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+<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" id="FS.ii" class="div2">
+            <a href="summa.FS_Q5_A8.html"></a>
+            <a href="summa.FS_Q6.html"></a>
+            <h2 id="FS.ii-p0.1">TREATISE ON HUMAN ACTS: ACTS PECULIAR TO MAN (QQ[6]-21)</h2>
+            <div id="FS_Q6" class="div3">
+               <a href="summa.FS.ii.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.FS_Q6_A1.html"></a>
+               <h3 id="FS_Q6-p0.1">OF THE VOLUNTARY AND THE INVOLUNTARY (EIGHT ARTICLES)</h3>
+               <p id="FS_Q6-p1"></p>
+               <p id="FS_Q6-p2"> Since therefore Happiness is to be gained by means of certain acts, we must in due sequence consider human acts, in order
+                  to know by what acts we may obtain Happiness, and by what acts we are prevented from obtaining it. But because operations
+                  and acts are concerned with things singular, consequently all practical knowledge is incomplete unless it take account of
+                  things in detail. The study of Morals, therefore, since it treats of human acts, should consider first the general
+                  principles; and secondly matters of detail.
+               </p>
+               <p id="FS_Q6-p3"> In treating of the general principles, the points that offer themselves for our consideration are (1) human acts themselves;
+                  (2) their principles. Now of human acts some are proper to man; others are common to man and animals. And since Happiness
+                  is man's proper good, those acts which are proper to man have a closer connection with Happiness than have those which are
+                  common to man and the other animals. First, then, we must consider those acts which are proper to man; secondly,
+                  those acts which are common to man and the other animals, and are called Passions. The first of these points offers a twofold
+                  consideration: (1) What makes a human act? (2) What distinguishes human acts?
+               </p>
+               <p id="FS_Q6-p4"> And since those acts are properly called human which are voluntary, because the will is the rational appetite, which is proper
+                  to man; we must consider acts in so far as they are voluntary.
+               </p>
+               <p id="FS_Q6-p5"> First, then, we must consider the voluntary and involuntary in general; secondly, those acts which are voluntary, as being
+                  elicited by the will, and as issuing from the will immediately; thirdly, those acts which are voluntary, as being commanded
+                  by the will, which issue from the will through the medium of the other powers.
+               </p>
+               <p id="FS_Q6-p6"> And because voluntary acts have certain circumstances, according to which we form our judgment concerning them, we must first
+                  consider the voluntary and the involuntary, and afterwards, the circumstances of those acts which are found to be voluntary
+                  or involuntary. Under the first head there are eight points of inquiry:
+               </p>
+               <p id="FS_Q6-p7"> (1) Whether there is anything voluntary in human acts?</p>
+               <p id="FS_Q6-p8"> (2) Whether in irrational animals?</p>
+               <p id="FS_Q6-p9"> (3) Whether there can be voluntariness without any action?</p>
+               <p id="FS_Q6-p10"> (4) Whether violence can be done to the will?</p>
+               <p id="FS_Q6-p11"> (5) Whether violence causes involuntariness?</p>
+               <p id="FS_Q6-p12"> (6) Whether fear causes involuntariness?</p>
+               <p id="FS_Q6-p13"> (7) Whether concupiscence causes involuntariness?</p>
+               <p id="FS_Q6-p14"> (8) Whether ignorance causes involuntariness?</p>
+               <div id="FS_Q6_A1" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q6.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q6_A2.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="FS_Q6_A1-p0.1">Whether there is anything voluntary in human acts?</h4>
+                  <p id="FS_Q6_A1-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q6_A1-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that there is nothing voluntary in human acts. For that is voluntary "which has its principle within itself."
+                     as Gregory of Nyssa [*Nemesius, De Natura Hom. xxxii.], Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 24), and Aristotle (Ethic. iii, 1) declare.
+                     But the principle of human acts is not in man himself, but outside him: since man's appetite is moved to act, by the appetible
+                     object which is outside him, and is as a "mover unmoved" (De Anima iii, 10).
+                     Therefore there is nothing voluntary in human acts.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q6_A1-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the Philosopher (Phys. viii, 2) proves that in animals no new movement arises that is not preceded by a motion from
+                     without. But all human acts are new, since none is eternal. Consequently, the principle of all human acts is from without:
+                     and therefore there is nothing voluntary in them.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q6_A1-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, he that acts voluntarily, can act of himself. But this is not true of man; for it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q6_A1-p4.1" href="./asv.html#John.15.5" target="asv">Jn. 15:5</a>): "Without Me you can do nothing." Therefore there is nothing voluntary in human acts.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q6_A1-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii) that "the voluntary is an act consisting in a rational operation." Now such are human acts.
+                     Therefore there is something voluntary in human acts.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q6_A1-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> There must needs be something voluntary in human acts. In order to make this clear, we must take note that the principle
+                     of some acts or movements is within the agent, or that which is moved; whereas the principle of some movements or acts is
+                     outside. For when a stone is moved upwards, the principle of this movement is outside the stone: whereas when it is moved
+                     downwards, the principle of this movement is in the stone. Now of those things that are moved by
+                     an intrinsic principle, some move themselves, some not. For since every agent or thing moved, acts or is moved for an end,
+                     as stated above (
+                     <a id="FS_Q6_A1-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q1_A2.html">Q[1], A[2]</a>); those are perfectly moved by an intrinsic principle, whose intrinsic principle is one not only of movement but of movement
+                     for an end. Now in order for a thing to be done for an end, some knowledge of the end is necessary. Therefore, whatever so
+                     acts or is moved by an intrinsic principle, that it has some knowledge of
+                     the end, has within itself the principle of its act, so that it not only acts, but acts for an end. On the other hand, if
+                     a thing has no knowledge of the end, even though it have an intrinsic principle of action or movement, nevertheless the principle
+                     of acting or being moved for an end is not in that thing, but in something else, by which the principle of its action towards
+                     an end is not in that thing, but in something else, by which the principle of its action towards an end is imprinted on
+                     it. Wherefore such like things are not said to move themselves, but to be moved by others. But those things which have a knowledge
+                     of the end are said to move themselves because there is in them a principle by which they not only act but also act for an
+                     end. And consequently, since both are from an intrinsic principle, to wit, that they act and that they act for an end, the
+                     movements of such things are said to be voluntary: for the word "voluntary" implies that their movements and acts are from
+                     their own inclination. Hence it is that, according to the definitions of Aristotle, Gregory of Nyssa, and Damascene [*See
+                     Objection 1], the voluntary is defined not only as having "a principle within" the agent, but also as implying "knowledge."
+                     Therefore, since man especially knows the end of his work, and moves himself, in his acts especially is the voluntary to be
+                     found.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q6_A1-p7">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Not every principle is a first principle. Therefore, although it is essential to the voluntary act that its principle be
+                     within the agent, nevertheless it is not contrary to the nature of the voluntary act that this intrinsic principle be caused
+                     or moved by an extrinsic principle: because it is not essential to the voluntary act that its intrinsic principle be a first
+                     principle. Yet again it must be observed that a principle of movement may happen to
+                     be first in a genus, but not first simply: thus in the genus of things subject to alteration, the first principle of alteration
+                     is a heavenly body, which is nevertheless, is not the first mover simply, but is moved locally by a higher mover. And so the
+                     intrinsic principle of the voluntary act, i.e. the cognitive and appetitive power, is the first principle in the genus of
+                     appetitive movement, although it is moved by an extrinsic principle according to other species of movement.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q6_A1-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> New movements in animals are indeed preceded by a motion from without; and this in two respects. First, in so far as by means
+                     of an extrinsic motion an animal's senses are confronted with something sensible, which, on being apprehended, moves the appetite.
+                     Thus a lion, on seeing a stag in movement and coming towards him, begins to be moved towards the stag. Secondly, in so far
+                     as some extrinsic motion produces a physical change in an animal's body, as
+                     in the case of cold or heat; and through the body being affected by the motion of an outward body, the sensitive appetite
+                     which is the power of a bodily organ, is also moved indirectly; thus it happens that through some alteration in the body the
+                     appetite is roused to the desire of something. But this is not contrary to the nature of voluntariness, as stated above (ad
+                     1), for such movements caused by an extrinsic principle are of another genus of movement.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q6_A1-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> God moves man to act, not only by proposing the appetible to the senses, or by effecting a change in his body, but also by
+                     moving the will itself; because every movement either of the will or of nature, proceeds from God as the First Mover. And
+                     just as it is not incompatible with nature that the natural movement be from God as the First Mover, inasmuch as nature is
+                     an instrument of God moving it: so it is not contrary to the essence of a voluntary
+                     act, that it proceed from God, inasmuch as the will is moved by God. Nevertheless both natural and voluntary movements have
+                     this in common, that it is essential that they should proceed from a principle within the agent.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q6_A1-p10"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q6_A1-p11"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q6.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q6_A2.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="FS_Q6_A2" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q6_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q6_A3.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="FS_Q6_A2-p0.1">Whether there is anything voluntary in irrational animals?</h4>
+                  <p id="FS_Q6_A2-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q6_A2-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that there is nothing voluntary in irrational animals. For a thing is called "voluntary" from "voluntas" [will].
+                     Now since the will is in the reason (De Anima iii, 9), it cannot be in irrational animals. Therefore neither is there anything
+                     voluntary in them.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q6_A2-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, according as human acts are voluntary, man is said to be master of his actions. But irrational animals are not masters
+                     of their actions; for "they act not; rather are they acted upon," as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 27). Therefore there
+                     is no such thing as a voluntary act in irrational animals.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q6_A2-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. 24) that "voluntary acts lead to praise and blame." But neither praise nor blame is
+                     due to the acts of irrational minds. Therefore such acts are not voluntary.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q6_A2-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 2) that "both children and irrational animals participate in the voluntary." The same is
+                     said by Damascene (De Fide Orth. 24) and Gregory of Nyssa [*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xxxii.].
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q6_A2-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above 
+                     <a id="FS_Q6_A2-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q6_A1.html">(A[1])</a>, it is essential to the voluntary act that its principle be within the agent, together with some knowledge of the end. Now
+                     knowledge of the end is twofold; perfect and imperfect. Perfect knowledge of the end consists in not only apprehending the
+                     thing which is the end, but also in knowing it under the aspect of end, and the relationship of the means to that end. And
+                     such knowledge belongs to none but the
+                     rational nature. But imperfect knowledge of the end consists in mere apprehension of the end, without knowing it under the
+                     aspect of end, or the relationship of an act to the end. Such knowledge of the end is exercised by irrational animals, through
+                     their senses and their natural estimative power.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q6_A2-p7"> Consequently perfect knowledge of the end leads to the perfect voluntary; inasmuch as, having apprehended the end, a man
+                     can, from deliberating about the end and the means thereto, be moved, or not, to gain that end. But imperfect knowledge of
+                     the end leads to the imperfect voluntary; inasmuch as the agent apprehends the end, but does not deliberate, and is moved
+                     to the end at once. Wherefore the voluntary in its perfection belongs to none but the rational nature: whereas the
+                     imperfect voluntary is within the competency of even irrational animals.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q6_A2-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The will is the name of the rational appetite; and consequently it cannot be in things devoid of reason. But the word "voluntary"
+                     is derived from "voluntas" [will], and can be extended to those things in which there is some participation of will, by way
+                     of likeness thereto. It is thus that voluntary action is attributed to irrational animals, in so far as they are moved to
+                     an end, through some kind of knowledge.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q6_A2-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The fact that man is master of his actions, is due to his being able to deliberate about them: for since the deliberating
+                     reason is indifferently disposed to opposite things, the will can be inclined to either. But it is not thus that voluntariness
+                     is in irrational animals, as stated above.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q6_A2-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Praise and blame are the result of the voluntary act, wherein is the perfect voluntary; such as is not to be found in irrational
+                     animals.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q6_A2-p11"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q6_A2-p12"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q6_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q6_A3.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="FS_Q6_A3" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q6_A2.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q6_A4.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="FS_Q6_A3-p0.1">Whether there can be voluntariness without any act?</h4>
+                  <p id="FS_Q6_A3-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q6_A3-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that voluntariness cannot be without any act. For that is voluntary which proceeds from the will. But nothing
+                     can proceed from the will, except through some act, at least an act of the will. Therefore there cannot be voluntariness without
+                     act.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q6_A3-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, just as one is said to wish by an act of the will, so when the act of the will ceases, one is said not to wish.
+                     But not to wish implies involuntariness, which is contrary to voluntariness. Therefore there can be nothing voluntary when
+                     the act of the will ceases.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q6_A3-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, knowledge is essential to the voluntary, as stated above (
+                     <a id="FS_Q6_A3-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q6_A1.html">AA[1]</a>,2). But knowledge involves an act. Therefore voluntariness cannot be without some act.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q6_A3-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The word "voluntary" is applied to that of which we are masters. Now we are masters in respect of to act and not to act,
+                     to will and not to will. Therefore just as to act and to will are voluntary, so also are not to act and not to will.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q6_A3-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> Voluntary is what proceeds from the will. Now one thing proceeds from another in two ways. First, directly; in which sense
+                     something proceeds from another inasmuch as this other acts; for instance, heating from heat. Secondly, indirectly; in which
+                     sense something proceeds from another through this other not acting; thus the sinking of a ship is set down to the helmsman,
+                     from his having ceased to steer. But we must take note that the cause of what follows
+                     from want of action is not always the agent as not acting; but only then when the agent can and ought to act. For if the helmsman
+                     were unable to steer the ship or if the ship's helm be not entrusted to him, the sinking of the ship would not be set down
+                     to him, although it might be due to his absence from the helm.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q6_A3-p7"> Since, then, the will by willing and acting, is able, and sometimes ought, to hinder not-willing and not-acting; this not-willing
+                     and not-acting is imputed to, as though proceeding from, the will. And thus it is that we can have the voluntary without an
+                     act; sometimes without outward act, but with an interior act; for instance, when one wills not to act; and sometimes without
+                     even an interior act, as when one does not will to act.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q6_A3-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> We apply the word "voluntary" not only to that which proceeds from the will directly, as from its action; but also to that
+                     which proceeds from it indirectly as from its inaction.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q6_A3-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> "Not to wish" is said in two senses. First, as though it were one word, and the infinitive of "I-do-not-wish." Consequently
+                     just as when I say "I do not wish to read," the sense is, "I wish not to read"; so "not to wish to read" is the same as "to
+                     wish not to read," and in this sense "not to wish" implies involuntariness. Secondly it is taken as a sentence: and then no
+                     act of the will is affirmed. And in this sense "not to wish" does not imply
+                     involuntariness.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q6_A3-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Voluntariness requires an act of knowledge in the same way as it requires an act of will; namely, in order that it be in
+                     one's power to consider, to wish and to act. And then, just as not to wish, and not to act, when it is time to wish and to
+                     act, is voluntary, so is it voluntary not to consider.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q6_A3-p11"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q6_A3-p12"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q6_A2.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q6_A4.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="FS_Q6_A4" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q6_A3.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q6_A5.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="FS_Q6_A4-p0.1">Whether violence can be done to the will?</h4>
+                  <p id="FS_Q6_A4-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q6_A4-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that violence can be done to the will. For everything can be compelled by that which is more powerful. But
+                     there is something, namely, God, that is more powerful than the human will. Therefore it can be compelled, at least by Him.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q6_A4-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, every passive subject is compelled by its active principle, when it is changed by it. But the will is a passive
+                     force: for it is a "mover moved" (De Anima iii, 10). Therefore, since it is sometimes moved by its active principle, it seems
+                     that sometimes it is compelled.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q6_A4-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, violent movement is that which is contrary to nature. But the movement of the will is sometimes contrary to nature;
+                     as is clear of the will's movement to sin, which is contrary to nature, as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iv, 20). Therefore
+                     the movement of the will can be compelled.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q6_A4-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Civ. Dei v, 10) that what is done by the will is not done of necessity. Now, whatever is done under compulsion
+                     is done of necessity: consequently what is done by the will, cannot be compelled. Therefore the will cannot be compelled to
+                     act.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q6_A4-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> The act of the will is twofold: one is its immediate act, as it were, elicited by it, namely, "to wish"; the other is an
+                     act of the will commanded by it, and put into execution by means of some other power, such as "to walk" and "to speak," which
+                     are commanded by the will to be executed by means of the motive power.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q6_A4-p7"> As regards the commanded acts of the will, then, the will can suffer violence, in so far as violence can prevent the exterior
+                     members from executing the will's command. But as to the will's own proper act, violence cannot be done to the will.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q6_A4-p8"> The reason of this is that the act of the will is nothing else than an inclination proceeding from the interior principle
+                     of knowledge: just as the natural appetite is an inclination proceeding from an interior principle without knowledge. Now
+                     what is compelled or violent is from an exterior principle. Consequently it is contrary to the nature of the will's own act,
+                     that it should be subject to compulsion and violence: just as it is also contrary to the nature of a natural
+                     inclination or movement. For a stone may have an upward movement from violence, but that this violent movement be from its
+                     natural inclination is impossible. In like manner a man may be dragged by force: but it is contrary to the very notion of
+                     violence, that he be dragged of his own will.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q6_A4-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> God Who is more powerful than the human will, can move the will of man, according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q6_A4-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Prov.21.1" target="asv"> Prov. 21:1</a>: "The heart of the king is in the hand of the Lord; whithersoever He will He shall turn it." But if this were by compulsion,
+                     it would no longer be by an act of the will, nor would the will itself be moved, but something else against the will.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q6_A4-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> It is not always a violent movement, when a passive subject is moved by its active principle; but only when this is done
+                     against the interior inclination of the passive subject. Otherwise every alteration and generation of simply bodies would
+                     be unnatural and violent: whereas they are natural by reason of the natural interior aptitude of the matter or subject to
+                     such a disposition. In like manner when the will is moved, according to its own
+                     inclination, by the appetible object, this movement is not violent but voluntary.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q6_A4-p11">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> That to which the will tends by sinning, although in reality it is evil and contrary to the rational nature, nevertheless
+                     is apprehended as something good and suitable to nature, in so far as it is suitable to man by reason of some pleasurable
+                     sensation or some vicious habit.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q6_A4-p12"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q6_A4-p13"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q6_A3.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q6_A5.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="FS_Q6_A5" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q6_A4.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q6_A6.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="FS_Q6_A5-p0.1">Whether violence causes involuntariness?</h4>
+                  <p id="FS_Q6_A5-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q6_A5-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that violence does not cause involuntariness. For we speak of voluntariness and involuntariness in respect
+                     of the will. But violence cannot be done to the will, as shown above 
+                     <a id="FS_Q6_A5-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q6_A4.html">(A[4])</a>. Therefore violence cannot cause involuntariness.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q6_A5-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, that which is done involuntarily is done with grief, as Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 24) and the Philosopher (Ethic.
+                     iii, 5) say. But sometimes a man suffers compulsion without being grieved thereby. Therefore violence does not cause involuntariness.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q6_A5-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, what is from the will cannot be involuntary. But some violent actions proceed from the will: for instance, when
+                     a man with a heavy body goes upwards; or when a man contorts his limbs in a way contrary to their natural flexibility. Therefore
+                     violence does not cause involuntariness.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q6_A5-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 1) and Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 24) say that "things done under compulsion are involuntary."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q6_A5-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> Violence is directly opposed to the voluntary, as likewise to the natural. For the voluntary and the natural have this in
+                     common, that both are from an intrinsic principle; whereas violence is from an extrinsic principle. And for this reason, just
+                     as in things devoid of knowledge, violence effects something against nature: so in things endowed with knowledge, it effects
+                     something against the will. Now that which is against nature is said to be "unnatural";
+                     and in like manner that which is against the will is said to be "involuntary." Therefore violence causes involuntariness.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q6_A5-p7">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The involuntary is opposed to the voluntary. Now it has been said 
+                     <a id="FS_Q6_A5-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q6_A4.html">(A[4])</a> that not only the act, which proceeds immediately from the will, is called voluntary, but also the act commanded by the will.
+                     Consequently, as to the act which proceeds immediately from the will, violence cannot be done to the will, as stated above
+                     
+                     <a id="FS_Q6_A5-p7.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q6_A4.html">(A[4])</a>: wherefore violence cannot make that act involuntary. But as to the commanded
+                     act, the will can suffer violence: and consequently in this respect violence causes involuntariness.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q6_A5-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As that is said to be natural, which is according to the inclination of nature; so that is said to be voluntary, which is
+                     according to the inclination of the will. Now a thing is said to be natural in two ways. First, because it is from nature
+                     as from an active principle: thus it is natural for fire to produce heat. Secondly, according to a passive principle; because,
+                     to wit, there is in nature an inclination to receive an action from an extrinsic
+                     principle: thus the movement of the heavens is said to be natural, by reason of the natural aptitude in a heavenly body to
+                     receive such movement; although the cause of that movement is a voluntary agent. In like manner an act is said to be voluntary
+                     in two ways. First, in regard to action, for instance, when one wishes to be passive to another. Hence when action is brought
+                     to bear on something, by an extrinsic agent, as long as the will to suffer that action remains in the passive subject,
+                     there is not violence simply: for although the patient does nothing by way of action, he does something by being willing to
+                     suffer. Consequently this cannot be called involuntary.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q6_A5-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As the Philosopher says (Phys. viii, 4) the movement of an animal, whereby at times an animal is moved against the natural
+                     inclination of the body, although it is not natural to the body, is nevertheless somewhat natural to the animal, to which
+                     it is natural to be moved according to its appetite. Accordingly this is violent, not simply but in a certain respect. The
+                     same remark applies in the case of one who contorts his limbs in a way that is contrary
+                     to their natural disposition. For this is violent in a certain respect, i.e. as to that particular limb; but not simply, i.e.
+                     as to the man himself.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q6_A5-p10"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q6_A5-p11"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q6_A4.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q6_A6.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="FS_Q6_A6" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q6_A5.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q6_A7.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="FS_Q6_A6-p0.1">Whether fear causes involuntariness simply?</h4>
+                  <p id="FS_Q6_A6-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q6_A6-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that fear causes involuntariness simply. For just as violence regards that which is contrary to the will at
+                     the time, so fear regards a future evil which is repugnant to the will. But violence causes involuntariness simply. Therefore
+                     fear too causes involuntariness simply.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q6_A6-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, that which is such of itself, remains such, whatever be added to it: thus what is hot of itself, as long as it remains,
+                     is still hot, whatever be added to it. But that which is done through fear, is involuntary in itself. Therefore, even with
+                     the addition of fear, it is involuntary.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q6_A6-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, that which is such, subject to a condition, is such in a certain respect; whereas what is such, without any condition,
+                     is such simply: thus what is necessary, subject to a condition, is necessary in some respect: but what is necessary absolutely,
+                     is necessary simply. But that which is done through fear, is absolutely involuntary; and is not voluntary, save under a condition,
+                     namely, in order that the evil feared may be avoided. Therefore that which is
+                     done through fear, is involuntary simply.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q6_A6-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Gregory of Nyssa [*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xxx.] and the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 1) say that such things as are done through
+                     fear are "voluntary rather than involuntary."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q6_A6-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> As the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii) and likewise Gregory of Nyssa in his book on Man (Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xxx), such
+                     things are done through fear "are of a mixed character," being partly voluntary and partly involuntary. For that which is
+                     done through fear, considered in itself, is not voluntary; but it becomes voluntary in this particular case, in order, namely,
+                     to avoid the evil feared.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q6_A6-p7"> But if the matter be considered aright, such things are voluntary rather than involuntary; for they are voluntary simply,
+                     but involuntary in a certain respect. For a thing is said to be simply, according as it is in act; but according as it is
+                     only in apprehension, it is not simply, but in a certain respect. Now that which is done through fear, is in act in so far
+                     as it is done. For, since acts are concerned with singulars; and the singular, as such, is here and now; that which
+                     is done is in act, in so far as it is here and now and under other individuating circumstances. And that which is done through
+                     fear is voluntary, inasmuch as it is here and now, that is to say, in so far as, under the circumstances, it hinders a greater
+                     evil which was feared; thus the throwing of the cargo into the sea becomes voluntary during the storm, through fear of the
+                     danger: wherefore it is clear that it is voluntary simply. And hence it is that what is done out of fear is essentially
+                     voluntary, because its principle is within. But if we consider what is done through fear, as outside this particular case,
+                     and inasmuch as it is repugnant to the will, this is merely a consideration of the mind. And consequently what is done through
+                     fear is involuntary, considered in that respect, that is to say, outside the actual circumstances of the case.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q6_A6-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Things done through fear and compulsion differ not only according to present and future time, but also in this, that the
+                     will does not consent, but is moved entirely counter to that which is done through compulsion: whereas what is done through
+                     fear, becomes voluntary, because the will is moved towards it, albeit not for its own sake, but on account of something else,
+                     that is, in order to avoid an evil which is feared. For the conditions of a
+                     voluntary act are satisfied, if it be done on account of something else voluntary: since the voluntary is not only what we
+                     wish, for its own sake, as an end, but also what we wish for the sake of something else, as an end. It is clear therefore
+                     that in what is done from compulsion, the will does nothing inwardly; whereas in what is done through fear, the will does
+                     something. Accordingly, as Gregory of Nyssa [*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xxx.] says, in order to exclude things done through fear,
+                     a
+                     violent action is defined as not only one, "the principal whereof is from without," but with the addition, "in which he that
+                     suffers violence concurs not at all"; because the will of him that is in fear, does concur somewhat in that which he does
+                     through fear.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q6_A6-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Things that are such absolutely, remain such, whatever be added to them; for instance, a cold thing, or a white thing: but
+                     things that are such relatively, vary according as they are compared with different things. For what is big in comparison
+                     with one thing, is small in comparison with another. Now a thing is said to be voluntary, not only for its own sake, as it
+                     were absolutely; but also for the sake of something else, as it were relatively.
+                     Accordingly, nothing prevents a thing which was not voluntary in comparison with one thing, from becoming voluntary when compared
+                     with another.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q6_A6-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> That which is done through fear, is voluntary without any condition, that is to say, according as it is actually done: but
+                     it is involuntary, under a certain condition, that is to say, if such a fear were not threatening. Consequently, this argument
+                     proves rather the opposite.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q6_A6-p11"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q6_A6-p12"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q6_A5.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q6_A7.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="FS_Q6_A7" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q6_A6.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q6_A8.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="FS_Q6_A7-p0.1">Whether concupiscence causes involuntariness?</h4>
+                  <p id="FS_Q6_A7-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q6_A7-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that concupiscence causes involuntariness. For just as fear is a passion, so is concupiscence. But fear causes
+                     involuntariness to a certain extent. Therefore concupiscence does so too.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q6_A7-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, just as the timid man through fear acts counter to that which he proposed, so does the incontinent, through concupiscence.
+                     But fear causes involuntariness to a certain extent. Therefore concupiscence does so also.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q6_A7-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, knowledge is necessary for voluntariness. But concupiscence impairs knowledge; for the Philosopher says (Ethic.
+                     vi, 5) that "delight," or the lust of pleasure, "destroys the judgment of prudence." Therefore concupiscence causes involuntariness.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q6_A7-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 24): "The involuntary act deserves mercy or indulgence, and is done with regret." But neither
+                     of these can be said of that which is done out of concupiscence. Therefore concupiscence does not cause involuntariness.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q6_A7-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> Concupiscence does not cause involuntariness, but on the contrary makes something to be voluntary. For a thing is said to
+                     be voluntary, from the fact that the will is moved to it. Now concupiscence inclines the will to desire the object of concupiscence.
+                     Therefore the effect of concupiscence is to make something to be voluntary rather than involuntary.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q6_A7-p7">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Fear regards evil, but concupiscence regards good. Now evil of itself is counter to the will, whereas good harmonizes with
+                     the will. Therefore fear has a greater tendency than concupiscence to cause involuntariness.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q6_A7-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> He who acts from fear retains the repugnance of the will to that which he does, considered in itself. But he that acts from
+                     concupiscence, e.g. an incontinent man, does not retain his former will whereby he repudiated the object of his concupiscence;
+                     for his will is changed so that he desires that which previously he repudiated. Accordingly, that which is done out of fear
+                     is involuntary, to a certain extent, but that which is done from concupiscence
+                     is nowise involuntary. For the man who yields to concupiscence acts counter to that which he purposed at first, but not counter
+                     to that which he desires now; whereas the timid man acts counter to that which in itself he desires now.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q6_A7-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> If concupiscence were to destroy knowledge altogether, as happens with those whom concupiscence has rendered mad, it would
+                     follow that concupiscence would take away voluntariness. And yet properly speaking it would not result in the act being involuntary,
+                     because in things bereft of reason, there is neither voluntary nor involuntary. But sometimes in those actions which are done
+                     from concupiscence, knowledge is not completely destroyed, because the
+                     power of knowing is not taken away entirely, but only the actual consideration in some particular possible act. Nevertheless,
+                     this itself is voluntary, according as by voluntary we mean that which is in the power of the will, for example "not to act"
+                     or "not to will," and in like manner "not to consider"; for the will can resist the passion, as we shall state later on (
+                     <a id="FS_Q6_A7-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q10_A3.html">Q[10], A[3]</a>;
+                     <a id="FS_Q6_A7-p9.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q77_A7.html"> Q[77], A[7]</a>).
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q6_A7-p10"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q6_A7-p11"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q6_A6.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q6_A8.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="FS_Q6_A8" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q6_A7.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q7.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="FS_Q6_A8-p0.1">Whether ignorance causes involuntariness?</h4>
+                  <p id="FS_Q6_A8-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q6_A8-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that ignorance does not cause involuntariness. For "the involuntary act deserves pardon," as Damascene says
+                     (De Fide Orth. ii, 24). But sometimes that which is done through ignorance does not deserve pardon, according to 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q6_A8-p2.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.14.38" target="asv">1 Cor. 14:38</a>: "If any man know not, he shall not be known." Therefore ignorance does not cause involuntariness.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q6_A8-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, every sin implies ignorance; according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q6_A8-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Prov.14.22" target="asv"> Prov. 14: 22</a>: "They err, that work evil." If, therefore, ignorance causes involuntariness, it would follow that every sin is involuntary:
+                     which is opposed to the saying of Augustine, that "every sin is voluntary" (De Vera Relig. xiv).
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q6_A8-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, "involuntariness is not without sadness," as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 24). But some things are done out
+                     of ignorance, but without sadness: for instance, a man may kill a foe, whom he wishes to kill, thinking at the time that he
+                     is killing a stag. Therefore ignorance does not cause involuntariness.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q6_A8-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 24) and the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 1) say that "what is done through ignorance is involuntary."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q6_A8-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> If ignorance causes involuntariness, it is in so far as it deprives one of knowledge, which is a necessary condition of voluntariness,
+                     as was declared above 
+                     <a id="FS_Q6_A8-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q6_A1.html">(A[1])</a>. But it is not every ignorance that deprives one of this knowledge. Accordingly, we must take note that ignorance has a threefold
+                     relationship to the act of the will: in one way, "concomitantly"; in another, "consequently"; in a third way, "antecedently."
+                     "Concomitantly,"
+                     when there is ignorance of what is done; but, so that even if it were known, it would be done. For then, ignorance does not
+                     induce one to wish this to be done, but it just happens that a thing is at the same time done, and not known: thus in the
+                     example given (OBJ 3) a man did indeed wish to kill his foe, but killed him in ignorance, thinking to kill a stag. And ignorance
+                     of this kind, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. iii, 1), does not cause involuntariness, since it is not the cause of
+                     anything that is repugnant to the will: but it causes "non-voluntariness," since that which is unknown cannot be actually
+                     willed. Ignorance is "consequent" to the act of the will, in so far as ignorance itself is voluntary: and this happens in
+                     two ways, in accordance with the two aforesaid modes of voluntary 
+                     <a id="FS_Q6_A8-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q6_A3.html">(A[3])</a>. First, because the act of the will is brought to bear on the ignorance: as when a man wishes not to know, that he may have
+                     an excuse for sin, or that he may
+                     not be withheld from sin; according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q6_A8-p6.3" href="./asv.html#Job.21.14" target="asv"> Job 21:14</a>: "We desire not the knowledge of Thy ways." And this is called "affected ignorance." Secondly, ignorance is said to be voluntary,
+                     when it regards that which one can and ought to know: for in this sense "not to act" and "not to will" are said to be voluntary,
+                     as stated above 
+                     <a id="FS_Q6_A8-p6.4" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q6_A3.html">(A[3])</a>. And ignorance of this kind happens, either when one does not actually consider what one can and ought to consider; this
+                     is
+                     called "ignorance of evil choice," and arises from some passion or habit: or when one does not take the trouble to acquire
+                     the knowledge which one ought to have; in which sense, ignorance of the general principles of law, which one to know, is voluntary,
+                     as being due to negligence. Accordingly, if in either of these ways, ignorance is voluntary, it cannot cause involuntariness
+                     simply. Nevertheless it causes involuntariness in a certain respect, inasmuch as it precedes the movement of the will
+                     towards the act, which movement would not be, if there were knowledge. Ignorance is "antecedent" to the act of the will, when
+                     it is not voluntary, and yet is the cause of man's willing what he would not will otherwise. Thus a man may be ignorant of
+                     some circumstance of his act, which he was not bound to know, the result being that he does that which he would not do, if
+                     he knew of that circumstance; for instance, a man, after taking proper precaution, may not know that someone is coming along
+                     the road, so that he shoots an arrow and slays a passer-by. Such ignorance causes involuntariness simply.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q6_A8-p7"> From this may be gathered the solution of the objections. For the first objection deals with ignorance of what a man is bound
+                     to know. The second, with ignorance of choice, which is voluntary to a certain extent, as stated above. The third, with that
+                     ignorance which is concomitant with the act of the will.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q6_A8-p8"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q6_A8-p9"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q6_A7.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q7.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <a href="summa.FS.ii.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.FS_Q6_A1.html"></a>
+            </div>
+            <div id="FS_Q7" class="div3">
+               <a href="summa.FS_Q6_A8.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.FS_Q7_A1.html"></a>
+               <h3 id="FS_Q7-p0.1">OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF HUMAN ACTS (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3>
+               <p id="FS_Q7-p1"></p>
+               <p id="FS_Q7-p2"> We must now consider the circumstances of human acts: under which head there are four points of inquiry:</p>
+               <p id="FS_Q7-p3"> (1) What is a circumstance?</p>
+               <p id="FS_Q7-p4"> (2) Whether a theologian should take note of the circumstances of human acts?</p>
+               <p id="FS_Q7-p5"> (3) How many circumstances are there?</p>
+               <p id="FS_Q7-p6"> (4) Which are the most important of them?</p>
+               <div id="FS_Q7_A1" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q7.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q7_A2.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="FS_Q7_A1-p0.1">Whether a circumstance is an accident of a human act?</h4>
+                  <p id="FS_Q7_A1-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q7_A1-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that a circumstance is not an accident of a human act. For Tully says (De Invent. Rhetor. i) that a circumstance
+                     is that from "which an orator adds authority and strength to his argument." But oratorical arguments are derived principally
+                     from things pertaining to the essence of a thing, such as the definition, the genus, the species, and the like, from which
+                     also Tully declares that an orator should draw his arguments. Therefore a circumstance is
+                     not an accident of a human act.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q7_A1-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, "to be in" is proper to an accident. But that which surrounds [circumstat] is rather out than in. Therefore the
+                     circumstances are not accidents of human acts.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q7_A1-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, an accident has no accident. But human acts themselves are accidents. Therefore the circumstances are not accidents
+                     of acts.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q7_A1-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The particular conditions of any singular thing are called its individuating accidents. But the Philosopher (Ethic. iii,
+                     1) calls the circumstances particular things [*{ta kath' ekasta}], i.e. the particular conditions of each act. Therefore the
+                     circumstances are individual accidents of human acts.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q7_A1-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> Since, according to the Philosopher (Peri Herm. i), "words are the signs of what we understand," it must needs be that in
+                     naming things we follow the process of intellectual knowledge. Now our intellectual knowledge proceeds from the better known
+                     to the less known. Accordingly with us, names of more obvious things are transferred so as to signify things less obvious:
+                     and hence it is that, as stated in Metaph. x, 4, "the notion of distance has been
+                     transferred from things that are apart locally, to all kinds of opposition": and in like manner words that signify local movement
+                     are employed to designate all other movements, because bodies which are circumscribed by place, are best known to us. And
+                     hence it is that the word "circumstance" has passed from located things to human acts.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q7_A1-p7"> Now in things located, that is said to surround something, which is outside it, but touches it, or is placed near it. Accordingly,
+                     whatever conditions are outside the substance of an act, and yet in some way touch the human act, are called circumstances.
+                     Now what is outside a thing's substance, while it belongs to that thing, is called its accident. Wherefore the circumstances
+                     of human acts should be called their accidents.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q7_A1-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The orator gives strength to his argument, in the first place, from the substance of the act; and secondly, from the circumstances
+                     of the act. Thus a man becomes indictable, first, through being guilty of murder; secondly, through having done it fraudulently,
+                     or from motives of greed or at a holy time or place, and so forth. And so in the passage quoted, it is said pointedly that
+                     the orator "adds strength to his argument," as though this were
+                     something secondary.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q7_A1-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> A thing is said to be an accident of something in two ways. First, from being in that thing: thus, whiteness is said to be
+                     an accident of Socrates. Secondly, because it is together with that thing in the same subject: thus, whiteness is an accident
+                     of the art of music, inasmuch as they meet in the same subject, so as to touch one another, as it were. And in this sense
+                     circumstances are said to be the accidents of human acts.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q7_A1-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As stated above (ad 2), an accident is said to be the accident of an accident, from the fact that they meet in the same subject.
+                     But this happens in two ways. First, in so far as two accidents are both related to the same subject, without any relation
+                     to one another; as whiteness and the art of music in Socrates. Secondly, when such accidents are related to one another; as
+                     when the subject receives one accident by means of the other; for instance, a
+                     body receives color by means of its surface. And thus also is one accident said to be in another; for we speak of color as
+                     being in the surface.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q7_A1-p11"> Accordingly, circumstances are related to acts in both these ways. For some circumstances that have a relation to acts, belong
+                     to the agent otherwise than through the act; as place and condition of person; whereas others belong to the agent by reason
+                     of the act, as the manner in which the act is done.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q7_A1-p12"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q7_A1-p13"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q7.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q7_A2.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="FS_Q7_A2" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q7_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q7_A3.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="FS_Q7_A2-p0.1">Whether theologians should take note of the circumstances of human acts?</h4>
+                  <p id="FS_Q7_A2-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q7_A2-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that theologians should not take note of the circumstances of human acts. Because theologians do not consider
+                     human acts otherwise than according to their quality of good or evil. But it seems that circumstances cannot give quality
+                     to human acts; for a thing is never qualified, formally speaking, by that which is outside it; but by that which is in it.
+                     Therefore theologians should not take note of the circumstances of acts.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q7_A2-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, circumstances are the accidents of acts. But one thing may be subject to an infinity of accidents; hence the Philosopher
+                     says (Metaph. vi, 2) that "no art or science considers accidental being, except only the art of sophistry." Therefore the
+                     theologian has not to consider circumstances.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q7_A2-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the consideration of circumstances belongs to the orator. But oratory is not a part of theology. Therefore it is
+                     not a theologian's business to consider circumstances.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q7_A2-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Ignorance of circumstances causes an act to be involuntary, according to Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 24) and Gregory of
+                     Nyssa [*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xxxi.]. But involuntariness excuses from sin, the consideration of which belongs to the theologian.
+                     Therefore circumstances also should be considered by the theologian.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q7_A2-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> Circumstances come under the consideration of the theologian, for a threefold reason. First, because the theologian considers
+                     human acts, inasmuch as man is thereby directed to Happiness. Now, everything that is directed to an end should be proportionate
+                     to that end. But acts are made proportionate to an end by means of a certain commensurateness, which results from the due
+                     circumstances. Hence the theologian has to consider the circumstances. Secondly,
+                     because the theologian considers human acts according as they are found to be good or evil, better or worse: and this diversity
+                     depends on circumstances, as we shall see further on (
+                     <a id="FS_Q7_A2-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q18_A10.html">Q[18], AA[10]</a>,11;
+                     <a id="FS_Q7_A2-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q73_A7.html"> Q[73], A[7]</a>). Thirdly, because the theologian considers human acts under the aspect of merit and demerit, which is proper to human acts;
+                     and for this it is requisite that they be voluntary. Now a human act is deemed to be voluntary or involuntary,
+                     according to knowledge or ignorance of circumstances, as stated above (
+                     <a id="FS_Q7_A2-p6.3" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q6_A8.html">Q[6], A[8]</a>). Therefore the theologian has to consider circumstances.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q7_A2-p7">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Good directed to the end is said to be useful; and this implies some kind of relation: wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic.
+                     i, 6) that "the good in the genus 'relation' is the useful." Now, in the genus "relation" a thing is denominated not only
+                     according to that which is inherent in the thing, but also according to that which is extrinsic to it: as may be seen in the
+                     expressions "right" and "left," "equal" and "unequal," and such like. Accordingly,
+                     since the goodness of acts consists in their utility to the end, nothing hinders their being called good or bad according
+                     to their proportion to extrinsic things that are adjacent to them.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q7_A2-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Accidents which are altogether accidental are neglected by every art, by reason of their uncertainty and infinity. But such
+                     like accidents are not what we call circumstances; because circumstances although, as stated above 
+                     <a id="FS_Q7_A2-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q7_A1.html">(A[1])</a>, they are extrinsic to the act, nevertheless are in a kind of contact with it, by being related to it. Proper accidents,
+                     however, come under the consideration of art.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q7_A2-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The consideration of circumstances belongs to the moralist, the politician, and the orator. To the moralist, in so far as
+                     with respect to circumstances we find or lose the mean of virtue in human acts and passions. To the politician and to the
+                     orator, in so far as circumstances make acts to be worthy of praise or blame, of excuse or indictment. In different ways,
+                     however: because where the orator persuades, the politician judges. To the theologian
+                     this consideration belongs, in all the aforesaid ways: since to him all the other arts are subservient: for he has to consider
+                     virtuous and vicious acts, just as the moralist does; and with the orator and politician he considers acts according as they
+                     are deserving of reward or punishment.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q7_A2-p10"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q7_A2-p11"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q7_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q7_A3.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="FS_Q7_A3" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q7_A2.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q7_A4.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="FS_Q7_A3-p0.1">Whether the circumstances are properly set forth in the third book of Ethics?</h4>
+                  <p id="FS_Q7_A3-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q7_A3-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the circumstances are not properly set forth in Ethic. iii, 1. For a circumstance of an act is described
+                     as something outside the act. Now time and place answer to this description. Therefore there are only two circumstances, to
+                     wit, "when" and "where."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q7_A3-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, we judge from the circumstances whether a thing is well or ill done. But this belongs to the mode of an act. Therefore
+                     all the circumstances are included under one, which is the "mode of acting."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q7_A3-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, circumstances are not part of the substance of an act. But the causes of an act seem to belong to its substance.
+                     Therefore no circumstance should be taken from the cause of the act itself. Accordingly, neither "who," nor "why," nor "about
+                     what," are circumstances: since "who" refers to the efficient cause, "why" to the final cause, and "about what" to the material
+                     cause.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q7_A3-p5"> On the contrary is the authority of the Philosopher in Ethic. iii, 1.</p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q7_A3-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> Tully, in his Rhetoric (De Invent. Rhetor. i), gives seven circumstances, which are contained in this verse:
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q7_A3-p7"> "Quis, quid, ubi, quibus auxiliis, cur, quomodo, quando---</p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q7_A3-p8"> Who, what, where, by what aids, why, how, and when."</p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q7_A3-p9">For in acts we must take note of "who" did it, "by what aids" or "instruments" he did it, "what" he did, "where" he did it,
+                     "why" he did it, "how" and "when" he did it. But Aristotle in Ethic. iii, 1 adds yet another, to wit, "about what," which
+                     Tully includes in the circumstance "what."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q7_A3-p10"> The reason of this enumeration may be set down as follows. For a circumstance is described as something outside the substance
+                     of the act, and yet in a way touching it. Now this happens in three ways: first, inasmuch as it touches the act itself; secondly,
+                     inasmuch as it touches the cause of the act; thirdly, inasmuch as it touches the effect. It touches the act itself, either
+                     by way of measure, as "time" and "place"; or by qualifying the act as the "mode of acting." It touches
+                     the effect when we consider "what" is done. It touches the cause of the act, as to the final cause, by the circumstance "why";
+                     as to the material cause, or object, in the circumstance "about what"; as to the principal efficient cause, in the circumstance
+                     "who"; and as to the instrumental efficient cause, in the circumstance "by what aids."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q7_A3-p11">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Time and place surround [circumstant] the act by way of measure; but the others surround the act by touching it in any other
+                     way, while they are extrinsic to the substance of the act.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q7_A3-p12">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> This mode "well" or "ill" is not a circumstance, but results from all the circumstances. But the mode which refers to a quality
+                     of the act is a special circumstance; for instance, that a man walk fast or slowly; that he strike hard or gently, and so
+                     forth.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q7_A3-p13">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> A condition of the cause, on which the substance of the act depends, is not a circumstance; it must be an additional condition.
+                     Thus, in regard to the object, it is not a circumstance of theft that the object is another's property, for this belongs to
+                     the substance of the act; but that it be great or small. And the same applies to the other circumstances which are considered
+                     in reference to the other causes. For the end that specifies the act is not a
+                     circumstance, but some additional end. Thus, that a valiant man act "valiantly for the sake of" the good of the virtue or
+                     fortitude, is not a circumstance; but if he act valiantly for the sake of the delivery of the state, or of Christendom, or
+                     some such purpose. The same is to be said with regard to the circumstance "what"; for that a man by pouring water on someone
+                     should happen to wash him, is not a circumstance of the washing; but that in doing so he give him a chill, or scald him; heal
+                     him
+                     or harm him, these are circumstances.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q7_A3-p14"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q7_A3-p15"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q7_A2.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q7_A4.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="FS_Q7_A4" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q7_A3.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q8.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="FS_Q7_A4-p0.1">Whether the most important circumstances are "why" and "in what the act consists"?</h4>
+                  <p id="FS_Q7_A4-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q7_A4-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that these are not the most important circumstances, namely, "why" and those "in which the act is, [*hen ois
+                     e praxis]" as stated in Ethic. iii, 1. For those in which the act is seem to be place and time: and these do not seem to be
+                     the most important of the circumstances, since, of them all, they are the most extrinsic to the act. Therefore those things
+                     in which the act is are not the most important circumstances.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q7_A4-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the end of a thing is extrinsic to it. Therefore it is not the most important circumstance.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q7_A4-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, that which holds the foremost place in regard to each thing, is its cause and its form. But the cause of an act
+                     is the person that does it; while the form of an act is the manner in which it is done. Therefore these two circumstances
+                     seem to be of the greatest importance.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q7_A4-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Gregory of Nyssa [*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xxxi.] says that "the most important circumstances" are "why it is done" and "what
+                     is done."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q7_A4-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above (
+                     <a id="FS_Q7_A4-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q1_A1.html">Q[1], A[1]</a>), acts are properly called human, inasmuch as they are voluntary. Now, the motive and object of the will is the end. Therefore
+                     that circumstance is the most important of all which touches the act on the part of the end, viz. the circumstance "why":
+                     and the second in importance, is that which touches the very substance of the act, viz. the circumstance "what he did." As
+                     to the other circumstances, they are
+                     more or less important, according as they more or less approach to these.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q7_A4-p7">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> By those things "in which the act is" the Philosopher does not mean time and place, but those circumstances that are affixed
+                     to the act itself. Wherefore Gregory of Nyssa [*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xxxi], as though he were explaining the dictum of the
+                     Philosopher, instead of the latter's term---"in which the act is"---said, "what is done."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q7_A4-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Although the end is not part of the substance of the act, yet it is the most important cause of the act, inasmuch as it moves
+                     the agent to act. Wherefore the moral act is specified chiefly by the end.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q7_A4-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The person that does the act is the cause of that act, inasmuch as he is moved thereto by the end; and it is chiefly in this
+                     respect that he is directed to the act; while other conditions of the person have not such an important relation to the act.
+                     As to the mode, it is not the substantial form of the act, for in an act the substantial form depends on the object and term
+                     or end; but it is, as it were, a certain accidental quality of the act.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q7_A4-p10"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q7_A4-p11"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q7_A3.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q8.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <a href="summa.FS_Q6_A8.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.FS_Q7_A1.html"></a>
+            </div>
+            <div id="FS_Q8" class="div3">
+               <a href="summa.FS_Q7_A4.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.FS_Q8_A1.html"></a>
+               <h3 id="FS_Q8-p0.1">OF THE WILL, IN REGARD TO WHAT IT WILLS (THREE ARTICLES)</h3>
+               <p id="FS_Q8-p1"></p>
+               <p id="FS_Q8-p2"> We must now consider the different acts of the will; and in the first place, those acts which belong to the will itself immediately,
+                  as being elicited by the will; secondly, those acts which are commanded by the will.
+               </p>
+               <p id="FS_Q8-p3"> Now the will is moved to the end, and to the means to the end; we must therefore consider: (1) those acts of the will whereby
+                  it is moved to the end; and (2) those whereby it is moved to the means. And since it seems that there are three acts of the
+                  will in reference to the end; viz. "volition," "enjoyment," and "intention"; we must consider: (1) volition; (2) enjoyment;
+                  (3) intention. Concerning the first, three things must be considered: (1) Of what things is the will? (2) By
+                  what is the will moved? (3) How is it moved?
+               </p>
+               <p id="FS_Q8-p4"> Under the first head there are three points of inquiry:</p>
+               <p id="FS_Q8-p5"> (1) Whether the will is of good only?</p>
+               <p id="FS_Q8-p6"> (2) Whether it is of the end only, or also of the means?</p>
+               <p id="FS_Q8-p7"> (3) If in any way it be of the means, whether it be moved to the end and to the means, by the same movement?</p>
+               <div id="FS_Q8_A1" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q8.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q8_A2.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="FS_Q8_A1-p0.1">Whether the will is of good only?</h4>
+                  <p id="FS_Q8_A1-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q8_A1-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the will is not of good only. For the same power regards opposites; for instance, sight regards white
+                     and black. But good and evil are opposites. Therefore the will is not only of good, but also of evil.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q8_A1-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, rational powers can be directed to opposite purposes, according to the Philosopher (Metaph. ix, 2). But the will
+                     is a rational power, since it is "in the reason," as is stated in De Anima iii, 9. Therefore the will can be directed to opposites;
+                     and consequently its volition is not confined to good, but extends to evil.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q8_A1-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, good and being are convertible. But volition is directed not only to beings, but also to non-beings. For sometimes
+                     we wish "not to walk," or "not to speak"; and again at times we wish for future things, which are not actual beings. Therefore
+                     the will is not of good only.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q8_A1-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that "evil is outside the scope of the will," and that "all things desire good."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q8_A1-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> The will is a rational appetite. Now every appetite is only of something good. The reason of this is that the appetite is
+                     nothing else than an inclination of a person desirous of a thing towards that thing. Now every inclination is to something
+                     like and suitable to the thing inclined. Since, therefore, everything, inasmuch as it is being and substance, is a good, it
+                     must needs be that every inclination is to something good. And hence it is that the
+                     Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 1) that "the good is that which all desire."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q8_A1-p7"> But it must be noted that, since every inclination results from a form, the natural appetite results from a form existing
+                     in the nature of things: while the sensitive appetite, as also the intellective or rational appetite, which we call the will,
+                     follows from an apprehended form. Therefore, just as the natural appetite tends to good existing in a thing; so the animal
+                     or voluntary appetite tends to a good which is apprehended. Consequently, in order that the will tend to
+                     anything, it is requisite, not that this be good in very truth, but that it be apprehended as good. Wherefore the Philosopher
+                     says (Phys. ii, 3) that "the end is a good, or an apparent good."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q8_A1-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The same power regards opposites, but it is not referred to them in the same way. Accordingly, the will is referred both
+                     to good and evil: but to good by desiring it: to evil, by shunning it. Wherefore the actual desire of good is called "volition"
+                     [*In Latin, 'voluntas'. To avoid confusion with "voluntas" (the will) St. Thomas adds a word of explanation, which in the
+                     translation may appear superfluous], meaning thereby the act of the will; for it is
+                     in this sense that we are now speaking of the will. On the other hand, the shunning of evil is better described as "nolition":
+                     wherefore, just as volition is of good, so nolition is of evil.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q8_A1-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> A rational power is not to be directed to all opposite purposes, but to those which are contained under its proper object;
+                     for no power seeks other than its proper object. Now, the object of the will is good. Wherefore the will can be directed to
+                     such opposite purposes as are contained under good, such as to be moved or to be at rest, to speak or to be silent, and such
+                     like: for the will can be directed to either under the aspect of good.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q8_A1-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> That which is not a being in nature, is considered as a being in the reason, wherefore negations and privations are said
+                     to be "beings of reason." In this way, too, future things, in so far as they are apprehended, are beings. Accordingly, in
+                     so far as such like are beings, they are apprehended under the aspect of good; and it is thus that the will is directed to
+                     them. Wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 1) that "to lack evil is considered as a
+                     good."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q8_A1-p11"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q8_A1-p12"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q8.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q8_A2.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="FS_Q8_A2" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q8_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q8_A3.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="FS_Q8_A2-p0.1">Whether volition is of the end only, or also of the means?</h4>
+                  <p id="FS_Q8_A2-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q8_A2-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that volition is not of the means, but of the end only. For the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 2) that "volition
+                     is of the end, while choice is of the means."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q8_A2-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, "For objects differing in genus there are corresponding different powers of the soul" (Ethic. vi, 1). Now, the end
+                     and the means are in different genera of good: because the end, which is a good either of rectitude or of pleasure, is in
+                     the genus "quality," or "action," or "passion"; whereas the good which is useful, and is directed to and end, is in the genus
+                     "relation" (Ethic. i, 6). Therefore, if volition is of the end, it is not of the means.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q8_A2-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, habits are proportionate to powers, since they are perfections thereof. But in those habits which are called practical
+                     arts, the end belongs to one, and the means to another art; thus the use of a ship, which is its end, belongs to the (art
+                     of the) helmsman; whereas the building of the ship, which is directed to the end, belongs to the art of the shipwright. Therefore,
+                     since volition is of the end, it is not of the means.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q8_A2-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> In natural things, it is by the same power that a thing passes through the middle space, and arrives at the terminus. But
+                     the means are a kind of middle space, through which one arrives at the end or terminus. Therefore, if volition is of the end,
+                     it is also of the means.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q8_A2-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> The word "voluntas" sometimes designates the power of the will, sometimes its act [*See note: above A[1], Reply OBJ[1]].
+                     Accordingly, if we speak of the will as a power, thus it extends both to the end and to the means. For every power extends
+                     to those things in which may be considered the aspect of the object of that power in any way whatever: thus the sight extends
+                     to all things whatsoever that are in any way colored. Now the aspect of good, which is the
+                     object of the power of the will, may be found not only in the end, but also in the means.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q8_A2-p7"> If, however, we speak of the will in regard to its act, then, properly speaking, volition is of the end only. Because every
+                     act denominated from a power, designates the simple act of that power: thus "to understand" designates the simple act of the
+                     understanding. Now the simple act of a power is referred to that which is in itself the object of that power. But that which
+                     is good and willed in itself is the end. Wherefore volition, properly speaking, is of the end itself. On the
+                     other hand, the means are good and willed, not in themselves, but as referred to the end. Wherefore the will is directed to
+                     them, only in so far as it is directed to the end: so that what it wills in them, is the end. Thus, to understand, is properly
+                     directed to things that are known in themselves, i.e. first principles: but we do not speak of understanding with regard to
+                     things known through first principles, except in so far as we see the principles in those things. For in morals the end is
+                     what principles are in speculative science (Ethic. viii, 8).
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q8_A2-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The Philosopher is speaking of the will in reference to the simple act of the will; not in reference to the power of the
+                     will.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q8_A2-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> There are different powers for objects that differ in genus and are on an equality; for instance, sound and color are different
+                     genera of sensibles, to which are referred hearing and sight. But the useful and the righteous are not on an equality, but
+                     are as that which is of itself, and that which is in relation to another. Now such like objects are always referred to the
+                     same power; for instance, the power of sight perceives both color and light by
+                     which color is seen.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q8_A2-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Not everything that diversifies habits, diversifies the powers: since habits are certain determinations of powers to certain
+                     special acts. Moreover, every practical art considers both the end and the means. For the art of the helmsman does indeed
+                     consider the end, as that which it effects; and the means, as that which it commands. On the other hand, the ship-building
+                     art considers the means as that which it effects; but it considers that which is the
+                     end, as that to which it refers what it effects. And again, in every practical art there is an end proper to it and means
+                     that belong properly to that art.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q8_A2-p11"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q8_A2-p12"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q8_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q8_A3.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="FS_Q8_A3" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q8_A2.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q9.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="FS_Q8_A3-p0.1">Whether the will is moved by the same act to the end and to the means?</h4>
+                  <p id="FS_Q8_A3-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q8_A3-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the will is moved by the same act, to the end and to the means. Because according to the Philosopher (Topic.
+                     iii, 2) "where one thing is on account of another there is only one." But the will does not will the means save on account
+                     of the end. Therefore it is moved to both by the same act.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q8_A3-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the end is the reason for willing the means, just as light is the reason of seeing colors. But light and colors
+                     are seen by the same act. Therefore it is the same movement of the will, whereby it wills the end and the means.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q8_A3-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, it is one and the same natural movement which tends through the middle space to the terminus. But the means are
+                     in comparison to the end, as the middle space is to the terminus. Therefore it is the same movement of the will whereby it
+                     is directed to the end and to the means.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q8_A3-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Acts are diversified according to their objects. But the end is a different species of good from the means, which are a useful
+                     good. Therefore the will is not moved to both by the same act.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q8_A3-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> Since the end is willed in itself, whereas the means, as such, are only willed for the end, it is evident that the will can
+                     be moved to the end, without being moved to the means; whereas it cannot be moved to the means, as such, unless it is moved
+                     to the end. Accordingly the will is moved to the end in two ways: first, to the end absolutely and in itself; secondly, as
+                     the reason for willing the means. Hence it is evident that the will is moved by one and the
+                     same movement, to the end, as the reason for willing the means; and to the means themselves. But it is another act whereby
+                     the will is moved to the end absolutely. And sometimes this act precedes the other in time; for example when a man first wills
+                     to have health, and afterwards deliberating by what means to be healed, wills to send for the doctor to heal him. The same
+                     happens in regard to the intellect: for at first a man understands the principles in themselves; but afterwards he understands
+                     them in the conclusions, inasmuch as he assents to the conclusions on account of the principles.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q8_A3-p7">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This argument holds in respect of the will being moved to the end as the reason for willing the means.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q8_A3-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Whenever color is seen, by the same act the light is seen; but the light can be seen without the color being seen. In like
+                     manner whenever a man wills the means, by the same act he wills the end; but not the conversely.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q8_A3-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> In the execution of a work, the means are as the middle space, and the end, as the terminus. Wherefore just as natural movement
+                     sometimes stops in the middle and does not reach the terminus; so sometimes one is busy with the means, without gaining the
+                     end. But in willing it is the reverse: the will through (willing) the end comes to will the means; just as the intellect arrives
+                     at the conclusions through the principles which are called "means." Hence
+                     it is that sometimes the intellect understands a mean, and does not proceed thence to the conclusion. And in like manner the
+                     will sometimes wills the end, and yet does not proceed to will the means.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q8_A3-p10"> The solution to the argument in the contrary sense is clear from what has been said above (A[2], ad 2). For the useful and
+                     the righteous are not species of good in an equal degree, but are as that which is for its own sake and that which is for
+                     the sake of something else: wherefore the act of the will can be directed to one and not to the other; but not conversely.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q8_A3-p11"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q8_A3-p12"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q8_A2.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q9.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <a href="summa.FS_Q7_A4.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.FS_Q8_A1.html"></a>
+            </div>
+            <div id="FS_Q9" class="div3">
+               <a href="summa.FS_Q8_A3.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.FS_Q9_A1.html"></a>
+               <h3 id="FS_Q9-p0.1">OF THAT WHICH MOVES THE WILL (SIX ARTICLES)</h3>
+               <p id="FS_Q9-p1"></p>
+               <p id="FS_Q9-p2"> We must now consider what moves the will: and under this head there are six points of inquiry:</p>
+               <p id="FS_Q9-p3"> (1) Whether the will is moved by the intellect?</p>
+               <p id="FS_Q9-p4"> (2) Whether it is moved by the sensitive appetite?</p>
+               <p id="FS_Q9-p5"> (3) Whether the will moves itself?</p>
+               <p id="FS_Q9-p6"> (4) Whether it is moved by an extrinsic principle?</p>
+               <p id="FS_Q9-p7"> (5) Whether it is moved by a heavenly body?</p>
+               <p id="FS_Q9-p8"> (6) Whether the will is moved by God alone as by an extrinsic principle?</p>
+               <div id="FS_Q9_A1" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q9.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q9_A2.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="FS_Q9_A1-p0.1">Whether the will is moved by the intellect?</h4>
+                  <p id="FS_Q9_A1-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q9_A1-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the will is not moved by the intellect. For Augustine says on
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q9_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.118.20" target="asv"> Ps. 118:20</a>: "My soul hath coveted to long for Thy justifications: The intellect flies ahead, the desire follows sluggishly or not at
+                     all: we know what is good, but deeds delight us not." But it would not be so, if the will were moved by the intellect: because
+                     movement of the movable results from motion of the mover. Therefore the intellect does not move the
+                     will.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q9_A1-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the intellect in presenting the appetible object to the will, stands in relation to the will, as the imagination
+                     in representing the appetible will to the sensitive appetite. But the imagination, does not remove the sensitive appetite:
+                     indeed sometimes our imagination affects us no more than what is set before us in a picture, and moves us not at all (De Anima
+                     ii, 3). Therefore neither does the intellect move the will.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q9_A1-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the same is not mover and moved in respect of the same thing. But the will moves the intellect; for we exercise
+                     the intellect when we will. Therefore the intellect does not move the will.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q9_A1-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 10) that "the appetible object is a mover not moved, whereas the will is a mover moved."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q9_A1-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> A thing requires to be moved by something in so far as it is in potentiality to several things; for that which is in potentiality
+                     needs to be reduced to act by something actual; and to do this is to move. Now a power of the soul is seen to be in potentiality
+                     to different things in two ways: first, with regard to acting and not acting; secondly, with regard to this or that action.
+                     Thus the sight sometimes sees actually, and sometimes sees not: and sometimes
+                     it sees white, and sometimes black. It needs therefore a mover in two respects, viz. as to the exercise or use of the act,
+                     and as to the determination of the act. The first of these is on the part of the subject, which is sometimes acting, sometimes
+                     not acting: while the other is on the part of the object, by reason of which the act is specified.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q9_A1-p7"> The motion of the subject itself is due to some agent. And since every agent acts for an end, as was shown above (
+                     <a id="FS_Q9_A1-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q1_A2.html">Q[1], A[2]</a>), the principle of this motion lies in the end. And hence it is that the art which is concerned with the end, by its command
+                     moves the art which is concerned with the means; just as the "art of sailing commands the art of shipbuilding" (Phys. ii,
+                     2). Now good in general, which has the nature of an end, is the object of the will.
+                     Consequently, in this respect, the will moves the other powers of the soul to their acts, for we make use of the other powers
+                     when we will. For the end and perfection of every other power, is included under the object of the will as some particular
+                     good: and always the art or power to which the universal end belongs, moves to their acts the arts or powers to which belong
+                     the particular ends included in the universal end. Thus the leader of an army, who intends the common good---i.e. the order
+                     of the whole army---by his command moves one of the captains, who intends the order of one company.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q9_A1-p8"> On the other hand, the object moves, by determining the act, after the manner of a formal principle, whereby in natural things
+                     actions are specified, as heating by heat. Now the first formal principle is universal "being" and "truth," which is the object
+                     of the intellect. And therefore by this kind of motion the intellect moves the will, as presenting its object to it.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q9_A1-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The passage quoted proves, not that the intellect does not move, but that it does not move of necessity.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q9_A1-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Just as the imagination of a form without estimation of fitness or harmfulness, does not move the sensitive appetite; so
+                     neither does the apprehension of the true without the aspect of goodness and desirability. Hence it is not the speculative
+                     intellect that moves, but the practical intellect (De Anima iii, 9).
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q9_A1-p11">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The will moves the intellect as to the exercise of its act; since even the true itself which is the perfection of the intellect,
+                     is included in the universal good, as a particular good. But as to the determination of the act, which the act derives from
+                     the object, the intellect moves the will; since the good itself is apprehended under a special aspect as contained in the
+                     universal true. It is therefore evident that the same is not mover and moved in
+                     the same respect.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q9_A1-p12"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q9_A1-p13"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q9.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q9_A2.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="FS_Q9_A2" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q9_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q9_A3.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="FS_Q9_A2-p0.1">Whether the will is moved by the sensitive appetite?</h4>
+                  <p id="FS_Q9_A2-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q9_A2-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the will cannot be moved by the sensitive appetite. For "to move and to act is more excellent than to
+                     be passive," as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 16). But the sensitive appetite is less excellent than the will which is
+                     the intellectual appetite; just as sense is less excellent than intellect. Therefore the sensitive appetite does not move
+                     the will.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q9_A2-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, no particular power can produce a universal effect. But the sensitive appetite is a particular power, because it
+                     follows the particular apprehension of sense. Therefore it cannot cause the movement of the will, which movement is universal,
+                     as following the universal apprehension of the intellect.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q9_A2-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, as is proved in Phys. viii, 5, the mover is not moved by that which it moves, in such a way that there be reciprocal
+                     motion. But the will moves the sensitive appetite, inasmuch as the sensitive appetite obeys the reason. Therefore the sensitive
+                     appetite does not move the will.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q9_A2-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q9_A2-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Jas.1.14" target="asv">James 1:14</a>): "Every man is tempted by his own concupiscence, being drawn away and allured." But man would not be drawn away by his concupiscence,
+                     unless his will were moved by the sensitive appetite, wherein concupiscence resides. Therefore the sensitive appetite moves
+                     the will.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q9_A2-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above 
+                     <a id="FS_Q9_A2-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q9_A1.html">(A[1])</a>, that which is apprehended as good and fitting, moves the will by way of object. Now, that a thing appear to be good and
+                     fitting, happens from two causes: namely, from the condition, either of the thing proposed, or of the one to whom it is proposed.
+                     For fitness is spoken of by way of relation; hence it depends on both extremes. And hence it is that taste, according as it
+                     is variously disposed, takes to a thing
+                     in various ways, as being fitting or unfitting. Wherefore as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 5): "According as a man is,
+                     such does the end seem to him."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q9_A2-p7"> Now it is evident that according to a passion of the sensitive appetite man is changed to a certain disposition. Wherefore
+                     according as man is affected by a passion, something seems to him fitting, which does not seem so when he is not so affected:
+                     thus that seems good to a man when angered, which does not seem good when he is calm. And in this way, the sensitive appetite
+                     moves the will, on the part of the object.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q9_A2-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Nothing hinders that which is better simply and in itself, from being less excellent in a certain respect. Accordingly the
+                     will is simply more excellent than the sensitive appetite: but in respect of the man in whom a passion is predominant, in
+                     so far as he is subject to that passion, the sensitive appetite is more excellent.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q9_A2-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Men's acts and choices are in reference to singulars. Wherefore from the very fact that the sensitive appetite is a particular
+                     power, it has great influence in disposing man so that something seems to him such or otherwise, in particular cases.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q9_A2-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As the Philosopher says (Polit. i, 2), the reason, in which resides the will, moves, by its command, the irascible and concupiscible
+                     powers, not, indeed, "by a despotic sovereignty," as a slave is moved by his master, but by a "royal and politic sovereignty,"
+                     as free men are ruled by their governor, and can nevertheless act counter to his commands. Hence both irascible and concupiscible
+                     can move counter to the will: and accordingly nothing hinders the
+                     will from being moved by them at times.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q9_A2-p11"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q9_A2-p12"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q9_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q9_A3.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="FS_Q9_A3" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q9_A2.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q9_A4.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="FS_Q9_A3-p0.1">Whether the will moves itself?</h4>
+                  <p id="FS_Q9_A3-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q9_A3-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the will does not move itself. For every mover, as such, is in act: whereas what is moved, is in potentiality;
+                     since "movement is the act of that which is in potentiality, as such" [*Aristotle, Phys. iii, 1]. Now the same is not in potentiality
+                     and in act, in respect of the same. Therefore nothing moves itself. Neither, therefore, can the will move itself.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q9_A3-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the movable is moved on the mover being present. But the will is always present to itself. If, therefore, it moved
+                     itself, it would always be moving itself, which is clearly false.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q9_A3-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the will is moved by the intellect, as stated above 
+                     <a id="FS_Q9_A3-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q9_A1.html">(A[1])</a>. If, therefore, the will move itself, it would follow that the same thing is at once moved immediately by two movers; which
+                     seems unreasonable. Therefore the will does not move itself.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q9_A3-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The will is mistress of its own act, and to it belongs to will and not to will. But this would not be so, had it not the
+                     power to move itself to will. Therefore it moves itself.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q9_A3-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above 
+                     <a id="FS_Q9_A3-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q9_A1.html">(A[1])</a>, it belongs to the will to move the other powers, by reason of the end which is the will's object. Now, as stated above (Q[8],
+                     A[2]), the end is in things appetible, what the principle is in things intelligible. But it is evident that the intellect,
+                     through its knowledge of the principle, reduces itself from potentiality to act, as to its knowledge of the conclusions; and
+                     thus it moves itself. And, in like
+                     manner, the will, through its volition of the end, moves itself to will the means.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q9_A3-p7">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> It is not in respect of the same that the will moves itself and is moved: wherefore neither is it in act and in potentiality
+                     in respect of the same. But forasmuch as it actually wills the end, it reduces itself from potentiality to act, in respect
+                     of the means, so as, in a word, to will them actually.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q9_A3-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The power of the will is always actually present to itself; but the act of the will, whereby it wills an end, is not always
+                     in the will. But it is by this act that it moves itself. Accordingly it does not follow that it is always moving itself.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q9_A3-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The will is moved by the intellect, otherwise than by itself. By the intellect it is moved on the part of the object: whereas
+                     it is moved by itself, as to the exercise of its act, in respect of the end.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q9_A3-p10"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q9_A3-p11"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q9_A2.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q9_A4.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="FS_Q9_A4" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q9_A3.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q9_A5.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="FS_Q9_A4-p0.1">Whether the will is moved by an exterior principle?</h4>
+                  <p id="FS_Q9_A4-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q9_A4-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the will is not moved by anything exterior. For the movement of the will is voluntary. But it is essential
+                     to the voluntary act that it be from an intrinsic principle, just as it is essential to the natural act. Therefore the movement
+                     of the will is not from anything exterior.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q9_A4-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the will cannot suffer violence, as was shown above (
+                     <a id="FS_Q9_A4-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q6_A4.html">Q[6], A[4]</a>). But the violent act is one "the principle of which is outside the agent" [*Aristotle, Ethic. iii, 1]. Therefore the will
+                     cannot be moved by anything exterior.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q9_A4-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, that which is sufficiently moved by one mover, needs not to be moved by another. But the will moves itself sufficiently.
+                     Therefore it is not moved by anything exterior.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q9_A4-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The will is moved by the object, as stated above (A[1] ). But the object of the will can be something exterior, offered to
+                     the sense. Therefore the will can be moved by something exterior.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q9_A4-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> As far as the will is moved by the object, it is evident that it can be moved by something exterior. But in so far as it
+                     is moved in the exercise of its act, we must again hold it to be moved by some exterior principle.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q9_A4-p7"> For everything that is at one time an agent actually, and at another time an agent in potentiality, needs to be moved by
+                     a mover. Now it is evident that the will begins to will something, whereas previously it did not will it. Therefore it must,
+                     of necessity, be moved by something to will it. And, indeed, it moves itself, as stated above 
+                     <a id="FS_Q9_A4-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q9_A3.html">(A[3])</a>, in so far as through willing the end it reduces itself to the act of willing the means. Now it cannot do this
+                     without the aid of counsel: for when a man wills to be healed, he begins to reflect how this can be attained, and through
+                     this reflection he comes to the conclusion that he can be healed by a physician: and this he wills. But since he did not always
+                     actually will to have health, he must, of necessity, have begun, through something moving him, to will to be healed. And if
+                     the will moved itself to will this, it must, of necessity, have done this with the aid of counsel following some previous
+                     volition. But this process could not go on to infinity. Wherefore we must, of necessity, suppose that the will advanced to
+                     its first movement in virtue of the instigation of some exterior mover, as Aristotle concludes in a chapter of the Eudemian
+                     Ethics (vii, 14).
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q9_A4-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> It is essential to the voluntary act that its principle be within the agent: but it is not necessary that this inward principle
+                     be the first principle unmoved by another. Wherefore though the voluntary act has an inward proximate principle, nevertheless
+                     its first principle is from without. Thus, too, the first principle of the natural movement is from without, that, to wit,
+                     which moves nature.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q9_A4-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> For an act to be violent it is not enough that its principle be extrinsic, but we must add "without the concurrence of him
+                     that suffers violence." This does not happen when the will is moved by an exterior principle: for it is the will that wills,
+                     though moved by another. But this movement would be violent, if it were counter to the movement of the will: which in the
+                     present case is impossible; since then the will would will and not will the same
+                     thing.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q9_A4-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The will moves itself sufficiently in one respect, and in its own order, that is to say as proximate agent; but it cannot
+                     move itself in every respect, as we have shown. Wherefore it needs to be moved by another as first mover.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q9_A4-p11"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q9_A4-p12"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q9_A3.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q9_A5.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="FS_Q9_A5" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q9_A4.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q9_A6.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="FS_Q9_A5-p0.1">Whether the will is moved by a heavenly body?</h4>
+                  <p id="FS_Q9_A5-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q9_A5-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the human will is moved by a heavenly body. For all various and multiform movements are reduced, as to
+                     their cause, to a uniform movement which is that of the heavens, as is proved in Phys. viii, 9. But human movements are various
+                     and multiform, since they begin to be, whereas previously they were not. Therefore they are reduced, as to their cause, to
+                     the movement of the heavens, which is uniform according to its nature.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q9_A5-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, according to Augustine (De Trin. iii, 4) "the lower bodies are moved by the higher." But the movements of the human
+                     body, which are caused by the will, could not be reduced to the movement of the heavens, as to their cause, unless the will
+                     too were moved by the heavens. Therefore the heavens move the human will.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q9_A5-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, by observing the heavenly bodies astrologers foretell the truth about future human acts, which are caused by the
+                     will. But this would not be so, if the heavenly bodies could not move man's will. Therefore the human will is moved by a heavenly
+                     body.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q9_A5-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 7) that "the heavenly bodies are not the causes of our acts." But they would be, if the
+                     will, which is the principle of human acts, were moved by the heavenly bodies. Therefore the will is not moved by the heavenly
+                     bodies.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q9_A5-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> It is evident that the will can be moved by the heavenly bodies in the same way as it is moved by its object; that is to
+                     say, in so far as exterior bodies, which move the will, through being offered to the senses, and also the organs themselves
+                     of the sensitive powers, are subject to the movements of the heavenly bodies.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q9_A5-p7"> But some have maintained that heavenly bodies have an influence on the human will, in the same way as some exterior agent
+                     moves the will, as to the exercise of its act. But this is impossible. For the "will," as stated in De Anima iii, 9, "is in
+                     the reason." Now the reason is a power of the soul, not bound to a bodily organ: wherefore it follows that the will is a power
+                     absolutely incorporeal and immaterial. But it is evident that no body can act on what is incorporeal, but
+                     rather the reverse: because things incorporeal and immaterial have a power more formal and more universal than any corporeal
+                     things whatever. Therefore it is impossible for a heavenly body to act directly on the intellect or will. For this reason
+                     Aristotle (De Anima iii, 3) ascribed to those who held that intellect differs not from sense, the theory that "such is the
+                     will of men, as is the day which the father of men and of gods bring on" [*Odyssey xviii. 135] (referring to Jupiter, by whom
+                     they understand the entire heavens). For all the sensitive powers, since they are acts of bodily organs, can be moved accidentally,
+                     by the heavenly bodies, i.e. through those bodies being moved, whose acts they are.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q9_A5-p8"> But since it has been stated 
+                     <a id="FS_Q9_A5-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q9_A2.html">(A[2])</a> that the intellectual appetite is moved, in a fashion, by the sensitive appetite, the movements of the heavenly bodies have
+                     an indirect bearing on the will; in so far as the will happens to be moved by the passions of the sensitive appetite.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q9_A5-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The multiform movements of the human will are reduced to some uniform cause, which, however, is above the intellect and will.
+                     This can be said, not of any body, but of some superior immaterial substance. Therefore there is no need for the movement
+                     of the will to be referred to the movement of the heavens, as to its cause.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q9_A5-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The movements of the human body are reduced, as to their cause, to the movement of a heavenly body, in so far as the disposition
+                     suitable to a particular movement, is somewhat due to the influence of heavenly bodies; also, in so far as the sensitive appetite
+                     is stirred by the influence of heavenly bodies; and again, in so far as exterior bodies are moved in accordance with the movement
+                     of heavenly bodies, at whose presence, the will begins to will or
+                     not to will something; for instance, when the body is chilled, we begin to wish to make the fire. But this movement of the
+                     will is on the part of the object offered from without: not on the part of an inward instigation.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q9_A5-p11">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As stated above (Cf. 
+                     <a id="FS_Q9_A5-p11.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q84_A6.html">FP, Q[84], AA[6]</a>,7) the sensitive appetite is the act of a bodily organ. Wherefore there is no reason why man should not be prone to anger
+                     or concupiscence, or some like passion, by reason of the influence of heavenly bodies, just as by reason of his natural complexion.
+                     But the majority of men are led by the passions, which the wise alone resist. Consequently, in the majority of cases predictions
+                     about
+                     human acts, gathered from the observation of heavenly bodies, are fulfilled. Nevertheless, as Ptolemy says (Centiloquium v),
+                     "the wise man governs the stars"; which is a though to say that by resisting his passions, he opposes his will, which is free
+                     and nowise subject to the movement of the heavens, to such like effects of the heavenly bodies.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q9_A5-p12"> Or, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. ii, 15): "We must confess that when the truth is foretold by astrologers, this is due
+                     to some most hidden inspiration, to which the human mind is subject without knowing it. And since this is done in order to
+                     deceive man, it must be the work of the lying spirits."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q9_A5-p13"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q9_A5-p14"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q9_A4.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q9_A6.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="FS_Q9_A6" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q9_A5.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q10.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="FS_Q9_A6-p0.1">Whether the will is moved by God alone, as exterior principle?</h4>
+                  <p id="FS_Q9_A6-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q9_A6-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the will is not moved by God alone as exterior principle. For it is natural that the inferior be moved
+                     by its superior: thus the lower bodies are moved by the heavenly bodies. But there is something which is higher than the will
+                     of man and below God, namely, the angel. Therefore man's will can be moved by an angel also, as exterior principle.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q9_A6-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the act of the will follows the act of the intellect. But man's intellect is reduced to act, not by God alone, but
+                     also by the angel who enlightens it, as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. iv). For the same reason, therefore, the will also is
+                     moved by an angel.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q9_A6-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, God is not the cause of other than good things, according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q9_A6-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.1.31" target="asv"> Gn. 1:31</a>: "God saw all the things that He had made, and they were very good." If, therefore man's will were moved by God alone, it
+                     would never be moved to evil: and yet it is the will whereby "we sin and whereby we do right," as Augustine says (Retract.
+                     i, 9).
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q9_A6-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q9_A6-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Phil.2.13" target="asv">Phil. 2:13</a>): "It is God Who worketh in us" [Vulg.'you'] "both to will and to accomplish."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q9_A6-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> The movement of the will is from within, as also is the movement of nature. Now although it is possible for something to
+                     move a natural thing, without being the cause of the thing moved, yet that alone, which is in some way the cause of a thing's
+                     nature, can cause a natural movement in that thing. For a stone is moved upwards by a man, who is not the cause of the stone's
+                     nature, but this movement is not natural to the stone; but the natural movement of the
+                     stone is caused by no other than the cause of its nature. Wherefore it is said in Phys. vii, 4, that the generator moves locally
+                     heavy and light things. Accordingly man endowed with a will is sometimes moved by something that is not his cause; but that
+                     his voluntary movement be from an exterior principle that is not the cause of his will, is impossible.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q9_A6-p7"> Now the cause of the will can be none other than God. And this is evident for two reasons. First, because the will is a power
+                     of the rational soul, which is caused by God alone, by creation, as was stated in the 
+                     <a id="FS_Q9_A6-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q90_A2.html">FP, Q[90], A[2]</a>. Secondly, it is evident from the fact that the will is ordained to the universal good. Wherefore nothing else can be the
+                     cause of the will, except God Himself, Who is the universal good: while every other good is good by
+                     participation, and is some particular good, and a particular cause does not give a universal inclination. Hence neither can
+                     primary matter, which is potentiality to all forms, be created by some particular agent.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q9_A6-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> An angel is not above man in such a way as to be the cause of his will, as the heavenly bodies are the causes of natural
+                     forms, from which result the natural movements of natural bodies.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q9_A6-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Man's intellect is moved by an angel, on the part of the object, which by the power of the angelic light is proposed to man's
+                     knowledge. And in this way the will also can be moved by a creature from without, as stated above 
+                     <a id="FS_Q9_A6-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q9_A4.html">(A[4])</a>.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q9_A6-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> God moves man's will, as the Universal Mover, to the universal object of the will, which is good. And without this universal
+                     motion, man cannot will anything. But man determines himself by his reason to will this or that, which is true or apparent
+                     good. Nevertheless, sometimes God moves some specially to the willing of something determinate, which is good; as in the case
+                     of those whom He moves by grace, as we shall state later on (
+                     <a id="FS_Q9_A6-p10.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q109_A2.html">Q[109], A[2]</a>).
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q9_A6-p11"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q9_A6-p12"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q9_A5.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q10.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <a href="summa.FS_Q8_A3.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.FS_Q9_A1.html"></a>
+            </div>
+            <div id="FS_Q10" class="div3">
+               <a href="summa.FS_Q9_A6.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.FS_Q10_A1.html"></a>
+               <h3 id="FS_Q10-p0.1">OF THE MANNER IN WHICH THE WILL IS MOVED (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3>
+               <p id="FS_Q10-p1"></p>
+               <p id="FS_Q10-p2"> We must now consider the manner in which the will is moved. Under this head there are four points of inquiry:</p>
+               <p id="FS_Q10-p3"> (1) Whether the will is moved to anything naturally?</p>
+               <p id="FS_Q10-p4"> (2) Whether it is moved of necessity by its object?</p>
+               <p id="FS_Q10-p5"> (3) Whether it is moved of necessity by the lower appetite?</p>
+               <p id="FS_Q10-p6"> (4) Whether it is moved of necessity by the exterior mover which is God?</p>
+               <div id="FS_Q10_A1" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q10.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q10_A2.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="FS_Q10_A1-p0.1">Whether the will is moved to anything naturally?</h4>
+                  <p id="FS_Q10_A1-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q10_A1-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the will is not moved to anything naturally. For the natural agent is condivided with the voluntary agent,
+                     as stated at the beginning of Phys. ii, 1. Therefore the will is not moved to anything naturally.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q10_A1-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, that which is natural is in a thing always: as "being hot" is in fire. But no movement is always in the will. Therefore
+                     no movement is natural to the will.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q10_A1-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, nature is determinate to one thing: whereas the will is referred to opposites. Therefore the will wills nothing
+                     naturally.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q10_A1-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The movement of the will follows the movement of the intellect. But the intellect understands some things naturally. Therefore
+                     the will, too, wills some things naturally.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q10_A1-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> As Boethius says (De Duabus Nat.) and the Philosopher also (Metaph. v, 4) the word "nature" is used in a manifold sense.
+                     For sometimes it stands for the intrinsic principle in movable things. In this sense nature is either matter or the material
+                     form, as stated in Phys. ii, 1. In another sense nature stands for any substance, or even for any being. And in this sense,
+                     that is said to be natural to a thing which befits it in respect of its substance. And this
+                     is that which of itself is in a thing. Now all things that do not of themselves belong to the thing in which they are, are
+                     reduced to something which belongs of itself to that thing, as to their principle. Wherefore, taking nature in this sense,
+                     it is necessary that the principle of whatever belongs to a thing, be a natural principle. This is evident in regard to the
+                     intellect: for the principles of intellectual knowledge are naturally known. In like manner the principle of voluntary movements
+                     must be something naturally willed.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q10_A1-p7"> Now this is good in general, to which the will tends naturally, as does each power to its object; and again it is the last
+                     end, which stands in the same relation to things appetible, as the first principles of demonstrations to things intelligible:
+                     and, speaking generally, it is all those things which belong to the willer according to his nature. For it is not only things
+                     pertaining to the will that the will desires, but also that which pertains to each power, and to the entire
+                     man. Wherefore man wills naturally not only the object of the will, but also other things that are appropriate to the other
+                     powers; such as the knowledge of truth, which befits the intellect; and to be and to live and other like things which regard
+                     the natural well-being; all of which are included in the object of the will, as so many particular goods.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q10_A1-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The will is distinguished from nature as one kind of cause from another; for some things happen naturally and some are done
+                     voluntarily. There is, however, another manner of causing that is proper to the will, which is mistress of its act, besides
+                     the manner proper to nature, which is determinate to one thing. But since the will is founded on some nature, it is necessary
+                     that the movement proper to nature be shared by the will, to some extent: just as
+                     what belongs to a previous cause is shared by a subsequent cause. Because in every thing, being itself, which is from nature,
+                     precedes volition, which is from the will. And hence it is that the will wills something naturally.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q10_A1-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> In the case of natural things, that which is natural, as a result of the form only, is always in them actually, as heat is
+                     in fire. But that which is natural as a result of matter, is not always in them actually, but sometimes only in potentiality:
+                     because form is act, whereas matter is potentiality. Now movement is "the act of that which is in potentiality" (Aristotle,
+                     Phys. iii, 1). Wherefore that which belongs to, or results from, movement, in
+                     regard to natural things, is not always in them. Thus fire does not always move upwards, but only when it is outside its own
+                     place. [*The Aristotelian theory was that fire's proper place is the fiery heaven, i.e. the Empyrean.] And in like manner
+                     it is not necessary that the will (which is reduced from potentiality to act, when it wills something), should always be in
+                     the act of volition; but only when it is in a certain determinate disposition. But God's will, which is pure act, is always
+                     in
+                     the act of volition.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q10_A1-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> To every nature there is one thing corresponding, proportionate, however, to that nature. For to nature considered as a genus,
+                     there corresponds something one generically; and to nature as species there corresponds something one specifically; and to
+                     the individualized nature there corresponds some one individual. Since, therefore, the will is an immaterial power like the
+                     intellect, some one general thing corresponds to it, naturally which is the good;
+                     just as to the intellect there corresponds some one general thing, which is the true, or being, or "what a thing is." And
+                     under good in general are included many particular goods, to none of which is the will determined.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q10_A1-p11"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q10_A1-p12"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q10.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q10_A2.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="FS_Q10_A2" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q10_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q10_A3.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="FS_Q10_A2-p0.1">Whether the will is moved, of necessity, by its object?</h4>
+                  <p id="FS_Q10_A2-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q10_A2-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the will is moved, of necessity, by its object. For the object of the will is compared to the will as mover
+                     to movable, as stated in De Anima iii, 10. But a mover, if it be sufficient, moves the movable of necessity. Therefore the
+                     will can be moved of necessity by its object.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q10_A2-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, just as the will is an immaterial power, so is the intellect: and both powers are ordained to a universal object,
+                     as stated above (A[1], ad 3). But the intellect is moved, of necessity, by its object: therefore the will also, by its object.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q10_A2-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, whatever one wills, is either the end, or something ordained to an end. But, seemingly, one wills an end necessarily:
+                     because it is like the principle in speculative matters, to which principle one assents of necessity. Now the end is the reason
+                     for willing the means; and so it seems that we will the means also necessarily. Therefore the will is moved of necessity by
+                     its object.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q10_A2-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The rational powers, according to the Philosopher (Metaph. ix, 2) are directed to opposites. But the will is a rational power,
+                     since it is in the reason, as stated in De Anima iii, 9. Therefore the will is directed to opposites. Therefore it is not
+                     moved, of necessity, to either of the opposites.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q10_A2-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> The will is moved in two ways: first, as to the exercise of its act; secondly, as to the specification of its act, derived
+                     from the object. As to the first way, no object moves the will necessarily, for no matter what the object be, it is in man's
+                     power not to think of it, and consequently not to will it actually. But as to the second manner of motion, the will is moved
+                     by one object necessarily, by another not. For in the movement of a power by its object,
+                     we must consider under what aspect the object moves the power. For the visible moves the sight, under the aspect of color
+                     actually visible. Wherefore if color be offered to the sight, it moves the sight necessarily: unless one turns one's eyes
+                     away; which belongs to the exercise of the act. But if the sight were confronted with something not in all respects colored
+                     actually, but only so in some respects, and in other respects not, the sight would not of necessity see such an object: for
+                     it
+                     might look at that part of the object which is not actually colored, and thus it would not see it. Now just as the actually
+                     colored is the object of sight, so is good the object of the will. Wherefore if the will be offered an object which is good
+                     universally and from every point of view, the will tends to it of necessity, if it wills anything at all; since it cannot
+                     will the opposite. If, on the other hand, the will is offered an object that is not good from every point of view, it will
+                     not
+                     tend to it of necessity. And since lack of any good whatever, is a non-good, consequently, that good alone which is perfect
+                     and lacking in nothing, is such a good that the will cannot not-will it: and this is Happiness. Whereas any other particular
+                     goods, in so far as they are lacking in some good, can be regarded as non-goods: and from this point of view, they can be
+                     set aside or approved by the will, which can tend to one and the same thing from various points of view.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q10_A2-p7">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The sufficient mover of a power is none but that object that in every respect presents the aspect of the mover of that power.
+                     If, on the other hand, it is lacking in any respect, it will not move of necessity, as stated above.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q10_A2-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The intellect is moved, of necessity, by an object which is such as to be always and necessarily true: but not by that which
+                     may be either true or false---viz. by that which is contingent: as we have said of the good.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q10_A2-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The last end moves the will necessarily, because it is the perfect good. In like manner whatever is ordained to that end,
+                     and without which the end cannot be attained, such as "to be" and "to live," and the like. But other things without which
+                     the end can be gained, are not necessarily willed by one who wills the end: just as he who assents to the principle, does
+                     not necessarily assent to the conclusions, without which the principles can still be
+                     true.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q10_A2-p10"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q10_A2-p11"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q10_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q10_A3.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="FS_Q10_A3" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q10_A2.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q10_A4.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="FS_Q10_A3-p0.1">Whether the will is moved, of necessity, by the lower appetite?</h4>
+                  <p id="FS_Q10_A3-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q10_A3-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the will is moved of necessity by a passion of the lower appetite. For the Apostle says (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q10_A3-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.7.19" target="asv">Rom. 7:19</a>): "The good which I will I do not; but the evil which I will not, that I do": and this is said by reason of concupiscence,
+                     which is a passion. Therefore the will is moved of necessity by a passion.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q10_A3-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, as stated in Ethic. iii, 5, "according as a man is, such does the end seem to him." But it is not in man's power
+                     to cast aside a passion once. Therefore it is not in man's power not to will that to which the passion inclines him.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q10_A3-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, a universal cause is not applied to a particular effect, except by means of a particular cause: wherefore the universal
+                     reason does not move save by means of a particular estimation, as stated in De Anima iii, 11. But as the universal reason
+                     is to the particular estimation, so is the will to the sensitive appetite. Therefore the will is not moved to will something
+                     particular, except through the sensitive appetite. Therefore, if the sensitive appetite
+                     happen to be disposed to something, by reason of a passion, the will cannot be moved in a contrary sense.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q10_A3-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b>
+                     It is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q10_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.4.7" target="asv">Gn. 4:7</a>):
+                     "Thy lust [Vulg. 'The lust thereof'] shall be
+                     under thee, and thou shalt have dominion over
+                     it." Therefore man's will is not moved of necessity by the lower appetite.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q10_A3-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above (
+                     <a id="FS_Q10_A3-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q9_A2.html">Q[9], A[2]</a>), the passion of the sensitive appetite moves the will, in so far as the will is moved by its object: inasmuch as, to wit,
+                     man through being disposed in such and such a way by a passion, judges something to be fitting and good, which he would not
+                     judge thus were it not for the passion. Now this influence of a passion on man occurs in two ways. First, so that his reason
+                     is wholly bound, so that he has not
+                     the use of reason: as happens in those who through a violent access of anger or concupiscence become furious or insane, just
+                     as they may from some other bodily disorder; since such like passions do not take place without some change in the body. And
+                     of such the same is to be said as of irrational animals, which follow, of necessity, the impulse of their passions: for in
+                     them there is neither movement of reason, nor, consequently, of will.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q10_A3-p7"> Sometimes, however, the reason is not entirely engrossed by the passion, so that the judgment of reason retains, to a certain
+                     extent, its freedom: and thus the movement of the will remains in a certain degree. Accordingly in so far as the reason remains
+                     free, and not subject to the passion, the will's movement, which also remains, does not tend of necessity to that whereto
+                     the passion inclines it. Consequently, either there is no movement of the will in that man, and the passion
+                     alone holds its sway: or if there be a movement of the will, it does not necessarily follow the passion.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q10_A3-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Although the will cannot prevent the movement of concupiscence from arising, of which the Apostle says: "The evil which I
+                     will not, that I do---i.e. I desire"; yet it is in the power of the will not to will to desire or not to consent to concupiscence.
+                     And thus it does not necessarily follow the movement of concupiscence.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q10_A3-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Since there is in man a twofold nature, intellectual and sensitive; sometimes man is such and such uniformly in respect of
+                     his whole soul: either because the sensitive part is wholly subject to this reason, as in the virtuous; or because reason
+                     is entirely engrossed by passion, as in a madman. But sometimes, although reason is clouded by passion, yet something of this
+                     reason remains free. And in respect of this, man can either repel the passion
+                     entirely, or at least hold himself in check so as not to be led away by the passion. For when thus disposed, since man is
+                     variously disposed according to the various parts of the soul, a thing appears to him otherwise according to his reason, than
+                     it does according to a passion.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q10_A3-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The will is moved not only by the universal good apprehended by the reason, but also by good apprehended by sense. Wherefore
+                     he can be moved to some particular good independently of a passion of the sensitive appetite. For we will and do many things
+                     without passion, and through choice alone; as is most evident in those cases wherein reason resists passion.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q10_A3-p11"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q10_A3-p12"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q10_A2.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q10_A4.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="FS_Q10_A4" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q10_A3.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q11.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="FS_Q10_A4-p0.1">Whether the will is moved of necessity by the exterior mover which is God?</h4>
+                  <p id="FS_Q10_A4-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q10_A4-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the will is moved of necessity by God. For every agent that cannot be resisted moves of necessity. But
+                     God cannot be resisted, because His power is infinite; wherefore it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q10_A4-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.9.19" target="asv">Rom. 9:19</a>): "Who resisteth His will?" Therefore God moves the will of necessity.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q10_A4-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the will is moved of necessity to whatever it wills naturally, as stated above (A[2], ad 3). But "whatever God does
+                     in a thing is natural to it," as Augustine says (Contra Faust. xxvi, 3). Therefore the will wills of necessity everything
+                     to which God moves it.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q10_A4-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, a thing is possible, if nothing impossible follows from its being supposed. But something impossible follows from
+                     the supposition that the will does not will that to which God moves it: because in that case God's operation would be ineffectual.
+                     Therefore it is not possible for the will not to will that to which God moves it. Therefore it wills it of necessity.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q10_A4-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q10_A4-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.15.14" target="asv">Ecclus. 15:14</a>): "God made man from the beginning, and left him in the hand of his own counsel." Therefore He does not of necessity move
+                     man's will.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q10_A4-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> As Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) "it belongs to Divine providence, not to destroy but to preserve the nature of things."
+                     Wherefore it moves all things in accordance with their conditions; so that from necessary causes through the Divine motion,
+                     effects follow of necessity; but from contingent causes, effects follow contingently. Since, therefore, the will is an active
+                     principle, not determinate to one thing, but having an indifferent relation to many things,
+                     God so moves it, that He does not determine it of necessity to one thing, but its movement remains contingent and not necessary,
+                     except in those things to which it is moved naturally.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q10_A4-p7">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The Divine will extends not only to the doing of something by the thing which He moves, but also to its being done in a way
+                     which is fitting to the nature of that thing. And therefore it would be more repugnant to the Divine motion, for the will
+                     to be moved of necessity, which is not fitting to its nature; than for it to be moved freely, which is becoming to its nature.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q10_A4-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> That is natural to a thing, which God so works in it that it may be natural to it: for thus is something becoming to a thing,
+                     according as God wishes it to be becoming. Now He does not wish that whatever He works in things should be natural to them,
+                     for instance, that the dead should rise again. But this He does wish to be natural to each thing---that it be subject to the
+                     Divine power.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q10_A4-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> If God moves the will to anything, it is incompatible with this supposition, that the will be not moved thereto. But it is
+                     not impossible simply. Consequently it does not follow that the will is moved by God necessarily.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q10_A4-p10"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q10_A4-p11"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q10_A3.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q11.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <a href="summa.FS_Q9_A6.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.FS_Q10_A1.html"></a>
+            </div>
+            <div id="FS_Q11" class="div3">
+               <a href="summa.FS_Q10_A4.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.FS_Q11_A1.html"></a>
+               <h3 id="FS_Q11-p0.1">OF ENJOYMENT [*Or, Fruition], WHICH IS AN ACT OF THE WILL (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3>
+               <p id="FS_Q11-p1"></p>
+               <p id="FS_Q11-p2"> We must now consider enjoyment: concerning which there are four points of inquiry:</p>
+               <p id="FS_Q11-p3"> (1) Whether to enjoy is an act of the appetitive power?</p>
+               <p id="FS_Q11-p4"> (2) Whether it belongs to the rational creature alone, or also to irrational animals?</p>
+               <p id="FS_Q11-p5"> (3) Whether enjoyment is only of the last end?</p>
+               <p id="FS_Q11-p6"> (4) Whether it is only of the end possessed?</p>
+               <div id="FS_Q11_A1" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q11.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q11_A2.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="FS_Q11_A1-p0.1">Whether to enjoy is an act of the appetitive power?</h4>
+                  <p id="FS_Q11_A1-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q11_A1-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that to enjoy belongs not only to the appetitive power. For to enjoy seems nothing else than to receive the
+                     fruit. But it is the intellect, in whose act Happiness consists, as shown above (
+                     <a id="FS_Q11_A1-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q3_A4.html">Q[3], A[4]</a>), that receives the fruit of human life, which is Happiness. Therefore to enjoy is not an act of the appetitive power, but
+                     of the intellect.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q11_A1-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, each power has its proper end, which is its perfection: thus the end of sight is to know the visible; of the hearing,
+                     to perceive sounds; and so forth. But the end of a thing is its fruit. Therefore to enjoy belongs to each power, and not only
+                     to the appetite.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q11_A1-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, enjoyment implies a certain delight. But sensible delight belongs to sense, which delights in its object: and for
+                     the same reason, intellectual delight belongs to the intellect. Therefore enjoyment belongs to the apprehensive, and not to
+                     the appetitive power.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q11_A1-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 4; and De Trin. x, 10,11): "To enjoy is to adhere lovingly to something for its own
+                     sake." But love belongs to the appetitive power. Therefore also to enjoy is an act of the appetitive power.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q11_A1-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> "Fruitio" [enjoyment] and "fructus" [fruit] seem to refer to the same, one being derived from the other; which from which,
+                     matters not for our purpose; though it seems probable that the one which is more clearly known, was first named. Now those
+                     things are most manifest to us which appeal most to the senses: wherefore it seems that the word "fruition" is derived from
+                     sensible fruits. But sensible fruit is that which we expect the tree to produce in the last
+                     place, and in which a certain sweetness is to be perceived. Hence fruition seems to have relation to love, or to the delight
+                     which one has in realizing the longed-for term, which is the end. Now the end and the good is the object of the appetitive
+                     power. Wherefore it is evident that fruition is the act of the appetitive power.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q11_A1-p7">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Nothing hinders one and the same thing from belonging, under different aspects, to different powers. Accordingly the vision
+                     of God, as vision, is an act of the intellect, but as a good and an end, is the object of the will. And as such is the fruition
+                     thereof: so that the intellect attains this end, as the executive power, but the will as the motive power, moving (the powers)
+                     towards the end and enjoying the end attained.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q11_A1-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The perfection and end of every other power is contained in the object of the appetitive power, as the proper is contained
+                     in the common, as stated above (
+                     <a id="FS_Q11_A1-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q9_A1.html">Q[9], A[1]</a>). Hence the perfection and end of each power, in so far as it is a good, belongs to the appetitive power. Wherefore the appetitive
+                     power moves the other powers to their ends; and itself realizes the end, when each of them reaches the end.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q11_A1-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> In delight there are two things: perception of what is becoming; and this belongs to the apprehensive power; and complacency
+                     in that which is offered as becoming: and this belongs to the appetitive power, in which power delight is formally completed.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q11_A1-p10"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q11_A1-p11"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q11.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q11_A2.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="FS_Q11_A2" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q11_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q11_A3.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="FS_Q11_A2-p0.1">Whether to enjoy belongs to the rational creature alone, or also to irrational animals?</h4>
+                  <p id="FS_Q11_A2-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q11_A2-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that to enjoy belongs to men alone. For Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 22) that "it is given to us men
+                     to enjoy and to use." Therefore other animals cannot enjoy.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q11_A2-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, to enjoy relates to the last end. But irrational animals cannot obtain the last end. Therefore it is not for them
+                     to enjoy.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q11_A2-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, just as the sensitive appetite is beneath the intellectual appetite, so is the natural appetite beneath the sensitive.
+                     If, therefore, to enjoy belongs to the sensitive appetite, it seems that for the same reason it can belong to the natural
+                     appetite. But this is evidently false, since the latter cannot delight in anything. Therefore the sensitive appetite cannot
+                     enjoy: and accordingly enjoyment is not possible for irrational animals.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q11_A2-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 30): "It is not so absurd to suppose that even beasts enjoy their food and any bodily pleasure."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q11_A2-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> As was stated above 
+                     <a id="FS_Q11_A2-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q11_A1.html">(A[1])</a> to enjoy is not the act of the power that achieves the end as executor, but of the power that commands the achievement; for
+                     it has been said to belong to the appetitive power. Now things void of reason have indeed a power of achieving an end by way
+                     of execution, as that by which a heavy body has a downward tendency, whereas a light body has an upward tendency. Yet the
+                     power of command in respect of the end
+                     is not in them, but in some higher nature, which moves all nature by its command, just as in things endowed with knowledge,
+                     the appetite moves the other powers to their acts. Wherefore it is clear that things void of knowledge, although they attain
+                     an end, have no enjoyment of the end: this is only for those that are endowed with knowledge.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q11_A2-p7"> Now knowledge of the end is twofold: perfect and imperfect. Perfect knowledge of the end, is that whereby not only is that
+                     known which is the end and the good, but also the universal formality of the end and the good; and such knowledge belongs
+                     to the rational nature alone. On the other hand, imperfect knowledge is that by which the end and the good are known in the
+                     particular. Such knowledge is in irrational animals: whose appetitive powers do not command with freedom, but are
+                     moved according to a natural instinct to whatever they apprehend. Consequently, enjoyment belongs to the rational nature,
+                     in a perfect degree; to irrational animals, imperfectly; to other creatures, not at all.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q11_A2-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Augustine is speaking there of perfect enjoyment.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q11_A2-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Enjoyment need not be of the last end simply; but of that which each one chooses for his last end.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q11_A2-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The sensitive appetite follows some knowledge; not so the natural appetite, especially in things void of knowledge.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q11_A2-p11">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Augustine is speaking there of imperfect enjoyment. This is clear from his way of speaking: for he says that "it is not so
+                     absurd to suppose that even beasts enjoy," that is, as it would be, if one were to say that they "use."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q11_A2-p12"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q11_A2-p13"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q11_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q11_A3.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="FS_Q11_A3" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q11_A2.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q11_A4.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="FS_Q11_A3-p0.1">Whether enjoyment is only of the last end?</h4>
+                  <p id="FS_Q11_A3-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q11_A3-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that enjoyment is not only of the last end. For the Apostle says (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q11_A3-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Phlm.1.20" target="asv">Philem. 20</a>): "Yea, brother, may I enjoy thee in the Lord." But it is evident that Paul had not placed his last end in a man. Therefore
+                     to enjoy is not only of the last end.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q11_A3-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, what we enjoy is the fruit. But the Apostle says (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q11_A3-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Gal.5.22" target="asv">Gal. 5:22</a>): "The fruit of the Spirit is charity, joy, peace," and other like things, which are not in the nature of the last end. Therefore
+                     enjoyment is not only of the last end.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q11_A3-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the acts of the will reflect on one another; for I will to will, and I love to love. But to enjoy is an act of the
+                     will: since "it is the will with which we enjoy," as Augustine says (De Trin. x, 10). Therefore a man enjoys his enjoyment.
+                     But the last end of man is not enjoyment, but the uncreated good alone, which is God. Therefore enjoyment is not only of the
+                     last end.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q11_A3-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Trin. x, 11): "A man does not enjoy that which he desires for the sake of something else." But the last
+                     end alone is that which man does not desire for the sake of something else. Therefore enjoyment is of the last end alone.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q11_A3-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above 
+                     <a id="FS_Q11_A3-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q11_A1.html">(A[1])</a> the notion of fruit implies two things: first that it should come last; second, that it should calm the appetite with a certain
+                     sweetness and delight. Now a thing is last either simply or relatively; simply, if it be referred to nothing else; relatively,
+                     if it is the last in a particular series. Therefore that which is last simply, and in which one delights as in the last end,
+                     is properly called fruit; and this
+                     it is that one is properly said to enjoy. But that which is delightful not in itself, but is desired, only as referred to
+                     something else, e.g. a bitter potion for the sake of health, can nowise be called fruit. And that which has something delightful
+                     about it, to which a number of preceding things are referred, may indeed by called fruit in a certain manner; but we cannot
+                     be said to enjoy it properly or as though it answered perfectly to the notion of fruit. Hence Augustine says (De Trin. x,
+                     10) that "we enjoy what we know, when the delighted will is at rest therein." But its rest is not absolute save in the possession
+                     of the last end: for as long as something is looked for, the movement of the will remains in suspense, although it has reached
+                     something. Thus in local movement, although any point between the two terms is a beginning and an end, yet it is not considered
+                     as an actual end, except when the movement stops there.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q11_A3-p7">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 33), "if he had said, 'May I enjoy thee,' without adding 'in the Lord,' he would
+                     seem to have set the end of his love in him. But since he added that he set his end in the Lord, he implied his desire to
+                     enjoy Him": as if we were to say that he expressed his enjoyment of his brother not as a term but as a means.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q11_A3-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Fruit bears one relation to the tree that bore it, and another to man that enjoys it. To the tree indeed that bore it, it
+                     is compared as effect to cause; to the one enjoying it, as the final object of his longing and the consummation of his delight.
+                     Accordingly these fruits mentioned by the Apostle are so called because they are certain effects of the Holy Ghost in us,
+                     wherefore they are called "fruits of the spirit": but not as though we are to enjoy
+                     them as our last end. Or we may say with Ambrose that they are called fruits because "we should desire them for their own
+                     sake": not indeed as though they were not ordained to the last end; but because they are such that we ought to find pleasure
+                     in them.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q11_A3-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As stated above (
+                     <a id="FS_Q11_A3-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q1_A8.html">Q[1], A[8]</a>;
+                     <a id="FS_Q11_A3-p9.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q2_A7.html"> Q[2], A[7]</a>), we speak of an end in a twofold sense: first, as being the thing itself; secondly, as the attainment thereof. These are
+                     not, of course, two ends, but one end, considered in itself, and in its relation to something else. Accordingly God is the
+                     last end, as that which is ultimately sought for: while the enjoyment is as the attainment of this last end. And so, just
+                     as God is not one end, and the enjoyment of God, another: so it is the same enjoyment whereby we enjoy God, and whereby we
+                     enjoy our enjoyment of God. And the same applies to created happiness which consists in enjoyment.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q11_A3-p10"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q11_A3-p11"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q11_A2.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q11_A4.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="FS_Q11_A4" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q11_A3.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q12.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="FS_Q11_A4-p0.1">Whether enjoyment is only of the end possessed?</h4>
+                  <p id="FS_Q11_A4-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q11_A4-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that enjoyment is only of the end possessed. For Augustine says (De Trin. x, 1) that "to enjoy is to use joyfully,
+                     with the joy, not of hope, but of possession." But so long as a thing is not had, there is joy, not of possession, but of
+                     hope. Therefore enjoyment is only of the end possessed.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q11_A4-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, as stated above 
+                     <a id="FS_Q11_A4-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q11_A3.html">(A[3])</a>, enjoyment is not properly otherwise than of the last end: because this alone gives rest to the appetite. But the appetite
+                     has no rest save in the possession of the end. Therefore enjoyment, properly speaking, is only of the end possessed.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q11_A4-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, to enjoy is to lay hold of the fruit. But one does not lay hold of the fruit until one is in possession of the end.
+                     Therefore enjoyment is only of the end possessed.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q11_A4-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> "to enjoy is to adhere lovingly to something for its own sake," as Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 4). But this is possible,
+                     even in regard to a thing which is not in our possession. Therefore it is possible to enjoy the end even though it be not
+                     possessed.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q11_A4-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> To enjoy implies a certain relation of the will to the last end, according as the will has something by way of last end.
+                     Now an end is possessed in two ways; perfectly and imperfectly. Perfectly, when it is possessed not only in intention but
+                     also in reality; imperfectly, when it is possessed in intention only. Perfect enjoyment, therefore, is of the end already
+                     possessed: but imperfect enjoyment is also of the end possessed not really, but only in
+                     intention.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q11_A4-p7">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Augustine speaks there of perfect enjoyment.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q11_A4-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The will is hindered in two ways from being at rest. First on the part of the object; by reason of its not being the last
+                     end, but ordained to something else: secondly on the part of the one who desires the end, by reason of his not being yet in
+                     possession of it. Now it is the object that specifies an act: but on the agent depends the manner of acting, so that the act
+                     be perfect or imperfect, as compared with the actual circumstances of the agent.
+                     Therefore enjoyment of anything but the last end is not enjoyment properly speaking, as falling short of the nature of enjoyment.
+                     But enjoyment of the last end, not yet possessed, is enjoyment properly speaking, but imperfect, on account of the imperfect
+                     way in which it is possessed.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q11_A4-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> One is said to lay hold of or to have an end, not only in reality, but also in intention, as stated above.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q11_A4-p10"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q11_A4-p11"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q11_A3.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q12.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <a href="summa.FS_Q10_A4.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.FS_Q11_A1.html"></a>
+            </div>
+            <div id="FS_Q12" class="div3">
+               <a href="summa.FS_Q11_A4.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.FS_Q12_A1.html"></a>
+               <h3 id="FS_Q12-p0.1">OF INTENTION (FIVE ARTICLES)</h3>
+               <p id="FS_Q12-p1"></p>
+               <p id="FS_Q12-p2"> We must now consider Intention: concerning which there are five points of inquiry:</p>
+               <p id="FS_Q12-p3"> (1) Whether intention is an act of intellect or of the will?</p>
+               <p id="FS_Q12-p4"> (2) Whether it is only of the last end?</p>
+               <p id="FS_Q12-p5"> (3) Whether one can intend two things at the same time?</p>
+               <p id="FS_Q12-p6"> (4) Whether intention of the end is the same act as volition of the means?</p>
+               <p id="FS_Q12-p7"> (5) Whether intention is within the competency of irrational animals?</p>
+               <div id="FS_Q12_A1" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q12.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q12_A2.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="FS_Q12_A1-p0.1">Whether intention is an act of the intellect or of the will?</h4>
+                  <p id="FS_Q12_A1-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q12_A1-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that intention is an act of the intellect, and not of the will. For it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q12_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.6.22" target="asv">Mat. 6:22</a>): "If thy eye be single, thy whole body shall be lightsome": where, according to Augustine (De Serm. Dom. in Monte ii, 13)
+                     the eye signifies intention. But since the eye is the organ of sight, it signifies the apprehensive power. Therefore intention
+                     is not an act of the appetitive but of the apprehensive power.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q12_A1-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte ii, 13) that Our Lord spoke of intention as a light, when He said (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q12_A1-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.6.23" target="asv">Mat. 6:23</a>): "If the light that is in thee be darkness," etc. But light pertains to knowledge. Therefore intention does too.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q12_A1-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, intention implies a kind of ordaining to an end. But to ordain is an act of reason. Therefore intention belongs
+                     not to the will but to the reason.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q12_A1-p5">
+                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, an act of the will is either of the end or of the means. But the act of the will in respect of the end is called
+                     volition, or enjoyment; with regard to the means, it is choice, from which intention is distinct. Therefore it is not an act
+                     of the will.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q12_A1-p6">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Trin. xi, 4,8,9) that "the intention of the will unites the sight to the object seen; and the images retained
+                     in the memory, to the penetrating gaze of the soul's inner thought." Therefore intention is an act of the will.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q12_A1-p7">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> Intention, as the very word denotes, signifies, "to tend to something." Now both the action of the mover and the movement
+                     of thing moved, tend to something. But that the movement of the thing moved tends to anything, is due to the action of the
+                     mover. Consequently intention belongs first and principally to that which moves to the end: hence we say that an architect
+                     or anyone who is in authority, by his command moves others to that which he intends. Now the
+                     will moves all the other powers of the soul to the end, as shown above (
+                     <a id="FS_Q12_A1-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q9_A1.html">Q[9], A[1]</a>). Wherefore it is evident that intention, properly speaking, is an act of the will.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q12_A1-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The eye designates intention figuratively, not because intention has reference to knowledge, but because it presupposes knowledge,
+                     which proposes to the will the end to which the latter moves; thus we foresee with the eye whither we should tend with our
+                     bodies.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q12_A1-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Intention is called a light because it is manifest to him who intends. Wherefore works are called darkness because a man
+                     knows what he intends, but knows not what the result may be, as Augustine expounds (De Serm. Dom. in Monte ii, 13).
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q12_A1-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The will does not ordain, but tends to something according to the order of reason. Consequently this word "intention" indicates
+                     an act of the will, presupposing the act whereby the reason orders something to the end.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q12_A1-p11">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Intention is an act of the will in regard to the end. Now the will stands in a threefold relation to the end. First, absolutely;
+                     and thus we have "volition," whereby we will absolutely to have health, and so forth. Secondly, it considers the end, as its
+                     place of rest; and thus "enjoyment" regards the end. Thirdly, it considers the end as the term towards which something is
+                     ordained; and thus "intention" regards the end. For when we speak of intending
+                     to have health, we mean not only that we have it, but that we will have it by means of something else.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q12_A1-p12"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q12_A1-p13"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q12.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q12_A2.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="FS_Q12_A2" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q12_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q12_A3.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="FS_Q12_A2-p0.1">Whether intention is only of the last end?</h4>
+                  <p id="FS_Q12_A2-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q12_A2-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that intention is only of the last end. For it is said in the book of Prosper's Sentences (Sent. 100): "The
+                     intention of the heart is a cry to God." But God is the last end of the human heart. Therefore intention is always regards
+                     the last end.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q12_A2-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, intention regards the end as the terminus, as stated above (A[1], ad 4). But a terminus is something last. Therefore
+                     intention always regards the last end.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q12_A2-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, just as intention regards the end, so does enjoyment. But enjoyment is always of the last end. Therefore intention
+                     is too.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q12_A2-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> There is but one last end of human wills, viz. Happiness, as stated above (
+                     <a id="FS_Q12_A2-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q1_A7.html">Q[1], A[7]</a>). If, therefore, intentions were only of the last end, men would not have different intentions: which is evidently false.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q12_A2-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above (A[1], ad 4), intention regards the end as a terminus of the movement of the will. Now a terminus of movement
+                     may be taken in two ways. First, the very last terminus, when the movement comes to a stop; this is the terminus of the whole
+                     movement. Secondly, some point midway, which is the beginning of one part of the movement, and the end or terminus of the
+                     other. Thus in the movement from A to C through B, C is the last terminus, while B is a
+                     terminus, but not the last. And intention can be both. Consequently though intention is always of the end, it need not be
+                     always of the last end.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q12_A2-p7">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The intention of the heart is called a cry to God, not that God is always the object of intention, but because He sees our
+                     intention. Or because, when we pray, we direct our intention to God, which intention has the force of a cry.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q12_A2-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> A terminus is something last, not always in respect of the whole, but sometimes in respect of a part.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q12_A2-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Enjoyment implies rest in the end; and this belongs to the last end alone. But intention implies movement towards an end,
+                     not rest. Wherefore the comparison proves nothing.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q12_A2-p10"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q12_A2-p11"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q12_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q12_A3.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="FS_Q12_A3" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q12_A2.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q12_A4.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="FS_Q12_A3-p0.1">Whether one can intend two things at the same time?</h4>
+                  <p id="FS_Q12_A3-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q12_A3-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that one cannot intend several things at the same time. For Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte ii, 14,16,17)
+                     that man's intention cannot be directed at the same time to God and to bodily benefits. Therefore, for the same reason, neither
+                     to any other two things.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q12_A3-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, intention designates a movement of the will towards a terminus. Now there cannot be several termini in the same
+                     direction of one movement. Therefore the will cannot intend several things at the same time.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q12_A3-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, intention presupposes an act of reason or of the intellect. But "it is not possible to understand several things
+                     at the same time," according to the Philosopher (Topic. ii, 10). Therefore neither is it possible to intend several things
+                     at the same time.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q12_A3-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Art imitates nature. Now nature intends two purposes by means of one instrument: thus "the tongue is for the purpose of taste
+                     and speech" (De Anima ii, 8). Therefore, for the same reason, art or reason can at the same time direct one thing to two ends:
+                     so that one can intend several ends at the same time.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q12_A3-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> The expression "two things" may be taken in two ways: they may be ordained to one another or not so ordained. And if they
+                     be ordained to one another, it is evident, from what has been said, that a man can intend several things at the same time.
+                     For intention is not only of the last end, as stated above 
+                     <a id="FS_Q12_A3-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q12_A2.html">(A[2])</a>, but also of an intermediary end. Now a man intends at the same time, both the proximate and the last end; as the mixing
+                     of a
+                     medicine and the giving of health.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q12_A3-p7"> But if we take two things that are not ordained to one another, thus also a man can intend several things at the same time.
+                     This is evident from the fact that a man prefers one thing to another because it is the better of the two. Now one of the
+                     reasons for which one thing is better than another is that it is available for more purposes: wherefore one thing can be chosen
+                     in preference to another, because of the greater number of purposes for which it is available: so that
+                     evidently a man can intend several things at the same time.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q12_A3-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Augustine means to say that man cannot at the same time direct his attention to God and to bodily benefits, as to two last
+                     ends: since, as stated above (
+                     <a id="FS_Q12_A3-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q1_A5.html">Q[1], A[5]</a>), one man cannot have several last ends.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q12_A3-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> There can be several termini ordained to one another, of the same movement and in the same direction; but not unless they
+                     be ordained to one another. At the same time it must be observed that what is not one in reality may be taken as one by the
+                     reason. Now intention is a movement of the will to something already ordained by the reason, as stated above (A[1], ad 3).
+                     Wherefore where we have many things in reality, we may take them as one term of
+                     intention, in so far as the reason takes them as one: either because two things concur in the integrity of one whole, as a
+                     proper measure of heat and cold conduce to health; or because two things are included in one which may be intended. For instance,
+                     the acquiring of wine and clothing is included in wealth, as in something common to both; wherefore nothing hinders the man
+                     who intends to acquire wealth, from intending both the others.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q12_A3-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As stated in the 
+                     <a id="FS_Q12_A3-p10.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q12_A10.html">FP, Q[12], A[10]</a>; 
+                     <a id="FS_Q12_A3-p10.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q58_A2.html">FP, Q[58], A[2]</a>; 
+                     <a id="FS_Q12_A3-p10.3" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q85_A4.html">FP, Q[85], A[4]</a> it is possible to understand several things at the same time, in so far as, in some way, they are one.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q12_A3-p11"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q12_A3-p12"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q12_A2.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q12_A4.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="FS_Q12_A4" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q12_A3.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q12_A5.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="FS_Q12_A4-p0.1">Whether intention of the end is the same act as the volition of the means?</h4>
+                  <p id="FS_Q12_A4-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q12_A4-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the intention of the end and the volition of the means are not one and the same movement. For Augustine
+                     says (De Trin. xi, 6) that "the will to see the window, has for its end the seeing of the window; and is another act from
+                     the will to see, through the window, the passersby." But that I should will to see the passersby, through the window, belongs
+                     to intention; whereas that I will to see the window, belongs to the volition of the means.
+                     Therefore intention of the end and the willing of the means are distinct movements of the will.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q12_A4-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, acts are distinct according to their objects. But the end and the means are distinct objects. Therefore the intention
+                     of the end and the willing of the means are distinct movements of the will.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q12_A4-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the willing of the means is called choice. But choice and intention are not the same. Therefore intention of the
+                     end and the willing of the means are not the same movement of the will.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q12_A4-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The means in relation to the end, are as the mid-space to the terminus. Now it is all the same movement that passes through
+                     the mid-space to the terminus, in natural things. Therefore in things pertaining to the will, the intention of the end is
+                     the same movement as the willing of the means.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q12_A4-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> The movement of the will to the end and to the means can be considered in two ways. First, according as the will is moved
+                     to each of the aforesaid absolutely and in itself. And thus there are really two movements of the will to them. Secondly,
+                     it may be considered accordingly as the will is moved to the means for the sake of the end: and thus the movement of the will
+                     to the end and its movement to the means are one and the same thing. For when I say: "I wish
+                     to take medicine for the sake of health," I signify no more than one movement of my will. And this is because the end is the
+                     reason for willing the means. Now the object, and that by reason of which it is an object, come under the same act; thus it
+                     is the same act of sight that perceives color and light, as stated above (
+                     <a id="FS_Q12_A4-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q8_A3.html">Q[8], A[3]</a>, ad 2). And the same applies to the intellect; for if it consider principle and conclusion absolutely, it considers each
+                     by a distinct act;
+                     but when it assents to the conclusion on account of the principles, there is but one act of the intellect.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q12_A4-p7">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Augustine is speaking of seeing the window and of seeing, through the window, the passersby, according as the will is moved
+                     to either absolutely.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q12_A4-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The end, considered as a thing, and the means to that end, are distinct objects of the will. But in so far as the end is
+                     the formal object in willing the means, they are one and the same object.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q12_A4-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> A movement which is one as to the subject, may differ, according to our way of looking at it, as to its beginning and end,
+                     as in the case of ascent and descent (Phys. iii, 3). Accordingly, in so far as the movement of the will is to the means, as
+                     ordained to the end, it is called "choice": but the movement of the will to the end as acquired by the means, it is called
+                     "intention." A sign of this is that we can have intention of the end without having
+                     determined the means which are the object of choice.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q12_A4-p10"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q12_A4-p11"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q12_A3.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q12_A5.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="FS_Q12_A5" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q12_A4.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q13.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="FS_Q12_A5-p0.1">Whether intention is within the competency of irrational animals?</h4>
+                  <p id="FS_Q12_A5-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q12_A5-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that irrational animals intend the end. For in things void of reason nature stands further apart from the rational
+                     nature, than does the sensitive nature in irrational animals. But nature intends the end even in things void of reason, as
+                     is proved in Phys. ii, 8. Much more, therefore, do irrational animals intend the end.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q12_A5-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, just as intention is of the end, so is enjoyment. But enjoyment is in irrational animals, as stated above (
+                     <a id="FS_Q12_A5-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q11_A2.html">Q[11], A[2]</a>). Therefore intention is too.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q12_A5-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, to intend an end belongs to one who acts for an end; since to intend is nothing else than to tend to something.
+                     But irrational animals act for an end; for an animal is moved either to seek food, or to do something of the kind. Therefore
+                     irrational animals intend an end.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q12_A5-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Intention of an end implies ordaining something to an end: which belongs to reason. Since therefore irrational animals are
+                     void of reason, it seems that they do not intend an end.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q12_A5-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above 
+                     <a id="FS_Q12_A5-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q12_A1.html">(A[1])</a>, to intend is to tend to something; and this belongs to the mover and to the moved. According, therefore, as that which is
+                     moved to an end by another is said to intend the end, thus nature is said to intend an end, as being moved to its end by God,
+                     as the arrow is moved by the archer. And in this way, irrational animals intend an end, inasmuch as they are moved to something
+                     by natural instinct. The other way of
+                     intending an end belongs to the mover; according as he ordains the movement of something, either his own or another's, to
+                     an end. This belongs to reason alone. Wherefore irrational animals do not intend an end in this way, which is to intend properly
+                     and principally, as stated above 
+                     <a id="FS_Q12_A5-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q12_A1.html">(A[1])</a>.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q12_A5-p7">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This argument takes intention in the sense of being moved to an end.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q12_A5-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Enjoyment does not imply the ordaining of one thing to another, as intention does, but absolute repose in the end.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q12_A5-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Irrational animals are moved to an end, not as though they thought that they can gain the end by this movement; this belongs
+                     to one that intends; but through desiring the end by natural instinct, they are moved to an end, moved, as it were, by another,
+                     like other things that are moved naturally.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q12_A5-p10"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q12_A5-p11"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q12_A4.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q13.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <a href="summa.FS_Q11_A4.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.FS_Q12_A1.html"></a>
+            </div>
+            <div id="FS_Q13" class="div3">
+               <a href="summa.FS_Q12_A5.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.FS_Q13_A1.html"></a>
+               <h3 id="FS_Q13-p0.1">OF CHOICE, WHICH IS AN ACT OF THE WILL WITH REGARD TO THE MEANS (SIX ARTICLES)</h3>
+               <p id="FS_Q13-p1"></p>
+               <p id="FS_Q13-p2"> We must now consider the acts of the will with regard to the means. There are three of them: to choose, to consent, and to
+                  use. And choice is preceded by counsel. First of all, then, we must consider choice: secondly, counsel; thirdly, consent;
+                  fourthly, use.
+               </p>
+               <p id="FS_Q13-p3"> Concerning choice there are six points of inquiry:</p>
+               <p id="FS_Q13-p4"> (1) Of what power is it the act; of the will or of the reason?</p>
+               <p id="FS_Q13-p5"> (2) Whether choice is to be found in irrational animals?</p>
+               <p id="FS_Q13-p6"> (3) Whether choice is only the means, or sometimes also of the end?</p>
+               <p id="FS_Q13-p7"> (4) Whether choice is only of things that we do ourselves?</p>
+               <p id="FS_Q13-p8"> (5) Whether choice is only of possible things?</p>
+               <p id="FS_Q13-p9"> (6) Whether man chooses of necessity or freely?</p>
+               <div id="FS_Q13_A1" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q13.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q13_A2.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="FS_Q13_A1-p0.1">Whether choice is an act of will or of reason?</h4>
+                  <p id="FS_Q13_A1-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q13_A1-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that choice is an act, not of will but of reason. For choice implies comparison, whereby one is given preference
+                     to another. But to compare is an act of reason. Therefore choice is an act of reason.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q13_A1-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it is for the same faculty to form a syllogism, and to draw the conclusion. But, in practical matters, it is the
+                     reason that forms syllogisms. Since therefore choice is a kind of conclusion in practical matters, as stated in Ethic. vii,
+                     3, it seems that it is an act of reason.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q13_A1-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, ignorance does not belong to the will but to the cognitive power. Now there is an "ignorance of choice," as is stated
+                     in Ethic. iii, 1. Therefore it seems that choice does not belong to the will but to the reason.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q13_A1-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 3) that choice is "the desire of things in our power." But desire is an act of will. Therefore
+                     choice is too.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q13_A1-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> The word choice implies something belonging to the reason or intellect, and something belonging to the will: for the Philosopher
+                     says (Ethic. vi, 2) that choice is either "intellect influenced by appetite or appetite influenced by intellect." Now whenever
+                     two things concur to make one, one of them is formal in regard to the other. Hence Gregory of Nyssa [*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom.
+                     xxxiii.] says that choice "is neither desire only, nor counsel only, but a
+                     combination of the two. For just as we say that an animal is composed of soul and body, and that it is neither a mere body,
+                     nor a mere soul, but both; so is it with choice."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q13_A1-p7"> Now we must observe, as regards the acts of the soul, that an act belonging essentially to some power or habit, receives
+                     a form or species from a higher power or habit, according as an inferior is ordained by a superior: for if a man were to perform
+                     an act of fortitude for the love of God, that act is materially an act of fortitude, but formally, an act of charity. Now
+                     it is evident that, in a sense, reason precedes the will and ordains its act: in so far as the will tends to
+                     its object, according to the order of reason, since the apprehensive power presents the object to the appetite. Accordingly,
+                     that act whereby the will tends to something proposed to it as being good, through being ordained to the end by the reason,
+                     is materially an act of the will, but formally an act of the reason. Now in such like matters the substance of the act is
+                     as the matter in comparison to the order imposed by the higher power. Wherefore choice is substantially not an act of the
+                     reason
+                     but of the will: for choice is accomplished in a certain movement of the soul towards the good which is chosen. Consequently
+                     it is evidently an act of the appetitive power.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q13_A1-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Choice implies a previous comparison; not that it consists in the comparison itself.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q13_A1-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> It is quite true that it is for the reason to draw the conclusion of a practical syllogism; and it is called "a decision"
+                     or "judgment," to be followed by "choice." And for this reason the conclusion seems to belong to the act of choice, as to
+                     that which results from it.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q13_A1-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> In speaking "of ignorance of choice," we do not mean that choice is a sort of knowledge, but that there is ignorance of what
+                     ought to be chosen.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q13_A1-p11"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q13_A1-p12"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q13.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q13_A2.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="FS_Q13_A2" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q13_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q13_A3.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="FS_Q13_A2-p0.1">Whether choice is to be found in irrational animals?</h4>
+                  <p id="FS_Q13_A2-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q13_A2-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that irrational animals are able to choose. For choice "is the desire of certain things on account of an end,"
+                     as stated in Ethic. iii, 2,3. But irrational animals desire something on account of an end: since they act for an end, and
+                     from desire. Therefore choice is in irrational animals.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q13_A2-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the very word "electio" [choice] seems to signify the taking of something in preference to others. But irrational
+                     animals take something in preference to others: thus we can easily see for ourselves that a sheep will eat one grass and refuse
+                     another. Therefore choice is in irrational animals.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q13_A2-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, according to Ethic. vi, 12, "it is from prudence that a man makes a good choice of means." But prudence is found
+                     in irrational animals: hence it is said in the beginning of Metaph. i, 1 that "those animals which, like bees, cannot hear
+                     sounds, are prudent by instinct." We see this plainly, in wonderful cases of sagacity manifested in the works of various animals,
+                     such as bees, spiders, and dogs. For a hound in following a stag, on coming to a
+                     crossroad, tries by scent whether the stag has passed by the first or the second road: and if he find that the stag has not
+                     passed there, being thus assured, takes to the third road without trying the scent; as though he were reasoning by way of
+                     exclusion, arguing that the stag must have passed by this way, since he did not pass by the others, and there is no other
+                     road. Therefore it seems that irrational animals are able to choose.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q13_A2-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Gregory of Nyssa [*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xxxiii.] says that "children and irrational animals act willingly but not from
+                     choice." Therefore choice is not in irrational animals.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q13_A2-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> Since choice is the taking of one thing in preference to another it must of necessity be in respect of several things that
+                     can be chosen. Consequently in those things which are altogether determinate to one there is no place for choice. Now the
+                     difference between the sensitive appetite and the will is that, as stated above (
+                     <a id="FS_Q13_A2-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q1_A2.html">Q[1], A[2]</a>, ad 3), the sensitive appetite is determinate to one particular thing, according to the order of
+                     nature; whereas the will, although determinate to one thing in general, viz. the good, according to the order of nature, is
+                     nevertheless indeterminate in respect of particular goods. Consequently choice belongs properly to the will, and not to the
+                     sensitive appetite which is all that irrational animals have. Wherefore irrational animals are not competent to choose.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q13_A2-p7">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Not every desire of one thing on account of an end is called choice: there must be a certain discrimination of one thing
+                     from another. And this cannot be except when the appetite can be moved to several things.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q13_A2-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> An irrational animal takes one thing in preference to another, because its appetite is naturally determinate to that thing.
+                     Wherefore as soon as an animal, whether by its sense or by its imagination, is offered something to which its appetite is
+                     naturally inclined, it is moved to that alone, without making any choice. Just as fire is moved upwards and not downwards,
+                     without its making any choice.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q13_A2-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As stated in Phys. iii, 3 "movement is the act of the movable, caused by a mover." Wherefore the power of the mover appears
+                     in the movement of that which it moves. Accordingly, in all things moved by reason, the order of reason which moves them is
+                     evident, although the things themselves are without reason: for an arrow through the motion of the archer goes straight towards
+                     the target, as though it were endowed with reason to direct its course. The
+                     same may be seen in the movements of clocks and all engines put together by the art of man. Now as artificial things are in
+                     comparison to human art, so are all natural things in comparison to the Divine art. And accordingly order is to be seen in
+                     things moved by nature, just as in things moved by reason, as is stated in Phys. ii. And thus it is that in the works of irrational
+                     animals we notice certain marks of sagacity, in so far as they have a natural inclination to set about their actions in
+                     a most orderly manner through being ordained by the Supreme art. For which reason, too, certain animals are called prudent
+                     or sagacious; and not because they reason or exercise any choice about things. This is clear from the fact that all that share
+                     in one nature, invariably act in the same way.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q13_A2-p10"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q13_A2-p11"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q13_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q13_A3.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="FS_Q13_A3" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q13_A2.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q13_A4.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="FS_Q13_A3-p0.1">Whether choice is only of the means, or sometimes also of the end?</h4>
+                  <p id="FS_Q13_A3-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q13_A3-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that choice is not only of the means. For the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 12) that "virtue makes us choose
+                     aright; but it is not the part of virtue, but of some other power to direct aright those things which are to be done for its
+                     sake." But that for the sake of which something is done is the end. Therefore choice is of the end.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q13_A3-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, choice implies preference of one thing to another. But just as there can be preference of means, so can there be
+                     preference of ends. Therefore choice can be of ends, just as it can be of means.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q13_A3-p4">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 2) that "volition is of the end, but choice of the means."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q13_A3-p5">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> As already stated (A[1], ad 2), choice results from the decision or judgment which is, as it were, the conclusion of a practical
+                     syllogism. Hence that which is the conclusion of a practical syllogism, is the matter of choice. Now in practical things the
+                     end stands in the position of a principle, not of a conclusion, as the Philosopher says (Phys. ii, 9). Wherefore the end,
+                     as such, is not a matter of choice.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q13_A3-p6"> But just as in speculative knowledge nothing hinders the principle of one demonstration or of one science, from being the
+                     conclusion of another demonstration or science; while the first indemonstrable principle cannot be the conclusion of any demonstration
+                     or science; so too that which is the end in one operation, may be ordained to something as an end. And in this way it is a
+                     matter of choice. Thus in the work of a physician health is the end: wherefore it is not a matter of
+                     choice for a physician, but a matter of principle. Now the health of the body is ordained to the good of the soul, consequently
+                     with one who has charge of the soul's health, health or sickness may be a matter of choice; for the Apostle says (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q13_A3-p6.1" href="./asv.html#iiCor.12.10" target="asv">2 Cor. 12:10</a>): "For when I am weak, then am I powerful." But the last end is nowise a matter of choice.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q13_A3-p7">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The proper ends of virtues are ordained to Happiness as to their last end. And thus it is that they can be a matter of choice.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q13_A3-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As stated above (
+                     <a id="FS_Q13_A3-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q1_A5.html">Q[1], A[5]</a>), there is but one last end. Accordingly wherever there are several ends, they can be the subject of choice, in so far as
+                     they are ordained to a further end.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q13_A3-p9"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q13_A3-p10"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q13_A2.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q13_A4.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="FS_Q13_A4" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q13_A3.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q13_A5.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="FS_Q13_A4-p0.1">Whether choice is of those things only that are done by us?</h4>
+                  <p id="FS_Q13_A4-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q13_A4-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that choice is not only in respect of human acts. For choice regards the means. Now, not only acts, but also
+                     the organs, are means (Phys. ii, 3). Therefore choice is not only concerned with human acts.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q13_A4-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, action is distinct from contemplation. But choice has a place even in contemplation; in so far as one opinion is
+                     preferred to another. Therefore choice is not concerned with human acts alone.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q13_A4-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, men are chosen for certain posts, whether secular or ecclesiastical, by those who exercise no action in their regard.
+                     Therefore choice is not concerned with human acts alone.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q13_A4-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 2) that "no man chooses save what he can do himself."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q13_A4-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> Just as intention regards the end, so does choice regard the means. Now the end is either an action or a thing. And when
+                     the end is a thing, some human action must intervene; either in so far as man produces the thing which is the end, as the
+                     physician produces health (wherefore the production of health is said to be the end of the physician); or in so far as man,
+                     in some fashion, uses or enjoys the thing which is the end; thus for the miser, money or the
+                     possession of money is the end. The same is to be said of the means. For the means must needs be either an action; or a thing,
+                     with some action intervening whereby man either makes the thing which is the means, or puts it to some use. And thus it is
+                     that choice is always in regard to human acts.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q13_A4-p7">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The organs are ordained to the end, inasmuch as man makes use of them for the sake of the end.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q13_A4-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> In contemplation itself there is the act of the intellect assenting to this or that opinion. It is exterior action that is
+                     put in contradistinction to contemplation.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q13_A4-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> When a man chooses someone for a bishopric or some high position in the state, he chooses to name that man to that post.
+                     Else, if he had no right to act in the appointment of the bishop or official, he would have no right to choose. Likewise,
+                     whenever we speak of one thing being chosen in preference to another, it is in conjunction with some action of the chooser.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q13_A4-p10"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q13_A4-p11"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q13_A3.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q13_A5.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="FS_Q13_A5" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q13_A4.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q13_A6.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="FS_Q13_A5-p0.1">Whether choice is only of possible things?</h4>
+                  <p id="FS_Q13_A5-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q13_A5-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that choice in not only of possible things. For choice is an act of the will, as stated above 
+                     <a id="FS_Q13_A5-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q13_A1.html">(A[1])</a>. Now there is "a willing of impossibilities" (Ethic. iii, 2). Therefore there is also a choice of impossibilities.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q13_A5-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, choice is of things done by us, as stated above 
+                     <a id="FS_Q13_A5-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q13_A4.html">(A[4])</a>. Therefore it matters not, as far as the act of choosing is concerned, whether one choose that which is impossible in itself,
+                     or that which is impossible to the chooser. Now it often happens that we are unable to accomplish what we choose: so that
+                     this proves to be impossible to us. Therefore choice is of the impossible.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q13_A5-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, to try to do a thing is to choose to do it. But the Blessed Benedict says (Regula lxviii) that if the superior command
+                     what is impossible, it should be attempted. Therefore choice can be of the impossible.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q13_A5-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 2) that "there is no choice of impossibilities."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q13_A5-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above 
+                     <a id="FS_Q13_A5-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q13_A4.html">(A[4])</a>, our choice is always concerned with our actions. Now whatever is done by us, is possible to us. Therefore we must needs
+                     say that choice is only of possible things.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q13_A5-p7"> Moreover, the reason for choosing a thing is that it conduces to an end. But what is impossible cannot conduce to an end.
+                     A sign of this is that when men in taking counsel together come to something that is impossible to them, they depart, as being
+                     unable to proceed with the business.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q13_A5-p8"> Again, this is evident if we examine the previous process of the reason. For the means, which are the object of choice, are
+                     to the end, as the conclusion is to the principle. Now it is clear that an impossible conclusion does not follow from a possible
+                     principle. Wherefore an end cannot be possible, unless the means be possible. Now no one is moved to the impossible. Consequently
+                     no one would tend to the end, save for the fact that the means appear to be possible. Therefore the
+                     impossible is not the object of choice.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q13_A5-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The will stands between the intellect and the external action: for the intellect proposes to the will its object, and the
+                     will causes the external action. Hence the principle of the movement in the will is to be found in the intellect, which apprehends
+                     something under the universal notion of good: but the term or perfection of the will's act is to be observed in its relation
+                     to the action whereby a man tends to the attainment of a thing; for the
+                     movement of the will is from the soul to the thing. Consequently the perfect act of the will is in respect of something that
+                     is good for one to do. Now this cannot be something impossible. Wherefore the complete act of the will is only in respect
+                     of what is possible and good for him that wills. But the incomplete act of the will is in respect of the impossible; and by
+                     some is called "velleity," because, to wit, one would will [vellet] such a thing, were it possible. But choice is an act of
+                     the
+                     will, fixed on something to be done by the chooser. And therefore it is by no means of anything but what is possible.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q13_A5-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Since the object of the will is the apprehended good, we must judge of the object of the will according as it is apprehended.
+                     And so, just as sometimes the will tends to something which is apprehended as good, and yet is not really good; so is choice
+                     sometimes made of something apprehended as possible to the chooser, and yet impossible to him.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q13_A5-p11">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The reason for this is that the subject should not rely on his own judgment to decide whether a certain thing is possible;
+                     but in each case should stand by his superior's judgment.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q13_A5-p12"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q13_A5-p13"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q13_A4.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q13_A6.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="FS_Q13_A6" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q13_A5.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q14.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="FS_Q13_A6-p0.1">Whether man chooses of necessity or freely?</h4>
+                  <p id="FS_Q13_A6-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q13_A6-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that man chooses of necessity. For the end stands in relation to the object of choice, as the principle of
+                     that which follows from the principles, as declared in Ethic. vii, 8. But conclusions follow of necessity from their principles.
+                     Therefore man is moved of necessity from (willing) the end of the choice (of the means).
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q13_A6-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, as stated above (A[1], ad 2), choice follows the reason's judgment of what is to be done. But reason judges of necessity
+                     about some things: on account of the necessity of the premises. Therefore it seems that choice also follows of necessity.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q13_A6-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if two things are absolutely equal, man is not moved to one more than to the other; thus if a hungry man, as Plato
+                     says (Cf. De Coelo ii, 13), be confronted on either side with two portions of food equally appetizing and at an equal distance,
+                     he is not moved towards one more than to the other; and he finds the reason of this in the immobility of the earth in the
+                     middle of the world. Now, if that which is equally (eligible) with something else cannot
+                     be chosen, much less can that be chosen which appears as less (eligible). Therefore if two or more things are available, of
+                     which one appears to be more (eligible), it is impossible to choose any of the others. Therefore that which appears to hold
+                     the first place is chosen of necessity. But every act of choosing is in regard to something that seems in some way better.
+                     Therefore every choice is made necessarily.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q13_A6-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Choice is an act of a rational power; which according to the Philosopher (Metaph. ix, 2) stands in relation to opposites.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q13_A6-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> Man does not choose of necessity. And this is because that which is possible not to be, is not of necessity. Now the reason
+                     why it is possible not to choose, or to choose, may be gathered from a twofold power in man. For man can will and not will,
+                     act and not act; again, he can will this or that, and do this or that. The reason of this is seated in the very power of the
+                     reason. For the will can tend to whatever the reason can apprehend as good. Now the
+                     reason can apprehend as good, not only this, viz. "to will" or "to act," but also this, viz. "not to will" or "not to act."
+                     Again, in all particular goods, the reason can consider an aspect of some good, and the lack of some good, which has the aspect
+                     of evil: and in this respect, it can apprehend any single one of such goods as to be chosen or to be avoided. The perfect
+                     good alone, which is Happiness, cannot be apprehended by the reason as an evil, or as lacking in any way. Consequently man
+                     wills Happiness of necessity, nor can he will not to be happy, or to be unhappy. Now since choice is not of the end, but of
+                     the means, as stated above 
+                     <a id="FS_Q13_A6-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q13_A3.html">(A[3])</a>; it is not of the perfect good, which is Happiness, but of other particular goods. Therefore man chooses not of necessity,
+                     but freely.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q13_A6-p7">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The conclusion does not always of necessity follow from the principles, but only when the principles cannot be true if the
+                     conclusion is not true. In like manner, the end does not always necessitate in man the choosing of the means, because the
+                     means are not always such that the end cannot be gained without them; or, if they be such, they are not always considered
+                     in that light.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q13_A6-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The reason's decision or judgment of what is to be done is about things that are contingent and possible to us. In such matters
+                     the conclusions do not follow of necessity from principles that are absolutely necessary, but from such as are so conditionally;
+                     as, for instance, "If he runs, he is in motion."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q13_A6-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> If two things be proposed as equal under one aspect, nothing hinders us from considering in one of them some particular point
+                     of superiority, so that the will has a bent towards that one rather than towards the other.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q13_A6-p10"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q13_A6-p11"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q13_A5.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q14.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <a href="summa.FS_Q12_A5.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.FS_Q13_A1.html"></a>
+            </div>
+            <div id="FS_Q14" class="div3">
+               <a href="summa.FS_Q13_A6.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.FS_Q14_A1.html"></a>
+               <h3 id="FS_Q14-p0.1">OF COUNSEL, WHICH PRECEDES CHOICE (SIX ARTICLES)</h3>
+               <p id="FS_Q14-p1"></p>
+               <p id="FS_Q14-p2"> We must now consider counsel; concerning which there are six points of inquiry:</p>
+               <p id="FS_Q14-p3"> (1) Whether counsel is an inquiry?</p>
+               <p id="FS_Q14-p4"> (2) Whether counsel is of the end or of the means?</p>
+               <p id="FS_Q14-p5"> (3) Whether counsel is only of things that we do?</p>
+               <p id="FS_Q14-p6"> (4) Whether counsel is of all things that we do?</p>
+               <p id="FS_Q14-p7"> (5) Whether the process of counsel is one of analysis?</p>
+               <p id="FS_Q14-p8"> (6) Whether the process of counsel is indefinite?</p>
+               <div id="FS_Q14_A1" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q14.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q14_A2.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="FS_Q14_A1-p0.1">Whether counsel is an inquiry?</h4>
+                  <p id="FS_Q14_A1-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q14_A1-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that counsel is not an inquiry. For Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 22) that counsel is "an act of the appetite."
+                     But inquiry is not an act of the appetite. Therefore counsel is not an inquiry.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q14_A1-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, inquiry is a discursive act of the intellect: for which reason it is not found in God, Whose knowledge is not discursive,
+                     as we have shown in the 
+                     <a id="FS_Q14_A1-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q14_A7.html">FP, Q[14], A[7]</a>. But counsel is ascribed to God: for it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q14_A1-p3.2" href="./asv.html#Eph.1.11" target="asv">Eph. 1:11</a>) that "He worketh all things according to the counsel of His will." Therefore counsel is not inquiry.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q14_A1-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, inquiry is of doubtful matters. But counsel is given in matters that are certainly good; thus the Apostle says (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q14_A1-p4.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.7.25" target="asv">1 Cor. 7:25</a>): "Now concerning virgins I have no commandment of the Lord: but I give counsel." Therefore counsel is not an inquiry.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q14_A1-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Gregory of Nyssa [*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xxxiv.] says: "Every counsel is an inquiry; but not every inquiry is a counsel."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q14_A1-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> Choice, as stated above (
+                     <a id="FS_Q14_A1-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q13_A1.html">Q[13], A[1]</a>, ad 2; A[3]), follows the judgment of the reason about what is to be done. Now there is much uncertainty in things that have
+                     to be done; because actions are concerned with contingent singulars, which by reason of their vicissitude, are uncertain.
+                     Now in things doubtful and uncertain the reason does not pronounce judgment, without previous inquiry: wherefore the reason
+                     must of necessity institute
+                     an inquiry before deciding on the objects of choice; and this inquiry is called counsel. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic.
+                     iii, 2) that choice is the "desire of what has been already counselled."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q14_A1-p7">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> When the acts of two powers are ordained to one another, in each of them there is something belonging to the other power:
+                     consequently each act can be denominated from either power. Now it is evident that the act of the reason giving direction
+                     as to the means, and the act of the will tending to these means according to the reason's direction, are ordained to one another.
+                     Consequently there is to be found something of the reason, viz. order, in that
+                     act of the will, which is choice: and in counsel, which is an act of reason, something of the will---both as matter (since
+                     counsel is of what man wills to do)---and as motive (because it is from willing the end, that man is moved to take counsel
+                     in regard to the means). And therefore, just as the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 2) that choice "is intellect influenced by
+                     appetite," thus pointing out that both concur in the act of choosing; so Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 22) that counsel
+                     is
+                     "appetite based on inquiry," so as to show that counsel belongs, in a way, both to the will, on whose behalf and by whose
+                     impulsion the inquiry is made, and to the reason that executes the inquiry.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q14_A1-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The things that we say of God must be understood without any of the defects which are to be found in us: thus in us science
+                     is of conclusions derived by reasoning from causes to effects: but science when said of God means sure knowledge of all effects
+                     in the First Cause, without any reasoning process. In like manner we ascribe counsel to God, as to the certainty of His knowledge
+                     or judgment, which certainty in us arises from the inquiry of counsel.
+                     But such inquiry has no place in God; wherefore in this respect it is not ascribed to God: in which sense Damascene says (De
+                     Fide Orth. ii, 22): "God takes not counsel: those only take counsel who lack knowledge."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q14_A1-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> It may happen that things which are most certainly good in the opinion of wise and spiritual men are not certainly good in
+                     the opinion of many, or at least of carnal-minded men. Consequently in such things counsel may be given.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q14_A1-p10"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q14_A1-p11"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q14.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q14_A2.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="FS_Q14_A2" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q14_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q14_A3.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="FS_Q14_A2-p0.1">Whether counsel is of the end, or only of the means?</h4>
+                  <p id="FS_Q14_A2-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q14_A2-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that counsel is not only of the means but also of the end. For whatever is doubtful, can be the subject of
+                     inquiry. Now in things to be done by man there happens sometimes a doubt as to the end and not only as to the means. Since
+                     therefore inquiry as to what is to be done is counsel, it seems that counsel can be of the end.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q14_A2-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the matter of counsel is human actions. But some human actions are ends, as stated in Ethic. i, 1. Therefore counsel
+                     can be of the end.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q14_A2-p4">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Gregory of Nyssa [*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xxxiv.] says that "counsel is not of the end, but of the means."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q14_A2-p5">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> The end is the principle in practical matters: because the reason of the means is to be found in the end. Now the principle
+                     cannot be called in question, but must be presupposed in every inquiry. Since therefore counsel is an inquiry, it is not of
+                     the end, but only of the means. Nevertheless it may happen that what is the end in regard to some things, is ordained to something
+                     else; just as also what is the principle of one demonstration, is the conclusion of
+                     another: and consequently that which is looked upon as the end in one inquiry, may be looked upon as the means in another;
+                     and thus it will become an object of counsel.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q14_A2-p6">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> That which is looked upon as an end, is already fixed: consequently as long as there is any doubt about it, it is not looked
+                     upon as an end. Wherefore if counsel is taken about it, it will be counsel not about the end, but about the means.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q14_A2-p7">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Counsel is about operations, in so far as they are ordained to some end. Consequently if any human act be an end, it will
+                     not, as such, be the matter of counsel.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q14_A2-p8"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q14_A2-p9"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q14_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q14_A3.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="FS_Q14_A3" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q14_A2.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q14_A4.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="FS_Q14_A3-p0.1">Whether counsel is only of things that we do?</h4>
+                  <p id="FS_Q14_A3-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q14_A3-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that counsel is not only of things that we do. For counsel implies some kind of conference. But it is possible
+                     for many to confer about things that are not subject to movement, and are not the result of our actions, such as the nature
+                     of various things. Therefore counsel is not only of things that we do.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q14_A3-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, men sometimes seek counsel about things that are laid down by law; hence we speak of counsel at law. And yet those
+                     who seek counsel thus, have nothing to do in making the laws. Therefore counsel is not only of things that we do.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q14_A3-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, some are said to take consultation about future events; which, however, are not in our power. Therefore counsel
+                     is not only of things that we do.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q14_A3-p5">
+                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, if counsel were only of things that we do, no would take counsel about what another does. But this is clearly untrue.
+                     Therefore counsel is not only of things that we do.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q14_A3-p6">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Gregory of Nyssa [*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xxxiv.] says: "We take counsel of things that are within our competency and that
+                     we are able to do."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q14_A3-p7">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> Counsel properly implies a conference held between several; the very word [consilium] denotes this, for it means a sitting
+                     together [considium], from the fact that many sit together in order to confer with one another. Now we must take note that
+                     in contingent particular cases, in order that anything be known for certain, it is necessary to take several conditions or
+                     circumstances into consideration, which it is not easy for one to consider, but are
+                     considered by several with greater certainty, since what one takes note of, escapes the notice of another; whereas in necessary
+                     and universal things, our view is brought to bear on matters much more absolute and simple, so that one man by himself may
+                     be sufficient to consider these things. Wherefore the inquiry of counsel is concerned, properly speaking, with contingent
+                     singulars. Now the knowledge of the truth in such matters does not rank so high as to be desirable of itself, as is the
+                     knowledge of things universal and necessary; but it is desired as being useful towards action, because actions bear on things
+                     singular and contingent. Consequently, properly speaking, counsel is about things done by us.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q14_A3-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Counsel implies conference, not of any kind, but about what is to be done, for the reason given above.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q14_A3-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Although that which is laid down by the law is not due to the action of him who seeks counsel, nevertheless it directs him
+                     in his action: since the mandate of the law is one reason for doing something.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q14_A3-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Counsel is not only about what is done, but also about whatever has relation to what is done. And for this reason we speak
+                     of consulting about future events, in so far as man is induced to do or omit something, through the knowledge of future events.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q14_A3-p11">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> We seek counsel about the actions of others, in so far as they are, in some way, one with us; either by union of affection---thus
+                     a man is solicitous about what concerns his friend, as though it concerned himself; or after the manner of an instrument,
+                     for the principal agent and the instrument are, in a way, one cause, since one acts through the other; thus the master takes
+                     counsel about what he would do through his servant.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q14_A3-p12"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q14_A3-p13"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q14_A2.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q14_A4.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="FS_Q14_A4" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q14_A3.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q14_A5.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="FS_Q14_A4-p0.1">Whether counsel is about all things that we do?</h4>
+                  <p id="FS_Q14_A4-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q14_A4-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that counsel is about all things that we have to do. For choice is the "desire of what is counselled" as stated
+                     above 
+                     <a id="FS_Q14_A4-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q14_A1.html">(A[1])</a>. But choice is about all things that we do. Therefore counsel is too.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q14_A4-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, counsel implies the reason's inquiry. But, whenever we do not act through the impulse of passion, we act in virtue
+                     of the reason's inquiry. Therefore there is counsel about everything that we do.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q14_A4-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 3) that "if it appears that something can be done by more means than one, we take
+                     counsel by inquiring whereby it may be done most easily and best; but if it can be accomplished by one means, how it can be
+                     done by this." But whatever is done, is done by one means or by several. Therefore counsel takes place in all things that
+                     we do.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q14_A4-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Gregory of Nyssa [*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xxxiv.] says that "counsel has no place in things that are done according to science
+                     or art."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q14_A4-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> Counsel is a kind of inquiry, as stated above 
+                     <a id="FS_Q14_A4-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q14_A1.html">(A[1])</a>. But we are wont to inquire about things that admit of doubt; hence the process of inquiry, which is called an argument,
+                     "is a reason that attests something that admitted of doubt" [*Cicero, Topic. ad Trebat.]. Now, that something in relation
+                     to human acts admits of no doubt, arises from a twofold source. First, because certain determinate ends are gained by certain
+                     determinate
+                     means: as happens in the arts which are governed by certain fixed rules of action; thus a writer does not take counsel how
+                     to form his letters, for this is determined by art. Secondly, from the fact that it little matters whether it is done this
+                     or that way; this occurs in minute matters, which help or hinder but little with regard to the end aimed at; and reason looks
+                     upon small things as mere nothings. Consequently there are two things of which we do not take counsel, although they conduce
+                     to
+                     the end, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 3): namely, minute things, and those which have a fixed way of being done, as
+                     in works produced by art, with the exception of those arts that admit of conjecture such as medicine, commerce, and the like,
+                     as Gregory of Nyssa says [*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xxiv.].
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q14_A4-p7">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Choice presupposes counsel by reason of its judgment or decision. Consequently when the judgment or decision is evident without
+                     inquiry, there is no need for the inquiry of counsel.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q14_A4-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> In matters that are evident, the reason makes no inquiry, but judges at once. Consequently there is no need of counsel in
+                     all that is done by reason.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q14_A4-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> When a thing can be accomplished by one means, but in different ways, doubt may arise, just as when it can be accomplished
+                     by several means: hence the need of counsel. But when not only the means, but also the way of using the means, is fixed, then
+                     there is no need of counsel.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q14_A4-p10"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q14_A4-p11"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q14_A3.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q14_A5.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="FS_Q14_A5" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q14_A4.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q14_A6.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="FS_Q14_A5-p0.1">Whether the process of counsel is one of analysis?</h4>
+                  <p id="FS_Q14_A5-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q14_A5-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the process of counsel is not one of analysis. For counsel is about things that we do. But the process
+                     of our actions is not one of analysis, but rather one of synthesis, viz. from the simple to the composite. Therefore counsel
+                     does not always proceed by way of analysis.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q14_A5-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, counsel is an inquiry of the reason. But reason proceeds from things that precede to things that follow, according
+                     to the more appropriate order. Since then, the past precedes the present, and the present precedes the future, it seems that
+                     in taking counsel one should proceed from the past and present to the future: which is not an analytical process. Therefore
+                     the process of counsel is not one of analysis.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q14_A5-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, counsel is only of such things as are possible to us, according to Ethic. iii, 3. But the question as to whether
+                     a certain thing is possible to us, depends on what we are able or unable to do, in order to gain such and such an end. Therefore
+                     the inquiry of counsel should begin from things present.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q14_A5-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 3) that "he who takes counsel seems to inquire and analyze."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q14_A5-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> In every inquiry one must begin from some principle. And if this principle precedes both in knowledge and in being, the process
+                     is not analytic, but synthetic: because to proceed from cause to effect is to proceed synthetically, since causes are more
+                     simple than effects. But if that which precedes in knowledge is later in the order of being, the process is one of analysis,
+                     as when our judgment deals with effects, which by analysis we trace to their simple
+                     causes. Now the principle in the inquiry of counsel is the end, which precedes indeed in intention, but comes afterwards into
+                     execution. Hence the inquiry of counsel must needs be one of analysis, beginning that is to say, from that which is intended
+                     in the future, and continuing until it arrives at that which is to be done at once.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q14_A5-p7">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Counsel is indeed about action. But actions take their reason from the end; and consequently the order of reasoning about
+                     actions is contrary to the order of actions.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q14_A5-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Reason begins with that which is first according to reason; but not always with that which is first in point of time.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q14_A5-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> We should not want to know whether something to be done for an end be possible, if it were not suitable for gaining that
+                     end. Hence we must first inquire whether it be conducive to the end, before considering whether it be possible.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q14_A5-p10"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q14_A5-p11"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q14_A4.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q14_A6.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="FS_Q14_A6" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q14_A5.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q15.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="FS_Q14_A6-p0.1">Whether the process of counsel is indefinite?</h4>
+                  <p id="FS_Q14_A6-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q14_A6-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the process of counsel is indefinite. For counsel is an inquiry about the particular things with which
+                     action is concerned. But singulars are infinite. Therefore the process of counsel is indefinite.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q14_A6-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the inquiry of counsel has to consider not only what is to be done, but how to avoid obstacles. But every human
+                     action can be hindered, and an obstacle can be removed by some human reason. Therefore the inquiry about removing obstacles
+                     can go on indefinitely.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q14_A6-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the inquiry of demonstrative science does not go on indefinitely, because one can come to principles that are self-evident,
+                     which are absolutely certain. But such like certainty is not to be had in contingent singulars, which are variable and uncertain.
+                     Therefore the inquiry of counsel goes on indefinitely.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q14_A6-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> "No one is moved to that which he cannot possibly reach" (De Coelo i, 7). But it is impossible to pass through the infinite.
+                     If therefore the inquiry of counsel is infinite, no one would begin to take counsel. Which is clearly untrue.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q14_A6-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> The inquiry of counsel is actually finite on both sides, on that of its principle and on that of its term. For a twofold
+                     principle is available in the inquiry of counsel. One is proper to it, and belongs to the very genus of things pertaining
+                     to operation: this is the end which is not the matter of counsel, but is taken for granted as its principle, as stated above
+                     
+                     <a id="FS_Q14_A6-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q14_A2.html">(A[2])</a>. The other principle is taken from another genus, so to speak;
+                     thus in demonstrative sciences one science postulates certain things from another, without inquiring into them. Now these
+                     principles which are taken for granted in the inquiry of counsel are any facts received through the senses---for instance,
+                     that this is bread or iron: and also any general statements known either through speculative or through practical science;
+                     for instance, that adultery is forbidden by God, or that man cannot live without suitable nourishment. Of such things counsel
+                     makes
+                     no inquiry. But the term of inquiry is that which we are able to do at once. For just as the end is considered in the light
+                     of a principle, so the means are considered in the light of a conclusion. Wherefore that which presents itself as to be done
+                     first, holds the position of an ultimate conclusion whereat the inquiry comes to an end. Nothing however prevents counsel
+                     from being infinite potentially, for as much as an infinite number of things may present themselves to be inquired into by
+                     means
+                     of counsel.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q14_A6-p7">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Singulars are infinite; not actually, but only potentially.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q14_A6-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Although human action can be hindered, the hindrance is not always at hand. Consequently it is not always necessary to take
+                     counsel about removing the obstacle.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q14_A6-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> In contingent singulars, something may be taken for certain, not simply, indeed, but for the time being, and as far as it
+                     concerns the work to be done. Thus that Socrates is sitting is not a necessary statement; but that he is sitting, as long
+                     as he continues to sit, is necessary; and this can be taken for a certain fact.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q14_A6-p10"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q14_A6-p11"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q14_A5.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q15.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <a href="summa.FS_Q13_A6.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.FS_Q14_A1.html"></a>
+            </div>
+            <div id="FS_Q15" class="div3">
+               <a href="summa.FS_Q14_A6.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.FS_Q15_A1.html"></a>
+               <h3 id="FS_Q15-p0.1">OF CONSENT, WHICH IS AN ACT OF THE WILL IN REGARD TO THE MEANS (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3>
+               <p id="FS_Q15-p1"></p>
+               <p id="FS_Q15-p2"> We must now consider consent; concerning which there are four points of inquiry:</p>
+               <p id="FS_Q15-p3"> (1) Whether consent is an act of the appetitive or of the apprehensive power?</p>
+               <p id="FS_Q15-p4"> (2) Whether it is to be found in irrational animals?</p>
+               <p id="FS_Q15-p5"> (3) Whether it is directed to the end or to the means?</p>
+               <p id="FS_Q15-p6"> (4) Whether consent to an act belongs to the higher part of the soul only?</p>
+               <div id="FS_Q15_A1" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q15.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q15_A2.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="FS_Q15_A1-p0.1">Whether consent is an act of the appetitive or of the apprehensive power?</h4>
+                  <p id="FS_Q15_A1-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q15_A1-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that consent belongs only to the apprehensive part of the soul. For Augustine (De Trin. xii, 12) ascribes consent
+                     to the higher reason. But the reason is an apprehensive power. Therefore consent belongs to an apprehensive power.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q15_A1-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, consent is "co-sense." But sense is an apprehensive power. Therefore consent is the act of an apprehensive power.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q15_A1-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, just as assent is an application of the intellect to something, so is consent. But assent belongs to the intellect,
+                     which is an apprehensive power. Therefore consent also belongs to an apprehensive power.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q15_A1-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 22) that "if a man judge without affection for that of which he judges, there is no sentence,"
+                     i.e. consent. But affection belongs to the appetitive power. Therefore consent does also.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q15_A1-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> Consent implies application of sense to something. Now it is proper to sense to take cognizance of things present; for the
+                     imagination apprehends the similitude of corporeal things, even in the absence of the things of which they bear the likeness;
+                     while the intellect apprehends universal ideas, which it can apprehend indifferently, whether the singulars be present or
+                     absent. And since the act of an appetitive power is a kind of inclination to the thing
+                     itself, the application of the appetitive power to the thing, in so far as it cleaves to it, gets by a kind of similitude,
+                     the name of sense, since, as it were, it acquires direct knowledge of the thing to which it cleaves, in so far as it takes
+                     complacency in it. Hence it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q15_A1-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.1.1" target="asv">Wis. 1:1</a>): "Think of [Sentite] the Lord in goodness." And on these grounds consent is an act of the appetitive power.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q15_A1-p7">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As stated in De Anima iii, 9, "the will is in the reason." Hence, when Augustine ascribes consent to the reason, he takes
+                     reason as including the will.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q15_A1-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Sense, properly speaking, belongs to the apprehensive faculty; but by way of similitude, in so far as it implies seeking
+                     acquaintance, it belongs to the appetitive power, as stated above.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q15_A1-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> "Assentire" [to assent] is, to speak, "ad aliud sentire" [to feel towards something]; and thus it implies a certain distance
+                     from that to which assent is given. But "consentire" [to consent] is "to feel with," and this implies a certain union to the
+                     object of consent. Hence the will, to which it belongs to tend to the thing itself, is more properly said to consent: whereas
+                     the intellect, whose act does not consist in a movement towards the thing, but
+                     rather the reverse, as we have stated in the 
+                     <a id="FS_Q15_A1-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q16_A1.html">FP, Q[16], A[1]</a>; 
+                     <a id="FS_Q15_A1-p9.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q27_A4.html">FP, Q[27], A[4]</a>; 
+                     <a id="FS_Q15_A1-p9.3" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q59_A2.html">FP, Q[59], A[2]</a>, is more properly said to assent: although one word is wont to be used for the other [*In Latin rather than in English.].
+                     We may also say that the intellect assents, in so far as it is moved by the will.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q15_A1-p10"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q15_A1-p11"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q15.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q15_A2.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="FS_Q15_A2" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q15_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q15_A3.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="FS_Q15_A2-p0.1">Whether consent is to be found in irrational animals?</h4>
+                  <p id="FS_Q15_A2-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q15_A2-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that consent is to be found in irrational animals. For consent implies a determination of the appetite to one
+                     thing. But the appetite of irrational animals is determinate to one thing. Therefore consent is to be found in irrational
+                     animals.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q15_A2-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, if you remove what is first, you remove what follows. But consent precedes the accomplished act. If therefore there
+                     were no consent in irrational animals, there would be no act accomplished; which is clearly false.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q15_A2-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, men are sometimes said to consent to do something, through some passion; desire, for instance, or anger. But irrational
+                     animals act through passion. Therefore they consent.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q15_A2-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 22) that "after judging, man approves and embraces the judgment of his counselling, and
+                     this is called the sentence," i.e. consent. But counsel is not in irrational animals. Therefore neither is consent.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q15_A2-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> Consent, properly speaking, is not in irrational animals. The reason of this is that consent implies an application of the
+                     appetitive movement to something as to be done. Now to apply the appetitive movement to the doing of something, belongs to
+                     the subject in whose power it is to move the appetite: thus to touch a stone is an action suitable to a stick, but to apply
+                     the stick so that it touch the stone, belongs to one who has the power of moving the stick.
+                     But irrational animals have not the command of the appetitive movement; for this is in them through natural instinct. Hence
+                     in the irrational animal, there is indeed the movement of the appetite, but it does not apply that movement to some particular
+                     thing. And hence it is that the irrational animal is not properly said to consent: this is proper to the rational nature,
+                     which has the command of the appetitive movement, and is able to apply or not to apply it to this or that thing.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q15_A2-p7">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> In irrational animals the determination of the appetite to a particular thing is merely passive: whereas consent implies
+                     a determination of the appetite, which is active rather than merely passive.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q15_A2-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> If the first be removed, then what follows is removed, provided that, properly speaking, it follow from that only. But if
+                     something can follow from several things, it is not removed by the fact that one of them is removed; thus if hardening is
+                     the effect of heat and of cold (since bricks are hardened by the fire, and frozen water is hardened by the cold), then by
+                     removing heat it does not follow that there is no hardening. Now the accomplishment of an
+                     act follows not only from consent, but also from the impulse of the appetite, such as is found in irrational animals.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q15_A2-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The man who acts through passion is able not to follow the passion: whereas irrational animals have not that power. Hence
+                     the comparison fails.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q15_A2-p10"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q15_A2-p11"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q15_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q15_A3.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="FS_Q15_A3" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q15_A2.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q15_A4.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="FS_Q15_A3-p0.1">Whether consent is directed to the end or to the means?</h4>
+                  <p id="FS_Q15_A3-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q15_A3-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that consent is directed to the end. Because that on account of which a thing is such is still more such. But
+                     it is on account of the end that we consent to the means. Therefore, still more do we consent to the end.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q15_A3-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the act of the intemperate man is his end, just as the act of the virtuous man is his end. But the intemperate man
+                     consents to his own act. Therefore consent can be directed to the end.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q15_A3-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, desire of the means is choice, as stated above (
+                     <a id="FS_Q15_A3-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q13_A1.html">Q[13], A[1]</a>). If therefore consent were only directed to the means it would nowise differ from choice. And this is proved to be false
+                     by the authority of Damascene who says (De Fide Orth. ii, 22) that "after the approval" which he calls "the sentence," "comes
+                     the choice." Therefore consent is not only directed to the means.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q15_A3-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 22) that the "sentence," i.e. the consent, takes place "when a man approves and embraces
+                     the judgment of his counsel." But counsel is only about the means. Therefore the same applies to consent.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q15_A3-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> Consent is the application of the appetitive movement to something that is already in the power of him who causes the application.
+                     Now the order of action is this: First there is the apprehension of the end; then the desire of the end; then the counsel
+                     about the means; then the desire of the means. Now the appetite tends to the last end naturally: wherefore the application
+                     of the appetitive movement to the apprehended end has not the nature of consent, but
+                     of simple volition. But as to those things which come under consideration after the last end, in so far as they are directed
+                     to the end, they come under counsel: and so counsel can be applied to them, in so far as the appetitive movement is applied
+                     to the judgment resulting from counsel. But the appetitive movement to the end is not applied to counsel: rather is counsel
+                     applied to it, because counsel presupposes the desire of the end. On the other hand, the desire of the means presupposes the
+                     decision of counsel. And therefore the application of the appetitive movement to counsel's decision is consent, properly speaking.
+                     Consequently, since counsel is only about the means, consent, properly speaking, is of nothing else but the means.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q15_A3-p7">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Just as the knowledge of conclusions through the principles is science, whereas the knowledge of the principles is not science,
+                     but something higher, namely, understanding; so do we consent to the means on account of the end, in respect of which our
+                     act is not consent but something greater, namely, volition.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q15_A3-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Delight in his act, rather than the act itself, is the end of the intemperate man, and for sake of this delight he consents
+                     to that act.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q15_A3-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Choice includes something that consent has not, namely, a certain relation to something to which something else is preferred:
+                     and therefore after consent there still remains a choice. For it may happen that by aid of counsel several means have been
+                     found conducive to the end, and through each of these meeting with approval, consent has been given to each: but after approving
+                     of many, we have given our preference to one by choosing it. But if only one
+                     meets with approval, then consent and choice do not differ in reality, but only in our way of looking at them; so that we
+                     call it consent, according as we approve of doing that thing; but choice according as we prefer it to those that do not meet
+                     with our approval.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q15_A3-p10"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q15_A3-p11"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q15_A2.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q15_A4.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="FS_Q15_A4" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q15_A3.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q16.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="FS_Q15_A4-p0.1">Whether consent to the act belongs only to the higher part of the soul?</h4>
+                  <p id="FS_Q15_A4-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q15_A4-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that consent to the act does not always belong to the higher reason. For "delight follows action, and perfects
+                     it, just as beauty perfects youth" [*oion tois akmaiois he hora}--as youthful vigor perfects a man in his prime] (Ethic. x,
+                     4). But consent to delight belongs to the lower reason, as Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 12). Therefore consent to the act
+                     does not belong only to the higher reason.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q15_A4-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, an act to which we consent is said to be voluntary. But it belongs to many powers to produce voluntary acts. Therefore
+                     the higher reason is not alone in consenting to the act.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q15_A4-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, "the higher reason is that which is intent on the contemplation and consultation of things eternal," as Augustine
+                     says (De Trin. xii, 7). But man often consents to an act not for eternal, but for temporal reasons, or even on account of
+                     some passion of the soul. Therefore consent to an act does not belong to the higher reason alone.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q15_A4-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 12): "It is impossible for man to make up his mind to commit a sin, unless that mental faculty
+                     which has the sovereign power of urging his members to, or restraining them from, act, yield to the evil deed and become its
+                     slave."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q15_A4-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> The final decision belongs to him who holds the highest place, and to whom it belongs to judge of the others; for as long
+                     as judgment about some matter remains to be pronounced, the final decision has not been given. Now it is evident that it belongs
+                     to the higher reason to judge of all: since it is by the reason that we judge of sensible things; and of things pertaining
+                     to human principles we judge according to Divine principles, which is the function of
+                     the higher reason. Wherefore as long as a man is uncertain whether he resists or not, according to Divine principles, no judgment
+                     of the reason can be considered in the light of a final decision. Now the final decision of what is to be done is consent
+                     to the act. Therefore consent to the act belongs to the higher reason; but in that sense in which the reason includes the
+                     will, as stated above (A[1], ad 1).
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q15_A4-p7">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Consent to delight in the work done belongs to the higher reason, as also does consent to the work; but consent to delight
+                     in thought belongs to the lower reason, just as to the lower reason it belongs to think. Nevertheless the higher reason exercises
+                     judgment on the fact of thinking or not thinking, considered as an action; and in like manner on the delight that results.
+                     But in so far as the act of thinking is considered as ordained to a further
+                     act, it belongs to the lower reason. For that which is ordained to something else, belongs to a lower art or power than does
+                     the end to which it is ordained: hence the art which is concerned with the end is called the master or principal art.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q15_A4-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Since actions are called voluntary from the fact that we consent to them, it does not follow that consent is an act of each
+                     power, but of the will which is in the reason, as stated above (A[1], ad 1), and from which the voluntary act is named.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q15_A4-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The higher reason is said to consent not only because it always moves to act, according to the eternal reasons; but also
+                     because it fails to dissent according to those same reasons.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q15_A4-p10"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q15_A4-p11"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q15_A3.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q16.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <a href="summa.FS_Q14_A6.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.FS_Q15_A1.html"></a>
+            </div>
+            <div id="FS_Q16" class="div3">
+               <a href="summa.FS_Q15_A4.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.FS_Q16_A1.html"></a>
+               <h3 id="FS_Q16-p0.1">OF USE, WHICH IS AN ACT OF THE WILL IN REGARD TO THE MEANS (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3>
+               <p id="FS_Q16-p1"></p>
+               <p id="FS_Q16-p2"> We must now consider use; concerning which there are four points of inquiry:</p>
+               <p id="FS_Q16-p3"> (1) Whether use is an act of the will?</p>
+               <p id="FS_Q16-p4"> (2) Whether it is to be found in irrational animals?</p>
+               <p id="FS_Q16-p5"> (3) Whether it regards the means only, or the end also?</p>
+               <p id="FS_Q16-p6"> (4) Of the relation of use to choice.</p>
+               <div id="FS_Q16_A1" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q16.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q16_A2.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="FS_Q16_A1-p0.1">Whether use is an act of the will?</h4>
+                  <p id="FS_Q16_A1-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q16_A1-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that use is not an act of the will. For Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 4) that "to use is to refer that
+                     which is the object of use to the obtaining of something else." But "to refer" something to another is an act of the reason
+                     to which it belongs to compare and to direct. Therefore use is an act of the reason and not of the will.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q16_A1-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 22) that man "goes forward to the operation, and this is called impulse; then
+                     he makes use (of the powers) and this is called use." But operation belongs to the executive power; and the act of the will
+                     does not follow the act of the executive power, on the contrary execution comes last. Therefore use is not an act of the will.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q16_A1-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 30): "All things that were made were made for man's use, because reason with which man
+                     is endowed uses all things by its judgment of them." But judgment of things created by God belongs to the speculative reason;
+                     which seems to be altogether distinct from the will, which is the principle of human acts. Therefore use is not an act of
+                     the will.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q16_A1-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Trin. x, 11): "To use is to apply to something to purpose of the will."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q16_A1-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> The use of a thing implies the application of that thing to an operation: hence the operation to which we apply a thing is
+                     called its use; thus the use of a horse is to ride, and the use of a stick is to strike. Now we apply to an operation not
+                     only the interior principles of action, viz. the powers of the soul or the members of the body; as the intellect, to understand;
+                     and the eye, to see; but also external things, as a stick, to strike. But it is evident
+                     that we do not apply external things to an operation save through the interior principles which are either the powers of the
+                     soul, or the habits of those powers, or the organs which are parts of the body. Now it has been shown above (
+                     <a id="FS_Q16_A1-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q9_A1.html">Q[9], A[1]</a>) that it is the will which moves the soul's powers to their acts, and this is to apply them to operation. Hence it is evident
+                     that first and principally use belongs to the will as first mover; to the reason, as directing; and to
+                     the other powers as executing the operation, which powers are compared to the will which applies them to act, as the instruments
+                     are compared to the principal agent. Now action is properly ascribed, not to the instrument, but to the principal agent, as
+                     building is ascribed to the builder, not to his tools. Hence it is evident that use is, properly speaking, an act of the will.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q16_A1-p7">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Reason does indeed refer one thing to another; but the will tends to that which is referred by the reason to something else.
+                     And in this sense to use is to refer one thing to another.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q16_A1-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Damascene is speaking of use in so far as it belongs to the executive powers.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q16_A1-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Even the speculative reason is applied by the will to the act of understanding or judging. Consequently the speculative reason
+                     is said to use, in so far as it is moved by the will, in the same way as the other powers.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q16_A1-p10"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q16_A1-p11"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q16.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q16_A2.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="FS_Q16_A2" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q16_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q16_A3.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="FS_Q16_A2-p0.1">Whether use is to be found in irrational animals?</h4>
+                  <p id="FS_Q16_A2-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q16_A2-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that use is to be found in irrational animals. For it is better to enjoy than to use, because, as Augustine
+                     says (De Trin. x, 10): "We use things by referring them to something else which we are to enjoy." But enjoyment is to be found
+                     in irrational animals, as stated above (
+                     <a id="FS_Q16_A2-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q11_A2.html">Q[11], A[2]</a>). Much more, therefore, is it possible for them to use.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q16_A2-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, to apply the members to action is to use them. But irrational animals apply their members to action; for instance,
+                     their feet, to walk; their horns, to strike. Therefore it is possible for irrational animals to use.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q16_A2-p4">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 30): "None but a rational animal can make use of a thing."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q16_A2-p5">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> as stated above 
+                     <a id="FS_Q16_A2-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q16_A1.html">(A[1])</a>, to use is to apply an active principle to action: thus to consent is to apply the appetitive movement to the desire of something,
+                     as stated above (Q[15], AA[1],2,3). Now he alone who has the disposal of a thing, can apply it to something else; and this
+                     belongs to him alone who knows how to refer it to something else, which is an act of the reason. And therefore none but a
+                     rational animal consents and uses.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q16_A2-p6">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> To enjoy implies the absolute movement of the appetite to the appetible: whereas to use implies a movement of the appetite
+                     to something as directed to something else. If therefore we compare use and enjoyment in respect of their objects, enjoyment
+                     is better than use; because that which is appetible absolutely is better than that which is appetible only as directed to
+                     something else. But if we compare them in respect of the apprehensive power that
+                     precedes them, greater excellence is required on the part of use: because to direct one thing to another is an act of reason;
+                     whereas to apprehend something absolutely is within the competency even of sense.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q16_A2-p7">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Animals by means of their members do something from natural instinct; not through knowing the relation of their members to
+                     these operations. Wherefore, properly speaking, they do not apply their members to action, nor do they use them.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q16_A2-p8"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q16_A2-p9"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q16_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q16_A3.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="FS_Q16_A3" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q16_A2.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q16_A4.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="FS_Q16_A3-p0.1">Whether use regards also the last end?</h4>
+                  <p id="FS_Q16_A3-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q16_A3-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that use can regard also the last end. For Augustine says (De Trin. x, 11): "Whoever enjoys, uses." But man
+                     enjoys the last end. Therefore he uses the last end.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q16_A3-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, "to use is to apply something to the purpose of the will" (De Trin. x, 11). But the last end, more than anything
+                     else, is the object of the will's application. Therefore it can be the object of use.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q16_A3-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Hilary says (De Trin. ii) that "Eternity is in the Father, Likeness in the Image," i.e. in the Son, "Use in the
+                     Gift," i.e. in the Holy Ghost. But the Holy Ghost, since He is God, is the last end. Therefore the last end can be the object
+                     of use.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q16_A3-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 30): "No one rightly uses God, but one enjoys Him." But God alone is the last end. Therefore
+                     we cannot use the last end.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q16_A3-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> Use, as stated above 
+                     <a id="FS_Q16_A3-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q16_A1.html">(A[1])</a>, implies the application of one thing to another. Now that which is applied to another is regarded in the light of means
+                     to an end; and consequently use always regards the means. For this reason things that are adapted to a certain end are said
+                     to be "useful"; in fact their very usefulness is sometimes called use.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q16_A3-p7"> It must, however, be observed that the last end may be taken in two ways: first, simply; secondly, in respect of an individual.
+                     For since the end, as stated above (
+                     <a id="FS_Q16_A3-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q1_A8.html">Q[1], A[8]</a>;
+                     <a id="FS_Q16_A3-p7.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q2_A7.html"> Q[2], A[7]</a>), signifies sometimes the thing itself, and sometimes the attainment or possession of that thing (thus the miser's end is
+                     either money or the possession of it); it is evident that, simply speaking, the last end is the thing itself; for the
+                     possession of money is good only inasmuch as there is some good in money. But in regard to the individual, the obtaining of
+                     money is the last end; for the miser would not seek for money, save that he might have it. Therefore, simply and properly
+                     speaking, a man enjoys money, because he places his last end therein; but in so far as he seeks to possess it, he is said
+                     to use it.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q16_A3-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Augustine is speaking of use in general, in so far as it implies the relation of an end to the enjoyment which a man seeks
+                     in that end.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q16_A3-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The end is applied to the purpose of the will, that the will may find rest in it. Consequently this rest in the end, which
+                     is the enjoyment thereof, is in this sense called use of the end. But the means are applied to the will's purpose, not only
+                     in being used as means, but as ordained to something else in which the will finds rest.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q16_A3-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The words of Hilary refer to use as applicable to rest in the last end; just as, speaking in a general sense, one may be
+                     said to use the end for the purpose of attaining it, as stated above. Hence Augustine says (De Trin. vi, 10) that "this love,
+                     delight, felicity, or happiness, is called use by him."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q16_A3-p11"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q16_A3-p12"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q16_A2.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q16_A4.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="FS_Q16_A4" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q16_A3.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q17.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="FS_Q16_A4-p0.1">Whether use precedes choice?</h4>
+                  <p id="FS_Q16_A4-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q16_A4-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that use precedes choice. For nothing follows after choice, except execution. But use, since it belongs to
+                     the will, precedes execution. Therefore it precedes choice also.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q16_A4-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the absolute precedes the relative. Therefore the less relative precedes the more relative. But choice implies two
+                     relations: one, of the thing chosen, in relation to the end; the other, of the thing chosen, in respect of that to which it
+                     is preferred; whereas use implies relation to the end only. Therefore use precedes choice.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q16_A4-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the will uses the other powers in so far as it removes them. But the will moves itself, too, as stated above (
+                     <a id="FS_Q16_A4-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q9_A3.html">Q[9], A[3]</a>). Therefore it uses itself, by applying itself to act. But it does this when it consents. Therefore there is use in consent.
+                     But consent precedes choice as stated above (
+                     <a id="FS_Q16_A4-p4.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q15_A3.html">Q[15], A[3]</a>, ad 3). Therefore use does also.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q16_A4-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 22) that "the will after choosing has an impulse to the operation, and afterwards it uses
+                     (the powers)." Therefore use follows choice.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q16_A4-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> The will has a twofold relation to the thing willed. One, according as the thing willed is, in a way, in the willing subject,
+                     by a kind of proportion or order to the thing willed. Wherefore those things that are naturally proportionate to a certain
+                     end, are said to desire that end naturally. Yet to have an end thus is to have it imperfectly. Now every imperfect thing tends
+                     to perfection. And therefore both the natural and the voluntary appetite tend to have
+                     the end in reality; and this is to have it perfectly. This is the second relation of the will to the thing willed.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q16_A4-p7"> Now the thing willed is not only the end, but also the means. And the last act that belongs to the first relation of the
+                     will to the means, is choice; for there the will becomes fully proportionate, by willing the means fully. Use, on the other
+                     hand, belongs to the second relation of the will, in respect of which it tends to the realization of the thing willed. Wherefore
+                     it is evident that use follows choice; provided that by use we mean the will's use of the executive power in
+                     moving it. But since the will, in a way, moves the reason also, and uses it, we may take the use of the means, as consisting
+                     in the consideration of the reason, whereby it refers the means to the end. In this sense use precedes choice.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q16_A4-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The motion of the will to the execution of the work, precedes execution, but follows choice. And so, since use belongs to
+                     that very motion of the will, it stands between choice and execution.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q16_A4-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> What is essentially relative is after the absolute; but the thing to which relation is referred need not come after. Indeed,
+                     the more a cause precedes, the more numerous the effects to which it has relation.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q16_A4-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Choice precedes use, if they be referred to the same object. But nothing hinders the use of one thing preceding the choice
+                     of another. And since the acts of the will react on one another, in each act of the will we can find both consent and choice
+                     and use; so that we may say that the will consents to choose, and consents to consent, and uses itself in consenting and choosing.
+                     And such acts as are ordained to that which precedes, precede also.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q16_A4-p11"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q16_A4-p12"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q16_A3.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q17.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <a href="summa.FS_Q15_A4.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.FS_Q16_A1.html"></a>
+            </div>
+            <div id="FS_Q17" class="div3">
+               <a href="summa.FS_Q16_A4.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.FS_Q17_A1.html"></a>
+               <h3 id="FS_Q17-p0.1">OF THE ACTS COMMANDED BY THE WILL (NINE ARTICLES)</h3>
+               <p id="FS_Q17-p1"></p>
+               <p id="FS_Q17-p2"> We must now consider the acts commanded by the will; under which head there are nine points of inquiry:</p>
+               <p id="FS_Q17-p3"> (1) Whether command is an act of the will or of the reason?</p>
+               <p id="FS_Q17-p4"> (2) Whether command belongs to irrational animals?</p>
+               <p id="FS_Q17-p5"> (3) Of the order between command and use</p>
+               <p id="FS_Q17-p6"> (4) Whether command and the commanded act are one act or distinct?</p>
+               <p id="FS_Q17-p7"> (5) Whether the act of the will is commanded?</p>
+               <p id="FS_Q17-p8"> (6) Whether the act of the reason is commanded?</p>
+               <p id="FS_Q17-p9"> (7) Whether the act of the sensitive appetite is commanded?</p>
+               <p id="FS_Q17-p10"> (8) Whether the act of the vegetal soul is commanded?</p>
+               <p id="FS_Q17-p11"> (9) Whether the acts of the external members are commanded?</p>
+               <div id="FS_Q17_A1" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q17.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q17_A2.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="FS_Q17_A1-p0.1">Whether command is an act of the reason or of the will?</h4>
+                  <p id="FS_Q17_A1-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q17_A1-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that command is not an act of the reason but of the will. For command is a kind of motion; because Avicenna
+                     says that there are four ways of moving, "by perfecting, by disposing, by commanding, and by counselling." But it belongs
+                     to the will to move all the other powers of the soul, as stated above (
+                     <a id="FS_Q17_A1-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q9_A1.html">Q[9], A[1]</a>). Therefore command is an act of the will.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q17_A1-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, just as to be commanded belongs to that which is subject, so, seemingly, to command belongs to that which is most
+                     free. But the root of liberty is especially in the will. Therefore to command belongs to the will.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q17_A1-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, command is followed at once by act. But the act of the reason is not followed at once by act: for he who judges
+                     that a thing should be done, does not do it at once. Therefore command is not an act of the reason, but of the will.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q17_A1-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Gregory of Nyssa [*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xvi.] and the Philosopher (Ethic. i, 13) say that "the appetite obeys reason."
+                     Therefore command is an act of the reason.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q17_A1-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> Command is an act of the reason presupposing, however, an act of the will. In proof of this, we must take note that, since
+                     the acts of the reason and of the will can be brought to bear on one another, in so far as the reason reasons about willing,
+                     and the will wills to reason, the result is that the act of the reason precedes the act of the will, and conversely. And since
+                     the power of the preceding act continues in the act that follows, it happens sometimes
+                     that there is an act of the will in so far as it retains in itself something of an act of the reason, as we have stated in
+                     reference to use and choice; and conversely, that there is an act of the reason in so far as it retains in itself something
+                     of an act of the will.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q17_A1-p7"> Now, command is essentially indeed an act of the reason: for the commander orders the one commanded to do something, by way
+                     of intimation or declaration; and to order thus by intimating or declaring is an act of the reason. Now the reason can intimate
+                     or declare something in two ways. First, absolutely: and this intimation is expressed by a verb in the indicative mood, as
+                     when one person says to another: "This is what you should do." Sometimes, however, the reason intimates
+                     something to a man by moving him thereto; and this intimation is expressed by a verb in the imperative mood; as when it is
+                     said to someone: "Do this." Now the first mover, among the powers of the soul, to the doing of an act is the will, as stated
+                     above (
+                     <a id="FS_Q17_A1-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q9_A1.html">Q[9], A[1]</a>). Since therefore the second mover does not move, save in virtue of the first mover, it follows that the very fact that the
+                     reason moves by commanding, is due to the power of the will. Consequently it follows
+                     that command is an act of the reason, presupposing an act of the will, in virtue of which the reason, by its command, moves
+                     (the power) to the execution of the act.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q17_A1-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> To command is to move, not anyhow, but by intimating and declaring to another; and this is an act of the reason.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q17_A1-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The root of liberty is the will as the subject thereof; but it is the reason as its cause. For the will can tend freely towards
+                     various objects, precisely because the reason can have various perceptions of good. Hence philosophers define the free-will
+                     as being "a free judgment arising from reason," implying that reason is the root of liberty.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q17_A1-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This argument proves that command is an act of reason not absolutely, but with a kind of motion as stated above.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q17_A1-p11"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q17_A1-p12"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q17.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q17_A2.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="FS_Q17_A2" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q17_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q17_A3.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="FS_Q17_A2-p0.1">Whether command belongs to irrational animals?</h4>
+                  <p id="FS_Q17_A2-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q17_A2-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that command belongs to irrational animals. Because, according to Avicenna, "the power that commands movement
+                     is the appetite; and the power that executes movement is in the muscles and nerves." But both powers are in irrational animals.
+                     Therefore command is to be found in irrational animals.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q17_A2-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the condition of a slave is that of one who receives commands. But the body is compared to the soul as a slave to
+                     his master, as the Philosopher says (Polit. i, 2). Therefore the body is commanded by the soul, even in irrational animals,
+                     since they are composed of soul and body.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q17_A2-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, by commanding, man has an impulse towards an action. But impulse to action is to be found in irrational animals,
+                     as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 22). Therefore command is to be found in irrational animals.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q17_A2-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Command is an act of reason, as stated above 
+                     <a id="FS_Q17_A2-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q17_A1.html">(A[1])</a>. But in irrational animals there is no reason. Neither, therefore, is there command.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q17_A2-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> To command is nothing else than to direct someone to do something, by a certain motion of intimation. Now to direct is the
+                     proper act of reason. Wherefore it is impossible that irrational animals should command in any way, since they are devoid
+                     of reason.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q17_A2-p7">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The appetitive power is said to command movement, in so far as it moves the commanding reason. But this is only in man. In
+                     irrational animals the appetitive power is not, properly speaking, a commanding faculty, unless command be taken loosely for
+                     motion.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q17_A2-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The body of the irrational animal is competent to obey; but its soul is not competent to command, because it is not competent
+                     to direct. Consequently there is no ratio there of commander and commanded; but only of mover and moved.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q17_A2-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Impulse to action is in irrational animals otherwise than in man. For the impulse of man to action arises from the directing
+                     reason; wherefore his impulse is one of command. On the other hand, the impulse of the irrational animal arises from natural
+                     instinct; because as soon as they apprehend the fitting or the unfitting, their appetite is moved naturally to pursue or to
+                     avoid. Wherefore they are directed by another to act; and they themselves do not
+                     direct themselves to act. Consequently in them is impulse but not command.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q17_A2-p10"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q17_A2-p11"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q17_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q17_A3.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="FS_Q17_A3" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q17_A2.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q17_A4.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="FS_Q17_A3-p0.1">Whether use precedes command?</h4>
+                  <p id="FS_Q17_A3-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q17_A3-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that use precedes command. For command is an act of the reason presupposing an act of the will, as stated above
+                     
+                     <a id="FS_Q17_A3-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q17_A1.html">(A[1])</a>. But, as we have already shown (Q[16], A[1]), use is an act of the will. Therefore use precedes command.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q17_A3-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, command is one of those things that are ordained to the end. But use is of those things that are ordained to the
+                     end. Therefore it seems that use precedes command.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q17_A3-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, every act of a power moved by the will is called use; because the will uses the other powers, as stated above (Q[16],
+                     A[1]). But command is an act of the reason as moved by the will, as stated above 
+                     <a id="FS_Q17_A3-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q17_A1.html">(A[1])</a>. Therefore command is a kind of use. Now the common precedes the proper. Therefore use precedes command.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q17_A3-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 22) that impulse to action precedes use. But impulse to operation is given by command.
+                     Therefore command precedes use.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q17_A3-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> use of that which is directed to the end, in so far as it is in the reason referring this to the end, precedes choice, as
+                     stated above (
+                     <a id="FS_Q17_A3-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q16_A4.html">Q[16], A[4]</a>). Wherefore still more does it precede command. On the other hand, use of that which is directed to the end, in so far as
+                     it is subject to the executive power, follows command; because use in the user is united to the act of the thing used; for
+                     one does not use a stick before doing
+                     something with the stick. But command is not simultaneous with the act of the thing to which the command is given: for it
+                     naturally precedes its fulfilment, sometimes, indeed, by priority of time. Consequently it is evident that command precedes
+                     use.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q17_A3-p7">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Not every act of the will precedes this act of the reason which is command; but an act of the will precedes, viz. choice;
+                     and an act of the will follows, viz. use. Because after counsel's decision, which is reason's judgment, the will chooses;
+                     and after choice, the reason commands that power which has to do what was chosen; and then, last of all, someone's will begins
+                     to use, by executing the command of reason; sometimes it is another's will, when one
+                     commands another; sometimes the will of the one that commands, when he commands himself to do something.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q17_A3-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Just as act ranks before power, so does the object rank before the act. Now the object of use is that which is directed to
+                     the end. Consequently, from the fact that command precedes, rather than that it follows use.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q17_A3-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Just as the act of the will in using the reason for the purpose of command, precedes the command; so also we may say that
+                     this act whereby the will uses the reason, is preceded by a command of reason; since the acts of these powers react on one
+                     another.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q17_A3-p10"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q17_A3-p11"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q17_A2.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q17_A4.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="FS_Q17_A4" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q17_A3.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q17_A5.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="FS_Q17_A4-p0.1">Whether command and the commanded act are one act, or distinct?</h4>
+                  <p id="FS_Q17_A4-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q17_A4-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the commanded act is not one with the command itself. For the acts of different powers are themselves
+                     distinct. But the commanded act belongs to one power, and the command to another; since one is the power that commands, and
+                     the other is the power that receives the command. Therefore the commanded act is not one with the command.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q17_A4-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, whatever things can be separate from one another, are distinct: for nothing is severed from itself. But sometimes
+                     the commanded act is separate from the command: for sometimes the command is given, and the commanded act follows not. Therefore
+                     command is a distinct act from the act commanded.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q17_A4-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, whatever things are related to one another as precedent and consequent, are distinct. But command naturally precedes
+                     the commanded act. Therefore they are distinct.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q17_A4-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Topic. iii, 2) that "where one thing is by reason of another, there is but one." But there is no commanded
+                     act unless by reason of the command. Therefore they are one.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q17_A4-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> Nothing prevents certain things being distinct in one respect, and one in another respect. Indeed, every multitude is one
+                     in some respect, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. xiii). But a difference is to be observed in this, that some are simply many,
+                     and one in a particular aspect: while with others it is the reverse. Now "one" is predicated in the same way as "being." And
+                     substance is being simply, whereas accident or being "of reason" is a being only in a
+                     certain respect. Wherefore those things that are one in substance are one simply, though many in a certain respect. Thus,
+                     in the genus substance, the whole composed of its integral or essential parts, is one simply: because the whole is being and
+                     substance simply, and the parts are being and substances in the whole. But those things which are distinct in substance, and
+                     one according to an accident, are distinct simply, and one in a certain respect: thus many men are one people, and many stones
+                     are one heap; which is unity of composition or order. In like manner also many individuals that are one in genus or species
+                     are many simply, and one in a certain respect: since to be one in genus or species is to be one according to the consideration
+                     of the reason.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q17_A4-p7"> Now just as in the genus of natural things, a whole is composed of matter and form (e.g. man, who is one natural being, though
+                     he has many parts, is composed of soul and body); so, in human acts, the act of a lower power is in the position of matter
+                     in regard to the act of a higher power, in so far as the lower power acts in virtue of the higher power moving it: for thus
+                     also the act of the first mover is as the form in regard to the act of its instrument. Hence it is evident
+                     that command and the commanded act are one human act, just as a whole is one, yet in its parts, many.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q17_A4-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> If the distinct powers are not ordained to one another, their acts are diverse simply. But when one power is the mover of
+                     the other, then their acts are, in a way, one: since "the act of the mover and the act of the thing moved are one act" (Phys.
+                     iii, 3).
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q17_A4-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The fact that command and the commanded act can be separated from one another shows that they are different parts. Because
+                     the parts of a man can be separated from one another, and yet they form one whole.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q17_A4-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> In those things that are many in parts, but one as a whole, nothing hinders one part from preceding another. Thus the soul,
+                     in a way, precedes the body; and the heart, the other members.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q17_A4-p11"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q17_A4-p12"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q17_A3.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q17_A5.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="FS_Q17_A5" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q17_A4.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q17_A6.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="FS_Q17_A5-p0.1">Whether the act of the will is commanded?</h4>
+                  <p id="FS_Q17_A5-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q17_A5-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the act of the will is not commanded. For Augustine says (Confess. viii, 9): "The mind commands the mind
+                     to will, and yet it does not." But to will is the act of the will. Therefore the act of the will is not commanded.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q17_A5-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, to receive a command belongs to one who can understand the command. But the will cannot understand the command;
+                     for the will differs from the intellect, to which it belongs to understand. Therefore the act of the will is not commanded.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q17_A5-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if one act of the will is commanded, for the same reason all are commanded. But if all the acts of the will are
+                     commanded, we must needs proceed to infinity; because the act of the will precedes the act of reason commanding, as stated
+                     above 
+                     <a id="FS_Q17_A5-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q17_A1.html">(A[1])</a>; for if that act of the will be also commanded, this command will be precedes by another act of the reason, and so on to
+                     infinity. But to proceed to infinity is not possible.
+                     Therefore the act of the will is not commanded.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q17_A5-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Whatever is in our power, is subject to our command. But the acts of the will, most of all, are in our power; since all our
+                     acts are said to be in our power, in so far as they are voluntary. Therefore the acts of the will are commanded by us.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q17_A5-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above 
+                     <a id="FS_Q17_A5-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q17_A1.html">(A[1])</a>, command is nothing else than the act of the reason directing, with a certain motion, something to act. Now it is evident
+                     that the reason can direct the act of the will: for just as it can judge it to be good to will something, so it can direct
+                     by commanding man to will. From this it is evident that an act of the will can be commanded.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q17_A5-p7">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As Augustine says (Confess. viii, 9) when the mind commands itself perfectly to will, then already it wills: but that sometimes
+                     it commands and wills not, is due to the fact that it commands imperfectly. Now imperfect command arises from the fact that
+                     the reason is moved by opposite motives to command or not to command: wherefore it fluctuates between the two, and fails to
+                     command perfectly.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q17_A5-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Just as each of the members of the body works not for itself alone but for the whole body; thus it is for the whole body
+                     that the eye sees; so is it with the powers of the soul. For the intellect understands, not for itself alone, but for all
+                     the powers; and the will wills not only for itself, but for all the powers too. Wherefore man, in so far as he is endowed
+                     with intellect and will, commands the act of the will for himself.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q17_A5-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Since command is an act of reason, that act is commanded which is subject to reason. Now the first act of the will is not
+                     due to the direction of the reason but to the instigation of nature, or of a higher cause, as stated above (
+                     <a id="FS_Q17_A5-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q9_A4.html">Q[9], A[4]</a>). Therefore there is no need to proceed to infinity.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q17_A5-p10"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q17_A5-p11"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q17_A4.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q17_A6.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="FS_Q17_A6" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q17_A5.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q17_A7.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="FS_Q17_A6-p0.1">Whether the act of the reason is commanded?</h4>
+                  <p id="FS_Q17_A6-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q17_A6-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the act of the reason cannot be commanded. For it seems impossible for a thing to command itself. But
+                     it is the reason that commands, as stated above 
+                     <a id="FS_Q17_A6-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q17_A1.html">(A[1])</a>. Therefore the act of the reason is not commanded.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q17_A6-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, that which is essential is different from that which is by participation. But the power whose act is commanded by
+                     reason, is rational by participation, as stated in Ethic. i, 13. Therefore the act of that power, which is essentially rational,
+                     is not commanded.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q17_A6-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, that act is commanded, which is in our power. But to know and judge the truth, which is the act of reason, is not
+                     always in our power. Therefore the act of the reason cannot be commanded.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q17_A6-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> That which we do of our free-will, can be done by our command. But the acts of the reason are accomplished through the free-will:
+                     for Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 22) that "by his free-will man inquires, considers, judges, approves." Therefore the
+                     acts of the reason can be commanded.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q17_A6-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> Since the reason reacts on itself, just as it directs the acts of other powers, so can it direct its own act. Consequently
+                     its act can be commanded.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q17_A6-p7"> But we must take note that the act of the reason may be considered in two ways. First, as to the exercise of the act. And
+                     considered thus, the act of the reason can always be commanded: as when one is told to be attentive, and to use one's reason.
+                     Secondly, as to the object; in respect of which two acts of the reason have to be noticed. One is the act whereby it apprehends
+                     the truth about something. This act is not in our power: because it happens in virtue of a natural or
+                     supernatural light. Consequently in this respect, the act of the reason is not in our power, and cannot be commanded. The
+                     other act of the reason is that whereby it assents to what it apprehends. If, therefore, that which the reason apprehends
+                     is such that it naturally assents thereto, e.g. the first principles, it is not in our power to assent or dissent to the like:
+                     assent follows naturally, and consequently, properly speaking, is not subject to our command. But some things which are
+                     apprehended do not convince the intellect to such an extent as not to leave it free to assent or dissent, or at least suspend
+                     its assent or dissent, on account of some cause or other; and in such things assent or dissent is in our power, and is subject
+                     to our command.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q17_A6-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Reason commands itself, just as the will moves itself, as stated above (
+                     <a id="FS_Q17_A6-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q9_A3.html">Q[9], A[3]</a>), that is to say, in so far as each power reacts on its own acts, and from one thing tends to another.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q17_A6-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> On account of the diversity of objects subject to the act of the reason, nothing prevents the reason from participating in
+                     itself: thus the knowledge of principles is participated in the knowledge of the conclusions.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q17_A6-p10"> The reply to the third object is evident from what has been said.</p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q17_A6-p11"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q17_A6-p12"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q17_A5.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q17_A7.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="FS_Q17_A7" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q17_A6.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q17_A8.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="FS_Q17_A7-p0.1">Whether the act of the sensitive appetite is commanded?</h4>
+                  <p id="FS_Q17_A7-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q17_A7-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the act of the sensitive appetite is not commanded. For the Apostle says (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q17_A7-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.7.15" target="asv">Rom. 7:15</a>): "For I do not that good which I will": and a gloss explains this by saying that man lusts, although he wills not to lust.
+                     But to lust is an act of the sensitive appetite. Therefore the act of the sensitive appetite is not subject to our command.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q17_A7-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, corporeal matter obeys God alone, to the effect of formal transmutation, as was shown in the 
+                     <a id="FS_Q17_A7-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q65_A4.html">FP, Q[65], A[4]</a>; 
+                     <a id="FS_Q17_A7-p3.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q91_A2.html">FP, Q[91], A[2]</a>; 
+                     <a id="FS_Q17_A7-p3.3" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q110_A2.html">FP, Q[110], A[2]</a>. But the act of the sensitive appetite is accompanied by a formal transmutation of the body, consisting in heat or cold.
+                     Therefore the act of the sensitive appetite is not subject to man's command.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q17_A7-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the proper motive principle of the sensitive appetite is something apprehended by sense or imagination. But it is
+                     not always in our power to apprehend something by sense or imagination. Therefore the act of the sensitive appetite is not
+                     subject to our command.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q17_A7-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Gregory of Nyssa [*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xvi.] says: "That which obeys reason is twofold, the concupiscible and the irascible,"
+                     which belong to the sensitive appetite. Therefore the act of the sensitive appetite is subject to the command of reason.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q17_A7-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> An act is subject to our command, in so far as it is in our power, as stated above 
+                     <a id="FS_Q17_A7-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q17_A5.html">(A[5])</a>. Consequently in order to understand in what manner the act of the sensitive appetite is subject to the command of reason,
+                     we must consider in what manner it is in our power. Now it must be observed that the sensitive appetite differs from the intellective
+                     appetite, which is called the will, in the fact that the sensitive appetite is a power of
+                     a corporeal organ, whereas the will is not. Again, every act of a power that uses a corporeal organ, depends not only on a
+                     power of the soul, but also on the disposition of that corporeal organ: thus the act of vision depends on the power of sight,
+                     and on the condition of the eye, which condition is a help or a hindrance to that act. Consequently the act of the sensitive
+                     appetite depends not only on the appetitive power, but also on the disposition of the body.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q17_A7-p7"> Now whatever part the power of the soul takes in the act, follows apprehension. And the apprehension of the imagination,
+                     being a particular apprehension, is regulated by the apprehension of reason, which is universal; just as a particular active
+                     power is regulated by a universal active power. Consequently in this respect the act of the sensitive appetite is subject
+                     to the command of reason. On the other hand, condition or disposition of the body is not subject to the command of
+                     reason: and consequently in this respect, the movement of the sensitive appetite is hindered from being wholly subject to
+                     the command of reason.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q17_A7-p8"> Moreover it happens sometimes that the movement of the sensitive appetite is aroused suddenly in consequence of an apprehension
+                     of the imagination of sense. And then such movement occurs without the command of reason: although reason could have prevented
+                     it, had it foreseen. Hence the Philosopher says (Polit. i, 2) that the reason governs the irascible and concupiscible not
+                     by a "despotic supremacy," which is that of a master over his slave; but by a "politic and royal
+                     supremacy," whereby the free are governed, who are not wholly subject to command.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q17_A7-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> That man lusts, although he wills not to lust, is due to a disposition of the body, whereby the sensitive appetite is hindered
+                     from perfect compliance with the command of reason. Hence the Apostle adds (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q17_A7-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.7.15" target="asv">Rom. 7:15</a>): "I see another law in my members, fighting against the law of my mind." This may also happen through a sudden movement
+                     of concupiscence, as stated above.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q17_A7-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The condition of the body stands in a twofold relation to the act of the sensitive appetite. First, as preceding it: thus
+                     a man may be disposed in one way or another, in respect of his body, to this or that passion. Secondly, as consequent to it:
+                     thus a man becomes heated through anger. Now the condition that precedes, is not subject to the command of reason: since it
+                     is due either to nature, or to some previous movement, which cannot cease at once.
+                     But the condition that is consequent, follows the command of reason: since it results from the local movement of the heart,
+                     which has various movements according to the various acts of the sensitive appetite.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q17_A7-p11">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Since the external sensible is necessary for the apprehension of the senses, it is not in our power to apprehend anything
+                     by the senses, unless the sensible be present; which presence of the sensible is not always in our power. For it is then that
+                     man can use his senses if he will so to do; unless there be some obstacle on the part of the organ. On the other hand, the
+                     apprehension of the imagination is subject to the ordering of reason, in proportion
+                     to the strength or weakness of the imaginative power. For that man is unable to imagine the things that reason considers,
+                     is either because they cannot be imagined, such as incorporeal things; or because of the weakness of the imaginative power,
+                     due to some organic indisposition.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q17_A7-p12"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q17_A7-p13"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q17_A6.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q17_A8.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="FS_Q17_A8" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q17_A7.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q17_A9.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="FS_Q17_A8-p0.1">Whether the act of the vegetal soul is commanded?</h4>
+                  <p id="FS_Q17_A8-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q17_A8-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the acts of the vegetal soul are subject to the command of reason. For the sensitive powers are of higher
+                     rank than the vegetal powers. But the powers of the sensitive soul are subject to the command of reason. Much more, therefore,
+                     are the powers of the vegetal soul.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q17_A8-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, man is called a "little world" [*Aristotle, Phys. viii. 2], because the soul is in the body, as God is in the world.
+                     But God is in the world in such a way, that everything in the world obeys His command. Therefore all that is in man, even
+                     the powers of the vegetal soul, obey the command of reason.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q17_A8-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, praise and blame are awarded only to such acts as are subject to the command of reason. But in the acts of the nutritive
+                     and generative power, there is room for praise and blame, virtue and vice: as in the case of gluttony and lust, and their
+                     contrary virtues. Therefore the acts of these powers are subject to the command of reason.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q17_A8-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Gregory of Nyssa [*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xxii.] sats that "the nutritive and generative power is one over which the reason
+                     has no control."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q17_A8-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> Some acts proceed from the natural appetite, others from the animal, or from the intellectual appetite: for every agent desires
+                     an end in some way. Now the natural appetite does not follow from some apprehension, as to the animal and the intellectual
+                     appetite. But the reason commands by way of apprehensive power. Wherefore those acts that proceed from the intellective or
+                     the animal appetite, can be commanded by reason: but not those acts that proceed from
+                     the natural appetite. And such are the acts of the vegetal soul; wherefore Gregory of Nyssa (Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xxii)
+                     says "that generation and nutrition belong to what are called natural powers." Consequently the acts of the vegetal soul are
+                     not subject to the command of reason.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q17_A8-p7">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The more immaterial an act is, the more noble it is, and the more is it subject to the command of reason. Hence the very
+                     fact that the acts of the vegetal soul do not obey reason, shows that they rank lowest.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q17_A8-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The comparison holds in a certain respect: because, to wit, as God moves the world, so the soul moves the body. But it does
+                     not hold in every respect: for the soul did not create the body out of nothing, as God created the world; for which reason
+                     the world is wholly subject to His command.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q17_A8-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Virtue and vice, praise and blame do not affect the acts themselves of the nutritive and generative power, i.e. digestion,
+                     and formation of the human body; but they affect the acts of the sensitive part, that are ordained to the acts of generation
+                     and nutrition; for example the desire for pleasure in the act of taking food or in the act of generation, and the right or
+                     wrong use thereof.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q17_A8-p10"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q17_A8-p11"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q17_A7.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q17_A9.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="FS_Q17_A9" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q17_A8.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q18.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="FS_Q17_A9-p0.1">Whether the acts of the external members are commanded?</h4>
+                  <p id="FS_Q17_A9-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q17_A9-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the members of the body do not obey reason as to their acts. For it is evident that the members of the
+                     body are more distant from the reason, than the powers of the vegetal soul. But the powers of the vegetal soul do not obey
+                     reason, as stated above 
+                     <a id="FS_Q17_A9-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q17_A8.html">(A[8])</a>. Therefore much less do the members of the body obey.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q17_A9-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the heart is the principle of animal movement. But the movement of the heart is not subject to the command of reason:
+                     for Gregory of Nyssa [*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xxii.] says that "the pulse is not controlled by reason." Therefore the movement
+                     of the bodily members is not subject to the command of reason.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q17_A9-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 16) that "the movement of the genital members is sometimes inopportune and not
+                     desired; sometimes when sought it fails, and whereas the heart is warm with desire, the body remains cold." Therefore the
+                     movements of the members are not obedient to reason.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q17_A9-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (Confess. viii, 9): "The mind commands a movement of the hand, and so ready is the hand to obey, that scarcely
+                     can one discern obedience from command."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q17_A9-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> The members of the body are organs of the soul's powers. Consequently according as the powers of the soul stand in respect
+                     of obedience to reason, so do the members of the body stand in respect thereof. Since then the sensitive powers are subject
+                     to the command of reason, whereas the natural powers are not; therefore all movements of members, that are moved by the sensitive
+                     powers, are subject to the command of reason; whereas those movements of members,
+                     that arise from the natural powers, are not subject to the command of reason.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q17_A9-p7">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The members do not move themselves, but are moved through the powers of the soul; of which powers, some are in closer contact
+                     with the reason than are the powers of the vegetal soul.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q17_A9-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> In things pertaining to intellect and will, that which is according to nature stands first, whence all other things are derived:
+                     thus from the knowledge of principles that are naturally known, is derived knowledge of the conclusions; and from volition
+                     of the end naturally desired, is derived the choice of the means. So also in bodily movements the principle is according to
+                     nature. Now the principle of bodily movements begins with the movement of the
+                     heart. Consequently the movement of the heart is according to nature, and not according to the will: for like a proper accident,
+                     it results from life, which follows from the union of soul and body. Thus the movement of heavy and light things results from
+                     their substantial form: for which reason they are said to be moved by their generator, as the Philosopher states (Phys. viii,
+                     4). Wherefore this movement is called "vital." For which reason Gregory of Nyssa (Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xxii) says
+                     that, just as the movement of generation and nutrition does not obey reason, so neither does the pulse which is a vital movement.
+                     By the pulse he means the movement of the heart which is indicated by the pulse veins.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q17_A9-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 17,20) it is in punishment of sin that the movement of these members does not obey reason:
+                     in this sense, that the soul is punished for its rebellion against God, by the insubmission of that member whereby original
+                     sin is transmitted to posterity.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q17_A9-p10"> But because, as we shall state later on, the effect of the sin of our first parent was that his nature was left to itself,
+                     through the withdrawal of the supernatural gift which God had bestowed on man, we must consider the natural cause of this
+                     particular member's insubmission to reason. This is stated by Aristotle (De Causis Mot. Animal.) who says that "the movements
+                     of the heart and of the organs of generation are involuntary," and that the reason of this is as follows. These
+                     members are stirred at the occasion of some apprehension; in so far as the intellect and imagination represent such things
+                     as arouse the passions of the soul, of which passions these movements are a consequence. But they are not moved at the command
+                     of the reason or intellect, because these movements are conditioned by a certain natural change of heat and cold, which change
+                     is not subject to the command of reason. This is the case with these two organs in particular, because each is as it were
+                     a separate animal being, in so far as it is a principle of life; and the principle is virtually the whole. For the heart is
+                     the principle of the senses; and from the organ of generation proceeds the seminal virtue, which is virtually the entire animal.
+                     Consequently they have their proper movements naturally: because principles must needs be natural, as stated above (Reply
+                     OBJ 2).
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q17_A9-p11"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q17_A9-p12"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q17_A8.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q18.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <a href="summa.FS_Q16_A4.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.FS_Q17_A1.html"></a>
+            </div>
+            <div id="FS_Q18" class="div3">
+               <a href="summa.FS_Q17_A9.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.FS_Q18_A1.html"></a>
+               <h3 id="FS_Q18-p0.1">OF THE GOOD AND EVIL OF HUMAN ACTS, IN GENERAL (ELEVEN ARTICLES)</h3>
+               <p id="FS_Q18-p1"></p>
+               <p id="FS_Q18-p2"> We must now consider the good and evil of human acts. First, how a human act is good or evil; secondly, what results from
+                  the good or evil of a human act, as merit or demerit, sin and guilt.
+               </p>
+               <p id="FS_Q18-p3"> Under the first head there will be a threefold consideration: the first will be of the good and evil of human acts, in general;
+                  the second, of the good and evil of internal acts; the third, of the good and evil of external acts.
+               </p>
+               <p id="FS_Q18-p4"> Concerning the first there are eleven points of inquiry:</p>
+               <p id="FS_Q18-p5"> (1) Whether every human action is good, or are there evil actions?</p>
+               <p id="FS_Q18-p6"> (2) Whether the good or evil of a human action is derived from its object?</p>
+               <p id="FS_Q18-p7"> (3) Whether it is derived from a circumstance?</p>
+               <p id="FS_Q18-p8"> (4) Whether it is derived from the end?</p>
+               <p id="FS_Q18-p9"> (5) Whether a human action is good or evil in its species?</p>
+               <p id="FS_Q18-p10"> (6) Whether an action has the species of good or evil from its end?</p>
+               <p id="FS_Q18-p11"> (7) Whether the species derived from the end is contained under the species derived from the object, as under its genus,
+                  or conversely?
+               </p>
+               <p id="FS_Q18-p12"> (8) Whether any action is indifferent in its species?</p>
+               <p id="FS_Q18-p13"> (9) Whether an individual action can be indifferent?</p>
+               <p id="FS_Q18-p14"> (10) Whether a circumstance places a moral action in the species of good or evil?</p>
+               <p id="FS_Q18-p15"> (11) Whether every circumstance that makes an action better or worse, places the moral action in the species of good or evil?</p>
+               <div id="FS_Q18_A1" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q18.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q18_A2.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="FS_Q18_A1-p0.1">Whether every human action is good, or are there evil actions?</h4>
+                  <p id="FS_Q18_A1-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q18_A1-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that every human action is good, and that none is evil. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that evil acts not,
+                     save in virtue of the good. But no evil is done in virtue of the good. Therefore no action is evil.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q18_A1-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, nothing acts except in so far as it is in act. Now a thing is evil, not according as it is in act, but according
+                     as its potentiality is void of act; whereas in so far as its potentiality is perfected by act, it is good, as stated in Metaph.
+                     ix, 9. Therefore nothing acts in so far as it is evil, but only according as it is good. Therefore every action is good, and
+                     none is evil.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q18_A1-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, evil cannot be a cause, save accidentally, as Dionysius declares (Div. Nom. iv). But every action has some effect
+                     which is proper to it. Therefore no action is evil, but every action is good.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q18_A1-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Our Lord said (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q18_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#John.3.20" target="asv">Jn. 3:20</a>): "Every one that doth evil, hateth the light." Therefore some actions of man are evil.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q18_A1-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> We must speak of good and evil in actions as of good and evil in things: because such as everything is, such is the act that
+                     it produces. Now in things, each one has so much good as it has being: since good and being are convertible, as was stated
+                     in the 
+                     <a id="FS_Q18_A1-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q5_A1.html">FP, Q[5], AA[1]</a>,3. But God alone has the whole plenitude of His Being in a certain unity: whereas every other thing has its proper fulness
+                     of being in a certain multiplicity.
+                     Wherefore it happens with some things, that they have being in some respect, and yet they are lacking in the fulness of being
+                     due to them. Thus the fulness of human being requires a compound of soul and body, having all the powers and instruments of
+                     knowledge and movement: wherefore if any man be lacking in any of these, he is lacking in something due to the fulness of
+                     his being. So that as much as he has of being, so much has he of goodness: while so far as he is lacking in goodness, and
+                     is
+                     said to be evil: thus a blind man is possessed of goodness inasmuch as he lives; and of evil, inasmuch as he lacks sight.
+                     That, however, which has nothing of being or goodness, could not be said to be either evil or good. But since this same fulness
+                     of being is of the very essence of good, if a thing be lacking in its due fulness of being, it is not said to be good simply,
+                     but in a certain respect, inasmuch as it is a being; although it can be called a being simply, and a non-being in a certain
+                     respect, as was stated in the 
+                     <a id="FS_Q18_A1-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q5_A1.html">FP, Q[5], A[1]</a>, ad 1. We must therefore say that every action has goodness, in so far as it has being; whereas it is lacking in goodness,
+                     in so far as it is lacking in something that is due to its fulness of being; and thus it is said to be evil: for instance
+                     if it lacks the quantity determined by reason, or its due place, or something of the kind.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q18_A1-p7">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Evil acts in virtue of deficient goodness. For it there were nothing of good there, there would be neither being nor possibility
+                     of action. On the other hand if good were not deficient, there would be no evil. Consequently the action done is a deficient
+                     good, which is good in a certain respect, but simply evil.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q18_A1-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Nothing hinders a thing from being in act in a certain respect, so that it can act; and in a certain respect deficient in
+                     act, so as to cause a deficient act. Thus a blind man has in act the power of walking, whereby he is able to walk; but inasmuch
+                     as he is deprived of sight he suffers a defect in walking by stumbling when he walks.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q18_A1-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> An evil action can have a proper effect, according to the goodness and being that it has. Thus adultery is the cause of human
+                     generation, inasmuch as it implies union of male and female, but not inasmuch as it lacks the order of reason.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q18_A1-p10"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q18_A1-p11"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q18.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q18_A2.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="FS_Q18_A2" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q18_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q18_A3.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="FS_Q18_A2-p0.1">Whether the good or evil of a man's action is derived from its object?</h4>
+                  <p id="FS_Q18_A2-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q18_A2-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the good or evil of an action is not derived from its object. For the object of any action is a thing.
+                     But "evil is not in things, but in the sinner's use of them," as Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. iii, 12). Therefore the
+                     good or evil of a human action is not derived from their object.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q18_A2-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the object is compared to the action as its matter. But the goodness of a thing is not from its matter, but rather
+                     from the form, which is an act. Therefore good and evil in actions is not derived from their object.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q18_A2-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the object of an active power is compared to the action as effect to cause. But the goodness of a cause does not
+                     depend on its effect; rather is it the reverse. Therefore good or evil in actions is not derived from their object.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q18_A2-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q18_A2-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Hos.9.10" target="asv">Osee 9:10</a>): "They became abominable as those things which they loved." Now man becomes abominable to God on account of the malice of
+                     his action. Therefore the malice of his action is according to the evil objects that man loves. And the same applies to the
+                     goodness of his action.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q18_A2-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> as stated above 
+                     <a id="FS_Q18_A2-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q18_A1.html">(A[1])</a> the good or evil of an action, as of other things, depends on its fulness of being or its lack of that fulness. Now the first
+                     thing that belongs to the fulness of being seems to be that which gives a thing its species. And just as a natural thing has
+                     its species from its form, so an action has its species from its object, as movement from its term. And therefore just as
+                     the primary goodness of a natural thing
+                     is derived from its form, which gives it its species, so the primary goodness of a moral action is derived from its suitable
+                     object: hence some call such an action "good in its genus"; for instance, "to make use of what is one's own." And just as,
+                     in natural things, the primary evil is when a generated thing does not realize its specific form (for instance, if instead
+                     of a man, something else be generated); so the primary evil in moral actions is that which is from the object, for instance,
+                     "to
+                     take what belongs to another." And this action is said to be "evil in its genus," genus here standing for species, just as
+                     we apply the term "mankind" to the whole human species.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q18_A2-p7">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Although external things are good in themselves, nevertheless they have not always a due proportion to this or that action.
+                     And so, inasmuch as they are considered as objects of such actions, they have not the quality of goodness.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q18_A2-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The object is not the matter "of which" (a thing is made), but the matter "about which" (something is done); and stands in
+                     relation to the act as its form, as it were, through giving it its species.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q18_A2-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The object of the human action is not always the object of an active power. For the appetitive power is, in a way, passive;
+                     in so far as it is moved by the appetible object; and yet it is a principle of human actions. Nor again have the objects of
+                     the active powers always the nature of an effect, but only when they are already transformed: thus food when transformed is
+                     the effect of the nutritive power; whereas food before being transformed stands in
+                     relation to the nutritive power as the matter about which it exercises its operation. Now since the object is in some way
+                     the effect of the active power, it follows that it is the term of its action, and consequently that it gives it its form and
+                     species, since movement derives its species from its term. Moreover, although the goodness of an action is not caused by the
+                     goodness of its effect, yet an action is said to be good from the fact that it can produce a good effect. Consequently the
+                     very
+                     proportion of an action to its effect is the measure of its goodness.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q18_A2-p10"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q18_A2-p11"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q18_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q18_A3.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="FS_Q18_A3" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q18_A2.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q18_A4.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="FS_Q18_A3-p0.1">Whether man's action is good or evil from a circumstance?</h4>
+                  <p id="FS_Q18_A3-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q18_A3-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that an action is not good or evil from a circumstance. For circumstances stand around [circumstant] an action,
+                     as being outside it, as stated above (
+                     <a id="FS_Q18_A3-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q7_A1.html">Q[7], A[1]</a>). But "good and evil are in things themselves," as is stated in Metaph. vi, 4. Therefore an action does not derive goodness
+                     or malice from a circumstance.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q18_A3-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the goodness or malice of an action is considered principally in the doctrine of morals. But since circumstances
+                     are accidents of actions, it seems that they are outside the scope of art: because "no art takes notice of what is accidental"
+                     (Metaph. vi, 2). Therefore the goodness or malice of an action is not taken from a circumstance.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q18_A3-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, that which belongs to a thing, in respect of its substance, is not ascribed to it in respect of an accident. But
+                     good and evil belong to an action in respect of its substance; because an action can be good or evil in its genus as stated
+                     above 
+                     <a id="FS_Q18_A3-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q18_A2.html">(A[2])</a>. Therefore an action is not good or bad from a circumstance.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q18_A3-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 3) that a virtuous man acts as he should, and when he should, and so on in respect of the
+                     other circumstances. Therefore, on the other hand, the vicious man, in the matter of each vice, acts when he should not, or
+                     where he should not, and so on with the other circumstances. Therefore human actions are good or evil according to circumstances.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q18_A3-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> In natural things, it is to be noted that the whole fulness of perfection due to a thing, is not from the mere substantial
+                     form, that gives it its species; since a thing derives much from supervening accidents, as man does from shape, color, and
+                     the like; and if any one of these accidents be out of due proportion, evil is the result. So it is with action. For the plenitude
+                     of its goodness does not consist wholly in its species, but also in certain additions
+                     which accrue to it by reason of certain accidents: and such are its due circumstances. Wherefore if something be wanting that
+                     is requisite as a due circumstance the action will be evil.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q18_A3-p7">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Circumstances are outside an action, inasmuch as they are not part of its essence; but they are in an action as accidents
+                     thereof. Thus, too, accidents in natural substances are outside the essence.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q18_A3-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Every accident is not accidentally in its subject; for some are proper accidents; and of these every art takes notice. And
+                     thus it is that the circumstances of actions are considered in the doctrine of morals.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q18_A3-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Since good and being are convertible; according as being is predicated of substance and of accident, so is good predicated
+                     of a thing both in respect of its essential being, and in respect of its accidental being; and this, both in natural things
+                     and in moral actions.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q18_A3-p10"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q18_A3-p11"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q18_A2.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q18_A4.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="FS_Q18_A4" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q18_A3.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q18_A5.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="FS_Q18_A4-p0.1">Whether a human action is good or evil from its end?</h4>
+                  <p id="FS_Q18_A4-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q18_A4-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the good and evil in human actions are not from the end. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that "nothing
+                     acts with a view to evil." If therefore an action were good or evil from its end, no action would be evil. Which is clearly
+                     false.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q18_A4-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the goodness of an action is something in the action. But the end is an extrinsic cause. Therefore an action is
+                     not said to be good or bad according to its end.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q18_A4-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, a good action may happen to be ordained to an evil end, as when a man gives an alms from vainglory; and conversely,
+                     an evil action may happen to be ordained to a good end, as a theft committed in order to give something to the poor. Therefore
+                     an action is not good or evil from its end.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q18_A4-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Boethius says (De Differ. Topic. ii) that "if the end is good, the thing is good, and if the end be evil, the thing also
+                     is evil."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q18_A4-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> The disposition of things as to goodness is the same as their disposition as to being. Now in some things the being does
+                     not depend on another, and in these it suffices to consider their being absolutely. But there are things the being of which
+                     depends on something else, and hence in their regard we must consider their being in its relation to the cause on which it
+                     depends. Now just as the being of a thing depends on the agent, and the form, so the goodness
+                     of a thing depends on its end. Hence in the Divine Persons, Whose goodness does not depend on another, the measure of goodness
+                     is not taken from the end. Whereas human actions, and other things, the goodness of which depends on something else, have
+                     a measure of goodness from the end on which they depend, besides that goodness which is in them absolutely.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q18_A4-p7"> Accordingly a fourfold goodness may be considered in a human action. First, that which, as an action, it derives from its
+                     genus; because as much as it has of action and being so much has it of goodness, as stated above 
+                     <a id="FS_Q18_A4-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q18_A1.html">(A[1])</a>. Secondly, it has goodness according to its species; which is derived from its suitable object. Thirdly, it has goodness
+                     from its circumstances, in respect, as it were, of its accidents. Fourthly, it has goodness from its end, to
+                     which it is compared as to the cause of its goodness.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q18_A4-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The good in view of which one acts is not always a true good; but sometimes it is a true good, sometimes an apparent good.
+                     And in the latter event, an evil action results from the end in view.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q18_A4-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Although the end is an extrinsic cause, nevertheless due proportion to the end, and relation to the end, are inherent to
+                     the action.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q18_A4-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Nothing hinders an action that is good in one of the way mentioned above, from lacking goodness in another way. And thus
+                     it may happen that an action which is good in its species or in its circumstances is ordained to an evil end, or vice versa.
+                     However, an action is not good simply, unless it is good in all those ways: since "evil results from any single defect, but
+                     good from the complete cause," as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv).
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q18_A4-p11"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q18_A4-p12"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q18_A3.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q18_A5.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="FS_Q18_A5" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q18_A4.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q18_A6.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="FS_Q18_A5-p0.1">Whether a human action is good or evil in its species?</h4>
+                  <p id="FS_Q18_A5-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q18_A5-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that good and evil in moral actions do not make a difference of species. For the existence of good and evil
+                     in actions is in conformity with their existence in things, as stated above 
+                     <a id="FS_Q18_A5-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q18_A1.html">(A[1])</a>. But good and evil do not make a specific difference in things; for a good man is specifically the same as a bad man. Therefore
+                     neither do they make a specific difference in actions.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q18_A5-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, since evil is a privation, it is a non-being. But non-being cannot be a difference, according to the Philosopher
+                     (Metaph. iii, 3). Since therefore the difference constitutes the species, it seems that an action is not constituted in a
+                     species through being evil. Consequently good and evil do not diversify the species of human actions.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q18_A5-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, acts that differ in species produce different effects. But the same specific effect results from a good and from
+                     an evil action: thus a man is born of adulterous or of lawful wedlock. Therefore good and evil actions do not differ in species.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q18_A5-p5">
+                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, actions are sometimes said to be good or bad from a circumstance, as stated above 
+                     <a id="FS_Q18_A5-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q18_A3.html">(A[3])</a>. But since a circumstance is an accident, it does not give an action its species. Therefore human actions do not differ in
+                     species on account of their goodness or malice.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q18_A5-p6">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> According to the Philosopher (Ethic ii. 1) "like habits produce like actions." But a good and a bad habit differ in species,
+                     as liberality and prodigality. Therefore also good and bad actions differ in species.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q18_A5-p7">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> Every action derives its species from its object, as stated above 
+                     <a id="FS_Q18_A5-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q18_A2.html">(A[2])</a>. Hence it follows that a difference of object causes a difference of species in actions. Now, it must be observed that a
+                     difference of objects causes a difference of species in actions, according as the latter are referred to one active principle,
+                     which does not cause a difference in actions, according as they are referred to another active principle. Because
+                     nothing accidental constitutes a species, but only that which is essential; and a difference of object may be essential in
+                     reference to one active principle, and accidental in reference to another. Thus to know color and to know sound, differ essentially
+                     in reference to sense, but not in reference to the intellect.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q18_A5-p8"> Now in human actions, good and evil are predicated in reference to the reason; because as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv),
+                     "the good of man is to be in accordance with reason," and evil is "to be against reason." For that is good for a thing which
+                     suits it in regard to its form; and evil, that which is against the order of its form. It is therefore evident that the difference
+                     of good and evil considered in reference to the object is an essential difference in relation to reason;
+                     that is to say, according as the object is suitable or unsuitable to reason. Now certain actions are called human or moral,
+                     inasmuch as they proceed from the reason. Consequently it is evident that good and evil diversify the species in human actions;
+                     since essential differences cause a difference of species.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q18_A5-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Even in natural things, good and evil, inasmuch as something is according to nature, and something against nature, diversify
+                     the natural species; for a dead body and a living body are not of the same species. In like manner, good, inasmuch as it is
+                     in accord with reason, and evil, inasmuch as it is against reason, diversify the moral species.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q18_A5-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Evil implies privation, not absolute, but affecting some potentiality. For an action is said to be evil in its species, not
+                     because it has no object at all; but because it has an object in disaccord with reason, for instance, to appropriate another's
+                     property. Wherefore in so far as the object is something positive, it can constitute the species of an evil act.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q18_A5-p11">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The conjugal act and adultery, as compared to reason, differ specifically and have effects specifically different; because
+                     the other deserves praise and reward, the other, blame and punishment. But as compared to the generative power, they do not
+                     differ in species; and thus they have one specific effect.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q18_A5-p12">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> A circumstance is sometimes taken as the essential difference of the object, as compared to reason; and then it can specify
+                     a moral act. And it must needs be so whenever a circumstance transforms an action from good to evil; for a circumstance would
+                     not make an action evil, except through being repugnant to reason.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q18_A5-p13"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q18_A5-p14"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q18_A4.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q18_A6.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="FS_Q18_A6" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q18_A5.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q18_A7.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="FS_Q18_A6-p0.1">Whether an action has the species of good or evil from its end?</h4>
+                  <p id="FS_Q18_A6-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q18_A6-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the good and evil which are from the end do not diversify the species of actions. For actions derive their
+                     species from the object. But the end is altogether apart from the object. Therefore the good and evil which are from the end
+                     do not diversify the species of an action.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q18_A6-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, that which is accidental does not constitute the species, as stated above 
+                     <a id="FS_Q18_A6-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q18_A5.html">(A[5])</a>. But it is accidental to an action to be ordained to some particular end; for instance, to give alms from vainglory. Therefore
+                     actions are not diversified as to species, according to the good and evil which are from the end.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q18_A6-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, acts that differ in species, can be ordained to the same end: thus to the end of vainglory, actions of various virtues
+                     and vices can be ordained. Therefore the good and evil which are taken from the end, do not diversify the species of action.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q18_A6-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It has been shown above (
+                     <a id="FS_Q18_A6-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q1_A3.html">Q[1], A[3]</a>) that human actions derive their species from the end. Therefore good and evil in respect of the end diversify the species
+                     of actions.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q18_A6-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> Certain actions are called human, inasmuch as they are voluntary, as stated above (
+                     <a id="FS_Q18_A6-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q1_A1.html">Q[1], A[1]</a>). Now, in a voluntary action, there is a twofold action, viz. the interior action of the will, and the external action: and
+                     each of these actions has its object. The end is properly the object of the interior act of the will: while the object of
+                     the external action, is that on which the action is brought to bear. Therefore just as the
+                     external action takes its species from the object on which it bears; so the interior act of the will takes its species from
+                     the end, as from its own proper object.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q18_A6-p7"> Now that which is on the part of the will is formal in regard to that which is on the part of the external action: because
+                     the will uses the limbs to act as instruments; nor have external actions any measure of morality, save in so far as they are
+                     voluntary. Consequently the species of a human act is considered formally with regard to the end, but materially with regard
+                     to the object of the external action. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 2) that "he who steals that he may
+                     commit adultery, is strictly speaking, more adulterer than thief."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q18_A6-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The end also has the character of an object, as stated above.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q18_A6-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Although it is accidental to the external action to be ordained to some particular end, it is not accidental to the interior
+                     act of the will, which act is compared to the external act, as form to matter.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q18_A6-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> When many actions, differing in species, are ordained to the same end, there is indeed a diversity of species on the part
+                     of the external actions; but unity of species on the part of the internal action.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q18_A6-p11"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q18_A6-p12"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q18_A5.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q18_A7.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="FS_Q18_A7" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q18_A6.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q18_A8.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="FS_Q18_A7-p0.1">Whether the species derived from the end is contained under the species derived from the object, as under its genus, or conversely?</h4>
+                  <p id="FS_Q18_A7-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q18_A7-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the species of goodness derived from the end is contained under the species of goodness derived from the
+                     object, as a species is contained under its genus; for instance, when a man commits a theft in order to give alms. For an
+                     action takes its species from its object, as stated above (
+                     <a id="FS_Q18_A7-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q18_A2.html">AA[2]</a>,6). But it is impossible for a thing to be contained under another species, if this species be not contained under the proper
+                     species of that thing; because the same thing cannot be contained in different species that are not subordinate to one another.
+                     Therefore the species which is taken from the end, is contained under the species which is taken from the object.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q18_A7-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the last difference always constitutes the most specific species. But the difference derived from the end seems
+                     to come after the difference derived from the object: because the end is something last. Therefore the species derived from
+                     the end, is contained under the species derived from the object, as its most specific species.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q18_A7-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the more formal a difference is compared to genus, as form to matter. But the species derived from the end, is more
+                     formal than that which is derived from the object, as stated above 
+                     <a id="FS_Q18_A7-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q18_A6.html">(A[6])</a>. Therefore the species derived from the end is contained under the species derived from the object, as the most specific
+                     species is contained under the subaltern genus.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q18_A7-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Each genus has its determinate differences. But an action of one same species on the part of its object, can be ordained
+                     to an infinite number of ends: for instance, theft can be ordained to an infinite number of good and bad ends. Therefore the
+                     species derived from the end is not contained under the species derived from the object, as under its genus.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q18_A7-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> The object of the external act can stand in a twofold relation to the end of the will: first, as being of itself ordained
+                     thereto; thus to fight well is of itself ordained to victory; secondly, as being ordained thereto accidentally; thus to take
+                     what belongs to another is ordained accidentally to the giving of alms. Now the differences that divide a genus, and constitute
+                     the species of that genus, must, as the Philosopher says (Metaph. vii, 12), divide that
+                     genus essentially: and if they divide it accidentally, the division is incorrect: as, if one were to say: "Animals are divided
+                     into rational and irrational; and the irrational into animals with wings, and animals without wings"; for "winged" and "wingless"
+                     are not essential determinations of the irrational being. But the following division would be correct: "Some animals have
+                     feet, some have no feet: and of those that have feet, some have two feet, some four, some many": because the latter
+                     division is an essential determination of the former. Accordingly when the object is not of itself ordained to the end, the
+                     specific difference derived from the object is not an essential determination of the species derived from the end, nor is
+                     the reverse the case. Wherefore one of these species is not under the other; but then the moral action is contained under
+                     two species that are disparate, as it were. Consequently we say that he that commits theft for the sake of adultery, is guilty
+                     of a
+                     twofold malice in one action. On the other hand, if the object be of itself ordained to the end, one of these differences
+                     is an essential determination of the other. Wherefore one of these species will be contained under the other.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q18_A7-p7"> It remains to be considered which of the two is contained under the other. In order to make this clear, we must first of
+                     all observe that the more particular the form is from which a difference is taken, the more specific is the difference. Secondly,
+                     that the more universal an agent is, the more universal a form does it cause. Thirdly, that the more remote an end is, the
+                     more universal the agent to which it corresponds; thus victory, which is the last end of the army, is the end
+                     intended by the commander in chief; while the right ordering of this or that regiment is the end intended by one of the lower
+                     officers. From all this it follows that the specific difference derived from the end, is more general; and that the difference
+                     derived from an object which of itself is ordained to that end, is a specific difference in relation to the former. For the
+                     will, the proper object of which is the end, is the universal mover in respect of all the powers of the soul, the proper
+                     objects of which are the objects of their particular acts.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q18_A7-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> One and the same thing, considered in its substance, cannot be in two species, one of which is not subordinate to the other.
+                     But in respect of those things which are superadded to the substance, one thing can be contained under different species.
+                     Thus one and the same fruit, as to its color, is contained under one species, i.e. a white thing: and, as to its perfume,
+                     under the species of sweet-smelling things. In like manner an action which, as to its
+                     substance, is in one natural species, considered in respect to the moral conditions that are added to it, can belong to two
+                     species, as stated above (
+                     <a id="FS_Q18_A7-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q1_A3.html">Q[1], A[3]</a>, ad 3).
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q18_A7-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The end is last in execution; but first in the intention of the reason, in regard to which moral actions receive their species.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q18_A7-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Difference is compared to genus as form to matter, inasmuch as it actualizes the genus. On the other hand, the genus is considered
+                     as more formal than the species, inasmuch as it is something more absolute and less contracted. Wherefore also the parts of
+                     a definition are reduced to the genus of formal cause, as is stated in Phys. ii, 3. And in this sense the genus is the formal
+                     cause of the species; and so much the more formal, as it is more
+                     universal.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q18_A7-p11"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q18_A7-p12"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q18_A6.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q18_A8.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="FS_Q18_A8" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q18_A7.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q18_A9.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="FS_Q18_A8-p0.1">Whether any action is indifferent in its species?</h4>
+                  <p id="FS_Q18_A8-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q18_A8-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that no action is indifferent in its species. For evil is the privation of good, according to Augustine (Enchiridion
+                     xi). But privation and habit are immediate contraries, according to the Philosopher (Categor. viii). Therefore there is not
+                     such thing as an action that is indifferent in its species, as though it were between good and evil.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q18_A8-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, human actions derive their species from their end or object, as stated above 
+                     <a id="FS_Q18_A8-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q18_A6.html">(A[6];</a> Q[1], A[3]). But every end and every object is either good or bad. Therefore every human action is good or evil according
+                     to its species. None, therefore, is indifferent in its species.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q18_A8-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, as stated above 
+                     <a id="FS_Q18_A8-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q18_A1.html">(A[1])</a>, an action is said to be good, when it has its due complement of goodness; and evil, when it lacks that complement. But every
+                     action must needs either have the entire plenitude of its goodness, or lack it in some respect. Therefore every action must
+                     needs be either good or bad in its species, and none is indifferent.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q18_A8-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte ii, 18) that "there are certain deeds of a middle kind, which can be done with a good
+                     or evil mind, of which it is rash to form a judgment." Therefore some actions are indifferent according to their species.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q18_A8-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above (
+                     <a id="FS_Q18_A8-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q18_A2.html">AA[2]</a>,5), every action takes its species from its object; while human action, which is called moral, takes its species from the
+                     object, in relation to the principle of human actions, which is the reason. Wherefore if the object of an action includes
+                     something in accord with the order of reason, it will be a good action according to its species; for instance, to give alms
+                     to a person in want. On the other hand, if it
+                     includes something repugnant to the order of reason, it will be an evil act according to its species; for instance, to steal,
+                     which is to appropriate what belongs to another. But it may happen that the object of an action does not include something
+                     pertaining to the order of reason; for instance, to pick up a straw from the ground, to walk in the fields, and the like:
+                     and such actions are indifferent according to their species.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q18_A8-p7">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Privation is twofold. One is privation "as a result" [privatum esse], and this leaves nothing, but takes all away: thus blindness
+                     takes away sight altogether; darkness, light; and death, life. Between this privation and the contrary habit, there can be
+                     no medium in respect of the proper subject. The other is privation "in process" [privari]: thus sickness is privation of health;
+                     not that it takes health away altogether, but that it is a kind of road
+                     to the entire loss of health, occasioned by death. And since this sort of privation leaves something, it is not always the
+                     immediate contrary of the opposite habit. In this way evil is a privation of good, as Simplicius says in his commentary on
+                     the Categories: because it does not take away all good, but leaves some. Consequently there can be something between good
+                     and evil.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q18_A8-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Every object or end has some goodness or malice, at least natural to it: but this does not imply moral goodness or malice,
+                     which is considered in relation to the reason, as stated above. And it is of this that we are here treating.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q18_A8-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Not everything belonging to an action belongs also to its species. Wherefore although an action's specific nature may not
+                     contain all that belongs to the full complement of its goodness, it is not therefore an action specifically bad; nor is it
+                     specifically good. Thus a man in regard to his species is neither virtuous nor wicked.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q18_A8-p10"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q18_A8-p11"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q18_A7.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q18_A9.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="FS_Q18_A9" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q18_A8.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q18_A10.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="FS_Q18_A9-p0.1">Whether an individual action can be indifferent?</h4>
+                  <p id="FS_Q18_A9-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q18_A9-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that an individual action can be indifferent. For there is no species that does not, cannot, contain an individual.
+                     But an action can be indifferent in its species, as stated above 
+                     <a id="FS_Q18_A9-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q18_A8.html">(A[8])</a>. Therefore an individual action can be indifferent.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q18_A9-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, individual actions cause like habits, as stated in Ethic. ii, 1. But a habit can be indifferent: for the Philosopher
+                     says (Ethic. iv, 1) that those who are of an even temper and prodigal disposition are not evil; and yet it is evident that
+                     they are not good, since they depart from virtue; and thus they are indifferent in respect of a habit. Therefore some individual
+                     actions are indifferent.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q18_A9-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, moral good belongs to virtue, while moral evil belongs to vice. But it happens sometimes that a man fails to ordain
+                     a specifically indifferent action to a vicious or virtuous end. Therefore an individual action may happen to be indifferent.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q18_A9-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Gregory says in a homily (vi in Evang.): "An idle word is one that lacks either the usefulness of rectitude or the motive
+                     of just necessity or pious utility." But an idle word is an evil, because "men . . . shall render an account of it in the
+                     day of judgment" (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q18_A9-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.12.36" target="asv">Mat. 12:36</a>): while if it does not lack the motive of just necessity or pious utility, it is good. Therefore every word is either good
+                     or bad. For the same reason every other
+                     action is either good or bad. Therefore no individual action is indifferent.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q18_A9-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> It sometimes happens that an action is indifferent in its species, but considered in the individual it is good or evil. And
+                     the reason of this is because a moral action, as stated above 
+                     <a id="FS_Q18_A9-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q18_A3.html">(A[3])</a>, derives its goodness not only from its object, whence it takes its species; but also from the circumstances, which are its
+                     accidents, as it were; just as something belongs to a man by reason of his individual accidents, which does not belong
+                     to him by reason of his species. And every individual action must needs have some circumstance that makes it good or bad,
+                     at least in respect of the intention of the end. For since it belongs to the reason to direct; if an action that proceeds
+                     from deliberate reason be not directed to the due end, it is, by that fact alone, repugnant to reason, and has the character
+                     of evil. But if it be directed to a due end, it is in accord with reason; wherefore it has the character of good. Now it must
+                     needs be either directed or not directed to a due end. Consequently every human action that proceeds from deliberate reason,
+                     if it be considered in the individual, must be good or bad.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q18_A9-p7"> If, however, it does not proceed from deliberate reason, but from some act of the imagination, as when a man strokes his
+                     beard, or moves his hand or foot; such an action, properly speaking, is not moral or human; since this depends on the reason.
+                     Hence it will be indifferent, as standing apart from the genus of moral actions.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q18_A9-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> For an action to be indifferent in its species can be understood in several ways. First in such a way that its species demands
+                     that it remain indifferent; and the objection proceeds along this line. But no action can be specifically indifferent thus:
+                     since no object of human action is such that it cannot be directed to good or evil, either through its end or through a circumstance.
+                     Secondly, specific indifference of an action may be due to the fact
+                     that as far as its species is concerned, it is neither good nor bad. Wherefore it can be made good or bad by something else.
+                     Thus man, as far as his species is concerned, is neither white nor black; nor is it a condition of his species that he should
+                     not be black or white; but blackness or whiteness is superadded to man by other principles than those of his species.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q18_A9-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The Philosopher states that a man is evil, properly speaking, if he be hurtful to others. And accordingly, because he hurts
+                     none save himself. And the same applies to all others who are not hurtful to other men. But we say here that evil, in general,
+                     is all that is repugnant to right reason. And in this sense every individual action is either good or bad, as stated above.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q18_A9-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Whenever an end is intended by deliberate reason, it belongs either to the good of some virtue, or to the evil of some vice.
+                     Thus, if a man's action is directed to the support or repose of his body, it is also directed to the good of virtue, provided
+                     he direct his body itself to the good of virtue. The same clearly applies to other actions.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q18_A9-p11"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q18_A9-p12"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q18_A8.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q18_A10.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="FS_Q18_A10" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q18_A9.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q18_A11.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="FS_Q18_A10-p0.1">Whether a circumstance places a moral action in the species of good or evil?</h4>
+                  <p id="FS_Q18_A10-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q18_A10-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that a circumstance cannot place a moral action in the species of good or evil. For the species of an action
+                     is taken from its object. But circumstances differ from the object. Therefore circumstances do not give an action its species.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q18_A10-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, circumstances are as accidents in relation to the moral action, as stated above (
+                     <a id="FS_Q18_A10-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q7_A1.html">Q[7], A[1]</a>). But an accident does not constitute the species. Therefore a circumstance does not constitute a species of good or evil.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q18_A10-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, one thing is not in several species. But one action has several circumstances. Therefore a circumstance does not
+                     place a moral action in a species of good or evil.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q18_A10-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Place is a circumstance. But place makes a moral action to be in a certain species of evil; for theft of a thing from a holy
+                     place is a sacrilege. Therefore a circumstance makes a moral action to be specifically good or bad.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q18_A10-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> Just as the species of natural things are constituted by their natural forms, so the species of moral actions are constituted
+                     by forms as conceived by the reason, as is evident from what was said above 
+                     <a id="FS_Q18_A10-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q18_A5.html">(A[5])</a>. But since nature is determinate to one thing, nor can a process of nature go on to infinity, there must needs be some ultimate
+                     form, giving a specific difference, after which no further specific difference is possible. Hence it
+                     is that in natural things, that which is accidental to a thing, cannot be taken as a difference constituting the species.
+                     But the process of reason is not fixed to one particular term, for at any point it can still proceed further. And consequently
+                     that which, in one action, is taken as a circumstance added to the object that specifies the action, can again be taken by
+                     the directing reason, as the principal condition of the object that determines the action's species. Thus to appropriate
+                     another's property is specified by reason of the property being "another's," and in this respect it is placed in the species
+                     of theft; and if we consider that action also in its bearing on place or time, then this will be an additional circumstance.
+                     But since the reason can direct as to place, time, and the like, it may happen that the condition as to place, in relation
+                     to the object, is considered as being in disaccord with reason: for instance, reason forbids damage to be done to a holy
+                     place. Consequently to steal from a holy place has an additional repugnance to the order of reason. And thus place, which
+                     was first of all considered as a circumstance, is considered here as the principal condition of the object, and as itself
+                     repugnant to reason. And in this way, whenever a circumstance has a special relation to reason, either for or against, it
+                     must needs specify the moral action whether good or bad.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q18_A10-p7">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> A circumstance, in so far as it specifies an action, is considered as a condition of the object, as stated above, and as
+                     being, as it were, a specific difference thereof.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q18_A10-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> A circumstance, so long as it is but a circumstance, does not specify an action, since thus it is a mere accident: but when
+                     it becomes a principal condition of the object, then it does specify the action.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q18_A10-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> It is not every circumstance that places the moral action in the species of good or evil; since not every circumstance implies
+                     accord or disaccord with reason. Consequently, although one action may have many circumstances, it does not follow that it
+                     is in many species. Nevertheless there is no reason why one action should not be in several, even disparate, moral species,
+                     as said above (A[7], ad 1;
+                     <a id="FS_Q18_A10-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q1_A3.html"> Q[1], A[3]</a>, ad 3).
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q18_A10-p10"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q18_A10-p11"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q18_A9.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q18_A11.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="FS_Q18_A11" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q18_A10.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q19.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="FS_Q18_A11-p0.1">Whether every circumstance that makes an action better or worse, places a moral action in a species of good or evil?</h4>
+                  <p id="FS_Q18_A11-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q18_A11-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that every circumstance relating to good or evil, specifies an action. For good and evil are specific differences
+                     of moral actions. Therefore that which causes a difference in the goodness or malice of a moral action, causes a specific
+                     difference, which is the same as to make it differ in species. Now that which makes an action better or worse, makes it differ
+                     in goodness and malice. Therefore it causes it to differ in species. Therefore every
+                     circumstance that makes an action better or worse, constitutes a species.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q18_A11-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, an additional circumstance either has in itself the character of goodness or malice, or it has not. If not, it cannot
+                     make the action better or worse; because what is not good, cannot make a greater good; and what is not evil, cannot make a
+                     greater evil. But if it has in itself the character of good or evil, for this very reason it has a certain species of good
+                     or evil. Therefore every circumstance that makes an action better or worse, constitutes a
+                     new species of good or evil.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q18_A11-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, according to Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv), "evil is caused by each single defect." Now every circumstance that increases
+                     malice, has a special defect. Therefore every such circumstance adds a new species of sin. And for the same reason, every
+                     circumstance that increases goodness, seems to add a new species of goodness: just as every unity added to a number makes
+                     a new species of number; since the good consists in "number, weight, and measure" (
+                     <a id="FS_Q18_A11-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q5_A5.html">FP, Q[5], A[5]</a>).
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q18_A11-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> More and less do not change a species. But more and less is a circumstance of additional goodness or malice. Therefore not
+                     every circumstance that makes a moral action better or worse, places it in a species of good or evil.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q18_A11-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above 
+                     <a id="FS_Q18_A11-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q18_A10.html">(A[10])</a>, a circumstance gives the species of good or evil to a moral action, in so far as it regards a special order of reason. Now
+                     it happens sometimes that a circumstance does not regard a special order of reason in respect of good or evil, except on the
+                     supposition of another previous circumstance, from which the moral action takes its species of good or evil. Thus to take
+                     something in a large or small quantity,
+                     does not regard the order of reason in respect of good or evil, except a certain other condition be presupposed, from which
+                     the action takes its malice or goodness; for instance, if what is taken belongs to another, which makes the action to be discordant
+                     with reason. Wherefore to take what belongs to another in a large or small quantity, does not change the species of the sin.
+                     Nevertheless it can aggravate or diminish the sin. The same applies to other evil or good actions. Consequently not
+                     every circumstance that makes a moral action better or worse, changes its species.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q18_A11-p7">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> In things which can be more or less intense, the difference of more or less does not change the species: thus by differing
+                     in whiteness through being more or less white a thing is not changed in regard to its species of color. In like manner that
+                     which makes an action to be more or less good or evil, does not make the action differ in species.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q18_A11-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> A circumstance that aggravates a sin, or adds to the goodness of an action, sometimes has no goodness or malice in itself,
+                     but in regard to some other condition of the action, as stated above. Consequently it does not add a new species, but adds
+                     to the goodness or malice derived from this other condition of the action.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q18_A11-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> A circumstance does not always involve a distinct defect of its own; sometimes it causes a defect in reference to something
+                     else. In like manner a circumstance does not always add further perfection, except in reference to something else. And, for
+                     as much as it does, although it may add to the goodness or malice, it does not always change the species of good or evil.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q18_A11-p10"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q18_A11-p11"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q18_A10.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q19.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <a href="summa.FS_Q17_A9.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.FS_Q18_A1.html"></a>
+            </div>
+            <div id="FS_Q19" class="div3">
+               <a href="summa.FS_Q18_A11.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.FS_Q19_A1.html"></a>
+               <h3 id="FS_Q19-p0.1">OF THE GOODNESS AND MALICE OF THE INTERIOR ACT OF THE WILL (TEN ARTICLES)</h3>
+               <p id="FS_Q19-p1"></p>
+               <p id="FS_Q19-p2"> We must now consider the goodness of the interior act of the will; under which head there are ten points of inquiry:</p>
+               <p id="FS_Q19-p3"> (1) Whether the goodness of the will depends on the subject?</p>
+               <p id="FS_Q19-p4"> (2) Whether it depends on the object alone?</p>
+               <p id="FS_Q19-p5"> (3) Whether it depends on reason?</p>
+               <p id="FS_Q19-p6"> (4) Whether it depends on the eternal law?</p>
+               <p id="FS_Q19-p7"> (5) Whether erring reason binds?</p>
+               <p id="FS_Q19-p8"> (6) Whether the will is evil if it follows the erring reason against the law of God?</p>
+               <p id="FS_Q19-p9"> (7) Whether the goodness of the will in regard to the means, depends on the intention of the end?</p>
+               <p id="FS_Q19-p10"> (8) Whether the degree of goodness or malice in the will depends on the degree of good or evil in the intention?</p>
+               <p id="FS_Q19-p11"> (9) Whether the goodness of the will depends on its conformity to the Divine Will?</p>
+               <p id="FS_Q19-p12"> (10) Whether it is necessary for the human will, in order to be good, to be conformed to the Divine Will, as regards the
+                  thing willed?
+               </p>
+               <div id="FS_Q19_A1" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q19.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q19_A2.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="FS_Q19_A1-p0.1">Whether the goodness of the will depends on the object?</h4>
+                  <p id="FS_Q19_A1-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q19_A1-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the goodness of the will does not depend on the object. For the will cannot be directed otherwise than
+                     to what is good: since "evil is outside the scope of the will," as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv). If therefore the goodness
+                     of the will depended on the object, it would follow that every act of the will is good, and none bad.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q19_A1-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, good is first of all in the end: wherefore the goodness of the end, as such, does not depend on any other. But,
+                     according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 5), "goodness of action is the end, but goodness of making is never the end": because
+                     the latter is always ordained to the thing made, as to its end. Therefore the goodness of the act of the will does not depend
+                     on any object.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q19_A1-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, such as a thing is, such does it make a thing to be. But the object of the will is good, by reason of the goodness
+                     of nature. Therefore it cannot give moral goodness to the will. Therefore the moral goodness of the will does not depend on
+                     the object.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q19_A1-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 1) that justice is that habit "from which men wish for just things": and accordingly, virtue
+                     is a habit from which men wish for good things. But a good will is one which is in accordance with virtue. Therefore the goodness
+                     of the will is from the fact that a man wills that which is good.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q19_A1-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> Good and evil are essential differences of the act of the will. Because good and evil of themselves regard the will; just
+                     as truth and falsehood regard reason; the act of which is divided essentially by the difference of truth and falsehood, for
+                     as much as an opinion is said to be true or false. Consequently good and evil will are acts differing in species. Now the
+                     specific difference in acts is according to objects, as stated above (
+                     <a id="FS_Q19_A1-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q18_A5.html">Q[18], A[5]</a>). Therefore good and evil in the acts of the will is derived properly from the objects.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q19_A1-p7">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The will is not always directed to what is truly good, but sometimes to the apparent good; which has indeed some measure
+                     of good, but not of a good that is simply suitable to be desired. Hence it is that the act of the will is not always good,
+                     but sometimes evil.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q19_A1-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Although an action can, in a certain way, be man's last end; nevertheless such action is not an act of the will, as stated
+                     above (
+                     <a id="FS_Q19_A1-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q1_A1.html">Q[1], A[1]</a>, ad 2).
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q19_A1-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Good is presented to the will as its object by the reason: and in so far as it is in accord with reason, it enters the moral
+                     order, and causes moral goodness in the act of the will: because the reason is the principle of human and moral acts, as stated
+                     above (
+                     <a id="FS_Q19_A1-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q18_A5.html">Q[18], A[5]</a>).
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q19_A1-p10"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q19_A1-p11"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q19.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q19_A2.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="FS_Q19_A2" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q19_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q19_A3.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="FS_Q19_A2-p0.1">Whether the goodness of the will depends on the object alone?</h4>
+                  <p id="FS_Q19_A2-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q19_A2-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the goodness of the will does not depend on the object alone. For the end has a closer relationship to
+                     the will than to any other power. But the acts of the other powers derive goodness not only from the object but also from
+                     the end, as we have shown above (
+                     <a id="FS_Q19_A2-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q18_A4.html">Q[18] , A[4]</a>). Therefore the act also of the will derives goodness not only from the object but also from the end.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q19_A2-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the goodness of an action is derived not only from the object but also from the circumstances, as stated above (
+                     <a id="FS_Q19_A2-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q18_A3.html">Q[18], A[3]</a>). But according to the diversity of circumstances there may be diversity of goodness and malice in the act of the will: for
+                     instance, if a man will, when he ought, where he ought, as much as he ought, and how he ought, or if he will as he ought not.
+                     Therefore the goodness of the will depends not only on
+                     the object, but also on the circumstances.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q19_A2-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, ignorance of circumstances excuses malice of the will, as stated above (
+                     <a id="FS_Q19_A2-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q6_A8.html">Q[6], A[8]</a>). But it would not be so, unless the goodness or malice of the will depended on the circumstances. Therefore the goodness
+                     and malice of the will depend on the circumstances, and not only on the object.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q19_A2-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> An action does not take its species from the circumstances as such, as stated above (Q[18], A[10], ad 2). But good and evil
+                     are specific differences of the act of the will, as stated above 
+                     <a id="FS_Q19_A2-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q19_A1.html">(A[1])</a>. Therefore the goodness and malice of the will depend, not on the circumstances, but on the object alone.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q19_A2-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> In every genus, the more a thing is first, the more simple it is, and the fewer the principles of which it consists: thus
+                     primary bodies are simple. Hence it is to be observed that the first things in every genus, are, in some way, simple and consist
+                     of one principle. Now the principle of the goodness and malice of human actions is taken from the act of the will. Consequently
+                     the goodness and malice of the act of the will depend on some one thing; while the
+                     goodness and malice of other acts may depend on several things.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q19_A2-p7"> Now that one thing which is the principle in each genus, is not something accidental to that genus, but something essential
+                     thereto: because whatever is accidental is reduced to something essential, as to its principle. Therefore the goodness of
+                     the will's act depends on that one thing alone, which of itself causes goodness in the act; and that one thing is the object,
+                     and not the circumstances, which are accidents, as it were, of the act.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q19_A2-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The end is the object of the will, but not of the other powers. Hence, in regard to the act of the will, the goodness derived
+                     from the object, does not differ from that which is derived from the end, as they differ in the acts of the other powers;
+                     except perhaps accidentally, in so far as one end depends on another, and one act of the will on another.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q19_A2-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Given that the act of the will is fixed on some good, no circumstances can make that act bad. Consequently when it is said
+                     that a man wills a good when he ought not, or where he ought not, this can be understood in two ways. First, so that this
+                     circumstance is referred to the thing willed. And thus the act of the will is not fixed on something good: since to will to
+                     do something when it ought not to be done, is not to will something good. Secondly, so
+                     that the circumstance is referred to the act of willing. And thus, it is impossible to will something good when one ought
+                     not to, because one ought always to will what is good: except, perhaps, accidentally, in so far as a man by willing some particular
+                     good, is prevented from willing at the same time another good which he ought to will at that time. And then evil results,
+                     not from his willing that particular good, but from his not willing the other. The same applies to the other
+                     circumstances.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q19_A2-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Ignorance of circumstances excuses malice of the will, in so far as the circumstance affects the thing willed: that is to
+                     say, in so far as a man ignores the circumstances of the act which he wills.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q19_A2-p11"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q19_A2-p12"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q19_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q19_A3.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="FS_Q19_A3" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q19_A2.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q19_A4.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="FS_Q19_A3-p0.1">Whether the goodness of the will depends on reason?</h4>
+                  <p id="FS_Q19_A3-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q19_A3-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the goodness of the will does not depend on reason. For what comes first does not depend on what follows.
+                     But the good belongs to the will before it belongs to reason, as is clear from what has been said above (
+                     <a id="FS_Q19_A3-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q9_A1.html">Q[9], A[1]</a>). Therefore the goodness of the will does not depend on reason.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q19_A3-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 2) that the goodness of the practical intellect is "a truth that is in conformity
+                     with right desire." But right desire is a good will. Therefore the goodness of the practical reason depends on the goodness
+                     of the will, rather than conversely.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q19_A3-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the mover does not depend on that which is moved, but vice versa. But the will moves the reason and the other powers,
+                     as stated above (
+                     <a id="FS_Q19_A3-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q9_A1.html">Q[9], A[1]</a>). Therefore the goodness of the will does not depend on reason.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q19_A3-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Hilary says (De Trin. x): "It is an unruly will that persists in its desires in opposition to reason." But the goodness of
+                     the will consists in not being unruly. Therefore the goodness of the will depends on its being subject to reason.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q19_A3-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above (
+                     <a id="FS_Q19_A3-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q19_A1.html">AA[1]</a>,2), the goodness of the will depends properly on the object. Now the will's object is proposed to it by reason. Because the
+                     good understood is the proportionate object of the will; while sensitive or imaginary good is proportionate not to the will
+                     but to the sensitive appetite: since the will can tend to the universal good, which reason apprehends; whereas the sensitive
+                     appetite tends only to the particular
+                     good, apprehended by the sensitive power. Therefore the goodness of the will depends on reason, in the same way as it depends
+                     on the object.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q19_A3-p7">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The good considered as such, i.e. as appetible, pertains to the will before pertaining to the reason. But considered as true
+                     it pertains to the reason, before, under the aspect of goodness, pertaining to the will: because the will cannot desire a
+                     good that is not previously apprehended by reason.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q19_A3-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The Philosopher speaks here of the practical intellect, in so far as it counsels and reasons about the means: for in this
+                     respect it is perfected by prudence. Now in regard to the means, the rectitude of the reason depends on its conformity with
+                     the desire of a due end: nevertheless the very desire of the due end presupposes on the part of reason a right apprehension
+                     of the end.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q19_A3-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The will moves the reason in one way: the reason moves the will in another, viz. on the part of the object, as stated above
+                     (
+                     <a id="FS_Q19_A3-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q9_A1.html">Q[9], A[1]</a>).
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q19_A3-p10"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q19_A3-p11"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q19_A2.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q19_A4.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="FS_Q19_A4" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q19_A3.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q19_A5.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="FS_Q19_A4-p0.1">Whether the goodness of the will depends on the eternal law?</h4>
+                  <p id="FS_Q19_A4-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q19_A4-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the goodness of the human will does not depend on the eternal law. Because to one thing there is one rule
+                     and one measure. But the rule of the human will, on which its goodness depends, is right reason. Therefore the goodness of
+                     the will does not depend on the eternal law.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q19_A4-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, "a measure is homogeneous with the thing measured" (Metaph. x, 1). But the eternal law is not homogeneous with the
+                     human will. Therefore the eternal law cannot be the measure on which the goodness of the human will depends.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q19_A4-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, a measure should be most certain. But the eternal law is unknown to us. Therefore it cannot be the measure on which
+                     the goodness of our will depends.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q19_A4-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (Contra Faust. xxii, 27) that "sin is a deed, word or desire against the eternal law." But malice of the will
+                     is the root of sin. Therefore, since malice is contrary to goodness, the goodness of the will depends on the eternal law.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q19_A4-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> Wherever a number of causes are subordinate to one another, the effect depends more on the first than on the second cause:
+                     since the second cause acts only in virtue of the first. Now it is from the eternal law, which is the Divine Reason, that
+                     human reason is the rule of the human will, from which the human derives its goodness. Hence it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q19_A4-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.4.6" target="asv">Ps. 4:6,7</a>): "Many say: Who showeth us good things? The light of Thy countenance, O Lord,
+                     is signed upon us": as though to say: "The light of our reason is able to show us good things, and guide our will, in so far
+                     as it is the light (i.e. derived from) Thy countenance." It is therefore evident that the goodness of the human will depends
+                     on the eternal law much more than on human reason: and when human reason fails we must have recourse to the Eternal Reason.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q19_A4-p7">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> To one thing there are not several proximate measures; but there can be several measures if one is subordinate to the other.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q19_A4-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> A proximate measure is homogeneous with the thing measured; a remote measure is not.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q19_A4-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Although the eternal law is unknown to us according as it is in the Divine Mind: nevertheless, it becomes known to us somewhat,
+                     either by natural reason which is derived therefrom as its proper image; or by some sort of additional revelation.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q19_A4-p10"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q19_A4-p11"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q19_A3.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q19_A5.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="FS_Q19_A5" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q19_A4.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q19_A6.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="FS_Q19_A5-p0.1">Whether the will is evil when it is at variance with erring reason?</h4>
+                  <p id="FS_Q19_A5-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q19_A5-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the will is not evil when it is at variance with erring reason. Because the reason is the rule of the
+                     human will, in so far as it is derived from the eternal law, as stated above 
+                     <a id="FS_Q19_A5-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q19_A4.html">(A[4])</a>. But erring reason is not derived from the eternal law. Therefore erring reason is not the rule of the human will. Therefore
+                     the will is not evil, if it be at variance with erring reason.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q19_A5-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, according to Augustine, the command of a lower authority does not bind if it be contrary to the command of a higher
+                     authority: for instance, if a provincial governor command something that is forbidden by the emperor. But erring reason sometimes
+                     proposes what is against the command of a higher power, namely, God Whose power is supreme. Therefore the decision of an erring
+                     reason does not bind. Consequently the will is not evil if it be at variance with
+                     erring reason.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q19_A5-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, every evil will is reducible to some species of malice. But the will that is at variance with erring reason is not
+                     reducible to some species of malice. For instance, if a man's reason err in telling him to commit fornication, his will in
+                     not willing to do so, cannot be reduced to any species of malice. Therefore the will is not evil when it is at variance with
+                     erring reason.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q19_A5-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> As stated in the 
+                     <a id="FS_Q19_A5-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q79_A13.html">FP, Q[79], A[13]</a>, conscience is nothing else than the application of knowledge to some action. Now knowledge is in the reason. Therefore when
+                     the will is at variance with erring reason, it is against conscience. But every such will is evil; for it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q19_A5-p5.2" href="./asv.html#Rom.14.23" target="asv">Rom. 14:23</a>): "All that is not of faith"---i.e. all that is against conscience---"is sin." Therefore the will is evil when it is at
+                     variance with erring reason.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q19_A5-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> Since conscience is a kind of dictate of the reason (for it is an application of knowledge to action, as was stated in the
+                     
+                     <a id="FS_Q19_A5-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q19_A13.html">FP, Q[19], A[13]</a>), to inquire whether the will is evil when it is at variance with erring reason, is the same as to inquire "whether an erring
+                     conscience binds." On this matter, some distinguished three kinds of actions: for some are good generically; some are indifferent;
+                     some are evil generically. And they say
+                     that if reason or conscience tell us to do something which is good generically, there is no error: and in like manner if it
+                     tell us not to do something which is evil generically; since it is the same reason that prescribes what is good and forbids
+                     what is evil. On the other hand if a man's reason or conscience tells him that he is bound by precept to do what is evil in
+                     itself; or that what is good in itself, is forbidden, then his reason or conscience errs. In like manner if a man's reason
+                     or
+                     conscience tell him, that what is indifferent in itself, for instance to raise a straw from the ground, is forbidden or commanded,
+                     his reason or conscience errs. They say, therefore, that reason or conscience when erring in matters of indifference, either
+                     by commanding or by forbidding them, binds: so that the will which is at variance with that erring reason is evil and sinful.
+                     But they say that when reason or conscience errs in commanding what is evil in itself, or in forbidding what is good
+                     in itself and necessary for salvation, it does not bind; wherefore in such cases the will which is at variance with erring
+                     reason or conscience is not evil.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q19_A5-p7"> But this is unreasonable. For in matters of indifference, the will that is at variance with erring reason or conscience,
+                     is evil in some way on account of the object, on which the goodness or malice of the will depends; not indeed on account of
+                     the object according as it is in its own nature; but according as it is accidentally apprehended by reason as something evil
+                     to do or to avoid. And since the object of the will is that which is proposed by the reason, as stated above
+                     
+                     <a id="FS_Q19_A5-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q19_A3.html">(A[3])</a>, from the very fact that a thing is proposed by the reason as being evil, the will by tending thereto becomes evil. And this
+                     is the case not only in indifferent matters, but also in those that are good or evil in themselves. For not only indifferent
+                     matters can received the character of goodness or malice accidentally; but also that which is good, can receive the character
+                     of evil, or that which is evil, can receive the character of goodness, on account of the
+                     reason apprehending it as such. For instance, to refrain from fornication is good: yet the will does not tend to this good
+                     except in so far as it is proposed by the reason. If, therefore, the erring reason propose it as an evil, the will tends to
+                     it as to something evil. Consequently the will is evil, because it wills evil, not indeed that which is evil in itself, but
+                     that which is evil accidentally, through being apprehended as such by the reason. In like manner, to believe in Christ is
+                     good
+                     in itself, and necessary for salvation: but the will does not tend thereto, except inasmuch as it is proposed by the reason.
+                     Consequently if it be proposed by the reason as something evil, the will tends to it as to something evil: not as if it were
+                     evil in itself, but because it is evil accidentally, through the apprehension of the reason. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic.
+                     vii, 9) that "properly speaking the incontinent man is one who does not follow right reason; but accidentally, he is also
+                     one who does not follow false reason." We must therefore conclude that, absolutely speaking, every will at variance with reason,
+                     whether right or erring, is always evil.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q19_A5-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Although the judgment of an erring reason is not derived from God, yet the erring reason puts forward its judgment as being
+                     true, and consequently as being derived from God, from Whom is all truth.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q19_A5-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The saying of Augustine holds good when it is known that the inferior authority prescribes something contrary to the command
+                     of the higher authority. But if a man were to believe the command of the proconsul to be the command of the emperor, in scorning
+                     the command of the proconsul he would scorn the command of the emperor. In like manner if a man were to know that human reason
+                     was dictating something contrary to God's commandment, he would not be
+                     bound to abide by reason: but then reason would not be entirely erroneous. But when erring reason proposes something as being
+                     commanded by God, then to scorn the dictate of reason is to scorn the commandment of God.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q19_A5-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Whenever reason apprehends something as evil, it apprehends it under some species of evil; for instance, as being something
+                     contrary to a divine precept, or as giving scandal, or for some such like reason. And then that evil is reduced to that species
+                     of malice.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q19_A5-p11"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q19_A5-p12"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q19_A4.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q19_A6.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="FS_Q19_A6" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q19_A5.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q19_A7.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="FS_Q19_A6-p0.1">Whether the will is good when it abides by erring reason?</h4>
+                  <p id="FS_Q19_A6-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q19_A6-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the will is good when it abides by erring reason. For just as the will, when at variance with the reason,
+                     tends to that which reason judges to be evil; so, when in accord with reason, it tends to what reason judges to be good. But
+                     the will is evil when it is at variance with reason, even when erring. Therefore even when it abides by erring reason, the
+                     will is good.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q19_A6-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the will is always good, when it abides by the commandment of God and the eternal law. But the eternal law and God's
+                     commandment are proposed to us by the apprehension of the reason, even when it errs. Therefore the will is good, even when
+                     it abides by erring reason.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q19_A6-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the will is evil when it is at variance with erring reason. If, therefore, the will is evil also when it abides
+                     by erring reason, it seems that the will is always evil when in conjunction with erring reason: so that in such a case a man
+                     would be in a dilemma, and, of necessity, would sin: which is unreasonable. Therefore the will is good when it abides by erring
+                     reason.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q19_A6-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The will of those who slew the apostles was evil. And yet it was in accord with the erring reason, according to
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q19_A6-p5.1" href="./asv.html#John.16.2" target="asv"> Jn. 16:2</a>: "The hour cometh, that whosoever killeth you, will think that he doth a service to God." Therefore the will can be evil,
+                     when it abides by erring reason.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q19_A6-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> Whereas the previous question is the same as inquiring "whether an erring conscience binds"; so this question is the same
+                     as inquiring "whether an erring conscience excuses." Now this question depends on what has been said above about ignorance.
+                     For it was said (Q[6], A[8]) that ignorance sometimes causes an act to be involuntary, and sometimes not. And since moral
+                     good and evil consist in action in so far as it is voluntary, as was stated above
+                     
+                     <a id="FS_Q19_A6-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q19_A2.html">(A[2])</a>; it is evident that when ignorance causes an act to be involuntary, it takes away the character of moral good and evil; but
+                     not, when it does not cause the act to be involuntary. Again, it has been stated above (Q[6], A[8]) that when ignorance is
+                     in any way willed, either directly or indirectly, it does not cause the act to be involuntary. And I call that ignorance "directly"
+                     voluntary, to which the act of the will tends: and that, "indirectly" voluntary, which
+                     is due to negligence, by reason of a man not wishing to know what he ought to know, as stated above (Q[6], A[8]).
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q19_A6-p7"> If then reason or conscience err with an error that is involuntary, either directly, or through negligence, so that one errs
+                     about what one ought to know; then such an error of reason or conscience does not excuse the will, that abides by that erring
+                     reason or conscience, from being evil. But if the error arise from ignorance of some circumstance, and without any negligence,
+                     so that it cause the act to be involuntary, then that error of reason or conscience excuses the will,
+                     that abides by that erring reason, from being evil. For instance, if erring reason tell a man that he should go to another
+                     man's wife, the will that abides by that erring reason is evil; since this error arises from ignorance of the Divine Law,
+                     which he is bound to know. But if a man's reason, errs in mistaking another for his wife, and if he wish to give her her right
+                     when she asks for it, his will is excused from being evil: because this error arises from ignorance of a circumstance, which
+                     ignorance excuses, and causes the act to be involuntary.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q19_A6-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv), "good results from the entire cause, evil from each particular defect." Consequently in
+                     order that the thing to which the will tends be called evil, it suffices, either that it be evil in itself, or that it be
+                     apprehended as evil. But in order for it to be good, it must be good in both ways.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q19_A6-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The eternal law cannot err, but human reason can. Consequently the will that abides by human reason, is not always right,
+                     nor is it always in accord with the eternal law.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q19_A6-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Just as in syllogistic arguments, granted one absurdity, others must needs follow; so in moral matters, given one absurdity,
+                     others must follow too. Thus suppose a man to seek vainglory, he will sin, whether he does his duty for vainglory or whether
+                     he omit to do it. Nor is he in a dilemma about the matter: because he can put aside his evil intention. In like manner, suppose
+                     a man's reason or conscience to err through inexcusable ignorance, then evil
+                     must needs result in the will. Nor is this man in a dilemma: because he can lay aside his error, since his ignorance is vincible
+                     and voluntary.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q19_A6-p11"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q19_A6-p12"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q19_A5.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q19_A7.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="FS_Q19_A7" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q19_A6.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q19_A8.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="FS_Q19_A7-p0.1">Whether the goodness of the will, as regards the means, depends on the intention of the end?</h4>
+                  <p id="FS_Q19_A7-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q19_A7-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the goodness of the will does not depend on the intention of the end. For it has been stated above 
+                     <a id="FS_Q19_A7-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q19_A2.html">(A[2])</a> that the goodness of the will depends on the object alone. But as regards the means, the object of the will is one thing,
+                     and the end intended is another. Therefore in such matters the goodness of the will does not depend on the intention of the
+                     end.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q19_A7-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, to wish to keep God's commandment, belongs to a good will. But this can be referred to an evil end, for instance,
+                     to vainglory or covetousness, by willing to obey God for the sake of temporal gain. Therefore the goodness of the will does
+                     not depend on the intention of the end.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q19_A7-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, just as good and evil diversify the will, so do they diversify the end. But malice of the will does not depend on
+                     the malice of the end intended; since a man who wills to steal in order to give alms, has an evil will, although he intends
+                     a good end. Therefore neither does the goodness of the will depend on the goodness of the end intended.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q19_A7-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (Confess. ix, 3) that God rewards the intention. But God rewards a thing because it is good. Therefore the
+                     goodness of the will depends on the intention of the end.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q19_A7-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> The intention may stand in a twofold relation to the act of the will; first, as preceding it, secondly as following [*Leonine
+                     edn.: 'accompanying'] it. The intention precedes the act of the will causally, when we will something because we intend a
+                     certain end. And then the order to the end is considered as the reason of the goodness of the thing willed: for instance,
+                     when a man wills to fast for God's sake; because the act of fasting is specifically good
+                     from the very fact that it is done for God's sake. Wherefore, since the goodness of the will depends on the goodness of the
+                     thing willed, as stated above (
+                     <a id="FS_Q19_A7-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q19_A1.html">AA[1]</a>,2), it must, of necessity, depend on the intention of the end.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q19_A7-p7"> On the other hand, intention follows the act of the will, when it is added to a preceding act of the will; for instance,
+                     a man may will to do something, and may afterwards refer it to God. And then the goodness of the previous act of the will
+                     does not depend on the subsequent intention, except in so far as that act is repeated with the subsequent intention.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q19_A7-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> When the intention is the cause of the act of willing, the order to the end is considered as the reason of the goodness of
+                     the object, as stated above.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q19_A7-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The act of the will cannot be said to be good, if an evil intention is the cause of willing. For when a man wills to give
+                     an alms for the sake of vainglory, he wills that which is good in itself, under a species of evil; and therefore, as willed
+                     by him, it is evil. Wherefore his will is evil. If, however, the intention is subsequent to the act of the will, then the
+                     latter may be good: and the intention does not spoil that act of the will which
+                     preceded, but that which is repeated.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q19_A7-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As we have already stated (A[6], ad 1), "evil results from each particular defect, but good from the whole and entire cause."
+                     Hence, whether the will tend to what is evil in itself, even under the species of good; or to the good under the species of
+                     evil, it will be evil in either case. But in order for the will to be good, it must tend to the good under the species of
+                     good; in other words, it must will the good for the sake of the good.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q19_A7-p11"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q19_A7-p12"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q19_A6.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q19_A8.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="FS_Q19_A8" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q19_A7.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q19_A9.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="FS_Q19_A8-p0.1">Whether the degree of goodness or malice in the will depends on the degree of good or evil in the intention?</h4>
+                  <p id="FS_Q19_A8-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q19_A8-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the degree of goodness in the will depends on the degree of good in the intention. Because on
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q19_A8-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.12.35" target="asv"> Mat. 12:35, </a> "A good man out of the good treasure of his heart bringeth forth that which is good," a gloss says: "A man does as much good
+                     as he intends." But the intention gives goodness not only to the external action, but also to the act of the will, as stated
+                     above 
+                     <a id="FS_Q19_A8-p2.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q19_A7.html">(A[7])</a>. Therefore the goodness of a
+                     man's will is according to the goodness of his intention.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q19_A8-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, if you add to the cause, you add to the effect. But the goodness of the intention is the cause of the good will.
+                     Therefore a man's will is good, according as his intention is good.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q19_A8-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, in evil actions, a man sins in proportion to his intention: for if a man were to throw a stone with a murderous
+                     intention, he would be guilty of murder. Therefore, for the same reason, in good actions, the will is good in proportion to
+                     the good intended.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q19_A8-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The intention can be good, while the will is evil. Therefore, for the same reason, the intention can be better, and the will
+                     less good.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q19_A8-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> In regard to both the act, and the intention of the end, we may consider a twofold quantity: one, on the part of the object,
+                     by reason of a man willing or doing a good that is greater; the other, taken from the intensity of the act, according as a
+                     man wills or acts intensely; and this is more on the part of the agent.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q19_A8-p7"> If then we speak of these respective quantities from the point of view of the object, it is evident that the quantity in
+                     the act does not depend on the quantity in the intention. With regard to the external act this may happen in two ways. First,
+                     through the object that is ordained to the intended end not being proportionate to that end; for instance, if a man were to
+                     give ten pounds, he could not realize his intention, if he intended to buy a thing worth a hundred pounds.
+                     Secondly, on account of the obstacles that may supervene in regard to the exterior action, which obstacles we are unable to
+                     remove: for instance, a man intends to go to Rome, and encounters obstacles, which prevent him from going. On the other hand,
+                     with regard to the interior act of the will, this happens in only one way: because the interior acts of the will are in our
+                     power, whereas the external actions are not. But the will can will an object that is not proportionate to the intended end:
+                     and thus the will that tends to that object considered absolutely, is not so good as the intention. Yet because the intention
+                     also belongs, in a way, to the act of the will, inasmuch, to wit, as it is the reason thereof; it comes to pass that the quantity
+                     of goodness in the intention redounds upon the act of the will; that is to say, in so far as the will wills some great good
+                     for an end, although that by which it wills to gain so great a good, is not proportionate to that good.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q19_A8-p8"> But if we consider the quantity in the intention and in the act, according to their respective intensity, then the intensity
+                     of the intention redounds upon the interior act and the exterior act of the will: since the intention stands in relation to
+                     them as a kind of form, as is clear from what has been said above (
+                     <a id="FS_Q19_A8-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q12_A4.html">Q[12], A[4]</a>;
+                     <a id="FS_Q19_A8-p8.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q18_A6.html"> Q[18], A[6]</a>). And yet considered materially, while the intention is intense, the interior or exterior
+                     act may be not so intense, materially speaking: for instance, when a man does not will with as much intensity to take medicine
+                     as he wills to regain health. Nevertheless the very fact of intending health intensely, redounds, as a formal principle, upon
+                     the intense volition of medicine.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q19_A8-p9"> We must observe, however, that the intensity of the interior or exterior act, may be referred to the intention as its object:
+                     as when a man intends to will intensely, or to do something intensely. And yet it does not follow that he wills or acts intensely;
+                     because the quantity of goodness in the interior or exterior act does not depend on the quantity of the good intended, as
+                     is shown above. And hence it is that a man does not merit as much as he intends to merit: because the
+                     quantity of merit is measured by the intensity of the act, as we shall show later on (
+                     <a id="FS_Q19_A8-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q20_A4.html">Q[20] , A[4]</a>;
+                     <a id="FS_Q19_A8-p9.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q114_A4.html"> Q[114], A[4]</a>).
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q19_A8-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This gloss speaks of good as in the estimation of God, Who considers principally the intention of the end. Wherefore another
+                     gloss says on the same passage that "the treasure of the heart is the intention, according to which God judges our works."
+                     For the goodness of the intention, as stated above, redounds, so to speak, upon the goodness of the will, which makes even
+                     the external act to be meritorious in God's sight.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q19_A8-p11">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The goodness of the intention is not the whole cause of a good will. Hence the argument does not prove.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q19_A8-p12">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The mere malice of the intention suffices to make the will evil: and therefore too, the will is as evil as the intention
+                     is evil. But the same reasoning does not apply to goodness, as stated above (ad 2).
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q19_A8-p13"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q19_A8-p14"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q19_A7.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q19_A9.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="FS_Q19_A9" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q19_A8.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q19_A10.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="FS_Q19_A9-p0.1">Whether the goodness of the will depends on its conformity to the Divine will?</h4>
+                  <p id="FS_Q19_A9-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q19_A9-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the goodness of the human will does not depend on its conformity to the Divine will. Because it is impossible
+                     for man's will to be conformed to the Divine will; as appears from the word of
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q19_A9-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.55.9" target="asv"> Isa. 55:9</a>: "As the heavens are exalted above the earth, so are My ways exalted above your ways, and My thoughts above your thoughts."
+                     If therefore goodness of the will depended on its conformity to the Divine will, it would follow
+                     that it is impossible for man's will to be good. Which is inadmissible.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q19_A9-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, just as our wills arise from the Divine will, so does our knowledge flow from the Divine knowledge. But our knowledge
+                     does not require to be conformed to God's knowledge; since God knows many things that we know not. Therefore there is no need
+                     for our will to be conformed to the Divine will.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q19_A9-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the will is a principle of action. But our action cannot be conformed to God's. Therefore neither can our will be
+                     conformed to His.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q19_A9-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q19_A9-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.26.39" target="asv">Mat. 26:39</a>): "Not as I will, but as Thou wilt": which words He said, because "He wishes man to be upright and to tend to God," as Augustine
+                     expounds in the Enchiridion [*Enarr. in 
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q19_A9-p5.2" href="./asv.html#Ps.32" target="asv">Ps. 32</a>, serm. i.]. But the rectitude of the will is its goodness. Therefore the goodness of the will depends on its conformity to
+                     the Divine will.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q19_A9-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above 
+                     <a id="FS_Q19_A9-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q19_A7.html">(A[7])</a>, the goodness of the will depends on the intention of the end. Now the last end of the human will is the Sovereign Good,
+                     namely, God, as stated above (Q[1], A[8]; Q[3], A[1]). Therefore the goodness of the human will requires it to be ordained
+                     to the Sovereign Good, that is, to God.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q19_A9-p7"> Now this Good is primarily and essentially compared to the Divine will, as its proper object. Again, that which is first
+                     in any genus is the measure and rule of all that belongs to that genus. Moreover, everything attains to rectitude and goodness,
+                     in so far as it is in accord with its proper measure. Therefore, in order that man's will be good it needs to be conformed
+                     to the Divine will.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q19_A9-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The human will cannot be conformed to the will of God so as to equal it, but only so as to imitate it. In like manner human
+                     knowledge is conformed to the Divine knowledge, in so far as it knows truth: and human action is conformed to the Divine,
+                     in so far as it is becoming to the agent: and this by way of imitation, not by way of equality.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q19_A9-p9"> From the above may be gathered the replies to the Second and Third Objections.</p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q19_A9-p10"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q19_A9-p11"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q19_A8.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q19_A10.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="FS_Q19_A10" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q19_A9.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q20.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="FS_Q19_A10-p0.1">Whether it is necessary for the human will, in order to be good, to be conformed to the Divine will, as regards the thing
+                     willed?
+                  </h4>
+                  <p id="FS_Q19_A10-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q19_A10-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the human will need not always be conformed to the Divine will, as regards the thing willed. For we cannot
+                     will what we know not: since the apprehended good is the object of the will. But in many things we know not what God wills.
+                     Therefore the human will cannot be conformed to the Divine will as to the thing willed.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q19_A10-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, God wills to damn the man whom He foresees about to die in mortal sin. If therefore man were bound to conform his
+                     will to the Divine will, in the point of the thing willed, it would follow that a man is bound to will his own damnation.
+                     Which is inadmissible.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q19_A10-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, no one is bound to will what is against filial piety. But if man were to will what God wills, this would sometimes
+                     be contrary to filial piety: for instance, when God wills the death of a father: if his son were to will it also, it would
+                     be against filial piety. Therefore man is not bound to conform his will to the Divine will, as to the thing willed.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q19_A10-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> (1) On
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q19_A10-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.32.1" target="asv"> Ps. 32:1, </a> "Praise becometh the upright," a gloss says: "That man has an upright heart, who wills what God wills." But everyone is bound
+                     to have an upright heart. Therefore everyone is bound to will what God wills.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q19_A10-p6"> (2) Moreover, the will takes its form from the object, as does every act. If therefore man is bound to conform his will to
+                     the Divine will, it follows that he is bound to conform it, as to the thing willed.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q19_A10-p7"> (3) Moreover, opposition of wills arises from men willing different things. But whoever has a will in opposition to the Divine
+                     will, has an evil will. Therefore whoever does not conform his will to the Divine will, as to the thing willed, has an evil
+                     will.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q19_A10-p8">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> As is evident from what has been said above (
+                     <a id="FS_Q19_A10-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q19_A3.html">AA[3]</a>,5), the will tends to its object, according as it is proposed by the reason. Now a thing may be considered in various ways
+                     by the reason, so as to appear good from one point of view, and not good from another point of view. And therefore if a man's
+                     will wills a thing to be, according as it appears to be good, his will is good: and the will of another man, who wills that
+                     thing not to
+                     be, according as it appears evil, is also good. Thus a judge has a good will, in willing a thief to be put to death, because
+                     this is just: while the will of another---e.g. the thief's wife or son, who wishes him not to be put to death, inasmuch as
+                     killing is a natural evil, is also good.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q19_A10-p9"> Now since the will follows the apprehension of the reason or intellect; the more universal the aspect of the apprehended
+                     good, the more universal the good to which the will tends. This is evident in the example given above: because the judge has
+                     care of the common good, which is justice, and therefore he wishes the thief's death, which has the aspect of good in relation
+                     to the common estate; whereas the thief's wife has to consider the private, the good of the family, and from
+                     this point of view she wishes her husband, the thief, not to be put to death. Now the good of the whole universe is that which
+                     is apprehended by God, Who is the Maker and Governor of all things: hence whatever He wills, He wills it under the aspect
+                     of the common good; this is His own Goodness, which is the good of the whole universe. On the other hand, the apprehension
+                     of a creature, according to its nature, is of some particular good, proportionate to that nature. Now a thing may happen to
+                     be
+                     good under a particular aspect, and yet not good under a universal aspect, or vice versa, as stated above. And therefore it
+                     comes to pass that a certain will is good from willing something considered under a particular aspect, which thing God wills
+                     not, under a universal aspect, and vice versa. And hence too it is, that various wills of various men can be good in respect
+                     of opposite things, for as much as, under various aspects, they wish a particular thing to be or not to be.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q19_A10-p10"> But a man's will is not right in willing a particular good, unless he refer it to the common good as an end: since even the
+                     natural appetite of each part is ordained to the common good of the whole. Now it is the end that supplies the formal reason,
+                     as it were, of willing whatever is directed to the end. Consequently, in order that a man will some particular good with a
+                     right will, he must will that particular good materially, and the Divine and universal good, formally.
+                     Therefore the human will is bound to be conformed to the Divine will, as to that which is willed formally, for it is bound
+                     to will the Divine and universal good; but not as to that which is willed materially, for the reason given above.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q19_A10-p11"> At the same time in both these respects, the human will is conformed to the Divine, in a certain degree. Because inasmuch
+                     as it is conformed to the Divine will in the common aspect of the thing willed, it is conformed thereto in the point of the
+                     last end. While, inasmuch as it is not conformed to the Divine will in the thing willed materially, it is conformed to that
+                     will considered as efficient cause; since the proper inclination consequent to nature, or to the particular
+                     apprehension of some particular thing, comes to a thing from God as its efficient cause. Hence it is customary to say that
+                     a man's will, in this respect, is conformed to the Divine will, because it wills what God wishes him to will.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q19_A10-p12"> There is yet another kind of conformity in respect of the formal cause, consisting in man's willing something from charity,
+                     as God wills it. And this conformity is also reduced to the formal conformity, that is in respect of the last end, which is
+                     the proper object of charity.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q19_A10-p13">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> We can know in a general way what God wills. For we know that whatever God wills, He wills it under the aspect of good. Consequently
+                     whoever wills a thing under any aspect of good, has a will conformed to the Divine will, as to the reason of the thing willed.
+                     But we know not what God wills in particular: and in this respect we are not bound to conform our will to the Divine will.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q19_A10-p14"> But in the state of glory, every one will see in each thing that he wills, the relation of that thing to what God wills in
+                     that particular matter. Consequently he will conform his will to God in all things not only formally, but also materially.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q19_A10-p15">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> God does not will the damnation of a man, considered precisely as damnation, nor a man's death, considered precisely as death,
+                     because, "He wills all men to be saved" (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q19_A10-p15.1" href="./asv.html#iTim.2.4" target="asv">1 Tim. 2:4</a>); but He wills such things under the aspect of justice. Wherefore in regard to such things it suffices for man to will the
+                     upholding of God's justice and of the natural order.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q19_A10-p16"> Wherefore the reply to the Third Objection is evident.</p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q19_A10-p17"> To the first argument advanced in a contrary sense, it should be said that a man who conforms his will to God's, in the aspect
+                     of reason of the thing willed, wills what God wills, more than the man, who conforms his will to God's, in the point of the
+                     very thing willed; because the will tends more to the end, than to that which is on account of the end.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q19_A10-p18"> To the second, it must be replied that the species and form of an act are taken from the object considered formally, rather
+                     than from the object considered materially.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q19_A10-p19"> To the third, it must be said that there is no opposition of wills when several people desire different things, but not under
+                     the same aspect: but there is opposition of wills, when under one and the same aspect, one man wills a thing which another
+                     wills not. But there is no question of this here.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q19_A10-p20"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q19_A10-p21"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q19_A9.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q20.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <a href="summa.FS_Q18_A11.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.FS_Q19_A1.html"></a>
+            </div>
+            <div id="FS_Q20" class="div3">
+               <a href="summa.FS_Q19_A10.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.FS_Q20_A1.html"></a>
+               <h3 id="FS_Q20-p0.1">OF GOODNESS AND MALICE IN EXTERNAL HUMAN AFFAIRS (SIX ARTICLES)</h3>
+               <p id="FS_Q20-p1"></p>
+               <p id="FS_Q20-p2"> We must next consider goodness and malice as to external actions: under which head there are six points of inquiry:</p>
+               <p id="FS_Q20-p3"> (1) Whether goodness and malice is first in the act of the will, or in the external action?</p>
+               <p id="FS_Q20-p4"> (2) Whether the whole goodness or malice of the external action depends on the goodness of the will?</p>
+               <p id="FS_Q20-p5"> (3) Whether the goodness and malice of the interior act are the same as those of the external action?</p>
+               <p id="FS_Q20-p6"> (4) Whether the external action adds any goodness or malice to that of the interior act?</p>
+               <p id="FS_Q20-p7"> (5) Whether the consequences of an external action increase its goodness or malice?</p>
+               <p id="FS_Q20-p8"> (6) Whether one and the same external action can be both good and evil?</p>
+               <div id="FS_Q20_A1" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q20.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q20_A2.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="FS_Q20_A1-p0.1">Whether goodness or malice is first in the action of the will, or in the external action?</h4>
+                  <p id="FS_Q20_A1-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q20_A1-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that good and evil are in the external action prior to being in the act of the will. For the will derives goodness
+                     from its object, as stated above (
+                     <a id="FS_Q20_A1-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q19_A1.html">Q[19], AA[1]</a>,2). But the external action is the object of the interior act of the will: for a man is said to will to commit a theft, or
+                     to will to give an alms. Therefore good and evil are in the external action, prior to being in the act of the will.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q20_A1-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the aspect of good belongs first to the end: since what is directed to the end receives the aspect of good from
+                     its relation to the end. Now whereas the act of the will cannot be an end, as stated above (
+                     <a id="FS_Q20_A1-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q1_A1.html">Q[1], A[1]</a>, ad 2), the act of another power can be an end. Therefore good is in the act of some other power prior to being in the act
+                     of the will.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q20_A1-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the act of the will stands in a formal relation to the external action, as stated above (
+                     <a id="FS_Q20_A1-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q18_A6.html">Q[18], A[6]</a>). But that which is formal is subsequent; since form is something added to matter. Therefore good and evil are in the external
+                     action, prior to being in the act of the will.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q20_A1-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (Retract. i, 9) that "it is by the will that we sin, and that we behave aright." Therefore moral good and
+                     evil are first in the will.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q20_A1-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> External actions may be said to be good or bad in two ways. First, in regard to their genus, and the circumstances connected
+                     with them: thus the giving of alms, if the required conditions be observed, is said to be good. Secondly, a thing is said
+                     to be good or evil, from its relation to the end: thus the giving of alms for vainglory is said to be evil. Now, since the
+                     end is the will's proper object, it is evident that this aspect of good or evil, which the
+                     external action derives from its relation to the end, is to be found first of all in the act of the will, whence it passes
+                     to the external action. On the other hand, the goodness or malice which the external action has of itself, on account of its
+                     being about due matter and its being attended by due circumstances, is not derived from the will, but rather from the reason.
+                     Consequently, if we consider the goodness of the external action, in so far as it comes from reason's ordination and
+                     apprehension, it is prior to the goodness of the act of the will: but if we consider it in so far as it is in the execution
+                     of the action done, it is subsequent to the goodness of the will, which is its principle.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q20_A1-p7">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The exterior action is the object of the will, inasmuch as it is proposed to the will by the reason, as good apprehended
+                     and ordained by the reason: and thus it is prior to the good in the act of the will. But inasmuch as it is found in the execution
+                     of the action, it is an effect of the will, and is subsequent to the will.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q20_A1-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The end precedes in the order of intention, but follows in the order of execution.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q20_A1-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> A form as received into matter, is subsequent to matter in the order of generation, although it precedes it in the order
+                     of nature: but inasmuch as it is in the active cause, it precedes in every way. Now the will is compared to the exterior action,
+                     as its efficient cause. Wherefore the goodness of the act of the will, as existing in the active cause, is the form of the
+                     exterior action.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q20_A1-p10"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q20_A1-p11"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q20.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q20_A2.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="FS_Q20_A2" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q20_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q20_A3.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="FS_Q20_A2-p0.1">Whether the whole goodness and malice of the external action depends on the goodness of the will?</h4>
+                  <p id="FS_Q20_A2-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q20_A2-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the whole goodness and malice of the external action depend on the goodness of the will. For it is written
+                     (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q20_A2-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.7.18" target="asv">Mat. 7:18</a>): "A good tree cannot bring forth evil fruit, neither can an evil tree bring forth good fruit." But, according to the gloss,
+                     the tree signifies the will, and fruit signifies works. Therefore, it is impossible for the interior act of the will to be
+                     good, and the external action evil, or vice versa.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q20_A2-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Augustine says (Retract. i, 9) that there is no sin without the will. If therefore there is no sin in the will,
+                     there will be none in the external action. And so the whole goodness or malice of the external action depends on the will.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q20_A2-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the good and evil of which we are speaking now are differences of the moral act. Now differences make an essential
+                     division in a genus, according to the Philosopher (Metaph. vii, 12). Since therefore an act is moral from being voluntary,
+                     it seems that goodness and malice in an act are derived from the will alone.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q20_A2-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (Contra Mendac. vii), that "there are some actions which neither a good end nor a good will can make good."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q20_A2-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above 
+                     <a id="FS_Q20_A2-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q20_A1.html">(A[1])</a>, we may consider a twofold goodness or malice in the external action: one in respect of due matter and circumstances; the
+                     other in respect of the order to the end. And that which is in respect of the order to the end, depends entirely on the will:
+                     while that which is in respect of due matter or circumstances, depends on the reason: and on this goodness depends the goodness
+                     of the will, in so far as the will
+                     tends towards it.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q20_A2-p7"> Now it must be observed, as was noted above (
+                     <a id="FS_Q20_A2-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q19_A6.html">Q[19], A[6]</a>, ad 1), that for a thing to be evil, one single defect suffices, whereas, for it to be good simply, it is not enough for
+                     it to be good in one point only, it must be good in every respect. If therefore the will be good, both from its proper object
+                     and from its end, if follows that the external action is good. But if the will be good from its intention of the end, this
+                     is not enough to make the
+                     external action good: and if the will be evil either by reason of its intention of the end, or by reason of the act willed,
+                     it follows that the external action is evil.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q20_A2-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> If the good tree be taken to signify the good will, it must be in so far as the will derives goodness from the act willed
+                     and from the end intended.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q20_A2-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> A man sins by his will, not only when he wills an evil end; but also when he wills an evil act.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q20_A2-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Voluntariness applies not only to the interior act of the will, but also to external actions, inasmuch as they proceed from
+                     the will and the reason. Consequently the difference of good and evil is applicable to both the interior and external act.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q20_A2-p11"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q20_A2-p12"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q20_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q20_A3.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="FS_Q20_A3" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q20_A2.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q20_A4.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="FS_Q20_A3-p0.1">Whether the goodness and malice of the external action are the same as those of the interior act?</h4>
+                  <p id="FS_Q20_A3-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q20_A3-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the goodness and malice of the interior act of the will are not the same as those of the external action.
+                     For the principle of the interior act is the interior apprehensive or appetitive power of the soul; whereas the principle
+                     of the external action is the power that accomplishes the movement. Now where the principles of action are different, the
+                     actions themselves are different. Moreover, it is the action which is the subject of goodness
+                     or malice: and the same accident cannot be in different subjects. Therefore the goodness of the interior act cannot be the
+                     same as that of the external action.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q20_A3-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, "A virtue makes that, which has it, good, and renders its action good also" (Ethic. ii, 6). But the intellective
+                     virtue in the commanding power is distinct from the moral virtue in the power commanded, as is declared in Ethic. i, 13. Therefore
+                     the goodness of the interior act, which belongs to the commanding power, is distinct from the goodness of the external action,
+                     which belongs to the power commanded.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q20_A3-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the same thing cannot be cause and effect; since nothing is its own cause. But the goodness of the interior act
+                     is the cause of the goodness of the external action, or vice versa, as stated above (
+                     <a id="FS_Q20_A3-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q20_A1.html">AA[1]</a>,2). Therefore it is not the same goodness in each.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q20_A3-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It was shown above (
+                     <a id="FS_Q20_A3-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q18_A6.html">Q[18], A[6]</a>) that the act of the will is the form, as it were, of the external action. Now that which results from the material and formal
+                     element is one thing. Therefore there is but one goodness of the internal and external act.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q20_A3-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above (Q[17], A[4]), the interior act of the will, and the external action, considered morally, are one act. Now
+                     it happens sometimes that one and the same individual act has several aspects of goodness or malice, and sometimes that it
+                     has but one. Hence we must say that sometimes the goodness or malice of the interior act is the same as that of the external
+                     action, and sometimes not. For as we have already said (
+                     <a id="FS_Q20_A3-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q20_A1.html">AA[1]</a>,2),
+                     these two goodnesses or malices, of the internal and external acts, are ordained to one another. Now it may happen, in things
+                     that are subordinate to something else, that a thing is good merely from being subordinate; thus a bitter draught is good
+                     merely because it procures health. Wherefore there are not two goodnesses, one the goodness of health, and the other the goodness
+                     of the draught; but one and the same. On the other hand it happens sometimes that that which is subordinate to something
+                     else, has some aspect of goodness in itself, besides the fact of its being subordinate to some other good: thus a palatable
+                     medicine can be considered in the light of a pleasurable good, besides being conducive to health.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q20_A3-p7"> We must therefore say that when the external action derives goodness or malice from its relation to the end only, then there
+                     is but one and the same goodness of the act of the will which of itself regards the end, and of the external action, which
+                     regards the end through the medium of the act of the will. But when the external action has goodness or malice of itself,
+                     i.e. in regard to its matter and circumstances, then the goodness of the external action is distinct from the
+                     goodness of the will in regarding the end; yet so that the goodness of the end passes into the external action, and the goodness
+                     of the matter and circumstances passes into the act of the will, as stated above (
+                     <a id="FS_Q20_A3-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q20_A1.html">AA[1]</a>,2).
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q20_A3-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This argument proves that the internal and external actions are different in the physical order: yet distinct as they are
+                     in that respect, they combine to form one thing in the moral order, as stated above (
+                     <a id="FS_Q20_A3-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q17_A4.html">Q[17], A[4]</a>).
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q20_A3-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As stated in Ethic. vi, 12, a moral virtue is ordained to the act of that virtue, which act is the end, as it were, of that
+                     virtue; whereas prudence, which is in the reason, is ordained to things directed to the end. For this reason various virtues
+                     are necessary. But right reason in regard to the very end of a virtue has no other goodness than the goodness of that virtue,
+                     in so far as the goodness of the reason is participated in each virtue.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q20_A3-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> When a thing is derived by one thing from another, as from a univocal efficient cause, then it is not the same in both: thus
+                     when a hot thing heats, the heat of the heater is distinct from the heat of the thing heated, although it be the same specifically.
+                     But when a thing is derived from one thing from another, according to analogy or proportion, then it is one and the same in
+                     both: thus the healthiness which is in medicine or urine is derived from
+                     the healthiness of the animal's body; nor is health as applied to urine and medicine, distinct from health as applied to the
+                     body of an animal, of which health medicine is the cause, and urine the sign. It is in this way that the goodness of the external
+                     action is derived from the goodness of the will, and vice versa; viz. according to the order of one to the other.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q20_A3-p11"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q20_A3-p12"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q20_A2.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q20_A4.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="FS_Q20_A4" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q20_A3.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q20_A5.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="FS_Q20_A4-p0.1">Whether the external action adds any goodness or malice to that of the interior act?</h4>
+                  <p id="FS_Q20_A4-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q20_A4-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the external action does not add any goodness or malice to that of the interior action. For Chrysostom
+                     says (Hom. xix in Mat.): "It is the will that is rewarded for doing good, or punished for doing evil." Now works are the witnesses
+                     of the will. Therefore God seeks for works not on His own account, in order to know how to judge; but for the sake of others,
+                     that all may understand how just He is. But good or evil is to be estimated according
+                     to God's judgment rather than according to the judgment of man. Therefore the external action adds no goodness or malice to
+                     that of the interior act.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q20_A4-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the goodness and malice of the interior and external acts are one and the same, as stated above 
+                     <a id="FS_Q20_A4-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q20_A3.html">(A[3])</a>. But increase is the addition of one thing to another. Therefore the external action does not add to the goodness or malice
+                     of the interior act.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q20_A4-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the entire goodness of created things does not add to the Divine Goodness, because it is entirely derived therefrom.
+                     But sometimes the entire goodness of the external action is derived from the goodness of the interior act, and sometimes conversely,
+                     as stated above (
+                     <a id="FS_Q20_A4-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q20_A1.html">AA[1]</a>,2). Therefore neither of them adds to the goodness or malice of the other.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q20_A4-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> Every agent intends to attain good and avoid evil. If therefore by the external action no further goodness or malice be added,
+                     it is to no purpose that he who has a good or an evil will, does a good deed or refrains from an evil deed. Which is unreasonable.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q20_A4-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> If we speak of the goodness which the external action derives from the will tending to the end, then the external action
+                     adds nothing to this goodness, unless it happens that the will in itself is made better in good things, or worse in evil things.
+                     This, seemingly, may happen in three ways. First in point of number; if, for instance, a man wishes to do something with a
+                     good or an evil end in view, and does not do it then, but afterwards wills and does it,
+                     the act of his will is doubled and a double good, or a double evil is the result. Secondly, in point of extension: when, for
+                     instance, a man wishes to do something for a good or an evil end, and is hindered by some obstacle, whereas another man perseveres
+                     in the movement of the will until he accomplish it in deed; it is evident that the will of the latter is more lasting in good
+                     or evil, and in this respect, is better or worse. Thirdly, in point of intensity: for these are certain external
+                     actions, which, in so far as they are pleasurable, or painful, are such as naturally to make the will more intense or more
+                     remiss; and it is evident that the more intensely the will tends to good or evil, the better or worse it is.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q20_A4-p7"> On the other hand, if we speak of the goodness which the external action derives from its matter and due circumstances, thus
+                     it stands in relation to the will as its term and end. And in this way it adds to the goodness or malice of the will; because
+                     every inclination or movement is perfected by attaining its end or reaching its term. Wherefore the will is not perfect, unless
+                     it be such that, given the opportunity, it realizes the operation. But if this prove impossible, as long
+                     as the will is perfect, so as to realize the operation if it could; the lack of perfection derived from the external action,
+                     is simply involuntary. Now just as the involuntary deserves neither punishment nor reward in the accomplishment of good or
+                     evil deeds, so neither does it lessen reward or punishment, if a man through simple involuntariness fail to do good or evil.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q20_A4-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Chrysostom is speaking of the case where a man's will is complete, and does not refrain from the deed save through the impossibility
+                     of achievement.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q20_A4-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> This argument applies to that goodness which the external action derives from the will as tending to the end. But the goodness
+                     which the external action takes from its matter and circumstances, is distinct from that which it derives from the end; but
+                     it is not distinct from that which it has from the very act willed, to which it stands in the relation of measure and cause,
+                     as stated above (
+                     <a id="FS_Q20_A4-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q20_A1.html">AA[1]</a>,2).
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q20_A4-p10"> From this the reply to the Third Objection is evident.</p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q20_A4-p11"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q20_A4-p12"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q20_A3.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q20_A5.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="FS_Q20_A5" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q20_A4.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q20_A6.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="FS_Q20_A5-p0.1">Whether the consequences of the external action increase its goodness or malice?</h4>
+                  <p id="FS_Q20_A5-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q20_A5-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the consequences of the external action increase its goodness or malice. For the effect pre-exists virtually
+                     in its cause. But the consequences result from the action as an effect from its cause. Therefore they pre-exist virtually
+                     in actions. Now a thing is judged to be good or bad according to its virtue, since a virtue "makes that which has it to be
+                     good" (Ethic. ii, 6). Therefore the consequences increase the goodness or malice of an
+                     action.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q20_A5-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the good actions of his hearers are consequences resulting from the words of a preacher. But such goods as these
+                     redound to the merit of the preacher, as is evident from
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q20_A5-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Phil.4.1" target="asv"> Phil. 4:1</a>: "My dearly beloved brethren, my joy and my crown." Therefore the consequences of an action increase its goodness or malice.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q20_A5-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, punishment is not increased, unless the fault increases: wherefore it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q20_A5-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Deut.25.2" target="asv">Dt. 25:2</a>): "According to the measure of the sin shall the measure also of the stripes be." But the punishment is increased on account
+                     of the consequences; for it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q20_A5-p4.2" href="./asv.html#Exod.21.29" target="asv">Ex. 21:29</a>): "But if the ox was wont to push with his horn yesterday and the day before, and they warned his master, and he did not
+                     shut him up, and he shall
+                     kill a man or a woman, then the ox shall be stoned, and his owner also shall be put to death." But he would not have been
+                     put to death, if the ox, although he had not been shut up, had not killed a man. Therefore the consequences increase the goodness
+                     or malice of an action.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q20_A5-p5">
+                     <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, if a man do something which may cause death, by striking, or by sentencing, and if death does not ensue, he does
+                     not contract irregularity: but he would if death were to ensue. Therefore the consequence of an action increase its goodness
+                     or malice.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q20_A5-p6">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The consequences do not make an action that was evil, to be good; nor one that was good, to be evil. For instance, if a man
+                     give an alms to a poor man who makes bad use of the alms by committing a sin, this does not undo the good done by the giver;
+                     and, in like manner, if a man bear patiently a wrong done to him, the wrongdoer is not thereby excused. Therefore the consequences
+                     of an action doe not increase its goodness or malice.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q20_A5-p7">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> The consequences of an action are either foreseen or not. If they are foreseen, it is evident that they increase the goodness
+                     or malice. For when a man foresees that many evils may follow from his action, and yet does not therefore desist therefrom,
+                     this shows his will to be all the more inordinate.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q20_A5-p8"> But if the consequences are not foreseen, we must make a distinction. Because if they follow from the nature of the action
+                     and in the majority of cases, in this respect, the consequences increase the goodness or malice of that action: for it is
+                     evident that an action is specifically better, if better results can follow from it; and specifically worse, if it is of a
+                     nature to produce worse results. On the other hand, if the consequences follow by accident and seldom, then they do
+                     not increase the goodness or malice of the action: because we do not judge of a thing according to that which belongs to it
+                     by accident, but only according to that which belongs to it of itself.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q20_A5-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The virtue of a cause is measured by the effect that flows from the nature of the cause, not by that which results by accident.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q20_A5-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The good actions done by the hearers, result from the preacher's words, as an effect that flows from their very nature. Hence
+                     they redound to the merit of the preacher: especially when such is his intention.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q20_A5-p11">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The consequences for which that man is ordered to be punished, both follow from the nature of the cause, and are supposed
+                     to be foreseen. For this reason they are reckoned as punishable.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q20_A5-p12">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> This argument would prove if irregularity were the result of the fault. But it is not the result of the fault, but of the
+                     fact, and of the obstacle to the reception of a sacrament.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q20_A5-p13"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q20_A5-p14"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q20_A4.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q20_A6.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="FS_Q20_A6" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q20_A5.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q21.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="FS_Q20_A6-p0.1">Whether one and the same external action can be both good and evil?</h4>
+                  <p id="FS_Q20_A6-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q20_A6-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that one and the same external action can be both good and evil. For "movement, if continuous, is one and the
+                     same" (Phys. v, 4). But one continuous movement can be both good and bad: for instance, a man may go to church continuously,
+                     intending at first vainglory, and afterwards the service of God. Therefore one and the same action can be both good and bad.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q20_A6-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, according to the Philosopher (Phys. iii, 3), action and passion are one act. But the passion may be good, as Christ's
+                     was; and the action evil, as that of the Jews. Therefore one and the same act can be both good and evil.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q20_A6-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, since a servant is an instrument, as it were, of his master, the servant's action is his master's, just as the action
+                     of a tool is the workman's action. But it may happen that the servant's action result from his master's good will, and is
+                     therefore good: and from the evil will of the servant, and is therefore evil. Therefore the same action can be both good and
+                     evil.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q20_A6-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The same thing cannot be the subject of contraries. But good and evil are contraries. Therefore the same action cannot be
+                     both good and evil.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q20_A6-p6">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The same thing cannot be the subject of contraries. But good and evil are contraries. Therefore the same action cannot be
+                     both good and evil.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q20_A6-p7">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> Nothing hinders a thing from being one, in so far as it is in one genus, and manifold, in so far as it is referred to another
+                     genus. Thus a continuous surface is one, considered as in the genus of quantity; and yet it is manifold, considered as to
+                     the genus of color, if it be partly white, and partly black. And accordingly, nothing hinders an action from being one, considered
+                     in the natural order; whereas it is not one, considered in the moral order; and
+                     vice versa, as we have stated above (A[3], ad 1;
+                     <a id="FS_Q20_A6-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q18_A7.html"> Q[18], A[7]</a>, ad 1). For continuous walking is one action, considered in the natural order: but it may resolve itself into many actions,
+                     considered in the moral order, if a change take place in the walker's will, for the will is the principle of moral actions.
+                     If therefore we consider one action in the moral order, it is impossible for it to be morally both good and evil. Whereas
+                     if it be one as to natural and not moral
+                     unity, it can be both good and evil.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q20_A6-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This continual movement which proceeds from various intentions, although it is one in the natural order, is not one in the
+                     point of moral unity.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q20_A6-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Action and passion belong to the moral order, in so far as they are voluntary. And therefore in so far as they are voluntary
+                     in respect of wills that differ, they are two distinct things, and good can be in one of them while evil is in the other.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q20_A6-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The action of the servant, in so far as it proceeds from the will of the servant, is not the master's action: but only in
+                     so far as it proceeds from the master's command. Wherefore the evil will of the servant does not make the action evil in this
+                     respect.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q20_A6-p11"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q20_A6-p12"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q20_A5.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q21.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <a href="summa.FS_Q19_A10.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.FS_Q20_A1.html"></a>
+            </div>
+            <div id="FS_Q21" class="div3">
+               <a href="summa.FS_Q20_A6.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.FS_Q21_A1.html"></a>
+               <h3 id="FS_Q21-p0.1">OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF HUMAN ACTIONS BY REASON OF THEIR GOODNESS AND MALICE (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3>
+               <p id="FS_Q21-p1"></p>
+               <p id="FS_Q21-p2"> We have now to consider the consequences of human actions by reason of their goodness and malice: and under this head there
+                  are four points of inquiry:
+               </p>
+               <p id="FS_Q21-p3"> (1) Whether a human action is right or sinful by reason of its being good or evil?</p>
+               <p id="FS_Q21-p4"> (2) Whether it thereby deserves praise or blame?</p>
+               <p id="FS_Q21-p5"> (3) Whether accordingly, it is meritorious or demeritorious?</p>
+               <p id="FS_Q21-p6"> (4) Whether it is accordingly meritorious or demeritorious before God?</p>
+               <div id="FS_Q21_A1" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q21.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q21_A2.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="FS_Q21_A1-p0.1">Whether a human action is right or sinful, in so far as it is good or evil?</h4>
+                  <p id="FS_Q21_A1-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q21_A1-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that a human action is not right or sinful, in so far as it is good or evil. For "monsters are the sins of nature"
+                     (Phys. ii, 8). But monsters are not actions, but things engendered outside the order of nature. Now things that are produced
+                     according to art and reason imitate those that are produced according to nature (Phys. ii, 8). Therefore an action is not
+                     sinful by reason of its being inordinate and evil.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q21_A1-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, sin, as stated in Phys. ii, 8 occurs in nature and art, when the end intended by nature or art is not attained.
+                     But the goodness or malice of a human action depends, before all, on the intention of the end, and on its achievement. Therefore
+                     it seems that the malice of an action does not make it sinful.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q21_A1-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if the malice of an action makes it sinful, it follows that wherever there is evil, there is sin. But this is false:
+                     since punishment is not a sin, although it is an evil. Therefore an action is not sinful by reason of its being evil.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q21_A1-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> As shown above (
+                     <a id="FS_Q21_A1-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q19_A4.html">Q[19], A[4]</a>), the goodness of a human action depends principally on the Eternal Law: and consequently its malice consists in its being
+                     in disaccord with the Eternal Law. But this is the very nature of sin; for Augustine says (Contra Faust. xxii, 27) that "sin
+                     is a word, deed, or desire, in opposition to the Eternal Law." Therefore a human action is sinful by reason of its being evil.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q21_A1-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> Evil is more comprehensive than sin, as also is good than right. For every privation of good, in whatever subject, is an
+                     evil: whereas sin consists properly in an action done for a certain end, and lacking due order to that end. Now the due order
+                     to an end is measured by some rule. In things that act according to nature, this rule is the natural force that inclines them
+                     to that end. When therefore an action proceeds from a natural force, in accord with the
+                     natural inclination to an end, then the action is said to be right: since the mean does not exceed its limits, viz. the action
+                     does not swerve from the order of its active principle to the end. But when an action strays from this rectitude, it comes
+                     under the notion of sin.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q21_A1-p7"> Now in those things that are done by the will, the proximate rule is the human reason, while the supreme rule is the Eternal
+                     Law. When, therefore, a human action tends to the end, according to the order of reason and of the Eternal Law, then that
+                     action is right: but when it turns aside from that rectitude, then it is said to be a sin. Now it is evident from what has
+                     been said (
+                     <a id="FS_Q21_A1-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q19_A3.html">Q[19], AA[3]</a>,4) that every voluntary action that turns aside from the order
+                     of reason and of the Eternal Law, is evil, and that every good action is in accord with reason and the Eternal Law. Hence
+                     it follows that a human action is right or sinful by reason of its being good or evil.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q21_A1-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Monsters are called sins, inasmuch as they result from a sin in nature's action.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q21_A1-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The end is twofold; the last end, and the proximate end. In the sin of nature, the action does indeed fail in respect of
+                     the last end, which is the perfection of the thing generated; but it does not fail in respect of any proximate end whatever;
+                     since when nature works it forms something. In like manner, the sin of the will always fails as regards the last end intended,
+                     because no voluntary evil action can be ordained to happiness, which is the last
+                     end: and yet it does not fail in respect of some proximate end: intended and achieved by the will. Wherefore also, since the
+                     very intention of this end is ordained to the last end, this same intention may be right or sinful.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q21_A1-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Each thing is ordained to its end by its action: and therefore sin, which consists in straying from the order to the end,
+                     consists properly in an action. On the other hand, punishment regards the person of the sinner, as was stated in the 
+                     <a id="FS_Q21_A1-p10.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q48_A5.html">FP, Q[48], A[5]</a>, ad 4; A[6], ad 3.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q21_A1-p11"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q21_A1-p12"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q21.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q21_A2.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="FS_Q21_A2" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q21_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q21_A3.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="FS_Q21_A2-p0.1">Whether a human action deserves praise or blame, by reason of its being good or evil?</h4>
+                  <p id="FS_Q21_A2-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q21_A2-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that a human action does not deserve praise or blame by reason of its being good or evil. For "sin happens
+                     even in things done by nature" (Phys. ii, 8). And yet natural things are not deserving of praise or blame (Ethic. iii, 5).
+                     Therefore a human action does not deserve blame, by reason of its being evil or sinful; and, consequently, neither does it
+                     deserve praise, by reason of its being good.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q21_A2-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, just as sin occurs in moral actions, so does it happen in the productions of art: because as stated in Phys. ii,
+                     8 "it is a sin in a grammarian to write badly, and in a doctor to give the wrong medicine." But the artist is not blamed for
+                     making something bad: because the artist's work is such, that he can produce a good or a bad thing, just as he lists. Therefore
+                     it seems that neither is there any reason for blaming a moral action, in the fact that it
+                     is evil.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q21_A2-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that evil is "weak and incapable." But weakness or inability either takes away or
+                     diminishes guilt. Therefore a human action does not incur guilt from being evil.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q21_A2-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (De Virt. et Vit. i) that "virtuous deeds deserve praise, while deeds that are opposed to virtue deserve
+                     censure and blame." But good actions are virtuous; because "virtue makes that which has it, good, and makes its action good"
+                     (Ethic. ii, 6): wherefore actions opposed to virtue are evil. Therefore a human action deserves praise or blame, through being
+                     good or evil.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q21_A2-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> Just as evil is more comprehensive than sin, so is sin more comprehensive than blame. For an action is said to deserve praise
+                     or blame, from its being imputed to the agent: since to praise or to blame means nothing else than to impute to someone the
+                     malice or goodness of his action. Now an action is imputed to an agent, when it is in his power, so that he has dominion over
+                     it: because it is through his will that man has dominion over his actions, as was made
+                     clear above (
+                     <a id="FS_Q21_A2-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q1_A1.html">Q[1], AA[1]</a>,2). Hence it follows that good or evil, in voluntary actions alone, renders them worthy of praise or blame: and in such like
+                     actions, evil, sin and guilt are one and the same thing.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q21_A2-p7">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Natural actions are not in the power of the natural agent: since the action of nature is determinate. And, therefore, although
+                     there be sin in natural actions, there is no blame.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q21_A2-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Reason stands in different relations to the productions of art, and to moral actions. In matters of art, reason is directed
+                     to a particular end, which is something devised by reason: whereas in moral matters, it is directed to the general end of
+                     all human life. Now a particular end is subordinate to the general end. Since therefore sin is a departure from the order
+                     to the end, as stated above 
+                     <a id="FS_Q21_A2-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q21_A1.html">(A[1])</a>, sin may occur in two ways,
+                     in a production of art. First, by a departure from the particular end intended by the artist: and this sin will be proper
+                     to the art; for instance, if an artist produce a bad thing, while intending to produce something good; or produce something
+                     good, while intending to produce something bad. Secondly, by a departure from the general end of human life: and then he will
+                     be said to sin, if he intend to produce a bad work, and does so in effect, so that another is taken in thereby. But this sin
+                     is
+                     not proper to the artist as such, but as man. Consequently for the former sin the artist is blamed as an artist; while for
+                     the latter he is blamed as a man. On the other hand, in moral matters, where we take into consideration the order of reason
+                     to the general end of human life, sin and evil are always due to a departure from the order of reason to the general end of
+                     human life. Wherefore man is blamed for such a sin, both as man and as a moral being. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi,
+                     5)
+                     that "in art, he who sins voluntarily is preferable; but in prudence, as in the moral virtues," which prudence directs, "he
+                     is the reverse."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q21_A2-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Weakness that occurs in voluntary evils, is subject to man's power: wherefore it neither takes away nor diminishes guilt.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q21_A2-p10"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q21_A2-p11"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q21_A1.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q21_A3.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="FS_Q21_A3" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q21_A2.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q21_A4.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="FS_Q21_A3-p0.1">Whether a human action is meritorious or demeritorious in so far as it is good or evil?</h4>
+                  <p id="FS_Q21_A3-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q21_A3-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that a human action is not meritorious or demeritorious on account of its goodness or malice. For we speak
+                     of merit or demerit in relation to retribution, which has no place save in matters relating to another person. But good or
+                     evil actions are not all related to another person, for some are related to the person of the agent. Therefore not every good
+                     or evil human action is meritorious or demeritorious.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q21_A3-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, no one deserves punishment or reward for doing as he chooses with that of which he is master: thus if a man destroys
+                     what belongs to him, he is not punished, as if he had destroyed what belongs to another. But man is master of his own actions.
+                     Therefore a man does not merit punishment or reward, through putting his action to a good or evil purpose.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q21_A3-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if a man acquire some good for himself, he does not on that account deserve to be benefited by another man: and
+                     the same applies to evil. Now a good action is itself a kind of good and perfection of the agent: while an inordinate action
+                     is his evil. Therefore a man does not merit or demerit, from the fact that he does a good or an evil deed.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q21_A3-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q21_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.3.10" target="asv">Is. 3:10,11</a>): "Say to the just man that it is well; for he shall eat the fruit of his doings. Woe to the wicked unto evil; for the reward
+                     of his hands shall be given him."
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q21_A3-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> We speak of merit and demerit, in relation to retribution, rendered according to justice. Now, retribution according to justice
+                     is rendered to a man, by reason of his having done something to another's advantage or hurt. It must, moreover, be observed
+                     that every individual member of a society is, in a fashion, a part and member of the whole society. Wherefore, any good or
+                     evil, done to the member of a society, redounds on the whole society: thus, who hurts
+                     the hand, hurts the man. When, therefore, anyone does good or evil to another individual, there is a twofold measure of merit
+                     or demerit in his action: first, in respect of the retribution owed to him by the individual to whom he has done good or harm;
+                     secondly, in respect of the retribution owed to him by the whole of society. Now when a man ordains his action directly for
+                     the good or evil of the whole society, retribution is owed to him, before and above all, by the whole society;
+                     secondarily, by all the parts of society. Whereas when a man does that which conduces to his own benefit or disadvantage,
+                     then again is retribution owed to him, in so far as this too affects the community, forasmuch as he is a part of society:
+                     although retribution is not due to him, in so far as it conduces to the good or harm of an individual, who is identical with
+                     the agent: unless, perchance, he owe retribution to himself, by a sort of resemblance, in so far as man is said to be just
+                     to
+                     himself.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q21_A3-p7"> It is therefore evident that a good or evil action deserves praise or blame, in so far as it is in the power of the will:
+                     that it is right or sinful, according as it is ordained to the end; and that its merit or demerit depends on the recompense
+                     for justice or injustice towards another.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q21_A3-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> A man's good or evil actions, although not ordained to the good or evil of another individual, are nevertheless ordained
+                     to the good or evil of another, i.e. the community.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q21_A3-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Man is master of his actions; and yet, in so far as he belongs to another, i.e. the community, of which he forms part, he
+                     merits or demerits, inasmuch as he disposes his actions well or ill: just as if he were to dispense well or ill other belongings
+                     of his, in respect of which he is bound to serve the community.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q21_A3-p10">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This very good or evil, which a man does to himself by his action, redounds to the community, as stated above.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q21_A3-p11"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q21_A3-p12"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q21_A2.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q21_A4.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <div id="FS_Q21_A4" class="div4">
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q21_A3.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS.iii.html"></a>
+                  <h4 id="FS_Q21_A4-p0.1">Whether a human action is meritorious or demeritorious before God, according as it is good or evil?</h4>
+                  <p id="FS_Q21_A4-p1"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q21_A4-p2">
+                     <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that man's actions, good or evil, are not meritorious or demeritorious in the sight of God. Because, as stated
+                     above 
+                     <a id="FS_Q21_A4-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q21_A3.html">(A[3])</a>, merit and demerit imply relation to retribution for good or harm done to another. But a man's action, good or evil, does
+                     no good or harm to God; for it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q21_A4-p2.2" href="./asv.html#Job.35.6" target="asv">Job 35:6,7</a>): "If thou sin, what shalt thou hurt Him? . . . And if thou do justly, what shalt thou give Him?"
+                     Therefore a human action, good or evil, is not meritorious or demeritorious in the sight of God.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q21_A4-p3">
+                     <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, an instrument acquires no merit or demerit in the sight of him that uses it; because the entire action of the instrument
+                     belongs to the user. Now when man acts he is the instrument of the Divine power which is the principal cause of his action;
+                     hence it is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q21_A4-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.10.15" target="asv">Is. 10:15</a>): "Shall the axe boast itself against him that cutteth with it? Or shall the saw exalt itself against him by whom it is drawn?"
+                     where man while acting is
+                     evidently compared to an instrument. Therefore man merits or demerits nothing in God's sight, by good or evil deeds.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q21_A4-p4">
+                     <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, a human action acquires merit or demerit through being ordained to someone else. But not all human actions are ordained
+                     to God. Therefore not every good or evil action acquires merit or demerit in God's sight.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q21_A4-p5">
+                     <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written (
+                     <a class="scripRef" id="FS_Q21_A4-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Eccl.12.14" target="asv">Eccles. 12:14</a>): "All things that are done, God will bring into judgment . . . whether it be good or evil." Now judgment implies retribution,
+                     in respect of which we speak of merit and demerit. Therefore every human action, both good and evil, acquires merit or demerit
+                     in God's sight.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q21_A4-p6">
+                     <b>I answer that,</b> A human action, as stated above 
+                     <a id="FS_Q21_A4-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q21_A3.html">(A[3])</a>, acquires merit or demerit, through being ordained to someone else, either by reason of himself, or by reason of the community:
+                     and in each way, our actions, good and evil, acquire merit or demerit, in the sight of God. On the part of God Himself, inasmuch
+                     as He is man's last end; and it is our duty to refer all our actions to the last end, as stated above (Q[19], A[10]). Consequently,
+                     whoever
+                     does an evil deed, not referable to God, does not give God the honor due to Him as our last end. On the part of the whole
+                     community of the universe, because in every community, he who governs the community, cares, first of all, for the common good;
+                     wherefore it is his business to award retribution for such things as are done well or ill in the community. Now God is the
+                     governor and ruler of the whole universe, as stated in the 
+                     <a id="FS_Q21_A4-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q103_A5.html">FP, Q[103], A[5]</a>: and especially of
+                     rational creatures. Consequently it is evident that human actions acquire merit or demerit in reference to Him: else it would
+                     follow that human actions are no business of God's.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q21_A4-p7">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> God in Himself neither gains nor losses anything by the action of man: but man, for his part, takes something from God, or
+                     offers something to Him, when he observes or does not observe the order instituted by God.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q21_A4-p8">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Man is so moved, as an instrument, by God, that, at the same time, he moves himself by his free-will, as was explained above
+                     (
+                     <a id="FS_Q21_A4-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q9_A6.html">Q[9], A[6]</a>, ad 3). Consequently, by his action, he acquires merit or demerit in God's sight.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q21_A4-p9">
+                     <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Man is not ordained to the body politic, according to all that he is and has; and so it does not follow that every action
+                     of his acquires merit or demerit in relation to the body politic. But all that man is, and can, and has, must be referred
+                     to God: and therefore every action of man, whether good or bad, acquires merit or demerit in the sight of God, as far as the
+                     action itself is concerned.
+                  </p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q21_A4-p10"></p>
+                  <p id="FS_Q21_A4-p11"></p>
+                  <a href="summa.FS_Q21_A3.html"></a>
+                  <a href="summa.FS.iii.html"></a>
+               </div>
+               <a href="summa.FS_Q20_A6.html"></a>
+               <a href="summa.FS_Q21_A1.html"></a>
+            </div>
+            <a href="summa.FS_Q5_A8.html"></a>
+            <a href="summa.FS_Q6.html"></a>
+         `
+     </div>
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