently it belongs more to delight not to be in time. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q31_A2-p11"></p> + <p id="FS_Q31_A2-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q31_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q31_A3.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q31_A3" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q31_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q31_A4.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q31_A3-p0.1">Whether delight differs from joy?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q31_A3-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q31_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that delight is altogether the same as joy. Because the passions of the soul differ according to their objects. + But delight and joy have the same object, namely, a good obtained. Therefore joy is altogether the same as delight. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q31_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, one movement does not end in two terms. But one and the same movement, that of desire, ends in joy and delight. + Therefore delight and joy are altogether the same. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q31_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if joy differs from delight, it seems that there is equal reason for distinguishing gladness, exultation, and cheerfulness + from delight, so that they would all be various passions of the soul. But this seems to be untrue. Therefore joy does not + differ from delight. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q31_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> We do not speak of joy in irrational animals; whereas we do speak of delight in them. Therefore joy is not the same as delight. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q31_A3-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Joy, as Avicenna states (De Anima iv), is a kind of delight. For we must observe that, just as some concupiscences are natural, + and some not natural, but consequent to reason, as stated above ( + <a id="FS_Q31_A3-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q30_A3.html">Q[30], A[3]</a>), so also some delights are natural, and some are not natural but rational. Or, as Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 13) and Gregory + of Nyssa [*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xviii.] put it, "some delights are of the body, some are of the soul"; + which amounts to the same. For we take delight both in those things which we desire naturally, when we get them, and in those + things which we desire as a result of reason. But we do not speak of joy except when delight follows reason; and so we do + not ascribe joy to irrational animals, but only delight. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q31_A3-p7"> Now whatever we desire naturally, can also be the object of reasoned desire and delight, but not vice versa. Consequently + whatever can be the object of delight, can also be the object of joy in rational beings. And yet everything is not always + the object of joy; since sometimes one feels a certain delight in the body, without rejoicing thereat according to reason. + And accordingly delight extends to more things than does joy. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q31_A3-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Since the object of the appetite of the soul is an apprehended good, diversity of apprehension pertains, in a way, to diversity + of the object. And so delights of the soul, which are also called joys, are distinct from bodily delights, which are not called + otherwise than delights: as we have observed above in regard to concupiscences ( + <a id="FS_Q31_A3-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q30_A3.html">Q[30], A[3]</a>, ad 2). + </p> + <p id="FS_Q31_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> A like difference is to be observed in concupiscences also: so that delight corresponds to concupiscence, while joy corresponds + to desire, which seems to pertain more to concupiscence of the soul. Hence there is a difference of repose corresponding to + the difference of movement. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q31_A3-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> These other names pertaining to delight are derived from the effects of delight; for "laetitia" [gladness] is derived from + the "dilation" of the heart, as if one were to say "latitia"; "exultation" is derived from the exterior signs of inward delight, + which appear outwardly in so far as the inward joy breaks forth from its bounds; and "cheerfulness" is so called from certain + special signs and effects of gladness. Yet all these names seem to belong to + joy; for we do not employ them save in speaking of rational beings. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q31_A3-p11"></p> + <p id="FS_Q31_A3-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q31_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q31_A4.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q31_A4" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q31_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q31_A5.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q31_A4-p0.1">Whether delight is in the intellectual appetite?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q31_A4-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q31_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that delight is not in the intellectual appetite. Because the Philosopher says (Rhet. i, 11) that "delight + is a sensible movement." But sensible movement is not in an intellectual power. Therefore delight is not in the intellectual + appetite. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q31_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, delight is a passion. But every passion is in the sensitive appetite. Therefore delight is only in the sensitive + appetite. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q31_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, delight is common to us and to the irrational animals. Therefore it is not elsewhere than in that power which we + have in common with irrational animals. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q31_A4-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q31_A4-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.36.4" target="asv">Ps. 36:4</a>): "Delight in the Lord." But the sensitive appetite cannot reach to God; only the intellectual appetite can. Therefore delight + can be in the intellectual appetite. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q31_A4-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above + <a id="FS_Q31_A4-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q31_A3.html">(A[3])</a>, a certain delight arises from the apprehension of the reason. Now on the reason apprehending something, not only the sensitive + appetite is moved, as regards its application to some particular thing, but also the intellectual appetite, which is called + the will. And accordingly in the intellectual appetite or will there is that delight which is called joy, but not bodily delight. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q31_A4-p7"> However, there is this difference of delight in either power, that delight of the sensitive appetite is accompanied by a + bodily transmutation, whereas delight of the intellectual appetite is nothing but the mere movement of the will. Hence Augustine + says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 6) that "desire and joy are nothing else but a volition of consent to the things we wish." + </p> + <p id="FS_Q31_A4-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> In this definition of the Philosopher, he uses the word "sensible" in its wide acceptation for any kind of perception. For + he says (Ethic. x, 4) that "delight is attendant upon every sense, as it is also upon every act of the intellect and contemplation." + Or we may say that he is defining delight of the sensitive appetite. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q31_A4-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Delight has the character of passion, properly speaking, when accompanied by bodily transmutation. It is not thus in the + intellectual appetite, but according to simple movement: for thus it is also in God and the angels. Hence the Philosopher + says (Ethic. vii, 14) that "God rejoices by one simple act": and Dionysius says at the end of De Coel. Hier., that "the angels + are not susceptible to our passible delight, but rejoice together with God with the + gladness of incorruption." + </p> + <p id="FS_Q31_A4-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> In us there is delight, not only in common with dumb animals, but also in common with angels. Wherefore Dionysius says (De + Coel. Hier.) that "holy men often take part in the angelic delights." Accordingly we have delight, not only in the sensitive + appetite, which we have in common with dumb animals, but also in the intellectual appetite, which we have in common with the + angels. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q31_A4-p11"></p> + <p id="FS_Q31_A4-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q31_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q31_A5.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q31_A5" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q31_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q31_A6.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q31_A5-p0.1">Whether bodily and sensible pleasures are greater than spiritual and intellectual pleasures?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q31_A5-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q31_A5-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that bodily and sensible pleasures are greater than spiritual and intelligible pleasures. For all men seek + some pleasure, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. x, 2,4). But more seek sensible pleasures, than intelligible spiritual + pleasures. Therefore bodily pleasures are greater. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q31_A5-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the greatness of a cause is known by its effect. But bodily pleasures have greater effects; since "they alter the + state of the body, and in some they cause madness" (Ethic. vii, 3). Therefore bodily pleasures are greater. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q31_A5-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, bodily pleasures need to be tempered and checked, by reason of their vehemence: whereas there is no need to check + spiritual pleasures. Therefore bodily pleasures are greater. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q31_A5-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q31_A5-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.118.103" target="asv">Ps. 118:103</a>): "How sweet are Thy words to my palate; more than honey to my mouth!" And the Philosopher says (Ethic. x, 7) that "the greatest + pleasure is derived from the operation of wisdom." + </p> + <p id="FS_Q31_A5-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above + <a id="FS_Q31_A5-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q31_A1.html">(A[1])</a>, pleasure arises from union with a suitable object perceived or known. Now, in the operations of the soul, especially of + the sensitive and intellectual soul, it must be noted that, since they do not pass into outward matter, they are acts or perfections + of the agent, e.g. to understand, to feel, to will and the like: because actions which pass into outward matter, are actions + and perfections rather of the + matter transformed; for "movement is the act produced by the mover in the thing moved" (Phys. iii, 3). Accordingly the aforesaid + actions of the sensitive and intellectual soul, are themselves a certain good of the agent, and are known by sense and intellect. + Wherefore from them also does pleasure arise, and not only from their objects. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q31_A5-p7"> If therefore we compare intellectual pleasures with sensible pleasures, according as we delight in the very actions, for + instance in sensitive and in intellectual knowledge; without doubt intellectual pleasures are much greater than sensible pleasures. + For man takes much more delight in knowing something, by understanding it, than in knowing something by perceiving it with + his sense. Because intellectual knowledge is more perfect; and because it is better known, since the + intellect reflects on its own act more than sense does. Moreover intellectual knowledge is more beloved: for there is no one + who would not forfeit his bodily sight rather than his intellectual vision, as beasts or fools are deprived thereof, as Augustine + says in De Civ. Dei (De Trin. xiv, 14). + </p> + <p id="FS_Q31_A5-p8"> If, however, intellectual spiritual pleasures be compared with sensible bodily pleasures, then, in themselves and absolutely + speaking, spiritual pleasures are greater. And this appears from the consideration of the three things needed for pleasure, + viz. the good which is brought into conjunction, that to which it is conjoined, and the conjunction itself. For spiritual + good is both greater and more beloved than bodily good: a sign whereof is that men abstain from even the + greatest bodily pleasures, rather than suffer loss of honor which is an intellectual good. Likewise the intellectual faculty + is much more noble and more knowing than the sensitive faculty. Also the conjunction is more intimate, more perfect and more + firm. More intimate, because the senses stop at the outward accidents of a thing, whereas the intellect penetrates to the + essence; for the object of the intellect is "what a thing is." More perfect, because the conjunction of the sensible to the + sense implies movement, which is an imperfect act: wherefore sensible pleasures are not perceived all at once, but some part + of them is passing away, while some other part is looked forward to as yet to be realized, as is manifest in pleasures of + the table and in sexual pleasures: whereas intelligible things are without movement: hence pleasures of this kind are realized + all at once. More firm; because the objects of bodily pleasure are corruptible, and soon pass away; whereas spiritual goods + are incorruptible. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q31_A5-p9"> On the other hand, in relation to us, bodily pleasures are more vehement, for three reasons. First, because sensible things + are more known to us, than intelligible things. Secondly, because sensible pleasures, through being passions of the sensitive + appetite, are accompanied by some alteration in the body: whereas this does not occur in spiritual pleasures, save by reason + of a certain reaction of the superior appetite on the lower. Thirdly, because bodily pleasures are sought as + remedies for bodily defects or troubles, whence various griefs arise. Wherefore bodily pleasures, by reason of their succeeding + griefs of this kind, are felt the more, and consequently are welcomed more than spiritual pleasures, which have no contrary + griefs, as we shall state farther on ( + <a id="FS_Q31_A5-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q35_A5.html">Q[35], A[5]</a>). + </p> + <p id="FS_Q31_A5-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The reason why more seek bodily pleasures is because sensible goods are known better and more generally: and, again, because + men need pleasures as remedies for many kinds of sorrow and sadness: and since the majority cannot attain spiritual pleasures, + which are proper to the virtuous, hence it is that they turn aside to seek those of the body. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q31_A5-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Bodily transmutation arises more from bodily pleasures, inasmuch as they are passions of the sensitive appetite. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q31_A5-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Bodily pleasures are realized in the sensitive faculty which is governed by reason: wherefore they need to be tempered and + checked by reason. But spiritual pleasures are in the mind, which is itself the rule: wherefore they are in themselves both + sober and moderate. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q31_A5-p13"></p> + <p id="FS_Q31_A5-p14"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q31_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q31_A6.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q31_A6" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q31_A5.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q31_A7.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q31_A6-p0.1">Whether the pleasures of touch are greater than the pleasures afforded by the other senses?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q31_A6-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q31_A6-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the pleasures of touch are not greater than the pleasures afforded by the other senses. Because the greatest + pleasure seems to be that without which all joy is at an end. But such is the pleasure afforded by the sight, according to + the words of + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q31_A6-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Tob.5.12" target="asv"> Tob. 5:12</a>: "What manner of joy shall be to me, who sit in darkness, and see not the light of heaven?" Therefore the pleasure afforded + by the sight is the greatest of sensible + pleasures. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q31_A6-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, "every one finds treasure in what he loves," as the Philosopher says (Rhet. i, 11). But "of all the senses the sight + is loved most" [*Metaph. i, 1]. Therefore the greatest pleasure seems to be afforded by sight. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q31_A6-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the beginning of friendship which is for the sake of the pleasant is principally sight. But pleasure is the cause + of such friendship. Therefore the greatest pleasure seems to be afforded by sight. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q31_A6-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 10), that the greatest pleasures are those which are afforded by the touch. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q31_A6-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above ( + <a id="FS_Q31_A6-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q25_A2.html">Q[25], A[2]</a>, ad 1; + <a id="FS_Q31_A6-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q27_A4.html"> Q[27], A[4]</a>, ad 1), everything gives pleasure according as it is loved. Now, as stated in Metaph. i, 1, the senses are loved for two + reasons: for the purpose of knowledge, and on account of their usefulness. Wherefore the senses afford pleasure in both these + ways. But because it is proper to man to apprehend knowledge itself as something good, it follows that the former + pleasures of the senses, i.e. those which arise from knowledge, are proper to man: whereas pleasures of the senses, as loved + for their usefulness, are common to all animals. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q31_A6-p7"> If therefore we speak of that sensible pleasure by which reason of knowledge, it is evident that the sight affords greater + pleasure than any other sense. On the other hand, if we speak of that sensible pleasure which is by reason of usefulness, + then the greatest pleasure is afforded by the touch. For the usefulness of sensible things is gauged by their relation to + the preservation of the animal's nature. Now the sensible objects of touch bear the closest relation to this + usefulness: for the touch takes cognizance of those things which are vital to an animal, namely, of things hot and cold and + the like. Wherefore in this respect, the pleasures of touch are greater as being more closely related to the end. For this + reason, too, other animals which do not experience sensible pleasure save by reason of usefulness, derive no pleasure from + the other senses except as subordinated to the sensible objects of the touch: "for dogs do not take delight in the smell of + hares, but in eating them; . . . nor does the lion feel pleasure in the lowing of an ox, but in devouring it" (Ethic. iii, + 10). + </p> + <p id="FS_Q31_A6-p8"> Since then the pleasure afforded by touch is the greatest in respect of usefulness, and the pleasure afforded by sight the + greatest in respect of knowledge; if anyone wish to compare these two, he will find that the pleasure of touch is, absolutely + speaking, greater than the pleasure of sight, so far as the latter remains within the limits of sensible pleasure. Because + it is evident that in everything, that which is natural is most powerful: and it is to these pleasures of the + touch that the natural concupiscences, such as those of food, sexual union, and the like, are ordained. If, however, we consider + the pleasures of sight, inasmuch sight is the handmaid of the mind, then the pleasures of sight are greater, forasmuch as + intellectual pleasures are greater than sensible. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q31_A6-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Joy, as stated above + <a id="FS_Q31_A6-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q31_A3.html">(A[3])</a>, denotes pleasure of the soul; and this belongs principally to the sight. But natural pleasure belongs principally to the + touch. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q31_A6-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The sight is loved most, "on account of knowledge, because it helps us to distinguish many things," as is stated in the same + passage (Metaph. i, 1). + </p> + <p id="FS_Q31_A6-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Pleasure causes carnal love in one way; the sight, in another. For pleasure, especially that which is afforded by the touch, + is the final cause of the friendship which is for the sake of the pleasant: whereas the sight is a cause like that from which + a movement has its beginning, inasmuch as the beholder on seeing the lovable object receives an impression of its image, which + entices him to love it and to seek its delight. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q31_A6-p12"></p> + <p id="FS_Q31_A6-p13"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q31_A5.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q31_A7.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q31_A7" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q31_A6.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q31_A8.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q31_A7-p0.1">Whether any pleasure is not natural?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q31_A7-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q31_A7-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that no pleasure is not natural. For pleasure is to the emotions of the soul what repose is to bodies. But + the appetite of a natural body does not repose save in a connatural place. Neither, therefore, can the repose of the animal + appetite, which is pleasure, be elsewhere than in something connatural. Therefore no pleasure is non-natural. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q31_A7-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, what is against nature is violent. But "whatever is violent causes grief" (Metaph. v, 5). Therefore nothing which + is unnatural can give pleasure. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q31_A7-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the fact of being established in one's own nature, if perceived, gives rise to pleasure, as is evident from the + Philosopher's definition quoted above + <a id="FS_Q31_A7-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q31_A1.html">(A[1])</a>. But it is natural to every thing to be established in its nature; because natural movement tends to a natural end. Therefore + every pleasure is natural. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q31_A7-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 5,6) that some things are pleasant "not from nature but from disease." + </p> + <p id="FS_Q31_A7-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> We speak of that as being natural, which is in accord with nature, as stated in Phys. ii, 1. Now, in man, nature can be taken + in two ways. First, inasmuch as intellect and reason is the principal part of man's nature, since in respect thereof he has + his own specific nature. And in this sense, those pleasures may be called natural to man, which are derived from things pertaining + to man in respect of his reason: for instance, it is natural to man to take + pleasure in contemplating the truth and in doing works of virtue. Secondly, nature in man may be taken as contrasted with + reason, and as denoting that which is common to man and other animals, especially that part of man which does not obey reason. + And in this sense, that which pertains to the preservation of the body, either as regards the individual, as food, drink, + sleep, and the like, or as regards the species, as sexual intercourse, are said to afford man natural pleasure. Under each + kind + of pleasures, we find some that are "not natural" speaking absolutely, and yet "connatural" in some respect. For it happens + in an individual that some one of the natural principles of the species is corrupted, so that something which is contrary + to the specific nature, becomes accidentally natural to this individual: thus it is natural to this hot water to give heat. + Consequently it happens that something which is not natural to man, either in regard to reason, or in regard to the preservation + of the body, becomes connatural to this individual man, on account of there being some corruption of nature in him. And this + corruption may be either on the part of the body---from some ailment; thus to a man suffering from fever, sweet things seem + bitter, and vice versa---or from an evil temperament; thus some take pleasure in eating earth and coals and the like; or on + the part of the soul; thus from custom some take pleasure in cannibalism or in the unnatural intercourse of man and beast, + or + other such things, which are not in accord with human nature. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q31_A7-p7"> This suffices for the answers to the objections.</p> + <p id="FS_Q31_A7-p8"></p> + <p id="FS_Q31_A7-p9"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q31_A6.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q31_A8.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q31_A8" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q31_A7.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q32.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q31_A8-p0.1">Whether one pleasure can be contrary to another?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q31_A8-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q31_A8-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that one pleasure cannot be contrary to another. Because the passions of the soul derive their species and + contrariety from their objects. Now the object of pleasure is the good. Since therefore good is not contrary to good, but + "good is contrary to evil, and evil to good," as stated in Praedic. viii; it seems that one pleasure is not contrary to another. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q31_A8-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, to one thing there is one contrary, as is proved in Metaph. x, 4. But sadness is contrary to pleasure. Therefore + pleasure is not contrary to pleasure. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q31_A8-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if one pleasure is contrary to another, this is only on account of the contrariety of the things which give pleasure. + But this difference is material: whereas contrariety is a difference of form, as stated in Metaph. x, 4. Therefore there is + no contrariety between one pleasure and another. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q31_A8-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Things of the same genus that impede one another are contraries, as the Philosopher states (Phys. viii, 8). But some pleasures + impede one another, as stated in Ethic. x, 5. Therefore some pleasures are contrary to one another. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q31_A8-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Pleasure, in the emotions of the soul, is likened to repose in natural bodies, as stated above ( + <a id="FS_Q31_A8-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q23_A4.html">Q[23], A[4]</a>). Now one repose is said to be contrary to another when they are in contrary termini; thus, "repose in a high place is contrary + to repose in a low place" (Phys. v, 6). Wherefore it happens in the emotions of the soul that one pleasure is contrary to + another. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q31_A8-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This saying of the Philosopher is to be understood of good and evil as applied to virtues and vices: because one vice may + be contrary to another vice, whereas no virtue can be contrary to another virtue. But in other things nothing prevents one + good from being contrary to another, such as hot and cold, of which the former is good in relation to fire, the latter, in + relation to water. And in this way one pleasure can be contrary to another. That this + is impossible with regard to the good of virtue, is due to the fact that virtue's good depends on fittingness in relation + to some one thing---i.e. the reason. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q31_A8-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Pleasure, in the emotions of the soul, is likened to natural repose in bodies: because its object is something suitable and + connatural, so to speak. But sadness is like a violent repose; because its object is disagreeable to the animal appetite, + just as the place of violent repose is disagreeable to the natural appetite. Now natural repose is contrary both to violent + repose of the same body, and to the natural repose of another, as stated in Phys. v, + 6. Wherefore pleasure is contrary to both to another pleasure and to sadness. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q31_A8-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The things in which we take pleasure, since they are the objects of pleasure, cause not only a material, but also a formal + difference, if the formality of pleasurableness be different. Because difference in the formal object causes a specific difference + in acts and passions, as stated above ( + <a id="FS_Q31_A8-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q23_A1.html">Q[23], AA[1]</a>,4; + <a id="FS_Q31_A8-p9.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q30_A2.html"> Q[30], A[2]</a>). + </p> + <p id="FS_Q31_A8-p10"></p> + <p id="FS_Q31_A8-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q31_A7.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q32.html"></a> + </div> + <a href="summa.FS_Q30_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q31_A1.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q32" class="div3"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q31_A8.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q32_A1.html"></a> + <h3 id="FS_Q32-p0.1">OF THE CAUSE OF PLEASURE (EIGHT ARTICLES)</h3> + <p id="FS_Q32-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q32-p2"> We must now consider the causes of pleasure: and under this head there are eight points of inquiry:</p> + <p id="FS_Q32-p3"> (1) Whether operation is the proper cause of pleasure?</p> + <p id="FS_Q32-p4"> (2) Whether movement is a cause of pleasure?</p> + <p id="FS_Q32-p5"> (3) Whether hope and memory cause pleasure?</p> + <p id="FS_Q32-p6"> (4) Whether sadness causes pleasure?</p> + <p id="FS_Q32-p7"> (5) Whether the actions of others are a cause of pleasure to us?</p> + <p id="FS_Q32-p8"> (6) Whether doing good to another is a cause of pleasure?</p> + <p id="FS_Q32-p9"> (7) Whether likeness is a cause of pleasure?</p> + <p id="FS_Q32-p10"> (8) Whether wonder is a cause of pleasure?</p> + <div id="FS_Q32_A1" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q32.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q32_A2.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q32_A1-p0.1">Whether operation is the proper cause of pleasure?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q32_A1-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q32_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that operation is not the proper and first cause of pleasure. For, as the Philosopher says (Rhet. i, 11), "pleasure + consists in a perception of the senses," since knowledge is requisite for pleasure, as stated above ( + <a id="FS_Q32_A1-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q31_A1.html">Q[31], A[1]</a>). But the objects of operations are knowable before the operations themselves. Therefore operation is not the proper cause + of pleasure. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q32_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, pleasure consists especially in an end gained: since it is this that is chiefly desired. But the end is not always + an operation, but is sometimes the effect of the operation. Therefore operation is not the proper and direct cause of pleasure. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q32_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, leisure and rest consist in cessation from work: and they are objects of pleasure (Rhet. i, 11). Therefore operation + is not the proper cause of pleasure. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q32_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 12,13; x, 4) that "pleasure is a connatural and uninterrupted operation." + </p> + <p id="FS_Q32_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above ( + <a id="FS_Q32_A1-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q31_A1.html">Q[31], A[1]</a>), two things are requisite for pleasure: namely, the attainment of the suitable good, and knowledge of this attainment. Now + each of these consists in a kind of operation: because actual knowledge is an operation; and the attainment of the suitable + good is by means of an operation. Moreover, the proper operation itself is a suitable good. Wherefore every pleasure must + needs be the result of some + operation. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q32_A1-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The objects of operations are not pleasurable save inasmuch as they are united to us; either by knowledge alone, as when + we take pleasure in thinking of or looking at certain things; or in some other way in addition to knowledge; as when a man + takes pleasure in knowing that he has something good--riches, honor, or the like; which would not be pleasurable unless they + were apprehended as possessed. For as the Philosopher observes (Polit. ii, 2) "we take + great pleasure in looking upon a thing as our own, by reason of the natural love we have for ourselves." Now to have such + like things is nothing else but to use them or to be able to use them: and this is through some operation. Wherefore it is + evident that every pleasure is traced to some operation as its cause. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q32_A1-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Even when it is not an operation, but the effect of an operation, that is the end, this effect is pleasant in so far as possessed + or effected: and this implies use or operation. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q32_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Operations are pleasant, in so far as they are proportionate and connatural to the agent. Now, since human power is finite, + operation is proportionate thereto according to a certain measure. Wherefore if it exceed that measure, it will be no longer + proportionate or pleasant, but, on the contrary, painful and irksome. And in this sense, leisure and play and other things + pertaining to repose, are pleasant, inasmuch as they banish sadness which results + from labor. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q32_A1-p10"></p> + <p id="FS_Q32_A1-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q32.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q32_A2.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q32_A2" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q32_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q32_A3.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q32_A2-p0.1">Whether movement is a cause of pleasure?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q32_A2-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q32_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that movement is not a cause of pleasure. Because, as stated above ( + <a id="FS_Q32_A2-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q31_A1.html">Q[31], A[1]</a>), the good which is obtained and is actually possessed, is the cause of pleasure: wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. + vii, 12) that pleasure is not compared with generation, but with the operation of a thing already in existence. Now that which + is being moved towards something has it not as yet; but, so to speak, is being generated in its + regard, forasmuch as generation or corruption are united to every movement, as stated in Phys. viii, 3. Therefore movement + is not a cause of pleasure. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q32_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, movement is the chief cause of toil and fatigue in our works. But operations through being toilsome and fatiguing + are not pleasant but disagreeable. Therefore movement is not a cause of pleasure. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q32_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, movement implies a certain innovation, which is the opposite of custom. But things "which we are accustomed to, + are pleasant," as the Philosopher says (Rhet. i, 11). Therefore movement is not a cause of pleasure. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q32_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (Confess. viii, 3): "What means this, O Lord my God, whereas Thou art everlasting joy to Thyself, and some + things around Thee evermore rejoice in Thee? What means this, that this portion of things ebbs and flows alternately displeased + and reconciled?" From these words we gather that man rejoices and takes pleasure in some kind of alterations: and therefore + movement seems to cause pleasure. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q32_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Three things are requisite for pleasure; two, i.e. the one that is pleased and the pleasurable object conjoined to him; and + a third, which is knowledge of this conjunction: and in respect of these three, movement is pleasant, as the Philosopher says + (Ethic. vii, 14 and Rhetor. i, 11). For as far as we who feel pleasure are concerned, change is pleasant to us because our + nature is changeable: for which reason that which is suitable to us at one time is not + suitable at another; thus to warm himself at a fire is suitable to man in winter but not in summer. Again, on the part of + the pleasing good which is united to us, change is pleasant. Because the continued action of an agent increases its effect: + thus the longer a person remains near the fire, the more he is warmed and dried. Now the natural mode of being consists in + a certain measure; and therefore when the continued presence of a pleasant object exceeds the measure of one's natural mode + of + being, the removal of that object becomes pleasant. On the part of the knowledge itself (change becomes pleasant), because + man desires to know something whole and perfect: when therefore a thing cannot be apprehended all at once as a whole, change + in such a thing is pleasant, so that one part may pass and another succeed, and thus the whole be perceived. Hence Augustine + says (Confess. iv, 11): "Thou wouldst not have the syllables stay, but fly away, that others may come, and thou hear the + whole. And so whenever any one thing is made up of many, all of which do not exist together, all would please collectively + more than they do severally, if all could be perceived collectively." + </p> + <p id="FS_Q32_A2-p7"> If therefore there be any thing, whose nature is unchangeable; the natural mode of whose being cannot be exceeded by the + continuation of any pleasing object; and which can behold the whole object of its delight at once---to such a one change will + afford no delight. And the more any pleasures approach to this, the more are they capable of being continual. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q32_A2-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Although the subject of movement has not yet perfectly that to which it is moved, nevertheless it is beginning to have something + thereof: and in this respect movement itself has something of pleasure. But it falls short of the perfection of pleasure; + because the more perfect pleasures regard things that are unchangeable. Moreover movement becomes the cause of pleasure, in + so far as thereby something which previously was unsuitable, becomes suitable or + ceases to be, as stated above. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q32_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Movement causes toil and fatigue, when it exceeds our natural aptitude. It is not thus that it causes pleasure, but by removing + the obstacles to our natural aptitude. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q32_A2-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> What is customary becomes pleasant, in so far as it becomes natural: because custom is like a second nature. But the movement + which gives pleasure is not that which departs from custom, but rather that which prevents the corruption of the natural mode + of being, that might result from continued operation. And thus from the same cause of connaturalness, both custom and movement + become pleasant. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q32_A2-p11"></p> + <p id="FS_Q32_A2-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q32_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q32_A3.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q32_A3" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q32_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q32_A4.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q32_A3-p0.1">Whether hope and memory causes pleasure?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q32_A3-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q32_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that memory and hope do not cause pleasure. Because pleasure is caused by present good, as Damascene says (De + Fide Orth. ii, 12). But hope and memory regard what is absent: since memory is of the past, and hope of the future. Therefore + memory and hope do not cause pleasure. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q32_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the same thing is not the cause of contraries. But hope causes affliction, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q32_A3-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Prov.13.12" target="asv"> Prov. 13:12</a>: "Hope that is deferred afflicteth the soul." Therefore hope does not cause pleasure. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q32_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, just as hope agrees with pleasure in regarding good, so also do desire and love. Therefore hope should not be assigned + as a cause of pleasure, any more than desire or love. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q32_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q32_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.12.12" target="asv">Rom. 12:12</a>): "Rejoicing in hope"; and ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q32_A3-p5.2" href="./asv.html#Ps.76.4" target="asv">Ps. 76:4</a>): "I remembered God, and was delighted." + </p> + <p id="FS_Q32_A3-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Pleasure is caused by the presence of suitable good, in so far as it is felt, or perceived in any way. Now a thing is present + to us in two ways. First, in knowledge---i.e. according as the thing known is in the knower by its likeness; secondly, in + reality---i.e. according as one thing is in real conjunction of any kind with another, either actually or potentially. And + since real conjunction is greater than conjunction by likeness, which is the conjunction of + knowledge; and again, since actual is greater than potential conjunction: therefore the greatest pleasure is that which arises + from sensation which requires the presence of the sensible object. The second place belongs to the pleasure of hope, wherein + there is pleasurable conjunction, not only in respect of apprehension, but also in respect of the faculty or power of obtaining + the pleasurable object. The third place belongs to the pleasure of memory, which has only the conjunction of + apprehension. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q32_A3-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Hope and memory are indeed of things which, absolutely speaking, are absent: and yet those are, after a fashion, present, + i.e. either according to apprehension only; or according to apprehension and possibility, at least supposed, of attainment. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q32_A3-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Nothing prevents the same thing, in different ways, being the cause of contraries. And so hope, inasmuch as it implies a + present appraising of a future good, causes pleasure; whereas, inasmuch as it implies absence of that good, it causes affliction. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q32_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Love and concupiscence also cause pleasure. For everything that is loved becomes pleasing to the lover, since love is a kind + of union or connaturalness of lover and beloved. In like manner every object of desire is pleasing to the one that desires, + since desire is chiefly a craving for pleasure. However hope, as implying a certainty of the real presence of the pleasing + good, that is not implied either by love or by concupiscence, is reckoned in + preference to them as causing pleasure; and also in preference to memory, which is of that which has already passed away. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q32_A3-p10"></p> + <p id="FS_Q32_A3-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q32_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q32_A4.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q32_A4" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q32_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q32_A5.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q32_A4-p0.1">Whether sadness causes pleasure?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q32_A4-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q32_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that sadness does not cause pleasure. For nothing causes its own contrary. But sadness is contrary to pleasure. + Therefore it does not cause it. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q32_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, contraries have contrary effects. But pleasures, when called to mind, cause pleasure. Therefore sad things, when + remembered, cause sorrow and not pleasure. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q32_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, as sadness is to pleasure, so is hatred to love. But hatred does not cause love, but rather the other way about, + as stated above ( + <a id="FS_Q32_A4-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q29_A2.html">Q[29], A[2]</a>). Therefore sadness does not cause pleasure. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q32_A4-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q32_A4-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.41.4" target="asv">Ps. 41:4</a>): "My tears have been my bread day and night": where bread denotes the refreshment of pleasure. Therefore tears, which arise + from sadness, can give pleasure. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q32_A4-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Sadness may be considered in two ways: as existing actually, and as existing in the memory: and in both ways sadness can + cause pleasure. Because sadness, as actually existing, causes pleasure, inasmuch as it brings to mind that which is loved, + the absence of which causes sadness; and yet the mere thought of it gives pleasure. The recollection of sadness becomes a + cause of pleasure, on account of the deliverance which ensued: because absence of evil is looked + upon as something good; wherefore so far as a man thinks that he has been delivered from that which caused him sorrow and + pain, so much reason has he to rejoice. Hence Augustine says in De Civ. Dei xxii, 31 [*Gregory, Moral. iv.] that "oftentimes + in joy we call to mind sad things . . . and in the season of health we recall past pains without feeling pain . . . and in + proportion are the more filled with joy and gladness": and again (Confess. viii, 3) he says that "the more peril there was + in the + battle, so much the more joy will there be in the triumph." + </p> + <p id="FS_Q32_A4-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Sometimes accidentally a thing is the cause of its contrary: thus "that which is cold sometimes causes heat," as stated in + Phys. viii, 1. In like manner sadness is the accidental cause of pleasure, in so far as it gives rise to the apprehension + of something pleasant. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q32_A4-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Sad things, called to mind, cause pleasure, not in so far as they are sad and contrary to pleasant things; but in so far + as man is delivered from them. In like manner the recollection of pleasant things, by reason of these being lost, may cause + sadness. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q32_A4-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Hatred also can be the accidental cause of love: i.e. so far as some love one another, inasmuch as they agree in hating one + and the same thing. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q32_A4-p10"></p> + <p id="FS_Q32_A4-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q32_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q32_A5.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q32_A5" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q32_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q32_A6.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q32_A5-p0.1">Whether the actions of others are a cause of pleasure to us?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q32_A5-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q32_A5-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the actions of others are not a cause of pleasure to us. Because the cause of pleasure is our own good + when conjoined to us. But the actions of others are not conjoined to us. Therefore they are not a cause of pleasure to us. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q32_A5-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the action is the agent's own good. If, therefore, the actions of others are a cause of pleasure to us, for the + same reason all goods belonging to others will be pleasing to us: which is evidently untrue. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q32_A5-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, action is pleasant through proceeding from an innate habit; hence it is stated in Ethic. ii, 3 that "we must reckon + the pleasure which follows after action, as being the sign of a habit existing in us." But the actions of others do not proceed + from habits existing in us, but, sometimes, from habits existing in the agents. Therefore the actions of others are not pleasing + to us, but to the agents themselves. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q32_A5-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written in the second canonical epistle of John (verse 4): "I was exceeding glad that I found thy children walking + in truth." + </p> + <p id="FS_Q32_A5-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above + <a id="FS_Q32_A5-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q32_A1.html">(A[1];</a> Q[31], A[1]), two things are requisite for pleasure, namely, the attainment of one's proper good, and the knowledge of having + obtained it. Wherefore the action of another may cause pleasure to us in three ways. First, from the fact that we obtain some + good through the action of another. And in this way, the actions of those who do some good to us, are pleasing to us: since + it is pleasant to be benefited by + another. Secondly, from the fact that another's action makes us to know or appreciate our own good: and for this reason men + take pleasure in being praised or honored by others, because, to wit, they thus become aware of some good existing in themselves. + And since this appreciation receives greater weight from the testimony of good and wise men, hence men take greater pleasure + in being praised and honored by them. And because a flatterer appears to praise, therefore flattery is pleasing to some. + And as love is for something good, while admiration is for something great, so it is pleasant to be loved and admired by others, + inasmuch as a man thus becomes aware of his own goodness or greatness, through their giving pleasure to others. Thirdly, from + the fact that another's actions, if they be good, are reckoned as one's own good, by reason of the power of love, which makes + a man to regard his friend as one with himself. And on account of hatred, which makes one to reckon another's good as + being in opposition to oneself, the evil action of an enemy becomes an object of pleasure: whence it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q32_A5-p6.2" href="./asv.html#iCor.13.6" target="asv">1 Cor. 13:6</a>) that charity "rejoiceth not in iniquity, but rejoiceth with the truth." + </p> + <p id="FS_Q32_A5-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Another's action may be conjoined to me, either by its effect, as in the first way, or by knowledge, as in the second way; + or by affection, as in the third way. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q32_A5-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> This argument avails for the third mode, but not for the first two. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q32_A5-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Although the actions of another do not proceed from habits that are in me, yet they either produce in me something that gives + pleasure; or they make me appreciate or know a habit of mind; or they proceed from the habit of one who is united to me by + love. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q32_A5-p10"></p> + <p id="FS_Q32_A5-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q32_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q32_A6.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q32_A6" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q32_A5.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q32_A7.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q32_A6-p0.1">Whether doing good to another is a cause of pleasure?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q32_A6-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q32_A6-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that doing good to another is not a cause of pleasure. Because pleasure is caused by one's obtaining one's + proper good, as stated above ( + <a id="FS_Q32_A6-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q32_A1.html">AA[1]</a>,5; Q[31], A[1]). But doing good pertains not to the obtaining but to the spending of one's proper good. Therefore it seems + to be the cause of sadness rather than of pleasure. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q32_A6-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 1) that "illiberality is more connatural to man than prodigality." Now it is a + mark of prodigality to do good to others; while it is a mark of illiberality to desist from doing good. Since therefore everyone + takes pleasure in a connatural operation, as stated in Ethic. vii, 14 and x, 4, it seems that doing good to others is not + a cause of pleasure. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q32_A6-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, contrary effects proceed from contrary causes. But man takes a natural pleasure in certain kinds of ill-doing, such + as overcoming, contradicting or scolding others, or, if he be angry, in punishing them, as the Philosopher says (Rhet. i, + 11). Therefore doing good to others is a cause of sadness rather than pleasure. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q32_A6-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Polit. ii, 2) that "it is most pleasant to give presents or assistance to friends and strangers." + </p> + <p id="FS_Q32_A6-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Doing good to another may give pleasure in three ways. First, in consideration of the effect, which is the good conferred + on another. In this respect, inasmuch as through being united to others by love, we look upon their good as being our own, + we take pleasure in the good we do to others, especially to our friends, as in our own good. Secondly, in consideration of + the end; as when a man, from doing good to another, hopes to get some good for himself, either + from God or from man: for hope is a cause of pleasure. Thirdly, in consideration of the principle: and thus, doing good to + another, can give pleasure in respect of a threefold principle. One is the faculty of doing good: and in this regard, doing + good to another becomes pleasant, in so far as it arouses in man an imagination of abundant good existing in him, whereof + he is able to give others a share. Wherefore men take pleasure in their children, and in their own works, as being things + on which + they bestow a share of their own good. Another principle is man's habitual inclination to do good, by reason of which doing + good becomes connatural to him: for which reason the liberal man takes pleasure in giving to others. The third principle is + the motive: for instance when a man is moved by one whom he loves, to do good to someone: for whatever we do or suffer for + a friend is pleasant, because love is the principal cause of pleasure. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q32_A6-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Spending gives pleasure as showing forth one's good. But in so far as it empties us of our own good it may be a cause of + sadness; for instance when it is excessive. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q32_A6-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Prodigality is an excessive spending, which is unnatural: wherefore prodigality is said to be contrary to nature. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q32_A6-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> To overcome, to contradict, and to punish, give pleasure, not as tending to another's ill, but as pertaining to one's own + good, which man loves more than he hates another's ill. For it is naturally pleasant to overcome, inasmuch as it makes a man + to appreciate his own superiority. Wherefore all those games in which there is a striving for the mastery, and a possibility + of winning it, afford the greatest pleasure: and speaking generally all contests, + in so far as they admit hope of victory. To contradict and to scold can give pleasure in two ways. First, as making man imagine + himself to be wise and excellent; since it belongs to wise men and elders to reprove and to scold. Secondly, in so far as + by scolding and reproving, one does good to another: for this gives one pleasure, as stated above. It is pleasant to an angry + man to punish, in so far as he thinks himself to be removing an apparent slight, which seems to be due to a previous hurt: + for when a man is hurt by another, he seems to be slighted thereby; and therefore he wishes to be quit of this slight by paying + back the hurt. And thus it is clear that doing good to another may be of itself pleasant: whereas doing evil to another is + not pleasant, except in so far as it seems to affect one's own good. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q32_A6-p10"></p> + <p id="FS_Q32_A6-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q32_A5.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q32_A7.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q32_A7" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q32_A6.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q32_A8.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q32_A7-p0.1">Whether likeness is a cause of pleasure?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q32_A7-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q32_A7-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that likeness is not a cause of pleasure. Because ruling and presiding seem to imply a certain unlikeness. + But "it is natural to take pleasure in ruling and presiding," as stated in Rhetor. i, 11. Therefore unlikeness, rather than + likeness, is a cause of pleasure. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q32_A7-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, nothing is more unlike pleasure than sorrow. But those who are burdened by sorrow are most inclined to seek pleasures, + as the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 14). Therefore unlikeness, rather than likeness, is a cause of pleasure. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q32_A7-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, those who are satiated with certain delights, derive not pleasure but disgust from them; as when one is satiated + with food. Therefore likeness is not a cause of pleasure. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q32_A7-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Likeness is a cause of love, as above stated ( + <a id="FS_Q32_A7-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q27_A3.html">Q[27], A[3]</a>): and love is the cause of pleasure. Therefore likeness is a cause of pleasure. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q32_A7-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Likeness is a kind of unity; hence that which is like us, as being one with us, causes pleasure; just at it causes love, + as stated above ( + <a id="FS_Q32_A7-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q27_A3.html">Q[27], A[3]</a>). And if that which is like us does not hurt our own good, but increase it, it is pleasurable simply; for instance one man + in respect of another, one youth in relation to another. But if it be hurtful to our own good, thus accidentally it causes + disgust or sadness, not as being like and + one with us, but as hurtful to that which is yet more one with us. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q32_A7-p7"> Now it happens in two ways that something like is hurtful to our own good. First, by destroying the measure of our own good, + by a kind of excess; because good, especially bodily good, as health, is conditioned by a certain measure: wherefore superfluous + good or any bodily pleasure, causes disgust. Secondly, by being directly contrary to one's own good: thus a potter dislikes + other potters, not because they are potters, but because they deprive him of his own excellence or + profits, which he seeks as his own good. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q32_A7-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Since ruler and subject are in communion with one another, there is a certain likeness between them: but this likeness is + conditioned by a certain superiority, since ruling and presiding pertain to the excellence of a man's own good: because they + belong to men who are wise and better than others; the result being that they give man an idea of his own excellence. Another + reason is that by ruling and presiding, a man does good to others, which is + pleasant. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q32_A7-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> That which gives pleasure to the sorrowful man, though it be unlike sorrow, bears some likeness to the man that is sorrowful: + because sorrows are contrary to his own good. Wherefore the sorrowful man seeks pleasure as making for his own good, in so + far as it is a remedy for its contrary. And this is why bodily pleasures, which are contrary to certain sorrows, are more + sought than intellectual pleasures, which have no contrary sorrow, as we shall state + later on ( + <a id="FS_Q32_A7-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q35_A5.html">Q[35], A[5]</a>). And this explains why all animals naturally desire pleasure: because animals ever work through sense and movement. For + this reason also young people are most inclined to seek pleasures; on account of the many changes to which they are subject, + while yet growing. Moreover this is why the melancholic has a strong desire for pleasures, in order to drive away sorrow: + because his "body is corroded by a base humor," as stated in Ethic. vii, 14. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q32_A7-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Bodily goods are conditioned by a certain fixed measure: wherefore surfeit of such things destroys the proper good, and consequently + gives rise to disgust and sorrow, through being contrary to the proper good of man. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q32_A7-p11"></p> + <p id="FS_Q32_A7-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q32_A6.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q32_A8.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q32_A8" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q32_A7.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q33.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q32_A8-p0.1">Whether wonder is a cause of pleasure?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q32_A8-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q32_A8-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that wonder is not a cause of pleasure. Because wonder is the act of one who is ignorant of the nature of something, + as Damascene says. But knowledge, rather than ignorance, is a cause of pleasure. Therefore wonder is not a cause of pleasure. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q32_A8-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, wonder is the beginning of wisdom, being as it were, the road to the search of truth, as stated in the beginning + of Metaph. i, 2. But "it is more pleasant to think of what we know, than to seek what we know not," as the Philosopher says + (Ethic. x, 7): since in the latter case we encounter difficulties and hindrances, in the former not; while pleasure arises + from an operation which is unhindered, as stated in Ethic. vii, 12,13. Therefore wonder hinders + rather than causes pleasure. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q32_A8-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, everyone takes pleasure in what he is accustomed to: wherefore the actions of habits acquired by custom, are pleasant. + But "we wonder at what is unwonted," as Augustine says (Tract. xxiv in Joan.). Therefore wonder is contrary to the cause of + pleasure. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q32_A8-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Rhet. i, 11) that wonder is the cause of pleasure. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q32_A8-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> It is pleasant to get what one desires, as stated above ( + <a id="FS_Q32_A8-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q23_A4.html">Q[23], A[4]</a>): and therefore the greater the desire for the thing loved, the greater the pleasure when it is attained: indeed the very + increase of desire brings with it an increase of pleasure, according as it gives rise to the hope of obtaining that which + is loved, since it was stated above (A[3], ad 3) that desire resulting from hope is a cause of pleasure. Now wonder is a + kind of desire for knowledge; a desire which comes to man when he sees an effect of which the cause either is unknown to him, + or surpasses his knowledge or faculty of understanding. Consequently wonder is a cause of pleasure, in so far as it includes + a hope of getting the knowledge which one desires to have. For this reason whatever is wonderful is pleasing, for instance + things that are scarce. Also, representations of things, even of those which are not pleasant in themselves, give rise to + pleasure; for the soul rejoices in comparing one thing with another, because comparison of one thing with another is the proper + and connatural act of the reason, as the Philosopher says (Poet. iv). This again is why "it is more delightful to be delivered + from great danger, because it is something wonderful," as stated in Rhetor. i, 11. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q32_A8-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Wonder gives pleasure, not because it implies ignorance, but in so far as it includes the desire of learning the cause, and + in so far as the wonderer learns something new, i.e. that the cause is other than he had thought it to be. [*According to + another reading:---that he is other than he thought himself to be.] + </p> + <p id="FS_Q32_A8-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Pleasure includes two things; rest in the good, and perception of this rest. As to the former therefore, since it is more + perfect to contemplate the known truth, than to seek for the unknown, the contemplation of what we know, is in itself more + pleasing than the research of what we do not know. Nevertheless, as to the second, it happens that research is sometimes more + pleasing accidentally, in so far as it proceeds from a greater desire: for greater + desire is awakened when we are conscious of our ignorance. This is why man takes the greatest pleasure in finding or learning + things for the first time. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q32_A8-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> It is pleasant to do what we are wont to do, inasmuch as this is connatural to us, as it were. And yet things that are of + rare occurrence can be pleasant, either as regards knowledge, from the fact that we desire to know something about them, in + so far as they are wonderful; or as regards action, from the fact that "the mind is more inclined by desire to act intensely + in things that are new," as stated in Ethic. x, 4, since more perfect operation + causes more perfect pleasure. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q32_A8-p10"></p> + <p id="FS_Q32_A8-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q32_A7.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q33.html"></a> + </div> + <a href="summa.FS_Q31_A8.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q32_A1.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q33" class="div3"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q32_A8.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q33_A1.html"></a> + <h3 id="FS_Q33-p0.1">OF THE EFFECTS OF PLEASURE (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3> + <p id="FS_Q33-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q33-p2"> We must now consider the effects of pleasure; and under this head there are four points of inquiry:</p> + <p id="FS_Q33-p3"> (1) Whether expansion is an effect of pleasure?</p> + <p id="FS_Q33-p4"> (2) Whether pleasure causes thirst or desire for itself?</p> + <p id="FS_Q33-p5"> (3) Whether pleasure hinders the use of reason?</p> + <p id="FS_Q33-p6"> (4) Whether pleasure perfects operation?</p> + <div id="FS_Q33_A1" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q33.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q33_A2.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q33_A1-p0.1">Whether expansion is an effect of pleasure?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q33_A1-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q33_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that expansion is not an effect of pleasure. For expansion seems to pertain more to love, according to the + Apostle ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q33_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#iiCor.6.11" target="asv">2 Cor. 6:11</a>): "Our heart is enlarged." Wherefore it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q33_A1-p2.2" href="./asv.html#Ps.118.96" target="asv">Ps. 118:96</a>) concerning the precept of charity: "Thy commandment is exceeding broad." But pleasure is a distinct passion from love. Therefore + expansion is not an effect of pleasure. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q33_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, when a thing expands it is enabled to receive more. But receiving pertains to desire, which is for something not + yet possessed. Therefore expansion seems to belong to desire rather than to pleasure. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q33_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, contraction is contrary to expansion. But contraction seems to belong to pleasure, for the hand closes on that which + we wish to grasp firmly: and such is the affection of appetite in regard to that which pleases it. Therefore expansion does + not pertain to pleasure. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q33_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> In order to express joy, it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q33_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.60.5" target="asv">Is. 60:5</a>): "Thou shall see and abound, thy heart shall wonder and be enlarged." Moreover pleasure is called by the name of "laetitia" + as being derived from "dilatatio" [expansion], as stated above ( + <a id="FS_Q33_A1-p5.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q31_A3.html">Q[31], A[3]</a>, ad 3). + </p> + <p id="FS_Q33_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Breadth [latitudo] is a dimension of bodily magnitude: hence it is not applied to the emotions of the soul, save metaphorically. + Now expansion denotes a kind of movement towards breadth; and it belongs to pleasure in respect of the two things requisite + for pleasure. One of these is on the part of the apprehensive power, which is cognizant of the conjunction with some suitable + good. As a result of this apprehension, man perceives that he has attained a + certain perfection, which is a magnitude of the spiritual order: and in this respect man's mind is said to be magnified or + expanded by pleasure. The other requisite for pleasure is on the part of the appetitive power, which acquiesces in the pleasurable + object, and rests therein, offering, as it were, to enfold it within itself. And thus man's affection is expanded by pleasure, + as though it surrendered itself to hold within itself the object of its pleasure. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q33_A1-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> In metaphorical expressions nothing hinders one and the same thing from being attributed to different things according to + different likenesses. And in this way expansion pertains to love by reason of a certain spreading out, in so far as the affection + of the lover spreads out to others, so as to care, not only for his own interests, but also for what concerns others. On the + other hand expansion pertains to pleasure, in so far as a thing becomes more + ample in itself so as to become more capacious. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q33_A1-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Desire includes a certain expansion arising from the imagination of the thing desired; but this expansion increases at the + presence of the pleasurable object: because the mind surrenders itself more to that object when it is already taking pleasure + in it, than when it desires it before possessing it; since pleasure is the end of desire. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q33_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> He that takes pleasure in a thing holds it fast, by clinging to it with all his might: but he opens his heart to it that + he may enjoy it perfectly. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q33_A1-p10"></p> + <p id="FS_Q33_A1-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q33.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q33_A2.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q33_A2" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q33_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q33_A3.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q33_A2-p0.1">Whether pleasure causes thirst or desire for itself?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q33_A2-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q33_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that pleasure does not cause desire for itself. Because all movement ceases when repose is reached. But pleasure + is, as it were, a certain repose of the movement of desire, as stated above ( + <a id="FS_Q33_A2-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q23_A4.html">Q[23], A[4]</a>; + <a id="FS_Q33_A2-p2.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q25_A2.html"> Q[25], A[2]</a>). Therefore the movement of desire ceases when pleasure is reached. Therefore pleasure does not cause desire. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q33_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, a thing does not cause its contrary. But pleasure is, in a way, contrary to desire, on the part of the object: since + desire regards a good which is not yet possessed, whereas pleasure regards the good that is possessed. Therefore pleasure + does not cause desire for itself. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q33_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, distaste is incompatible with desire. But pleasure often causes distaste. Therefore it does not cause desire. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q33_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Our Lord said ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q33_A2-p5.1" href="./asv.html#John.4.13" target="asv">Jn. 4:13</a>): "Whosoever drinketh of this water, shall thirst again": where, according to Augustine (Tract. xv in Joan.), water denotes + pleasures of the body. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q33_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Pleasure can be considered in two ways; first, as existing in reality; secondly, as existing in the memory. Again thirst, + or desire, can be taken in two ways; first, properly, as denoting a craving for something not possessed; secondly, in general, + as excluding distaste. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q33_A2-p7"> Considered as existing in reality, pleasure does not of itself cause thirst or desire for itself, but only accidentally; + provided we take thirst or desire as denoting a craving for some thing not possessed: because pleasure is an emotion of the + appetite in respect of something actually present. But it may happen that what is actually present is not perfectly possessed: + and this may be on the part of the thing possessed, or on the part of the possessor. On the part of the thing + possessed, this happens through the thing possessed not being a simultaneous whole; wherefore one obtains possession of it + successively, and while taking pleasure in what one has, one desires to possess the remainder: thus if a man is pleased with + the first part of a verse, he desires to hear the second part, as Augustine says (Confess. iv, 11). In this way nearly all + bodily pleasures cause thirst for themselves, until they are fully realized, because pleasures of this kind arise from some + movement: as is evident in pleasures of the table. On the part of the possessor, this happens when a man possesses a thing + which is perfect in itself, yet does not possess it perfectly, but obtains possession of it little by little. Thus in this + life, a faint perception of Divine knowledge affords us delight, and delight sets up a thirst or desire for perfect knowledge; + in which sense we may understand the words of + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q33_A2-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.24.29" target="asv"> Ecclus. 24:29</a>: "They that drink me shall yet thirst." + </p> + <p id="FS_Q33_A2-p8"> On the other hand, if by thirst or desire we understand the mere intensity of the emotion, that excludes distaste, thus more + than all others spiritual pleasures cause thirst or desire for themselves. Because bodily pleasures become distasteful by + reason of their causing an excess in the natural mode of being, when they are increased or even when they are protracted; + as is evident in the case of pleasures of the table. This is why, when a man arrives at the point of perfection in + bodily pleasures, he wearies of them, and sometimes desires another kind. Spiritual pleasures, on the contrary, do not exceed + the natural mode of being, but perfect nature. Hence when their point of perfection is reached, then do they afford the greatest + delight: except, perchance, accidentally, in so far as the work of contemplation is accompanied by some operation of the bodily + powers, which tire from protracted activity. And in this sense also we may understand those words of + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q33_A2-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.24.29" target="asv"> + Ecclus. 24:29 + </a>: "They that drink me shall yet thirst": for, even of the angels, who know God perfectly, and delight in Him, it is written + ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q33_A2-p8.2" href="./asv.html#iPet.1.12" target="asv">1 Pet. 1:12</a>) that they "desire to look at Him." + </p> + <p id="FS_Q33_A2-p9"> Lastly, if we consider pleasure, not as existing in reality, but as existing in the memory, thus it has of itself a natural + tendency to cause thirst and desire for itself: when, to wit, man returns to that disposition, in which he was when he experienced + the pleasure that is past. But if he be changed from that disposition, the memory of that pleasure does not give him pleasure, + but distaste: for instance, the memory of food in respect of a man who has eaten to repletion. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q33_A2-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> When pleasure is perfect, then it includes complete rest; and the movement of desire, tending to what was not possessed, + ceases. But when it is imperfect, then the desire, tending to what was not possessed, does not cease altogether. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q33_A2-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> That which is possessed imperfectly, is possessed in one respect, and in another respect is not possessed. Consequently it + may be the object of desire and pleasure at the same time. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q33_A2-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Pleasures cause distaste in one way, desire in another, as stated above. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q33_A2-p13"></p> + <p id="FS_Q33_A2-p14"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q33_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q33_A3.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q33_A3" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q33_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q33_A4.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q33_A3-p0.1">Whether pleasure hinders the use of reason?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q33_A3-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q33_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that pleasure does not hinder the use of reason. Because repose facilitates very much the due use of reason: + wherefore the Philosopher says (Phys. vii, 3) that "while we sit and rest, the soul is inclined to knowledge and prudence"; + and it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q33_A3-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.8.16" target="asv">Wis. 8:16</a>): "When I go into my house, I shall repose myself with her," i.e. wisdom. But pleasure is a kind of repose. Therefore it + helps rather than hinders the use of + reason. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q33_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, things which are not in the same subject though they be contraries, do not hinder one another. But pleasure is in + the appetitive faculty, while the use of reason is in the apprehensive power. Therefore pleasure does not hinder the use of + reason. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q33_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, that which is hindered by another, seems to be moved, as it were, thereby. But the use of an apprehensive power + moves pleasure rather than is moved by it: because it is the cause of pleasure. Therefore pleasure does not hinder the use + of reason. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q33_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 5), that "pleasure destroys the estimate of prudence." + </p> + <p id="FS_Q33_A3-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As is stated in Ethic. x, 5, "appropriate pleasures increase activity . . . whereas pleasures arising from other sources + are impediments to activity." Accordingly there is a certain pleasure that is taken in the very act of reason, as when one + takes pleasure in contemplating or in reasoning: and such pleasure does not hinder the act of reason, but helps it; because + we are more attentive in doing that which gives us pleasure, and attention fosters + activity. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q33_A3-p7"> On the other hand bodily pleasures hinder the use of reason in three ways. First, by distracting the reason. Because, as + we have just observed, we attend much to that which pleases us. Now when the attention is firmly fixed on one thing, it is + either weakened in respect of other things, or it is entirely withdrawn from them; and thus if the bodily pleasure be great, + either it entirely hinders the use of reason, by concentrating the mind's attention on itself; or else it hinders + it considerably. Secondly, by being contrary to reason. Because some pleasures, especially those that are in excess, are contrary + to the order of reason: and in this sense the Philosopher says that "bodily pleasures destroy the estimate of prudence, but + not the speculative estimate," to which they are not opposed, "for instance that the three angles of a triangle are together + equal to two right angles." In the first sense, however, they hinder both estimates. Thirdly, by fettering the reason: + in so far as bodily pleasure is followed by a certain alteration in the body, greater even than in the other passions, in + proportion as the appetite is more vehemently affected towards a present than towards an absent thing. Now such bodily disturbances + hinder the use of reason; as may be seen in the case of drunkards, in whom the use of reason is fettered or hindered. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q33_A3-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Bodily pleasure implies indeed repose of the appetite in the object of pleasure; which repose is sometimes contrary to reason; + but on the part of the body it always implies alteration. And in respect of both points, it hinders the use of reason. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q33_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The powers of the appetite and of apprehension are indeed distinct parts, but belonging to the one soul. Consequently when + the soul is very intent on the action of one part, it is hindered from attending to a contrary act of the other part. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q33_A3-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The use of reason requires the due use of the imagination and of the other sensitive powers, which are exercised through + a bodily organ. Consequently alteration in the body hinders the use of reason, because it hinders the act of the imagination + and of the other sensitive powers. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q33_A3-p11"></p> + <p id="FS_Q33_A3-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q33_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q33_A4.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q33_A4" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q33_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q34.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q33_A4-p0.1">Whether pleasure perfects operation?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q33_A4-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q33_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that pleasure does not perfect operation. For every human operation depends on the use of reason. But pleasure + hinders the use of reason, as stated above + <a id="FS_Q33_A4-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q33_A3.html">(A[3])</a>. Therefore pleasure does not perfect, but weakens human operation. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q33_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, nothing perfects itself or its cause. But pleasure is an operation (Ethic. vii, 12; x, 4), i.e. either in its essence + or in its cause. Therefore pleasure does not perfect operation. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q33_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if pleasure perfects operation, it does so either as end, or as form, or as agent. But not as end; because operation + is not sought for the sake of pleasure, but rather the reverse, as stated above ( + <a id="FS_Q33_A4-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q4_A2.html">Q[4], A[2]</a>): nor as agent, because rather is it the operation that causes pleasure: nor again as form, because, according to the Philosopher + (Ethic. x, 4), "pleasure does not perfect operation, as a habit does." Therefore pleasure + does not perfect operation. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q33_A4-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Ethic. x, 4) that "pleasure perfects operation." + </p> + <p id="FS_Q33_A4-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Pleasure perfects operation in two ways. First, as an end: not indeed according as an end is that on "account of which a + thing is"; but according as every good which is added to a thing and completes it, can be called its end. And in this sense + the Philosopher says (Ethic. x, 4) that "pleasure perfects operation . . . as some end added to it": that is to say, inasmuch + as to this good, which is operation, there is added another good, which is pleasure, + denoting the repose of the appetite in a good that is presupposed. Secondly, as agent; not indeed directly, for the Philosopher + says (Ethic. x, 4) that "pleasure perfects operation, not as a physician makes a man healthy, but as health does": but it + does so indirectly; inasmuch as the agent, through taking pleasure in his action, is more eagerly intent on it, and carries + it out with greater care. And in this sense it is said in Ethic. x, 5 that "pleasures increase their appropriate activities, + and hinder those that are not appropriate." + </p> + <p id="FS_Q33_A4-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> It is not every pleasure that hinders the act of reason, but only bodily pleasure; for this arises, not from the act of reason, + but from the act of the concupiscible faculty, which act is intensified by pleasure. On the contrary, pleasure that arises + from the act of reason, strengthens the use of reason. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q33_A4-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As stated in Phys. ii, 3 two things may be causes of one another, if one be the efficient, the other the final cause. And + in this way, operation is the efficient cause of pleasure, while pleasure perfects operation by way of final cause, as stated + above. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q33_A4-p9"> The Reply to the Third Objection is evident for what has been said.</p> + <p id="FS_Q33_A4-p10"></p> + <p id="FS_Q33_A4-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q33_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q34.html"></a> + </div> + <a href="summa.FS_Q32_A8.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q33_A1.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q34" class="div3"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q33_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q34_A1.html"></a> + <h3 id="FS_Q34-p0.1">OF THE GOODNESS AND MALICE OF PLEASURES (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3> + <p id="FS_Q34-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q34-p2"> We must now consider the goodness and malice of pleasures: under which head there are four points of inquiry:</p> + <p id="FS_Q34-p3"> (1) Whether every pleasure is evil?</p> + <p id="FS_Q34-p4"> (2) If not, whether every pleasure is good?</p> + <p id="FS_Q34-p5"> (3) Whether any pleasure is the greatest good?</p> + <p id="FS_Q34-p6"> (4) Whether pleasure is the measure or rule by which to judge of moral good and evil?</p> + <div id="FS_Q34_A1" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q34.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q34_A2.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q34_A1-p0.1">Whether every pleasure is evil?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q34_A1-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q34_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that every pleasure is evil. For that which destroys prudence and hinders the use of reason, seems to be evil + in itself: since man's good is to be "in accord with reason," as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv). But pleasure destroys prudence + and hinders the use of reason; and so much the more, as the pleasure is greater: wherefore "in sexual pleasures," which are + the greatest of all, "it is impossible to understand anything," as stated in Ethic. vii, + 11. Moreover, Jerome says in his commentary on Matthew [*Origen, Hom. vi in Num.] that "at the time of conjugal intercourse, + the presence of the Holy Ghost is not vouchsafed, even if it be a prophet that fulfils the conjugal duty." Therefore pleasure + is evil in itself; and consequently every pleasure is evil. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q34_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, that which the virtuous man shuns, and the man lacking in virtue seeks, seems to be evil in itself, and should be + avoided; because, as stated in Ethic. x, 5 "the virtuous man is a kind of measure and rule of human actions"; and the Apostle + says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q34_A1-p3.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.2.15" target="asv">1 Cor. 2:15</a>): "The spiritual man judgeth all things." But children and dumb animals, in whom there is no virtue, seek pleasure: whereas + the man who is master of himself does not. Therefore + pleasures are evil in themselves and should be avoided. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q34_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, "virtue and art are concerned about the difficult and the good" (Ethic. ii, 3). But no art is ordained to pleasure. + Therefore pleasure is not something good. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q34_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q34_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.36.4" target="asv">Ps. 36:4</a>): "Delight in the Lord." Since, therefore, Divine authority leads to no evil, it seems that not every pleasure is evil. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q34_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated in Ethic. x, 2,[3] some have maintained that all pleasure is evil. The reason seems to have been that they took + account only of sensible and bodily pleasures which are more manifest; since, also in other respects, the ancient philosophers + did not discriminate between the intelligible and the sensible, nor between intellect and sense (De Anima iii, 3). And they + held that all bodily pleasures should be reckoned as bad, and thus that man, being prone + to immoderate pleasures, arrives at the mean of virtue by abstaining from pleasure. But they were wrong in holding this opinion. + Because, since none can live without some sensible and bodily pleasure, if they who teach that all pleasures are evil, are + found in the act of taking pleasure; men will be more inclined to pleasure by following the example of their works instead + of listening to the doctrine of their words: since, in human actions and passions, wherein experience is of great weight, + example moves more than words. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q34_A1-p7"> We must therefore say that some pleasures are good, and that some are evil. For pleasure is a repose of the appetitive power + in some loved good, and resulting from some operation; wherefore we assign a twofold reason for this assertion. The first + is in respect of the good in which a man reposes with pleasure. For good and evil in the moral order depend on agreement or + disagreement with reason, as stated above ( + <a id="FS_Q34_A1-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q18_A5.html">Q[18], A[5]</a>): just as in the order of + nature, a thing is said to be natural, if it agrees with nature, and unnatural, if it disagrees. Accordingly, just as in the + natural order there is a certain natural repose, whereby a thing rests in that which agrees with its nature, for instance, + when a heavy body rests down below; and again an unnatural repose, whereby a thing rests in that which disagrees with its + nature, as when a heavy body rests up aloft: so, in the moral order, there is a good pleasure, whereby the higher or lower + appetite rests in that which is in accord with reason; and an evil pleasure, whereby the appetite rests in that which is discordant + from reason and the law of God. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q34_A1-p8"> The second reason can be found by considering the actions, some of which are good, some evil. Now pleasures which are conjoined + to actions are more akin to those actions, than desires, which precede them in point of time. Wherefore, since the desires + of good actions are good, and of evil actions, evil; much more are the pleasures of good actions good, and those of evil actions + evil. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q34_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As stated above (Q[33], A[3]), it is not the pleasures which result from an act of reason, that hinder the reason or destroy + prudence, but extraneous pleasures, such as the pleasures of the body. These indeed hinder the use of reason, as stated above + (Q[33], A[3]), either by contrariety of the appetite that rests in something repugnant to reason, which makes the pleasure + morally bad; or by fettering the reason: thus in conjugal intercourse, though the + pleasure be in accord with reason, yet it hinders the use of reason, on account of the accompanying bodily change. But in + this case the pleasure is not morally evil; as neither is sleep, whereby the reason is fettered, morally evil, if it be taken + according to reason: for reason itself demands that the use of reason be interrupted at times. We must add, however, that + although this fettering of the reason through the pleasure of conjugal intercourse has no moral malice, since it is neither + a + mortal nor a venial sin; yet it proceeds from a kind of moral malice, namely, from the sin of our first parent; because, as + stated in the + <a id="FS_Q34_A1-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q98_A2.html">FP, Q[98], A[2]</a> the case was different in the state of innocence. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q34_A1-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The temperate man does not shun all pleasures, but those that are immoderate, and contrary to reason. The fact that children + and dumb animals seek pleasures, does not prove that all pleasures are evil: because they have from God their natural appetite, + which is moved to that which is naturally suitable to them. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q34_A1-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Art is not concerned with all kinds of good, but with the making of external things, as we shall state further on ( + <a id="FS_Q34_A1-p11.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q57_A3.html">Q[57], A[3]</a>). But actions and passions, which are within us, are more the concern of prudence and virtue than of art. Nevertheless there + is an art of making pleasure, namely, "the art of cookery and the art of making arguments," as stated in Ethic. vii, 12. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q34_A1-p12"></p> + <p id="FS_Q34_A1-p13"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q34.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q34_A2.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q34_A2" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q34_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q34_A3.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q34_A2-p0.1">Whether every pleasure is good?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q34_A2-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q34_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that every pleasure is good. Because as stated in the + <a id="FS_Q34_A2-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q5_A6.html">FP, Q[5], A[6]</a> there are three kinds of good: the virtuous, the useful, and the pleasant. But everything virtuous is good; and in like manner + everything useful is good. Therefore also every pleasure is good. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q34_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, that which is not sought for the sake of something else, is good in itself, as stated in Ethic. i, 6,7. But pleasure + is not sought for the sake of something else; for it seems absurd to ask anyone why he seeks to be pleased. Therefore pleasure + is good in itself. Now that which is predicated to a thing considered in itself, is predicated thereof universally. Therefore + every pleasure is good. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q34_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, that which is desired by all, seems to be good of itself: because good is "what all things seek," as stated in Ethic. + i, 1. But everyone seeks some kind of pleasure, even children and dumb animals. Therefore pleasure is good in itself: and + consequently all pleasure is good. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q34_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q34_A2-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Prov.2.14" target="asv">Prov. 2:14</a>): "Who are glad when they have done evil, and rejoice in most wicked things." + </p> + <p id="FS_Q34_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> While some of the Stoics maintained that all pleasures are evil, the Epicureans held that pleasure is good in itself, and + that consequently all pleasures are good. They seem to have thus erred through not discriminating between that which is good + simply, and that which is good in respect of a particular individual. That which is good simply, is good in itself. Now that + which is not good in itself, may be good in respect of some individual in two ways. In one + way, because it is suitable to him by reason of a disposition in which he is now, which disposition, however, is not natural: + thus it is sometimes good for a leper to eat things that are poisonous, which are not suitable simply to the human temperament. + In another way, through something unsuitable being esteemed suitable. And since pleasure is the repose of the appetite in + some good, if the appetite reposes in that which is good simply, the pleasure will be pleasure simply, and good simply. But + if a man's appetite repose in that which is good, not simply, but in respect of that particular man, then his pleasure will + not be pleasure simply, but a pleasure to him; neither will it be good simply, but in a certain respect, or an apparent good. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q34_A2-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The virtuous and the useful depend on accordance with reason, and consequently nothing is virtuous or useful, without being + good. But the pleasant depends on agreement with the appetite, which tends sometimes to that which is discordant from reason. + Consequently not every object of pleasure is good in the moral order which depends on the order of reason. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q34_A2-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The reason why pleasure is not sought for the sake of something else is because it is repose in the end. Now the end may + be either good or evil; although nothing can be an end except in so far as it is good in respect of such and such a man: and + so too with regard to pleasure. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q34_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> All things seek pleasure in the same way as they seek good: since pleasure is the repose of the appetite in good. But, just + as it happens that not every good which is desired, is of itself and verily good; so not every pleasure is of itself and verily + good. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q34_A2-p10"></p> + <p id="FS_Q34_A2-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q34_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q34_A3.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q34_A3" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q34_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q34_A4.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q34_A3-p0.1">Whether any pleasure is the greatest good?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q34_A3-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q34_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that no pleasure is the greatest good. Because nothing generated is the greatest good: since generation cannot + be the last end. But pleasure is a consequence of generation: for the fact that a thing takes pleasure is due to its being + established in its own nature, as stated above ( + <a id="FS_Q34_A3-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q31_A1.html">Q[31], A[1]</a>). Therefore no pleasure is the greatest good. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q34_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, that which is the greatest good cannot be made better by addition. But pleasure is made better by addition; since + pleasure together with virtue is better than pleasure without virtue. Therefore pleasure is not the greatest good. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q34_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, that which is the greatest good is universally good, as being good of itself: since that which is such of itself + is prior to and greater than that which is such accidentally. But pleasure is not universally good, as stated above + <a id="FS_Q34_A3-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q34_A2.html">(A[2])</a>. Therefore pleasure is not the greatest good. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q34_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Happiness is the greatest good: since it is the end of man's life. But Happiness is not without pleasure: for it is written + ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q34_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.15.11" target="asv">Ps. 15:11</a>): "Thou shalt fill me with joy with Thy countenance; at Thy right hand are delights even to the end." + </p> + <p id="FS_Q34_A3-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Plato held neither with the Stoics, who asserted that all pleasures are evil, nor with the Epicureans, who maintained that + all pleasures are good; but he said that some are good, and some evil; yet, so that no pleasure be the sovereign or greatest + good. But, judging from his arguments, he fails in two points. First, because, from observing that sensible and bodily pleasure + consists in a certain movement and "becoming," as is evident in satiety from eating + and the like; he concluded that all pleasure arises from some "becoming" and movement: and from this, since "becoming" and + movement are the acts of something imperfect, it would follow that pleasure is not of the nature of ultimate perfection. But + this is seen to be evidently false as regards intellectual pleasures: because one takes pleasure, not only in the "becoming" + of knowledge, for instance, when one learns or wonders, as stated above ( + <a id="FS_Q34_A3-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q32_A8.html">Q[32], A[8]</a>, ad 2); but also + in the act of contemplation, by making use of knowledge already acquired. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q34_A3-p7"> Secondly, because by greatest good he understood that which is the supreme good simply, i.e. the good as existing apart from, + and unparticipated by, all else, in which sense God is the Supreme Good; whereas we are speaking of the greatest good in human + things. Now the greatest good of everything is its last end. And the end, as stated above ( + <a id="FS_Q34_A3-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q1_A8.html">Q[1], A[8]</a>; + <a id="FS_Q34_A3-p7.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q2_A7.html"> Q[2], A[7]</a>) is twofold; namely, the thing itself, and the use of that thing; + thus the miser's end is either money or the possession of money. Accordingly, man's last end may be said to be either God + Who is the Supreme Good simply; or the enjoyment of God, which implies a certain pleasure in the last end. And in this sense + a certain pleasure of man may be said to be the greatest among human goods. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q34_A3-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Not every pleasure arises from a "becoming"; for some pleasures result from perfect operations, as stated above. Accordingly + nothing prevents some pleasure being the greatest good, although every pleasure is not such. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q34_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> This argument is true of the greatest good simply, by participation of which all things are good; wherefore no addition can + make it better: whereas in regard to other goods, it is universally true that any good becomes better by the addition of another + good. Moreover it might be said that pleasure is not something extraneous to the operation of virtue, but that it accompanies + it, as stated in Ethic. i, 8. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q34_A3-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> That pleasure is the greatest good is due not to the mere fact that it is pleasure, but to the fact that it is perfect repose + in the perfect good. Hence it does not follow that every pleasure is supremely good, or even good at all. Thus a certain science + is supremely good, but not every science is. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q34_A3-p11"></p> + <p id="FS_Q34_A3-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q34_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q34_A4.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q34_A4" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q34_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q35.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q34_A4-p0.1">Whether pleasure is the measure or rule by which to judge of moral good or evil?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q34_A4-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q34_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that pleasure is not the measure or rule of moral good and evil. Because "that which is first in a genus is + the measure of all the rest" (Metaph. x, 1). But pleasure is not the first thing in the moral genus, for it is preceded by + love and desire. Therefore it is not the rule of goodness and malice in moral matters. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q34_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, a measure or rule should be uniform; hence that movement which is the most uniform, is the measure and rule of all + movements (Metaph. x, 1). But pleasures are various and multiform: since some of them are good, and some evil. Therefore pleasure + is not the measure and rule of morals. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q34_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, judgment of the effect from its cause is more certain than judgment of cause from effect. Now goodness or malice + of operation is the cause of goodness or malice of pleasure: because "those pleasures are good which result from good operations, + and those are evil which arise from evil operations," as stated in Ethic. x, 5. Therefore pleasures are not the rule and measure + of moral goodness and malice. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q34_A4-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine, commenting on + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q34_A4-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.7.10" target="asv"> Ps. 7:10 </a>"The searcher of hearts and reins is God," says: "The end of care and thought is the pleasure which each one aims at achieving." + And the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 11) that "pleasure is the architect," i.e. the principal, "end [*St. Thomas took "finis" + as being the nominative, whereas it is the genitive---{tou telous}; and the Greek reads "He" (i.e. the political philosopher), + "is the architect of + the end."], in regard to which, we say absolutely that this is evil, and that, good." + </p> + <p id="FS_Q34_A4-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Moral goodness or malice depends chiefly on the will, as stated above ( + <a id="FS_Q34_A4-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q20_A1.html">Q[20], A[1]</a>); and it is chiefly from the end that we discern whether the will is good or evil. Now the end is taken to be that in which + the will reposes: and the repose of the will and of every appetite in the good is pleasure. And therefore man is reckoned + to be good or bad chiefly according to the pleasure of the human will; since that man is good and virtuous, + who takes pleasure in the works of virtue; and that man evil, who takes pleasure in evil works. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q34_A4-p7"> On the other hand, pleasures of the sensitive appetite are not the rule of moral goodness and malice; since food is universally + pleasurable to the sensitive appetite both of good and of evil men. But the will of the good man takes pleasure in them in + accordance with reason, to which the will of the evil man gives no heed. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q34_A4-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Love and desire precede pleasure in the order of generation. But pleasure precedes them in the order of the end, which serves + a principle in actions; and it is by the principle, which is the rule and measure of such matters, that we form our judgment. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q34_A4-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> All pleasures are uniform in the point of their being the repose of the appetite in something good: and in this respect pleasure + can be a rule or measure. Because that man is good, whose will rests in the true good: and that man evil, whose will rests + in evil. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q34_A4-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Since pleasure perfects operation as its end, as stated above ( + <a id="FS_Q34_A4-p10.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q33_A4.html">Q[33], A[4]</a>); an operation cannot be perfectly good, unless there be also pleasure in good: because the goodness of a thing depends on + its end. And thus, in a way, the goodness of the pleasure is the cause of goodness in the operation. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q34_A4-p11"></p> + <p id="FS_Q34_A4-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q34_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q35.html"></a> + </div> + <a href="summa.FS_Q33_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q34_A1.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q35" class="div3"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q34_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q35_A1.html"></a> + <h3 id="FS_Q35-p0.1">OF PAIN OR SORROW, IN ITSELF (EIGHT ARTICLES)</h3> + <p id="FS_Q35-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q35-p2"> We have now to consider pain and sorrow: concerning which we must consider: (1) Sorrow or pain in itself; (2) Its cause; + (3) Its effects; (4) Its remedies; (5) Its goodness or malice. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q35-p3"> Under the first head there are eight points of inquiry:</p> + <p id="FS_Q35-p4"> (1) Whether pain is a passion of the soul?</p> + <p id="FS_Q35-p5"> (2) Whether sorrow is the same as pain?</p> + <p id="FS_Q35-p6"> (3) Whether sorrow or pain is contrary in pleasure?</p> + <p id="FS_Q35-p7"> (4) Whether all sorrow is contrary to all pleasure?</p> + <p id="FS_Q35-p8"> (5) Whether there is a sorrow contrary to the pleasure of contemplation?</p> + <p id="FS_Q35-p9"> (6) Whether sorrow is to be shunned more than pleasure is to be sought?</p> + <p id="FS_Q35-p10"> (7) Whether exterior pain is greater than interior?</p> + <p id="FS_Q35-p11"> (8) Of the species of sorrow.</p> + <div id="FS_Q35_A1" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q35.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q35_A2.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q35_A1-p0.1">Whether pain is a passion of the soul?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q35_A1-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q35_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that pain is not a passion of the soul. Because no passion of the soul is in the body. But pain can be in the + body, since Augustine says (De Vera Relig. xii), that "bodily pain is a sudden corruption of the well-being of that thing + which the soul, by making evil use of it, made subject to corruption." Therefore pain is not a passion of the soul. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q35_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, every passion of the soul belongs to the appetitive faculty. But pain does not belong to the appetitive, but rather + to the apprehensive part: for Augustine says (De Nat. Boni xx) that "bodily pain is caused by the sense resisting a more powerful + body." Therefore pain is not a passion of the soul. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q35_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, every passion of the soul belongs to the animal appetite. But pain does not belong to the animal appetite, but rather + to the natural appetite; for Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. viii, 14): "Had not some good remained in nature, we should feel + no pain in being punished by the loss of good." Therefore pain is not a passion of the soul. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q35_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine (De Civ. Dei xiv, 8) reckons pain among the passions of the soul; quoting Virgil (Aeneid, vi, 733): "hence wild + desires and grovelling fears/And human laughter, human tears." [Translation: Conington.] + </p> + <p id="FS_Q35_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Just as two things are requisite for pleasure; namely, conjunction with good and perception of this conjunction; so also + two things are requisite for pain: namely, conjunction with some evil (which is in so far evil as it deprives one of some + good), and perception of this conjunction. Now whatever is conjoined, if it have not the aspect of good or evil in regard + to the being to which it is conjoined, cannot cause pleasure or pain. Whence it is evident that + something under the aspect of good or evil is the object of the pleasure or pain. But good and evil, as such, are objects + of the appetite. Consequently it is clear that pleasure and pain belong to the appetite. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q35_A1-p7"> Now every appetitive movement or inclination consequent to apprehension, belongs to the intellective or sensitive appetite: + since the inclination of the natural appetite is not consequent to an apprehension of the subject of that appetite, but to + the apprehension of another, as stated in the + <a id="FS_Q35_A1-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q103_A1.html">FP, Q[103], AA[1]</a>,3. Since then pleasure and pain presuppose some sense or apprehension in the same subject, it is evident that pain, like + pleasure, is in the + intellective or sensitive appetite. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q35_A1-p8"> Again every movement of the sensitive appetite is called a passion, as stated above ( + <a id="FS_Q35_A1-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q22_A1.html">Q[22], AA[1]</a>,3): and especially those which tend to some defect. Consequently pain, according as it is in the sensitive appetite, is most + properly called a passion of the soul: just as bodily ailments are properly called passions of the body. Hence Augustine (De + Civ. Dei xiv, 7,[8] [*Quoting Cicero]) reckons pain especially as being a kind of ailment. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q35_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> We speak of the body, because the cause of pain is in the body: as when we suffer something hurtful to the body. But the + movement of pain is always in the soul; since "the body cannot feel pain unless the soul feel it," as Augustine says (Super + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q35_A1-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.87.4" target="asv"> Psalm 87:4</a>). + </p> + <p id="FS_Q35_A1-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> We speak of pain of the senses, not as though it were an act of the sensitive power; but because the senses are required + for bodily pain, in the same way as for bodily pleasure. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q35_A1-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Pain at the loss of good proves the goodness of the nature, not because pain is an act of the natural appetite, but because + nature desires something as good, the removal of which being perceived, there results the passion of pain in the sensitive + appetite. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q35_A1-p12"></p> + <p id="FS_Q35_A1-p13"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q35.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q35_A2.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q35_A2" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q35_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q35_A3.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q35_A2-p0.1">Whether sorrow is the same as pain?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q35_A2-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q35_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that sorrow is not pain. For Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 7) that "pain is used to express bodily suffering." + But sorrow is used more in reference to the soul. Therefore sorrow is not pain. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q35_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, pain is only in respect of present evil. But sorrow can refer to both past and future evil: thus repentance is sorrow + for the past, and anxiety for the future. Therefore sorrow is quite different from pain. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q35_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, pain seems not to follow save from the sense of touch. But sorrow can arise from all the senses. Therefore sorrow + is not pain, and extends to more objects. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q35_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q35_A2-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.9.2" target="asv">Rom. 9:2</a>): "I have great sorrow [Douay: 'sadness'] and continual pain [Douay: 'sorrow'] in my heart," thus denoting the same thing + by sorrow and pain. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q35_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Pleasure and pain can arise from a twofold apprehension, namely, from the apprehension of an exterior sense; and from the + interior apprehension of the intellect or of the imagination. Now the interior apprehension extends to more objects than the + exterior apprehension: because whatever things come under the exterior apprehension, come under the interior, but not conversely. + Consequently that pleasure alone which is caused by an interior apprehension is + called joy, as stated above ( + <a id="FS_Q35_A2-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q31_A3.html">Q[31], A[3]</a>): and in like manner that pain alone which is caused by an interior apprehension, is called sorrow. And just as that pleasure + which is caused by an exterior apprehension, is called pleasure but not joy; so too that pain which is caused by an exterior + apprehension, is called pain indeed but not sorrow. Accordingly sorrow is a species of pain, as joy is a species of pleasure. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q35_A2-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Augustine is speaking there of the use of the word: because "pain" is more generally used in reference to bodily pains, which + are better known, than in reference to spiritual pains. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q35_A2-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> External sense perceives only what is present; but the interior cognitive power can perceive the present, past and future. + Consequently sorrow can regard present, past and future: whereas bodily pain, which follows apprehension of the external sense, + can only regard something present. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q35_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The sensibles of touch are painful, not only in so far as they are disproportionate to the apprehensive power, but also in + so far as they are contrary to nature: whereas the objects of the other senses can indeed be disproportionate to the apprehensive + power, but they are not contrary to nature, save as they are subordinate to the sensibles of touch. Consequently man alone, + who is a perfectly cognizant animal, takes pleasure in the objects of the + other senses for their own sake; whereas other animals take no pleasure in them save as referable to the sensibles of touch, + as stated in Ethic. iii, 10. Accordingly, in referring to the objects of the other senses, we do not speak of pain in so far + as it is contrary to natural pleasure: but rather of sorrow, which is contrary to joy. So then if pain be taken as denoting + bodily pain, which is its more usual meaning, then it is contrasted with sorrow, according to the distinction of interior + and + exterior apprehension; although, on the part of the objects, pleasure extends further than does bodily pain. But if pain be + taken in a wide sense, then it is the genus of sorrow, as stated above. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q35_A2-p10"></p> + <p id="FS_Q35_A2-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q35_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q35_A3.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q35_A3" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q35_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q35_A4.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q35_A3-p0.1">Whether sorrow or pain is contrary to pleasure?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q35_A3-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q35_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that sorrow is not contrary to pleasure. For one of two contraries is not the cause of the other. But sorrow + can be the cause of pleasure; for it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q35_A3-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.5.5" target="asv">Mat. 5:5</a>): "Blessed are they that mourn, for they shall be comforted." Therefore they are not contrary to one another. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q35_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, one contrary does not denominate the other. But to some, pain or sorrow gives pleasure: thus Augustine says (Confess. + iii, 2) that in stage-plays sorrow itself gives pleasure: and (Confess. iv, 5) that "weeping is a bitter thing, and yet it + sometimes pleases us." Therefore pain is not contrary to pleasure. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q35_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, one contrary is not the matter of the other; because contraries cannot co-exist together. But sorrow can be the + matter of pleasure; for Augustine says (De Poenit. xiii): "The penitent should ever sorrow, and rejoice in his sorrow." The + Philosopher too says (Ethic. ix, 4) that, on the other hand, "the evil man feels pain at having been pleased." Therefore pleasure + and pain are not contrary to one another. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q35_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 6) that "joy is the volition of consent to the things we wish: and that sorrow is the volition + of dissent from the things we do not wish." But consent and dissent are contraries. Therefore pleasure and sorrow are contrary + to one another. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q35_A3-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As the Philosopher says (Metaph. x, 4), contrariety is a difference in respect of a form. Now the form or species of a passion + or movement is taken from the object or term. Consequently, since the objects of pleasure and sorrow or pain, viz. present + good and present evil, are contrary to one another, it follows that pain and pleasure are contrary to one another. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q35_A3-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Nothing hinders one contrary causing the other accidentally: and thus sorrow can be the cause of pleasure. In one way, in + so far as from sorrow at the absence of something, or at the presence of its contrary, one seeks the more eagerly for something + pleasant: thus a thirsty man seeks more eagerly the pleasure of a drink, as a remedy for the pain he suffers. In another way, + in so far as, from a strong desire for a certain pleasure, one does not shrink + from undergoing pain, so as to obtain that pleasure. In each of these ways, the sorrows of the present life lead us to the + comfort of the future life. Because by the mere fact that man mourns for his sins, or for the delay of glory, he merits the + consolation of eternity. In like manner a man merits it when he shrinks not from hardships and straits in order to obtain + it. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q35_A3-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Pain itself can be pleasurable accidentally in so far as it is accompanied by wonder, as in stage-plays; or in so far as + it recalls a beloved object to one's memory, and makes one feel one's love for the thing, whose absence gives us pain. Consequently, + since love is pleasant, both pain and whatever else results from love, forasmuch as they remind us of our love, are pleasant. + And, for this reason, we derive pleasure even from pains depicted on the + stage: in so far as, in witnessing them, we perceive ourselves to conceive a certain love for those who are there represented. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q35_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The will and the reason reflect on their own acts, inasmuch as the acts themselves of the will and reason are considered + under the aspect of good or evil. In this way sorrow can be the matter of pleasure, or vice versa, not essentially but accidentally: + that is, in so far as either of them is considered under the aspect of good or evil. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q35_A3-p10"></p> + <p id="FS_Q35_A3-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q35_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q35_A4.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q35_A4" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q35_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q35_A5.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q35_A4-p0.1">Whether all sorrow is contrary to all pleasure?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q35_A4-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q35_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that all sorrow is contrary to all pleasure. Because, just as whiteness and blackness are contrary species + of color, so pleasure and sorrow are contrary species of the soul's passions. But whiteness and blackness are universally + contrary to one another. Therefore pleasure and sorrow are so too. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q35_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, remedies are made of things contrary (to the evil). But every pleasure is a remedy for all manner of sorrow, as + the Philosopher declares (Ethic. vii, 14). Therefore every pleasure is contrary to every sorrow. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q35_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, contraries are hindrances to one another. But every sorrow hinders any kind of pleasure: as is evident from Ethic. + x, 5. Therefore every sorrow is contrary to every pleasure. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q35_A4-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The same thing is not the cause of contraries. But joy for one thing, and sorrow for the opposite thing, proceed from the + same habit: thus from charity it happens that we "rejoice with them that rejoice," and "weep with them that weep" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q35_A4-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.12.15" target="asv">Rom. 12:15</a>). Therefore not every sorrow is contrary to every pleasure. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q35_A4-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated in Metaph. x, 4 contrariety is a difference in respect of a form. Now a form may be generic or specific. Consequently + things may be contraries in respect of a generic form, as virtue and vice; or in respect of a specific form, as justice and + injustice. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q35_A4-p7"> Now we must observe that some things are specified by absolute forms, e.g. substances and qualities; whereas other things + are specified in relation to something extrinsic, e.g. passions and movements, which derive their species from their terms + or objects. Accordingly in those things that are specified by absolute forms, it happens that species contained under contrary + genera are not contrary as to their specific nature: but it does not happen for them to have any affinity or + fittingness to one another. For intemperance and justice, which are in the contrary genera of virtue and vice, are not contrary + to one another in respect of their specific nature; and yet they have no affinity or fittingness to one another. On the other + hand, in those things that are specified in relation to something extrinsic, it happens that species belonging to contrary + genera, are not only not contrary to one another, but also that they have a certain mutual affinity or fittingness. The + reason of this is that where there is one same relation to two contraries, there is contrariety; e.g. to approach to a white + thing, and to approach to a black thing, are contraries; whereas contrary relations to contrary things, implies a certain + likeness, e.g. to recede from something white, and to approach to something black. This is most evident in the case of contradiction, + which is the principle of opposition: because opposition consists in affirming and denying the same thing, e.g. + "white" and "non-white"; while there is fittingness and likeness in the affirmation of one contrary and the denial of the + other, as, if I were to say "black" and "not white." + </p> + <p id="FS_Q35_A4-p8"> Now sorrow and pleasure, being passions, are specified by their objects. According to their respective genera, they are contrary + to one another: since one is a kind of "pursuit," the other a kind of "avoidance," which "are to the appetite, what affirmation + and denial are to the intellect" (Ethic. vi, 2). Consequently sorrow and pleasure in respect of the same object, are specifically + contrary to one another: whereas sorrow and pleasure in respect of objects that are not contrary + but disparate, are not specifically contrary to one another, but are also disparate; for instance, sorrow at the death of + a friend, and pleasure in contemplation. If, however, those diverse objects be contrary to one another, then pleasure and + sorrow are not only specifically contrary, but they also have a certain mutual fittingness and affinity: for instance to rejoice + in good and to sorrow for evil. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q35_A4-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Whiteness and blackness do not take their species from their relationship to something extrinsic, as pleasure and sorrow + do: wherefore the comparison does not hold. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q35_A4-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Genus is taken from matter, as is stated in Metaph. viii, 2; and in accidents the subject takes the place of matter. Now + it has been said above that pleasure and sorrow are generically contrary to one another. Consequently in every sorrow the + subject has a disposition contrary to the disposition of the subject of pleasure: because in every pleasure the appetite is + viewed as accepting what it possesses, and in every sorrow, as avoiding it. And + therefore on the part of the subject every pleasure is a remedy for any kind of sorrow, and every sorrow is a hindrance of + all manner of pleasure: but chiefly when pleasure is opposed to sorrow specifically. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q35_A4-p11"> Wherefore the Reply to the Third Objection is evident. Or we may say that, although not every sorrow is specifically contrary + to every pleasure, yet they are contrary to one another in regard to their effects: since one has the effect of strengthening + the animal nature, while the other results in a kind of discomfort. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q35_A4-p12"></p> + <p id="FS_Q35_A4-p13"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q35_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q35_A5.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q35_A5" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q35_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q35_A6.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q35_A5-p0.1">Whether there is any sorrow contrary to the pleasure of contemplation?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q35_A5-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q35_A5-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that there is a sorrow that is contrary to the pleasure of contemplation. For the Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q35_A5-p2.1" href="./asv.html#iiCor.7.10" target="asv">2 Cor. 7:10</a>): "The sorrow that is according to God, worketh penance steadfast unto salvation." Now to look at God belongs to the higher + reason, whose act is to give itself to contemplation, according to Augustine (De Trin. xii, 3,4). Therefore there is a sorrow + contrary to the pleasure of contemplation. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q35_A5-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, contrary things have contrary effects. If therefore the contemplation of one contrary gives pleasure, the other + contrary will give sorrow: and so there will be a sorrow contrary to the pleasure of contemplation. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q35_A5-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, as the object of pleasure is good, so the object of sorrow is evil. But contemplation can be an evil: since the + Philosopher says (Metaph. xii, 9) that "it is unfitting to think of certain things." Therefore sorrow can be contrary to the + pleasure of contemplation. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q35_A5-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, any work, so far as it is unhindered, can be a cause of pleasure, as stated in Ethic. vii, 12,13; x, 4. But the + work of contemplation can be hindered in many ways, either so as to destroy it altogether, or as to make it difficult. Therefore + in contemplation there can be a sorrow contrary to the pleasure. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q35_A5-p6"> + <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, affliction of the flesh is a cause of sorrow. But, as it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q35_A5-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Eccl.12.12" target="asv">Eccles. 12:12</a>) "much study is an affliction of the flesh." Therefore contemplation admits of sorrow contrary to its pleasure. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q35_A5-p7"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q35_A5-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.8.16" target="asv">Wis. 8:16</a>): "Her," i.e. wisdom's, "conversation hath no bitterness nor her company any tediousness; but joy and gladness." Now the + conversation and company of wisdom are found in contemplation. Therefore there is no sorrow contrary to the pleasure of contemplation. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q35_A5-p8"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The pleasure of contemplation can be understood in two ways. In one way, so that contemplation is the cause, but not the + object of pleasure: and then pleasure is taken not in contemplating but in the thing contemplated. Now it is possible to contemplate + something harmful and sorrowful, just as to contemplate something suitable and pleasant. Consequently if the pleasure of contemplation + be taken in this way, nothing hinders some sorrow being contrary to the + pleasure of contemplation. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q35_A5-p9"> In another way, the pleasure of contemplation is understood, so that contemplation is its object and cause; as when one takes + pleasure in the very act of contemplating. And thus, according to Gregory of Nyssa [*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xviii.], "no sorrow + is contrary to that pleasure which is about contemplation": and the Philosopher says the same (Topic. i, 13; Ethic. x, 3). + This, however, is to be understood as being the case properly speaking. The reason is because sorrow is of + itself contrary to pleasure in a contrary object: thus pleasure in heat is contrary to sorrow caused by cold. But there is + no contrary to the object of contemplation: because contraries, as apprehended by the mind, are not contrary, but one is the + means of knowing the other. Wherefore, properly speaking, there cannot be a sorrow contrary to the pleasure of contemplation. + Nor has it any sorrow annexed to it, as bodily pleasures have, which are like remedies against certain annoyances; thus a + man + takes pleasure in drinking through being troubled with thirst, but when the thirst is quite driven out, the pleasure of drinking + ceases also. Because the pleasure of contemplation is not caused by one's being quit of an annoyance, but by the fact that + contemplation is pleasant in itself: for pleasure is not a "becoming" but a perfect operation, as stated above ( + <a id="FS_Q35_A5-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q31_A1.html">Q[31], A[1]</a>). + </p> + <p id="FS_Q35_A5-p10"> Accidentally, however, sorrow is mingled with the pleasure of contemplation; and this in two ways: first, on the part of + an organ, secondly, through some impediment in the apprehension. On the part of an organ, sorrow or pain is mingled with apprehension, + directly, as regards the apprehensive powers of the sensitive part, which have a bodily organ; either from the sensible object + disagreeing with the normal condition of the organ, as the taste of something bitter, and the smell + of something foul; or from the sensible object, though agreeable, being so continuous in its action on the sense, that it + exceeds the normal condition of the organ, as stated above ( + <a id="FS_Q35_A5-p10.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q33_A2.html">Q[33], A[2]</a>), the result being that an apprehension which at first was pleasant becomes tedious. But these two things cannot occur directly + in the contemplation of the mind; because the mind has no corporeal organ: wherefore it was said in the authority quoted above + that intellectual + contemplation has neither "bitterness," nor "tediousness." Since, however, the human mind, in contemplation, makes use of + the sensitive powers of apprehension, to whose acts weariness is incidental; therefore some affliction or pain is indirectly + mingled with contemplation. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q35_A5-p11"> Nevertheless, in neither of these ways, is the pain thus accidentally mingled with contemplation, contrary to the pleasure + thereof. Because pain caused by a hindrance to contemplation, is not contrary to the pleasure of contemplation, but rather + is in affinity and in harmony with it, as is evident from what has been said above + <a id="FS_Q35_A5-p11.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q35_A4.html">(A[4])</a>: while pain or sorrow caused by bodily weariness, does not belong to the same genus, wherefore it is altogether disparate. + Accordingly it is evident that no sorrow is contrary to pleasure taken in the very act of contemplation; nor is any sorrow + connected with it save accidentally. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q35_A5-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The "sorrow which is according to God," is not caused by the very act of intellectual contemplation, but by something which + the mind contemplates: viz. by sin, which the mind considers as contrary to the love of God. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q35_A5-p13"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Things which are contrary according to nature are not contrary according as they exist in the mind: for things that are contrary + in reality are not contrary in the order of thought; indeed rather is one contrary the reason for knowing the other. Hence + one and the same science considers contraries. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q35_A5-p14"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Contemplation, in itself, is never evil, since it is nothing else than the consideration of truth, which is the good of the + intellect: it can, however, be evil accidentally, i.e. in so far as the contemplation of a less noble object hinders the contemplation + of a more noble object; or on the part of the object contemplated, to which the appetite is inordinately attached. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q35_A5-p15"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Sorrow caused by a hindrance to contemplation, is not contrary to the pleasure of contemplation, but is in harmony with it, + as stated above. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q35_A5-p16"> + <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> Affliction of the flesh affects contemplation accidentally and indirectly, as stated above. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q35_A5-p17"></p> + <p id="FS_Q35_A5-p18"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q35_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q35_A6.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q35_A6" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q35_A5.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q35_A7.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q35_A6-p0.1">Whether sorrow is to be shunned more than pleasure is to be sought?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q35_A6-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q35_A6-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that sorrow is to be shunned more than pleasure is to be sought. For Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 63): "There + is nobody that does not shun sorrow more than he seeks pleasure." Now that which all agree in doing, seems to be natural. + Therefore it is natural and right for sorrow to be shunned more than pleasure is sought. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q35_A6-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the action of a contrary conduces to rapidity and intensity of movement: for "hot water freezes quicker and harder," + as the Philosopher says (Meteor. i, 12). But the shunning of sorrow is due to the contrariety of the cause of sorrow; whereas + the desire for pleasure does not arise from any contrariety, but rather from the suitableness of the pleasant object. Therefore + sorrow is shunned more eagerly than pleasure is sought. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q35_A6-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the stronger the passion which a man resists according to reason, the more worthy is he of praise, and the more + virtuous: since "virtue is concerned with the difficult and the good" (Ethic. ii, 3). But the brave man who resists the movement + of shunning sorrow, is more virtuous than the temperate man, who resists the movement of desire for pleasure: since the Philosopher + says (Rhet. ii, 4) that "the brave and the just are chiefly praised." Therefore + the movement of shunning sorrow is more eager than the movement of seeking pleasure. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q35_A6-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Good is stronger than evil, as Dionysius declares (Div. Nom. iv). But pleasure is desirable for the sake of the good which + is its object; whereas the shunning of sorrow is on account of evil. Therefore the desire for pleasure is more eager than + the shunning of sorrow. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q35_A6-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The desire for pleasure is of itself more eager than the shunning of sorrow. The reason of this is that the cause of pleasure + is a suitable good; while the cause of pain or sorrow is an unsuitable evil. Now it happens that a certain good is suitable + without any repugnance at all: but it is not possible for any evil to be so unsuitable as not to be suitable in some way. + Wherefore pleasure can be entire and perfect: whereas sorrow is always partial. Therefore + desire for pleasure is naturally greater than the shunning of sorrow. Another reason is because the good, which is the object + of pleasure, is sought for its own sake: whereas the evil, which is the object of sorrow, is to be shunned as being a privation + of good: and that which is by reason of itself is stronger than that which is by reason of something else. Moreover we find + a confirmation of this in natural movements. For every natural movement is more intense in the end, when a thing + approaches the term that is suitable to its nature, than at the beginning, when it leaves the term that is unsuitable to its + nature: as though nature were more eager in tending to what is suitable to it, than in shunning what is unsuitable. Therefore + the inclination of the appetitive power is, of itself, more eager in tending to pleasure than in shunning sorrow. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q35_A6-p7"> But it happens accidentally that a man shuns sorrow more eagerly than he seeks pleasure: and this for three reasons. First, + on the part of the apprehension. Because, as Augustine says (De Trin. x, 12), "love is felt more keenly, when we lack that + which we love." Now from the lack of what we love, sorrow results, which is caused either by the loss of some loved good, + or by the presence of some contrary evil. But pleasure suffers no lack of the good loved, for it rests in + possession of it. Since then love is the cause of pleasure and sorrow, the latter is more the shunned, according as love is + the more keenly felt on account of that which is contrary to it. Secondly, on the part of the cause of sorrow or pain, which + cause is repugnant to a good that is more loved than the good in which we take pleasure. For we love the natural well-being + of the body more than the pleasure of eating: and consequently we would leave the pleasure of eating and the like, from fear + of the pain occasioned by blows or other such causes, which are contrary to the well-being of the body. Thirdly, on the part + of the effect: namely, in so far as sorrow hinders not only one pleasure, but all. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q35_A6-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The saying of Augustine that "sorrow is shunned more than pleasure is sought" is true accidentally but not simply. And this + is clear from what he says after: "Since we see that the most savage animals are deterred from the greatest pleasures by fear + of pain," which pain is contrary to life which is loved above all. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q35_A6-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> It is not the same with movement from within and movement from without. For movement from within tends to what is suitable + more than it recedes from that which is unsuitable; as we remarked above in regard to natural movement. But movement from + without is intensified by the very opposition: because each thing strives in its own way to resist anything contrary to it, + as aiming at its own preservation. Hence violent movement is intense at first, and + slackens towards the end. Now the movement of the appetitive faculty is from within: since it tends from the soul to the object. + Consequently pleasure is, of itself, more to be sought than sorrow is to be shunned. But the movement of the sensitive faculty + is from without, as it were from the object of the soul. Consequently the more contrary a thing is the more it is felt. And + then too, accidentally, in so far as the senses are requisite for pleasure and pain, pain is shunned more than pleasure + is sought. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q35_A6-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> A brave man is not praised because, in accordance with reason, he is not overcome by any kind of sorrow or pain whatever, + but because he is not overcome by that which is concerned with the dangers of death. And this kind of sorrow is more shunned, + than pleasures of the table or of sexual intercourse are sought, which latter pleasures are the object of temperance: thus + life is loved more than food and sexual pleasure. But the temperate man is praised + for refraining from pleasures of touch, more than for not shunning the pains which are contrary to them, as is stated in Ethic. + iii, 11. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q35_A6-p11"></p> + <p id="FS_Q35_A6-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q35_A5.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q35_A7.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q35_A7" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q35_A6.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q35_A8.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q35_A7-p0.1">Whether outward pain is greater than interior sorrow?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q35_A7-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q35_A7-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that outward pain is greater than interior sorrow of the heart. Because outward pain arises from a cause repugnant + to the well-being of the body in which is life: whereas interior sorrow is caused by some evil in the imagination. Since, + therefore, life is loved more than an imagined good, it seems that, according to what has been said above + <a id="FS_Q35_A7-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q35_A6.html">(A[6])</a>, outward pain is greater than interior sorrow. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q35_A7-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the reality moves more than its likeness does. But outward pain arises from the real conjunction of some contrary; + whereas inward sorrow arises from the apprehended likeness of a contrary. Therefore outward pain is greater than inward sorrow. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q35_A7-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, a cause is known by its effect. But outward pain has more striking effects: since man dies sooner of outward pain + than of interior sorrow. Therefore outward pain is greater and is shunned more than interior sorrow. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q35_A7-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q35_A7-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.25.17" target="asv">Ecclus. 25:17</a>): "The sadness of the heart is every wound [Douay: 'plague'], and the wickedness of a woman is all evil." Therefore, just + as the wickedness of a woman surpasses all other wickedness, as the text implies; so sadness of the heart surpasses every + outward wound. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q35_A7-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Interior and exterior pain agree in one point and differ in two. They agree in this, that each is a movement of the appetitive + power, as stated above + <a id="FS_Q35_A7-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q35_A1.html">(A[1])</a>. But they differ in respect of those two things which are requisite for pain and pleasure; namely, in respect of the cause, + which is a conjoined good or evil; and in respect of the apprehension. For the cause of outward pain is a conjoined evil repugnant + to the body; while the + cause of inward pain is a conjoined evil repugnant to the appetite. Again, outward pain arises from an apprehension of sense, + chiefly of touch; while inward pain arises from an interior apprehension, of the imagination or of the reason. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q35_A7-p7"> If then we compare the cause of inward pain to the cause of outward pain, the former belongs, of itself, to the appetite + to which both these pains belong: while the latter belongs to the appetite directly. Because inward pain arises from something + being repugnant to the appetite itself, while outward pain arises from something being repugnant to the appetite, through + being repugnant to the body. Now, that which is of itself is always prior to that which is by reason of another. + Wherefore, from this point of view, inward pain surpasses outward pain. In like manner also on the part of apprehension: because + the apprehension of reason and imagination is of a higher order than the apprehension of the sense of touch. Consequently + inward pain is, simply and of itself, more keen than outward pain: a sign whereof is that one willingly undergoes outward + pain in order to avoid inward pain: and in so far as outward pain is not repugnant to the interior appetite, it becomes in + a + manner pleasant and agreeable by way of inward joy. Sometimes, however, outward pain is accompanied by inward pain, and then + the pain is increased. Because inward pain is not only greater than outward pain, it is also more universal: since whatever + is repugnant to the body, can be repugnant to the interior appetite; and whatever is apprehended by sense may be apprehended + by imagination and reason, but not conversely. Hence in the passage quoted above it is said expressively: "Sadness of the + heart is every wound," because even the pains of outward wounds are comprised in the interior sorrows of the heart. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q35_A7-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Inward pain can also arise from things that are destructive of life. And then the comparison of inward to outward pain must + not be taken in reference to the various evils that cause pain; but in regard to the various ways in which this cause of pain + is compared to the appetite. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q35_A7-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Inward pain is not caused by the apprehended likeness of a thing: for a man is not inwardly pained by the apprehended likeness + itself, but by the thing which the likeness represents. And this thing is all the more perfectly apprehended by means of its + likeness, as this likeness is more immaterial and abstract. Consequently inward pain is, of itself, greater, as being caused + by a greater evil, forasmuch as evil is better known by an inward + apprehension. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q35_A7-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Bodily changes are more liable to be caused by outward pain, both from the fact that outward pain is caused by a corruptive + conjoined corporally, which is a necessary condition of the sense of touch; and from the fact that the outward sense is more + material than the inward sense, just as the sensitive appetite is more material than the intellective. For this reason, as + stated above ( + <a id="FS_Q35_A7-p10.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q22_A3.html">Q[22], A[3]</a>; + <a id="FS_Q35_A7-p10.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q31_A5.html"> Q[31], + A[5] + </a> ), the body undergoes a greater change from the movement of the sensitive appetite: and, in like manner, from outward than + from inward pain. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q35_A7-p11"></p> + <p id="FS_Q35_A7-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q35_A6.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q35_A8.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q35_A8" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q35_A7.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q36.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q35_A8-p0.1">Whether there are only four species of sorrow?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q35_A8-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q35_A8-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that Damascene's (De Fide Orth. ii, 14) division of sorrow into four species is incorrect; viz. into "torpor, + distress," which Gregory of Nyssa [*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xix.] calls "anxiety,"---"pity," and "envy." For sorrow is contrary + to pleasure. But there are not several species of pleasure. Therefore it is incorrect to assign different species of sorrow. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q35_A8-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, "Repentance" is a species of sorrow; and so are "indignation" and "jealousy," as the Philosopher states (Rhet. ii, + 9,11). But these are not included in the above species. Therefore this division is insufficient. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q35_A8-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the members of a division should be things that are opposed to one another. But these species are not opposed to + one another. For according to Gregory [*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xix.] "torpor is sorrow depriving of speech; anxiety is the + sorrow that weighs down; envy is sorrow for another's good; pity is sorrow for another's wrongs." But it is possible for one + to sorrow for another's wrongs, and for another's good, and at the same time to be weighed + down inwardly, and outwardly to be speechless. Therefore this division is correct. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q35_A8-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> stands the twofold authority of Gregory of Nyssa [*Nemesius] and of Damascene. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q35_A8-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> It belongs to the notion of a species that it is something added to the genus. But a thing can be added to a genus in two + ways. First, as something belonging of itself to the genus, and virtually contained therein: thus "rational" is added to "animal." + Such an addition makes true species of a genus: as the Philosopher says (Metaph. vii, 12; viii, 2,3). But, secondly, a thing + may be added to a genus, that is, as it were, foreign to the notion conveyed by that + genus: thus "white" or something of the kind may be added to "animal." Such an addition does not make true species of the + genus, according to the usual sense in which we speak of genera and species. But sometimes a thing is said to be a species + of a certain genus, through having something foreign to that genus indeed, but to which the notion of that genus is applicable: + thus a live coal or a flame is said to be a species of fire, because in each of them the nature of fire is applied to a + foreign matter. In like manner we speak of astronomy and perspective as being species of mathematics, inasmuch as the principles + of mathematics are applied to natural matter. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q35_A8-p7"> In accordance with this manner of speaking, the species of sorrow are reckoned by an application of the notion of sorrow + to something foreign to it. This foreign matter may be taken on the part of the cause or the object, or of the effect. For + the proper object of sorrow is "one's own evil." Hence sorrow may be concerned for an object foreign to it either through + one's being sorry for an evil that is not one's own; and thus we have "pity" which is sorrow for another's evil, + considered, however, as one's own: or through one's being sorry for something that is neither evil nor one's own, but another's + good, considered, however, as one's own evil: and thus we have "envy." The proper effect of sorrow consists in a certain "flight + of the appetite." Wherefore the foreign element in the effect of sorrow, may be taken so as to affect the first part only, + by excluding flight: and thus we have "anxiety" which weighs on the mind, so as to make escape seem impossible: hence + it is also called "perplexity." If, however, the mind be weighed down so much, that even the limbs become motionless, which + belongs to "torpor," then we have the foreign element affecting both, since there is neither flight, nor is the effect in + the appetite. And the reason why torpor especially is said to deprive one of speech is because of all the external movements + the voice is the best expression of the inward thought and desire, not only in men, but also in other animals, as is stated + in + Polit. i, 1. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q35_A8-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Pleasure is caused by good, which has only one meaning: and so pleasure is not divided into several species as sorrow is; + for the latter is caused by evil, which "happens in many ways," as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv). + </p> + <p id="FS_Q35_A8-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Repentance is for one's own evil, which is the proper object of sorrow: wherefore it does not belong to these species. Jealousy + and indignation are included in envy, as we shall explain later ( + <a id="FS_Q35_A8-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q36_A2.html">SS, Q[36], A[2]</a>). + </p> + <p id="FS_Q35_A8-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This division is not according to opposite species; but according to the diversity of foreign matter to which the notion + of sorrow is applied, as stated above. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q35_A8-p11"></p> + <p id="FS_Q35_A8-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q35_A7.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q36.html"></a> + </div> + <a href="summa.FS_Q34_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q35_A1.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q36" class="div3"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q35_A8.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q36_A1.html"></a> + <h3 id="FS_Q36-p0.1">OF THE CAUSES OF SORROW OR PAIN (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3> + <p id="FS_Q36-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q36-p2"> We must now consider the causes of sorrow: under which head there are four points of inquiry:</p> + <p id="FS_Q36-p3"> (1) Whether sorrow is caused by the loss of a good or rather by the presence of an evil?</p> + <p id="FS_Q36-p4"> (2) Whether desire is a cause of sorrow?</p> + <p id="FS_Q36-p5"> (3) Whether the craving for unity is a cause of sorrow?</p> + <p id="FS_Q36-p6"> (4) Whether an irresistible power is a cause of sorrow?</p> + <div id="FS_Q36_A1" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q36.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q36_A2.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q36_A1-p0.1">Whether sorrow is caused by the loss of good or by the presence of evil?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q36_A1-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q36_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that sorrow is caused by the loss of a good rather than by the presence of an evil. For Augustine says (De + viii QQ. Dulcit. qu. 1) that sorrow is caused by the loss of temporal goods. Therefore, in like manner, every sorrow is caused + by the loss of some good. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q36_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it was said above ( + <a id="FS_Q36_A1-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q35_A4.html">Q[35], A[4]</a>) that the sorrow which is contrary to a pleasure, has the same object as that pleasure. But the object of pleasure is good, + as stated above ( + <a id="FS_Q36_A1-p3.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q23_A4.html">Q[23], A[4]</a>; + <a id="FS_Q36_A1-p3.3" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q31_A1.html"> Q[31], A[1]</a>; + <a id="FS_Q36_A1-p3.4" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q35_A3.html"> Q[35], A[3]</a>). Therefore sorrow is caused chiefly by the loss of good. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q36_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, according to Augustine (De Civ. Dei xiv, 7,9), love is the cause of sorrow, as of the other emotions of the soul. + But the object of love is good. Therefore pain or sorrow is felt for the loss of good rather than for an evil that is present. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q36_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 12) that "the dreaded evil gives rise to fear, the present evil is the cause of sorrow." + </p> + <p id="FS_Q36_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> If privations, as considered by the mind, were what they are in reality, this question would seem to be of no importance. + For, as stated in the + <a id="FS_Q36_A1-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q14_A10.html">FP, Q[14], A[10]</a> and + <a id="FS_Q36_A1-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q48_A3.html">FP, Q[48], A[3]</a>, evil is the privation of good: and privation is in reality nothing else than the lack of the contrary habit; so that, in + this respect, to sorrow for the loss of good, would be the same as to sorrow for the presence of evil. But + sorrow is a movement of the appetite in consequence of an apprehension: and even a privation, as apprehended, has the aspect + of a being, wherefore it is called "a being of reason." And in this way evil, being a privation, is regarded as a "contrary." + Accordingly, so far as the movement of the appetite is concerned, it makes a difference which of the two it regards chiefly, + the present evil or the good which is lost. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q36_A1-p7"> Again, since the movement of the animal appetite holds the same place in the actions of the soul, as natural movement in + natural things; the truth of the matter is to be found by considering natural movements. For if, in natural movements, we + observe those of approach and withdrawal, approach is of itself directed to something suitable to nature; while withdrawal + is of itself directed to something contrary to nature; thus a heavy body, of itself, withdraws from a higher place, + and approaches naturally to a lower place. But if we consider the cause of both these movements, viz. gravity, then gravity + itself inclines towards the lower place more than it withdraws from the higher place, since withdrawal from the latter is + the reason for its downward tendency. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q36_A1-p8"> Accordingly, since, in the movements of the appetite, sorrow is a kind of flight or withdrawal, while pleasure is a kind + of pursuit or approach; just as pleasure regards first the good possessed, as its proper object, so sorrow regards the evil + that is present. On the other hand love, which is the cause of pleasure and sorrow, regards good rather than evil: and therefore, + forasmuch as the object is the cause of a passion, the present evil is more properly the cause of sorrow or + pain, than the good which is lost. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q36_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The loss itself of good is apprehended as an evil, just as the loss of evil is apprehended as a good: and in this sense Augustine + says that pain results from the loss of temporal goods. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q36_A1-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Pleasure and its contrary pain have the same object, but under contrary aspects: because if the presence of a particular + thin be the object of pleasure, the absence of that same thing is the object of sorrow. Now one contrary includes the privation + of the other, as stated in Metaph. x, 4: and consequently sorrow in respect of one contrary is, in a way, directed to the + same thing under a contrary aspect. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q36_A1-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> When many movements arise from one cause, it does not follow that they all regard chiefly that which the cause regards chiefly, + but only the first of them. And each of the others regards chiefly that which is suitable to it according to its own nature. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q36_A1-p12"></p> + <p id="FS_Q36_A1-p13"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q36.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q36_A2.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q36_A2" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q36_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q36_A3.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q36_A2-p0.1">Whether desire is a cause of sorrow?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q36_A2-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q36_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that desire is not a cause of pain or sorrow. Because sorrow of itself regards evil, as stated above + <a id="FS_Q36_A2-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q36_A1.html">(A[1])</a>: whereas desire is a movement of the appetite towards good. Now movement towards one contrary is not a cause of movement + towards the other contrary. Therefore desire is not a cause of pain. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q36_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, pain, according to Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 12), is caused by something present; whereas the object of desire + is something future. Therefore desire is not a cause of pain. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q36_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, that which is pleasant in itself is not a cause of pain. But desire is pleasant in itself, as the Philosopher says + (Rhet. i, 11). Therefore desire is not a cause of pain or sorrow. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q36_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (Enchiridion xxiv): "When ignorance of things necessary to be done, and desire of things hurtful, found their + way in: error and pain stole an entrance in their company." But ignorance is the cause of error. Therefore desire is a cause + of sorrow. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q36_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Sorrow is a movement of the animal appetite. Now, as stated above + <a id="FS_Q36_A2-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q36_A1.html">(A[1])</a>, the appetitive movement is likened to the natural appetite; a likeness, that may be assigned to a twofold cause; one, on + the part of the end, the other, on the part of the principle of movement. Thus, on the part of the end, the cause of a heavy + body's downward movement is the lower place; while the principle of that movement is a natural inclination resulting + from gravity. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q36_A2-p7"> Now the cause of the appetitive movement, on the part of the end, is the object of that movement. And thus, it has been said + above + <a id="FS_Q36_A2-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q36_A1.html">(A[1])</a> that the cause of pain or sorrow is a present evil. On the other hand, the cause, by way or principle, of that movement, + is the inward inclination of the appetite; which inclination regards, first of all, the good, and in consequence, the rejection + of a contrary evil. Hence the first principle of this appetitive + movement is love, which is the first inclination of the appetite towards the possession of good: while the second principle + is hatred, which is the first inclination of the appetite towards the avoidance of evil. But since concupiscence or desire + is the first effect of love, which gives rise to the greatest pleasure, as stated above (Q[32], A[6]); hence it is that Augustine + often speaks of desire or concupiscence in the sense of love, as was also stated (Q[30], A[2], ad 2): and in this sense he + says that desire is the universal cause of sorrow. Sometimes, however, desire taken in its proper sense, is the cause of sorrow. + Because whatever hinders a movement from reaching its end is contrary to that movement. Now that which is contrary to the + movement of the appetite, is a cause of sorrow. Consequently, desire becomes a cause of sorrow, in so far as we sorrow for + the delay of a desired good, or for its entire removal. But it cannot be a universal cause of sorrow: since we sorrow more + for the loss of present good, in which we have already taken pleasure, than for the withdrawal of future good which we desire + to have. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q36_A2-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The inclination of the appetite to the possession of good causes the inclination of the appetite to fly from evil, as stated + above. And hence it is that the appetitive movements that regard good, are reckoned as causing the appetitive movements that + regard evil. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q36_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> That which is desired, though really future, is, nevertheless, in a way, present, inasmuch as it is hoped for. Or we may + say that although the desired good itself is future, yet the hindrance is reckoned as present, and so gives rise to sorrow. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q36_A2-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Desire gives pleasure, so long as there is hope of obtaining that which is desired. But, when hope is removed through the + presence of an obstacle, desire causes sorrow. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q36_A2-p11"></p> + <p id="FS_Q36_A2-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q36_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q36_A3.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q36_A3" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q36_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q36_A4.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q36_A3-p0.1">Whether the craving for unity is a cause of sorrow?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q36_A3-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q36_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the craving for unity is not a cause of sorrow. For the Philosopher says (Ethic. x, 3) that "this opinion," + which held repletion to be the cause of pleasure, and division [*Aristotle wrote {endeian}, 'want'; St. Thomas, in the Latin + version, read 'incisionem'; should he have read 'indigentiam'?], the cause of sorrow, "seems to have originated in pains and + pleasures connected with food." But not every pleasure or sorrow is of this kind. + Therefore the craving for unity is not the universal cause of sorrow; since repletion pertains to unity, and division is the + cause of multitude. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q36_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, every separation is opposed to unity. If therefore sorrow were caused by a craving for unity, no separation would + be pleasant: and this is clearly untrue as regards the separation of whatever is superfluous. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q36_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, for the same reason we desire the conjunction of good and the removal of evil. But as conjunction regards unity, + since it is a kind of union; so separation is contrary to unity. Therefore the craving for unity should not be reckoned, rather + than the craving for separation, as causing sorrow. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q36_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. iii, 23), that "from the pain that dumb animals feel, it is quite evident how their souls desire + unity, in ruling and quickening their bodies. For what else is pain but a feeling of impatience of division or corruption?" + </p> + <p id="FS_Q36_A3-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Forasmuch as the desire or craving for good is reckoned as a cause of sorrow, so must a craving for unity, and love, be accounted + as causing sorrow. Because the good of each thing consists in a certain unity, inasmuch as each thing has, united in itself, + the elements of which its perfection consists: wherefore the Platonists held that "one" is a principle, just as "good" is. + Hence everything naturally desires unity, just as it desires goodness: and + therefore, just as love or desire for good is a cause of sorrow, so also is the love or craving for unity. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q36_A3-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Not every kind of union causes perfect goodness, but only that on which the perfect being of a thing depends. Hence neither + does the desire of any kind of unity cause pain or sorrow, as some have maintained: whose opinion is refuted by the Philosopher + from the fact that repletion is not always pleasant; for instance, when a man has eaten to repletion, he takes no further + pleasure in eating; because repletion or union of this kind, is repugnant rather + than conducive to perfect being. Consequently sorrow is caused by the craving, not for any kind of unity, but for that unity + in which the perfection of nature consists. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q36_A3-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Separation can be pleasant, either because it removes something contrary to a thing's perfection, or because it has some + union connected with it, such as union of the sense to its object. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q36_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Separation from things hurtful and corruptive is desired, in so far as they destroy the unity which is due. Wherefore the + desire for such like separation is not the first cause of sorrow, whereas the craving for unity is. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q36_A3-p10"></p> + <p id="FS_Q36_A3-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q36_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q36_A4.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q36_A4" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q36_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q37.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q36_A4-p0.1">Whether an irresistible power is a cause of sorrow?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q36_A4-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q36_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that a greater power should not be reckoned a cause of sorrow. For that which is in the power of the agent + is not present but future. But sorrow is for present evil. Therefore a greater power is not a cause of sorrow. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q36_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, hurt inflicted is the cause of sorrow. But hurt can be inflicted even by a lesser power. Therefore a greater power + should not be reckoned as a cause of sorrow. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q36_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the interior inclinations of the soul are the causes of the movements of appetite. But a greater power is something + external. Therefore it should not be reckoned as a cause of sorrow. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q36_A4-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Nat. Boni xx): "Sorrow in the soul is caused by the will resisting a stronger power: while pain in the + body is caused by sense resisting a stronger body." + </p> + <p id="FS_Q36_A4-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above + <a id="FS_Q36_A4-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q36_A1.html">(A[1])</a>, a present evil, is cause of sorrow or pain, by way of object. Therefore that which is the cause of the evil being present, + should be reckoned as causing pain or sorrow. Now it is evident that it is contrary to the inclination of the appetite to + be united with a present evil: and whatever is contrary to a thing's inclination does not happen to it save by the action + of something stronger. Wherefore Augustine + reckons a greater power as being the cause of sorrow. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q36_A4-p7"> But it must be noted that if the stronger power goes so far as to transform the contrary inclination into its own inclination + there will be no longer repugnance or violence: thus if a stronger agent, by its action on a heavy body, deprives it of its + downward tendency, its consequent upward tendency is not violent but natural to it. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q36_A4-p8"> Accordingly if some greater power prevail so far as to take away from the will or the sensitive appetite, their respective + inclinations, pain or sorrow will not result therefrom; such is the result only when the contrary inclination of the appetite + remains. And hence Augustine says (De Nat. Boni xx) that sorrow is caused by the will "resisting a stronger power": for were + it not to resist, but to yield by consenting, the result would be not sorrow but pleasure. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q36_A4-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> A greater power causes sorrow, as acting not potentially but actually, i.e. by causing the actual presence of the corruptive + evil. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q36_A4-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Nothing hinders a power which is not simply greater, from being greater in some respect: and accordingly it is able to inflict + some harm. But if it be nowise stronger, it can do no harm at all: wherefore it cannot bring about that which causes sorrow. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q36_A4-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> External agents can be the causes of appetitive movements, in so far as they cause the presence of the object: and it is + thus that a greater power is reckoned to be the cause of sorrow. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q36_A4-p12"></p> + <p id="FS_Q36_A4-p13"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q36_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q37.html"></a> + </div> + <a href="summa.FS_Q35_A8.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q36_A1.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q37" class="div3"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q36_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q37_A1.html"></a> + <h3 id="FS_Q37-p0.1">OF THE EFFECTS OF PAIN OR SORROW (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3> + <p id="FS_Q37-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q37-p2"> We must now consider the effects of pain or of sorrow: under which head there are four points of inquiry:</p> + <p id="FS_Q37-p3"> (1) Whether pain deprives one of the power to learn?</p> + <p id="FS_Q37-p4"> (2) Whether the effect of sorrow or pain is to burden the soul?</p> + <p id="FS_Q37-p5"> (3) Whether sorrow or pain weakens all activity?</p> + <p id="FS_Q37-p6"> (4) Whether sorrow is more harmful to the body than all the other passions of the soul?</p> + <div id="FS_Q37_A1" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q37.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q37_A2.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q37_A1-p0.1">Whether pain deprives one of the power to learn?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q37_A1-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q37_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that pain does not deprive one of the power to learn. For it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q37_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.26.9" target="asv">Is. 26:9</a>): "When Thou shalt do Thy judgments on the earth, the inhabitants of the world shall learn justice": and further on (verse + 16): "In the tribulation of murmuring Thy instruction was with them." But the judgments of God and tribulation cause sorrow + in men's hearts. Therefore pain or sorrow, far from destroying, increases the power of learning. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q37_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q37_A1-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.28.9" target="asv">Is. 28:9</a>): "Whom shall He teach knowledge? And whom shall He make to understand the hearing? Them that are weaned from the milk, that + are drawn away from the breasts," i.e. from pleasures. But pain and sorrow are most destructive of pleasure; since sorrow + hinders all pleasure, as stated in Ethic. vii, 14: and ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q37_A1-p3.2" href="./asv.html#Sir.11.29" target="asv">Ecclus. 11:29</a>) it is stated that "the affliction of an hour maketh one forget great + delights." Therefore pain, instead of taking away, increases the faculty of learning. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q37_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, inward sorrow surpasses outward pain, as stated above ( + <a id="FS_Q37_A1-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q35_A7.html">Q[35], A[7]</a>). But man can learn while sorrowful. Much more, therefore, can he learn while in bodily pain. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q37_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (Soliloq. i, 12): "Although during those days I was tormented with a violent tooth-ache, I was not able to + turn over in my mind other things than those I had already learnt; and as to learning anything, I was quite unequal to it, + because it required undivided attention." + </p> + <p id="FS_Q37_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Since all the powers of the soul are rooted in the one essence of the soul, it must needs happen, when the intention of the + soul is strongly drawn towards the action of one power, that it is withdrawn from the action of another power: because the + soul, being one, can only have one intention. The result is that if one thing draws upon itself the entire intention of the + soul, or a great portion thereof, anything else requiring considerable attention is + incompatible therewith. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q37_A1-p7"> Now it is evident that sensible pain above all draws the soul's attention to itself; because it is natural for each thing + to tend wholly to repel whatever is contrary to it, as may be observed even in natural things. It is likewise evident that + in order to learn anything new, we require study and effort with a strong intention, as is clearly stated in + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q37_A1-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Prov.2.4" target="asv"> Prov. 2:4,5</a>: "If thou shalt seek wisdom as money, and shall dig for her as for a treasure, then shalt thou + understand learning" [Vulg: 'the fear of the Lord']. Consequently if the pain be acute, man is prevented at the time from + learning anything: indeed it can be so acute, that, as long as it lasts, a man is unable to give his attention even to that + which he knew already. However a difference is to be observed according to the difference of love that a man has for learning + or for considering: because the greater his love, the more will he retain the intention of his mind so as to prevent it from + turning entirely to the pain. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q37_A1-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Moderate sorrow, that does not cause the mind to wander, can conduce to the acquisition of learning especially in regard + to those things by which a man hopes to be freed from sorrow. And thus, "in the tribulation of murmuring," men are more apt + to be taught by God. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q37_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Both pleasure and pain, in so far as they draw upon themselves the soul's intention, hinder the reason from the act of consideration, + wherefore it is stated in Ethic. vii, 11 that "in the moment of sexual pleasure, a man cannot understand anything." Nevertheless + pain attracts the soul's intention more than pleasure does: thus we observe in natural things that the action of a natural + body is more intense in regard to its contrary; for instance, hot + water is more accessible to the action of cold, and in consequence freezes harder. If therefore pain or sorrow be moderate, + it can conduce accidentally to the facility of learning, in so far as it takes away an excess of pleasure. But, of itself, + it is a hindrance; and if it be intense, it prevents it altogether. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q37_A1-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> External pain arises from hurt done to the body, so that it involves bodily transmutation more than inward sorrow does: and + yet the latter is greater in regard to the formal element of pain, which belongs to the soul. Consequently bodily pain is + a greater hindrance to contemplation which requires complete repose, than inward sorrow is. Nevertheless if inward sorrow + be very intense, it attracts the intention, so that man is unable to learn anything for + the first time: wherefore on account of sorrow Gregory interrupted his commentary on Ezechiel (Hom. xxii in Ezechiel). + </p> + <p id="FS_Q37_A1-p11"></p> + <p id="FS_Q37_A1-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q37.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q37_A2.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q37_A2" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q37_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q37_A3.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q37_A2-p0.1">Whether the effect of sorrow or pain is to burden the soul?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q37_A2-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q37_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that it is not an effect of sorrow to burden the soul. For the Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q37_A2-p2.1" href="./asv.html#iiCor.7.11" target="asv">2 Cor. 7:11</a>): "Behold this self-same thing, that you were made sorrowful according to God, how great carefulness it worketh in you: yea, + defence, yea indignation," etc. Now carefulness and indignation imply that the soul is uplifted, which is contrary to being + depressed. Therefore depression is not an effect of sorrow. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q37_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, sorrow is contrary to pleasure. But the effect of pleasure is expansion: the opposite of which is not depression + but contraction. Therefore depression should not be reckoned as an effect of sorrow. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q37_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, sorrow consumes those who are inflicted therewith, as may be gathered from the words of the Apostle ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q37_A2-p4.1" href="./asv.html#iiCor.2.7" target="asv">2 Cor. 2:7</a>): "Lest perhaps such an one be swallowed up with overmuch sorrow." But that which is depressed is not consumed; nay, it is + weighed down by something heavy, whereas that which is consumed enters within the consumer. Therefore depression should not + be reckoned an effect of sorrow. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q37_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Gregory of Nyssa [*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xix.] and Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 14) speak of "depressing sorrow." + </p> + <p id="FS_Q37_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The effects of the soul's passions are sometimes named metaphorically, from a likeness to sensible bodies: for the reason + that the movements of the animal appetite are like the inclinations of the natural appetite. And in this way fervor is ascribed + to love, expansion to pleasure, and depression to sorrow. For a man is said to be depressed, through being hindered in his + own movement by some weight. Now it is evident from what has been said above ( + <a id="FS_Q37_A2-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q23_A4.html">Q[23], A[4]</a>; + <a id="FS_Q37_A2-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q25_A4.html"> Q[25], A[4]</a>; + <a id="FS_Q37_A2-p6.3" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q36_A1.html"> Q[36], A[1]</a>) that sorrow is caused by a present evil: and this evil, from the very fact that it is repugnant to the movement of the will, + depresses the soul, inasmuch as it hinders it from enjoying that which it wishes to enjoy. And if the evil which is the cause + of sorrow be not so strong as to deprive one of the hope of avoiding it, although the soul be depressed in so far as, for + the present, it + fails to grasp that which it craves for; yet it retains the movement whereby to repulse that evil. If, on the other hand, + the strength of the evil be such as to exclude the hope of evasion, then even the interior movement of the afflicted soul + is absolutely hindered, so that it cannot turn aside either this way or that. Sometimes even the external movement of the + body is paralyzed, so that a man becomes completely stupefied. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q37_A2-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> That uplifting of the soul ensues from the sorrow which is according to God, because it brings with it the hope of the forgiveness + of sin. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q37_A2-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As far as the movement of the appetite is concerned, contraction and depression amount to the same: because the soul, through + being depressed so as to be unable to attend freely to outward things, withdraws to itself, closing itself up as it were. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q37_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Sorrow is said to consume man, when the force of the afflicting evil is such as to shut out all hope of evasion: and thus + also it both depresses and consumes at the same time. For certain things, taken metaphorically, imply one another, which taken + literally, appear to exclude one another. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q37_A2-p10"></p> + <p id="FS_Q37_A2-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q37_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q37_A3.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q37_A3" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q37_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q37_A4.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q37_A3-p0.1">Whether sorrow or pain weakens all activity?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q37_A3-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q37_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that sorrow does not weaken all activity. Because carefulness is caused by sorrow, as is clear from the passage + of the Apostle quoted above (A[2], OBJ[1]). But carefulness conduces to good work: wherefore the Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q37_A3-p2.1" href="./asv.html#iiTim.2.15" target="asv">2 Tim. 2:15</a>): "Carefully study to present thyself . . . a workman that needeth not to be ashamed." Therefore sorrow is not a hindrance + to work, but helps one to work well. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q37_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, sorrow causes desire in many cases, as stated in Ethic. vii, 14. But desire causes intensity of action. Therefore + sorrow does too. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q37_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, as some actions are proper to the joyful, so are others proper to the sorrowful; for instance, to mourn. Now a thing + is improved by that which is suitable to it. Therefore certain actions are not hindered but improved by reason of sorrow. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q37_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Ethic. x, 4) that "pleasure perfects action," whereas on the other hand, "sorrow hinders it" (Ethic. + x, 5). + </p> + <p id="FS_Q37_A3-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above + <a id="FS_Q37_A3-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q37_A2.html">(A[2])</a>, sorrow at times does not depress or consume the soul, so as to shut out all movement, internal or external; but certain + movements are sometimes caused by sorrow itself. Accordingly action stands in a twofold relation to sorrow. First, as being + the object of sorrow: and thus sorrow hinders any action: for we never do that which we do with sorrow, so well as that which + we do with pleasure, or without sorrow. The + reason for this is that the will is the cause of human actions: and consequently when we do something that gives pain, the + action must of necessity be weakened in consequence. Secondly, action stands in relation to sorrow, as to its principle and + cause: and such action must needs be improved by sorrow: thus the more one sorrows on account of a certain thing, the more + one strives to shake off sorrow, provided there is a hope of shaking it off: otherwise no movement or action would result + from + that sorrow. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q37_A3-p7"> From what has been said the replies to the objections are evident.</p> + <p id="FS_Q37_A3-p8"></p> + <p id="FS_Q37_A3-p9"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q37_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q37_A4.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q37_A4" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q37_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q38.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q37_A4-p0.1">Whether sorrow is more harmful to the body than the other passions of the soul?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q37_A4-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q37_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that sorrow is not most harmful to the body. For sorrow has a spiritual existence in the soul. But those things + which have only a spiritual existence do not cause a transmutation in the body: as is evident with regard to the images of + colors, which images are in the air and do not give color to bodies. Therefore sorrow is not harmful to the body. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q37_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further if it be harmful to the body, this can only be due to its having a bodily transmutation in conjunction with it. But + bodily transmutation takes place in all the passions of the soul, as stated above ( + <a id="FS_Q37_A4-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q22_A1.html">Q[22], AA[1]</a>,3). Therefore sorrow is not more harmful to the body than the other passions of the soul. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q37_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 3) that "anger and desire drive some to madness": which seems to be a very great + harm, since reason is the most excellent thing in man. Moreover, despair seems to be more harmful than sorrow; for it is the + cause of sorrow. Therefore sorrow is not more harmful to the body than the other passions of the soul. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q37_A4-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q37_A4-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Prov.17.22" target="asv">Prov. 17:22</a>): "A joyful mind maketh age flourishing: a sorrowful spirit drieth up the bones": and ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q37_A4-p5.2" href="./asv.html#Prov.25.20" target="asv">Prov. 25:20</a>): "As a moth doth by a garment, and a worm by the wood: so the sadness of a man consumeth the heart": and ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q37_A4-p5.3" href="./asv.html#Sir.38.19" target="asv">Ecclus. 38:19</a>): "Of sadness cometh death." + </p> + <p id="FS_Q37_A4-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Of all the soul's passions, sorrow is most harmful to the body. The reason of this is because sorrow is repugnant to man's + life in respect of the species of its movement, and not merely in respect of its measure or quantity, as is the case with + the other passions of the soul. For man's life consists in a certain movement, which flows from the heart to the other parts + of the body: and this movement is befitting to human nature according to a certain fixed + measure. Consequently if this movement goes beyond the right measure, it will be repugnant to man's life in respect of the + measure of quantity; but not in respect of its specific character: whereas if this movement be hindered in its progress, it + will be repugnant to life in respect of its species. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q37_A4-p7"> Now it must be noted that, in all the passions of the soul, the bodily transmutation which is their material element, is + in conformity with and in proportion to the appetitive movement, which is the formal element: just as in everything matter + is proportionate to form. Consequently those passions that imply a movement of the appetite in pursuit of something, are not + repugnant to the vital movement as regards its species, but they may be repugnant thereto as regards its measure: + such are love, joy, desire and the like; wherefore these passions conduce to the well-being of the body; though, if they be + excessive, they may be harmful to it. On the other hand, those passions which denote in the appetite a movement of flight + or contraction, are repugnant to the vital movement, not only as regards its measure, but also as regards its species; wherefore + they are simply harmful: such are fear and despair, and above all sorrow which depresses the soul by reason of a present + evil, which makes a stronger impression than future evil. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q37_A4-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Since the soul naturally moves the body, the spiritual movement of the soul is naturally the cause of bodily transmutation. + Nor is there any parallel with spiritual images, because they are not naturally ordained to move such other bodies as are + not naturally moved by the soul. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q37_A4-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Other passions imply a bodily transmutation which is specifically in conformity with the vital movement: whereas sorrow implies + a transmutation that is repugnant thereto, as stated above. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q37_A4-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> A lesser cause suffices to hinder the use of reason, than to destroy life: since we observe that many ailments deprive one + of the use of reason, before depriving one of life. Nevertheless fear and anger cause very great harm to the body, by reason + of the sorrow which they imply, and which arises from the absence of the thing desired. Moreover sorrow too sometimes deprives + man of the use of reason: as may be seen in those who through sorrow become a + prey to melancholy or madness. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q37_A4-p11"></p> + <p id="FS_Q37_A4-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q37_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q38.html"></a> + </div> + <a href="summa.FS_Q36_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q37_A1.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q38" class="div3"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q37_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q38_A1.html"></a> + <h3 id="FS_Q38-p0.1">OF THE REMEDIES OF SORROW OR PAIN (FIVE ARTICLES)</h3> + <p id="FS_Q38-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q38-p2"> We must now consider the remedies of pain or sorrow: under which head there are five points of inquiry:</p> + <p id="FS_Q38-p3"> (1) Whether pain or sorrow is assuaged by every pleasure?</p> + <p id="FS_Q38-p4"> (2) Whether it is assuaged by weeping?</p> + <p id="FS_Q38-p5"> (3) Whether it is assuaged by the sympathy of friends?</p> + <p id="FS_Q38-p6"> (4) Whether it is assuaged by contemplating the truth?</p> + <p id="FS_Q38-p7"> (5) Whether it is assuaged by sleep and baths?</p> + <div id="FS_Q38_A1" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q38.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q38_A2.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q38_A1-p0.1">Whether pain or sorrow is assuaged by every pleasure?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q38_A1-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q38_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that not every pleasure assuages every pain or sorrow. For pleasure does not assuage sorrow, save in so far + as it is contrary to it: for "remedies work by contraries" (Ethic. ii, 3). But not every pleasure is contrary to every sorrow; + as stated above ( + <a id="FS_Q38_A1-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q35_A4.html">Q[35], A[4]</a> ). Therefore not every pleasure assuages every sorrow. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q38_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, that which causes sorrow does not assuage it. But some pleasures cause sorrow; since, as stated in Ethic. ix, 4, + "the wicked man feels pain at having been pleased." Therefore not every pleasure assuages sorrow. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q38_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Augustine says (Confess. iv, 7) that he fled from his country, where he had been wont to associate with his friend, + now dead: "for so should his eyes look for him less, where they were not wont to see him." Hence we may gather that those + things which united us to our dead or absent friends, become burdensome to us when we mourn their death or absence. But nothing + united us more than the pleasures we enjoyed in common. Therefore these very pleasures + become burdensome to us when we mourn. Therefore not every pleasure assuages every sorrow. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q38_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 14) that "sorrow is driven forth by pleasure, both by a contrary pleasure and by any other, + provided it be intense." + </p> + <p id="FS_Q38_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As is evident from what has been said above ( + <a id="FS_Q38_A1-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q23_A4.html">Q[23], A[4]</a> ), pleasure is a kind of repose of the appetite in a suitable good; while sorrow arises from something unsuited to the appetite. + Consequently in movements of the appetite pleasure is to sorrow, what, in bodies, repose is to weariness, which is due to + a non-natural transmutation; for sorrow itself implies a certain weariness or ailing of the appetitive faculty. Therefore + just as + all repose of the body brings relief to any kind of weariness, ensuing from any non-natural cause; so every pleasure brings + relief by assuaging any kind of sorrow, due to any cause whatever. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q38_A1-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Although not every pleasure is specifically contrary to every sorrow, yet it is generically, as stated above ( + <a id="FS_Q38_A1-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q35_A4.html">Q[35], A[4]</a>). And consequently, on the part of the disposition of the subject, any sorrow can be assuaged by any pleasure. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q38_A1-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The pleasures of wicked men are not a cause of sorrow while they are enjoyed, but afterwards: that is to say, in so far as + wicked men repent of those things in which they took pleasure. This sorrow is healed by contrary pleasures. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q38_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> When there are two causes inclining to contrary movements, each hinders the other; yet the one which is stronger and more + persistent, prevails in the end. Now when a man is made sorrowful by those things in which he took pleasure in common with + a deceased or absent friend, there are two causes producing contrary movements. For the thought of the friend's death or absence, + inclines him to sorrow: whereas the present good inclines him to pleasure. + Consequently each is modified by the other. And yet, since the perception of the present moves more strongly than the memory + of the past, and since love of self is more persistent than love of another; hence it is that, in the end, the pleasure drives + out the sorrow. Wherefore a little further on (Confess. iv, 8) Augustine says that his "sorrow gave way to his former pleasures." + </p> + <p id="FS_Q38_A1-p10"></p> + <p id="FS_Q38_A1-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q38.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q38_A2.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q38_A2" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q38_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q38_A3.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q38_A2-p0.1">Whether pain or sorrow is assuaged by tears?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q38_A2-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q38_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that tears do not assuage sorrow. Because no effect diminishes its cause. But tears or groans are an effect + of sorrow. Therefore they do not diminish sorrow. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q38_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, just as tears or groans are an effect of sorrow, so laughter is an effect of joy. But laughter does not lessen joy. + Therefore tears do not lessen sorrow. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q38_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, when we weep, the evil that saddens us is present to the imagination. But the image of that which saddens us increases + sorrow, just as the image of a pleasant thing adds to joy. Therefore it seems that tears do not assuage sorrow. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q38_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (Confess. iv, 7) that when he mourned the death of his friend, "in groans and in tears alone did he find some + little refreshment." + </p> + <p id="FS_Q38_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Tears and groans naturally assuage sorrow: and this for two reasons. First, because a hurtful thing hurts yet more if we + keep it shut up, because the soul is more intent on it: whereas if it be allowed to escape, the soul's intention is dispersed + as it were on outward things, so that the inward sorrow is lessened. This is why men, burdened with sorrow, make outward show + of their sorrow, by tears or groans or even by words, their sorrow is assuaged. Secondly, + because an action, that befits a man according to his actual disposition, is always pleasant to him. Now tears and groans + are actions befitting a man who is in sorrow or pain; and consequently they become pleasant to him. Since then, as stated + above + <a id="FS_Q38_A2-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q38_A1.html">(A[1])</a>, every pleasure assuages sorrow or pain somewhat, it follows that sorrow is assuaged by weeping and groans. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q38_A2-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This relation of the cause to effect is opposed to the relation existing between the cause of sorrow and the sorrowing man. + For every effect is suited to its cause, and consequently is pleasant to it; but the cause of sorrow is disagreeable to him + that sorrows. Hence the effect of sorrow is not related to him that sorrows in the same way as the cause of sorrow is. For + this reason sorrow is assuaged by its effect, on account of the aforesaid + contrariety. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q38_A2-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The relation of effect to cause is like the relation of the object of pleasure to him that takes pleasure in it: because + in each case the one agrees with the other. Now every like thing increases its like. Therefore joy is increased by laughter + and the other effects of joy: except they be excessive, in which case, accidentally, they lessen it. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q38_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The image of that which saddens us, considered in itself, has a natural tendency to increase sorrow: yet from the very fact + that a man imagines himself to be doing that which is fitting according to his actual state, he feels a certain amount of + pleasure. For the same reason if laughter escapes a man when he is so disposed that he thinks he ought to weep, he is sorry + for it, as having done something unbecoming to him, as Cicero says (De Tusc. Quaest. + iii, 27). + </p> + <p id="FS_Q38_A2-p10"></p> + <p id="FS_Q38_A2-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q38_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q38_A3.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q38_A3" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q38_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q38_A4.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q38_A3-p0.1">Whether pain or sorrow are assuaged by the sympathy of friends?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q38_A3-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q38_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the sorrow of sympathizing friends does not assuage our own sorrow. For contraries have contrary effects. + Now as Augustine says (Confess. viii, 4), "when many rejoice together, each one has more exuberant joy, for they are kindled + and inflamed one by the other." Therefore, in like manner, when many are sorrowful, it seems that their sorrow is greater. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q38_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, friendship demands mutual love, as Augustine declares (Confess. iv, 9). But a sympathizing friend is pained at the + sorrow of his friend with whom he sympathizes. Consequently the pain of a sympathizing friend becomes, to the friend in sorrow, + a further cause of sorrow: so that, his pain being doubled his sorrow seems to increase. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q38_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, sorrow arises from every evil affecting a friend, as though it affected oneself: since "a friend is one's other + self" (Ethic. ix, 4,9). But sorrow is an evil. Therefore the sorrow of the sympathizing friend increases the sorrow of the + friend with whom he sympathizes. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q38_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Ethic. ix, 11) that those who are in pain are consoled when their friends sympathize with them. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q38_A3-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> When one is in pain, it is natural that the sympathy of a friend should afford consolation: whereof the Philosopher indicates + a twofold reason (Ethic. ix, 11). The first is because, since sorrow has a depressing effect, it is like a weight whereof + we strive to unburden ourselves: so that when a man sees others saddened by his own sorrow, it seems as though others were + bearing the burden with him, striving, as it were, to lessen its weight; wherefore the load + of sorrow becomes lighter for him: something like what occurs in the carrying of bodily burdens. The second and better reason + is because when a man's friends condole with him, he sees that he is loved by them, and this affords him pleasure, as stated + above (Q[32], A[5]). Consequently, since every pleasure assuages sorrow, as stated above + <a id="FS_Q38_A3-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q38_A1.html">(A[1])</a>, it follows that sorrow is mitigated by a sympathizing friend. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q38_A3-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> In either case there is a proof of friendship, viz. when a man rejoices with the joyful, and when he sorrows with the sorrowful. + Consequently each becomes an object of pleasure by reason of its cause. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q38_A3-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The friend's sorrow itself would be a cause of sorrow: but consideration of its cause, viz. his love, gives rise rather to + pleasure. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q38_A3-p9"> And this suffices for the reply to the Third Objection.</p> + <p id="FS_Q38_A3-p10"></p> + <p id="FS_Q38_A3-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q38_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q38_A4.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q38_A4" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q38_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q38_A5.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q38_A4-p0.1">Whether pain and sorrow are assuaged by the contemplation of truth?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q38_A4-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q38_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the contemplation of truth does not assuage sorrow. For it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q38_A4-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Eccl.1.18" target="asv">Eccles. 1:18</a>): "He that addeth knowledge addeth also sorrow" [Vulg.: 'labor']. But knowledge pertains to the contemplation of truth. Therefore + the contemplation of truth does not assuage sorrow. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q38_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the contemplation of truth belongs to the speculative intellect. But "the speculative intellect is not a principle + of movement"; as stated in De Anima iii, 11. Therefore, since joy and sorrow are movements of the soul, it seems that the + contemplation of truth does not help to assuage sorrow. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q38_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the remedy for an ailment should be applied to the part which ails. But contemplation of truth is in the intellect. + Therefore it does not assuage bodily pain, which is in the senses. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q38_A4-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (Soliloq. i, 12): "It seemed to me that if the light of that truth were to dawn on our minds, either I should + not feel that pain, or at least that pain would seem nothing to me." + </p> + <p id="FS_Q38_A4-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above (Q[3], A[5]), the greatest of all pleasures consists in the contemplation of truth. Now every pleasure assuages + pain as stated above + <a id="FS_Q38_A4-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q38_A1.html">(A[1])</a>: hence the contemplation of truth assuages pain or sorrow, and the more so, the more perfectly one is a lover of wisdom. + And therefore in the midst of tribulations men rejoice in the contemplation of Divine things and of future Happiness, according + to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q38_A4-p6.2" href="./asv.html#Jas.1.2" target="asv"> James + 1:2 + </a>: "My brethren, count it all joy, when you shall fall into divers temptations": and, what is more, even in the midst of bodily + tortures this joy is found; as the "martyr Tiburtius, when he was walking barefoot on the burning coals, said: Methinks, I + walk on roses, in the name of Jesus Christ." [*Cf. Dominican Breviary, August 11th, commemoration of St. Tiburtius.] + </p> + <p id="FS_Q38_A4-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> "He that addeth knowledge, addeth sorrow," either on account of the difficulty and disappointment in the search for truth; + or because knowledge makes man acquainted with many things that are contrary to his will. Accordingly, on the part of the + things known, knowledge causes sorrow: but on the part of the contemplation of truth, it causes pleasure. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q38_A4-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The speculative intellect does not move the mind on the part of the thing contemplated: but on the part of contemplation + itself, which is man's good and naturally pleasant to him. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q38_A4-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> In the powers of the soul there is an overflow from the higher to the lower powers: and accordingly, the pleasure of contemplation, + which is in the higher part, overflows so as to mitigate even that pain which is in the senses. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q38_A4-p10"></p> + <p id="FS_Q38_A4-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q38_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q38_A5.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q38_A5" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q38_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q39.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q38_A5-p0.1">Whether pain and sorrow are assuaged by sleep and baths?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q38_A5-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q38_A5-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that sleep and baths do not assuage sorrow. For sorrow is in the soul: whereas sleep and baths regard the body. + Therefore they do not conduce to the assuaging of sorrow. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q38_A5-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the same effect does not seem to ensue from contrary causes. But these, being bodily things, are incompatible with + the contemplation of truth which is a cause of the assuaging of sorrow, as stated above + <a id="FS_Q38_A5-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q38_A4.html">(A[4])</a>. Therefore sorrow is not mitigated by the like. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q38_A5-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, sorrow and pain, in so far as they affect the body, denote a certain transmutation of the heart. But such remedies + as these seem to pertain to the outward senses and limbs, rather than to the interior disposition of the heart. Therefore + they do not assuage sorrow. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q38_A5-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (Confess. ix, 12): "I had heard that the bath had its name [*Balneum, from the Greek {balaneion}] . . . from + the fact of its driving sadness from the mind." And further on, he says: "I slept, and woke up again, and found my grief not + a little assuaged": and quotes the words from the hymn of Ambrose [*Cf. Sarum Breviary: First Sunday after the octave of the + Epiphany, Hymn for first Vespers], in which it is said that "Sleep restores the tired + limbs to labor, refreshes the weary mind, and banishes sorrow." + </p> + <p id="FS_Q38_A5-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above ( + <a id="FS_Q38_A5-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q37_A4.html">Q[37], A[4]</a>), sorrow, by reason of its specific nature, is repugnant to the vital movement of the body; and consequently whatever restores + the bodily nature to its due state of vital movement, is opposed to sorrow and assuages it. Moreover such remedies, from the + very fact that they bring nature back to its normal state, are causes of pleasure; for this is precisely in what pleasure + consists, as stated above ( + <a id="FS_Q38_A5-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q31_A1.html">Q[31], A[1]</a>). Therefore, since every + pleasure assuages sorrow, sorrow is assuaged by such like bodily remedies. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q38_A5-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The normal disposition of the body, so far as it is felt, is itself a cause of pleasure, and consequently assuages sorrow. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q38_A5-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As stated above ( + <a id="FS_Q38_A5-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q31_A8.html">Q[31], A[8]</a>), one pleasure hinders another; and yet every pleasure assuages sorrow. Consequently it is not unreasonable that sorrow should + be assuaged by causes which hinder one another. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q38_A5-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Every good disposition of the body reacts somewhat on the heart, which is the beginning and end of bodily movements, as stated + in De Causa Mot. Animal. xi. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q38_A5-p10"></p> + <p id="FS_Q38_A5-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q38_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q39.html"></a> + </div> + <a href="summa.FS_Q37_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q38_A1.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q39" class="div3"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q38_A5.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q39_A1.html"></a> + <h3 id="FS_Q39-p0.1">OF THE GOODNESS AND MALICE OF SORROW OR PAIN (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3> + <p id="FS_Q39-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q39-p2"> We must now consider the goodness and malice of pain or sorrow: under which head there are four points of inquiry:</p> + <p id="FS_Q39-p3"> (1) Whether all sorrow is evil?</p> + <p id="FS_Q39-p4"> (2) Whether sorrow can be a virtuous good?</p> + <p id="FS_Q39-p5"> (3) Whether it can be a useful good?</p> + <p id="FS_Q39-p6"> (4) Whether bodily pain is the greatest evil?</p> + <div id="FS_Q39_A1" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q39.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q39_A2.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q39_A1-p0.1">Whether all sorrow is evil?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q39_A1-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q39_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that all sorrow is evil. For Gregory of Nyssa [*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xix.] says: "All sorrow is evil, from + its very nature." Now what is naturally evil, is evil always and everywhere. Therefore, all sorrow is evil. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q39_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, that which all, even the virtuous, avoid, is evil. But all avoid sorrow, even the virtuous, since as stated in Ethic. + vii, 11, "though the prudent man does not aim at pleasure, yet he aims at avoiding sorrow." Therefore sorrow is evil. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q39_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, just as bodily evil is the object and cause of bodily pain, so spiritual evil is the object and cause of sorrow + in the soul. But every bodily pain is a bodily evil. Therefore every spiritual sorrow is an evil of the soul. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q39_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Sorrow for evil is contrary to pleasure in evil. But pleasure in evil is evil: wherefore in condemnation of certain men, + it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q39_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Prov.2.14" target="asv">Prov. 2:14</a>), that "they were glad when they had done evil." Therefore sorrow for evil is good. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q39_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> A thing may be good or evil in two ways: first considered simply and in itself; and thus all sorrow is an evil, because the + mere fact of a man's appetite being uneasy about a present evil, is itself an evil, because it hinders the response of the + appetite in good. Secondly, a thing is said to be good or evil, on the supposition of something else: thus shame is said to + be good, on the supposition of a shameful deed done, as stated in Ethic. iv, 9. + Accordingly, supposing the presence of something saddening or painful, it is a sign of goodness if a man is in sorrow or pain + on account of this present evil. For if he were not to be in sorrow or pain, this could only be either because he feels it + not, or because he does not reckon it as something unbecoming, both of which are manifest evils. Consequently it is a condition + of goodness, that, supposing an evil to be present, sorrow or pain should ensue. Wherefore Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. + viii, 14): "It is also a good thing that he sorrows for the good he has lost: for had not some good remained in his nature, + he could not be punished by the loss of good." Because, however, in the science of Morals, we consider things individually---for + actions are concerned about individuals---that which is good on some supposition, should be considered as good: just as that + which is voluntary on some supposition, is judged to be voluntary, as stated in Ethic. iii, 1, and likewise above ( + <a id="FS_Q39_A1-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q6_A6.html">Q[6], A[6]</a>). + </p> + <p id="FS_Q39_A1-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Gregory of Nyssa [*Nemesius] is speaking of sorrow on the part of the evil that causes it, but not on the part of the subject + that feels and rejects the evil. And from this point of view, all shun sorrow, inasmuch as they shun evil: but they do not + shun the perception and rejection of evil. The same also applies to bodily pain: because the perception and rejection of bodily + evil is the proof of the goodness of nature. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q39_A1-p8"> This suffices for the Replies to the Second and Third Objections.</p> + <p id="FS_Q39_A1-p9"></p> + <p id="FS_Q39_A1-p10"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q39.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q39_A2.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q39_A2" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q39_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q39_A3.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q39_A2-p0.1">Whether sorrow can be a virtuous good?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q39_A2-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q39_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that sorrow is not a virtuous good. For that which leads to hell is not a virtuous good. But, as Augustine + says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 33), "Jacob seems to have feared lest he should be troubled overmuch by sorrow, and so, instead of + entering into the rest of the blessed, be consigned to the hell of sinners." Therefore sorrow is not a virtuous good. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q39_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the virtuous good is praiseworthy and meritorious. But sorrow lessens praise or merit: for the Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q39_A2-p3.1" href="./asv.html#iiCor.9.7" target="asv">2 Cor. 9:7</a>): "Everyone, as he hath determined in his heart, not with sadness, or of necessity." Therefore sorrow is not a virtuous good. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q39_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 15), "sorrow is concerned about those things which happen against our will." + But not to will those things which are actually taking place, is to have a will opposed to the decree of God, to Whose providence + whatever is done is subject. Since, then, conformity of the human to the Divine will is a condition of the rectitude of the + will, as stated above ( + <a id="FS_Q39_A2-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q19_A9.html">Q[19], A[9]</a>), it seems that sorrow is + incompatible with rectitude of the will, and that consequently it is not virtuous. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q39_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Whatever merits the reward of eternal life is virtuous. But such is sorrow; as is evident from + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q39_A2-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.5.5" target="asv"> Mat. 5:5</a>: "Blessed are they that mourn, for they shall be comforted." Therefore sorrow is a virtuous good. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q39_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> In so far as sorrow is good, it can be a virtuous good. For it has been said above + <a id="FS_Q39_A2-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q39_A1.html">(A[1])</a> that sorrow is a good inasmuch as it denotes perception and rejection of evil. These two things, as regards bodily pain, + are a proof of the goodness of nature, to which it is due that the senses perceive, and that nature shuns, the harmful thing + that causes pain. As regards interior sorrow, perception of the evil is sometimes due to a right + judgment of reason; while the rejection of the evil is the act of the will, well disposed and detesting that evil. Now every + virtuous good results from these two things, the rectitude of the reason and the will. Wherefore it is evident that sorrow + may be a virtuous good. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q39_A2-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> All the passions of the soul should be regulated according to the rule of reason, which is the root of the virtuous good; + but excessive sorrow, of which Augustine is speaking, oversteps this rule, and therefore it fails to be a virtuous good. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q39_A2-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Just as sorrow for an evil arises from a right will and reason, which detest the evil, so sorrow for a good is due to a perverse + reason and will, which detest the good. Consequently such sorrow is an obstacle to the praise and merit of the virtuous good; + for instance, when a man gives an alms sorrowfully. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q39_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Some things do actually happen, not because God wills, but because He permits them to happen---such as sins. Consequently + a will that is opposed to sin, whether in oneself or in another, is not discordant from the Divine will. Penal evils happen + actually, even by God's will. But it is not necessary for the rectitude of his will, that man should will them in themselves: + but only that he should not revolt against the order of Divine justice, as stated + above ( + <a id="FS_Q39_A2-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q19_A10.html">Q[19], A[10]</a>). + </p> + <p id="FS_Q39_A2-p10"></p> + <p id="FS_Q39_A2-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q39_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q39_A3.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q39_A3" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q39_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q39_A4.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q39_A3-p0.1">Whether sorrow can be a useful good?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q39_A3-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q39_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that sorrow cannot be a useful good. For it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q39_A3-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.30.25" target="asv">Ecclus. 30:25</a>): "Sadness hath killed many, and there is no profit in it." + </p> + <p id="FS_Q39_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, choice is of that which is useful to an end. But sorrow is not an object of choice; in fact, "a thing without sorrow + is to be chosen rather than the same thing with sorrow" (Topic. iii, 2). Therefore sorrow is not a useful good. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q39_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, "Everything is for the sake of its own operation," as stated in De Coel. ii, 3. But "sorrow hinders operation," + as stated in Ethic. x, 5. Therefore sorrow is not a useful good. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q39_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The wise man seeks only that which is useful. But according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q39_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Eccl.7.5" target="asv"> Eccles. 7:5, </a> "the heart of the wise is where there is mourning, and the heart of fools where there is mirth." Therefore sorrow is useful. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q39_A3-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> A twofold movement of the appetite ensues from a present evil. One is that whereby the appetite is opposed to the present + evil; and, in this respect, sorrow is of no use; because that which is present, cannot be not present. The other movement + arises in the appetite to the effect of avoiding or expelling the saddening evil: and, in this respect, sorrow is of use, + if it be for something which ought to be avoided. Because there are two reasons for which it may + be right to avoid a thing. First, because it should be avoided in itself, on account of its being contrary to good; for instance, + sin. Wherefore sorrow for sin is useful as inducing a man to avoid sin: hence the Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q39_A3-p6.1" href="./asv.html#iiCor.7.9" target="asv">2 Cor. 7:9</a>): "I am glad: not because you were made sorrowful, but because you were made sorrowful unto penance." Secondly, a thing is + to be avoided, not as though it were evil in itself, but because it is an occasion of evil; either through one's being + attached to it, and loving it too much, or through one's being thrown headlong thereby into an evil, as is evident in the + case of temporal goods. And, in this respect, sorrow for temporal goods may be useful; according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q39_A3-p6.2" href="./asv.html#Eccl.7.3" target="asv"> Eccles. 7:3</a>: "It is better to go to the house of mourning, than to the house of feasting: for in that we are put in mind of the end of + all." + </p> + <p id="FS_Q39_A3-p7"> Moreover, sorrow for that which ought to be avoided is always useful, since it adds another motive for avoiding it. Because + the very evil is in itself a thing to be avoided: while everyone avoids sorrow for its own sake, just as everyone seeks the + good, and pleasure in the good. Therefore just as pleasure in the good makes one seek the good more earnestly, so sorrow for + evil makes one avoid evil more eagerly. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q39_A3-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This passage is to be taken as referring to excessive sorrow, which consumes the soul: for such sorrow paralyzes the soul, + and hinders it from shunning evil, as stated above ( + <a id="FS_Q39_A3-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q37_A2.html">Q[37], A[2]</a>). + </p> + <p id="FS_Q39_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Just as any object of choice becomes less eligible by reason of sorrow, so that which ought to be shunned is still more to + be shunned by reason of sorrow: and, in this respect, sorrow is useful. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q39_A3-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Sorrow caused by an action hinders that action: but sorrow for the cessation of an action, makes one do it more earnestly. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q39_A3-p11"></p> + <p id="FS_Q39_A3-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q39_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q39_A4.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q39_A4" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q39_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q40.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q39_A4-p0.1">Whether bodily pain is the greatest evil?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q39_A4-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q39_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that pain is the greatest evil. Because "the worst is contrary to the best" (Ethic. viii, 10). But a certain + pleasure is the greatest good, viz. the pleasure of bliss. Therefore a certain pain is the greatest evil. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q39_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, happiness is man's greatest good, because it is his last end. But man's Happiness consists in his "having whatever + he will, and in willing naught amiss," as stated above ( + <a id="FS_Q39_A4-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q3_A4.html">Q[3], A[4]</a>, OBJ[5]; + <a id="FS_Q39_A4-p3.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q5_A8.html"> Q[5], A[8]</a>, OBJ[3]). Therefore man's greatest good consists in the fulfilment of his will. Now pain consists in something happening + contrary to the will, as Augustine declares (De Civ. Dei xiv, 6,15). Therefore pain + is man's greatest evil. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q39_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Augustine argues thus (Soliloq. i, 12): "We are composed of two parts, i.e. of a soul and a body, whereof the body + is the inferior. Now the sovereign good is the greatest good of the better part: while the supreme evil is the greatest evil + of the inferior part. But wisdom is the greatest good of the soul; while the worst thing in the body is pain. Therefore man's + greatest good is to be wise: while his greatest evil is to suffer pain." + </p> + <p id="FS_Q39_A4-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Guilt is a greater evil than punishment, as was stated in the + <a id="FS_Q39_A4-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q48_A6.html">FP, Q[48], A[6]</a>. But sorrow or pain belongs to the punishment of sin, just as the enjoyment of changeable things is an evil of guilt. For + Augustine says (De Vera Relig. xii): "What is pain of the soul, except for the soul to be deprived of that which it was wont + to enjoy, or had hoped to enjoy? And this is all that is called evil, i.e. sin, and the punishment of sin." + Therefore sorrow or pain is not man's greatest evil. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q39_A4-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> It is impossible for any sorrow or pain to be man's greatest evil. For all sorrow or pain is either for something that is + truly evil, or for something that is apparently evil, but good in reality. Now pain or sorrow for that which is truly evil + cannot be the greatest evil: for there is something worse, namely, either not to reckon as evil that which is really evil, + or not to reject it. Again, sorrow or pain, for that which is apparently evil, but really + good, cannot be the greatest evil, for it would be worse to be altogether separated from that which is truly good. Hence it + is impossible for any sorrow or pain to be man's greatest evil. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q39_A4-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Pleasure and sorrow have two good points in common: namely, a true judgment concerning good and evil; and the right order + of the will in approving of good and rejecting evil. Thus it is clear that in pain or sorrow there is a good, by the removal + of which they become worse: and yet there is not an evil in every pleasure, by the removal of which the pleasure is better. + Consequently, a pleasure can be man's highest good, in the way above stated ( + <a id="FS_Q39_A4-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q34_A3.html">Q[34], + A[3] + </a>): whereas sorrow cannot be man's greatest evil. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q39_A4-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The very fact of the will being opposed to evil is a good. And for this reason, sorrow or pain cannot be the greatest evil; + because it has an admixture of good. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q39_A4-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> That which harms the better thing is worse than that which harms the worse. Now a thing is called evil "because it harms," + as Augustine says (Enchiridion xii). Therefore that which is an evil to the soul is a greater evil than that which is an evil + to the body. Therefore this argument does not prove: nor does Augustine give it as his own, but as taken from another [*Cornelius + Celsus]. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q39_A4-p10"></p> + <p id="FS_Q39_A4-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q39_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q40.html"></a> + </div> + <a href="summa.FS_Q38_A5.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q39_A1.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q40" class="div3"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q39_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q40_A1.html"></a> + <h3 id="FS_Q40-p0.1">OF THE IRASCIBLE PASSIONS, AND FIRST, OF HOPE AND DESPAIR (EIGHT ARTICLES)</h3> + <p id="FS_Q40-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q40-p2"> We must now consider the irascible passions: (1) Hope and despair; (2) Fear and daring; (3) Anger. Under first head there + are eight points of inquiry: + </p> + <p id="FS_Q40-p3"> (1) Whether hope is the same as desire or cupidity?</p> + <p id="FS_Q40-p4"> (2) Whether hope is in the apprehensive, or in the appetitive faculty?</p> + <p id="FS_Q40-p5"> (3) Whether hope is in dumb animals?</p> + <p id="FS_Q40-p6"> (4) Whether despair is contrary to hope?</p> + <p id="FS_Q40-p7"> (5) Whether experience is a cause of hope?</p> + <p id="FS_Q40-p8"> (6) Whether hope abounds in young men and drunkards?</p> + <p id="FS_Q40-p9"> (7) Concerning the order of hope to love;</p> + <p id="FS_Q40-p10"> (8) Whether love conduces to action?</p> + <div id="FS_Q40_A1" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q40.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q40_A2.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q40_A1-p0.1">Whether hope is the same as desire of cupidity?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q40_A1-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q40_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that hope is the same as desire or cupidity. Because hope is reckoned as one of the four principal passions. + But Augustine in setting down the four principal passions puts cupidity in the place of hope (De Civ. Dei xiv, 3,7). Therefore + hope is the same as cupidity or desire. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q40_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, passions differ according to their objects. But the object of hope is the same as the object of cupidity or desire, + viz. the future good. Therefore hope is the same as cupidity or desire. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q40_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> If it be said that hope, in addition to desire, denotes the possibility of obtaining the future good; on the contrary, whatever + is accidental to the object does not make a different species of passion. But possibility of acquisition is accidental to + a future good, which is the object of cupidity or desire, and of hope. Therefore hope does not differ specifically from desire + or cupidity. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q40_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> To different powers belong different species of passions. But hope is in the irascible power; whereas desire or cupidity + is in the concupiscible. Therefore hope differs specifically from desire or cupidity. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q40_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The species of a passion is taken from the object. Now, in the object of hope, we may note four conditions. First, that it + is something good; since, properly speaking, hope regards only the good; in this respect, hope differs from fear, which regards + evil. Secondly, that it is future; for hope does not regard that which is present and already possessed: in this respect, + hope differs from joy which regards a present good. Thirdly, that it must be something + arduous and difficult to obtain, for we do not speak of any one hoping for trifles, which are in one's power to have at any + time: in this respect, hope differs from desire or cupidity, which regards the future good absolutely: wherefore it belongs + to the concupiscible, while hope belongs to the irascible faculty. Fourthly, that this difficult thing is something possible + to obtain: for one does not hope for that which one cannot get at all: and, in this respect, hope differs from despair. It + is + therefore evident that hope differs from desire, as the irascible passions differ from the concupiscible. For this reason, + moreover, hope presupposes desire: just as all irascible passions presuppose the passions of the concupiscible faculty, as + stated above ( + <a id="FS_Q40_A1-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q25_A1.html">Q[25], A[1]</a>). + </p> + <p id="FS_Q40_A1-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Augustine mentions desire instead of hope, because each regards future good; and because the good which is not arduous is + reckoned as nothing: thus implying that desire seems to tend chiefly to the arduous good, to which hope tends likewise. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q40_A1-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The object of hope is the future good considered, not absolutely, but as arduous and difficult of attainment, as stated above. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q40_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The object of hope adds not only possibility to the object of desire, but also difficulty: and this makes hope belong to + another power, viz. the irascible, which regards something difficult, as stated in the + <a id="FS_Q40_A1-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q81_A2.html">FP, Q[81], A[2]</a>. Moreover, possibility and impossibility are not altogether accidental to the object of the appetitive power: because the + appetite is a principle of movement; and nothing is moved to anything except under + the aspect of being possible; for no one is moved to that which he reckons impossible to get. Consequently hope differs from + despair according to the difference of possible and impossible. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q40_A1-p10"></p> + <p id="FS_Q40_A1-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q40.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q40_A2.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q40_A2" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q40_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q40_A3.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q40_A2-p0.1">Whether hope is in the apprehensive or in the appetitive power?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q40_A2-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q40_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that hope belongs to the cognitive power. Because hope, seemingly, is a kind of awaiting; for the Apostle says + ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q40_A2-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.8.25" target="asv">Rom. 8:25</a>): "If we hope for that which we see not; we wait for it with patience." But awaiting seems to belong to the cognitive power, + which we exercise by "looking out." Therefore hope belongs to the cognitive power. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q40_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, apparently hope is the same as confidence; hence when a man hopes he is said to be confident, as though to hope + and to be confident were the same thing. But confidence, like faith, seems to belong to the cognitive power. Therefore hope + does too. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q40_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, certainty is a property of the cognitive power. But certainty is ascribed to hope. Therefore hope belongs to the + cognitive power. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q40_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Hope regards good, as stated above + <a id="FS_Q40_A2-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q40_A1.html">(A[1])</a>. Now good, as such, is not the object of the cognitive, but of the appetitive power. Therefore hope belongs, not to the cognitive, + but to the appetitive power. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q40_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Since hope denotes a certain stretching out of the appetite towards good, it evidently belongs to the appetitive power; since + movement towards things belongs properly to the appetite: whereas the action of the cognitive power is accomplished not by + the movement of the knower towards things, but rather according as the things known are in the knower. But since the cognitive + power moves the appetite, by presenting its object to it; there arise in the appetite + various movements according to various aspects of the apprehended object. For the apprehension of good gives rise to one kind + of movement in the appetite, while the apprehension of evil gives rise to another: in like manner various movements arise + from the apprehension of something present and of something future; of something considered absolutely, and of something considered + as arduous; of something possible, and of something impossible. And accordingly hope is a movement of the appetitive + power ensuing from the apprehension of a future good, difficult but possible to obtain; namely, a stretching forth of the + appetite to such a good. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q40_A2-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Since hope regards a possible good, there arises in man a twofold movement of hope; for a thing may be possible to him in + two ways, viz. by his own power, or by another's. Accordingly when a man hopes to obtain something by his own power, he is + not said to wait for it, but simply to hope for it. But, properly speaking, he is said to await that which he hopes to get + by another's help as though to await [exspectare] implied keeping one's eyes on another + [ex alio spectare], in so far as the apprehensive power, by going ahead, not only keeps its eye on the good which man intends + to get, but also on the thing by whose power he hopes to get it; according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q40_A2-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.51.10" target="asv"> Ecclus. 51:10, </a> "I looked for the succor of men." Wherefore the movement of hope is sometimes called expectation, on account of the preceding + inspection of the cognitive power. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q40_A2-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> When a man desires a thing and reckons that he can get it, he believes that he can get it, he believes that he will get it; + and from this belief which precedes in the cognitive power, the ensuing movement in the appetite is called confidence. Because + the movement of the appetite takes its name from the knowledge that precedes it, as an effect from a cause which is better + known; for the apprehensive power knows its own act better than that of the + appetite. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q40_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Certainty is ascribed to the movement, not only of the sensitive, but also of the natural appetite; thus we say that a stone + is certain to tend downwards. This is owing to the inerrancy which the movement of the sensitive or even natural appetite + derives from the certainty of the knowledge that precedes it. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q40_A2-p10"></p> + <p id="FS_Q40_A2-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q40_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q40_A3.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q40_A3" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q40_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q40_A4.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q40_A3-p0.1">Whether hope is in dumb animals?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q40_A3-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q40_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that there is no hope in dumb animals. Because hope is for some future good, as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. + ii, 12). But knowledge of the future is not in the competency of dumb animals, whose knowledge is confined to the senses and + does not extend to the future. Therefore there is no hope in dumb animals. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q40_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the object of hope is a future good, possible of attainment. But possible and impossible are differences of the + true and the false, which are only in the mind, as the Philosopher states (Metaph. vi, 4). Therefore there is no hope in dumb + animals, since they have no mind. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q40_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. ix, 14) that "animals are moved by the things that they see." But hope is of things + unseen: "for what a man seeth, why doth he hope for?" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q40_A3-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.8.24" target="asv">Rom. 8:24</a>). Therefore there is no hope in dumb animals. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q40_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Hope is an irascible passion. But the irascible faculty is in dumb animals. Therefore hope is also. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q40_A3-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The internal passions of animals can be gathered from their outward movements: from which it is clear that hope is in dumb + animals. For if a dog see a hare, or a hawk see a bird, too far off, it makes no movement towards it, as having no hope to + catch it: whereas, if it be near, it makes a movement towards it, as being in hopes of catching it. Because as stated above + ( + <a id="FS_Q40_A3-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q1_A2.html">Q[1], A[2]</a>; + <a id="FS_Q40_A3-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q26_A1.html"> Q[26], A[1]</a>; + <a id="FS_Q40_A3-p6.3" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q35_A1.html"> Q[35], A[1]</a>), the sensitive appetite of dumb animals, and likewise the natural appetite of insensible things, result from the apprehension + of an intellect, just as the appetite of the intellectual nature, which is called the will. But there is a difference, in + that the will is moved by an apprehension of the intellect in the same subject; whereas the movement of the natural appetite + results from the apprehension of the separate Intellect, Who is the Author of nature; as + does also the sensitive appetite of dumb animals, who act from a certain natural instinct. Consequently, in the actions of + irrational animals and of other natural things, we observe a procedure which is similar to that which we observe in the actions + of art: and in this way hope and despair are in dumb animals. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q40_A3-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Although dumb animals do not know the future, yet an animal is moved by its natural instinct to something future, as though + it foresaw the future. Because this instinct is planted in them by the Divine Intellect that foresees the future. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q40_A3-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The object of hope is not the possible as differentiating the true, for thus the possible ensues from the relation of a predicate + to a subject. The object of hope is the possible as compared to a power. For such is the division of the possible given in + Metaph. v, 12, i.e. into the two kinds we have just mentioned. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q40_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Although the thing which is future does not come under the object of sight; nevertheless through seeing something present, + an animal's appetite is moved to seek or avoid something future. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q40_A3-p10"></p> + <p id="FS_Q40_A3-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q40_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q40_A4.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q40_A4" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q40_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q40_A5.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q40_A4-p0.1">Whether despair is contrary to hope?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q40_A4-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q40_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that despair is not contrary to hope. Because "to one thing there is one contrary" (Metaph. x, 5). But fear + is contrary to hope. Therefore despair is not contrary to hope. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q40_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, contraries seem to bear on the same thing. But hope and despair do not bear on the same thing: since hope regards + the good, whereas despair arises from some evil that is in the way of obtaining good. Therefore hope is not contrary to despair. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q40_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, movement is contrary to movement: while repose is in opposition to movement as a privation thereof. But despair + seems to imply immobility rather than movement. Therefore it is not contrary to hope, which implies movement of stretching + out towards the hoped-for good. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q40_A4-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The very name of despair [desperatio] implies that it is contrary to hope [spes]. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q40_A4-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above ( + <a id="FS_Q40_A4-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q23_A2.html">Q[23], A[2]</a>), there is a twofold contrariety of movements. One is in respect of approach to contrary terms: and this contrariety alone + is to be found in the concupiscible passions, for instance between love and hatred. The other is according to approach and + withdrawal with regard to the same term; and is to be found in the irascible passions, as stated above ( + <a id="FS_Q40_A4-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q23_A2.html">Q[23], A[2]</a>). Now the object of + hope, which is the arduous good, has the character of a principle of attraction, if it be considered in the light of something + attainable; and thus hope tends thereto, for it denotes a kind of approach. But in so far as it is considered as unobtainable, + it has the character of a principle of repulsion, because, as stated in Ethic. iii, 3, "when men come to an impossibility + they disperse." And this is how despair stands in regard to this object, wherefore it implies a movement of withdrawal: and + consequently it is contrary to hope, as withdrawal is to approach. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q40_A4-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Fear is contrary to hope, because their objects, i.e. good and evil, are contrary: for this contrariety is found in the irascible + passions, according as they ensue from the passions of the concupiscible. But despair is contrary to hope, only by contrariety + of approach and withdrawal. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q40_A4-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Despair does not regard evil as such; sometimes however it regards evil accidentally, as making the difficult good impossible + to obtain. But it can arise from the mere excess of good. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q40_A4-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Despair implies not only privation of hope, but also a recoil from the thing desired, by reason of its being esteemed impossible + to get. Hence despair, like hope, presupposes desire; because we neither hope for nor despair of that which we do not desire + to have. For this reason, too, each of them regards the good, which is the object of desire. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q40_A4-p10"></p> + <p id="FS_Q40_A4-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q40_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q40_A5.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q40_A5" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q40_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q40_A6.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q40_A5-p0.1">Whether experience is a cause of hope?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q40_A5-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q40_A5-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that experience is not a cause of hope. Because experience belongs to the cognitive power; wherefore the Philosopher + says (Ethic. ii, 1) that "intellectual virtue needs experience and time." But hope is not in the cognitive power, but in the + appetite, as stated above + <a id="FS_Q40_A5-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q40_A2.html">(A[2])</a>. Therefore experience is not a cause of hope. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q40_A5-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 13) that "the old are slow to hope, on account of their experience"; whence it seems + to follow that experience causes want of hope. But the same cause is not productive of opposites. Therefore experience is + not a cause of hope. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q40_A5-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the Philosopher says (De Coel. ii, 5) that "to have something to say about everything, without leaving anything + out, is sometimes a proof of folly." But to attempt everything seems to point to great hopes; while folly arises from inexperience. + Therefore inexperience, rather than experience, seems to be a cause of hope. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q40_A5-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 8) "some are hopeful, through having been victorious often and over many opponents": which + seems to pertain to experience. Therefore experience is a cause of hope. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q40_A5-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above + <a id="FS_Q40_A5-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q40_A1.html">(A[1])</a>, the object of hope is a future good, difficult but possible to obtain. Consequently a thing may be a cause of hope, either + because it makes something possible to a man: or because it makes him think something possible. In the first way hope is caused + by everything that increases a man's power; e.g. riches, strength, and, among others, experience: since by experience man + acquires the faculty of doing something + easily, and the result of this is hope. Wherefore Vegetius says (De Re Milit. i): "No one fears to do that which he is sure + of having learned well." + </p> + <p id="FS_Q40_A5-p7"> In the second way, hope is caused by everything that makes man think that he can obtain something: and thus both teaching + and persuasion may be a cause of hope. And then again experience is a cause of hope, in so far as it makes him reckon something + possible, which before his experience he looked upon as impossible. However, in this way, experience can cause a lack of hope: + because just as it makes a man think possible what he had previously thought impossible; so, conversely, + experience makes a man consider as impossible that which hitherto he had thought possible. Accordingly experience causes hope + in two ways, despair in one way: and for this reason we may say rather that it causes hope. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q40_A5-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Experience in matters pertaining to action not only produces knowledge; it also causes a certain habit, by reason of custom, + which renders the action easier. Moreover, the intellectual virtue itself adds to the power of acting with ease: because it + shows something to be possible; and thus is a cause of hope. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q40_A5-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The old are wanting in hope because of their experience, in so far as experience makes them think something impossible. Hence + he adds (Rhet. ii, 13) that "many evils have befallen them." + </p> + <p id="FS_Q40_A5-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Folly and inexperience can be a cause of hope accidentally as it were, by removing the knowledge which would help one to + judge truly a thing to be impossible. Wherefore inexperience is a cause of hope, for the same reason as experience causes + lack of hope. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q40_A5-p11"></p> + <p id="FS_Q40_A5-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q40_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q40_A6.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q40_A6" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q40_A5.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q40_A7.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q40_A6-p0.1">Whether hope abounds in young men and drunkards?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q40_A6-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q40_A6-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that youth and drunkenness are not causes of hope. Because hope implies certainty and steadiness; so much so + that it is compared to an anchor ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q40_A6-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Heb.6.19" target="asv">Heb. 6:19</a>). But young men and drunkards are wanting in steadiness; since their minds are easily changed. Therefore youth and drunkenness + are not causes of hope. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q40_A6-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, as stated above + <a id="FS_Q40_A6-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q40_A5.html">(A[5])</a>, the cause of hope is chiefly whatever increases one's power. But youth and drunkenness are united to weakness. Therefore + they are not causes of hope. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q40_A6-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, experience is a cause of hope, as stated above + <a id="FS_Q40_A6-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q40_A5.html">(A[5])</a>. But youth lacks experience. Therefore it is not a cause of hope. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q40_A6-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 8) that "drunken men are hopeful": and (Rhet. ii, 12) that "the young are full of hope." + </p> + <p id="FS_Q40_A6-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Youth is a cause of hope for three reasons, as the Philosopher states in Rhet. ii, 12: and these three reasons may be gathered + from the three conditions of the good which is the object of hope---namely, that it is future, arduous and possible, as stated + above + <a id="FS_Q40_A6-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q40_A1.html">(A[1])</a>. For youth has much of the future before it, and little of the past: and therefore since memory is of the past, and hope + of the future, it has little to remember and + lives very much in hope. Again, youths, on account of the heat of their nature, are full of spirit; so that their heart expands: + and it is owing to the heart being expanded that one tends to that which is arduous; wherefore youths are spirited and hopeful. + Likewise they who have not suffered defeat, nor had experience of obstacles to their efforts, are prone to count a thing possible + to them. Wherefore youths, through inexperience of obstacles and of their own shortcomings, easily count a thing + possible; and consequently are of good hope. Two of these causes are also in those who are in drink---viz. heat and high spirits, + on account of wine, and heedlessness of dangers and shortcomings. For the same reason all foolish and thoughtless persons + attempt everything and are full of hope. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q40_A6-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Although youths and men in drink lack steadiness in reality, yet they are steady in their own estimation, for they think + that they will steadily obtain that which they hope for. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q40_A6-p8"> In like manner, in reply to the Second Objection, we must observe that young people and men in drink are indeed unsteady + in reality: but, in their own estimation, they are capable, for they know not their shortcomings. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q40_A6-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Not only experience, but also lack of experience, is, in some way, a cause of hope, as explained above (A[5], ad 3). + </p> + <p id="FS_Q40_A6-p10"></p> + <p id="FS_Q40_A6-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q40_A5.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q40_A7.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q40_A7" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q40_A6.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q40_A8.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q40_A7-p0.1">Whether hope is a cause of love?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q40_A7-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q40_A7-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that hope is not a cause of love. Because, according to Augustine (De Civ. Dei xiv, 7,9), love is the first + of the soul's emotions. But hope is an emotion of the soul. Therefore love precedes hope, and consequently hope does not cause + love. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q40_A7-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, desire precedes hope. But desire is caused by love, as stated above ( + <a id="FS_Q40_A7-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q25_A2.html">Q[25], A[2]</a>). Therefore hope, too, follows love, and consequently is not its cause. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q40_A7-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, hope causes pleasure, as stated above ( + <a id="FS_Q40_A7-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q32_A3.html">Q[32], A[3]</a>). But pleasure is only of the good that is loved. Therefore love precedes hope. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q40_A7-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The gloss commenting on + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q40_A7-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.1.2" target="asv"> Mat. 1:2, </a> "Abraham begot Isaac, and Isaac begot Jacob," says, i.e. "faith begets hope, and hope begets charity." But charity is love. + Therefore love is caused by hope. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q40_A7-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Hope can regard two things. For it regards as its object, the good which one hopes for. But since the good we hope for is + something difficult but possible to obtain; and since it happens sometimes that what is difficult becomes possible to us, + not through ourselves but through others; hence it is that hope regards also that by which something becomes possible to us. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q40_A7-p7"> In so far, then, as hope regards the good we hope to get, it is caused by love: since we do not hope save for that which + we desire and love. But in so far as hope regards one through whom something becomes possible to us, love is caused by hope, + and not vice versa. Because by the very fact that we hope that good will accrue to us through someone, we are moved towards + him as to our own good; and thus we begin to love him. Whereas from the fact that we love someone we do not hope + in him, except accidentally, that is, in so far as we think that he returns our love. Wherefore the fact of being loved by + another makes us hope in him; but our love for him is caused by the hope we have in him. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q40_A7-p8"> Wherefore the Replies to the Objections are evident.</p> + <p id="FS_Q40_A7-p9"></p> + <p id="FS_Q40_A7-p10"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q40_A6.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q40_A8.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q40_A8" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q40_A7.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q41.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q40_A8-p0.1">Whether hope is a help or a hindrance to action?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q40_A8-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q40_A8-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that hope is not a help but a hindrance to action. Because hope implies security. But security begets negligence + which hinders action. Therefore hope is a hindrance to action. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q40_A8-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, sorrow hinders action, as stated above ( + <a id="FS_Q40_A8-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q37_A3.html">Q[37], A[3]</a>). But hope sometimes causes sorrow: for it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q40_A8-p3.2" href="./asv.html#Prov.13.12" target="asv">Prov. 13:12</a>): "Hope that is deferred afflicteth the soul." Therefore hope hinders action. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q40_A8-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, despair is contrary to hope, as stated above + <a id="FS_Q40_A8-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q40_A4.html">(A[4])</a>. But despair, especially in matters of war, conduces to action; for it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q40_A8-p4.2" href="./asv.html#iiKgdms.2.26" target="asv">2 Kings 2:26</a>), that "it is dangerous to drive people to despair." Therefore hope has a contrary effect, namely, by hindering action. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q40_A8-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q40_A8-p5.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.9.10" target="asv">1 Cor. 9:10</a>) that "he that plougheth should plough in hope . . . to receive fruit": and the same applies to all other actions. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q40_A8-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Hope of its very nature is a help to action by making it more intense: and this for two reasons. First, by reason of its + object, which is a good, difficult but possible. For the thought of its being difficult arouses our attention; while the thought + that it is possible is no drag on our effort. Hence it follows that by reason of hope man is intent on his action. Secondly, + on account of its effect. Because hope, as stated above ( + <a id="FS_Q40_A8-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q32_A3.html">Q[32], + A[3] + </a>), causes pleasure; which is a help to action, as stated above ( + <a id="FS_Q40_A8-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q33_A4.html">Q[33], A[4]</a>). Therefore hope is conducive to action. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q40_A8-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Hope regards a good to be obtained; security regards an evil to be avoided. Wherefore security seems to be contrary to fear + rather than to belong to hope. Yet security does not beget negligence, save in so far as it lessens the idea of difficulty: + whereby it also lessens the character of hope: for the things in which a man fears no hindrance, are no longer looked upon + as difficult. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q40_A8-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Hope of itself causes pleasure; it is by accident that it causes sorrow, as stated above ( + <a id="FS_Q40_A8-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q32_A3.html">Q[32], A[3]</a>, ad 2). + </p> + <p id="FS_Q40_A8-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Despair threatens danger in war, on account of a certain hope that attaches to it. For they who despair of flight, strive + less to fly, but hope to avenge their death: and therefore in this hope they fight the more bravely, and consequently prove + dangerous to the foe. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q40_A8-p10"></p> + <p id="FS_Q40_A8-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q40_A7.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q41.html"></a> + </div> + <a href="summa.FS_Q39_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q40_A1.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q41" class="div3"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q40_A8.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q41_A1.html"></a> + <h3 id="FS_Q41-p0.1">OF FEAR, IN ITSELF (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3> + <p id="FS_Q41-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q41-p2"> We must now consider, in the first place, fear; and, secondly, daring. With regard to fear, four things must be considered: + (1) Fear, in itself; (2) Its object; (3) Its cause; (4) Its effect. Under the first head there are four points of inquiry: + </p> + <p id="FS_Q41-p3"> (1) Whether fear is a passion of the soul?</p> + <p id="FS_Q41-p4"> (2) Whether fear is a special passion?</p> + <p id="FS_Q41-p5"> (3) Whether there is a natural fear?</p> + <p id="FS_Q41-p6"> (4) Of the species of fear.</p> + <div id="FS_Q41_A1" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q41.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q41_A2.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q41_A1-p0.1">Whether fear is a passion of the soul?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q41_A1-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q41_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that fear is not a passion of the soul. For Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 23) that "fear is a power, by + way of {systole}"---i.e. of contraction---"desirous of vindicating nature." But no virtue is a passion, as is proved in Ethic. + ii, 5. Therefore fear is not a passion. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q41_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, every passion is an effect due to the presence of an agent. But fear is not of something present, but of something + future, as Damascene declares (De Fide Orth. ii, 12). Therefore fear is not a passion. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q41_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, every passion of the soul is a movement of the sensitive appetite, in consequence of an apprehension of the senses. + But sense apprehends, not the future but the present. Since, then, fear is of future evil, it seems that it is not a passion + of the soul. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q41_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine (De Civ. Dei xiv, 5, seqq.) reckons fear among the other passions of the soul. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q41_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Among the other passions of the soul, after sorrow, fear chiefly has the character of passion. For as we have stated above + (Q[22] ), the notion of passion implies first of all a movement of a passive power---i.e. of a power whose object is compared + to it as its active principle: since passion is the effect of an agent. In this way, both "to feel" and "to understand" are + passions. Secondly, more properly speaking, passion is a movement of the appetitive + power; and more properly still, it is a movement of an appetitive power that has a bodily organ, such movement being accompanied + by a bodily transmutation. And, again, most properly those movements are called passions, which imply some deterioration. + Now it is evident that fear, since it regards evil, belongs to the appetitive power, which of itself regards good and evil. + Moreover, it belongs to the sensitive appetite: for it is accompanied by a certain transmutation---i.e. contraction---as + Damascene says (Cf. OBJ 1). Again, it implies relation to evil as overcoming, so to speak, some particular good. Wherefore + it has most properly the character of passion; less, however, than sorrow, which regards the present evil: because fear regards + future evil, which is not so strong a motive as present evil. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q41_A1-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Virtue denotes a principle of action: wherefore, in so far as the interior movements of the appetitive faculty are principles + of external action, they are called virtues. But the Philosopher denies that passion is a virtue by way of habit. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q41_A1-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Just as the passion of a natural body is due to the bodily presence of an agent, so is the passion of the soul due to the + agent being present to the soul, although neither corporally nor really present: that is to say, in so far as the evil which + is really future, is present in the apprehension of the soul. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q41_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The senses do not apprehend the future: but from apprehending the present, an animal is moved by natural instinct to hope + for a future good, or to fear a future evil. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q41_A1-p10"></p> + <p id="FS_Q41_A1-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q41.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q41_A2.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q41_A2" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q41_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q41_A3.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q41_A2-p0.1">Whether fear is a special passion?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q41_A2-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q41_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that fear is not a special passion. For Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 33) that "the man who is not distraught + by fear, is neither harassed by desire, nor wounded by sickness"---i.e. sorrow---"nor tossed about in transports of empty + joys." Wherefore it seems that, if fear be set aside, all the other passions are removed. Therefore fear is not a special + but a general passion. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q41_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 2) that "pursuit and avoidance in the appetite are what affirmation and denial + are in the intellect." But denial is nothing special in the intellect, as neither is affirmation, but something common to + many. Therefore neither is avoidance anything special in the appetite. But fear is nothing but a kind of avoidance of evil. + Therefore it is not a special passion. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q41_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if fear were a special passion, it would be chiefly in the irascible part. But fear is also in the concupiscible: + since the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5) that "fear is a kind of sorrow"; and Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 23) that + fear is "a power of desire": and both sorrow and desire are in the concupiscible faculty, as stated above ( + <a id="FS_Q41_A2-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q23_A4.html">Q[23], A[4]</a>). Therefore fear is not a special passion, since it belongs to different + powers. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q41_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Fear is condivided with the other passions of the soul, as is clear from Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 12,15). + </p> + <p id="FS_Q41_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The passions of the soul derive their species from their objects: hence that is a special passion, which has a special object. + Now fear has a special object, as hope has. For just as the object of hope is a future good, difficult but possible to obtain; + so the object of fear is a future evil, difficult and irresistible. Consequently fear is a special passion of the soul. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q41_A2-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> All the passions of the soul arise from one source, viz. love, wherein they are connected with one another. By reason of + this connection, when fear is put aside, the other passions of the soul are dispersed; not, however, as though it were a general + passion. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q41_A2-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Not every avoidance in the appetite is fear, but avoidance of a special object, as stated. Wherefore, though avoidance be + something common, yet fear is a special passion. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q41_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Fear is nowise in the concupiscible: for it regards evil, not absolutely, but as difficult or arduous, so as to be almost + unavoidable. But since the irascible passions arise from the passions of the concupiscible faculty, and terminate therein, + as stated above ( + <a id="FS_Q41_A2-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q25_A1.html">Q[25], A[1]</a>); hence it is that what belongs to the concupiscible is ascribed to fear. For fear is called sorrow, in so far as the object + of fear causes sorrow when + present: wherefore the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5) that fear arises "from the representation of a future evil which is + either corruptive or painful." In like manner desire is ascribed by Damascene to fear, because just as hope arises from the + desire of good, so fear arises from avoidance of evil; while avoidance of evil arises from the desire of good, as is evident + from what has been said above ( + <a id="FS_Q41_A2-p9.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q25_A2.html">Q[25], A[2]</a>; + <a id="FS_Q41_A2-p9.3" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q29_A2.html"> Q[29], A[2]</a>; + <a id="FS_Q41_A2-p9.4" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q36_A2.html"> + Q[36], A[2] + </a>). + </p> + <p id="FS_Q41_A2-p10"></p> + <p id="FS_Q41_A2-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q41_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q41_A3.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q41_A3" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q41_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q41_A4.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q41_A3-p0.1">Whether there is a natural fear?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q41_A3-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q41_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that there is a natural fear. For Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 23) that "there is a natural fear, through + the soul refusing to be severed from the body." + </p> + <p id="FS_Q41_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, fear arises from love, as stated above (A[2], ad 1). But there is a natural love, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv). + Therefore there is also a natural fear. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q41_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, fear is opposed to hope, as stated above ( + <a id="FS_Q41_A3-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q40_A4.html">Q[40], A[4]</a>, ad 1). But there is a hope of nature, as is evident from + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q41_A3-p4.2" href="./asv.html#Rom.4.18" target="asv"> Rom. 4:18, </a> where it is said of Abraham that "against hope" of nature, "he believed in hope" of grace. Therefore there is also a fear + of nature. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q41_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> That which is natural is common to things animate and inanimate. But fear is not in things inanimate. Therefore there is + no natural fear. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q41_A3-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> A movement is said to be natural, because nature inclines thereto. Now this happens in two ways. First, so that it is entirely + accomplished by nature, without any operation of the apprehensive faculty: thus to have an upward movement is natural to fire, + and to grow is the natural movement of animals and plants. Secondly, a movement is said to be natural, if nature inclines + thereto, though it be accomplished by the apprehensive faculty alone: since, as stated + above ( + <a id="FS_Q41_A3-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q10_A1.html">Q[10], A[1]</a>), the movements of the cognitive and appetitive faculties are reducible to nature as to their first principle. In this way, + even the acts of the apprehensive power, such as understanding, feeling, and remembering, as well as the movements of the + animal appetite, are sometimes said to be natural. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q41_A3-p7"> And in this sense we may say that there is a natural fear; and it is distinguished from non-natural fear, by reason of the + diversity of its object. For, as the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5), there is a fear of "corruptive evil," which nature shrinks + from on account of its natural desire to exist; and such fear is said to be natural. Again, there is a fear of "painful evil," + which is repugnant not to nature, but to the desire of the appetite; and such fear is not natural. In + this sense we have stated above ( + <a id="FS_Q41_A3-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q26_A1.html">Q[26], A[1]</a>; + <a id="FS_Q41_A3-p7.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q30_A3.html"> Q[30], A[3]</a>; + <a id="FS_Q41_A3-p7.3" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q31_A7.html"> Q[31], A[7]</a>) that love, desire, and pleasure are divisible into natural and non-natural. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q41_A3-p8"> But in the first sense of the word "natural," we must observe that certain passions of the soul are sometimes said to be + natural, as love, desire, and hope; whereas the others cannot be called natural. The reason of this is because love and hatred, + desire and avoidance, imply a certain inclination to pursue what is good or to avoid what is evil; which inclination is to + be found in the natural appetite also. Consequently there is a natural love; while we may also speak of desire + and hope as being even in natural things devoid of knowledge. On the other hand the other passions of the soul denote certain + movements, whereto the natural inclination is nowise sufficient. This is due either to the fact that perception or knowledge + is essential to these passions (thus we have said + <a id="FS_Q41_A3-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q31_A1.html">, Q[31], AA[1]</a>,3; + <a id="FS_Q41_A3-p8.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q35_A1.html"> Q[35], A[1]</a>, that apprehension is a necessary condition of pleasure and sorrow), wherefore things devoid of knowledge cannot be + said to take pleasure or to be sorrowful: or else it is because such like movements are contrary to the very nature of natural + inclination: for instance, despair flies from good on account of some difficulty; and fear shrinks from repelling a contrary + evil; both of which are contrary to the inclination of nature. Wherefore such like passions are in no way ascribed to inanimate + beings. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q41_A3-p9"> Thus the Replies to the Objections are evident.</p> + <p id="FS_Q41_A3-p10"></p> + <p id="FS_Q41_A3-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q41_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q41_A4.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q41_A4" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q41_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q42.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q41_A4-p0.1">Whether the species of fear is suitably assigned?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q41_A4-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q41_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that six species of fear are unsuitably assigned by Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 15); namely, "laziness, shamefacedness, + shame, amazement, stupor, and anxiety." Because, as the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5), "fear regards a saddening evil." Therefore + the species of fear should correspond to the species of sorrow. Now there are four species of sorrow, as stated above ( + <a id="FS_Q41_A4-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q35_A8.html">Q[35], A[8]</a>). Therefore there should only be four + species of fear corresponding to them. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q41_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, that which consists in an action of our own is in our power. But fear regards an evil that surpasses our power, + as stated above + <a id="FS_Q41_A4-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q41_A2.html">(A[2])</a>. Therefore laziness, shamefacedness, and shame, which regard our own actions, should not be reckoned as species of fear. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q41_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, fear is of the future, as stated above ( + <a id="FS_Q41_A4-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q41_A1.html">AA[1]</a>, 2). But "shame regards a disgraceful deed already done," as Gregory of Nyssa [*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xx.] says. Therefore + shame is not a species of fear. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q41_A4-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, fear is only of evil. But amazement and stupor regard great and unwonted things, whether good or evil. Therefore + amazement and stupor are not species of fear. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q41_A4-p6"> + <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, Philosophers have been led by amazement to seek the truth, as stated in the beginning of Metaphysics. But fear leads + to flight rather than to search. Therefore amazement is not a species of fear. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q41_A4-p7"> On the contrary suffices the authority of Damascene and Gregory of Nyssa [*Nemesius] (Cf. OBJ 1,3).</p> + <p id="FS_Q41_A4-p8"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above + <a id="FS_Q41_A4-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q41_A2.html">(A[2])</a>, fear regards a future evil which surpasses the power of him that fears, so that it is irresistible. Now man's evil, like + his good, may be considered either in his action or in external things. In his action he has a twofold evil to fear. First, + there is the toil that burdens his nature: and hence arises "laziness," as when a man shrinks from work for fear of too much + toil. Secondly, there is the disgrace which + damages him in the opinion of others. And thus, if disgrace is feared in a deed that is yet to be done, there is "shamefacedness"; + if, however, it be a deed already done, there is "shame." + </p> + <p id="FS_Q41_A4-p9"> On the other hand, the evil that consists in external things may surpass man's faculty of resistance in three ways. First + by reason of its magnitude; when, that is to say, a man considers some great evil the outcome of which he is unable to gauge: + and then there is "amazement." Secondly, by reason of its being unwonted; because, to wit, some unwonted evil arises before + us, and on that account is great in our estimation: and then there is "stupor," which is caused by the + representation of something unwonted. Thirdly, by reason of its being unforeseen: thus future misfortunes are feared, and + fear of this kind is called "anxiety." + </p> + <p id="FS_Q41_A4-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Those species of sorrow given above are not derived from the diversity of objects, but from the diversity of effects, and + for certain special reasons. Consequently there is no need for those species of sorrow to correspond with these species of + fear, which are derived from the proper division of the object of fear itself. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q41_A4-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> A deed considered as being actually done, is in the power of the doer. But it is possible to take into consideration something + connected with the deed, and surpassing the faculty of the doer, for which reason he shrinks from the deed. It is in this + sense that laziness, shamefacedness, and shame are reckoned as species of fear. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q41_A4-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The past deed may be the occasion of fear of future reproach or disgrace: and in this sense shame is a species of fear. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q41_A4-p13"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Not every amazement and stupor are species of fear, but that amazement which is caused by a great evil, and that stupor which + arises from an unwonted evil. Or else we may say that, just as laziness shrinks from the toil of external work, so amazement + and stupor shrink from the difficulty of considering a great and unwonted thing, whether good or evil: so that amazement and + stupor stand in relation to the act of the intellect, as laziness does to + external work. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q41_A4-p14"> + <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> He who is amazed shrinks at present from forming a judgment of that which amazes him, fearing to fall short of the truth, + but inquires afterwards: whereas he who is overcome by stupor fears both to judge at present, and to inquire afterwards. Wherefore + amazement is a beginning of philosophical research: whereas stupor is a hindrance thereto. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q41_A4-p15"></p> + <p id="FS_Q41_A4-p16"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q41_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q42.html"></a> + </div> + <a href="summa.FS_Q40_A8.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q41_A1.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q42" class="div3"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q41_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q42_A1.html"></a> + <h3 id="FS_Q42-p0.1">OF THE OBJECT OF FEAR (SIX ARTICLES)</h3> + <p id="FS_Q42-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q42-p2"> We must now consider the object of fear: under which head there are six points of inquiry:</p> + <p id="FS_Q42-p3"> (1) Whether good or evil is the object of fear?</p> + <p id="FS_Q42-p4"> (2) Whether evil of nature is the object of fear?</p> + <p id="FS_Q42-p5"> (3) Whether the evil of sin is an object of fear?</p> + <p id="FS_Q42-p6"> (4) Whether fear itself can be feared?</p> + <p id="FS_Q42-p7"> (5) Whether sudden things are especially feared?</p> + <p id="FS_Q42-p8"> (6) Whether those things are more feared against which there is no remedy?</p> + <div id="FS_Q42_A1" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q42.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q42_A2.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q42_A1-p0.1">Whether the object of fear is good or evil?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q42_A1-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q42_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that good is the object of fear. For Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 83) that "we fear nothing save to lose what + we love and possess, or not to obtain that which we hope for." But that which we love is good. Therefore fear regards good + as its proper object. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q42_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5) that "power and to be above another is a thing to be feared." But this is a good + thing. Therefore good is the object of fear. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q42_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, there can be no evil in God. But we are commanded to fear God, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q42_A1-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.33.10" target="asv"> Ps. 33:10</a>: "Fear the Lord, all ye saints." Therefore even the good is an object of fear. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q42_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 12) that fear is of future evil. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q42_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Fear is a movement of the appetitive power. Now it belongs to the appetitive power to pursue and to avoid, as stated in Ethic. + vi, 2: and pursuit is of good, while avoidance is of evil. Consequently whatever movement of the appetitive power implies + pursuit, has some good for its object: and whatever movement implies avoidance, has an evil for its object. Wherefore, since + fear implies an avoidance, in the first place and of its very nature it regards evil as + its proper object. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q42_A1-p7"> It can, however, regard good also, in so far as referable to evil. This can be in two ways. In one way, inasmuch as an evil + causes privation of good. Now a thing is evil from the very fact that it is a privation of some good. Wherefore, since evil + is shunned because it is evil, it follows that it is shunned because it deprives one of the good that one pursues through + love thereof. And in this sense Augustine says that there is no cause for fear, save loss of the good we + love. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q42_A1-p8"> In another way, good stands related to evil as its cause: in so far as some good can by its power bring harm to the good + we love: and so, just as hope, as stated above ( + <a id="FS_Q42_A1-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q40_A7.html">Q[40], A[7]</a>), regards two things, namely, the good to which it tends, and the thing through which there is a hope of obtaining the desired + good; so also does fear regard two things, namely, the evil from which it shrinks, and that good which, by its power, can + inflict that evil. In this + way God is feared by man, inasmuch as He can inflict punishment, spiritual or corporal. In this way, too, we fear the power + of man; especially when it has been thwarted, or when it is unjust, because then it is more likely to do us a harm. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q42_A1-p9"> In like manner one fears "to be over another," i.e. to lean on another, so that it is in his power to do us a harm: thus + a man fears another, who knows him to be guilty of a crime lest he reveal it to others. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q42_A1-p10"> This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.</p> + <p id="FS_Q42_A1-p11"></p> + <p id="FS_Q42_A1-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q42.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q42_A2.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q42_A2" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q42_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q42_A3.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q42_A2-p0.1">Whether evil of nature is an object of fear?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q42_A2-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q42_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that evil of nature is not an object of fear. For the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5) that "fear makes us take + counsel." But we do not take counsel about things which happen naturally, as stated in Ethic. iii, 3. Therefore evil of nature + is not an object of fear. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q42_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, natural defects such as death and the like are always threatening man. If therefore such like evils were an object + of fear, man would needs be always in fear. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q42_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, nature does not move to contraries. But evil of nature is an effect of nature. Therefore if a man shrinks from such + like evils through fear thereof, this is not an effect of nature. Therefore natural fear is not of the evil of nature; and + yet it seems that it should be. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q42_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 6) that "the most terrible of all things is death," which is an evil of nature. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q42_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5), fear is caused by the "imagination of a future evil which is either corruptive or + painful." Now just as a painful evil is that which is contrary to the will, so a corruptive evil is that which is contrary + to nature: and this is the evil of nature. Consequently evil of nature can be the object of fear. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q42_A2-p7"> But it must be observed that evil of nature sometimes arises from a natural cause; and then it is called evil of nature, + not merely from being a privation of the good of nature, but also from being an effect of nature; such are natural death and + other like defects. But sometimes evil of nature arises from a non-natural cause; such as violent death inflicted by an assailant. + In either case evil of nature is feared to a certain extent, and to a certain extent not. For since fear + arises "from the imagination of future evil," as the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5), whatever removes the imagination of the + future evil, removes fear also. Now it may happen in two ways that an evil may not appear as about to be. First, through being + remote and far off: for, on account of the distance, such a thing is considered as though it were not to be. Hence we either + do not fear it, or fear it but little; for, as the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5), "we do not fear things that are very + far off; since all know that they shall die, but as death is not near, they heed it not." Secondly, a future evil is considered + as though it were not to be, on account of its being inevitable, wherefore we look upon it as already present. Hence the Philosopher + says (Rhet. ii, 5) that "those who are already on the scaffold, are not afraid," seeing that they are on the very point of + a death from which there is no escape; "but in order that a man be afraid, there must be some hope of escape for + him." + </p> + <p id="FS_Q42_A2-p8"> Consequently evil of nature is not feared if it be not apprehended as future: but if evil of nature, that is corruptive, + be apprehended as near at hand, and yet with some hope of escape, then it will be feared. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q42_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The evil of nature sometimes is not an effect of nature, as stated above. But in so far as it is an effect of nature, although + it may be impossible to avoid it entirely, yet it may be possible to delay it. And with this hope one may take counsel about + avoiding it. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q42_A2-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Although evil of nature ever threatens, yet it does not always threaten from near at hand: and consequently it is not always + feared. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q42_A2-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Death and other defects of nature are the effects of the common nature; and yet the individual nature rebels against them + as far as it can. Accordingly, from the inclination of the individual nature arise pain and sorrow for such like evils, when + present; fear when threatening in the future. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q42_A2-p12"></p> + <p id="FS_Q42_A2-p13"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q42_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q42_A3.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q42_A3" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q42_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q42_A4.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q42_A3-p0.1">Whether the evil of sin is an object of fear?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q42_A3-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q42_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the evil of sin can be an object of fear. For Augustine says on the canonical Epistle of John (Tract. + ix), that "by chaste fear man fears to be severed from God." Now nothing but sin severs us from God; according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q42_A3-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.59.2" target="asv"> Is. 59:2</a>: "Your iniquities have divided between you and your God." Therefore the evil of sin can be an object of fear. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q42_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Cicero says (Quaest. Tusc. iv, 4,6) that "we fear when they are yet to come, those things which give us pain when + they are present." But it is possible for one to be pained or sorrowful on account of the evil of sin. Therefore one can also + fear the evil of sin. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q42_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, hope is contrary to fear. But the good of virtue can be the object of hope, as the Philosopher declares (Ethic. + ix, 4): and the Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q42_A3-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Gal.5.10" target="asv">Gal. 5:10</a>): "I have confidence in you in the Lord, that you will not be of another mind." Therefore fear can regard evil of sin. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q42_A3-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, shame is a kind of fear, as stated above ( + <a id="FS_Q42_A3-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q41_A4.html">Q[41], A[4]</a>). But shame regards a disgraceful deed, which is an evil of sin. Therefore fear does so likewise. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q42_A3-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5) that "not all evils are feared, for instance that someone be unjust or slow." + </p> + <p id="FS_Q42_A3-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above ( + <a id="FS_Q42_A3-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q40_A1.html">Q[40], A[1]</a>; + <a id="FS_Q42_A3-p7.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q41_A2.html"> Q[41], A[2]</a>), as the object of hope is a future good difficult but possible to obtain, so the object of fear is a future evil, arduous + and not to be easily avoided. From this we may gather that whatever is entirely subject to our power and will, is not an object + of fear; and that nothing gives rise to fear save what is due to an external cause. Now human will is the proper cause + of the evil of sin: and consequently evil of sin, properly speaking, is not an object of fear. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q42_A3-p8"> But since the human will may be inclined to sin by an extrinsic cause; if this cause have a strong power of inclination, + in that respect a man may fear the evil of sin, in so far as it arises from that extrinsic cause: as when he fears to dwell + in the company of wicked men, lest he be led by them to sin. But, properly speaking, a man thus disposed, fears the being + led astray rather than the sin considered in its proper nature, i.e. as a voluntary act; for considered in this + light it is not an object of fear to him. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q42_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Separation from God is a punishment resulting from sin: and every punishment is, in some way, due to an extrinsic cause. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q42_A3-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Sorrow and fear agree in one point, since each regards evil: they differ, however, in two points. First, because sorrow is + about present evil, whereas fear is future evil. Secondly, because sorrow, being in the concupiscible faculty, regards evil + absolutely; wherefore it can be about any evil, great or small; whereas fear, being in the irascible part, regards evil with + the addition of a certain arduousness or difficulty; which difficulty ceases in so + far as a thing is subject to the will. Consequently not all things that give us pain when they are present, make us fear when + they are yet to come, but only some things, namely, those that are difficult. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q42_A3-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Hope is of good that is obtainable. Now one may obtain a good either of oneself, or through another: and so, hope may be + of an act of virtue, which lies within our own power. On the other hand, fear is of an evil that does not lie in our own power: + and consequently the evil which is feared is always from an extrinsic cause; while the good that is hoped for may be both + from an intrinsic and from an extrinsic cause. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q42_A3-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> As stated above ( + <a id="FS_Q42_A3-p12.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q41_A4.html">Q[41], A[4]</a>, ad 2,3), shame is not fear of the very act of sin, but of the disgrace or ignominy which arises therefrom, and which is + due to an extrinsic cause. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q42_A3-p13"></p> + <p id="FS_Q42_A3-p14"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q42_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q42_A4.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q42_A4" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q42_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q42_A5.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q42_A4-p0.1">Whether fear itself can be feared?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q42_A4-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q42_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that fear cannot be feared. For whatever is feared, is prevented from being lost, through fear thereof: thus + a man who fears to lose his health, keeps it, through fearing its loss. If therefore a man be afraid of fear, he will keep + himself from fear by being afraid: which seems absurd. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q42_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, fear is a kind of flight. But nothing flies from itself. Therefore fear cannot be the object of fear. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q42_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, fear is about the future. But fear is present to him that fears. Therefore it cannot be the object of his fear. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q42_A4-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> A man can love his own love, and can grieve at his own sorrow. Therefore, in like manner, he can fear his own fear. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q42_A4-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above + <a id="FS_Q42_A4-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q42_A3.html">(A[3])</a>, nothing can be an object of fear, save what is due to an extrinsic cause; but not that which ensues from our own will. Now + fear partly arises from an extrinsic cause, and is partly subject to the will. It is due to an extrinsic cause, in so far + as it is a passion resulting from the imagination of an imminent evil. In this sense it is possible for fear to be the object + of fear, i.e. a man may fear lest he + should be threatened by the necessity of fearing, through being assailed by some great evil. It is subject to the will, in + so far as the lower appetite obeys reason; wherefore man is able to drive fear away. In this sense fear cannot be the object + of fear, as Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 33). Lest, however, anyone make use of his arguments, in order to prove that fear + cannot be at all be the object of fear, we must add a solution to the same. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q42_A4-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Not every fear is identically the same; there are various fears according to the various objects of fear. Nothing, then, + prevents a man from keeping himself from fearing one thing, by fearing another, so that the fear which he has preserves him + from the fear which he has not. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q42_A4-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Since fear of an imminent evil is not identical with the fear of the fear of imminent evil; it does not follow that a thing + flies from itself, or that it is the same flight in both cases. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q42_A4-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> On account of the various kinds of fear already alluded to (ad 2) a man's present fear may have a future fear for its object. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q42_A4-p10"></p> + <p id="FS_Q42_A4-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q42_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q42_A5.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q42_A5" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q42_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q42_A6.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q42_A5-p0.1">Whether sudden things are especially feared?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q42_A5-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q42_A5-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that unwonted and sudden things are not especially feared. Because, as hope is about good things, so fear is + about evil things. But experience conduces to the increase of hope in good things. Therefore it also adds to fear in evil + things. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q42_A5-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5) that "those are feared most, not who are quick-tempered, but who are gentle and + cunning." Now it is clear that those who are quick-tempered are more subject to sudden emotions. Therefore sudden things are + less to be feared. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q42_A5-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, we think less about things that happen suddenly. But the more we think about a thing, the more we fear it; hence + the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 8) that "some appear to be courageous through ignorance, but as soon as they discover that + the case is different from what they expected, they run away." Therefore sudden things are feared less. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q42_A5-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (Confess. ii, 6): "Fear is startled at things unwonted and sudden, which endanger things beloved, and takes + forethought for their safety." + </p> + <p id="FS_Q42_A5-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated about + <a id="FS_Q42_A5-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q42_A3.html">(A[3];</a> Q[41], A[2]), the object of fear is an imminent evil, which can be repelled, but with difficulty. Now this is due to one + of two causes: to the greatness of the evil, or to the weakness of him that fears; while unwontedness and suddenness conduce + to both of these causes. First, it helps an imminent evil to seem greater. Because all material things, whether good or evil, + the more we consider them, the smaller + they seem. Consequently, just as sorrow for a present evil is mitigated in course of time, as Cicero states (De Quaest. Tusc. + iii, 30); so, too, fear of a future evil is diminished by thinking about it beforehand. Secondly, unwontedness and suddenness + increase the weakness of him that fears, in so far as they deprive him of the remedies with which he might otherwise provide + himself to forestall the coming evil, were it not for the evil taking him by surprise. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q42_A5-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The object of hope is a good that is possible to obtain. Consequently whatever increases a man's power, is of a nature to + increase hope, and, for the same reason, to diminish fear, since fear is about an evil which cannot be easily repelled. Since, + therefore, experience increases a man's power of action, therefore, as it increases hope, so does it diminish fear. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q42_A5-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Those who are quick-tempered do not hide their anger; wherefore the harm they do others is not so sudden, as not to be foreseen. + On the other hand, those who are gentle or cunning hide their anger; wherefore the harm which may be impending from them, + cannot be foreseen, but takes one by surprise. For this reason the Philosopher says that such men are feared more than others. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q42_A5-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Bodily good or evil, considered in itself, seems greater at first. The reason for this is that a thing is more obvious when + seen in juxtaposition with its contrary. Hence, when a man passes unexpectedly from penury to wealth, he thinks more of his + wealth on account of his previous poverty: while, on the other hand, the rich man who suddenly becomes poor, finds poverty + all the more disagreeable. For this reason sudden evil is feared more, because it + seems more to be evil. However, it may happen through some accident that the greatness of some evil is hidden; for instance + if the foe hides himself in ambush: and then it is true that evil inspires greater fear through being much thought about. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q42_A5-p10"></p> + <p id="FS_Q42_A5-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q42_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q42_A6.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q42_A6" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q42_A5.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q43.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q42_A6-p0.1">Whether those things are more feared, for which there is no remedy?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q42_A6-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q42_A6-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that those things are not more to be feared, for which there is no remedy. Because it is a condition of fear, + that there be some hope of safety, as stated above + <a id="FS_Q42_A6-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q42_A2.html">(A[2])</a>. But an evil that cannot be remedied leaves no hope of escape. Therefore such things are not feared at all. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q42_A6-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, there is no remedy for the evil of death: since, in the natural course of things, there is no return from death + to life. And yet death is not the most feared of all things, as the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5). Therefore those things + are not feared most, for which there is no remedy. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q42_A6-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 6) that "a thing which lasts long is no better than that which lasts but one day: + nor is that which lasts for ever any better than that which is not everlasting": and the same applies to evil. But things + that cannot be remedied seem to differ from other things, merely in the point of their lasting long or for ever. Consequently + they are not therefore any worse or more to be feared. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q42_A6-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5) that "those things are most to be feared which when done wrong cannot be put right . . + . or for which there is no help, or which are not easy." + </p> + <p id="FS_Q42_A6-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The object of fear is evil: consequently whatever tends to increase evil, conduces to the increase of fear. Now evil is increased + not only in its species of evil, but also in respect of circumstances, as stated above ( + <a id="FS_Q42_A6-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q18_A3.html">Q[18], A[3]</a>). And of all the circumstances, longlastingness, or even everlastingness, seems to have the greatest bearing on the increase + of evil. Because things that exist in time are measured, in a way, according to + the duration of time: wherefore if it be an evil to suffer something for a certain length of time, we should reckon the evil + doubled, if it be suffered for twice that length of time. And accordingly, to suffer the same thing for an infinite length + of time, i.e. for ever, implies, so to speak, an infinite increase. Now those evils which, after they have come, cannot be + remedied at all, or at least not easily, are considered as lasting for ever or for a long time: for which reason they inspire + the greatest fear. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q42_A6-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Remedy for an evil is twofold. One, by which a future evil is warded off from coming. If such a remedy be removed, there + is an end to hope and consequently to fear; wherefore we do not speak now of remedies of that kind. The other remedy is one + by which an already present evil is removed: and of such a remedy we speak now. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q42_A6-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Although death be an evil without remedy, yet, since it threatens not from near, it is not feared, as stated above + <a id="FS_Q42_A6-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q42_A2.html">(A[2])</a>. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q42_A6-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The Philosopher is speaking there of things that are good in themselves, i.e. good specifically. And such like good is no + better for lasting long or for ever: its goodness depends on its very nature. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q42_A6-p10"></p> + <p id="FS_Q42_A6-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q42_A5.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q43.html"></a> + </div> + <a href="summa.FS_Q41_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q42_A1.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q43" class="div3"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q42_A6.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q43_A1.html"></a> + <h3 id="FS_Q43-p0.1">OF THE CAUSE OF FEAR (TWO ARTICLES)</h3> + <p id="FS_Q43-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q43-p2"> We must now consider the cause of fear: under which head there are two points of inquiry:</p> + <p id="FS_Q43-p3"> (1) Whether love is the cause of fear?</p> + <p id="FS_Q43-p4"> (2) Whether defect is the cause of fear?</p> + <div id="FS_Q43_A1" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q43.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q43_A2.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q43_A1-p0.1">Whether love is the cause of fear?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q43_A1-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q43_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that love is not the cause of fear. For that which leads to a thing is its cause. But "fear leads to the love + of charity" as Augustine says on the canonical epistle of John (Tract. ix). Therefore fear is the cause of love, and not conversely. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q43_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5) that "those are feared most from whom we dread the advent of some evil." But + the dread of evil being caused by someone, makes us hate rather than love him. Therefore fear is caused by hate rather than + by love. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q43_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, it has been stated above ( + <a id="FS_Q43_A1-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q42_A3.html">Q[42], A[3]</a>) that those things which occur by our own doing are not fearful. But that which we do from love, is done from our inmost + heart. Therefore fear is not caused by love. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q43_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 33): "There can be no doubt that there is no cause for fear save the loss of what we love, when + we possess it, or the failure to obtain what we hope for." Therefore all fear is caused by our loving something: and consequently + love is the cause of fear. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q43_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The objects of the soul's passions stand in relation thereto as the forms to things natural or artificial: because the passions + of the soul take their species from their objects, as the aforesaid things do from their forms. Therefore, just as whatever + is a cause of the form, is a cause of the thing constituted by that form, so whatever is a cause, in any way whatever, of + the object, is a cause of the passion. Now a thing may be a cause of the object, either + by way of efficient cause, or by way of material disposition. Thus the object of pleasure is good apprehended as suitable + and conjoined: and its efficient cause is that which causes the conjunction, or the suitableness, or goodness, or apprehension + of that good thing; while its cause by way of material disposition, is a habit or any sort of disposition by reason of which + this conjoined good becomes suitable or is apprehended as such. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q43_A1-p7"> Accordingly, as to the matter in question, the object of fear is something reckoned as an evil to come, near at hand and + difficult to avoid. Therefore that which can inflict such an evil, is the efficient cause of the object of fear, and, consequently, + of fear itself. While that which renders a man so disposed that thing is such an evil to him, is a cause of fear and of its + object, by way of material disposition. And thus it is that love causes fear: since it is through his + loving a certain good, that whatever deprives a man of that good is an evil to him, and that consequently he fears it as an + evil. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q43_A1-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As stated above ( + <a id="FS_Q43_A1-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q42_A1.html">Q[42], A[1]</a>), fear, of itself and in the first place, regards the evil from which it recoils as being contrary to some loved good: and + thus fear, of itself, is born of love. But, in the second place, it regards the cause from which that evil ensues: so that + sometimes, accidentally, fear gives rise to love; in so far as, for instance, through fear of God's punishments, man keeps + His commandments, and thus + begins to hope, while hope leads to love, as stated above ( + <a id="FS_Q43_A1-p8.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q40_A7.html">Q[40] , A[7]</a>). + </p> + <p id="FS_Q43_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> He, from whom evil is expected, is indeed hated at first; but afterwards, when once we begin to hope for good from him, we + begin to love him. But the good, the contrary evil of which is feared, was loved from the beginning. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q43_A1-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This argument is true of that which is the efficient cause of the evil to be feared: whereas love causes fear by way of material + disposition, as stated above. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q43_A1-p11"></p> + <p id="FS_Q43_A1-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q43.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q43_A2.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q43_A2" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q43_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q44.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q43_A2-p0.1">Whether defect is the cause of fear?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q43_A2-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q43_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that defect is not a cause of fear. Because those who are in power are very much feared. But defect is contrary + to power. Therefore defect is not a cause of fear. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q43_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the defect of those who are already being executed is extreme. But such like do not fear as stated in Rhet. ii, + 5. Therefore defect is not a cause of fear. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q43_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, contests arise from strength not from defect. But "those who contend fear those who contend with them" (Rhet. ii, + 5). Therefore defect is not a cause of fear. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q43_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Contraries ensue from contrary causes. But "wealth, strength, a multitude of friends, and power drive fear away" (Rhet. ii, + 5). Therefore fear is caused by lack of these. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q43_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above + <a id="FS_Q43_A2-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q43_A1.html">(A[1])</a>, fear may be set down to a twofold cause: one is by way of a material disposition, on the part of him that fears; the other + is by way of efficient cause, on the part of the person feared. As to the first then, some defect is, of itself, the cause + of fear: for it is owing to some lack of power that one is unable easily to repulse a threatening evil. And yet, in order + to cause fear, this defect must be according + to a measure. For the defect which causes fear of a future evil, is less than the defect caused by evil present, which is + the object of sorrow. And still greater would be the defect, if perception of the evil, or love of the good whose contrary + is feared, were entirely absent. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q43_A2-p7"> But as to the second, power and strength are, of themselves, the cause of fear: because it is owing to the fact that the + cause apprehended as harmful is powerful, that its effect cannot be repulsed. It may happen, however, in this respect, that + some defect causes fear accidentally, in so far as owing to some defect someone wishes to hurt another; for instance, by reason + of injustice, either because that other has already done him a harm, or because he fears to be harmed by + him. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q43_A2-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This argument is true of the cause of fear, on the part of the efficient cause. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q43_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Those who are already being executed, are actually suffering from a present evil; wherefore their defect exceeds the measure + of fear. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q43_A2-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Those who contend with one another are afraid, not on account of the power which enables them to contend: but on account + of the lack of power, owing to which they are not confident of victory. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q43_A2-p11"></p> + <p id="FS_Q43_A2-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q43_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q44.html"></a> + </div> + <a href="summa.FS_Q42_A6.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q43_A1.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q44" class="div3"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q43_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q44_A1.html"></a> + <h3 id="FS_Q44-p0.1">OF THE EFFECTS OF FEAR (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3> + <p id="FS_Q44-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q44-p2"> We must now consider the effects of fear: under which head there are four points of inquiry:</p> + <p id="FS_Q44-p3"> (1) Whether fear causes contraction?</p> + <p id="FS_Q44-p4"> (2) Whether it makes men suitable for counsel?</p> + <p id="FS_Q44-p5"> (3) Whether it makes one tremble?</p> + <p id="FS_Q44-p6"> (4) Whether it hinders action?</p> + <div id="FS_Q44_A1" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q44.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q44_A2.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q44_A1-p0.1">Whether fear causes contraction?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q44_A1-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q44_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that fear does not cause contraction. For when contraction takes place, the heat and vital spirits are withdrawn + inwardly. But accumulation of heat and vital spirits in the interior parts of the body, dilates the heart unto endeavors of + daring, as may be seen in those who are angered: while the contrary happens in those who are afraid. Therefore fear does not + cause contraction. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q44_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, when, as a result of contraction, the vital spirits and heat are accumulated in the interior parts, man cries out, + as may be seen in those who are in pain. But those who fear utter nothing: on the contrary they lose their speech. Therefore + fear does not cause contraction. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q44_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, shame is a kind of fear, as stated above ( + <a id="FS_Q44_A1-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q41_A4.html">Q[41], A[4]</a>). But "those who are ashamed blush," as Cicero (De Quaest. Tusc. iv, 8), and the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 9) observe. But + blushing is an indication, not of contraction, but of the reverse. Therefore contraction is not an effect of fear. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q44_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 23) that "fear is a power according to {systole}," i.e. contraction. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q44_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above ( + <a id="FS_Q44_A1-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q28_A5.html">Q[28], A[5]</a>), in the passions of the soul, the formal element is the movement of the appetitive power, while the bodily transmutation + is the material element. Both of these are mutually proportionate; and consequently the bodily transmutation assumes a resemblance + to and the very nature of the appetitive movement. Now, as to the appetitive movement of the soul, fear implies a certain + contraction: the reason of which + is that fear arises from the imagination of some threatening evil which is difficult to repel, as stated above ( + <a id="FS_Q44_A1-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q41_A2.html">Q[41], A[2]</a>). But that a thing be difficult to repel is due to lack of power, as stated above ( + <a id="FS_Q44_A1-p6.3" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q43_A2.html">Q[43], A[2]</a>): and the weaker a power is, the fewer the things to which it extends. Wherefore from the very imagination that causes fear + there ensues a certain contraction in the appetite. Thus we observe in one who is dying that nature + withdraws inwardly, on account of the lack of power: and again we see the inhabitants of a city, when seized with fear, leave + the outskirts, and, as far as possible, make for the inner quarters. It is in resemblance to this contraction, which pertains + to the appetite of the soul, that in fear a similar contraction of heat and vital spirits towards the inner parts takes place + in regard to the body. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q44_A1-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As the Philosopher says (De Problem. xxvii, 3), although in those who fear, the vital spirits recede from outer to the inner + parts of the body, yet the movement of vital spirits is not the same in those who are angry and those who are afraid. For + in those who are angry, by reason of the heat and subtlety of the vital spirits, which result from the craving for vengeance, + the inward movement has an upward direction: wherefore the vital spirits and heat + concentrate around the heart: the result being that an angry man is quick and brave in attacking. But in those who are afraid, + on account of the condensation caused by cold, the vital spirits have a downward movement; the said cold being due to the + imagined lack of power. Consequently the heat and vital spirits abandon the heart instead of concentrating around it: the + result being that a man who is afraid is not quick to attack, but is more inclined to run away. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q44_A1-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> To everyone that is in pain, whether man or animal, it is natural to use all possible means of repelling the harmful thing + that causes pain but its presence: thus we observe that animals, when in pain, attack with their jaws or with their horns. + Now the greatest help for all purposes, in animals, is heat and vital spirits: wherefore when they are in pain, their nature + stores up the heat and vital spirits within them, in order to make use thereof in + repelling the harmful object. Hence the Philosopher says (De Problem. xxvii, 9) when the vital spirits and heat are concentrated + together within, they require to find a vent in the voice: for which reason those who are in pain can scarcely refrain from + crying aloud. On the other hand, in those who are afraid, the internal heat and vital spirits move from the heart downwards, + as stated above (ad 1): wherefore fear hinders speech which ensues from the emission of the vital spirits in an upward + direction through the mouth: the result being that fear makes its subject speechless. For this reason, too, fear "makes its + subject tremble," as the Philosopher says (De Problem. xxvii, 1,6,7). + </p> + <p id="FS_Q44_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Mortal perils are contrary not only to the appetite of the soul, but also to nature. Consequently in such like fear, there + is contraction not only in the appetite, but also in the corporeal nature: for when an animal is moved by the imagination + of death, it experiences a contraction of heat towards the inner parts of the body, as though it were threatened by a natural + death. Hence it is that "those who are in fear of death turn pale" (Ethic. iv, 9). + But the evil that shame fears, is contrary, not to nature, but only to the appetite of the soul. Consequently there results + a contraction in this appetite, but not in the corporeal nature; in fact, the soul, as though contracted in itself, is free + to set the vital spirits and heat in movement, so that they spread to the outward parts of the body: the result being that + those who are ashamed blush. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q44_A1-p10"></p> + <p id="FS_Q44_A1-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q44.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q44_A2.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q44_A2" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q44_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q44_A3.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q44_A2-p0.1">Whether fear makes one suitable for counsel? </h4> + <p id="FS_Q44_A2-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q44_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that fear does not make one suitable for counsel. For the same thing cannot be conducive to counsel, and a + hindrance thereto. But fear hinders counsel: because every passion disturbs repose, which is requisite for the good use of + reason. Therefore fear does not make a man suitable for counsel. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q44_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, counsel is an act of reason, in thinking and deliberating about the future. But a certain fear "drives away all + thought, and dislocates the mind," as Cicero observes (De Quaest. Tusc. iv, 8). Therefore fear does not conduce to counsel, + but hinders it. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q44_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, just as we have recourse to counsel in order to avoid evil, so do we, in order to attain good things. But whereas + fear is of evil to be avoided, so is hope of good things to be obtained. Therefore fear is not more conducive to counsel, + than hope is. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q44_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5) that "fear makes men of counsel." + </p> + <p id="FS_Q44_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> A man of counsel may be taken in two ways. First, from his being willing or anxious to take counsel. And thus fear makes + men of counsel. Because, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 3), "we take counsel on great matters, because therein we distrust + ourselves." Now things which make us afraid, are not simply evil, but have a certain magnitude, both because they seem difficult + to repel, and because they are apprehended as near to us, as stated above ( + <a id="FS_Q44_A2-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q42_A2.html">Q[42], A[2]</a>). Wherefore men seek for counsel especially when they are afraid. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q44_A2-p7"> Secondly, a man of counsel means one who is apt for giving good counsel: and in this sense, neither fear nor any passion + makes men of counsel. Because when a man is affected by a passion, things seem to him greater or smaller than they really + are: thus to a lover, what he loves seems better; to him that fears, what he fears seems more dreadful. Consequently owing + to the want of right judgment, every passion, considered in itself, hinders the faculty of giving good counsel. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q44_A2-p8"> This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.</p> + <p id="FS_Q44_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The stronger a passion is, the greater the hindrance is it to the man who is swayed by it. Consequently, when fear is intense, + man does indeed wish to take counsel, but his thoughts are so disturbed, that he can find no counsel. If, however, the fear + be slight, so as to make a man wish to take counsel, without gravely disturbing the reason; it may even make it easier for + him to take good counsel, by reason of his ensuing carefulness. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q44_A2-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Hope also makes man a good counsellor: because, as the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5), "no man takes counsel in matters he + despairs of," nor about impossible things, as he says in Ethic. iii, 3. But fear incites to counsel more than hope does. Because + hope is of good things, as being possible of attainment; whereas fear is of evil things, as being difficult to repel, so that + fear regards the aspect of difficulty more than hope does. And it is in + matters of difficulty, especially when we distrust ourselves, that we take counsel, as stated above. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q44_A2-p11"></p> + <p id="FS_Q44_A2-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q44_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q44_A3.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q44_A3" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q44_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q44_A4.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q44_A3-p0.1">Whether fear makes one tremble?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q44_A3-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q44_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that trembling is not an effect of fear. Because trembling is occasioned by cold; thus we observe that a cold + person trembles. Now fear does not seem to make one cold, but rather to cause a parching heat: a sign whereof is that those + who fear are thirsty, especially if their fear be very great, as in the case of those who are being led to execution. Therefore + fear does not cause trembling. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q44_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, faecal evacuation is occasioned by heat; hence laxative medicines are generally warm. But these evacuations are + often caused by fear. Therefore fear apparently causes heat; and consequently does not cause trembling. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q44_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, in fear, the heat is withdrawn from the outer to the inner parts of the body. If, therefore, man trembles in his + outward parts, through the heat being withdrawn thus; it seems that fear should cause this trembling in all the external members. + But such is not the case. Therefore trembling of the body is not caused by fear. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q44_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Cicero says (De Quaest. Tusc. iv, 8) that "fear is followed by trembling, pallor and chattering of the teeth." + </p> + <p id="FS_Q44_A3-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above + <a id="FS_Q44_A3-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q44_A1.html">(A[1])</a>, in fear there takes place a certain contraction from the outward to the inner parts of the body, the result being that the + outer parts become cold; and for this reason trembling is occasioned in these parts, being caused by a lack of power in controlling + the members: which lack of power is due to the want of heat, which is the instrument whereby the soul moves those members, + as stated in De Anima ii, 4. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q44_A3-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> When the heat withdraws from the outer to the inner parts, the inward heat increases, especially in the inferior or nutritive + parts. Consequently the humid element being spent, thirst ensues; sometimes indeed the result is a loosening of the bowels, + and urinary or even seminal evacuation. Or else such like evacuations are due to contraction of the abdomen and testicles, + as the Philosopher says (De Problem. xxii, 11). + </p> + <p id="FS_Q44_A3-p8"> This suffices for the Reply to the Second Objection.</p> + <p id="FS_Q44_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> In fear, heat abandons the heart, with a downward movement: hence in those who are afraid the heart especially trembles, + as also those members which are connected with the breast where the heart resides. Hence those who fear tremble especially + in their speech, on account of the tracheal artery being near the heart. The lower lip, too, and the lower jaw tremble, through + their connection with the heart; which explains the chattering of the teeth. For + the same reason the arms and hands tremble. Or else because the aforesaid members are more mobile. For which reason the knees + tremble in those who are afraid, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q44_A3-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.35.3" target="asv">Is. 35:3</a>: "Strengthen ye the feeble hands, and confirm the trembling [Vulg.: 'weak'] knees." + </p> + <p id="FS_Q44_A3-p10"></p> + <p id="FS_Q44_A3-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q44_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q44_A4.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q44_A4" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q44_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q45.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q44_A4-p0.1">Whether fear hinders action?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q44_A4-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q44_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that fear hinders action. For action is hindered chiefly by a disturbance in the reason, which directs action. + But fear disturbs reason, as stated above + <a id="FS_Q44_A4-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q44_A2.html">(A[2])</a>. Therefore fear hinders action. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q44_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, those who fear while doing anything, are more apt to fail: thus a man who walks on a plank placed aloft, easily + falls through fear; whereas, if he were to walk on the same plank down below, he would not fall, through not being afraid. + Therefore fear hinders action. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q44_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, laziness or sloth is a kind of fear. But laziness hinders action. Therefore fear does too. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q44_A4-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q44_A4-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Phil.2.12" target="asv">Phil. 2:12</a>): "With fear and trembling work out your salvation": and he would not say this if fear were a hindrance to a good work. Therefore + fear does not hinder a good action. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q44_A4-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Man's exterior actions are caused by the soul as first mover, but by the bodily members as instruments. Now action may be + hindered both by defect of the instrument, and by defect of the principal mover. On the part of the bodily instruments, fear, + considered in itself, is always apt to hinder exterior action, on account of the outward members being deprived, through fear, + of their heat. But on the part of the soul, if the fear be moderate, without much + disturbance of the reason, it conduces to working well, in so far as it causes a certain solicitude, and makes a man take + counsel and work with greater attention. If, however, fear increases so much as to disturb the reason, it hinders action even + on the part of the soul. But of such a fear the Apostle does not speak. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q44_A4-p7"> This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.</p> + <p id="FS_Q44_A4-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> He that falls from a plank placed aloft, suffers a disturbance of his imagination, through fear of the fall that is pictured + to his imagination. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q44_A4-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Everyone in fear shuns that which he fears: and therefore, since laziness is a fear of work itself as being toilsome, it + hinders work by withdrawing the will from it. But fear of other things conduces to action, in so far as it inclines the will + to do that whereby a man escapes from what he fears. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q44_A4-p10"></p> + <p id="FS_Q44_A4-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q44_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q45.html"></a> + </div> + <a href="summa.FS_Q43_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q44_A1.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q45" class="div3"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q44_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q45_A1.html"></a> + <h3 id="FS_Q45-p0.1">OF DARING (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3> + <p id="FS_Q45-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q45-p2"> We must now consider daring: under which head there are four points of inquiry:</p> + <p id="FS_Q45-p3"> (1) Whether daring is contrary to fear?</p> + <p id="FS_Q45-p4"> (2) How is daring related to hope?</p> + <p id="FS_Q45-p5"> (3) Of the cause of daring;</p> + <p id="FS_Q45-p6"> (4) Of its effect.</p> + <div id="FS_Q45_A1" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q45.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q45_A2.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q45_A1-p0.1">Whether daring is contrary to fear?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q45_A1-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q45_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that daring is not contrary to fear. For Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 31) that "daring is a vice." Now vice + is contrary to virtue. Since, therefore, fear is not a virtue but a passion, it seems that daring is not contrary to fear. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q45_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, to one thing there is one contrary. But hope is contrary to fear. Therefore daring is not contrary to fear. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q45_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, every passion excludes its opposite. But fear excludes safety; for Augustine says (Confess. ii, 6) that "fear takes + forethought for safety." Therefore safety is contrary to fear. Therefore daring is not contrary to fear. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q45_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5) that "daring is contrary to fear." + </p> + <p id="FS_Q45_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> It is of the essence of contraries to be "farthest removed from one another," as stated in Metaph. x, 4. Now that which is + farthest removed from fear, is daring: since fear turns away from the future hurt, on account of its victory over him that + fears it; whereas daring turns on threatened danger because of its own victory over that same danger. Consequently it is evident + that daring is contrary to fear. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q45_A1-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Anger, daring and all the names of the passions can be taken in two ways. First, as denoting absolutely movements of the + sensitive appetite in respect of some object, good or bad: and thus they are names of passions. Secondly, as denoting besides + this movement, a straying from the order of reason: and thus they are names of vices. It is in this sense that Augustine speaks + of daring: but we are speaking of it in the first sense. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q45_A1-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> To one thing, in the same respect, there are not several contraries; but in different respects nothing prevents one thing + having several contraries. Accordingly it has been said above ( + <a id="FS_Q45_A1-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q23_A2.html">Q[23], A[2]</a>; + <a id="FS_Q45_A1-p8.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q40_A4.html"> Q[40], A[4]</a>) that the irascible passions admit of a twofold contrariety: one, according to the opposition of good and evil, and thus + fear is contrary to hope: the other, according to the opposition of + approach and withdrawal, and thus daring is contrary to fear, and despair contrary to hope. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q45_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Safety does not denote something contrary to fear, but merely the exclusion of fear: for he is said to be safe, who fears + not. Wherefore safety is opposed to fear, as a privation: while daring is opposed thereto as a contrary. And as contrariety + implies privation, so daring implies safety. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q45_A1-p10"></p> + <p id="FS_Q45_A1-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q45.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q45_A2.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q45_A2" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q45_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q45_A3.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q45_A2-p0.1">Whether daring ensues from hope?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q45_A2-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q45_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that daring does not ensue from hope. Because daring regards evil and fearful things, as stated in Ethic. iii, + 7. But hope regards good things, as stated above ( + <a id="FS_Q45_A2-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q40_A1.html">Q[40], A[1]</a>). Therefore they have different objects and are not in the same order. Therefore daring does not ensue from hope. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q45_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, just as daring is contrary to fear, so is despair contrary to hope. But fear does not ensue from despair: in fact, + despair excludes fear, as the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5). Therefore daring does not result from hope. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q45_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, daring is intent on something good, viz. victory. But it belongs to hope to tend to that which is good and difficult. + Therefore daring is the same as hope; and consequently does not result from it. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q45_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 8) that "those are hopeful are full of daring." Therefore it seems that daring ensues from + hope. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q45_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As we have often stated ( + <a id="FS_Q45_A2-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q22_A2.html">Q[22], A[2]</a>; + <a id="FS_Q45_A2-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q35_A1.html"> Q[35], A[1]</a>; + <a id="FS_Q45_A2-p6.3" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q41_A1.html"> Q[41], A[1]</a>), all these passions belong to the appetitive power. Now every movement of the appetitive power is reducible to one either + of pursuit or of avoidance. Again, pursuit or avoidance is of something either by reason of itself or by reason of something + else. By reason of itself, good is the object of pursuit, and evil, the + object of avoidance: but by reason of something else, evil can be the object of pursuit, through some good attaching to it; + and good can be the object of avoidance, through some evil attaching to it. Now that which is by reason of something else, + follows that which is by reason of itself. Consequently pursuit of evil follows pursuit of good; and avoidance of good follows + avoidance of evil. Now these four things belong to four passions, since pursuit of good belongs to hope, avoidance of evil + to + fear, the pursuit of the fearful evil belongs to daring, and the avoidance of good to despair. It follows, therefore, that + daring results from hope; since it is in the hope of overcoming the threatening object of fear, that one attacks it boldly. + But despair results from fear: since the reason why a man despairs is because he fears the difficulty attaching to the good + he should hope for. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q45_A2-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This argument would hold, if good and evil were not co-ordinate objects. But because evil has a certain relation to good, + since it comes after good, as privation comes after habit; consequently daring which pursues evil, comes after hope which + pursues good. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q45_A2-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Although good, absolutely speaking, is prior to evil, yet avoidance of evil precedes avoidance of good; just as the pursuit + of good precedes the pursuit of evil. Consequently just as hope precedes daring, so fear precedes despair. And just as fear + does not always lead to despair, but only when it is intense; so hope does not always lead to daring, save only when it is + strong. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q45_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Although the object of daring is an evil to which, in the estimation of the daring man, the good of victory is conjoined; + yet daring regards the evil, and hope regards the conjoined good. In like manner despair regards directly the good which it + turns away from, while fear regards the conjoined evil. Hence, properly speaking, daring is not a part of hope, but its effect: + just as despair is an effect, not a part, of fear. For this reason, too, daring + cannot be a principal passion. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q45_A2-p10"></p> + <p id="FS_Q45_A2-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q45_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q45_A3.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q45_A3" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q45_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q45_A4.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q45_A3-p0.1">Whether some defect is a cause of daring?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q45_A3-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q45_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that some defect is a cause of daring. For the Philosopher says (De Problem. xxvii, 4) that "lovers of wine + are strong and daring." But from wine ensues the effect of drunkenness. Therefore daring is caused by a defect. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q45_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5) that "those who have no experience of danger are bold." But want of experience + is a defect. Therefore daring is caused by a defect. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q45_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, those who have suffered wrongs are wont to be daring; "like the beasts when beaten," as stated in Ethic. iii, 5. + But the suffering of wrongs pertains to defect. Therefore daring is caused by a defect. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q45_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5) that the cause of daring "is the presence in the imagination of the hope that the means + of safety are nigh, and that the things to be feared are either non-existent or far off." But anything pertaining to defect + implies either the removal of the means of safety, or the proximity of something to be feared. Therefore nothing pertaining + to defect is a cause of daring. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q45_A3-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above ( + <a id="FS_Q45_A3-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q45_A1.html">AA[1]</a>,2) daring results from hope and is contrary to fear: wherefore whatever is naturally apt to cause hope or banish fear, is + a cause of daring. Since, however, fear and hope, and also daring, being passions, consist in a movement of the appetite, + and in a certain bodily transmutation; a thing may be considered as the cause of daring in two ways, whether by raising hope, + or by banishing fear; in one way, in the + part of the appetitive movement; in another way, on the part of the bodily transmutation. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q45_A3-p7"> On the part of the appetitive movement which follows apprehension, hope that leads to daring is roused by those things that + make us reckon victory as possible. Such things regard either our own power, as bodily strength, experience of dangers, abundance + of wealth, and the like; or they regard the powers of others, such as having a great number of friends or any other means + of help, especially if a man trust in the Divine assistance: wherefore "those are more daring, with whom it + is well in regard to godlike things," as the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5). Fear is banished, in this way, by the removal + of threatening causes of fear; for instance, by the fact that a man has not enemies, through having harmed nobody, so that + he is not aware of any imminent danger; since those especially appear to be threatened by danger, who have harmed others. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q45_A3-p8"> On the part of the bodily transmutation, daring is caused through the incitement of hope and the banishment of fear, by those + things which raise the temperature about the heart. Wherefore the Philosopher says (De Part. Animal. iii, 4) that "those whose + heart is small in size, are more daring; while animals whose heart is large are timid; because the natural heat is unable + to give the same degree of temperature to a large as to a small heart; just as a fire does not heat a large + house as well as it does a small house." He says also (De Problem. xxvii, 4), that "those whose lungs contain much blood, + are more daring, through the heat in the heart that results therefrom." He says also in the same passage that "lovers of wine + are more daring, on account of the heat of the wine": hence it has been said above ( + <a id="FS_Q45_A3-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q40_A6.html">Q[40], A[6]</a>) that drunkenness conduces to hope, since the heat in the heart banishes fear and raises hope, by reason of the dilatation + and + enlargement of the heart. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q45_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Drunkenness causes daring, not through being a defect, but through dilating the heart: and again through making a man think + greatly of himself. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q45_A3-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Those who have no experience of dangers are more daring, not on account of a defect, but accidentally, i.e. in so far as + through being inexperienced they do not know their own failings, nor the dangers that threaten. Hence it is that the removal + of the cause of fear gives rise to daring. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q45_A3-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5) "those who have been wronged are courageous, because they think that God comes to the + assistance of those who suffer unjustly." + </p> + <p id="FS_Q45_A3-p12"> Hence it is evident that no defect causes daring except accidentally, i.e. in so far as some excellence attaches thereto, + real or imaginary, either in oneself or in another. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q45_A3-p13"></p> + <p id="FS_Q45_A3-p14"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q45_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q45_A4.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q45_A4" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q45_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q46.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q45_A4-p0.1">Whether the brave are more eager at first than in the midst of danger?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q45_A4-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q45_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the daring are not more eager at first than in the midst of danger. Because trembling is caused by fear, + which is contrary to daring, as stated above + <a id="FS_Q45_A4-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q45_A1.html">(A[1];</a> Q[44], A[3]). But the daring sometimes tremble at first, as the Philosopher says (De Problem. xxvii, 3). Therefore they are + not more eager at first than in the midst of danger. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q45_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, passion is intensified by an increase in its object: thus since a good is lovable, what is better is yet more lovable. + But the object of daring is something difficult. Therefore the greater the difficulty, the greater the daring. But danger + is more arduous and difficult when present. It is then therefore that daring is greatest. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q45_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, anger is provoked by the infliction of wounds. But anger causes daring; for the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5) that + "anger makes man bold." Therefore when man is in the midst of danger and when he is being beaten, then is he most daring. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q45_A4-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is said in Ethic. iii, 7 that "the daring are precipitate and full of eagerness before the danger, yet in the midst of + dangers they stand aloof." + </p> + <p id="FS_Q45_A4-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Daring, being a movement of the sensitive appetite, follows an apprehension of the sensitive faculty. But the sensitive faculty + cannot make comparisons, nor can it inquire into circumstances; its judgment is instantaneous. Now it happens sometimes that + it is impossible for a man to take note in an instant of all the difficulties of a certain situation: hence there arises the + movement of daring to face the danger; so that when he comes to experience the + danger, he feels the difficulty to be greater than he expected, and so gives way. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q45_A4-p7"> On the other hand, reason discusses all the difficulties of a situation. Consequently men of fortitude who face danger according + to the judgment of reason, at first seem slack, because they face the danger not from passion but with due deliberation. Yet + when they are in the midst of danger, they experience nothing unforeseen, but sometimes the difficulty turns out to be less + than they anticipated; wherefore they are more persevering. Moreover, it may be because they face the + danger on account of the good of virtue which is the abiding object of their will, however great the danger may prove: whereas + men of daring face the danger on account of a mere thought giving rise to hope and banishing fear, as stated above + <a id="FS_Q45_A4-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q45_A3.html">(A[3])</a>. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q45_A4-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Trembling does occur in men of daring, on account of the heat being withdrawn from the outer to the inner parts of the body, + as occurs also in those who are afraid. But in men of daring the heat withdraws to the heart; whereas in those who are afraid, + it withdraws to the inferior parts. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q45_A4-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The object of love is good simply, wherefore if it be increased, love is increased simply. But the object of daring is a + compound of good and evil; and the movement of daring towards evil presupposes the movement of hope towards good. If, therefore, + so much difficulty be added to the danger that it overcomes hope, the movement of daring does not ensue, but fails. But if + the movement of daring does ensue, the greater the danger, the greater is the + daring considered to be. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q45_A4-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Hurt does not give rise to anger unless there be some kind of hope, as we shall see later on ( + <a id="FS_Q45_A4-p10.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q46_A1.html">Q[46], A[1]</a>). Consequently if the danger be so great as to banish all hope of victory, anger does not ensue. It is true, however, that + if anger does ensue, there will be greater daring. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q45_A4-p11"></p> + <p id="FS_Q45_A4-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q45_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q46.html"></a> + </div> + <a href="summa.FS_Q44_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q45_A1.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q46" class="div3"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q45_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q46_A1.html"></a> + <h3 id="FS_Q46-p0.1">OF ANGER, IN ITSELF (EIGHT ARTICLES)</h3> + <p id="FS_Q46-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q46-p2"> We must now consider anger: and (1) anger in itself; (2) the cause of anger and its remedy; (3) the effect of anger.</p> + <p id="FS_Q46-p3"> Under the first head there are eight points of inquiry:</p> + <p id="FS_Q46-p4"> (1) Whether anger is a special passion?</p> + <p id="FS_Q46-p5"> (2) Whether the object of anger is good or evil?</p> + <p id="FS_Q46-p6"> (3) Whether anger is in the concupiscible faculty?</p> + <p id="FS_Q46-p7"> (4) Whether anger is accompanied by an act of reason?</p> + <p id="FS_Q46-p8"> (5) Whether anger is more natural than desire?</p> + <p id="FS_Q46-p9"> (6) Whether anger is more grievous than hatred?</p> + <p id="FS_Q46-p10"> (7) Whether anger is only towards those with whom we have a relation of justice?</p> + <p id="FS_Q46-p11"> (8) Of the species of anger.</p> + <div id="FS_Q46_A1" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q46.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q46_A2.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q46_A1-p0.1">Whether anger is a special passion?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q46_A1-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q46_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that anger is not a special passion. For the irascible power takes its name from anger [ira]. But there are + several passions in this power, not only one. Therefore anger is not one special passion. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q46_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, to every special passion there is a contrary passion; as is evident by going through them one by one. But no passion + is contrary to anger, as stated above ( + <a id="FS_Q46_A1-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q23_A3.html">Q[23], A[3]</a>). Therefore anger is not a special passion. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q46_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, one special passion does not include another. But anger includes several passions: since it accompanies sorrow, + pleasure, and hope, as the Philosopher states (Rhet. ii, 2). Therefore anger is not a special passion. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q46_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 16) calls anger a special passion: and so does Cicero (De Quaest. Tusc. iv, 7). + </p> + <p id="FS_Q46_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> A thing is said to be general in two ways. First, by predication; thus "animal" is general in respect of all animals. Secondly, + by causality; thus the sun is the general cause of all things generated here below, according to Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv). + Because just as a genus contains potentially many differences, according to a likeness of matter; so an efficient cause contains + many effects according to its active power. Now it happens that an effect is + produced by the concurrence of various causes; and since every cause remains somewhat in its effect, we may say that, in yet + a third way, an effect which is due to the concurrence of several causes, has a certain generality, inasmuch as several causes + are, in a fashion, actually existing therein. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q46_A1-p7"> Accordingly in the first way, anger is not a general passion but is condivided with the other passions, as stated above ( + <a id="FS_Q46_A1-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q23_A4.html">Q[23], A[4]</a>). In like manner, neither is it in the second way: since it is not a cause of the other passions. But in this way, love may + be called a general passion, as Augustine declares (De Civ. Dei xiv, 7,9), because love is the primary root of all the other + passions, as stated above ( + <a id="FS_Q46_A1-p7.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q27_A4.html">Q[27], A[4]</a> ). But, in a + third way, anger may be called a general passion, inasmuch as it is caused by a concurrence of several passions. Because the + movement of anger does not arise save on account of some pain inflicted, and unless there be desire and hope of revenge: for, + as the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 2), "the angry man hopes to punish; since he craves for revenge as being possible." Consequently + if the person, who inflicted the injury, excel very much, anger does not ensue, but only sorrow, as Avicenna states + (De Anima iv, 6). + </p> + <p id="FS_Q46_A1-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The irascible power takes its name from "ira" [anger], not because every movement of that power is one of anger; but because + all its movements terminate in anger; and because, of all these movements, anger is the most patent. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q46_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> From the very fact that anger is caused by contrary passions, i.e. by hope, which is of good, and by sorrow, which is of + evil, it includes in itself contrariety: and consequently it has no contrary outside itself. Thus also in mixed colors there + is no contrariety, except that of the simple colors from which they are made. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q46_A1-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Anger includes several passions, not indeed as a genus includes several species; but rather according to the inclusion of + cause and effect. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q46_A1-p11"></p> + <p id="FS_Q46_A1-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q46.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q46_A2.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q46_A2" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q46_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q46_A3.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q46_A2-p0.1">Whether the object of anger is good or evil?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q46_A2-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q46_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the object of anger is evil. For Gregory of Nyssa says [*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xxi.] that anger is "the + sword-bearer of desire," inasmuch, to wit, as it assails whatever obstacle stands in the way of desire. But an obstacle has + the character of evil. Therefore anger regards evil as its object. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q46_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, anger and hatred agree in their effect, since each seeks to inflict harm on another. But hatred regards evil as + its object, as stated above ( + <a id="FS_Q46_A2-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q29_A1.html">Q[29], A[1]</a>). Therefore anger does also. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q46_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, anger arises from sorrow; wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. viii, 6) that "anger acts with sorrow." But evil + is the object of sorrow. Therefore it is also the object of anger. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q46_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (Confess. ii, 6) that "anger craves for revenge." But the desire for revenge is a desire for something good: + since revenge belongs to justice. Therefore the object of anger is good. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q46_A2-p6"> Moreover, anger is always accompanied by hope, wherefore it causes pleasure, as the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 2). But the + object of hope and of pleasure is good. Therefore good is also the object of anger. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q46_A2-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The movement of the appetitive power follows an act of the apprehensive power. Now the apprehensive power apprehends a thing + in two ways. First, by way of an incomplex object, as when we understand what a man is; secondly, by way of a complex object, + as when we understand that whiteness is in a man. Consequently in each of these ways the appetitive power can tend to both + good and evil: by way of a simple and incomplex object, when the appetite simply follows + and adheres to good, or recoils from evil: and such movements are desire, hope, pleasure, sorrow, and so forth: by way of + a complex object, as when the appetite is concerned with some good or evil being in, or being done to, another, either seeking + this or recoiling from it. This is evident in the case of love and hatred: for we love someone, in so far as we wish some + good to be in him; and we hate someone, in so far as we wish some evil to be in him. It is the same with anger; for when a + man + is angry, he wishes to be avenged on someone. Hence the movement of anger has a twofold tendency: viz. to vengeance itself, + which it desires and hopes for as being a good, wherefore it takes pleasure in it; and to the person on whom it seeks vengeance, + as to something contrary and hurtful, which bears the character of evil. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q46_A2-p8"> We must, however, observe a twofold difference in this respect, between anger on the one side, and hatred and love on the + other. The first difference is that anger always regards two objects: whereas love and hatred sometimes regard but one object, + as when a man is said to love wine or something of the kind, or to hate it. The second difference is, that both the objects + of love are good: since the lover wishes good to someone, as to something agreeable to himself: while both the + objects of hatred bear the character of evil: for the man who hates, wishes evil to someone, as to something disagreeable + to him. Whereas anger regards one object under the aspect of evil, viz. the noxious person, on whom it seeks to be avenged. + Consequently it is a passion somewhat made up of contrary passions. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q46_A2-p9"> This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.</p> + <p id="FS_Q46_A2-p10"></p> + <p id="FS_Q46_A2-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q46_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q46_A3.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q46_A3" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q46_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q46_A4.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q46_A3-p0.1">Whether anger is in the concupiscible faculty?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q46_A3-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q46_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that anger is in the concupiscible faculty. For Cicero says (De Quaest. Tusc. iv, 9) that anger is a kind of + "desire." But desire is in the concupiscible faculty. Therefore anger is too. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q46_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Augustine says in his Rule, that "anger grows into hatred": and Cicero says (De Quaest. Tusc. iv, 9) that "hatred + is inveterate anger." But hatred, like love, is a concupiscible passion. Therefore anger is in the concupiscible faculty. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q46_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 16) and Gregory of Nyssa [*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xxi.] say that "anger is made up + of sorrow and desire." Both of these are in the concupiscible faculty. Therefore anger is a concupiscible passion. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q46_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The concupiscible is distinct from the irascible faculty. If, therefore, anger were in the concupiscible power, the irascible + would not take its name from it. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q46_A3-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above (Q[23], A[1]), the passions of the irascible part differ from the passions of the concupiscible faculty, + in that the objects of the concupiscible passions are good and evil absolutely considered, whereas the objects of the irascible + passions are good and evil in a certain elevation or arduousness. Now it has been stated + <a id="FS_Q46_A3-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q46_A2.html">(A[2])</a> that anger regards two objects: viz. the vengeance that it seeks; and the person on whom it + seeks vengeance; and in respect of both, anger requires a certain arduousness: for the movement of anger does not arise, unless + there be some magnitude about both these objects; since "we make no ado about things that are naught or very minute," as the + Philosopher observes (Rhet. ii, 2). It is therefore evident that anger is not in the concupiscible, but in the irascible faculty. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q46_A3-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Cicero gives the name of desire to any kind of craving for a future good, without discriminating between that which is arduous + and that which is not. Accordingly he reckons anger as a kind of desire, inasmuch as it is a desire of vengeance. In this + sense, however, desire is common to the irascible and concupiscible faculties. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q46_A3-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Anger is said to grow into hatred, not as though the same passion which at first was anger, afterwards becomes hatred by + becoming inveterate; but by a process of causality. For anger when it lasts a long time engenders hatred. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q46_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Anger is said to be composed of sorrow and desire, not as though they were its parts, but because they are its causes: and + it has been said above ( + <a id="FS_Q46_A3-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q25_A2.html">Q[25], A[2]</a>) that the concupiscible passions are the causes of the irascible passions. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q46_A3-p10"></p> + <p id="FS_Q46_A3-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q46_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q46_A4.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q46_A4" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q46_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q46_A5.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q46_A4-p0.1">Whether anger requires an act of reason?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q46_A4-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q46_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that anger does not require an act of reason. For, since anger is a passion, it is in the sensitive appetite. + But the sensitive appetite follows an apprehension, not of reason, but of the sensitive faculty. Therefore anger does not + require an act of reason. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q46_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, dumb animals are devoid of reason: and yet they are seen to be angry. Therefore anger does not require an act of + reason. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q46_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, drunkenness fetters the reason; whereas it is conducive to anger. Therefore anger does not require an act of reason. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q46_A4-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 6) that "anger listens to reason somewhat." + </p> + <p id="FS_Q46_A4-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above + <a id="FS_Q46_A4-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q46_A2.html">(A[2])</a>, anger is a desire for vengeance. Now vengeance implies a comparison between the punishment to be inflicted and the hurt + done; wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 6) that "anger, as if it had drawn the inference that it ought to quarrel + with such a person, is therefore immediately exasperated." Now to compare and to draw an inference is an act of reason. Therefore + anger, in a fashion, requires an act of + reason. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q46_A4-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The movement of the appetitive power may follow an act of reason in two ways. In the first way, it follows the reason in + so far as the reason commands: and thus the will follows reason, wherefore it is called the rational appetite. In another + way, it follows reason in so far as the reason denounces, and thus anger follows reason. For the Philosopher says (De Problem. + xxviii, 3) that "anger follows reason, not in obedience to reason's command, but as a + result of reason's denouncing the injury." Because the sensitive appetite is subject to the reason, not immediately but through + the will. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q46_A4-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Dumb animals have a natural instinct imparted to them by the Divine Reason, in virtue of which they are gifted with movements, + both internal and external, like unto rational movements, as stated above ( + <a id="FS_Q46_A4-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q40_A3.html">Q[40], A[3]</a>). + </p> + <p id="FS_Q46_A4-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As stated in Ethic. vii, 6, "anger listens somewhat to reason" in so far as reason denounces the injury inflicted, "but listens + not perfectly," because it does not observe the rule of reason as to the measure of vengeance. Anger, therefore, requires + an act of reason; and yet proves a hindrance to reason. Wherefore the Philosopher says (De Problem. iii, 2,27) that whose + who are very drunk, so as to be incapable of the use of reason, do not get angry: + but those who are slightly drunk, do get angry, through being still able, though hampered, to form a judgment of reason. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q46_A4-p10"></p> + <p id="FS_Q46_A4-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q46_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q46_A5.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q46_A5" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q46_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q46_A6.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q46_A5-p0.1">Whether anger is more natural than desire?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q46_A5-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q46_A5-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that anger is not more natural than desire. Because it is proper to man to be by nature a gentle animal. But + "gentleness is contrary to anger," as the Philosopher states (Rhet. ii, 3). Therefore anger is no more natural than desire, + in fact it seems to be altogether unnatural to man. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q46_A5-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, reason is contrasted with nature: since those things that act according to reason, are not said to act according + to nature. Now "anger requires an act of reason, but desire does not," as stated in Ethic. vii, 6. Therefore desire is more + natural than anger. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q46_A5-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, anger is a craving for vengeance: while desire is a craving for those things especially which are pleasant to the + touch, viz. for pleasures of the table and for sexual pleasures. But these things are more natural to man than vengeance. + Therefore desire is more natural than anger. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q46_A5-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 6) that "anger is more natural than desire." + </p> + <p id="FS_Q46_A5-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> By "natural" we mean that which is caused by nature, as stated in Phys. ii, 1. Consequently the question as to whether a + particular passion is more or less natural cannot be decided without reference to the cause of that passion. Now the cause + of a passion, as stated above ( + <a id="FS_Q46_A5-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q36_A2.html">Q[36], A[2]</a>), may be considered in two ways: first, on the part of the object; secondly, on the part of the subject. If then we consider + the cause of anger and of + desire, on the part of the object, thus desire, especially of pleasures of the table, and of sexual pleasures, is more natural + than anger; in so far as these pleasures are more natural to man than vengeance. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q46_A5-p7"> If, however, we consider the cause of anger on the part of the subject, thus anger, in a manner, is more natural; and, in + a manner, desire is more natural. Because the nature of an individual man may be considered either as to the generic, or as + to the specific nature, or again as to the particular temperament of the individual. If then we consider the generic nature, + i.e. the nature of this man considered as an animal; thus desire is more natural than anger; because it is from + this very generic nature that man is inclined to desire those things which tend to preserve in him the life both of the species + and of the individual. If, however, we consider the specific nature, i.e. the nature of this man as a rational being; then + anger is more natural to man than desire, in so far as anger follows reason more than desire does. Wherefore the Philosopher + says (Ethic. iv, 5) that "revenge" which pertains to anger "is more natural to man than meekness": for it is natural to + everything to rise up against things contrary and hurtful. And if we consider the nature of the individual, in respect of + his particular temperament, thus anger is more natural than desire; for the reason that anger is prone to ensue from the natural + tendency to anger, more than desire, or any other passion, is to ensue from a natural tendency to desire, which tendencies + result from a man's individual temperament. Because disposition to anger is due to a bilious temperament; and of all the + humors, the bile moves quickest; for it is like fire. Consequently he that is temperamentally disposed to anger is sooner + incensed with anger, than he that is temperamentally disposed to desire, is inflamed with desire: and for this reason the + Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 6) that a disposition to anger is more liable to be transmitted from parent to child, than a + disposition to desire. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q46_A5-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> We may consider in man both the natural temperament on the part of the body, and the reason. On the part of the bodily temperament, + a man, considered specifically, does not naturally excel others either in anger or in any other passion, on account of the + moderation of his temperament. But other animals, for as much as their temperament recedes from this moderation and approaches + to an extreme disposition, are naturally disposed to some excess of + passion, such as the lion in daring, the hound in anger, the hare in fear, and so forth. On the part of reason, however, it + is natural to man, both to be angry and to be gentle: in so far as reason somewhat causes anger, by denouncing the injury + which causes anger; and somewhat appeases anger, in so far as the angry man "does not listen perfectly to the command of reason," + as stated above (A[4], ad 3). + </p> + <p id="FS_Q46_A5-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Reason itself belongs to the nature of man: wherefore from the very fact that anger requires an act of reason, it follows + that it is, in a manner, natural to man. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q46_A5-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This argument regards anger and desire on the part of the object. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q46_A5-p11"></p> + <p id="FS_Q46_A5-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q46_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q46_A6.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q46_A6" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q46_A5.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q46_A7.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q46_A6-p0.1">Whether anger is more grievous than hatred?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q46_A6-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q46_A6-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that anger is more grievous than hatred. For it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q46_A6-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Prov.27.4" target="asv">Prov. 27:4</a>) that "anger hath no mercy, nor fury when it breaketh forth." But hatred sometimes has mercy. Therefore anger is more grievous + than hatred. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q46_A6-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it is worse to suffer evil and to grieve for it, than merely to suffer it. But when a man hates, he is contented + if the object of his hatred suffer evil: whereas the angry man is not satisfied unless the object of his anger know it and + be aggrieved thereby, as the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 4). Therefore, anger is more grievous than hatred. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q46_A6-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, a thing seems to be so much the more firm according as more things concur to set it up: thus a habit is all the + more settled through being caused by several acts. But anger is caused by the concurrence of several passions, as stated above + + <a id="FS_Q46_A6-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q46_A1.html">(A[1])</a>: whereas hatred is not. Therefore anger is more settled and more grievous than hatred. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q46_A6-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine, in his Rule, compares hatred to "a beam," but anger to "a mote." + </p> + <p id="FS_Q46_A6-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The species and nature of a passion are taken from its object. Now the object of anger is the same in substance as the object + of hatred; since, just as the hater wishes evil to him whom he hates, so does the angry man wish evil to him with whom he + is angry. But there is a difference of aspect: for the hater wishes evil to his enemy, as evil, whereas the angry man wishes + evil to him with whom he is angry, not as evil but in so far as it has an aspect of good, + that is, in so far as he reckons it as just, since it is a means of vengeance. Wherefore also it has been said above + <a id="FS_Q46_A6-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q46_A2.html">(A[2])</a> that hatred implies application of evil to evil, whereas anger denotes application of good to evil. Now it is evident that + to seek evil under the aspect of justice, is a lesser evil, than simply to seek evil to someone. Because to wish evil to someone + under the aspect of justice, may be according to the virtue of justice, if it be in conformity + with the order of reason; and anger fails only in this, that it does not obey the precept of reason in taking vengeance. Consequently + it is evident that hatred is far worse and graver than anger. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q46_A6-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> In anger and hatred two points may be considered: namely, the thing desired, and the intensity of the desire. As to the thing + desired, anger has more mercy than hatred has. For since hatred desires another's evil for evil's sake, it is satisfied with + no particular measure of evil: because those things that are desired for their own sake, are desired without measure, as the + Philosopher states (Polit. i, 3), instancing a miser with regard to riches. + Hence it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q46_A6-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.12.16" target="asv">Ecclus. 12:16</a>): "An enemy . . . if he find an opportunity, will not be satisfied with blood." Anger, on the other hand, seeks evil only + under the aspect of a just means of vengeance. Consequently when the evil inflicted goes beyond the measure of justice according + to the estimate of the angry man, then he has mercy. Wherefore the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 4) that "the angry man is appeased + if many evils befall, whereas the hater is never + appeased." + </p> + <p id="FS_Q46_A6-p8"> As to the intensity of the desire, anger excludes mercy more than hatred does; because the movement of anger is more impetuous, + through the heating of the bile. Hence the passage quoted continues: "Who can bear the violence of one provoked?" + </p> + <p id="FS_Q46_A6-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As stated above, an angry man wishes evil to someone, in so far as this evil is a means of just vengeance. Now vengeance + is wrought by the infliction of a punishment: and the nature of punishment consists in being contrary to the will, painful, + and inflicted for some fault. Consequently an angry man desires this, that the person whom he is hurting, may feel it and + be in pain, and know that this has befallen him on account of the harm he has done the + other. The hater, on the other hand, cares not for all this, since he desires another's evil as such. It is not true, however, + that an evil is worse through giving pain: because "injustice and imprudence, although evil," yet, being voluntary, "do not + grieve those in whom they are," as the Philosopher observes (Rhet. ii, 4). + </p> + <p id="FS_Q46_A6-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> That which proceeds from several causes, is more settled when these causes are of one kind: but it may be that one cause + prevails over many others. Now hatred ensues from a more lasting cause than anger does. Because anger arises from an emotion + of the soul due to the wrong inflicted; whereas hatred ensues from a disposition in a man, by reason of which he considers + that which he hates to be contrary and hurtful to him. Consequently, as passion is + more transitory than disposition or habit, so anger is less lasting than hatred; although hatred itself is a passion ensuing + from this disposition. Hence the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 4) that "hatred is more incurable than anger." + </p> + <p id="FS_Q46_A6-p11"></p> + <p id="FS_Q46_A6-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q46_A5.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q46_A7.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q46_A7" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q46_A6.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q46_A8.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q46_A7-p0.1">Whether anger is only towards those to whom one has an obligation of justice?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q46_A7-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q46_A7-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that anger is not only towards those to whom one has an obligation of justice. For there is no justice between + man and irrational beings. And yet sometimes one is angry with irrational beings; thus, out of anger, a writer throws away + his pen, or a rider strikes his horse. Therefore anger is not only towards those to whom one has an obligation of justice. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q46_A7-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, "there is no justice towards oneself . . . nor is there justice towards one's own" (Ethic. v, 6). But sometimes + a man is angry with himself; for instance, a penitent, on account of his sin; hence it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q46_A7-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.4.5" target="asv">Ps. 4:5</a>): "Be ye angry and sin not." Therefore anger is not only towards those with whom one has a relation of justice. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q46_A7-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, justice and injustice can be of one man towards an entire class, or a whole community: for instance, when the state + injures an individual. But anger is not towards a class but only towards an individual, as the Philosopher states (Rhet. ii, + 4). Therefore properly speaking, anger is not towards those with whom one is in relation of justice or injustice. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q46_A7-p5"> The contrary, however, may be gathered from the Philosopher (Rhet. ii, 2,3).</p> + <p id="FS_Q46_A7-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above + <a id="FS_Q46_A7-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q46_A6.html">(A[6])</a>, anger desires evil as being a means of just vengeance. Consequently, anger is towards those to whom we are just or unjust: + since vengeance is an act of justice, and wrong-doing is an act of injustice. Therefore both on the part of the cause, viz. + the harm done by another, and on the part of the vengeance sought by the angry man, it is evident that anger concerns those + to whom one is just or unjust. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q46_A7-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As stated above (A[4], ad 2), anger, though it follows an act of reason, can nevertheless be in dumb animals that are devoid + of reason, in so far as through their natural instinct they are moved by their imagination to something like rational action. + Since then in man there is both reason and imagination, the movement of anger can be aroused in man in two ways. First, when + only his imagination denounces the injury: and, in this way, man is aroused to + a movement of anger even against irrational and inanimate beings, which movement is like that which occurs in animals against + anything that injures them. Secondly, by the reason denouncing the injury: and thus, according to the Philosopher (Rhet. ii, + 3), "it is impossible to be angry with insensible things, or with the dead": both because they feel no pain, which is, above + all, what the angry man seeks in those with whom he is angry: and because there is no question of vengeance on them, since + they can do us no harm. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q46_A7-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 11), "metaphorically speaking there is a certain justice and injustice between a man and + himself," in so far as the reason rules the irascible and concupiscible parts of the soul. And in this sense a man is said + to be avenged on himself, and consequently, to be angry with himself. But properly, and in accordance with the nature of things, + a man is never angry with himself. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q46_A7-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The Philosopher (Rhet. ii, 4) assigns as one difference between hatred and anger, that "hatred may be felt towards a class, + as we hate the entire class of thieves; whereas anger is directed only towards an individual." The reason is that hatred arises + from our considering a quality as disagreeing with our disposition; and this may refer to a thing in general or in particular. + Anger, on the other hand, ensues from someone having injured us by his + action. Now all actions are the deeds of individuals: and consequently anger is always pointed at an individual. When the + whole state hurts us, the whole state is reckoned as one individual [*Cf. + <a id="FS_Q46_A7-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q29_A6.html"> Q[29], A[6]</a>]. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q46_A7-p10"></p> + <p id="FS_Q46_A7-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q46_A6.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q46_A8.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q46_A8" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q46_A7.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q47.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q46_A8-p0.1">Whether the species of anger are suitably assigned?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q46_A8-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q46_A8-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 16) unsuitably assigns three species of anger---"wrath," "ill-will" and "rancor." + For no genus derives its specific differences from accidents. But these three are diversified in respect of an accident: because + "the beginning of the movement of anger is called wrath {cholos}, if anger continue it is called ill-will {menis}; while rancor + {kotos} is anger waiting for an opportunity of vengeance." Therefore these + are not different species of anger. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q46_A8-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Cicero says (De Quaest. Tusc. iv, 9) that "excandescentia [irascibility] is what the Greeks call {thymosis}, and + is a kind of anger that arises and subsides intermittently"; while according to Damascene {thymosis}, is the same as the Greek + {kotos} [rancor]. Therefore {kotos} does not bide its time for taking vengeance, but in course of time spends itself. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q46_A8-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Gregory (Moral. xxi, 4) gives three degrees of anger, namely, "anger without utterance, anger with utterance, and + anger with perfection of speech," corresponding to the three degrees mentioned by Our Lord ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q46_A8-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.5.22" target="asv">Mat. 5:22</a>): "Whosoever is angry with his brother" [thus implying "anger without utterance"], and then, "whosoever shall say to his + brother, 'Raca'" [implying "anger with utterance yet without full expression"], and lastly, + "whosoever shall say 'Thou fool'" [where we have "perfection of speech"]. Therefore Damascene's division is imperfect, since + it takes no account of utterance. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q46_A8-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> stands the authority of Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 16) and Gregory of Nyssa [*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xxi.]. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q46_A8-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The species of anger given by Damascene and Gregory of Nyssa are taken from those things which give increase to anger. This + happens in three ways. First from facility of the movement itself, and he calls this kind of anger {cholos} [bile] because + it quickly aroused. Secondly, on the part of the grief that causes anger, and which dwells some time in the memory; this belongs + to {menis} [ill-will] which is derived from {menein} [to dwell]. Thirdly, on the part + of that which the angry man seeks, viz. vengeance; and this pertains to {kotos} [rancor] which never rests until it is avenged + [* + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q46_A8-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Eph.4.31" target="asv">Eph. 4:31</a>: "Let all bitterness and anger and indignation . . . be put away from you."]. Hence the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 5) calls + some angry persons {akrocholoi} [choleric], because they are easily angered; some he calls {pikroi} [bitter], because they + retain their anger for a long time; and some he calls {chalepoi} [ill-tempered], because they + never rest until they have retaliated [*Cf. + <a id="FS_Q46_A8-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.SS_Q158_A5.html">SS, Q[158], A[5]</a>]. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q46_A8-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> All those things which give anger some kind of perfection are not altogether accidental to anger; and consequently nothing + prevents them from causing a certain specific difference thereof. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q46_A8-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Irascibility, which Cicero mentions, seems to pertain to the first species of anger, which consists in a certain quickness + of temper, rather than to rancor [furor]. And there is no reason why the Greek {thymosis}, which is denoted by the Latin "furor," + should not signify both quickness to anger, and firmness of purpose in being avenged. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q46_A8-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> These degrees are distinguished according to various effects of anger; and not according to degrees of perfection in the + very movement of anger. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q46_A8-p10"></p> + <p id="FS_Q46_A8-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q46_A7.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q47.html"></a> + </div> + <a href="summa.FS_Q45_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q46_A1.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q47" class="div3"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q46_A8.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q47_A1.html"></a> + <h3 id="FS_Q47-p0.1">OF THE CAUSE THAT PROVOKES ANGER, AND OF THE REMEDIES OF ANGER (FOUR ARTICLES) [*There is no further mention of these remedies + in the text, except in A[4].] + </h3> + <p id="FS_Q47-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q47-p2"> We must now consider the cause that provokes anger, and its remedies. Under this head there are four points of inquiry:</p> + <p id="FS_Q47-p3"> (1) Whether the motive of anger is always something done against the one who is angry?</p> + <p id="FS_Q47-p4"> (2) Whether slight or contempt is the sole motive of anger?</p> + <p id="FS_Q47-p5"> (3) Of the cause of anger on the part of the angry person;</p> + <p id="FS_Q47-p6"> (4) Of the cause of anger on the part of the person with whom one is angry.</p> + <div id="FS_Q47_A1" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q47.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q47_A2.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q47_A1-p0.1">Whether the motive of anger is always something done against the one who is angry?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q47_A1-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q47_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the motive of anger is not always something done against the one who is angry. Because man, by sinning, + can do nothing against God; since it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q47_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Job.35.6" target="asv">Job 35:6</a>): "If thy iniquities be multiplied, what shalt thou do against Him?" And yet God is spoken of as being angry with man on + account of sin, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q47_A1-p2.2" href="./asv.html#Ps.105.40" target="asv"> Ps. 105:40</a>: "The Lord was exceedingly angry with His people." Therefore it is not always on + account of something done against him, that a man is angry. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q47_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, anger is a desire for vengeance. But one may desire vengeance for things done against others. Therefore we are not + always angry on account of something done against us. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q47_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, as the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 2) man is angry especially with those "who despise what he takes a great interest + in; thus men who study philosophy are angry with those who despise philosophy," and so forth. But contempt of philosophy does + not harm the philosopher. Therefore it is not always a harm done to us that makes us angry. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q47_A1-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, he that holds his tongue when another insults him, provokes him to greater anger, as Chrysostom observes (Hom. xxii, + in Ep. ad Rom.). But by holding his tongue he does the other no harm. Therefore a man is not always provoked to anger by something + done against him. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q47_A1-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 4) that "anger is always due to something done to oneself: whereas hatred may arise without + anything being done to us, for we hate a man simply because we think him such." + </p> + <p id="FS_Q47_A1-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above ( + <a id="FS_Q47_A1-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q46_A6.html">Q[46], A[6]</a>), anger is the desire to hurt another for the purpose of just vengeance. Now unless some injury has been done, there is no + question of vengeance: nor does any injury provoke one to vengeance, but only that which is done to the person who seeks vengeance: + for just as everything naturally seeks its own good, so does it naturally repel its own evil. But injury done by anyone does + not affect a man unless in + some way it be something done against him. Consequently the motive of a man's anger is always something done against him. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q47_A1-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> We speak of anger in God, not as of a passion of the soul but as of judgment of justice, inasmuch as He wills to take vengeance + on sin. Because the sinner, by sinning, cannot do God any actual harm: but so far as he himself is concerned, he acts against + God in two ways. First, in so far as he despises God in His commandments. Secondly, in so far as he harms himself or another; + which injury redounds to God, inasmuch as the person injured is an object + of God's providence and protection. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q47_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> If we are angry with those who harm others, and seek to be avenged on them, it is because those who are injured belong in + some way to us: either by some kinship or friendship, or at least because of the nature we have in common. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q47_A1-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> When we take a very great interest in a thing, we look upon it as our own good; so that if anyone despise it, it seems as + though we ourselves were despised and injured. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q47_A1-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Silence provokes the insulter to anger when he thinks it is due to contempt, as though his anger were slighted: and a slight + is an action. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q47_A1-p12"></p> + <p id="FS_Q47_A1-p13"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q47.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q47_A2.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q47_A2" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q47_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q47_A3.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q47_A2-p0.1">Whether the sole motive of anger is slight or contempt?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q47_A2-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q47_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that slight or contempt is not the sole motive of anger. For Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 16) that we + are angry "when we suffer, or think that we are suffering, an injury." But one may suffer an injury without being despised + or slighted. Therefore a slight is not the only motive of anger. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q47_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, desire for honor and grief for a slight belong to the same subject. But dumb animals do not desire honor. Therefore + they are not grieved by being slighted. And yet "they are roused to anger, when wounded," as the Philosopher says (Ethic. + iii, 8). Therefore a slight is not the sole motive of anger. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q47_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the Philosopher (Rhet. ii, 2) gives many other causes of anger, for instance, "being forgotten by others; that others + should rejoice in our misfortunes; that they should make known our evils; being hindered from doing as we like." Therefore + being slighted is not the only motive for being angry. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q47_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 2) that anger is "a desire, with sorrow, for vengeance, on account of a seeming slight done + unbecomingly." + </p> + <p id="FS_Q47_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> All the causes of anger are reduced to slight. For slight is of three kinds, as stated in Rhet. ii, 2, viz. "contempt," "despiteful + treatment," i.e. hindering one from doing one's will, and "insolence": and all motives of anger are reduced to these three. + Two reasons may be assigned for this. First, because anger seeks another's hurt as being a means of just vengeance: wherefore + it seeks vengeance in so far as it seems just. Now just vengeance is taken only + for that which is done unjustly; hence that which provokes anger is always something considered in the light of an injustice. + Wherefore the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 3) that "men are not angry---if they think they have wronged some one and are suffering + justly on that account; because there is no anger at what is just." Now injury is done to another in three ways: namely, through + ignorance, through passion, and through choice. Then, most of all, a man does an injustice, when he does an injury + from choice, on purpose, or from deliberate malice, as stated in Ethic. v, 8. Wherefore we are most of all angry with those + who, in our opinion, have hurt us on purpose. For if we think that some one has done us an injury through ignorance or through + passion, either we are not angry with them at all, or very much less: since to do anything through ignorance or through passion + takes away from the notion of injury, and to a certain extent calls for mercy and forgiveness. Those, on the other hand, + who do an injury on purpose, seem to sin from contempt; wherefore we are angry with them most of all. Hence the Philosopher + says (Rhet. ii, 3) that "we are either not angry at all, or not very angry with those who have acted through anger, because + they do not seem to have acted slightingly." + </p> + <p id="FS_Q47_A2-p7"> The second reason is because a slight is opposed to a man's excellence: because "men think little of things that are not + worth much ado" (Rhet. ii, 2). Now we seek for some kind of excellence from all our goods. Consequently whatever injury is + inflicted on us, in so far as it is derogatory to our excellence, seems to savor of a slight. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q47_A2-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Any other cause, besides contempt, through which a man suffers an injury, takes away from the notion of injury: contempt + or slight alone adds to the motive of anger, and consequently is of itself the cause of anger. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q47_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Although a dumb animal does not seek honor as such, yet it naturally seeks a certain superiority, and is angry with anything + derogatory thereto. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q47_A2-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Each of those causes amounts to some kind of slight. Thus forgetfulness is a clear sign of slight esteem, for the more we + think of a thing the more is it fixed in our memory. Again if a man does not hesitate by his remarks to give pain to another, + this seems to show that he thinks little of him: and those too who show signs of hilarity when another is in misfortune, seem + to care little about his good or evil. Again he that hinders another from + carrying out his will, without deriving thereby any profit to himself, seems not to care much for his friendship. Consequently + all those things, in so far as they are signs of contempt, provoke anger. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q47_A2-p11"></p> + <p id="FS_Q47_A2-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q47_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q47_A3.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q47_A3" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q47_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q47_A4.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q47_A3-p0.1">Whether a man's excellence is the cause of his being angry?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q47_A3-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q47_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that a man's excellence is not the cause of his being more easily angry. For the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, + 2) that "some are angry especially when they are grieved, for instance, the sick, the poor, and those who are disappointed." + But these things seem to pertain to defect. Therefore defect rather than excellence makes one prone to anger. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q47_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 2) that "some are very much inclined to be angry when they are despised for some + failing or weakness of the existence of which there are grounds for suspicion; but if they think they excel in those points, + they do not trouble." But a suspicion of this kind is due to some defect. Therefore defect rather than excellence is a cause + of a man being angry. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q47_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, whatever savors of excellence makes a man agreeable and hopeful. But the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 3) that "men + are not angry when they play, make jokes, or take part in a feast, nor when they are prosperous or successful, nor in moderate + pleasures and well-founded hope." Therefore excellence is not a cause of anger. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q47_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 9) that excellence makes men prone to anger. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q47_A3-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The cause of anger, in the man who is angry, may be taken in two ways. First in respect of the motive of anger: and thus + excellence is the cause of a man being easily angered. Because the motive of anger is an unjust slight, as stated above + <a id="FS_Q47_A3-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q47_A2.html">(A[2])</a>. Now it is evident that the more excellent a man is, the more unjust is a slight offered him in the matter in which he excels. + Consequently those who excel in any matter, are most of all + angry, if they be slighted in that matter; for instance, a wealthy man in his riches, or an orator in his eloquence, and so + forth. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q47_A3-p7"> Secondly, the cause of anger, in the man who is angry, may be considered on the part of the disposition produced in him by + the motive aforesaid. Now it is evident that nothing moves a man to anger except a hurt that grieves him: while whatever savors + of defect is above all a cause of grief; since men who suffer from some defect are more easily hurt. And this is why men who + are weak, or subject to some other defect, are more easily angered, since they are more easily grieved. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q47_A3-p8"> This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.</p> + <p id="FS_Q47_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> If a man be despised in a matter in which he evidently excels greatly, he does not consider himself the loser thereby, and + therefore is not grieved: and in this respect he is less angered. But in another respect, in so far as he is more undeservedly + despised, he has more reason for being angry: unless perhaps he thinks that he is envied or insulted not through contempt + but through ignorance, or some other like cause. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q47_A3-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> All these things hinder anger in so far as they hinder sorrow. But in another respect they are naturally apt to provoke anger, + because they make it more unseemly to insult anyone. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q47_A3-p11"></p> + <p id="FS_Q47_A3-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q47_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q47_A4.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q47_A4" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q47_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q48.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q47_A4-p0.1">Whether a person's defect is a reason for being more easily angry with him?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q47_A4-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q47_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that a person's defect is not a reason for being more easily angry with him. For the Philosopher says (Rhet. + ii, 3) that "we are not angry with those who confess and repent and humble themselves; on the contrary, we are gentle with + them. Wherefore dogs bite not those who sit down." But these things savor of littleness and defect. Therefore littleness of + a person is a reason for being less angry with him. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q47_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, there is no greater defect than death. But anger ceases at the sight of death. Therefore defect of a person does + not provoke anger against him. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q47_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, no one thinks little of a man through his being friendly towards him. But we are more angry with friends, if they + offend us or refuse to help us; hence it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q47_A4-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.54.13" target="asv">Ps. 54:13</a>): "If my enemy had reviled me I would verily have borne with it." Therefore a person's defect is not a reason for being more + easily angry with him. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q47_A4-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 2) that "the rich man is angry with the poor man, if the latter despise him; and in like + manner the prince is angry with his subject." + </p> + <p id="FS_Q47_A4-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above ( + <a id="FS_Q47_A4-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q47_A2.html">AA[2]</a>,3) unmerited contempt more than anything else is a provocative of anger. Consequently deficiency or littleness in the person + with whom we are angry, tends to increase our anger, in so far as it adds to the unmeritedness of being despised. For just + as the higher a man's position is, the more undeservedly he is despised; so the lower it is, the less reason he has for despising. + Thus a nobleman is angry if he be + insulted by a peasant; a wise man, if by a fool; a master, if by a servant. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q47_A4-p7"> If, however, the littleness or deficiency lessens the unmerited contempt, then it does not increase but lessens anger. In + this way those who repent of their ill-deeds, and confess that they have done wrong, who humble themselves and ask pardon, + mitigate anger, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q47_A4-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Prov.15.1" target="asv">Prov. 15:1</a>: "A mild answer breaketh wrath": because, to wit, they seem not to despise, but rather to think much of those before whom + they humble themselves. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q47_A4-p8"> This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.</p> + <p id="FS_Q47_A4-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> There are two reasons why anger ceases at the sight of death. One is because the dead are incapable of sorrow and sensation; + and this is chiefly what the angry seek in those with whom they are angered. Another reason is because the dead seem to have + attained to the limit of evils. Hence anger ceases in regard to all who are grievously hurt, in so far as this hurt surpasses + the measure of just retaliation. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q47_A4-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> To be despised by one's friends seems also a greater indignity. Consequently if they despise us by hurting or by failing + to help, we are angry with them for the same reason for which we are angry with those who are beneath us. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q47_A4-p11"></p> + <p id="FS_Q47_A4-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q47_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q48.html"></a> + </div> + <a href="summa.FS_Q46_A8.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q47_A1.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q48" class="div3"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q47_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q48_A1.html"></a> + <h3 id="FS_Q48-p0.1">OF THE EFFECTS OF ANGER (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3> + <p id="FS_Q48-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q48-p2"> We must now consider the effects of anger: under which head there are four points of inquiry:</p> + <p id="FS_Q48-p3"> (1) Whether anger causes pleasure?</p> + <p id="FS_Q48-p4"> (2) Whether above all it causes heat in the heart?</p> + <p id="FS_Q48-p5"> (3) Whether above all it hinders the use of reason?</p> + <p id="FS_Q48-p6"> (4) Whether it causes taciturnity?</p> + <div id="FS_Q48_A1" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q48.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q48_A2.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q48_A1-p0.1">Whether anger causes pleasure?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q48_A1-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q48_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that anger does not cause pleasure. Because sorrow excludes pleasure. But anger is never without sorrow, since, + as stated in Ethic. vii, 6, "everyone that acts from anger, acts with pain." Therefore anger does not cause pleasure. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q48_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 5) that "vengeance makes anger to cease, because it substitutes pleasure for pain": + whence we may gather that the angry man derives pleasure from vengeance, and that vengeance quells his anger. Therefore on + the advent of pleasure, anger departs: and consequently anger is not an effect united with pleasure. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q48_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, no effect hinders its cause, since it is conformed to its cause. But pleasure hinders anger as stated in Rhet. ii, + 3. Therefore pleasure is not an effect of anger. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q48_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 5) quotes the saying that anger is "Sweet to the soul as honey to the taste" (Iliad, xviii, 109 + [trl. Pope]). + </p> + <p id="FS_Q48_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 14), pleasures, chiefly sensible and bodily pleasures, are remedies against sorrow: + and therefore the greater the sorrow or anxiety, the more sensible are we to the pleasure which heals it, as is evident in + the case of thirst which increases the pleasure of drink. Now it is clear from what has been said ( + <a id="FS_Q48_A1-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q47_A1.html">Q[47], AA[1]</a>,3), that the movement of anger arises from a wrong done that causes sorrow, for + which sorrow vengeance is sought as a remedy. Consequently as soon as vengeance is present, pleasure ensues, and so much the + greater according as the sorrow was greater. Therefore if vengeance be really present, perfect pleasure ensues, entirely excluding + sorrow, so that the movement of anger ceases. But before vengeance is really present, it becomes present to the angry man + in two ways: in one way, by hope; because none is angry except he hopes for vengeance, as stated above ( + <a id="FS_Q48_A1-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q46_A1.html">Q[46], A[1]</a>); in another way, by thinking of it continually, for to everyone that desires a thing it is pleasant to dwell on the thought + of what he desires; wherefore the imaginings of dreams are pleasant. Accordingly an angry man takes pleasure in thinking much + about vengeance. This pleasure, however, is not perfect, so as to banish sorrow and consequently anger. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q48_A1-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The angry man does not grieve and rejoice at the same thing; he grieves for the wrong done, while he takes pleasure in the + thought and hope of vengeance. Consequently sorrow is to anger as its beginning; while pleasure is the effect or terminus + of anger. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q48_A1-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> This argument holds in regard to pleasure caused by the real presence of vengeance, which banishes anger altogether. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q48_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Pleasure that precedes hinders sorrow from ensuing, and consequently is a hindrance to anger. But pleasure felt in taking + vengeance follows from anger. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q48_A1-p10"></p> + <p id="FS_Q48_A1-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q48.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q48_A2.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q48_A2" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q48_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q48_A3.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q48_A2-p0.1">Whether anger above all causes fervor in the heart?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q48_A2-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q48_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that heat is not above all the effect of anger. For fervor, as stated above ( + <a id="FS_Q48_A2-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q28_A5.html">Q[28], A[5]</a>; + <a id="FS_Q48_A2-p2.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q37_A2.html"> Q[37], A[2]</a>), belongs to love. But love, as above stated, is the beginning and cause of all the passions. Since then the cause is more + powerful than its effect, it seems that anger is not the chief cause of fervor. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q48_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, those things which, of themselves, arouse fervor, increase as time goes on; thus love grows stronger the longer + it lasts. But in course of time anger grows weaker; for the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 3) that "time puts an end to anger." + Therefore fervor is not the proper effect of anger. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q48_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, fervor added to fervor produces greater fervor. But "the addition of a greater anger banishes already existing anger," + as the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 3). Therefore anger does not cause fervor. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q48_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 16) that "anger is fervor of the blood around the heart, resulting from an exhalation of + the bile." + </p> + <p id="FS_Q48_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above ( + <a id="FS_Q48_A2-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q44_A1.html">Q[44], A[1]</a>), the bodily transmutation that occurs in the passions of the soul is proportionate to the movement of the appetite. Now + it is evident that every appetite, even the natural appetite, tends with greater force to repel that which is contrary to + it, if it be present: hence we see that hot water freezes harder, as though the cold acted with greater force on the hot object. + Since then the appetitive movement + of anger is caused by some injury inflicted, as by a contrary that is present; it follows that the appetite tends with great + force to repel the injury by the desire of vengeance; and hence ensues great vehemence and impetuosity in the movement of + anger. And because the movement of anger is not one of recoil, which corresponds to the action of cold, but one of prosecution, + which corresponds to the action of heat, the result is that the movement of anger produces fervor of the blood and vital + spirits around the heart, which is the instrument of the soul's passions. And hence it is that, on account of the heart being + so disturbed by anger, those chiefly who are angry betray signs thereof in their outer members. For, as Gregory says (Moral. + v, 30) "the heart that is inflamed with the stings of its own anger beats quick, the body trembles, the tongue stammers, the + countenance takes fire, the eyes grow fierce, they that are well known are not recognized. With the mouth indeed he shapes + a sound, but the understanding knows not what it says." + </p> + <p id="FS_Q48_A2-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> "Love itself is not felt so keenly as in the absence of the beloved," as Augustine observes (De Trin. x, 12). Consequently + when a man suffers from a hurt done to the excellence that he loves, he feels his love thereof the more: the result being + that his heart is moved with greater heat to remove the hindrance to the object of his love; so that anger increases the fervor + of love and makes it to be felt more. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q48_A2-p8"> Nevertheless, the fervor arising from heat differs according as it is to be referred to love or to anger. Because the fervor + of love has a certain sweetness and gentleness; for it tends to the good that one loves: whence it is likened to the warmth + of the air and of the blood. For this reason sanguine temperaments are more inclined to love; and hence the saying that "love + springs from the liver," because of the blood being formed there. On the other hand, the fervor of anger has + a certain bitterness with a tendency to destroy, for it seeks to be avenged on the contrary evil: whence it is likened to + the heat of fire and of the bile, and for this reason Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 16) that it "results from an exhalation + of the bile whence it takes its name {chole}." + </p> + <p id="FS_Q48_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Time, of necessity, weakens all those things, the causes of which are impaired by time. Now it is evident that memory is + weakened by time; for things which happened long ago easily slip from our memory. But anger is caused by the memory of a wrong + done. Consequently the cause of anger is impaired little by little as time goes on, until at length it vanishes altogether. + Moreover a wrong seems greater when it is first felt; and our estimate thereof is + gradually lessened the further the sense of present wrong recedes into the past. The same applies to love, so long as the + cause of love is in the memory alone; wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. viii, 5) that "if a friend's absence lasts long, + it seems to make men forget their friendship." But in the presence of a friend, the cause of friendship is continually being + multiplied by time: wherefore the friendship increases: and the same would apply to anger, were its cause continually + multiplied. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q48_A2-p10"> Nevertheless the very fact that anger soon spends itself proves the strength of its fervor: for as a great fire is soon spent + having burnt up all the fuel; so too anger, by reason of its vehemence, soon dies away. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q48_A2-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Every power that is divided in itself is weakened. Consequently if a man being already angry with one, becomes angry with + another, by this very fact his anger with the former is weakened. Especially is this so if his anger in the second case be + greater: because the wrong done which aroused his former anger, will, in comparison with the second wrong, which is reckoned + greater, seem to be of little or no account. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q48_A2-p12"></p> + <p id="FS_Q48_A2-p13"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q48_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q48_A3.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q48_A3" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q48_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q48_A4.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q48_A3-p0.1">Whether anger above all hinders the use of reason?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q48_A3-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q48_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that anger does not hinder the use of reason. Because that which presupposes an act of reason, does not seem + to hinder the use of reason. But "anger listens to reason," as stated in Ethic. vii, 6. Therefore anger does not hinder reason. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q48_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the more the reason is hindered, the less does a man show his thoughts. But the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 6) + that "an angry man is not cunning but is open." Therefore anger does not seem to hinder the use of reason, as desire does; + for desire is cunning, as he also states (Ethic. vii, 6.). + </p> + <p id="FS_Q48_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the judgment of reason becomes more evident by juxtaposition of the contrary: because contraries stand out more + clearly when placed beside one another. But this also increases anger: for the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 2) that "men are + more angry if they receive unwonted treatment; for instance, honorable men, if they be dishonored": and so forth. Therefore + the same cause increases anger, and facilitates the judgment of reason. Therefore anger does + not hinder the judgment of reason. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q48_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Gregory says (Moral. v, 30) that anger "withdraws the light of understanding, while by agitating it troubles the mind." + </p> + <p id="FS_Q48_A3-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Although the mind or reason makes no use of a bodily organ in its proper act, yet, since it needs certain sensitive powers + for the execution of its act, the acts of which powers are hindered when the body is disturbed, it follows of necessity that + any disturbance in the body hinders even the judgment of reason; as is clear in the case of drunkenness or sleep. Now it has + been stated + <a id="FS_Q48_A3-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q48_A2.html">(A[2])</a> that anger, above all, causes a bodily + disturbance in the region of the heart, so much as to effect even the outward members. Consequently, of all the passions, + anger is the most manifest obstacle to the judgment of reason, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q48_A3-p6.2" href="./asv.html#Ps.30.10" target="asv"> Ps. 30:10</a>: "My eye is troubled with wrath." + </p> + <p id="FS_Q48_A3-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The beginning of anger is in the reason, as regards the appetitive movement, which is the formal element of anger. But the + passion of anger forestalls the perfect judgment of reason, as though it listened but imperfectly to reason, on account of + the commotion of the heat urging to instant action, which commotion is the material element of anger. In this respect it hinders + the judgment of reason. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q48_A3-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> An angry man is said to be open, not because it is clear to him what he ought to do, but because he acts openly, without + thought of hiding himself. This is due partly to the reason being hindered, so as not to discern what should be hidden and + what done openly, nor to devise the means of hiding; and partly to the dilatation of the heart which pertains to magnanimity + which is an effect of anger: wherefore the Philosopher says of the magnanimous man + (Ethic. iv, 3) that "he is open in his hatreds and his friendships . . . and speaks and acts openly." Desire, on the other + hand, is said to lie low and to be cunning, because, in many cases, the pleasurable things that are desired, savor of shame + and voluptuousness, wherein man wishes not to be seen. But in those things that savor of manliness and excellence, such as + matters of vengeance, man seeks to be in the open. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q48_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As stated above (ad 1), the movement of anger begins in the reason, wherefore the juxtaposition of one contrary with another + facilitates the judgment of reason, on the same grounds as it increases anger. For when a man who is possessed of honor or + wealth, suffers a loss therein, the loss seems all the greater, both on account of the contrast, and because it was unforeseen. + Consequently it causes greater grief: just as a great good, through being + received unexpectedly, causes greater delight. And in proportion to the increase of the grief that precedes, anger is increased + also. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q48_A3-p10"></p> + <p id="FS_Q48_A3-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q48_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q48_A4.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FS_Q48_A4" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FS_Q48_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS.iv.html"></a> + <h4 id="FS_Q48_A4-p0.1">Whether anger above all causes taciturnity?</h4> + <p id="FS_Q48_A4-p1"></p> + <p id="FS_Q48_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that anger does not cause taciturnity. Because taciturnity is opposed to speech. But increase in anger conduces + to speech; as is evident from the degrees of anger laid down by Our Lord ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q48_A4-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.5.22" target="asv">Mat. 5:22</a>): where He says: "Whosoever is angry with his brother"; and " . . . whosoever shall say to his brother, 'Raca'"; and " . + . . whosoever shall say to his brother, 'Thou fool.'" Therefore anger does not cause taciturnity. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q48_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, through failing to obey reason, man sometimes breaks out into unbecoming words: hence it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q48_A4-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Prov.25.28" target="asv">Prov. 25:28</a>): "As a city that lieth open and is not compassed with walls, so is a man that cannot refrain his own spirit in speaking." + But anger, above all, hinders the judgment of reason, as stated above + <a id="FS_Q48_A4-p3.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q48_A3.html">(A[3])</a>. Consequently above all it makes one break out into unbecoming words. Therefore it does not + cause taciturnity. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q48_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q48_A4-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.12.34" target="asv">Mat. 12:34</a>): "Out of the abundance of the heart the mouth speaketh." But anger, above all, causes a disturbance in the heart, as stated + above + <a id="FS_Q48_A4-p4.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q48_A2.html">(A[2])</a>. Therefore above all it conduces to speech. Therefore it does not cause taciturnity. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q48_A4-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Gregory says (Moral. v, 30) that "when anger does not vent itself outwardly by the lips, inwardly it burns the more fiercely." + </p> + <p id="FS_Q48_A4-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above + <a id="FS_Q48_A4-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q48_A3.html">(A[3];</a> Q[46], A[4]), anger both follows an act of reason, and hinders the reason: and in both respects it may cause taciturnity. + On the part of the reason, when the judgment of reason prevails so far, that although it does not curb the appetite in its + inordinate desire for vengeance, yet it curbs the tongue from unbridled speech. Wherefore Gregory says (Moral. v, 30): "Sometimes + when the mind is disturbed, anger, as + if in judgment, commands silence." On the part of the impediment to reason because, as stated above + <a id="FS_Q48_A4-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q48_A2.html">(A[2])</a>, the disturbance of anger reaches to the outward members, and chiefly to those members which reflect more distinctly the + emotions of the heart, such as the eyes, face and tongue; wherefore, as observed above + <a id="FS_Q48_A4-p6.3" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q48_A2.html">(A[2])</a>, "the tongue stammers, the countenance takes fire, the eyes grow fierce." Consequently anger may cause such a disturbance, + that + the tongue is altogether deprived of speech; and taciturnity is the result. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q48_A4-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Anger sometimes goes so far as to hinder the reason from curbing the tongue: but sometimes it goes yet farther, so as to + paralyze the tongue and other outward members. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q48_A4-p8"> And this suffices for the Reply to the Second Objection.</p> + <p id="FS_Q48_A4-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The disturbance of the heart may sometimes superabound to the extend that the movements of the outward members are hindered + by the inordinate movement of the heart. Thence ensue taciturnity and immobility of the outward members; and sometimes even + death. If, however, the disturbance be not so great, then "out of the abundance of the heart" thus disturbed, the mouth proceeds + to speak. + </p> + <p id="FS_Q48_A4-p10"></p> + <p id="FS_Q48_A4-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.FS_Q48_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS.iv.html"></a> + </div> + <a href="summa.FS_Q47_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q48_A1.html"></a> + </div> + <a href="summa.FS_Q21_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FS_Q22.html"></a> + ` + </div> \ No newline at end of file