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--- /dev/null Thu Jan 01 00:00:00 1970 +0000 +++ b/summa/english/FP_viii.html Sun Jan 03 14:43:02 2010 +0000 @@ -0,0 +1,2603 @@ +<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" id="FP.viii" class="div2"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q64_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q65.html"></a> + <h2 id="FP.viii-p0.1">TREATISE ON THE WORK OF THE SIX DAYS (QQ[65]-74)</h2> + <div id="FP_Q65" class="div3"> + <a href="summa.FP.viii.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q65_A1.html"></a> + <h3 id="FP_Q65-p0.1">THE WORK OF CREATION OF CORPOREAL CREATURES (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3> + <p id="FP_Q65-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q65-p2"> From the consideration of spiritual creatures we proceed to that of corporeal creatures, in the production of which, as Holy + Scripture makes mention, three works are found, namely, the work of creation, as given in the words, "In the beginning God + created heaven and earth"; the work of distinction as given in the words, "He divided the light from the darkness, and the + waters that are above the firmament from the waters that are under the firmament"; and the work of adornment, + expressed thus, "Let there be lights in the firmament." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q65-p3"> First, then, we must consider the work of creation; secondly, the work of distinction; and thirdly, the work of adornment. + Under the first head there are four points of inquiry: + </p> + <p id="FP_Q65-p4"> (1) Whether corporeal creatures are from God?</p> + <p id="FP_Q65-p5"> (2) Whether they were created on account of God's goodness?</p> + <p id="FP_Q65-p6"> (3) Whether they were created by God through the medium of the angels?</p> + <p id="FP_Q65-p7"> (4) Whether the forms of bodies are from the angels or immediately from God.</p> + <div id="FP_Q65_A1" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q65.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q65_A2.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q65_A1-p0.1">Whether corporeal creatures are from God?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q65_A1-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q65_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that corporeal creatures are not from God. For it is said ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q65_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Eccl.3.14" target="asv">Eccles. 3:14</a>): "I have learned that all the works which God hath made, continue for ever." But visible bodies do not continue for ever, + for it is said ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q65_A1-p2.2" href="./asv.html#iiCor.4.18" target="asv">2 Cor. 4:18</a>): "The things which are seen are temporal, but the things which are not seen are eternal." Therefore God did not make visible + bodies. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q65_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it is said ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q65_A1-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.1.31" target="asv">Gn. 1:31</a>): "God saw all things that He had made, and they were very good." But corporeal creatures are evil, since we find them harmful + in many ways; as may be seen in serpents, in the sun's heat, and other things. Now a thing is called evil, in so far as it + is harmful. Corporeal creatures, therefore, are not from God. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q65_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, what is from God does not withdraw us from God, but leads us to Him. But corporeal creatures withdraw us from God. + Hence the Apostle ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q65_A1-p4.1" href="./asv.html#iiCor.4.18" target="asv">2 Cor. 4:18</a>): "While we look not at the things which are seen." Corporeal creatures, therefore, are not from God. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q65_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is said ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q65_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.145.6" target="asv">Ps. 145:6</a>): "Who made heaven and earth, the sea, and all things that are in them." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q65_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Certain heretics maintain that visible things are not created by the good God, but by an evil principle, and allege in proof + of their error the words of the Apostle ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q65_A1-p6.1" href="./asv.html#iiCor.4.4" target="asv">2 Cor. 4:4</a>), "The god of this world hath blinded the minds of unbelievers." But this position is altogether untenable. For, if things + that differ agree in some point, there must be some cause for that agreement, since things diverse in nature cannot be united + of themselves. + Hence whenever in different things some one thing common to all is found, it must be that these different things receive that + one thing from some one cause, as different bodies that are hot receive their heat from fire. But being is found to be common + to all things, however otherwise different. There must, therefore, be one principle of being from which all things in whatever + way existing have their being, whether they are invisible and spiritual, or visible and corporeal. But the devil is + called the god of this world, not as having created it, but because worldlings serve him, of whom also the Apostle says, speaking + in the same sense, "Whose god is their belly" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q65_A1-p6.2" href="./asv.html#Phil.3.19" target="asv">Phil. 3:19</a>). + </p> + <p id="FP_Q65_A1-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> All the creatures of God in some respects continue for ever, at least as to matter, since what is created will never be annihilated, + even though it be corruptible. And the nearer a creature approaches God, Who is immovable, the more it also is immovable. + For corruptible creatures endure for ever as regards their matter, though they change as regards their substantial form. But + incorruptible creatures endure with respect to their substance, though they + are mutable in other respects, such as place, for instance, the heavenly bodies; or the affections, as spiritual creatures. + But the Apostle's words, "The things which are seen are temporal," though true even as regards such things considered in themselves + (in so far as every visible creature is subject to time, either as to being or as to movement), are intended to apply to visible + things in so far as they are offered to man as rewards. For such rewards, as consist in these visible things, are + temporal; while those that are invisible endure for ever. Hence he said before ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q65_A1-p7.1" href="./asv.html#iiCor.4.17" target="asv">2 Cor. 4:17</a>): "It worketh for us . . . an eternal weight of glory." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q65_A1-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Corporeal creatures according to their nature are good, though this good is not universal, but partial and limited, the consequence + of which is a certain opposition of contrary qualities, though each quality is good in itself. To those, however, who estimate + things, not by the nature thereof, but by the good they themselves can derive therefrom, everything which is harmful to themselves + seems simply evil. For they do not reflect that what is in some + way injurious to one person, to another is beneficial, and that even to themselves the same thing may be evil in some respects, + but good in others. And this could not be, if bodies were essentially evil and harmful. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q65_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Creatures of themselves do not withdraw us from God, but lead us to Him; for "the invisible things of God are clearly seen, + being understood by the things that are made" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q65_A1-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.1.20" target="asv">Rom. 1:20</a>). If, then, they withdraw men from God, it is the fault of those who use them foolishly. Thus it is said ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q65_A1-p9.2" href="./asv.html#Wis.14.11" target="asv">Wis. 14:11</a>): "Creatures are turned into a snare to the feet of the unwise." And the very fact that they can thus withdraw us + from God proves that they came from Him, for they cannot lead the foolish away from God except by the allurements of some + good that they have from Him. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q65_A1-p10"></p> + <p id="FP_Q65_A1-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q65.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q65_A2.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q65_A2" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q65_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q65_A3.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q65_A2-p0.1">Whether corporeal things were made on account of God's goodness?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q65_A2-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q65_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that corporeal creatures were not made on account of God's goodness. For it is said ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q65_A2-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.1.14" target="asv">Wis. 1:14</a>) that God "created all things that they might be." Therefore all things were created for their own being's sake, and not + on account of God's goodness. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q65_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, good has the nature of an end; therefore the greater good in things is the end of the lesser good. But spiritual + creatures are related to corporeal creatures, as the greater good to the lesser. Corporeal creatures, therefore, are created + for the sake of spiritual creatures, and not on account of God's goodness. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q65_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, justice does not give unequal things except to the unequal. Now God is just: therefore inequality not created by + God must precede all inequality created by Him. But an inequality not created by God can only arise from free-will, and consequently + all inequality results from the different movements of free-will. Now, corporeal creatures are unequal to spiritual creatures. + Therefore the former were made on account of movements of free-will, and not on + account of God's goodness. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q65_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is said ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q65_A2-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Prov.16.4" target="asv">Prov. 16:4</a>): "The Lord hath made all things for Himself." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q65_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Origen laid down [*Peri Archon ii.] that corporeal creatures were not made according to God's original purpose, but in punishment + of the sin of spiritual creatures. For he maintained that God in the beginning made spiritual creatures only, and all of equal + nature; but that of these by the use of free-will some turned to God, and, according to the measure of their conversion, were + given an higher or a lower rank, retaining their simplicity; while others + turned from God, and became bound to different kinds of bodies according to the degree of their turning away. But this position + is erroneous. In the first place, because it is contrary to Scripture, which, after narrating the production of each kind + of corporeal creatures, subjoins, "God saw that it was good" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q65_A2-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.1" target="asv">Gn. 1</a>), as if to say that everything was brought into being for the reason that it was good for it to be. But according to Origen's + opinion, the corporeal creature was made, not because + it was good that it should be, but that the evil in another might be punished. Secondly, because it would follow that the + arrangement, which now exists, of the corporeal world would arise from mere chance. For it the sun's body was made what it + is, that it might serve for a punishment suitable to some sin of a spiritual creature, it would follow, if other spiritual + creatures had sinned in the same way as the one to punish whom the sun had been created, that many suns would exist in the + world; + and so of other things. But such a consequence is altogether inadmissible. Hence we must set aside this theory as false, and + consider that the entire universe is constituted by all creatures, as a whole consists of its parts. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q65_A2-p7"> Now if we wish to assign an end to any whole, and to the parts of that whole, we shall find, first, that each and every part + exists for the sake of its proper act, as the eye for the act of seeing; secondly, that less honorable parts exist for the + more honorable, as the senses for the intellect, the lungs for the heart; and, thirdly, that all parts are for the perfection + of the whole, as the matter for the form, since the parts are, as it were, the matter of the whole. + Furthermore, the whole man is on account of an extrinsic end, that end being the fruition of God. So, therefore, in the parts + of the universe also every creature exists for its own proper act and perfection, and the less noble for the nobler, as those + creatures that are less noble than man exist for the sake of man, whilst each and every creature exists for the perfection + of the entire universe. Furthermore, the entire universe, with all its parts, is ordained towards God as its end, inasmuch + as it imitates, as it were, and shows forth the Divine goodness, to the glory of God. Reasonable creatures, however, have + in some special and higher manner God as their end, since they can attain to Him by their own operations, by knowing and loving + Him. Thus it is plain that the Divine goodness is the end of all corporeal things. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q65_A2-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> In the very fact of any creature possessing being, it represents the Divine being and Its goodness. And, therefore, that + God created all things, that they might have being, does not exclude that He created them for His own goodness. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q65_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The proximate end does not exclude the ultimate end. Therefore that corporeal creatures were, in a manner, made for the sake + of the spiritual, does not prevent their being made on account of God's goodness. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q65_A2-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Equality of justice has its place in retribution, since equal rewards or punishments are due to equal merit or demerit. But + this does not apply to things as at first instituted. For just as an architect, without injustice, places stones of the same + kind in different parts of a building, not on account of any antecedent difference in the stones, but with a view to securing + that perfection of the entire building, which could not be obtained except by + the different positions of the stones; even so, God from the beginning, to secure perfection in the universe, has set therein + creatures of various and unequal natures, according to His wisdom, and without injustice, since no diversity of merit is presupposed. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q65_A2-p11"></p> + <p id="FP_Q65_A2-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q65_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q65_A3.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q65_A3" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q65_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q65_A4.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q65_A3-p0.1">Whether corporeal creatures were produced by God through the medium of the angels?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q65_A3-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q65_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that corporeal creatures were produced by God through the medium of the angels. For, as all things are governed + by the Divine wisdom, so by it were all things made, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q65_A3-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.103.24" target="asv"> Ps. 103:24 </a>"Thou hast made all things in wisdom." But "it belongs to wisdom to ordain," as stated in the beginning of the Metaphysics + (i, 2). Hence in the government of things the lower is ruled by the higher in a certain fitting order, as Augustine + says (De Trin. iii, 4). Therefore in the production of things it was ordained that the corporeal should be produced by the + spiritual, as the lower by the higher. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q65_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, diversity of effects shows diversity of causes, since like always produces like. It then all creatures, both spiritual + and corporeal, were produced immediately by God, there would be no diversity in creatures, for one would not be further removed + from God than another. But this is clearly false; for the Philosopher says that some things are corruptible because they are + far removed from God (De Gen. et Corrup. ii, text. 59). + </p> + <p id="FP_Q65_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, infinite power is not required to produce a finite effect. But every corporeal thing is finite. Therefore, it could + be, and was, produced by the finite power of spiritual creatures: for in suchlike beings there is no distinction between what + is and what is possible: especially as no dignity befitting a nature is denied to that nature, unless it be in punishment + of a fault. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q65_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is said ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q65_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.1.1" target="asv">Gn. 1:1</a>): "In the beginning God created heaven and earth"; by which are understood corporeal creatures. These, therefore, were produced + immediately by God. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q65_A3-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Some have maintained that creatures proceeded from God by degrees, in such a way that the first creature proceeded from Him + immediately, and in its turn produced another, and so on until the production of corporeal creatures. But this position is + untenable, since the first production of corporeal creatures is by creation, by which matter itself is produced: for in the + act of coming into being the imperfect must be made before the perfect: and it is + impossible that anything should be created, save by God alone. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q65_A3-p7"> In proof whereof it must be borne in mind that the higher the cause, the more numerous the objects to which its causation + extends. Now the underlying principle in things is always more universal than that which informs and restricts it; thus, being + is more universal than living, living than understanding, matter than form. The more widely, then, one thing underlies others, + the more directly does that thing proceed from a higher cause. Thus the thing that underlies primarily all + things, belongs properly to the causality of the supreme cause. Therefore no secondary cause can produce anything, unless + there is presupposed in the thing produced something that is caused by a higher cause. But creation is the production of a + thing in its entire substance, nothing being presupposed either uncreated or created. Hence it remains that nothing can create + except God alone, Who is the first cause. Therefore, in order to show that all bodies were created immediately by God, Moses + said: "In the beginning God created heaven and earth." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q65_A3-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> In the production of things an order exists, but not such that one creature is created by another, for that is impossible; + but rather such that by the Divine wisdom diverse grades are constituted in creatures. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q65_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> God Himself, though one, has knowledge of many and different things without detriment to the simplicity of His nature, as + has been shown above ( + <a id="FP_Q65_A3-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q15_A2.html">Q[15], A[2]</a>); so that by His wisdom He is the cause of diverse things as known by Him, even as an artificer, by apprehending diverse + forms, produces diverse works of art. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q65_A3-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The amount of the power of an agent is measured not only by the thing made, but also by the manner of making it; for one + and the same thing is made in one way by a higher power, in another by a lower. But the production of finite things, where + nothing is presupposed as existing, is the work of infinite power, and, as such, can belong to no creature. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q65_A3-p11"></p> + <p id="FP_Q65_A3-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q65_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q65_A4.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q65_A4" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q65_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q66.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q65_A4-p0.1">Whether the forms of bodies are from the angels?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q65_A4-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q65_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the forms of bodies come from the angels. For Boethius says (De Trin. i): "From forms that are without + matter come the forms that are in matter." But forms that are without matter are spiritual substances, and forms that are + in matter are the forms of bodies. Therefore, the forms of bodies are from spiritual substances. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q65_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, all that is such by participation is reduced to that which is such by its essence. But spiritual substances are + forms essentially, whereas corporeal creatures have forms by participation. Therefore the forms of corporeal things are derived + from spiritual substances. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q65_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, spiritual substances have more power of causation than the heavenly bodies. But the heavenly bodies give form to + things here below, for which reason they are said to cause generation and corruption. Much more, therefore, are material forms + derived from spiritual substances. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q65_A4-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 8): "We must not suppose that this corporeal matter serves the angels at their nod, but rather + that it obeys God thus." But corporeal matter may be said thus to serve that from which it receives its form. Corporeal forms, + then, are not from the angels, but from God. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q65_A4-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> It was the opinion of some that all corporeal forms are derived from spiritual substances, which we call the angels. And + there are two ways in which this has been stated. For Plato held that the forms of corporeal matter are derived from, and + formed by, forms immaterially subsisting, by a kind of participation. Thus he held that there exists an immaterial man, and + an immaterial horse, and so forth, and that from such the individual sensible things that we + see are constituted, in so far as in corporeal matter there abides the impression received from these separate forms, by a + kind of assimilation, or as he calls it, "participation" (Phaedo xlix). And, according to the Platonists, the order of forms + corresponds to the order of those separate substances; for example, that there is a single separate substance, which is horse + and the cause of all horses, whilst above this is separate life, or "per se" life, as they term it, which is the cause of + all + life, and that above this again is that which they call being itself, which is the cause of all being. Avicenna, however, + and certain others, have maintained that the forms of corporeal things do not subsist "per se" in matter, but in the intellect + only. Thus they say that from forms existing in the intellect of spiritual creatures (called "intelligences" by them, but + "angels" by us) proceed all the forms of corporeal matter, as the form of his handiwork proceeds from the forms in the mind + of + the craftsman. This theory seems to be the same as that of certain heretics of modern times, who say that God indeed created + all things, but that the devil formed corporeal matter, and differentiated it into species. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q65_A4-p7"> But all these opinions seem to have a common origin; they all, in fact, sought for a cause of forms as though the form were + of itself brought into being. Whereas, as Aristotle (Metaph. vii, text. 26,27,28), proves, what is, properly speaking, made, + is the "composite." Now, such are the forms of corruptible things that at one time they exist and at another exist not, without + being themselves generated or corrupted, but by reason of the generation or corruption of the "composite"; + since even forms have not being, but composites have being through forms: for, according to a thing's mode of being, is the + mode in which it is brought into being. Since, then, like is produced from like, we must not look for the cause of corporeal + forms in any immaterial form, but in something that is composite, as this fire is generated by that fire. Corporeal forms, + therefore, are caused, not as emanations from some immaterial form, but by matter being brought from potentiality into act + by + some composite agent. But since the composite agent, which is a body, is moved by a created spiritual substance, as Augustine + says (De Trin. iii, 4,5), it follows further that even corporeal forms are derived from spiritual substances, not emanating + from them, but as the term of their movement. And, further still, the species of the angelic intellect, which are, as it were, + the seminal types of corporeal forms, must be referred to God as the first cause. But in the first production of corporeal + creatures no transmutation from potentiality to act can have taken place, and accordingly, the corporeal forms that bodies + had when first produced came immediately form God, whose bidding alone matter obeys, as its own proper cause. To signify this, + Moses prefaces each work with the words, "God said, Let this thing be," or "that," to denote the formation of all things by + the Word of God, from Whom, according to Augustine [*Tract. i. in Joan. and Gen. ad lit. i. 4], is "all form and fitness and + concord of parts." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q65_A4-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> By immaterial forms Boethius understands the types of things in the mind of God. Thus the Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q65_A4-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Heb.11.3" target="asv">Heb. 11:3</a>): "By faith we understand that the world was framed by the Word of God; that from invisible things visible things might be + made." But if by immaterial forms he understands the angels, we say that from them come material forms, not by emanation, + but by motion. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q65_A4-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Forms received into matter are to be referred, not to self-subsisting forms of the same type, as the Platonists held, but + either to intelligible forms of the angelic intellect, from which they proceed by movement, or, still higher, to the types + in the Divine intellect, by which the seeds of forms are implanted in created things, that they may be able to be brought + by movement into act. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q65_A4-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The heavenly bodies inform earthly ones by movement, not by emanation. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q65_A4-p11"></p> + <p id="FP_Q65_A4-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q65_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q66.html"></a> + </div> + <a href="summa.FP.viii.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q65_A1.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q66" class="div3"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q65_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q66_A1.html"></a> + <h3 id="FP_Q66-p0.1">ON THE ORDER OF CREATION TOWARDS DISTINCTION (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3> + <p id="FP_Q66-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q66-p2"> We must next consider the work of distinction; first, the ordering of creation towards distinction; secondly, the distinction + itself. Under the first head there are four points of inquiry: + </p> + <p id="FP_Q66-p3"> (1) Whether formlessness of created matter preceded in time its formation?</p> + <p id="FP_Q66-p4"> (2) Whether the matter of all corporeal things is the same?</p> + <p id="FP_Q66-p5"> (3) Whether the empyrean heaven was created contemporaneously with formless matter?</p> + <p id="FP_Q66-p6"> (4) Whether time was created simultaneously with it?</p> + <div id="FP_Q66_A1" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q66.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q66_A2.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q66_A1-p0.1">Whether formlessness of created matter preceded in time its formation?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q66_A1-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q66_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that formlessness of matter preceded in time its formation. For it is said ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q66_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.1.2" target="asv">Gn. 1:2</a>): "The earth was void and empty," or "invisible and shapeless," according to another version [*Septuagint]; by which is understood + the formlessness of matter, as Augustine says (Confess. xii, 12). Therefore matter was formless until it received its form. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q66_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, nature in its working imitates the working of God, as a secondary cause imitates a first cause. But in the working + of nature formlessness precedes form in time. It does so, therefore, in the Divine working. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q66_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, matter is higher than accident, for matter is part of substance. But God can effect that accident exist without + substance, as in the Sacrament of the Altar. He could, therefore, cause matter to exist without form. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q66_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> An imperfect effect proves imperfection in the agent. But God is an agent absolutely perfect; wherefore it is said of Him + ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q66_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Deut.32.4" target="asv">Dt. 32:4</a>): "The works of God are perfect." Therefore the work of His creation was at no time formless. Further, the formation of corporeal + creatures was effected by the work of distinction. But confusion is opposed to distinction, as formlessness to form. It, therefore, + formlessness preceded in time the formation of matter, it follows + that at the beginning confusion, called by the ancients chaos, existed in the corporeal creation. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q66_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> On this point holy men differ in opinion. Augustine for instance (Gen. ad lit. i, 15), believes that the formlessness of + matter was not prior in time to its formation, but only in origin or the order of nature, whereas others, as Basil (Hom. ii + In Hexaem.), Ambrose (In Hexaem. i), and Chrysostom (Hom. ii In Gen.), hold that formlessness of matter preceded in time its + formation. And although these opinions seem mutually contradictory, in reality they differ + but little; for Augustine takes the formlessness of matter in a different sense from the others. In his sense it means the + absence of all form, and if we thus understand it we cannot say that the formlessness of matter was prior in time either to + its formation or to its distinction. As to formation, the argument is clear. For it formless matter preceded in duration, + it already existed; for this is implied by duration, since the end of creation is being in act: and act itself is a form. + To say, + then, that matter preceded, but without form, is to say that being existed actually, yet without act, which is a contradiction + in terms. Nor can it be said that it possessed some common form, on which afterwards supervened the different forms that distinguish + it. For this would be to hold the opinion of the ancient natural philosophers, who maintained that primary matter was some + corporeal thing in act, as fire, air, water, or some intermediate substance. Hence, it followed that to be made + means merely to be changed; for since that preceding form bestowed actual substantial being, and made some particular thing + to be, it would result that the supervening form would not simply make an actual being, but 'this' actual being; which is + the proper effect of an accidental form. Thus the consequent forms would be merely accidents, implying not generation, but + alteration. Hence we must assert that primary matter was not created altogether formless, nor under any one common form, but + under + distinct forms. And so, if the formlessness of matter be taken as referring to the condition of primary matter, which in itself + is formless, this formlessness did not precede in time its formation or distinction, but only in origin and nature, as Augustine + says; in the same way as potentiality is prior to act, and the part to the whole. But the other holy writers understand by + formlessness, not the exclusion of all form, but the absence of that beauty and comeliness which are now apparent in + the corporeal creation. Accordingly they say that the formlessness of corporeal matter preceded its form in duration. And + so, when this is considered, it appears that Augustine agrees with them in some respects, and in others disagrees, as will + be shown later ( + <a id="FP_Q66_A1-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q69_A1.html">Q[69], A[1]</a>; + <a id="FP_Q66_A1-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q74_A2.html">Q[74], A[2]</a>). + </p> + <p id="FP_Q66_A1-p7"> As far as may be gathered from the text of Genesis a threefold beauty was wanting to corporeal creatures, for which reason + they are said to be without form. For the beauty of light was wanting to all that transparent body which we call the heavens, + whence it is said that "darkness was upon the fact of the deep." And the earth lacked beauty in two ways: first, that beauty + which it acquired when its watery veil was withdrawn, and so we read that "the earth was void," or + "invisible," inasmuch as the waters covered and concealed it from view; secondly, that which it derives from being adorned + by herbs and plants, for which reason it is called "empty," or, according to another reading [*Septuagint], "shapeless"---that + is, unadorned. Thus after mention of two created natures, the heaven and the earth, the formlessness of the heaven is indicated + by the words, "darkness was upon the face of the deep," since the air is included under heaven; and the formlessness of + the earth, by the words, "the earth was void and empty." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q66_A1-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The word earth is taken differently in this passage by Augustine, and by other writers. Augustine holds that by the words + "earth" and "water," in this passage. primary matter itself is signified on account of its being impossible for Moses to make + the idea of such matter intelligible to an ignorant people, except under the similitude of well-known objects. Hence he uses + a variety of figures in speaking of it, calling it not water only, nor earth only, + lest they should think it to be in very truth water or earth. At the same time it has so far a likeness to earth, in that + it is susceptible of form, and to water in its adaptability to a variety of forms. In this respect, then, the earth is said + to be "void and empty," or "invisible and shapeless," that matter is known by means of form. Hence, considered in itself, + it is called "invisible" or "void," and its potentiality is completed by form; thus Plato says that matter is "place" [*Timaeus, + quoted by Aristotle, Phys. iv, text. 15]. But other holy writers understand by earth the element of earth, and we have said + + <a id="FP_Q66_A1-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q66_A1.html">(A[1])</a> how, in this sense, the earth was, according to them, without form. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q66_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Nature produces effect in act from being in potentiality; and consequently in the operations of nature potentiality must + precede act in time, and formlessness precede form. But God produces being in act out of nothing, and can, therefore, produce + a perfect thing in an instant, according to the greatness of His power. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q66_A1-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Accident, inasmuch as it is a form, is a kind of act; whereas matter, as such, is essentially being in potentiality. Hence + it is more repugnant that matter should be in act without form, than for accident to be without subject. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q66_A1-p11"> In reply to the first argument in the contrary sense, we say that if, according to some holy writers, formlessness was prior + in time to the informing of matter, this arose, not from want of power on God's part, but from His wisdom, and from the design + of preserving due order in the disposition of creatures by developing perfection from imperfection. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q66_A1-p12"> In reply to the second argument, we say that certain of the ancient natural philosophers maintained confusion devoid of all + distinction; except Anaxagoras, who taught that the intellect alone was distinct and without admixture. But previous to the + work of distinction Holy Scripture enumerates several kinds of differentiation, the first being that of the heaven from the + earth, in which even a material distinction is expressed, as will be shown later + <a id="FP_Q66_A1-p12.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q66_A3.html">(A[3];</a> + <a id="FP_Q66_A1-p12.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q68_A1.html">Q[68], A[1]</a>). This is signified by the words, "In the beginning God created heaven and earth." The second distinction mentioned is that + of the elements according to their forms, since both earth and water are named. That air and fire are not mentioned by name + is due to the fact that the corporeal nature of these would not be so evident as that of earth and water, to the ignorant + people to whom Moses spoke. Plato (Timaeus xxvi), nevertheless, + understood air to be signified by the words, "Spirit of God," since spirit is another name for air, and considered that by + the word heaven is meant fire, for he held heaven to be composed of fire, as Augustine relates (De Civ. Dei viii, 11). But + Rabbi Moses (Perplex. ii), though otherwise agreeing with Plato, says that fire is signified by the word darkness, since, + said he, fire does not shine in its own sphere. However, it seems more reasonable to hold to what we stated above; because + by the + words "Spirit of God" Scripture usually means the Holy Ghost, Who is said to "move over the waters," not, indeed, in bodily + shape, but as the craftsman's will may be said to move over the material to which he intends to give a form. The third distinction + is that of place; since the earth is said to be under the waters that rendered it invisible, whilst the air, the subject of + darkness, is described as being above the waters, in the words: "Darkness was upon the face of the deep." The remaining + distinctions will appear from what follows + <a id="FP_Q66_A1-p12.3" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q71.html">(Q[71])</a>. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q66_A1-p13"></p> + <p id="FP_Q66_A1-p14"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q66.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q66_A2.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q66_A2" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q66_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q66_A3.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q66_A2-p0.1">Whether the formless matter of all corporeal things is the same?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q66_A2-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q66_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the formless matter of all corporeal things is the same. For Augustine says (Confess. xii, 12): "I find + two things Thou hast made, one formed, the other formless," and he says that the latter was the earth invisible and shapeless, + whereby, he says, the matter of all corporeal things is designated. Therefore the matter of all corporeal things is the same. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q66_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the Philosopher says (Metaph. v, text. 10): "Things that are one in genus are one in matter." But all corporeal + things are in the same genus of body. Therefore the matter of all bodies is the same. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q66_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, different acts befit different potentialities, and the same act befits the same potentiality. But all bodies have + the same form, corporeity. Therefore all bodies have the same matter. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q66_A2-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, matter, considered in itself, is only in potentiality. But distinction is due to form. Therefore matter considered + in itself is the same in all corporeal things. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q66_A2-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Things of which the matter is the same are mutually interchangeable and mutually active or passive, as is said (De Gener. + i, text. 50). But heavenly and earthly bodies do not act upon each other mutually. Therefore their matter is not the same. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q66_A2-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> On this question the opinions of philosophers have differed. Plato and all who preceded Aristotle held that all bodies are + of the nature of the four elements. Hence because the four elements have one common matter, as their mutual generation and + corruption prove, it followed that the matter of all bodies is the same. But the fact of the incorruptibility of some bodies + was ascribed by Plato, not to the condition of matter, but to the will of the artificer, + God, Whom he represents as saying to the heavenly bodies: "By your own nature you are subject to dissolution, but by My will + you are indissoluble, for My will is more powerful than the link that binds you together." But this theory Aristotle (De Caelo + i, text. 5) disproves by the natural movements of bodies. For since, he says, the heavenly bodies have a natural movement, + different from that of the elements, it follows that they have a different nature from them. For movement in a circle, which + is proper to the heavenly bodies, is not by contraries, whereas the movements of the elements are mutually opposite, one tending + upwards, another downwards: so, therefore, the heavenly body is without contrariety, whereas the elemental bodies have contrariety + in their nature. And as generation and corruption are from contraries, it follows that, whereas the elements are corruptible, + the heavenly bodies are incorruptible. But in spite of this difference of natural corruption and incorruption, + Avicebron taught unity of matter in all bodies, arguing from their unity of form. And, indeed, if corporeity were one form + in itself, on which the other forms that distinguish bodies from each other supervene, this argument would necessarily be + true; for this form of corporeity would inhere in matter immutably and so far all bodies would be incorruptible. But corruption + would then be merely accidental through the disappearance of successive forms---that is to say, it would be corruption, not + pure and simple, but partial, since a being in act would subsist under the transient form. Thus the ancient natural philosophers + taught that the substratum of bodies was some actual being, such as air or fire. But supposing that no form exists in corruptible + bodies which remains subsisting beneath generation and corruption, it follows necessarily that the matter of corruptible and + incorruptible bodies is not the same. For matter, as it is in itself, is in potentiality to form. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q66_A2-p8"> Considered in itself, then, it is in potentiality in respect to all those forms to which it is common, and in receiving any + one form it is in act only as regards that form. Hence it remains in potentiality to all other forms. And this is the case + even where some forms are more perfect than others, and contain these others virtually in themselves. For potentiality in + itself is indifferent with respect to perfection and imperfection, so that under an imperfect form it is in + potentiality to a perfect form, and "vice versa." Matter, therefore, whilst existing under the form of an incorruptible body, + would be in potentiality to the form of a corruptible body; and as it does not actually possess the latter, it has both form + and the privation of form; for want of a form in that which is in potentiality thereto is privation. But this condition implies + corruptibility. It is therefore impossible that bodies by nature corruptible, and those by nature incorruptible, should + possess the same matter. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q66_A2-p9"> Neither can we say, as Averroes [*De Substantia Orbis ii.] imagines, that a heavenly body itself is the matter of the heaven---beings + in potentiality with regard to place, though not to being, and that its form is a separate substance united to it as its motive + force. For it is impossible to suppose any being in act, unless in its totality it be act and form, or be something which + has act or form. Setting aside, then, in thought, the separate substance stated to be endowed with + motive power, if the heavenly body is not something having form---that is, something composed of a form and the subject of + that form---it follows that in its totality it is form and act. But every such thing is something actually understood, which + the heavenly bodies are not, being sensible. It follows, then, that the matter of the heavenly bodies, considered in itself, + is in potentiality to that form alone which it actually possesses. Nor does it concern the point at issue to inquire whether + this is a soul or any other thing. Hence this form perfects this matter in such a way that there remains in it no potentiality + with respect to being, but only to place, as Aristotle [*De Coelo i, text. 20] says. So, then, the matter of the heavenly + bodies and of the elements is not the same, except by analogy, in so far as they agree in the character of potentiality. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q66_A2-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Augustine follows in this the opinion of Plato, who does not admit a fifth essence. Or we may say that formless matter is + one with the unity of order, as all bodies are one in the order of corporeal creatures. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q66_A2-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> If genus is taken in a physical sense, corruptible and incorruptible things are not in the same genus, on account of their + different modes of potentiality, as is said in Metaph. x, text. 26. Logically considered, however, there is but one genus + of all bodies, since they are all included in the one notion of corporeity. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q66_A2-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The form of corporeity is not one and the same in all bodies, being no other than the various forms by which bodies are distinguished, + as stated above. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q66_A2-p13"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> As potentiality is directed towards act, potential beings are differentiated by their different acts, as sight is by color, + hearing by sound. Therefore for this reason the matter of the celestial bodies is different from that of the elemental, because + the matter of the celestial is not in potentiality to an elemental form. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q66_A2-p14"></p> + <p id="FP_Q66_A2-p15"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q66_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q66_A3.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q66_A3" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q66_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q66_A4.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q66_A3-p0.1">Whether the empyrean heaven was created at the same time as formless matter?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q66_A3-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q66_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the empyrean heaven was not created at the same time as formless matter. For the empyrean, if it is anything + at all, must be a sensible body. But all sensible bodies are movable, and the empyrean heaven is not movable. For if it were + so, its movement would be ascertained by the movement of some visible body, which is not the case. The empyrean heaven, then, + was not created contemporaneously with formless matter. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q66_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 4) that "the lower bodies are governed by the higher in a certain order." If, therefore, + the empyrean heaven is the highest of bodies, it must necessarily exercise some influence on bodies below it. But this does + not seem to be the case, especially as it is presumed to be without movement; for one body cannot move another unless itself + also be moved. Therefore the empyrean heaven was not created together with formless + matter. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q66_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if it is held that the empyrean heaven is the place of contemplation, and not ordained to natural effects; on the + contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. iv, 20): "In so far as we mentally apprehend eternal things, so far are we not of this + world"; from which it is clear that contemplation lifts the mind above the things of this world. Corporeal place, therefore, + cannot be the seat of contemplation. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q66_A3-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, among the heavenly bodies exists a body, partly transparent and partly luminous, which we call the sidereal heaven. + There exists also a heaven wholly transparent, called by some the aqueous or crystalline heaven. If, then, there exists a + still higher heaven, it must be wholly luminous. But this cannot be, for then the air would be constantly illuminated, and + there would be no night. Therefore the empyrean heaven was not created together with formless + matter. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q66_A3-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Strabus says that in the passage, "In the beginning God created heaven and earth," heaven denotes not the visible firmament, + but the empyrean or fiery heaven. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q66_A3-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The empyrean heaven rests only on the authority of Strabus and Bede, and also of Basil; all of whom agree in one respect, + namely, in holding it to be the place of the blessed. Strabus and Bede say that as soon as created it was filled with angels; + and Basil [*Hom. ii. in Hexaem.] says: "Just as the lost are driven into the lowest darkness, so the reward for worthy deeds + is laid up in the light beyond this world, where the just shall obtain the abode of + rest." But they differ in the reasons on which they base their statement. Strabus and Bede teach that there is an empyrean + heaven, because the firmament, which they take to mean the sidereal heaven, is said to have been made, not in the beginning, + but on the second day: whereas the reason given by Basil is that otherwise God would seem to have made darkness His first + work, as the Manicheans falsely assert, when they call the God of the Old Testament the God of darkness. These reasons, however, + are not very cogent. For the question of the firmament, said to have been made on the second day, is solved in one way by + Augustine, and in another by other holy writers. But the question of the darkness is explained according to Augustine [*Gen. + ad lit. i; vii.], by supposing that formlessness, signified by darkness, preceded form not by duration, but by origin. According + to others, however, since darkness is no creature, but a privation of light, it is a proof of Divine wisdom, that the + things it created from nothing it produced first of all in an imperfect state, and afterwards brought them to perfection. + But a better reason can be drawn from the state of glory itself. For in the reward to come a two-fold glory is looked for, + spiritual and corporeal, not only in the human body to be glorified, but in the whole world which is to be made new. Now the + spiritual glory began with the beginning of the world, in the blessedness of the angels, equality with whom is promised to + the + saints. It was fitting, then, that even from the beginning, there should be made some beginning of bodily glory in something + corporeal, free at the very outset from the servitude of corruption and change, and wholly luminous, even as the whole bodily + creation, after the Resurrection, is expected to be. So, then, that heaven is called the empyrean, i.e. fiery, not from its + heat, but from its brightness. It is to be noticed, however, that Augustine (De Civ. Dei x, 9,27) says that Porphyry sets + the demons apart from the angels by supposing that the former inhabit the air, the latter the ether, or empyrean. But Porphyry, + as a Platonist, held the heaven, known as sidereal, to be fiery, and therefore called it empyrean or ethereal, taking ethereal + to denote the burning of flame, and not as Aristotle understands it, swiftness of movement (De Coel. i, text. 22). This much + has been said to prevent anyone from supposing that Augustine maintained an empyrean heaven in the sense understood by + modern writers. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q66_A3-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Sensible corporeal things are movable in the present state of the world, for by the movement of corporeal creatures is secured + by the multiplication of the elements. But when glory is finally consummated, the movement of bodies will cease. And such + must have been from the beginning the condition of the empyrean. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q66_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> It is sufficiently probable, as some assert, that the empyrean heaven, having the state of glory for its ordained end, does + not influence inferior bodies of another order---those, namely, that are directed only to natural ends. Yet it seems still + more probable that it does influence bodies that are moved, though itself motionless, just as angels of the highest rank, + who assist [*Infra, + <a id="FP_Q66_A3-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q112_A3.html">Q[112], A[3]</a>], influence those of lower + degree who act as messengers, though they themselves are not sent, as Dionysius teaches (Coel. Hier. xii). For this reason + it may be said that the influence of the empyrean upon that which is called the first heaven, and is moved, produces therein + not something that comes and goes as a result of movement, but something of a fixed and stable nature, as the power of conservation + or causation, or something of the kind pertaining to dignity. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q66_A3-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Corporeal place is assigned to contemplation, not as necessary, but as congruous, that the splendor without may correspond + to that which is within. Hence Basil (Hom. ii in Hexaem.) says: "The ministering spirit could not live in darkness, but made + his habitual dwelling in light and joy." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q66_A3-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> As Basil says (Hom. ii in Hexaem.): "It is certain that the heaven was created spherical in shape, of dense body, and sufficiently + strong to separate what is outside it from what it encloses. On this account it darkens the region external to it, the light + by which itself is lit up being shut out from that region. "But since the body of the firmament, though solid, is transparent, + for that it does not exclude light (as is clear from the fact that we + can see the stars through the intervening heavens), we may also say that the empyrean has light, not condensed so as to emit + rays, as the sun does, but of a more subtle nature. Or it may have the brightness of glory which differs from mere natural + brightness. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q66_A3-p12"></p> + <p id="FP_Q66_A3-p13"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q66_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q66_A4.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q66_A4" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q66_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q67.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q66_A4-p0.1">Whether time was created simultaneously with formless matter?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q66_A4-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q66_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that time was not created simultaneously with formless matter. For Augustine says (Confess. xii, 12): "I find + two things that Thou didst create before time was, the primary corporeal matter, and the angelic nature. "Therefore time was + not created with formless matter. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q66_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, time is divided by day and night. But in the beginning there was neither day nor night, for these began when "God + divided the light from the darkness. "Therefore in the beginning time was not. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q66_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, time is the measure of the firmament's movement; and the firmament is said to have been made on the second day. + Therefore in the beginning time was not. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q66_A4-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, movement precedes time, and therefore should be reckoned among the first things created, rather than time. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q66_A4-p6"> + <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, as time is the extrinsic measure of created things, so is place. Place, then, as truly as time, must be reckoned + among the things first created. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q66_A4-p7"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. i, 3): "Both spiritual and corporeal creatures were created at the beginning of time." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q66_A4-p8"> + <b>I answer that,</b> It is commonly said that the first things created were these four---the angelic nature, the empyrean heaven, formless corporeal + matter, and time. It must be observed, however, that this is not the opinion of Augustine. For he (Confess. xii, 12) specifies + only two things as first created---the angelic nature and corporeal matter---making no mention of the empyrean heaven. But + these two, namely, the angelic nature and formless matter, precede the formation, by + nature only, and not by duration; and therefore, as they precede formation, so do they precede movement and time. Time, therefore, + cannot be included among them. But the enumeration above given is that of other holy writers, who hold that the formlessness + of matter preceded by duration its form, and this view postulates the existence of time as the measure of duration: for otherwise + there would be no such measure. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q66_A4-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The teaching of Augustine rests on the opinion that the angelic nature and formless matter precede time by origin or nature. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q66_A4-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As in the opinion of some holy writers matter was in some measure formless before it received its full form, so time was + in a manner formless before it was fully formed and distinguished into day and night. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q66_A4-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> If the movement of the firmament did not begin immediately from the beginning, then the time that preceded was the measure, + not of the firmament's movement, but of the first movement of whatsoever kind. For it is accidental to time to be the measure + of the firmament's movement, in so far as this is the first movement. But if the first movement was another than this, time + would have been its measure, for everything is measured by the first of its kind. + And it must be granted that forthwith from the beginning, there was movement of some kind, at least in the succession of concepts + and affections in the angelic mind: while movement without time cannot be conceived, since time is nothing else than "the + measure of priority and succession in movement." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q66_A4-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Among the first created things are to be reckoned those which have a general relationship to things. And, therefore, among + these time must be included, as having the nature of a common measure; but not movement, which is related only to the movable + subject. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q66_A4-p13"> + <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> Place is implied as existing in the empyrean heaven, this being the boundary of the universe. And since place has reference + to things permanent, it was created at once in its totality. But time, as not being permanent, was created in its beginning: + even as actually we cannot lay hold of any part of time save the "now." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q66_A4-p14"></p> + <p id="FP_Q66_A4-p15"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q66_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q67.html"></a> + </div> + <a href="summa.FP_Q65_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q66_A1.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q67" class="div3"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q66_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q67_A1.html"></a> + <h3 id="FP_Q67-p0.1">ON THE WORK OF DISTINCTION IN ITSELF (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3> + <p id="FP_Q67-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q67-p2"> We must consider next the work of distinction in itself. First, the work of the first day; secondly, the work of the second + day; thirdly the work of the third day. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q67-p3"> Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:</p> + <p id="FP_Q67-p4"> (1) Whether the word light is used in its proper sense in speaking of spiritual things?</p> + <p id="FP_Q67-p5"> (2) Whether light, in corporeal things, is itself corporeal?</p> + <p id="FP_Q67-p6"> (3) Whether light is a quality?</p> + <p id="FP_Q67-p7"> (4) Whether light was fittingly made on the first day?</p> + <div id="FP_Q67_A1" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q67.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q67_A2.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q67_A1-p0.1">Whether the word "light" is used in its proper sense in speaking of spiritual things?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q67_A1-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q67_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that "light" is used in its proper sense in spiritual things. For Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. iv, 28) that + "in spiritual things light is better and surer: and that Christ is not called Light in the same sense as He is called the + Stone; the former is to be taken literally, and the latter metaphorically." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q67_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv) includes Light among the intellectual names of God. But such names are used in their proper + sense in spiritual things. Therefore light is used in its proper sense in spiritual matters. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q67_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q67_A1-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Eph.5.13" target="asv">Eph. 5:13</a>): "All that is made manifest is light." But to be made manifest belongs more properly to spiritual things than to corporeal. + Therefore also does light. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q67_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Ambrose says (De Fide ii) that "Splendor" is among those things which are said of God metaphorically. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q67_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Any word may be used in two ways---that is to say, either in its original application or in its more extended meaning. This + is clearly shown in the word "sight," originally applied to the act of the sense, and then, as sight is the noblest and most + trustworthy of the senses, extended in common speech to all knowledge obtained through the other senses. Thus we say, "Seeing + how it tastes," or "smells," or "burns. "Further, sight is applied to knowledge + obtained through the intellect, as in those words: "Blessed are the clean of heart, for they shall see God" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q67_A1-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.5.8" target="asv">Mat. 5:8</a>). And thus it is with the word light. In its primary meaning it signifies that which makes manifest to the sense of sight; + afterwards it was extended to that which makes manifest to cognition of any kind. If, then, the word is taken in its strict + and primary meaning, it is to be understood metaphorically when applied to spiritual things, as Ambrose says (De + Fide ii). But if taken in its common and extended use, as applied to manifestation of every kind, it may properly be applied + to spiritual things. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q67_A1-p7"> The answer to the objections will sufficiently appear from what has been said.</p> + <p id="FP_Q67_A1-p8"></p> + <p id="FP_Q67_A1-p9"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q67.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q67_A2.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q67_A2" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q67_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q67_A3.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q67_A2-p0.1">Whether light is a body?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q67_A2-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q67_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that light is a body. For Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. iii, 5) that "light takes the first place among bodies."Therefore + light is a body. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q67_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the Philosopher says (Topic. v, 2) that "light is a species of fire." But fire is a body, and therefore so is light. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q67_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the powers of movement, intersection, reflection, belong properly to bodies; and all these are attributes of light + and its rays. Moreover, different rays of light, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. ii) are united and separated, which seems impossible + unless they are bodies. Therefore light is a body. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q67_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Two bodies cannot occupy the same place simultaneously. But this is the case with light and air. Therefore light is not a + body. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q67_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Light cannot be a body, for three evident reasons. First, on the part of place. For the place of any one body is different + from that of any other, nor is it possible, naturally speaking, for any two bodies of whatever nature, to exist simultaneously + in the same place; since contiguity requires distinction of place. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q67_A2-p7"> The second reason is from movement. For if light were a body, its diffusion would be the local movement of a body. Now no + local movement of a body can be instantaneous, as everything that moves from one place to another must pass through the intervening + space before reaching the end: whereas the diffusion of light is instantaneous. Nor can it be argued that the time required + is too short to be perceived; for though this may be the case in short distances, it cannot be so in + distances so great as that which separates the East from the West. Yet as soon as the sun is at the horizon, the whole hemisphere + is illuminated from end to end. It must also be borne in mind on the part of movement that whereas all bodies have their natural + determinate movement, that of light is indifferent as regards direction, working equally in a circle as in a straight line. + Hence it appears that the diffusion of light is not the local movement of a body. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q67_A2-p8"> The third reason is from generation and corruption. For if light were a body, it would follow that whenever the air is darkened + by the absence of the luminary, the body of light would be corrupted, and its matter would receive a new form. But unless + we are to say that darkness is a body, this does not appear to be the case. Neither does it appear from what matter a body + can be daily generated large enough to fill the intervening hemisphere. Also it would be absurd to say that a + body of so great a bulk is corrupted by the mere absence of the luminary. And should anyone reply that it is not corrupted, + but approaches and moves around with the sun, we may ask why it is that when a lighted candle is obscured by the intervening + object the whole room is darkened? It is not that the light is condensed round the candle when this is done, since it burns + no more brightly then than it burned before. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q67_A2-p9"> Since, therefore, these things are repugnant, not only to reason, but to common sense, we must conclude that light cannot + be a body. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q67_A2-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Augustine takes light to be a luminous body in act---in other words, to be fire, the noblest of the four elements. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q67_A2-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Aristotle pronounces light to be fire existing in its own proper matter: just as fire in aerial matter is "flame," or in + earthly matter is "burning coal." Nor must too much attention be paid to the instances adduced by Aristotle in his works on + logic, as he merely mentions them as the more or less probable opinions of various writers. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q67_A2-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> All these properties are assigned to light metaphorically, and might in the same way be attributed to heat. For because movement + from place to place is naturally first in the order of movement as is proved Phys. viii, text. 55, we use terms belonging + to local movement in speaking of alteration and movement of all kinds. For even the word distance is derived from the idea + of remoteness of place, to that of all contraries, as is said Metaph. x, text. + 13. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q67_A2-p13"></p> + <p id="FP_Q67_A2-p14"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q67_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q67_A3.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q67_A3" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q67_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q67_A4.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q67_A3-p0.1">Whether light is a quality?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q67_A3-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q67_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that light is not a quality. For every quality remains in its subject, though the active cause of the quality + be removed, as heat remains in water removed from the fire. But light does not remain in the air when the source of light + is withdrawn. Therefore light is not a quality. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q67_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, every sensible quality has its opposite, as cold is opposed to heat, blackness to whiteness. But this is not the + case with light since darkness is merely a privation of light. Light therefore is not a sensible quality. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q67_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, a cause is more potent than its effect. But the light of the heavenly bodies is a cause of substantial forms of + earthly bodies, and also gives to colors their immaterial being, by making them actually visible. Light, then, is not a sensible + quality, but rather a substantial or spiritual form. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q67_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Damascene (De Fide Orth. i) says that light is a species of quality. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q67_A3-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Some writers have said that the light in the air has not a natural being such as the color on a wall has, but only an intentional + being, as a similitude of color in the air. But this cannot be the case for two reasons. First, because light gives a name + to the air, since by it the air becomes actually luminous. But color does not do this, for we do not speak of the air as colored. + Secondly, because light produces natural effects, for by the rays of the sun + bodies are warmed, and natural changes cannot be brought about by mere intentions. Others have said that light is the sun's + substantial form, but this also seems impossible for two reasons. First, because substantial forms are not of themselves objects + of the senses; for the object of the intellect is what a thing is, as is said De Anima iii, text. 26: whereas light is visible + of itself. In the second place, because it is impossible that what is the substantial form of one thing should be the + accidental form of another; since substantial forms of their very nature constitute species: wherefore the substantial form + always and everywhere accompanies the species. But light is not the substantial form of air, for if it were, the air would + be destroyed when light is withdrawn. Hence it cannot be the substantial form of the sun. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q67_A3-p7"> We must say, then, that as heat is an active quality consequent on the substantial form of fire, so light is an active quality + consequent on the substantial form of the sun, or of another body that is of itself luminous, if there is any such body. A + proof of this is that the rays of different stars produce different effects according to the diverse natures of bodies. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q67_A3-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Since quality is consequent upon substantial form, the mode in which the subject receives a quality differs as the mode differs + in which a subject receives a substantial form. For when matter receives its form perfectly, the qualities consequent upon + the form are firm and enduring; as when, for instance, water is converted into fire. When, however, substantial form is received + imperfectly, so as to be, as it were, in process of being received, rather + than fully impressed, the consequent quality lasts for a time but is not permanent; as may be seen when water which has been + heated returns in time to its natural state. But light is not produced by the transmutation of matter, as though matter were + in receipt of a substantial form, and light were a certain inception of substantial form. For this reason light disappears + on the disappearance of its active cause. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q67_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> It is accidental to light not to have a contrary, forasmuch as it is the natural quality of the first corporeal cause of + change, which is itself removed from contrariety. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q67_A3-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As heat acts towards perfecting the form of fire, as an instrumental cause, by virtue of the substantial form, so does light + act instrumentally, by virtue of the heavenly bodies, towards producing substantial forms; and towards rendering colors actually + visible, inasmuch as it is a quality of the first sensible body. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q67_A3-p11"></p> + <p id="FP_Q67_A3-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q67_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q67_A4.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q67_A4" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q67_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q68.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q67_A4-p0.1">Whether the production of light is fittingly assigned to the first day?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q67_A4-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q67_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the production of light is not fittingly assigned to the first day. For light, as stated above + <a id="FP_Q67_A4-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q67_A3.html">(A[3])</a>, is a quality. But qualities are accidents, and as such should have, not the first, but a subordinate place. The production + of light, then, ought not to be assigned to the first day. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q67_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it is light that distinguishes night from day, and this is effected by the sun, which is recorded as having been + made on the fourth day. Therefore the production of light could not have been on the first day. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q67_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, night and day are brought about by the circular movement of a luminous body. But movement of this kind is an attribute + of the firmament, and we read that the firmament was made on the second day. Therefore the production of light, dividing night + from day, ought not to be assigned to the first day. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q67_A4-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, if it be said that spiritual light is here spoken of, it may be replied that the light made on the first day dispels + the darkness. But in the beginning spiritual darkness was not, for even the demons were in the beginning good, as has been + shown ( + <a id="FP_Q67_A4-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q63_A5.html">Q[63], A[5]</a>). Therefore the production of light ought not to be assigned to the first day. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q67_A4-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> That without which there could not be day, must have been made on the first day. But there can be no day without light. Therefore + light must have been made on the first day. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q67_A4-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> There are two opinions as to the production of light. Augustine seems to say (De Civ. Dei xi, 9,33) that Moses could not + have fittingly passed over the production of the spiritual creature, and therefore when we read, "In the beginning God created + heaven and earth," a spiritual nature as yet formless is to be understood by the word "heaven," and formless matter of the + corporeal creature by the word "earth." And spiritual nature was formed first, as being of + higher dignity than corporeal. The forming, therefore, of this spiritual nature is signified by the production of light, that + is to say, of spiritual light. For a spiritual nature receives its form by the enlightenment whereby it is led to adhere to + the Word of God. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q67_A4-p8"> Other writers think that the production of spiritual creatures was purposely omitted by Moses, and give various reasons. + Basil [*Hom. i in Hexaem.] says that Moses begins his narrative from the beginning of time which belongs to sensible things; + but that the spiritual or angelic creation is passed over, as created beforehand. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q67_A4-p9"> Chrysostom [*Hom. ii in Genes.] gives as a reason for the omission that Moses was addressing an ignorant people, to whom + material things alone appealed, and whom he was endeavoring to withdraw from the service of idols. It would have been to them + a pretext for idolatry if he had spoken to them of natures spiritual in substance and nobler than all corporeal creatures; + for they would have paid them Divine worship, since they were prone to worship as gods even the sun, moon, and + stars, which was forbidden them ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q67_A4-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Deut.4" target="asv">Dt. 4</a>). + </p> + <p id="FP_Q67_A4-p10"> But mention is made of several kinds of formlessness, in regard to the corporeal creature. One is where we read that "the + earth was void and empty," and another where it is said that "darkness was upon the face of the deep." Now it seems to be + required, for two reasons, that the formlessness of darkness should be removed first of all by the production of light. In + the first place because light is a quality of the first body, as was stated + <a id="FP_Q67_A4-p10.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q67_A3.html">(A[3])</a>, and + thus by means of light it was fitting that the world should first receive its form. The second reason is because light is + a common quality. For light is common to terrestrial and celestial bodies. But as in knowledge we proceed from general principles, + so do we in work of every kind. For the living thing is generated before the animal, and the animal before the man, as is + shown in De Gener. Anim. ii, 3. It was fitting, then, as an evidence of the Divine wisdom, that among the works of + distinction the production of light should take first place, since light is a form of the primary body, and because it is + more common quality. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q67_A4-p11"> Basil [*Hom. ii in Hexaem.], indeed, adds a third reason: that all other things are made manifest by light. And there is + yet a fourth, already touched upon in the objections; that day cannot be unless light exists, which was made therefore on + the first day. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q67_A4-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> According to the opinion of those who hold that the formlessness of matter preceded its form in duration, matter must be + held to have been created at the beginning with substantial forms, afterwards receiving those that are accidental, among which + light holds the first place. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q67_A4-p13"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> In the opinion of some the light here spoken of was a kind of luminous nebula, and that on the making of the sun this returned + to the matter of which it had been formed. But this cannot well be maintained, as in the beginning of Genesis Holy Scripture + records the institution of that order of nature which henceforth is to endure. We cannot, then, say that what was made at + that time afterwards ceased to exist. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q67_A4-p14"> Others, therefore, held that this luminous nebula continues in existence, but so closely attached to the sun as to be indistinguishable. + But this is as much as to say that it is superfluous, whereas none of God's works have been made in vain. On this account + it is held by some that the sun's body was made out of this nebula. This, too, is impossible to those at least who believe + that the sun is different in its nature from the four elements, and naturally incorruptible. For in + that case its matter cannot take on another form. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q67_A4-p15"> I answer, then, with Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv), that the light was the sun's light, formless as yet, being already the solar + substance, and possessing illuminative power in a general way, to which was afterwards added the special and determinative + power required to produce determinate effects. Thus, then, in the production of this light a triple distinction was made between + light and darkness. First, as to the cause, forasmuch as in the substance of the sun we have the cause of + light, and in the opaque nature of the earth the cause of darkness. Secondly, as to place, for in one hemisphere there was + light, in the other darkness. Thirdly, as to time; because there was light for one and darkness for another in the same hemisphere; + and this is signified by the words, "He called the light day, and the darkness night." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q67_A4-p16"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Basil says (Hom. ii in Hexaem.) that day and night were then caused by expansion and contraction of light, rather than by + movement. But Augustine objects to this (Gen. ad lit. i), that there was no reason for this vicissitude of expansion and contraction + since there were neither men nor animals on the earth at that time, for whose service this was required. Nor does the nature + of a luminous body seem to admit of the withdrawal of light, so long as the + body is actually present; though this might be effected by a miracle. As to this, however, Augustine remarks (Gen. ad lit. + i) that in the first founding of the order of nature we must not look for miracles, but for what is in accordance with nature. + We hold, then, that the movement of the heavens is twofold. Of these movements, one is common to the entire heaven, and is + the cause of day and night. This, as it seems, had its beginning on the first day. The other varies in proportion as it + affects various bodies, and by its variations is the cause of the succession of days, months, and years. Thus it is, that + in the account of the first day the distinction between day and night alone is mentioned; this distinction being brought about + by the common movement of the heavens. The further distinction into successive days, seasons, and years recorded as begun + on the fourth day, in the words, "let them be for seasons, and for days, and years" is due to proper movements. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q67_A4-p17"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> As Augustine teaches (Confess. xii; Gen. ad lit. 1,15), formlessness did not precede forms in duration; and so we must understand + the production of light to signify the formation of spiritual creatures, not, indeed, with the perfection of glory, in which + they were not created, but with the perfection of grace, which they possessed from their creation as said above ( + <a id="FP_Q67_A4-p17.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q62_A3.html">Q[62], A[3]</a>). Thus the division of light from darkness will + denote the distinction of the spiritual creature from other created things as yet without form. But if all created things + received their form at the same time, the darkness must be held to mean the spiritual darkness of the wicked, not as existing + from the beginning but such as God foresaw would exist. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q67_A4-p18"></p> + <p id="FP_Q67_A4-p19"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q67_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q68.html"></a> + </div> + <a href="summa.FP_Q66_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q67_A1.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q68" class="div3"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q67_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q68_A1.html"></a> + <h3 id="FP_Q68-p0.1">ON THE WORK OF THE SECOND DAY (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3> + <p id="FP_Q68-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q68-p2"> We must next consider the work of the second day. Under this head there are four points of inquiry:</p> + <p id="FP_Q68-p3"> (1) Whether the firmament was made on the second day?</p> + <p id="FP_Q68-p4"> (2) Whether there are waters above the firmament?</p> + <p id="FP_Q68-p5"> (3) Whether the firmament divides waters from waters?</p> + <p id="FP_Q68-p6"> (4) Whether there is more than one heaven?</p> + <div id="FP_Q68_A1" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q68.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q68_A2.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q68_A1-p0.1">Whether the firmament was made on the second day?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q68_A1-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q68_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the firmament was not made on the second day. For it is said ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q68_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.1.8" target="asv">Gn. 1:8</a>): "God called the firmament heaven." But the heaven existed before days, as is clear from the words, "In the beginning God + created heaven and earth." Therefore the firmament was not made on the second day. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q68_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the work of the six days is ordered conformably to the order of Divine wisdom. Now it would ill become the Divine + wisdom to make afterwards that which is naturally first. But though the firmament naturally precedes the earth and the waters, + these are mentioned before the formation of light, which was on the first day. Therefore the firmament was not made on the + second day. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q68_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, all that was made in the six days was formed out of matter created before days began. But the firmament cannot have + been formed out of pre-existing matter, for if so it would be liable to generation and corruption. Therefore the firmament + was not made on the second day. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q68_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q68_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.1.6" target="asv">Gn. 1:6</a>): "God said: let there be a firmament," and further on (verse 8); "And the evening and morning were the second day." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q68_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> In discussing questions of this kind two rules are to observed, as Augustine teaches (Gen. ad lit. i, 18). The first is, + to hold the truth of Scripture without wavering. The second is that since Holy Scripture can be explained in a multiplicity + of senses, one should adhere to a particular explanation, only in such measure as to be ready to abandon it, if it be proved + with certainty to be false; lest Holy Scripture be exposed to the ridicule of unbelievers, + and obstacles be placed to their believing. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q68_A1-p7"> We say, therefore, that the words which speak of the firmament as made on the second day can be understood in two senses. + They may be understood, first, of the starry firmament, on which point it is necessary to set forth the different opinions + of philosophers. Some of these believed it to be composed of the elements; and this was the opinion of Empedocles, who, however, + held further that the body of the firmament was not susceptible of dissolution, because its parts are, so to + say, not in disunion, but in harmony. Others held the firmament to be of the nature of the four elements, not, indeed, compounded + of them, but being as it were a simple element. Such was the opinion of Plato, who held that element to be fire. Others, again, + have held that the heaven is not of the nature of the four elements, but is itself a fifth body, existing over and above these. + This is the opinion of Aristotle (De Coel. i, text. 6,32). + </p> + <p id="FP_Q68_A1-p8"> According to the first opinion, it may, strictly speaking, be granted that the firmament was made, even as to substance, + on the second day. For it is part of the work of creation to produce the substance of the elements, while it belongs to the + work of distinction and adornment to give forms to the elements that pre-exist. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q68_A1-p9"> But the belief that the firmament was made, as to its substance, on the second day is incompatible with the opinion of Plato, + according to whom the making of the firmament implies the production of the element of fire. This production, however, belongs + to the work of creation, at least, according to those who hold that formlessness of matter preceded in time its formation, + since the first form received by matter is the elemental. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q68_A1-p10"> Still less compatible with the belief that the substance of the firmament was produced on the second day is the opinion of + Aristotle, seeing that the mention of days denotes succession of time, whereas the firmament, being naturally incorruptible, + is of a matter not susceptible of change of form; wherefore it could not be made out of matter existing antecedently in time. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q68_A1-p11"> Hence to produce the substance of the firmament belongs to the work of creation. But its formation, in some degree, belongs + to the second day, according to both opinions: for as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv), the light of the sun was without form + during the first three days, and afterwards, on the fourth day, received its form. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q68_A1-p12"> If, however, we take these days to denote merely sequence in the natural order, as Augustine holds (Gen. ad lit. iv, 22,24), + and not succession in time, there is then nothing to prevent our saying, whilst holding any one of the opinions given above, + that the substantial formation of the firmament belongs to the second day. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q68_A1-p13"> Another possible explanation is to understand by the firmament that was made on the second day, not that in which the stars + are set, but the part of the atmosphere where the clouds are collected, and which has received the name firmament from the + firmness and density of the air. "For a body is called firm," that is dense and solid, "thereby differing from a mathematical + body" as is remarked by Basil (Hom. iii in Hexaem.). If, then, this explanation is adopted none of these + opinions will be found repugnant to reason. Augustine, in fact (Gen. ad lit. ii, 4), recommends it thus: "I consider this + view of the question worthy of all commendation, as neither contrary to faith nor difficult to be proved and believed." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q68_A1-p14"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> According to Chrysostom (Hom. iii in Genes.), Moses prefaces his record by speaking of the works of God collectively, in + the words, "In the beginning God created heaven and earth," and then proceeds to explain them part by part; in somewhat the + same way as one might say: "This house was constructed by that builder," and then add: "First, he laid the foundations, then + built the walls, and thirdly, put on the roof." In accepting this explanation we are, + therefore, not bound to hold that a different heaven is spoken of in the words: "In the beginning God created heaven and earth," + and when we read that the firmament was made on the second day. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q68_A1-p15"> We may also say that the heaven recorded as created in the beginning is not the same as that made on the second day; and + there are several senses in which this may be understood. Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. i, 9) that the heaven recorded as made + on the first day is the formless spiritual nature, and that the heaven of the second day is the corporeal heaven. According + to Bede (Hexaem. i) and Strabus, the heaven made on the first day is the empyrean, and the firmament made on the + second day, the starry heaven. According to Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii) that of the first day was spherical in form and without + stars, the same, in fact, that the philosophers speak of, calling it the ninth sphere, and the primary movable body that moves + with diurnal movement: while by the firmament made on the second day he understands the starry heaven. According to another + theory, touched upon by Augustine [*Gen. ad lit. ii, 1] the heaven made on the first day was the starry heaven, and the + firmament made on the second day was that region of the air where the clouds are collected, which is also called heaven, but + equivocally. And to show that the word is here used in an equivocal sense, it is expressly said that "God called the firmament + heaven"; just as in a preceding verse it said that "God called the light day" (since the word "day" is also used to denote + a space of twenty-four hours). Other instances of a similar use occur, as pointed out by Rabbi Moses. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q68_A1-p16"> The second and third objections are sufficiently answered by what has been already said.</p> + <p id="FP_Q68_A1-p17"></p> + <p id="FP_Q68_A1-p18"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q68.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q68_A2.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q68_A2" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q68_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q68_A3.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q68_A2-p0.1">Whether there are waters above the firmament?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q68_A2-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q68_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that there are not waters above the firmament. For water is heavy by nature, and heavy things tend naturally + downwards, not upwards. Therefore there are not waters above the firmament. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q68_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, water is fluid by nature, and fluids cannot rest on a sphere, as experience shows. Therefore, since the firmament + is a sphere, there cannot be water above it. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q68_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, water is an element, and appointed to the generation of composite bodies, according to the relation in which imperfect + things stand towards perfect. But bodies of composite nature have their place upon the earth, and not above the firmament, + so that water would be useless there. But none of God's works are useless. Therefore there are not waters above the firmament. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q68_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q68_A2-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.1.7" target="asv">Gn. 1:7</a>): "(God) divided the waters that were under the firmament, from those that were above the firmament." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q68_A2-p6"> I answer with Augustine (Gen. ad lit. ii, 5) that, "These words of Scripture have more authority than the most exalted human + intellect. Hence, whatever these waters are, and whatever their mode of existence, we cannot for a moment doubt that they + are there." As to the nature of these waters, all are not agreed. Origen says (Hom. i in Gen.) that the waters that are above + the firmament are "spiritual substances." Wherefore it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q68_A2-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.148.4" target="asv">Ps. 148:4</a>): "Let the + waters that are above the heavens praise the name of the Lord," and ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q68_A2-p6.2" href="./asv.html#Dan.3.60" target="asv">Dan. 3:60</a>): "Ye waters that are above the heavens, bless the Lord."To this Basil answers (Hom. iii in Hexaem.) that these words do + not mean that these waters are rational creatures, but that "the thoughtful contemplation of them by those who understand + fulfils the glory of the Creator." Hence in the same context, fire, hail, and other like creatures, are invoked in the same + way, though no one would + attribute reason to these. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q68_A2-p7"> We must hold, then, these waters to be material, but their exact nature will be differently defined according as opinions + on the firmament differ. For if by the firmament we understand the starry heaven, and as being of the nature of the four elements, + for the same reason it may be believed that the waters above the heaven are of the same nature as the elemental waters. But + if by the firmament we understand the starry heaven, not, however, as being of the nature of the four + elements then the waters above the firmament will not be of the same nature as the elemental waters, but just as, according + to Strabus, one heaven is called empyrean, that is, fiery, solely on account of its splendor: so this other heaven will be + called aqueous solely on account of its transparence; and this heaven is above the starry heaven. Again, if the firmament + is held to be of other nature than the elements, it may still be said to divide the waters, if we understand by water not + the + element but formless matter. Augustine, in fact, says (Super Gen. cont. Manich. i, 5,7) that whatever divides bodies from + bodies can be said to divide waters from waters. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q68_A2-p8"> If, however, we understand by the firmament that part of the air in which the clouds are collected, then the waters above + the firmament must rather be the vapors resolved from the waters which are raised above a part of the atmosphere, and from + which the rain falls. But to say, as some writers alluded to by Augustine (Gen. ad lit. ii, 4), that waters resolved into + vapor may be lifted above the starry heaven, is a mere absurdity. The solid nature of the firmament, the intervening + region of fire, wherein all vapor must be consumed, the tendency in light and rarefied bodies to drift to one spot beneath + the vault of the moon, as well as the fact that vapors are perceived not to rise even to the tops of the higher mountains, + all to go to show the impossibility of this. Nor is it less absurd to say, in support of this opinion, that bodies may be + rarefied infinitely, since natural bodies cannot be infinitely rarefied or divided, but up to a certain point only. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q68_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Some have attempted to solve this difficulty by supposing that in spite of the natural gravity of water, it is kept in its + place above the firmament by the Divine power. Augustine (Gen. ad lit. ii, 1), however will not admit this solution, but says + "It is our business here to inquire how God has constituted the natures of His creatures, not how far it may have pleased + Him to work on them by way of miracle." We leave this view, then, and answer that + according to the last two opinions on the firmament and the waters the solution appears from what has been said. According + to the first opinion, an order of the elements must be supposed different from that given by Aristotle, that is to say, that + the waters surrounding the earth are of a dense consistency, and those around the firmament of a rarer consistency, in proportion + to the respective density of the earth and of the heaven. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q68_A2-p10"> Or by the water, as stated, we may understand the matter of bodies to be signified.</p> + <p id="FP_Q68_A2-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The solution is clear from what has been said, according to the last two opinions. But according to the first opinion, Basil + gives two replies (Hom. iii in Hexaem.). He answers first, that a body seen as concave beneath need not necessarily be rounded, + or convex, above. Secondly, that the waters above the firmament are not fluid, but exist outside it in a solid state, as a + mass of ice, and that this is the crystalline heaven of some writers. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q68_A2-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> According to the third opinion given, the waters above the firmament have been raised in the form of vapors, and serve to + give rain to the earth. But according to the second opinion, they are above the heaven that is wholly transparent and starless. + This, according to some, is the primary mobile, the cause of the daily revolution of the entire heaven, whereby the continuance + of generation is secured. In the same way the starry heaven, by the zodiacal + movement, is the cause whereby different bodies are generated or corrupted, through the rising and setting of the stars, and + their various influences. But according to the first opinion these waters are set there to temper the heat of the celestial + bodies, as Basil supposes (Hom. iii in Hexaem.). And Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. ii, 5) that some have considered this to + be proved by the extreme cold of Saturn owing to its nearness to the waters that are above the firmament. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q68_A2-p13"></p> + <p id="FP_Q68_A2-p14"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q68_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q68_A3.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q68_A3" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q68_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q68_A4.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q68_A3-p0.1">Whether the firmament divides waters from waters?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q68_A3-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q68_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the firmament does not divide waters from waters. For bodies that are of one and the same species have + naturally one and the same place. But the Philosopher says (Topic. i, 6): "All water is the same species." Water therefore + cannot be distinct from water by place. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q68_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, should it be said that the waters above the firmament differ in species from those under the firmament, it may be + argued, on the contrary, that things distinct in species need nothing else to distinguish them. If then, these waters differ + in species, it is not the firmament that distinguishes them. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q68_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, it would appear that what distinguishes waters from waters must be something which is in contact with them on either + side, as a wall standing in the midst of a river. But it is evident that the waters below do not reach up to the firmament. + Therefore the firmament does not divide the waters from the waters. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q68_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q68_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.1.6" target="asv">Gn. 1:6</a>): "Let there be a firmament made amidst the waters; and let it divide the waters from the waters." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q68_A3-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The text of Genesis, considered superficially, might lead to the adoption of a theory similar to that held by certain philosophers + of antiquity, who taught that water was a body infinite in dimension, and the primary element of all bodies. Thus in the words, + "Darkness was upon the face of the deep," the word "deep" might be taken to mean the infinite mass of water, understood as + the principle of all other bodies. These philosophers also taught that not all + corporeal things are confined beneath the heaven perceived by our senses, but that a body of water, infinite in extent, exists + above that heaven. On this view the firmament of heaven might be said to divide the waters without from those within---that + is to say, from all bodies under the heaven, since they took water to be the principle of them all. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q68_A3-p7"> As, however, this theory can be shown to be false by solid reasons, it cannot be held to be the sense of Holy Scripture. + It should rather be considered that Moses was speaking to ignorant people, and that out of condescension to their weakness + he put before them only such things as are apparent to sense. Now even the most uneducated can perceive by their senses that + earth and water are corporeal, whereas it is not evident to all that air also is corporeal, for there have even + been philosophers who said that air is nothing, and called a space filled with air a vacuum. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q68_A3-p8"> Moses, then, while he expressly mentions water and earth, makes no express mention of air by name, to avoid setting before + ignorant persons something beyond their knowledge. In order, however, to express the truth to those capable of understanding + it, he implies in the words: "Darkness was upon the face of the deep," the existence of air as attendant, so to say, upon + the water. For it may be understood from these words that over the face of the water a transparent body was + extended, the subject of light and darkness, which, in fact, is the air. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q68_A3-p9"> Whether, then, we understand by the firmament the starry heaven, or the cloudy region of the air, it is true to say that + it divides the waters from the waters, according as we take water to denote formless matter, or any kind of transparent body, + as fittingly designated under the name of waters. For the starry heaven divides the lower transparent bodies from the higher, + and the cloudy region divides that higher part of the air, where the rain and similar things are generated, + from the lower part, which is connected with the water and included under that name. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q68_A3-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> If by the firmament is understood the starry heaven, the waters above are not of the same species as those beneath. But if + by the firmament is understood the cloudy region of the air, both these waters are of the same species, and two places are + assigned to them, though not for the same purpose, the higher being the place of their begetting, the lower, the place of + their repose. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q68_A3-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> If the waters are held to differ in species, the firmament cannot be said to divide the waters, as the cause of their destruction, + but only as the boundary of each. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q68_A3-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> On account of the air and other similar bodies being invisible, Moses includes all such bodies under the name of water, and + thus it is evident that waters are found on each side of the firmament, whatever be the sense in which the word is used. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q68_A3-p13"></p> + <p id="FP_Q68_A3-p14"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q68_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q68_A4.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q68_A4" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q68_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q69.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q68_A4-p0.1">Whether there is only one heaven?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q68_A4-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q68_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that there is only one heaven. For the heaven is contrasted with the earth, in the words, "In the beginning + God created heaven and earth."But there is only one earth. Therefore there is only one heaven. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q68_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, that which consists of the entire sum of its own matter, must be one; and such is the heaven, as the Philosopher + proves (De Coel. i, text. 95). Therefore there is but one heaven. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q68_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, whatever is predicated of many things univocally is predicated of them according to some common notion. But if there + are more heavens than one, they are so called univocally, for if equivocally only, they could not properly be called many. + If, then, they are many, there must be some common notion by reason of which each is called heaven, but this common notion + cannot be assigned. Therefore there cannot be more than one heaven. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q68_A4-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is said ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q68_A4-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.148.4" target="asv">Ps. 148:4</a>): "Praise Him, ye heavens of heavens." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q68_A4-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> On this point there seems to be a diversity of opinion between Basil and Chrysostom. The latter says that there is only one + heaven (Hom. iv in Gen.), and that the words 'heavens of heavens' are merely the translation of the Hebrew idiom according + to which the word is always used in the plural, just as in Latin there are many nouns that are wanting in the singular. On + the other hand, Basil (Hom. iii in Hexaem.), whom Damascene follows (De Fide Orth. ii), says + that there are many heavens. The difference, however, is more nominal than real. For Chrysostom means by the one heaven the + whole body that is above the earth and the water, for which reason the birds that fly in the air are called birds of heaven + [* + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q68_A4-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.8.9" target="asv">Ps. 8:9</a>]. But since in this body there are many distinct parts, Basil said that there are more heavens than one. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q68_A4-p7"> In order, then, to understand the distinction of heavens, it must be borne in mind that Scripture speaks of heaven in a threefold + sense. Sometimes it uses the word in its proper and natural meaning, when it denotes that body on high which is luminous actually + or potentially, and incorruptible by nature. In this body there are three heavens; the first is the empyrean, which is wholly + luminous; the second is the aqueous or crystalline, wholly transparent; and the third is called + the starry heaven, in part transparent, and in part actually luminous, and divided into eight spheres. One of these is the + sphere of the fixed stars; the other seven, which may be called the seven heavens, are the spheres of the planets. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q68_A4-p8"> In the second place, the name heaven is applied to a body that participates in any property of the heavenly body, as sublimity + and luminosity, actual or potential. Thus Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii) holds as one heaven all the space between the waters + and the moon's orb, calling it the aerial. According to him, then, there are three heavens, the aerial, the starry, and one + higher than both these, of which the Apostle is understood to speak when he says of himself that he was + "rapt to the third heaven." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q68_A4-p9"> But since this space contains two elements, namely, fire and air, and in each of these there is what is called a higher and + a lower region Rabanus subdivides this space into four distinct heavens. The higher region of fire he calls the fiery heaven; + the lower, the Olympian heaven from a lofty mountain of that name: the higher region of air he calls, from its brightness, + the ethereal heaven; the lower, the aerial. When, therefore, these four heavens are added to the three + enumerated above, there are seven corporeal heavens in all, in the opinion of Rabanus. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q68_A4-p10"> Thirdly, there are metaphorical uses of the word heaven, as when this name is applied to the Blessed Trinity, Who is the + Light and the Most High Spirit. It is explained by some, as thus applied, in the words, "I will ascend into heaven"; whereby + the evil spirit is represented as seeking to make himself equal with God. Sometimes also spiritual blessings, the recompense + of the Saints, from being the highest of all good gifts, are signified by the word heaven, and, in fact, are so + signified, according to Augustine (De Serm. Dom. in Monte), in the words, "Your reward is very great in heaven" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q68_A4-p10.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.5.12" target="asv">Mat. 5:12</a>). + </p> + <p id="FP_Q68_A4-p11"> Again, three kinds of supernatural visions, bodily, imaginative, and intellectual, are called sometimes so many heavens, + in reference to which Augustine (Gen. ad lit. xii) expounds Paul's rapture "to the third heaven." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q68_A4-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The earth stands in relation to the heaven as the centre of a circle to its circumference. But as one center may have many + circumferences, so, though there is but one earth, there may be many heavens. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q68_A4-p13"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The argument holds good as to the heaven, in so far as it denotes the entire sum of corporeal creation, for in that sense + it is one. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q68_A4-p14"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> All the heavens have in common sublimity and some degree of luminosity, as appears from what has been said. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q68_A4-p15"></p> + <p id="FP_Q68_A4-p16"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q68_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q69.html"></a> + </div> + <a href="summa.FP_Q67_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q68_A1.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q69" class="div3"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q68_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q69_A1.html"></a> + <h3 id="FP_Q69-p0.1">ON THE WORK OF THE THIRD DAY (TWO ARTICLES)</h3> + <p id="FP_Q69-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q69-p2"> We next consider the work of the third day. Under this head there are two points of inquiry:</p> + <p id="FP_Q69-p3"> (1) About the gathering together of the waters;</p> + <p id="FP_Q69-p4"> (2) About the production of plants.</p> + <div id="FP_Q69_A1" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q69.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q69_A2.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q69_A1-p0.1">Whether it was fitting that the gathering together of the waters should take place, as recorded, on the third day?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q69_A1-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q69_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that it was not fitting that the gathering together of the waters should take place on the third day. For what + was made on the first and second days is expressly said to have been "made" in the words, "God said: Be light made," and "Let + there be a firmament made."But the third day is contradistinguished from the first and the second days. Therefore the work + of the third day should have been described as a making not as a gathering together. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q69_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the earth hitherto had been completely covered by the waters, wherefore it was described as "invisible" [* + <a id="FP_Q69_A1-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q66_A1.html">Q[66], A[1]</a>, OBJ[1]]. There was then no place on the earth to which the waters could be gathered together. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q69_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, things which are not in continuous contact cannot occupy one place. But not all the waters are in continuous contact, + and therefore all were not gathered together into one place. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q69_A1-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, a gathering together is a mode of local movement. But the waters flow naturally, and take their course towards the + sea. In their case, therefore, a Divine precept of this kind was unnecessary. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q69_A1-p6"> + <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, the earth is given its name at its first creation by the words, "In the beginning God created heaven and earth." + Therefore the imposition of its name on the third day seems to be recorded without necessity. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q69_A1-p7"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The authority of Scripture suffices. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q69_A1-p8"> + <b>I answer that,</b> It is necessary to reply differently to this question according to the different interpretations given by Augustine and other + holy writers. In all these works, according to Augustine (Gen. ad lit. i, 15; iv, 22,34; De Gen. Contr. Manich. i, 5, 7), + there is no order of duration, but only of origin and nature. He says that the formless spiritual and formless corporeal natures + were created first of all, and that the latter are at first indicated by the words + "earth" and "water." Not that this formlessness preceded formation, in time, but only in origin; nor yet that one formation + preceded another in duration, but merely in the order of nature. Agreeably, then, to this order, the formation of the highest + or spiritual nature is recorded in the first place, where it is said that light was made on the first day. For as the spiritual + nature is higher than the corporeal, so the higher bodies are nobler than the lower. Hence the formation of the higher + bodies is indicated in the second place, by the words, "Let there be made a firmament," by which is to be understood the impression + of celestial forms on formless matter, that preceded with priority not of time, but of origin only. But in the third place + the impression of elemental forms on formless matter is recorded, also with a priority of origin only. Therefore the words, + "Let the waters be gathered together, and the dry land appear," mean that corporeal matter was impressed with the + substantial form of water, so as to have such movement, and with the substantial form of earth, so as to have such an appearance. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q69_A1-p9"> According, however, to other holy writers [* + <a id="FP_Q69_A1-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q66_A1.html">Q[66], A[1]</a>] an order of duration in the works is to be understood, by which is meant that the formlessness of matter precedes its formation, + and one form another, in order of time. Nevertheless, they do not hold that the formlessness of matter implies the total absence + of form, since heaven, earth, and water already existed, since these three are named as already clearly perceptible to the + senses; rather they + understand by formlessness the want of due distinction and of perfect beauty, and in respect of these three Scripture mentions + three kinds of formlessness. Heaven, the highest of them, was without form so long as "darkness" filled it, because it was + the source of light. The formlessness of water, which holds the middle place, is called the "deep," because, as Augustine + says (Contr. Faust. xxii, 11), this word signifies the mass of waters without order. Thirdly, the formless state of the earth + is touched upon when the earth is said to be "void" or "invisible," because it was covered by the waters. Thus, then, the + formation of the highest body took place on the first day. And since time results from the movement of the heaven, and is + the numerical measure of the movement of the highest body, from this formation, resulted the distinction of time, namely, + that of night and day. On the second day the intermediate body, water, was formed, receiving from the firmament a sort of + distinction + and order (so that water be understood as including certain other things, as explained above ( + <a id="FP_Q69_A1-p9.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q68_A3.html">Q[68], A[3]</a>)). On the third day the earth, the lowest body, received its form by the withdrawal of the waters, and there resulted the + distinction in the lowest body, namely, of land and sea. Hence Scripture, having clearly expresses the manner in which it + received its form by the equally suitable words, "Let the dry land appear." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q69_A1-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> According to Augustine [*Gen. ad lit. ii, 7,8; iii, 20], Scripture does not say of the work of the third day, that it was + made, as it says of those that precede, in order to show that higher and spiritual forms, such as the angels and the heavenly + bodies, are perfect and stable in being, whereas inferior forms are imperfect and mutable. Hence the impression of such forms + is signified by the gathering of the waters, and the appearing of the land. For + "water," to use Augustine's words, "glides and flows away, the earth abides" (Gen. ad lit. ii, 11). Others, again, hold that + the work of the third day was perfected on that day only as regards movement from place to place, and that for this reason + Scripture had no reason to speak of it as made. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q69_A1-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> This argument is easily solved, according to Augustine's opinion (De Gen. Contr. Manich. i), because we need not suppose + that the earth was first covered by the waters, and that these were afterwards gathered together, but that they were produced + in this very gathering together. But according to the other writers there are three solutions, which Augustine gives (Gen. + ad lit. i, 12). The first supposes that the waters are heaped up to a greater height + at the place where they were gathered together, for it has been proved in regard to the Red Sea, that the sea is higher than + the land, as Basil remarks (Hom. iv in Hexaem.). The second explains the water that covered the earth as being rarefied or + nebulous, which was afterwards condensed when the waters were gathered together. The third suggests the existence of hollows + in the earth, to receive the confluence of waters. Of the above the first seems the most probable. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q69_A1-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> All the waters have the sea as their goal, into which they flow by channels hidden or apparent, and this may be the reason + why they are said to be gathered together into one place. Or, "one place" is to be understood not simply, but as contrasted + with the place of the dry land, so that the sense would be, "Let the waters be gathered together in one place," that is, apart + from the dry land. That the waters occupied more places than one seems to be + implied by the words that follow, "The gathering together of the waters He called Seas." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q69_A1-p13"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> The Divine command gives bodies their natural movement and by these natural movements they are said to "fulfill His word." + Or we may say that it was according to the nature of water completely to cover the earth, just as the air completely surrounds + both water and earth; but as a necessary means towards an end, namely, that plants and animals might be on the earth, it was + necessary for the waters to be withdrawn from a portion of the earth. Some + philosophers attribute this uncovering of the earth's surface to the action of the sun lifting up the vapors and thus drying + the land. Scripture, however, attributes it to the Divine power, not only in the Book of Genesis, but also + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q69_A1-p13.1" href="./asv.html#Job.38.10" target="asv"> Job 38:10 </a>where in the person of the Lord it is said, "I set My bounds around the sea," and + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q69_A1-p13.2" href="./asv.html#Jer.5.22" target="asv"> Jer. 5:22, </a> where it is written: "Will you not then fear Me, saith the Lord, who have set the sand a bound for the sea?" + </p> + <p id="FP_Q69_A1-p14"> + <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> According to Augustine (De Gen. Contr. Manich. i), primary matter is meant by the word earth, where first mentioned, but + in the present passage it is to be taken for the element itself. Again it may be said with Basil (Hom. iv in Hexaem.), that + the earth is mentioned in the first passage in respect of its nature, but here in respect of its principal property, namely, + dryness. Wherefore it is written: "He called the dry land, Earth." It may also be + said with Rabbi Moses, that the expression, "He called," denotes throughout an equivocal use of the name imposed. Thus we + find it said at first that "He called the light Day": for the reason that later on a period of twenty-four hours is also called + day, where it is said that "there was evening and morning, one day." In like manner it is said that "the firmament," that + is, the air, "He called heaven": for that which was first created was also called "heaven." And here, again, it is said that + "the dry land," that is, the part from which the waters had withdrawn, "He called, Earth," as distinct from the sea; although + the name earth is equally applied to that which is covered with waters or not. So by the expression "He called" we are to + understand throughout that the nature or property He bestowed corresponded to the name He gave. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q69_A1-p15"></p> + <p id="FP_Q69_A1-p16"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q69.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q69_A2.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q69_A2" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q69_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q70.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q69_A2-p0.1">Whether it was fitting that the production of plants should take place on the third day?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q69_A2-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q69_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that it was not fitting that the production of plants should take place on the third day. For plants have life, + as animals have. But the production of animals belongs to the work, not of distinction, but of adornment. Therefore the production + of plants, as also belonging to the work of adornment, ought not to be recorded as taking place on the third day, which is + devoted to the work of distinction. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q69_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, a work by which the earth is accursed should have been recorded apart from the work by which it receives its form. + But the words of + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q69_A2-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.3.17" target="asv"> Gn. 3:17, </a> "Cursed is the earth in thy work, thorns and thistles shall it bring forth to thee," show that by the production of certain + plants the earth was accursed. Therefore the production of plants in general should not have been recorded on the third day, + which is concerned with the work of + formation. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q69_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, as plants are firmly fixed to the earth, so are stones and metals, which are, nevertheless, not mentioned in the + work of formation. Plants, therefore, ought not to have been made on the third day. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q69_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is said ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q69_A2-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.1.12" target="asv">Gn. 1:12</a>): "The earth brought forth the green herb," after which there follows, "The evening and the morning were the third day." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q69_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> On the third day, as said + <a id="FP_Q69_A2-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q69_A1.html">(A[1])</a>, the formless state of the earth comes to an end. But this state is described as twofold. On the one hand, the earth was + "invisible" or "void," being covered by the waters; on the other hand, it was "shapeless" or "empty," that is, without that + comeliness which it owes to the plants that clothe it, as it were, with a garment. Thus, therefore, in either respect this + formless state ends on the third + day: first, when "the waters were gathered together into one place and the dry land appeared"; secondly, when "the earth brought + forth the green herb." But concerning the production of plants, Augustine's opinion differs from that of others. For other + commentators, in accordance with the surface meaning of the text, consider that the plants were produced in act in their various + species on this third day; whereas Augustine (Gen. ad lit. v, 5; viii, 3) says that the earth is said to have then + produced plants and trees in their causes, that is, it received then the power to produce them. He supports this view by the + authority of Scripture, for it is said ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q69_A2-p6.2" href="./asv.html#Gen.2.4" target="asv">Gn. 2:4,5</a>): "These are the generations of the heaven and the earth, when they were created, in the day that . . . God made the heaven + and the earth, and every plant of the field before it sprung up in the earth, and every herb of the ground before it grew." + Therefore, the production of plants in their causes, + within the earth, took place before they sprang up from the earth's surface. And this is confirmed by reason, as follows. + In these first days God created all things in their origin or causes, and from this work He subsequently rested. Yet afterwards, + by governing His creatures, in the work of propagation, "He worketh until now."Now the production of plants from out the earth + is a work of propagation, and therefore they were not produced in act on the third day, but in their causes only. + However, in accordance with other writers, it may be said that the first constitution of species belongs to the work of the + six days, but the reproduction among them of like from like, to the government of the universe. And Scripture indicates this + in the words, "before it sprung up in the earth," and "before it grew," that is, before like was produced from like; just + as now happens in the natural course by the production of seed. Wherefore Scripture says pointedly ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q69_A2-p6.3" href="./asv.html#Gen.1.11" target="asv">Gn. + 1:11 + </a>): "Let the earth bring forth the green herb, and such as may seed," as indicating the production of perfection of perfect + species, from which the seed of others should arise. Nor does the question where the seminal power may reside, whether in + root, stem, or fruit, affect the argument. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q69_A2-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Life in plants is hidden, since they lack sense and local movement, by which the animate and the inanimate are chiefly discernible. + And therefore, since they are firmly fixed in the earth, their production is treated as a part of the earth's formation. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q69_A2-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Even before the earth was accursed, thorns and thistles had been produced, either virtually or actually. But they were not + produced in punishment of man; as though the earth, which he tilled to gain his food, produced unfruitful and noxious plants. + Hence it is said: "Shall it bring forth TO THEE." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q69_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Moses put before the people such things only as were manifest to their senses, as we have said ( + <a id="FP_Q69_A2-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q67_A4.html">Q[67], A[4]</a>; + <a id="FP_Q69_A2-p9.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q68_A3.html">Q[68], A[3]</a>). But minerals are generated in hidden ways within the bowels of the earth. Moreover they seem hardly specifically distinct + from earth, and would seem to be species thereof. For this reason, therefore, he makes no mention of them. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q69_A2-p10"></p> + <p id="FP_Q69_A2-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q69_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q70.html"></a> + </div> + <a href="summa.FP_Q68_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q69_A1.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q70" class="div3"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q69_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q70_A1.html"></a> + <h3 id="FP_Q70-p0.1">OF THE WORK OF ADORNMENT, AS REGARDS THE FOURTH DAY (THREE ARTICLES)</h3> + <p id="FP_Q70-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q70-p2"> We must next consider the work of adornment, first as to each day by itself, secondly as to all seven days in general.</p> + <p id="FP_Q70-p3"> In the first place, then, we consider the work of the fourth day, secondly, that of the fifth day, thirdly, that of the sixth + day, and fourthly, such matters as belong to the seventh day. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q70-p4"> Under the first head there are three points of inquiry:</p> + <p id="FP_Q70-p5"> (1) As to the production of the lights;</p> + <p id="FP_Q70-p6"> (2) As to the end of their production;</p> + <p id="FP_Q70-p7"> (3) Whether they are living beings?</p> + <div id="FP_Q70_A1" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q70.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q70_A2.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q70_A1-p0.1">Whether the lights ought to have been produced on the fourth day?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q70_A1-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q70_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the lights ought not to have been produced on the fourth day. For the heavenly luminaries are by nature + incorruptible bodies: wherefore their matter cannot exist without their form. But as their matter was produced in the work + of creation, before there was any day, so therefore were their forms. It follows, then, that the lights were not produced + on the fourth day. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q70_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the luminaries are, as it were, vessels of light. But light was made on the first day. The luminaries, therefore, + should have been made on the first day, not on the fourth. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q70_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the lights are fixed in the firmament, as plants are fixed in the earth. For, the Scripture says: "He set them in + the firmament." But plants are described as produced when the earth, to which they are attached, received its form. The lights, + therefore, should have been produced at the same time as the firmament, that is to say, on the second day. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q70_A1-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, plants are an effect of the sun, moon, and other heavenly bodies. Now, cause precedes effect in the order of nature. + The lights, therefore, ought not to have been produced on the fourth day, but on the third day. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q70_A1-p6"> + <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, as astronomers say, there are many stars larger than the moon. Therefore the sun and the moon alone are not correctly + described as the "two great lights." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q70_A1-p7"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Suffices the authority of Scripture. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q70_A1-p8"> + <b>I answer that,</b> In recapitulating the Divine works, Scripture says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q70_A1-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.2.1" target="asv">Gn. 2:1</a>): "So the heavens and the earth were finished and all the furniture of them," thereby indicating that the work was threefold. + In the first work, that of "creation," the heaven and the earth were produced, but as yet without form. In the second, or + work of "distinction," the heaven and the earth were perfected, either by adding substantial form to formless matter, as Augustine + holds (Gen. ad lit. ii, + 11), or by giving them the order and beauty due to them, as other holy writers suppose. To these two works is added the work + of adornment, which is distinct from perfect. For the perfection of the heaven and the earth regards, seemingly, those things + that belong to them intrinsically, but the adornment, those that are extrinsic, just as the perfection of a man lies in his + proper parts and forms, and his adornment, in clothing or such like. Now just as distinction of certain things is made most + evident by their local movement, as separating one from another; so the work of adornment is set forth by the production of + things having movement in the heavens, and upon the earth. But it has been stated above ( + <a id="FP_Q70_A1-p8.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q69_A1.html">Q[69], A[1]</a>), that three things are recorded as created, namely, the heaven, the water, and the earth; and these three received their + form from the three days' work of distinction, so that heaven was formed on the first day; on the second day the waters were + separated; and on the third day, the earth was divided into sea and dry land. So also is it in the work of adornment; on the + first day of this work, which is the fourth of creation, are produced the lights, to adorn the heaven by their movements; + on the second day, which is the fifth, birds and fishes are called into being, to make beautiful the intermediate element, + for they move in air and water, which are here taken as one; while on the third day, which is the sixth, animals are brought + forth, to move upon the earth and adorn it. It must also here be noted that Augustine's opinion (Gen. ad lit. v, 5) on the + production of lights is not at variance with that of other holy writers, since he says that they were made actually, and not + merely virtually, for the firmament has not the power of producing lights, as the earth has of producing plants. Wherefore + Scripture does not say: "Let the firmament produce lights," though it says: "Let the earth bring forth the green herb." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q70_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> In Augustine's opinion there is no difficulty here; for he does not hold a succession of time in these works, and so there + was no need for the matter of the lights to exist under another form. Nor is there any difficulty in the opinion of those + who hold the heavenly bodies to be of the nature of the four elements, for it may be said that they were formed out of matter + already existing, as animals and plants were formed. For those, however, who hold + the heavenly bodies to be of another nature from the elements, and naturally incorruptible, the answer must be that the lights + were substantially created at the beginning, but that their substance, at first formless, is formed on this day, by receiving + not its substantial form, but a determination of power. As to the fact that the lights are not mentioned as existing from + the beginning, but only as made on the fourth day, Chrysostom (Hom. vi in Gen.) explains this by the need of guarding the + people from the danger of idolatry: since the lights are proved not to be gods, by the fact that they were not from the beginning. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q70_A1-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> No difficulty exists if we follow Augustine in holding the light made on the first day to be spiritual, and that made on + this day to be corporeal. If, however, the light made on the first day is understood to be itself corporeal, then it must + be held to have been produced on that day merely as light in general; and that on the fourth day the lights received a definite + power to produce determinate effects. Thus we observe that the rays of the sun have + one effect, those of the moon another, and so forth. Hence, speaking of such a determination of power, Dionysius (Div. Nom. + iv) says that the sun's light which previously was without form, was formed on the fourth day. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q70_A1-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> According to Ptolemy the heavenly luminaries are not fixed in the spheres, but have their own movement distinct from the + movement of the spheres. Wherefore Chrysostom says (Hom. vi in Gen.) that He is said to have set them in the firmament, not + because He fixed them there immovably, but because He bade them to be there, even as He placed man in Paradise, to be there. + In the opinion of Aristotle, however, the stars are fixed in their orbits, and in + reality have no other movement but that of the spheres; and yet our senses perceive the movement of the luminaries and not + that of the spheres (De Coel. ii, text. 43). But Moses describes what is obvious to sense, out of condescension to popular + ignorance, as we have already said ( + <a id="FP_Q70_A1-p11.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q67_A4.html">Q[67], A[4]</a>; + <a id="FP_Q70_A1-p11.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q68_A3.html">Q[68], A[3]</a>). The objection, however, falls to the ground if we regard the firmament made on the second day as having a natural distinction + from that in + which the stars are placed, even though the distinction is not apparent to the senses, the testimony of which Moses follows, + as stated above (De Coel. ii, text. 43). For although to the senses there appears but one firmament; if we admit a higher + and a lower firmament, the lower will be that which was made on the second day, and on the fourth the stars were fixed in + the higher firmament. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q70_A1-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> In the words of Basil (Hom. v in Hexaem.), plants were recorded as produced before the sun and moon, to prevent idolatry, + since those who believe the heavenly bodies to be gods, hold that plants originate primarily from these bodies. Although as + Chrysostom remarks (Hom. vi in Gen.), the sun, moon, and stars cooperate in the work of production by their movements, as + the husbandman cooperates by his labor. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q70_A1-p13"> + <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> As Chrysostom says, the two lights are called great, not so much with regard to their dimensions as to their influence and + power. For though the stars be of greater bulk than the moon, yet the influence of the moon is more perceptible to the senses + in this lower world. Moreover, as far as the senses are concerned, its apparent size is greater. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q70_A1-p14"></p> + <p id="FP_Q70_A1-p15"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q70.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q70_A2.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q70_A2" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q70_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q70_A3.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q70_A2-p0.1">Whether the cause assigned for the production of the lights is reasonable?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q70_A2-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q70_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the cause assigned for the production of the lights is not reasonable. For it is said ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q70_A2-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Jer.10.2" target="asv">Jer. 10:2</a>): "Be not afraid of the signs of heaven, which the heathens fear." Therefore the heavenly lights were not made to be signs. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q70_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, sign is contradistinguished from cause. But the lights are the cause of what takes place upon the earth. Therefore + they are not signs. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q70_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the distinction of seasons and days began from the first day. Therefore the lights were not made "for seasons, and + days, and years," that is, in order to distinguish them. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q70_A2-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, nothing is made for the sake of that which is inferior to itself, "since the end is better than the means" (Topic. + iii). But the lights are nobler than the earth. Therefore they were not made "to enlighten it." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q70_A2-p6"> + <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, the new moon cannot be said "to rule the night." But such it probably did when first made; for men begin to count + from the new moon. The moon, therefore, was not made "to rule the night." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q70_A2-p7"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Suffices the authority of Scripture. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q70_A2-p8"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As we have said above ( + <a id="FP_Q70_A2-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q65_A2.html">Q[65], A[2]</a>), a corporeal creature can be considered as made either for the sake of its proper act, or for other creatures, or for the + whole universe, or for the glory of God. Of these reasons only that which points out the usefulness of these things to man, + is touched upon by Moses, in order to withdraw his people from idolatry. Hence it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q70_A2-p8.2" href="./asv.html#Deut.4.19" target="asv">Dt. 4:19</a>): "Lest perhaps lifting up thy + eyes to heaven, thou see the sun and the moon and all the stars of heaven, and being deceived by error thou adore and serve + them, which the Lord thy God created for the service of all nations." Now, he explains this service at the beginning of Genesis + as threefold. First, the lights are of service to man, in regard to sight, which directs him in his works, and is most useful + for perceiving objects. In reference to this he says: "Let them shine in the firmament and give life to the earth." + Secondly, as regards the changes of the seasons, which prevent weariness, preserve health, and provide for the necessities + of food; all of which things could not be secured if it were always summer or winter. In reference to this he says: "Let them + be for seasons, and for days, and years." Thirdly, as regards the convenience of business and work, in so far as the lights + are set in the heavens to indicate fair or foul weather, as favorable to various occupations. And in this respect he says: + "Let them be for signs." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q70_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The lights in the heaven are set for signs of changes effected in corporeal creatures, but not of those changes which depend + upon the free-will. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q70_A2-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> We are sometimes brought to the knowledge of hidden effects through their sensible causes, and conversely. Hence nothing + prevents a sensible cause from being a sign. But he says "signs," rather than "causes," to guard against idolatry. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q70_A2-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The general division of time into day and night took place on the first day, as regards the diurnal movement, which is common + to the whole heaven and may be understood to have begun on that first day. But the particular distinctions of days and seasons + and years, according as one day is hotter than another, one season than another, and one year than another, are due to certain + particular movements of the stars: which movements may have had their + beginning on the fourth day. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q70_A2-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Light was given to the earth for the service of man, who, by reason of his soul, is nobler than the heavenly bodies. Nor + is it untrue to say that a higher creature may be made for the sake of a lower, considered not in itself, but as ordained + to the good of the universe. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q70_A2-p13"> + <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> When the moon is at its perfection it rises in the evening and sets in the morning, and thus it rules the night, and it was + probably made in its full perfection as were plants yielding seed, as also were animals and man himself. For although the + perfect is developed from the imperfect by natural processes, yet the perfect must exist simply before the imperfect. Augustine, + however (Gen. ad lit. ii), does not say this, for he says that it is not + unfitting that God made things imperfect, which He afterwards perfected. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q70_A2-p14"></p> + <p id="FP_Q70_A2-p15"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q70_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q70_A3.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q70_A3" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q70_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q71.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q70_A3-p0.1">Whether the lights of heaven are living beings?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q70_A3-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q70_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the lights of heaven are living beings. For the nobler a body is, the more nobly it should be adorned. + But a body less noble than the heaven, is adorned with living beings, with fish, birds, and the beasts of the field. Therefore + the lights of heaven, as pertaining to its adornment, should be living beings also. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q70_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the nobler a body is, the nobler must be its form. But the sun, moon, and stars are nobler bodies than plants or + animals, and must therefore have nobler forms. Now the noblest of all forms is the soul, as being the first principle of life. + Hence Augustine (De Vera Relig. xxix) says: "Every living substance stands higher in the order of nature than one that has + not life." The lights of heaven, therefore, are living beings. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q70_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, a cause is nobler than its effect. But the sun, moon, and stars are a cause of life, as is especially evidenced + in the case of animals generated from putrefaction, which receive life from the power of the sun and stars. Much more, therefore, + have the heavenly bodies a living soul. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q70_A3-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, the movement of the heaven and the heavenly bodies are natural (De Coel. i, text. 7,8): and natural movement is + from an intrinsic principle. Now the principle of movement in the heavenly bodies is a substance capable of apprehension, + and is moved as the desirer is moved by the object desired (Metaph. xii, text. 36). Therefore, seemingly, the apprehending + principle is intrinsic to the heavenly bodies: and consequently they are living beings. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q70_A3-p6"> + <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, the first of movables is the heaven. Now, of all things that are endowed with movement the first moves itself, as + is proved in Phys. viii, text. 34, because, what is such of itself precedes that which is by another. But only beings that + are living move themselves, as is shown in the same book (text. 27). Therefore the heavenly bodies are living beings. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q70_A3-p7"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii), "Let no one esteem the heavens or the heavenly bodies to be living things, for they have + neither life nor sense." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q70_A3-p8"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Philosophers have differed on this question. Anaxagoras, for instance, as Augustine mentions (De Civ. Dei xviii, 41), "was + condemned by the Athenians for teaching that the sun was a fiery mass of stone, and neither a god nor even a living being." + On the other hand, the Platonists held that the heavenly bodies have life. Nor was there less diversity of opinion among the + Doctors of the Church. It was the belief of Origen (Peri Archon i) and Jerome that these + bodies were alive, and the latter seems to explain in that sense the words ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q70_A3-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Eccl.1.6" target="asv">Eccles. 1:6</a>), "The spirit goeth forward, surveying all places round about." But Basil (Hom. iii, vi in Hexaem.) and Damascene (De Fide + Orth. ii) maintain that the heavenly bodies are inanimate. Augustine leaves the matter in doubt, without committing himself + to either theory, though he goes so far as to say that if the heavenly bodies are really living beings, their souls must be + akin to the angelic + nature (Gen. ad lit. ii, 18; Enchiridion lviii). + </p> + <p id="FP_Q70_A3-p9"> In examining the truth of this question, where such diversity of opinion exists, we shall do well to bear in mind that the + union of soul and body exists for the sake of the soul and not of the body; for the form does not exist for the matter, but + the matter for the form. Now the nature and power of the soul are apprehended through its operation, which is to a certain + extent its end. Yet for some of these operations, as sensation and nutrition, our body is a necessary instrument. + Hence it is clear that the sensitive and nutritive souls must be united to a body in order to exercise their functions. There + are, however, operations of the soul, which are not exercised through the medium of the body, though the body ministers, as + it were, to their production. The intellect, for example, makes use of the phantasms derived from the bodily senses, and thus + far is dependent on the body, although capable of existing apart from it. It is not, however, possible that the functions + of nutrition, growth, and generation, through which the nutritive soul operates, can be exercised by the heavenly bodies, + for such operations are incompatible with a body naturally incorruptible. Equally impossible is it that the functions of the + sensitive soul can appertain to the heavenly body, since all the senses depend on the sense of touch, which perceives elemental + qualities, and all the organs of the senses require a certain proportion in the admixture of elements, whereas the nature + of + the heavenly bodies is not elemental. It follows, then, that of the operations of the soul the only ones left to be attributed + to the heavenly bodies are those of understanding and moving; for appetite follows both sensitive and intellectual perception, + and is in proportion thereto. But the operations of the intellect, which does not act through the body, do not need a body + as their instrument, except to supply phantasms through the senses. Moreover, the operations of the sensitive soul, as we + have seen, cannot be attributed to the heavenly bodies. Accordingly, the union of a soul to a heavenly body cannot be for + the purpose of the operations of the intellect. It remains, then, only to consider whether the movement of the heavenly bodies + demands a soul as the motive power, not that the soul, in order to move the heavenly body, need be united to the latter as + its form; but by contact of power, as a mover is united to that which he moves. Wherefore Aristotle (Phys. viii, text. 42,43), + after showing that the first mover is made up of two parts, the moving and the moved, goes on to show the nature of the union + between these two parts. This, he says, is effected by contact which is mutual if both are bodies; on the part of one only, + if one is a body and the other not. The Platonists explain the union of soul and body in the same way, as a contact of a moving + power with the object moved, and since Plato holds the heavenly bodies to be living beings, this means nothing else but + that substances of spiritual nature are united to them, and act as their moving power. A proof that the heavenly bodies are + moved by the direct influence and contact of some spiritual substance, and not, like bodies of specific gravity, by nature, + lies in the fact that whereas nature moves to one fixed end which having attained, it rests; this does not appear in the movement + of heavenly bodies. Hence it follows that they are moved by some intellectual substances. Augustine appears to be of the + same opinion when he expresses his belief that all corporeal things are ruled by God through the spirit of life (De Trin. + iii, 4). + </p> + <p id="FP_Q70_A3-p10"> From what has been said, then, it is clear that the heavenly bodies are not living beings in the same sense as plants and + animals, and that if they are called so, it can only be equivocally. It will also be seen that the difference of opinion between + those who affirm, and those who deny, that these bodies have life, is not a difference of things but of words. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q70_A3-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Certain things belong to the adornment of the universe by reason of their proper movement; and in this way the heavenly luminaries + agree with others that conduce to that adornment, for they are moved by a living substance. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q70_A3-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> One being may be nobler than another absolutely, but not in a particular respect. While, then, it is not conceded that the + souls of heavenly bodies are nobler than the souls of animals absolutely it must be conceded that they are superior to them + with regard to their respective forms, since their form perfects their matter entirely, which is not in potentiality to other + forms; whereas a soul does not do this. Also as regards movement the power that + moves the heavenly bodies is of a nobler kind. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q70_A3-p13"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Since the heavenly body is a mover moved, it is of the nature of an instrument, which acts in virtue of the agent: and therefore + since this agent is a living substance the heavenly body can impart life in virtue of that agent. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q70_A3-p14"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> The movements of the heavenly bodies are natural, not on account of their active principle, but on account of their passive + principle; that is to say, from a certain natural aptitude for being moved by an intelligent power. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q70_A3-p15"> + <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> The heaven is said to move itself in as far as it is compounded of mover and moved; not by the union of the mover, as the + form, with the moved, as the matter, but by contact with the motive power, as we have said. So far, then, the principle that + moves it may be called intrinsic, and consequently its movement natural with respect to that active principle; just as we + say that voluntary movement is natural to the animal as animal (Phys. viii, text. + 27). + </p> + <p id="FP_Q70_A3-p16"></p> + <p id="FP_Q70_A3-p17"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q70_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q71.html"></a> + </div> + <a href="summa.FP_Q69_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q70_A1.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q71" class="div3"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q70_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q72.html"></a> + <h3 id="FP_Q71-p0.1">ON THE WORK OF THE FIFTH DAY (ONE ARTICLE)</h3> + <p id="FP_Q71-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q71-p2"> We must next consider the work of the fifth day.</p> + <p id="FP_Q71-p3"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that this work is not fittingly described. For the waters produce that which the power of water suffices to + produce. But the power of water does not suffice for the production of every kind of fishes and birds since we find that many + of them are generated from seed. Therefore the words, "Let the waters bring forth the creeping creature having life, and the + fowl that may fly over the earth," do not fittingly describe this work. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q71-p4"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, fishes and birds are not produced from water only, but earth seems to predominate over water in their composition, + as is shown by the fact that their bodies tend naturally to the earth and rest upon it. It is not, then, fittingly that fishes + and birds are produced from water. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q71-p5"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, fishes move in the waters, and birds in the air. If, then, fishes are produced from the waters, birds ought to be + produced from the air, and not from the waters. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q71-p6"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, not all fishes creep through the waters, for some, as seals, have feet and walk on land. Therefore the production + of fishes is not sufficiently described by the words, "Let the waters bring forth the creeping creature having life." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q71-p7"> + <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, land animals are more perfect than birds and fishes which appears from the fact that they have more distinct limbs, + and generation of a higher order. For they bring forth living beings, whereas birds and fishes bring forth eggs. But the more + perfect has precedence in the order of nature. Therefore fishes and birds ought not to have been produced on the fifth day, + before land animals. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q71-p8"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Suffices the authority of Scripture. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q71-p9"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As said above, ( + <a id="FP_Q71-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q70_A1.html">Q[70], A[1]</a>), the order of the work of adornment corresponds to the order of the work of distinction. Hence, as among the three days + assigned to the work of distinction, the middle, or second, day is devoted to the work of distinction of water, which is the + intermediate body, so in the three days of the work of adornment, the middle day, which is the fifth, is assigned to the adornment + of the intermediate body, by the + production of birds and fishes. As, then, Moses makes mention of the lights and the light on the fourth day, to show that + the fourth day corresponds to the first day on which he had said that the light was made, so on this fifth day he mentions + the waters and the firmament of heaven to show that the fifth day corresponds to the second. It must, however, be observed + that Augustine differs from other writers in his opinion about the production of fishes and birds, as he differs about the + production of plants. For while others say that fishes and birds were produced on the fifth day actually, he holds that the + nature of the waters produced them on that day potentially. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q71-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> It was laid down by Avicenna that animals of all kinds can be generated by various minglings of the elements, and naturally, + without any kind of seed. This, however, seems repugnant to the fact that nature produces its effects by determinate means, + and consequently, those things that are naturally generated from seed cannot be generated naturally in any other way. It ought, + then, rather to be said that in the natural generation of all animals that are + generated from seed, the active principle lies in the formative power of the seed, but that in the case of animals generated + from putrefaction, the formative power of is the influence of the heavenly bodies. The material principle, however, in the + generation of either kind of animals, is either some element, or something compounded of the elements. But at the first beginning + of the world the active principle was the Word of God, which produced animals from material elements, either in act, as + some holy writers say, or virtually, as Augustine teaches. Not as though the power possessed by water or earth of producing + all animals resides in the earth and the water themselves, as Avicenna held, but in the power originally given to the elements + of producing them from elemental matter by the power of seed or the influence of the stars. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q71-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The bodies of birds and fishes may be considered from two points of view. If considered in themselves, it will be evident + that the earthly element must predominate, since the element that is least active, namely, the earth, must be the most abundant + in quantity in order that the mingling may be duly tempered in the body of the animal. But if considered as by nature constituted + to move with certain specific motions, thus they have some special affinity + with the bodies in which they move; and hence the words in which their generation is described. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q71-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The air, as not being so apparent to the senses, is not enumerated by itself, but with other things: partly with the water, + because the lower region of the air is thickened by watery exhalations; partly with the heaven as to the higher region. But + birds move in the lower part of the air, and so are said to fly "beneath the firmament," even if the firmament be taken to + mean the region of clouds. Hence the production of birds is ascribed to the water. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q71-p13"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Nature passes from one extreme to another through the medium; and therefore there are creatures of intermediate type between + the animals of the air and those of the water, having something in common with both; and they are reckoned as belonging to + that class to which they are most allied, through the characters possessed in common with that class, rather than with the + other. But in order to include among fishes all such intermediate forms as have + special characters like to theirs, the words, "Let the waters bring forth the creeping creature having life," are followed + by these: "God created great whales," etc. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q71-p14"> + <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> The order in which the production of these animals is given has reference to the order of those bodies which they are set + to adorn, rather than to the superiority of the animals themselves. Moreover, in generation also the more perfect is reached + through the less perfect. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q71-p15"></p> + <p id="FP_Q71-p16"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q70_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q72.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q72" class="div3"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q71.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q73.html"></a> + <h3 id="FP_Q72-p0.1">ON THE WORK OF THE SIXTH DAY (ONE ARTICLE)</h3> + <p id="FP_Q72-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q72-p2"> We must now consider the work of the sixth day.</p> + <p id="FP_Q72-p3"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that this work is not fittingly described. For as birds and fishes have a living soul, so also have land animals. + But these animals are not themselves living souls. Therefore the words, "Let the earth bring forth the living creature," should + rather have been, "Let the earth bring forth the living four-footed creatures." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q72-p4"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, a genus ought not to be opposed to its species. But beasts and cattle are quadrupeds. Therefore quadrupeds ought + not to be enumerated as a class with beasts and cattle. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q72-p5"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, as animals belong to a determinate genus and species, so also does man. But in the making of man nothing is said + of his genus and species, and therefore nothing ought to have been said about them in the production of other animals, whereas + it is said "according to its genus" and "in its species." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q72-p6"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, land animals are more like man, whom God is recorded to have blessed, than are birds and fishes. But as birds and + fishes are said to be blessed, this should have been said, with much more reason, of the other animals as well. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q72-p7"> + <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, certain animals are generated from putrefaction, which is a kind of corruption. But corruption is repugnant to the + first founding of the world. Therefore such animals should not have been produced at that time. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q72-p8"> + <b>Objection 6:</b> Further, certain animals are poisonous, and injurious to man. But there ought to have been nothing injurious to man before + man sinned. Therefore such animals ought not to have been made by God at all, since He is the Author of good; or at least + not until man had sinned. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q72-p9"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Suffices the authority of Scripture. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q72-p10"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As on the fifth day the intermediate body, namely, the water, is adorned, and thus that day corresponds to the second day; + so the sixth day, on which the lowest body, or the earth, is adorned by the production of land animals, corresponds to the + third day. Hence the earth is mentioned in both places. And here again Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. v) that the production + was potential, and other holy writers that it was actual. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q72-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The different grades of life which are found in different living creatures can be discovered from the various ways in which + Scripture speaks of them, as Basil says (Hom. viii in Hexaem.). The life of plants, for instance, is very imperfect and difficult + to discern, and hence, in speaking of their production, nothing is said of their life, but only their generation is mentioned, + since only in generation is a vital act observed in them. For the powers of + nutrition and growth are subordinate to the generative life, as will be shown later on ( + <a id="FP_Q72-p11.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q78_A2.html">Q[78], A[2]</a>). But amongst animals, those that live on land are, generally speaking, more perfect than birds and fishes, not because the + fish is devoid of memory, as Basil upholds (Hom. viii in Hexaem.) and Augustine rejects (Gen. ad lit. iii), but because their + limbs are more distinct and their generation of a higher order, (yet some imperfect animals, such as bees and ants, are more + intelligent in certain ways). Scripture, therefore, does not call fishes "living creatures," but "creeping creatures having + life"; whereas it does call land animals "living creatures" on account of their more perfect life, and seems to imply that + fishes are merely bodies having in them something of a soul, whilst land animals, from the higher perfection of their life, + are, as it were, living souls with bodies subject to them. But the life of man, as being the most perfect grade, is not said + to + be produced, like the life of other animals, by earth or water, but immediately by God. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q72-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> By "cattle," domestic animals are signified, which in any way are of service to man: but by "beasts," wild animals such as + bears and lions are designated. By "creeping things" those animals are meant which either have no feet and cannot rise from + the earth, as serpents, or those whose feet are too short to life them far from the ground, as the lizard and tortoise. But + since certain animals, as deer and goats, seem to fall under none of these classes, + the word "quadrupeds" is added. Or perhaps the word "quadruped" is used first as being the genus, to which the others are + added as species, for even some reptiles, such as lizards and tortoises, are four-footed. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q72-p13"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> In other animals, and in plants, mention is made of genus and species, to denote the generation of like from like. But it + was unnecessary to do so in the case of man, as what had already been said of other creatures might be understood of him. + Again, animals and plants may be said to be produced according to their kinds, to signify their remoteness from the Divine + image and likeness, whereas man is said to be made "to the image and likeness of God." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q72-p14"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> The blessing of God gives power to multiply by generation, and, having been mentioned in the preceding account of the making + of birds and fishes, could be understood of the beasts of the earth, without requiring to be repeated. The blessing, however, + is repeated in the case of man, since in him generation of children has a special relation to the number of the elect [*Cf. + Augustine, Gen. ad lit. iii, 12], and to prevent anyone from saying that there was + any sin whatever in the act of begetting children. As to plants, since they experience neither desire of propagation, nor + sensation in generating, they are deemed unworthy of a formal blessing. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q72-p15"> + <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> Since the generation of one thing is the corruption of another, it was not incompatible with the first formation of things, + that from the corruption of the less perfect the more perfect should be generated. Hence animals generated from the corruption + of inanimate things, or of plants, may have been generated then. But those generated from corruption of animals could not + have been produced then otherwise than potentially. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q72-p16"> + <b>Reply to Objection 6:</b> In the words of Augustine (Super. Gen. contr. Manich. i): "If an unskilled person enters the workshop of an artificer he + sees in it many appliances of which he does not understand the use, and which, if he is a foolish fellow, he considers unnecessary. + Moreover, should he carelessly fall into the fire, or wound himself with a sharp-edged tool, he is under the impression that + many of the things there are hurtful; whereas the craftsman, knowing their use, + laughs at his folly. And thus some people presume to find fault with many things in this world, through not seeing the reasons + for their existence. For though not required for the furnishing of our house, these things are necessary for the perfection + of the universe." And, since man before he sinned would have used the things of this world conformably to the order designed, + poisonous animals would not have injured him. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q72-p17"></p> + <p id="FP_Q72-p18"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q71.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q73.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q73" class="div3"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q72.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q73_A1.html"></a> + <h3 id="FP_Q73-p0.1">ON THE THINGS THAT BELONG TO THE SEVENTH DAY (THREE ARTICLES)</h3> + <p id="FP_Q73-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q73-p2"> We must next consider the things that belong to the seventh day. Under this head there are three points of inquiry:</p> + <p id="FP_Q73-p3"> (1) About the completion of the works;</p> + <p id="FP_Q73-p4"> (2) About the resting of God;</p> + <p id="FP_Q73-p5"> (3) About the blessing and sanctifying of this day.</p> + <div id="FP_Q73_A1" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q73.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q73_A2.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q73_A1-p0.1">Whether the completion of the Divine works ought to be ascribed to the seventh day?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q73_A1-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q73_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the completion of the Divine works ought not to be ascribed to the seventh day. For all things that are + done in this world belong to the Divine works. But the consummation of the world will be at the end of the world ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q73_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.13.39" target="asv">Mat. 13:39,40</a>). Moreover, the time of Christ's Incarnation is a time of completion, wherefore it is called "the time of fulness [*Vulg.: + 'the fulness of time']" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q73_A1-p2.2" href="./asv.html#Gal.4.4" target="asv">Gal. 4:4</a>). And Christ + Himself, at the moment of His death, cried out, "It is consummated" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q73_A1-p2.3" href="./asv.html#John.19.30" target="asv">Jn. 19:30</a>). Hence the completion of the Divine works does not belong to the seventh day. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q73_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the completion of a work is an act in itself. But we do not read that God acted at all on the seventh day, but rather + that He rested from all His work. Therefore the completion of the works does not belong to the seventh day. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q73_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, nothing is said to be complete to which many things are added, unless they are merely superfluous, for a thing is + called perfect to which nothing is wanting that it ought to possess. But many things were made after the seventh day, as the + production of many individual beings, and even of certain new species that are frequently appearing, especially in the case + of animals generated from putrefaction. Also, God creates daily new souls. Again, the work + of the Incarnation was a new work, of which it is said ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q73_A1-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Jer.31.22" target="asv">Jer. 31:22</a>): "The Lord hath created a new thing upon the earth." Miracles also are new works, of which it is said ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q73_A1-p4.2" href="./asv.html#Eccl.36.6" target="asv">Eccles. 36:6</a>): "Renew thy signs, and work new miracles." Moreover, all things will be made new when the Saints are glorified, according + to + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q73_A1-p4.3" href="./asv.html#Rev.21.5" target="asv"> Apoc. 21:5</a>: "And He that sat on the throne said: Behold I make all things new." Therefore the completion of the Divine works + ought not to be attributed to the seventh day. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q73_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is said ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q73_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.2.2" target="asv">Gn. 2:2</a>): "On the seventh day God ended His work which He had made." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q73_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The perfection of a thing is twofold, the first perfection and the second perfection. The 'first' perfection is that according + to which a thing is substantially perfect, and this perfection is the form of the whole; which form results from the whole + having its parts complete. But the 'second' perfection is the end, which is either an operation, as the end of the harpist + is to play the harp; or something that is attained by an operation, as the end of the + builder is the house that he makes by building. But the first perfection is the cause of the second, because the form is the + principle of operation. Now the final perfection, which is the end of the whole universe, is the perfect beatitude of the + Saints at the consummation of the world; and the first perfection is the completeness of the universe at its first founding, + and this is what is ascribed to the seventh day. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q73_A1-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The first perfection is the cause of the second, as above said. Now for the attaining of beatitude two things are required, + nature and grace. Therefore, as said above, the perfection of beatitude will be at the end of the world. But this consummation + existed previously in its causes, as to nature, at the first founding of the world, as to grace, in the Incarnation of Christ. + For, "Grace and truth came by Jesus Christ" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q73_A1-p7.1" href="./asv.html#John.1.17" target="asv">Jn. 1:17</a>). + So, then, on the seventh day was the consummation of nature, in Christ's Incarnation the consummation of grace, and at the + end of the world will be the consummation of glory. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q73_A1-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> God did act on the seventh day, not by creating new creatures, but by directing and moving His creatures to the work proper + to them, and thus He made some beginning of the "second" perfection. So that, according to our version of the Scripture, the + completion of the works is attributed to the seventh day, though according to another it is assigned to the sixth. Either + version, however, may stand, since the completion of the universe as to the + completeness of its parts belongs to the sixth day, but its completion as regards their operation, to the seventh. It may + also be added that in continuous movement, so long as any movement further is possible, movement cannot be called completed + till it comes to rest, for rest denotes consummation of movement. Now God might have made many other creatures besides those + which He made in the six days, and hence, by the fact that He ceased making them on the seventh day, He is said on that day + to + have consummated His work. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q73_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Nothing entirely new was afterwards made by God, but all things subsequently made had in a sense been made before in the + work of the six days. Some things, indeed, had a previous experience materially, as the rib from the side of Adam out of which + God formed Eve; whilst others existed not only in matter but also in their causes, as those individual creatures that are + now generated existed in the first of their kind. Species, also, that are new, if any + such appear, existed beforehand in various active powers; so that animals, and perhaps even new species of animals, are produced + by putrefaction by the power which the stars and elements received at the beginning. Again, animals of new kinds arise occasionally + from the connection of individuals belonging to different species, as the mule is the offspring of an ass and a mare; but + even these existed previously in their causes, in the works of the six days. Some also existed beforehand by way of + similitude, as the souls now created. And the work of the Incarnation itself was thus foreshadowed, for as we read ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q73_A1-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Phil.2.7" target="asv">Phil. 2:7</a>), The Son of God "was made in the likeness of men." And again, the glory that is spiritual was anticipated in the angels + by way of similitude; and that of the body in the heaven, especially the empyrean. Hence it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q73_A1-p9.2" href="./asv.html#Eccl.1.10" target="asv">Eccles. 1:10</a>), "Nothing under the sun is new, for it hath already gone before, in the ages that were + before us." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q73_A1-p10"></p> + <p id="FP_Q73_A1-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q73.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q73_A2.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q73_A2" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q73_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q73_A3.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q73_A2-p0.1">Whether God rested on the seventh day from all His work?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q73_A2-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q73_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that God did not rest on the seventh day from all His work. For it is said ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q73_A2-p2.1" href="./asv.html#John.5.17" target="asv">Jn. 5:17</a>), "My Father worketh until now, and I work." God, then, did not rest on the seventh day from all His work. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q73_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, rest is opposed to movement, or to labor, which movement causes. But, as God produced His work without movement + and without labor, He cannot be said to have rested on the seventh day from His work. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q73_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, should it be said that God rested on the seventh day by causing man to rest; against this it may be argued that + rest is set down in contradistinction to His work; now the words "God created" or "made" this thing or the other cannot be + explained to mean that He made man create or make these things. Therefore the resting of God cannot be explained as His making + man to rest. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q73_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is said ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q73_A2-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.2.2" target="asv">Gn. 2:2</a>): "God rested on the seventh day from all the work which He had done." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q73_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Rest is, properly speaking, opposed to movement, and consequently to the labor that arises from movement. But although movement, + strictly speaking, is a quality of bodies, yet the word is applied also to spiritual things, and in a twofold sense. On the + one hand, every operation may be called a movement, and thus the Divine goodness is said to move and go forth to its object, + in communicating itself to that object, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. ii). On the + other hand, the desire that tends to an object outside itself, is said to move towards it. Hence rest is taken in two senses, + in one sense meaning a cessation from work, in the other, the satisfying of desire. Now, in either sense God is said to have + rested on the seventh day. First, because He ceased from creating new creatures on that day, for, as said above (A[1], ad + 3), He made nothing afterwards that had not existed previously, in some degree, in the first works; secondly, because He + Himself had no need of the things that He had made, but was happy in the fruition of Himself. Hence, when all things were + made He is not said to have rested "in" His works, as though needing them for His own happiness, but to have rested "from" + them, as in fact resting in Himself, as He suffices for Himself and fulfils His own desire. And even though from all eternity + He rested in Himself, yet the rest in Himself, which He took after He had finished His works, is that rest which belongs to + the + seventh day. And this, says Augustine, is the meaning of God's resting from His works on that day (Gen. ad lit. iv). + </p> + <p id="FP_Q73_A2-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> God indeed "worketh until now" by preserving and providing for the creatures He has made, but not by the making of new ones. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q73_A2-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Rest is here not opposed to labor or to movement, but to the production of new creatures, and to the desire tending to an + external object. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q73_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Even as God rests in Himself alone and is happy in the enjoyment of Himself, so our own sole happiness lies in the enjoyment + of God. Thus, also, He makes us find rest in Himself, both from His works and our own. It is not, then, unreasonable to say + that God rested in giving rest to us. Still, this explanation must not be set down as the only one, and the other is the first + and principal explanation. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q73_A2-p10"></p> + <p id="FP_Q73_A2-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q73_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q73_A3.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q73_A3" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q73_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q74.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q73_A3-p0.1">Whether blessing and sanctifying are due to the seventh day?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q73_A3-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q73_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that blessing and sanctifying are not due to the seventh day. For it is usual to call a time blessed or holy + for that some good thing has happened in it, or some evil been avoided. But whether God works or ceases from work nothing + accrues to Him or is lost to Him. Therefore no special blessing or sanctifying are due to the seventh day. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q73_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the Latin "benedictio" [blessing] is derived from "bonitas" [goodness]. But it is the nature of good to spread and + communicate itself, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv). The days, therefore, in which God produced creatures deserved a blessing + rather than the day on which He ceased producing them. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q73_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, over each creature a blessing was pronounced, as upon each work it was said, "God saw that it was good." Therefore + it was not necessary that after all had been produced, the seventh day should be blessed. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q73_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q73_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.2.3" target="asv">Gn. 2:3</a>), "God blessed the seventh day and sanctified it, because in it He had rested from all His work." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q73_A3-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As said above + <a id="FP_Q73_A3-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q73_A2.html">(A[2])</a>, God's rest on the seventh day is understood in two ways. First, in that He ceased from producing new works, though He still + preserves and provides for the creatures He has made. Secondly, in that after all His works He rested in Himself. According + to the first meaning, then, a blessing befits the seventh day, since, as we explained (Q[72], ad 4), the blessing referred + to the increase by multiplication; for which + reason God said to the creatures which He blessed: "Increase and multiply." Now, this increase is effected through God's Providence + over His creatures, securing the generation of like from like. And according to the second meaning, it is right that the seventh + day should have been sanctified, since the special sanctification of every creature consists in resting in God. For this reason + things dedicated to God are said to be sanctified. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q73_A3-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The seventh day is said to be sanctified not because anything can accrue to God, or be taken from Him, but because something + is added to creatures by their multiplying, and by their resting in God. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q73_A3-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> In the first six days creatures were produced in their first causes, but after being thus produced, they are multiplied and + preserved, and this work also belongs to the Divine goodness. And the perfection of this goodness is made most clear by the + knowledge that in it alone God finds His own rest, and we may find ours in its fruition. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q73_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The good mentioned in the works of each day belongs to the first institution of nature; but the blessing attached to the + seventh day, to its propagation. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q73_A3-p10"></p> + <p id="FP_Q73_A3-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q73_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q74.html"></a> + </div> + <a href="summa.FP_Q72.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q73_A1.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q74" class="div3"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q73_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q74_A1.html"></a> + <h3 id="FP_Q74-p0.1">ON ALL THE SEVEN DAYS IN COMMON (THREE ARTICLES)</h3> + <p id="FP_Q74-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q74-p2"> We next consider all the seven days in common: and there are three points of inquiry:</p> + <p id="FP_Q74-p3"> (1) As to the sufficiency of these days;</p> + <p id="FP_Q74-p4"> (2) Whether they are all one day, or more than one?</p> + <p id="FP_Q74-p5"> (3) As to certain modes of speaking which Scripture uses in narrating the works of the six days.</p> + <div id="FP_Q74_A1" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q74.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q74_A2.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q74_A1-p0.1">Whether these days are sufficiently enumerated?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q74_A1-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q74_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that these days are not sufficiently enumerated. For the work of creation is no less distinct from the works + of distinction and adornment than these two works are from one another. But separate days are assigned to distinction and + to adornment, and therefore separate days should be assigned to creation. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q74_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, air and fire are nobler elements than earth and water. But one day is assigned to the distinction of water, and + another to the distinction of the land. Therefore, other days ought to be devoted to the distinction of fire and air. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q74_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, fish differ from birds as much as birds differ from the beasts of the earth, whereas man differs more from other + animals than all animals whatsoever differ from each other. But one day is devoted to the production of fishes, and another + to that of the beast of the earth. Another day, then, ought to be assigned to the production of birds and another to that + of man. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q74_A1-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, it would seem, on the other hand, that some of these days are superfluous. Light, for instance, stands to the luminaries + in the relation of accident to subject. But the subject is produced at the same time as the accident proper to it. The light + and the luminaries, therefore, ought not to have been produced on different days. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q74_A1-p6"> + <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, these days are devoted to the first instituting of the world. But as on the seventh day nothing was instituted, + that day ought not to be enumerated with the others. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q74_A1-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The reason of the distinction of these days is made clear by what has been said above ( + <a id="FP_Q74_A1-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q70_A1.html">Q[70], A[1]</a>), namely, that the parts of the world had first to be distinguished, and then each part adorned and filled, as it were, by + the beings that inhabit it. Now the parts into which the corporeal creation is divided are three, according to some holy writers, + these parts being the heaven, or highest part, the water, or middle part, and the + earth, or the lowest part. Thus the Pythagoreans teach that perfection consists in three things, the beginning, the middle, + and the end. The first part, then, is distinguished on the first day, and adorned on the fourth, the middle part distinguished + on the middle day, and adorned on the fifth, and the third part distinguished on the third day, and adorned on the sixth. + But Augustine, while agreeing with the above writers as to the last three days, differs as to the first three, for, according + to him, spiritual creatures are formed on the first day, and corporeal on the two others, the higher bodies being formed on + the first these two days, and the lower on the second. Thus, then, the perfection of the Divine works corresponds to the perfection + of the number six, which is the sum of its aliquot parts, one, two, three; since one day is assigned to the forming of spiritual + creatures, two to that of corporeal creatures, and three to the work of adornment. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q74_A1-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> According to Augustine, the work of creation belongs to the production of formless matter, and of the formless spiritual + nature, both of which are outside of time, as he himself says (Confess. xii, 12). Thus, then, the creation of either is set + down before there was any day. But it may also be said, following other holy writers, that the works of distinction and adornment + imply certain changes in the creature which are measurable by time; whereas the + work of creation lies only in the Divine act producing the substance of beings instantaneously. For this reason, therefore, + every work of distinction and adornment is said to take place "in a day," but creation "in the beginning" which denotes something + indivisible. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q74_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Fire and air, as not distinctly known by the unlettered, are not expressly named by Moses among the parts of the world, but + reckoned with the intermediate part, or water, especially as regards the lowest part of the air; or with the heaven, to which + the higher region of air approaches, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. ii, 13). + </p> + <p id="FP_Q74_A1-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The production of animals is recorded with reference to their adorning the various parts of the world, and therefore the + days of their production are separated or united according as the animals adorn the same parts of the world, or different + parts. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q74_A1-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> The nature of light, as existing in a subject, was made on the first day; and the making of the luminaries on the fourth + day does not mean that their substance was produced anew, but that they then received a form that they had not before, as + said above ( + <a id="FP_Q74_A1-p11.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q70_A1.html">Q[70], A[1]</a> ad 2). + </p> + <p id="FP_Q74_A1-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> According to Augustine (Gen. ad lit. iv, 15), after all that has been recorded that is assigned to the six days, something + distinct is attributed to the seventh---namely, that on it God rested in Himself from His works: and for this reason it was + right that the seventh day should be mentioned after the six. It may also be said, with the other writers, that the world + entered on the seventh day upon a new state, in that nothing new was to be added to + it, and that therefore the seventh day is mentioned after the six, from its being devoted to cessation from work. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q74_A1-p13"></p> + <p id="FP_Q74_A1-p14"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q74.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q74_A2.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q74_A2" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q74_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q74_A3.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q74_A2-p0.1">Whether all these days are one day?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q74_A2-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q74_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that all these days are one day. For it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q74_A2-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.2.4" target="asv">Gn. 2:4,5</a>): "These are the generations of the heaven and the earth, when they were created, in the day that the Lord . . . made the + heaven and the earth, and every plant of the field, before it sprung up in the earth." Therefore the day in which God made + "the heaven and the earth, and every plant of the field," is one and the same day. But He made the heaven and the earth on + the first day, or rather before there was any day, but the plant of the field He made on the third day. Therefore the first + and third days are but one day, and for a like reason all the rest. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q74_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it is said ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q74_A2-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.18.1" target="asv">Ecclus. 18:1</a>): "He that liveth for ever, created all things together." But this would not be the case if the days of these works were + more than one. Therefore they are not many but one only. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q74_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, on the seventh day God ceased from all new works. If, then, the seventh day is distinct from the other days, it + follows that He did not make that day; which is not admissible. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q74_A2-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, the entire work ascribed to one day God perfected in an instant, for with each work are the words (God) "said . + . . . and it was . . . done." If, then, He had kept back His next work to another day, it would follow that for the remainder + of a day He would have ceased from working and left it vacant, which would be superfluous. The day, therefore, of the preceding + work is one with the day of the work that follows. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q74_A2-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q74_A2-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.1" target="asv">Gn. 1</a>), "The evening and the morning were the second day . . . the third day," and so on. But where there is a second and third + there are more than one. There was not, therefore, only one day. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q74_A2-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> On this question Augustine differs from other expositors. His opinion is that all the days that are called seven, are one + day represented in a sevenfold aspect (Gen. ad lit. iv, 22; De Civ. Dei xi, 9; Ad Orosium xxvi); while others consider there + were seven distinct days, not one only. Now, these two opinions, taken as explaining the literal text of Genesis, are certainly + widely different. For Augustine understands by the word "day," the knowledge in the + mind of the angels, and hence, according to him, the first day denotes their knowledge of the first of the Divine works, the + second day their knowledge of the second work, and similarly with the rest. Thus, then, each work is said to have been wrought + in some one of these days, inasmuch as God wrought in some one of these days, inasmuch as God wrought nothing in the universe + without impressing the knowledge thereof on the angelic mind; which can know many things at the same time, especially in + the Word, in Whom all angelic knowledge is perfected and terminated. So the distinction of days denotes the natural order + of the things known, and not a succession in the knowledge acquired, or in the things produced. Moreover, angelic knowledge + is appropriately called "day," since light, the cause of day, is to be found in spiritual things, as Augustine observes (Gen. + ad lit. iv, 28). In the opinion of the others, however, the days signify a succession both in time, and in the things + produced. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q74_A2-p8"> If, however, these two explanations are looked at as referring to the mode of production, they will be found not greatly + to differ, if the diversity of opinion existing on two points, as already shown ( + <a id="FP_Q74_A2-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q67_A1.html">Q[67], A[1]</a>; + <a id="FP_Q74_A2-p8.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q69_A1.html">Q[69], A[1]</a>), between Augustine and other writers is taken into account. First, because Augustine takes the earth and the water as first + created, to signify matter totally without form; but the making of the firmament, + the gathering of the waters, and the appearing of dry land, to denote the impression of forms upon corporeal matter. But other + holy writers take the earth and the water, as first created, to signify the elements of the universe themselves existing under + the proper forms, and the works that follow to mean some sort of distinction in bodies previously existing, as also has been + shown ( + <a id="FP_Q74_A2-p8.3" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q67_A1.html">Q[67], AA[1]</a>,4; + <a id="FP_Q74_A2-p8.4" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q69_A1.html">Q[69], A[1]</a> ). Secondly, some writers hold that + plants and animals were produced actually in the work of the six days; Augustine, that they were produced potentially. Now + the opinion of Augustine, that the works of the six days were simultaneous, is consistent with either view of the mode of + production. For the other writers agree with him that in the first production of things matter existed under the substantial + form of the elements, and agree with him also that in the first instituting of the world animals and plants did not exist + actually. There remains, however, a difference as to four points; since, according to the latter, there was a time, after + the production of creatures, in which light did not exist, the firmament had not been formed, and the earth was still covered + by the waters, nor had the heavenly bodies been formed, which is the fourth difference; which are not consistent with Augustine's + explanation. In order, therefore, to be impartial, we must meet the arguments of either side. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q74_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> On the day on which God created the heaven and the earth, He created also every plant of the field, not, indeed, actually, + but "before it sprung up in the earth," that is, potentially. And this work Augustine ascribes to the third day, but other + writers to the first instituting of the world. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q74_A2-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> God created all things together so far as regards their substance in some measure formless. But He did not create all things + together, so far as regards that formation of things which lies in distinction and adornment. Hence the word "creation" is + significant. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q74_A2-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> On the seventh day God ceased from making new things, but not from providing for their increase, and to this latter work + it belongs that the first day is succeeded by other days. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q74_A2-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> All things were not distinguished and adorned together, not from a want of power on God's part, as requiring time in which + to work, but that due order might be observed in the instituting of the world. Hence it was fitting that different days should + be assigned to the different states of the world, as each succeeding work added to the world a fresh state of perfection. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q74_A2-p13"> + <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> According to Augustine, the order of days refers to the natural order of the works attributed to the days. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q74_A2-p14"></p> + <p id="FP_Q74_A2-p15"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q74_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q74_A3.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q74_A3" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q74_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP.ix.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q74_A3-p0.1">Whether Scripture uses suitable words to express the work of the six days?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q74_A3-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q74_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem the Scripture does not use suitable words to express the works of the six days. For as light, the firmament, + and other similar works were made by the Word of God, so were the heaven and the earth. For "all things were made by Him" + ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q74_A3-p2.1" href="./asv.html#John.1.3" target="asv">Jn. 1:3</a>). Therefore in the creation of heaven and earth, as in the other works, mention should have been made of the Word of God. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q74_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the water was created by God, yet its creation is not mentioned. Therefore the creation of the world is not sufficiently + described. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q74_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, it is said ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q74_A3-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.1.31" target="asv">Gn. 1:31</a>): "God saw all the things that He had made, and they were very good." It ought, then, to have been said of each work, "God + saw that it was good." The omission, therefore, of these words in the work of creation and in that of the second day, is not + fitting. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q74_A3-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, the Spirit of God is God Himself. But it does not befit God to move and to occupy place. Therefore the words, "The + Spirit of God moved over the waters," are unbecoming. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q74_A3-p6"> + <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, what is already made is not made over again. Therefore to the words, "God said: Let the firmament be made . . . + and it was so," it is superfluous to add, "God made the firmament." And the like is to be said of other works. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q74_A3-p7"> + <b>Objection 6:</b> Further, evening and morning do not sufficiently divide the day, since the day has many parts. Therefore the words, "The + evening and morning were the second day" or, "the third day," are not suitable. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q74_A3-p8"> + <b>Objection 7:</b> Further, "first," not "one," corresponds to "second" and "third." It should therefore have been said that, "The evening and + the morning were the first day," rather than "one day." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q74_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> According to Augustine (Gen. ad lit. i, 4), the person of the Son is mentioned both in the first creation of the world, and + in its distinction and adornment, but differently in either place. For distinction and adornment belong to the work by which + the world receives its form. But as the giving form to a work of art is by means of the form of the art in the mind of the + artist, which may be called his intelligible word, so the giving form to every + creature is by the word of God; and for this reason in the works of distinction and adornment the Word is mentioned. But in + creation the Son is mentioned as the beginning, by the words, "In the beginning God created," since by creation is understood + the production of formless matter. But according to those who hold that the elements were created from the first under their + proper forms, another explanation must be given; and therefore Basil says (Hom. ii, iii in Hexaem.) that the words, "God + said," signify a Divine command. Such a command, however, could not have been given before creatures had been produced that + could obey it. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q74_A3-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> According to Augustine (De Civ. Dei ix, 33), by the heaven is understood the formless spiritual nature, and by the earth, + the formless matter of all corporeal things, and thus no creature is omitted. But, according to Basil (Hom. i in Hexaem.), + the heaven and the earth, as the two extremes, are alone mentioned, the intervening things being left to be understood, since + all these move heavenwards, if light, or earthwards, if heavy. And others say that + under the word, "earth," Scripture is accustomed to include all the four elements as ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q74_A3-p10.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.148.7" target="asv">Ps. 148:7,8</a>) after the words, "Praise the Lord from the earth," is added, "fire, hail, snow, and ice." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q74_A3-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> In the account of the creation there is found something to correspond to the words, "God saw that it was good," used in the + work of distinction and adornment, and this appears from the consideration that the Holy Spirit is Love. Now, "there are two + things," says Augustine (Gen. ad lit. i, 8) which came from God's love of His creatures, their existence and their permanence. + That they might then exist, and exist permanently, "the Spirit of God," it is + said, "moved over the waters"---that is to say, over that formless matter, signified by water, even as the love of the artist + moves over the materials of his art, that out of them he may form his work. And the words, "God saw that it was good," signify + that the things that He had made were to endure, since they express a certain satisfaction taken by God in His works, as of + an artist in his art: not as though He knew the creature otherwise, or that the creature was pleasing to Him otherwise, + than before He made it. Thus in either work, of creation and of formation, the Trinity of Persons is implied. In creation + the Person of the Father is indicated by God the Creator, the Person of the Son by the beginning, in which He created, and + the Person of the Holy Ghost by the Spirit that moved over the waters. But in the formation, the Person of the Father is indicated + by God that speaks, and the Person of the Son by the Word in which He speaks, and the Person of the Holy Spirit by the + satisfaction with which God saw that what was made was good. And if the words, "God saw that it was good," are not said of + the work of the second day, this is because the work of distinguishing the waters was only begun on that day, but perfected + on the third. Hence these words, that are said of the third day, refer also to the second. Or it may be that Scripture does + not use these words of approval of the second days' work, because this is concerned with the distinction of things not evident + to the senses of mankind. Or, again, because by the firmament is simply understood the cloudy region of the air, which is + not one of the permanent parts of the universe, nor of the principal divisions of the world. The above three reasons are given + by Rabbi Moses [*Perplex. ii.], and to these may be added a mystical one derived from numbers and assigned by some writers, + according to whom the work of the second day is not marked with approval because the second number is an imperfect number, + as + receding from the perfection of unity. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q74_A3-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Rabbi Moses (Perplex. ii) understands by the "Spirit of the Lord," the air or the wind, as Plato also did, and says that + it is so called according to the custom of Scripture, in which these things are throughout attributed to God. But according + to the holy writers, the Spirit of the Lord signifies the Holy Ghost, Who is said to "move over the water"---that is to say, + over what Augustine holds to mean formless matter, lest it should be supposed that + God loved of necessity the works He was to produce, as though He stood in need of them. For love of that kind is subject to, + not superior to, the object of love. Moreover, it is fittingly implied that the Spirit moved over that which was incomplete + and unfinished, since that movement is not one of place, but of pre-eminent power, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. i, 7). + It is the opinion, however, of Basil (Hom. ii in Hexaem.) that the Spirit moved over the element of water, "fostering and + quickening its nature and impressing vital power, as the hen broods over her chickens." For water has especially a life-giving + power, since many animals are generated in water, and the seed of all animals is liquid. Also the life of the soul is given + by the water of baptism, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q74_A3-p12.1" href="./asv.html#John.3.5" target="asv"> Jn. 3:5</a>: "Unless a man be born again of water and the Holy Ghost, he cannot enter into the kingdom of God." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q74_A3-p13"> + <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> According to Augustine (Gen. ad lit. i, 8), these three phrases denote the threefold being of creatures; first, their being + in the Word, denoted by the command "Let . . . be made"; secondly, their being in the angelic mind, signified by the words, + "It was . . . done"; thirdly, their being in their proper nature, by the words, "He made." And because the formation of the + angels is recorded on the first day, it was not necessary there to add, "He made." + It may also be said, following other writers, that the words, "He said," and "Let . . . be made," denote God's command, and + the words, "It was done," the fulfilment of that command. But as it was necessary, for the sake of those especially who have + asserted that all visible things were made by the angels, to mention how things were made, it is added, in order to remove + that error, that God Himself made them. Hence, in each work, after the words, "It was done," some act of God is expressed + by + some such words as, "He made," or, "He divided," or, "He called." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q74_A3-p14"> + <b>Reply to Objection 6:</b> According to Augustine (Gen. ad lit. iv, 22,30), by the "evening" and the "morning" are understood the evening and the morning + knowledge of the angels, which has been explained ( + <a id="FP_Q74_A3-p14.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q58_A6.html">Q[58], A[6]</a>,7). But, according to Basil (Hom. ii in Hexaem.), the entire period takes its name, as is customary, from its more important + part, the day. And instance of this is found in the words of Jacob, "The days of my pilgrimage," where night is not + mentioned at all. But the evening and the morning are mentioned as being the ends of the day, since day begins with morning + and ends with evening, or because evening denotes the beginning of night, and morning the beginning of day. It seems fitting, + also, that where the first distinction of creatures is described, divisions of time should be denoted only by what marks their + beginning. And the reason for mentioning the evening first is that as the evening ends the day, which begins with the + light, the termination of the light at evening precedes the termination of the darkness, which ends with the morning. But + Chrysostom's explanation is that thereby it is intended to show that the natural day does not end with the evening, but with + the morning (Hom. v in Gen.). + </p> + <p id="FP_Q74_A3-p15"> + <b>Reply to Objection 7:</b> The words "one day" are used when day is first instituted, to denote that one day is made up of twenty-four hours. Hence, + by mentioning "one," the measure of a natural day is fixed. Another reason may be to signify that a day is completed by the + return of the sun to the point from which it commenced its course. And yet another, because at the completion of a week of + seven days, the first day returns which is one with the eighth day. The three reasons + assigned above are those given by Basil (Hom. ii in Hexaem.). + </p> + <p id="FP_Q74_A3-p16"></p> + <p id="FP_Q74_A3-p17"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q74_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP.ix.html"></a> + </div> + <a href="summa.FP_Q73_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q74_A1.html"></a> + </div> + <a href="summa.FP_Q64_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q65.html"></a> + ` + </div> \ No newline at end of file