Mercurial > hg > Aquinas
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| author | ht |
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| date | Sun, 03 Jan 2010 14:43:02 +0000 |
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--- /dev/null Thu Jan 01 00:00:00 1970 +0000 +++ b/summa/english/FP_ix.html Sun Jan 03 14:43:02 2010 +0000 @@ -0,0 +1,10704 @@ +<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" id="FP.ix" class="div2"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q74_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q75.html"></a> + <h2 id="FP.ix-p0.1">TREATISE ON MAN (QQ[75]-102)</h2> + <div id="FP_Q75" class="div3"> + <a href="summa.FP.ix.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q75_A1.html"></a> + <h3 id="FP_Q75-p0.1">OF MAN WHO IS COMPOSED OF A SPIRITUAL AND A CORPOREAL SUBSTANCE: AND IN THE FIRST PLACE, CONCERNING WHAT BELONGS TO THE ESSENCE + OF THE SOUL (SEVEN ARTICLES) + </h3> + <p id="FP_Q75-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q75-p2"> Having treated of the spiritual and of the corporeal creature, we now proceed to treat of man, who is composed of a spiritual + and corporeal substance. We shall treat first of the nature of man, and secondly of his origin. Now the theologian considers + the nature of man in relation to the soul; but not in relation to the body, except in so far as the body has relation to the + soul. Hence the first object of our consideration will be the soul. And since Dionysius (Ang. Hier. xi) says + that three things are to be found in spiritual substances---essence, power, and operation---we shall treat first of what belongs + to the essence of the soul; secondly, of what belongs to its power; thirdly, of what belongs to its operation. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q75-p3"> Concerning the first, two points have to be considered; the first is the nature of the soul considered in itself; the second + is the union of the soul with the body. Under the first head there are seven points of inquiry. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q75-p4"> (1) Whether the soul is a body?</p> + <p id="FP_Q75-p5"> (2) Whether the human soul is a subsistence?</p> + <p id="FP_Q75-p6"> (3) Whether the souls of brute animals are subsistent?</p> + <p id="FP_Q75-p7"> (4) Whether the soul is man, or is man composed of soul and body?</p> + <p id="FP_Q75-p8"> (5) Whether the soul is composed of matter and form?</p> + <p id="FP_Q75-p9"> (6) Whether the soul is incorruptible?</p> + <p id="FP_Q75-p10"> (7) Whether the soul is of the same species as an angel?</p> + <div id="FP_Q75_A1" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q75.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q75_A2.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q75_A1-p0.1">Whether the soul is a body?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q75_A1-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q75_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the soul is a body. For the soul is the moving principle of the body. Nor does it move unless moved. First, + because seemingly nothing can move unless it is itself moved, since nothing gives what it has not; for instance, what is not + hot does not give heat. Secondly, because if there be anything that moves and is not moved, it must be the cause of eternal, + unchanging movement, as we find proved Phys. viii, 6; and this does not appear to be + the case in the movement of an animal, which is caused by the soul. Therefore the soul is a mover moved. But every mover moved + is a body. Therefore the soul is a body. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q75_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, all knowledge is caused by means of a likeness. But there can be no likeness of a body to an incorporeal thing. + If, therefore, the soul were not a body, it could not have knowledge of corporeal things. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q75_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, between the mover and the moved there must be contact. But contact is only between bodies. Since, therefore, the + soul moves the body, it seems that the soul must be a body. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q75_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Trin. vi, 6) that the soul "is simple in comparison with the body, inasmuch as it does not occupy space + by its bulk." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q75_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> To seek the nature of the soul, we must premise that the soul is defined as the first principle of life of those things which + live: for we call living things "animate," [*i.e. having a soul], and those things which have no life, "inanimate." Now life + is shown principally by two actions, knowledge and movement. The philosophers of old, not being able to rise above their imagination, + supposed that the principle of these actions was something corporeal: for + they asserted that only bodies were real things; and that what is not corporeal is nothing: hence they maintained that the + soul is something corporeal. This opinion can be proved to be false in many ways; but we shall make use of only one proof, + based on universal and certain principles, which shows clearly that the soul is not a body. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q75_A1-p7"> It is manifest that not every principle of vital action is a soul, for then the eye would be a soul, as it is a principle + of vision; and the same might be applied to the other instruments of the soul: but it is the "first" principle of life, which + we call the soul. Now, though a body may be a principle of life, or to be a living thing, as the heart is a principle of life + in an animal, yet nothing corporeal can be the first principle of life. For it is clear that to be a + principle of life, or to be a living thing, does not belong to a body as such; since, if that were the case, every body would + be a living thing, or a principle of life. Therefore a body is competent to be a living thing or even a principle of life, + as "such" a body. Now that it is actually such a body, it owes to some principle which is called its act. Therefore the soul, + which is the first principle of life, is not a body, but the act of a body; thus heat, which is the principle of + calefaction, is not a body, but an act of a body. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q75_A1-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As everything which is in motion must be moved by something else, a process which cannot be prolonged indefinitely, we must + allow that not every mover is moved. For, since to be moved is to pass from potentiality to actuality, the mover gives what + it has to the thing moved, inasmuch as it causes it to be in act. But, as is shown in Phys. viii, 6, there is a mover which + is altogether immovable, and not moved either essentially, or accidentally; and + such a mover can cause an invariable movement. There is, however, another kind of mover, which, though not moved essentially, + is moved accidentally; and for this reason it does not cause an invariable movement; such a mover, is the soul. There is, + again, another mover, which is moved essentially---namely, the body. And because the philosophers of old believed that nothing + existed but bodies, they maintained that every mover is moved; and that the soul is moved directly, and is a body. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q75_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The likeness of a thing known is not of necessity actually in the nature of the knower; but given a thing which knows potentially, + and afterwards knows actually, the likeness of the thing known must be in the nature of the knower, not actually, but only + potentially; thus color is not actually in the pupil of the eye, but only potentially. Hence it is necessary, not that the + likeness of corporeal things should be actually in the nature of the soul, but + that there be a potentiality in the soul for such a likeness. But the ancient philosophers omitted to distinguish between + actuality and potentiality; and so they held that the soul must be a body in order to have knowledge of a body; and that it + must be composed of the principles of which all bodies are formed in order to know all bodies. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q75_A1-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> There are two kinds of contact; of "quantity," and of "power." By the former a body can be touched only by a body; by the + latter a body can be touched by an incorporeal thing, which moves that body. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q75_A1-p11"></p> + <p id="FP_Q75_A1-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q75.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q75_A2.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q75_A2" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q75_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q75_A3.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q75_A2-p0.1">Whether the human soul is something subsistent?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q75_A2-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q75_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the human soul is not something subsistent. For that which subsists is said to be "this particular thing." + Now "this particular thing" is said not of the soul, but of that which is composed of soul and body. Therefore the soul is + not something subsistent. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q75_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, everything subsistent operates. But the soul does not operate; for, as the Philosopher says (De Anima i, 4), "to + say that the soul feels or understands is like saying that the soul weaves or builds." Therefore the soul is not subsistent. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q75_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if the soul were subsistent, it would have some operation apart from the body. But it has no operation apart from + the body, not even that of understanding: for the act of understanding does not take place without a phantasm, which cannot + exist apart from the body. Therefore the human soul is not something subsistent. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q75_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Trin. x, 7): "Who understands that the nature of the soul is that of a substance and not that of a body, + will see that those who maintain the corporeal nature of the soul, are led astray through associating with the soul those + things without which they are unable to think of any nature---i.e. imaginary pictures of corporeal things." Therefore the + nature of the human intellect is not only incorporeal, but it is also a substance, that is, + something subsistent. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q75_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> It must necessarily be allowed that the principle of intellectual operation which we call the soul, is a principle both incorporeal + and subsistent. For it is clear that by means of the intellect man can have knowledge of all corporeal things. Now whatever + knows certain things cannot have any of them in its own nature; because that which is in it naturally would impede the knowledge + of anything else. Thus we observe that a sick man's tongue being vitiated by + a feverish and bitter humor, is insensible to anything sweet, and everything seems bitter to it. Therefore, if the intellectual + principle contained the nature of a body it would be unable to know all bodies. Now every body has its own determinate nature. + Therefore it is impossible for the intellectual principle to be a body. It is likewise impossible for it to understand by + means of a bodily organ; since the determinate nature of that organ would impede knowledge of all bodies; as when a + certain determinate color is not only in the pupil of the eye, but also in a glass vase, the liquid in the vase seems to be + of that same color. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q75_A2-p7"> Therefore the intellectual principle which we call the mind or the intellect has an operation "per se" apart from the body. + Now only that which subsists can have an operation "per se." For nothing can operate but what is actual: for which reason + we do not say that heat imparts heat, but that what is hot gives heat. We must conclude, therefore, that the human soul, which + is called the intellect or the mind, is something incorporeal and subsistent. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q75_A2-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> "This particular thing" can be taken in two senses. Firstly, for anything subsistent; secondly, for that which subsists, + and is complete in a specific nature. The former sense excludes the inherence of an accident or of a material form; the latter + excludes also the imperfection of the part, so that a hand can be called "this particular thing" in the first sense, but not + in the second. Therefore, as the human soul is a part of human nature, it can + indeed be called "this particular thing," in the first sense, as being something subsistent; but not in the second, for in + this sense, what is composed of body and soul is said to be "this particular thing." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q75_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Aristotle wrote those words as expressing not his own opinion, but the opinion of those who said that to understand is to + be moved, as is clear from the context. Or we may reply that to operate "per se" belongs to what exists "per se." But for + a thing to exist "per se," it suffices sometimes that it be not inherent, as an accident or a material form; even though it + be part of something. Nevertheless, that is rightly said to subsist "per se," which is + neither inherent in the above sense, nor part of anything else. In this sense, the eye or the hand cannot be said to subsist + "per se"; nor can it for that reason be said to operate "per se." Hence the operation of the parts is through each part attributed + to the whole. For we say that man sees with the eye, and feels with the hand, and not in the same sense as when we say that + what is hot gives heat by its heat; for heat, strictly speaking, does not give heat. We may therefore say that the soul + understands, as the eye sees; but it is more correct to say that man understands through the soul. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q75_A2-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The body is necessary for the action of the intellect, not as its origin of action, but on the part of the object; for the + phantasm is to the intellect what color is to the sight. Neither does such a dependence on the body prove the intellect to + be non-subsistent; otherwise it would follow that an animal is non-subsistent, since it requires external objects of the senses + in order to perform its act of perception. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q75_A2-p11"></p> + <p id="FP_Q75_A2-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q75_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q75_A3.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q75_A3" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q75_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q75_A4.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q75_A3-p0.1">Whether the souls of brute animals are subsistent?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q75_A3-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q75_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the souls of brute animals are subsistent. For man is of the same 'genus' as other animals; and, as we + have just shown + <a id="FP_Q75_A3-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q75_A2.html">(A[2])</a>, the soul of man is subsistent. Therefore the souls of other animals are subsistent. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q75_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the relation of the sensitive faculty to sensible objects is like the relation of the intellectual faculty to intelligible + objects. But the intellect, apart from the body, apprehends intelligible objects. Therefore the sensitive faculty, apart from + the body, perceives sensible objects. Therefore, since the souls of brute animals are sensitive, it follows that they are + subsistent; just as the human intellectual soul is subsistent. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q75_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the soul of brute animals moves the body. But the body is not a mover, but is moved. Therefore the soul of brute + animals has an operation apart from the body. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q75_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Is what is written in the book De Eccl. Dogm. xvi, xvii: "Man alone we believe to have a subsistent soul: whereas the souls + of animals are not subsistent." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q75_A3-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The ancient philosophers made no distinction between sense and intellect, and referred both a corporeal principle, as has + been said + <a id="FP_Q75_A3-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q75_A1.html">(A[1])</a>. Plato, however, drew a distinction between intellect and sense; yet he referred both to an incorporeal principle, maintaining + that sensing, just as understanding, belongs to the soul as such. From this it follows that even the souls of brute animals + are subsistent. But Aristotle held that of the + operations of the soul, understanding alone is performed without a corporeal organ. On the other hand, sensation and the consequent + operations of the sensitive soul are evidently accompanied with change in the body; thus in the act of vision, the pupil of + the eye is affected by a reflection of color: and so with the other senses. Hence it is clear that the sensitive soul has + no "per se" operation of its own, and that every operation of the sensitive soul belongs to the composite. Wherefore we + conclude that as the souls of brute animals have no "per se" operations they are not subsistent. For the operation of anything + follows the mode of its being. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q75_A3-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Although man is of the same "genus" as other animals, he is of a different "species." Specific difference is derived from + the difference of form; nor does every difference of form necessarily imply a diversity of "genus." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q75_A3-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The relation of the sensitive faculty to the sensible object is in one way the same as that of the intellectual faculty to + the intelligible object, in so far as each is in potentiality to its object. But in another way their relations differ, inasmuch + as the impression of the object on the sense is accompanied with change in the body; so that excessive strength of the sensible + corrupts sense; a thing that never occurs in the case of the intellect. For + an intellect that understands the highest of intelligible objects is more able afterwards to understand those that are lower. + If, however, in the process of intellectual operation the body is weary, this result is accidental, inasmuch as the intellect + requires the operation of the sensitive powers in the production of the phantasms. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q75_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Motive power is of two kinds. One, the appetitive power, commands motion. The operation of this power in the sensitive soul + is not apart from the body; for anger, joy, and passions of a like nature are accompanied by a change in the body. The other + motive power is that which executes motion in adapting the members for obeying the appetite; and the act of this power does + not consist in moving, but in being moved. Whence it is clear that to move is not + an act of the sensitive soul without the body. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q75_A3-p10"></p> + <p id="FP_Q75_A3-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q75_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q75_A4.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q75_A4" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q75_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q75_A5.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q75_A4-p0.1">Whether the soul is man?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q75_A4-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q75_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the soul is man. For it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q75_A4-p2.1" href="./asv.html#iiCor.4.16" target="asv">2 Cor. 4:16</a>): "Though our outward man is corrupted, yet the inward man is renewed day by day." But that which is within man is the soul. + Therefore the soul is the inward man. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q75_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the human soul is a substance. But it is not a universal substance. Therefore it is a particular substance. Therefore + it is a "hypostasis" or a person; and it can only be a human person. Therefore the soul is man; for a human person is a man. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q75_A4-p4"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine (De Civ. Dei xix, 3) commends Varro as holding "that man is not a mere soul, nor a mere body; but both soul and + body." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q75_A4-p5"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The assertion "the soul is man," can be taken in two senses. First, that man is a soul; though this particular man, Socrates, + for instance, is not a soul, but composed of soul and body. I say this, forasmuch as some held that the form alone belongs + to the species; while matter is part of the individual, and not the species. This cannot be true; for to the nature of the + species belongs what the definition signifies; and in natural things the definition does + not signify the form only, but the form and the matter. Hence in natural things the matter is part of the species; not, indeed, + signate matter, which is the principle of individuality; but the common matter. For as it belongs to the notion of this particular + man to be composed of this soul, of this flesh, and of these bones; so it belongs to the notion of man to be composed of soul, + flesh, and bones; for whatever belongs in common to the substance of all the individuals contained under a given + species, must belong to the substance of the species. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q75_A4-p6"> It may also be understood in this sense, that this soul is this man; and this could be held if it were supposed that the + operation of the sensitive soul were proper to it, apart from the body; because in that case all the operations which are + attributed to man would belong to the soul only; and whatever performs the operations proper to a thing, is that thing; wherefore + that which performs the operations of a man is man. But it has been shown above + <a id="FP_Q75_A4-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q75_A3.html">(A[3])</a> that sensation is not the operation of the soul only. Since, then, sensation is an operation of man, but not proper to him, + it is clear that man is not a soul only, but something composed of soul and body. Plato, through supposing that sensation + was proper to the soul, could maintain man to be a soul making use of the body. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q75_A4-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> According to the Philosopher (Ethic. ix, 8), a thing seems to be chiefly what is principle in it; thus what the governor + of a state does, the state is said to do. In this way sometimes what is principle in man is said to be man; sometimes, indeed, + the intellectual part which, in accordance with truth, is called the "inward" man; and sometimes the sensitive part with the + body is called man in the opinion of those whose observation does not go beyond + the senses. And this is called the "outward" man. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q75_A4-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Not every particular substance is a hypostasis or a person, but that which has the complete nature of its species. Hence + a hand, or a foot, is not called a hypostasis, or a person; nor, likewise, is the soul alone so called, since it is a part + of the human species. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q75_A4-p9"></p> + <p id="FP_Q75_A4-p10"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q75_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q75_A5.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q75_A5" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q75_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q75_A6.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q75_A5-p0.1">Whether the soul is composed of matter and form?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q75_A5-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q75_A5-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the soul is composed of matter and form. For potentiality is opposed to actuality. Now, whatsoever things + are in actuality participate of the First Act, which is God; by participation of Whom, all things are good, are beings, and + are living things, as is clear from the teaching of Dionysius (Div. Nom. v). Therefore whatsoever things are in potentiality + participate of the first potentiality. But the first potentiality is primary matter. + Therefore, since the human soul is, after a manner, in potentiality; which appears from the fact that sometimes a man is potentially + understanding; it seems that the human soul must participate of primary matter, as part of itself. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q75_A5-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, wherever the properties of matter are found, there matter is. But the properties of matter are found in the soul---namely, + to be a subject, and to be changed, for it is a subject to science, and virtue; and it changes from ignorance to knowledge + and from vice to virtue. Therefore matter is in the soul. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q75_A5-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, things which have no matter, have no cause of their existence, as the Philosopher says Metaph. viii (Did. vii, 6). + But the soul has a cause of its existence, since it is created by God. Therefore the soul has matter. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q75_A5-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, what has no matter, and is a form only, is a pure act, and is infinite. But this belongs to God alone. Therefore + the soul has matter. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q75_A5-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine (Gen. ad lit. vii, 7,8,9) proves that the soul was made neither of corporeal matter, nor of spiritual matter. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q75_A5-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The soul has no matter. We may consider this question in two ways. First, from the notion of a soul in general; for it belongs + to the notion of a soul to be the form of a body. Now, either it is a form by virtue of itself, in its entirety, or by virtue + of some part of itself. If by virtue of itself in its entirety, then it is impossible that any part of it should be matter, + if by matter we understand something purely potential: for a form, as such, is an + act; and that which is purely potentiality cannot be part of an act, since potentiality is repugnant to actuality as being + opposite thereto. If, however, it be a form by virtue of a part of itself, then we call that part the soul: and that matter, + which it actualizes first, we call the "primary animate." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q75_A5-p8"> Secondly, we may proceed from the specific notion of the human soul inasmuch as it is intellectual. For it is clear that + whatever is received into something is received according to the condition of the recipient. Now a thing is known in as far + as its form is in the knower. But the intellectual soul knows a thing in its nature absolutely: for instance, it knows a stone + absolutely as a stone; and therefore the form of a stone absolutely, as to its proper formal idea, is in the + intellectual soul. Therefore the intellectual soul itself is an absolute form, and not something composed of matter and form. + For if the intellectual soul were composed of matter and form, the forms of things would be received into it as individuals, + and so it would only know the individual: just as it happens with the sensitive powers which receive forms in a corporeal + organ; since matter is the principle by which forms are individualized. It follows, therefore, that the intellectual soul, + and + every intellectual substance which has knowledge of forms absolutely, is exempt from composition of matter and form. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q75_A5-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The First Act is the universal principle of all acts; because It is infinite, virtually "precontaining all things," as Dionysius + says (Div. Nom. v). Wherefore things participate of It not as a part of themselves, but by diffusion of Its processions. Now + as potentiality is receptive of act, it must be proportionate to act. But the acts received which proceed from the First Infinite + Act, and are participations thereof, are diverse, so that there cannot + be one potentiality which receives all acts, as there is one act, from which all participated acts are derived; for then the + receptive potentiality would equal the active potentiality of the First Act. Now the receptive potentiality in the intellectual + soul is other than the receptive potentiality of first matter, as appears from the diversity of the things received by each. + For primary matter receives individual forms; whereas the intelligence receives absolute forms. Hence the existence of + such a potentiality in the intellectual soul does not prove that the soul is composed of matter and form. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q75_A5-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> To be a subject and to be changed belong to matter by reason of its being in potentiality. As, therefore, the potentiality + of the intelligence is one thing and the potentiality of primary matter another, so in each is there a different reason of + subjection and change. For the intelligence is subject to knowledge, and is changed from ignorance to knowledge, by reason + of its being in potentiality with regard to the intelligible species. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q75_A5-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The form causes matter to be, and so does the agent; wherefore the agent causes matter to be, so far as it actualizes it + by transmuting it to the act of a form. A subsistent form, however, does not owe its existence to some formal principle, nor + has it a cause transmuting it from potentiality to act. So after the words quoted above, the Philosopher concludes, that in + things composed of matter and form "there is no other cause but that which moves from + potentiality to act; while whatsoever things have no matter are simply beings at once." [*The Leonine edition has, "simpliciter + sunt quod vere entia aliquid." The Parma edition of St. Thomas's Commentary on Aristotle has, "statim per se unum quiddam + est . . . et ens quiddam."] + </p> + <p id="FP_Q75_A5-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Everything participated is compared to the participator as its act. But whatever created form be supposed to subsist "per + se," must have existence by participation; for "even life," or anything of that sort, "is a participator of existence," as + Dionysius says (Div. Nom. v). Now participated existence is limited by the capacity of the participator; so that God alone, + Who is His own existence, is pure act and infinite. But in intellectual substances + there is composition of actuality and potentiality, not, indeed, of matter and form, but of form and participated existence. + Wherefore some say that they are composed of that "whereby they are" and that "which they are"; for existence itself is that + by which a thing is. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q75_A5-p13"></p> + <p id="FP_Q75_A5-p14"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q75_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q75_A6.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q75_A6" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q75_A5.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q75_A7.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q75_A6-p0.1">Whether the human soul is incorruptible?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q75_A6-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q75_A6-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the human soul is corruptible. For those things that have a like beginning and process seemingly have + a like end. But the beginning, by generation, of men is like that of animals, for they are made from the earth. And the process + of life is alike in both; because "all things breathe alike, and man hath nothing more than the beast," as it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q75_A6-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Eccl.3.19" target="asv">Eccles. 3:19</a>). Therefore, as the same text concludes, "the death of man + and beast is one, and the condition of both is equal." But the souls of brute animals are corruptible. Therefore, also, the + human soul is corruptible. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q75_A6-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, whatever is out of nothing can return to nothingness; because the end should correspond to the beginning. But as + it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q75_A6-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.2.2" target="asv">Wis. 2:2</a>), "We are born of nothing"; which is true, not only of the body, but also of the soul. Therefore, as is concluded in the + same passage, "After this we shall be as if we had not been," even as to our soul. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q75_A6-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, nothing is without its own proper operation. But the operation proper to the soul, which is to understand through + a phantasm, cannot be without the body. For the soul understands nothing without a phantasm; and there is no phantasm without + the body as the Philosopher says (De Anima i, 1). Therefore the soul cannot survive the dissolution of the body. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q75_A6-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that human souls owe to Divine goodness that they are "intellectual," and that they have "an + incorruptible substantial life." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q75_A6-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> We must assert that the intellectual principle which we call the human soul is incorruptible. For a thing may be corrupted + in two ways---"per se," and accidentally. Now it is impossible for any substance to be generated or corrupted accidentally, + that is, by the generation or corruption of something else. For generation and corruption belong to a thing, just as existence + belongs to it, which is acquired by generation and lost by corruption. Therefore, + whatever has existence "per se" cannot be generated or corrupted except 'per se'; while things which do not subsist, such + as accidents and material forms, acquire existence or lost it through the generation or corruption of composite things. Now + it was shown above ( + <a id="FP_Q75_A6-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q75_A2.html">AA[2]</a>,3) that the souls of brutes are not self-subsistent, whereas the human soul is; so that the souls of brutes are corrupted, + when their bodies are corrupted; while the human soul could not be corrupted + unless it were corrupted "per se." This, indeed, is impossible, not only as regards the human soul, but also as regards anything + subsistent that is a form alone. For it is clear that what belongs to a thing by virtue of itself is inseparable from it; + but existence belongs to a form, which is an act, by virtue of itself. Wherefore matter acquires actual existence as it acquires + the form; while it is corrupted so far as the form is separated from it. But it is impossible for a form to be + separated from itself; and therefore it is impossible for a subsistent form to cease to exist. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q75_A6-p7"> Granted even that the soul is composed of matter and form, as some pretend, we should nevertheless have to maintain that + it is incorruptible. For corruption is found only where there is contrariety; since generation and corruption are from contraries + and into contraries. Wherefore the heavenly bodies, since they have no matter subject to contrariety, are incorruptible. Now + there can be no contrariety in the intellectual soul; for it receives according to the manner of its + existence, and those things which it receives are without contrariety; for the notions even of contraries are not themselves + contrary, since contraries belong to the same knowledge. Therefore it is impossible for the intellectual soul to be corruptible. + Moreover we may take a sign of this from the fact that everything naturally aspires to existence after its own manner. Now, + in things that have knowledge, desire ensues upon knowledge. The senses indeed do not know existence, except under the + conditions of "here" and "now," whereas the intellect apprehends existence absolutely, and for all time; so that everything + that has an intellect naturally desires always to exist. But a natural desire cannot be in vain. Therefore every intellectual + substance is incorruptible. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q75_A6-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Solomon reasons thus in the person of the foolish, as expressed in the words of + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q75_A6-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.2" target="asv">Wisdom 2</a>. Therefore the saying that man and animals have a like beginning in generation is true of the body; for all animals alike + are made of earth. But it is not true of the soul. For the souls of brutes are produced by some power of the body; whereas + the human soul is produced by God. To signify this it is written as to other animals: "Let the earth bring forth the + living soul" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q75_A6-p8.2" href="./asv.html#Gen.1.24" target="asv">Gn. 1:24</a>): while of man it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q75_A6-p8.3" href="./asv.html#Gen.2.7" target="asv">Gn. 2:7</a>) that "He breathed into his face the breath of life." And so in the last chapter of Ecclesiastes (12:7) it is concluded: + "(Before) the dust return into its earth from whence it was; and the spirit return to God Who gave it." Again the process + of life is alike as to the body, concerning which it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q75_A6-p8.4" href="./asv.html#Eccl.3.19" target="asv">Eccles. 3:19</a>): "All things breathe alike," and ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q75_A6-p8.5" href="./asv.html#Wis.2.2" target="asv">Wis. + 2:2 + </a>), "The breath in our nostrils is smoke." But the process is not alike of the soul; for man is intelligent, whereas animals + are not. Hence it is false to say: "Man has nothing more than beasts." Thus death comes to both alike as to the body, by not + as to the soul. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q75_A6-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As a thing can be created by reason, not of a passive potentiality, but only of the active potentiality of the Creator, Who + can produce something out of nothing, so when we say that a thing can be reduced to nothing, we do not imply in the creature + a potentiality to non-existence, but in the Creator the power of ceasing to sustain existence. But a thing is said to be corruptible + because there is in it a potentiality to non-existence. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q75_A6-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> To understand through a phantasm is the proper operation of the soul by virtue of its union with the body. After separation + from the body it will have another mode of understanding, similar to other substances separated from bodies, as will appear + later on ( + <a id="FP_Q75_A6-p10.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q89_A1.html">Q[89], A[1]</a>). + </p> + <p id="FP_Q75_A6-p11"></p> + <p id="FP_Q75_A6-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q75_A5.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q75_A7.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q75_A7" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q75_A6.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q76.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q75_A7-p0.1">Whether the soul is of the same species as an angel?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q75_A7-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q75_A7-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the soul is of the same species as an angel. For each thing is ordained to its proper end by the nature + of its species, whence is derived its inclination for that end. But the end of the soul is the same as that of an angel---namely, + eternal happiness. Therefore they are of the same species. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q75_A7-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the ultimate specific difference is the noblest, because it completes the nature of the species. But there is nothing + nobler either in an angel or in the soul than their intellectual nature. Therefore the soul and the angel agree in the ultimate + specific difference: therefore they belong to the same species. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q75_A7-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, it seems that the soul does not differ from an angel except in its union with the body. But as the body is outside + the essence of the soul, it seems that it does not belong to its species. Therefore the soul and angel are of the same species. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q75_A7-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Things which have different natural operations are of different species. But the natural operations of the soul and of an + angel are different; since, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. vii), "Angelic minds have simple and blessed intelligence, not gathering + their knowledge of Divine things from visible things." Subsequently he says the contrary to this of the soul. Therefore the + soul and an angel are not of the same species. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q75_A7-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Origen (Peri Archon iii, 5) held that human souls and angels are all of the same species; and this because he supposed that + in these substances the difference of degree was accidental, as resulting from their free-will: as we have seen above ( + <a id="FP_Q75_A7-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q47_A2.html">Q[47], A[2]</a>). But this cannot be; for in incorporeal substances there cannot be diversity of number without diversity of species and + inequality of nature; because, as they are not composed of + matter and form, but are subsistent forms, it is clear that there is necessarily among them a diversity of species. For a + separate form cannot be understood otherwise than as one of a single species; thus, supposing a separate whiteness to exist, + it could only be one; forasmuch as one whiteness does not differ from another except as in this or that subject. But diversity + of species is always accompanied with a diversity of nature; thus in species of colors one is more perfect than another; and + the same applies to other species, because differences which divide a "genus" are contrary to one another. Contraries, however, + are compared to one another as the perfect to the imperfect, since the "principle of contrariety is habit, and privation thereof," + as is written Metaph. x (Did. ix, 4). The same would follow if the aforesaid substances were composed of matter and form. + For if the matter of one be distinct from the matter of another, it follows that either the form is the principle of + the distinction of matter---that is to say, that the matter is distinct on account of its relation to divers forms; and even + then there would result a difference of species and inequality of nature: or else the matter is the principle of the distinction + of forms. But one matter cannot be distinct from another, except by a distinction of quantity, which has no place in these + incorporeal substances, such as an angel and the soul. So that it is not possible for the angel and the soul to be of the + same species. How it is that there can be many souls of one species will be explained later ( + <a id="FP_Q75_A7-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q76_A2.html">Q[76], A[2]</a>, ad 1). + </p> + <p id="FP_Q75_A7-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This argument proceeds from the proximate and natural end. Eternal happiness is the ultimate and supernatural end. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q75_A7-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The ultimate specific difference is the noblest because it is the most determinate, in the same way as actuality is nobler + than potentiality. Thus, however, the intellectual faculty is not the noblest, because it is indeterminate and common to many + degrees of intellectuality; as the sensible faculty is common to many degrees in the sensible nature. Hence, as all sensible + things are not of one species, so neither are all intellectual things of one + species. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q75_A7-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The body is not of the essence of the soul; but the soul by the nature of its essence can be united to the body, so that, + properly speaking, not the soul alone, but the "composite," is the species. And the very fact that the soul in a certain way + requires the body for its operation, proves that the soul is endowed with a grade of intellectuality inferior to that of an + angel, who is not united to a body. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q75_A7-p10"></p> + <p id="FP_Q75_A7-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q75_A6.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q76.html"></a> + </div> + <a href="summa.FP.ix.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q75_A1.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q76" class="div3"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q75_A7.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q76_A1.html"></a> + <h3 id="FP_Q76-p0.1">OF THE UNION OF BODY AND SOUL (EIGHT ARTICLES)</h3> + <p id="FP_Q76-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q76-p2"> We now consider the union of the soul with the body; and concerning this there are eight points of inquiry:</p> + <p id="FP_Q76-p3"> (1) Whether the intellectual principle is united to the body as its form?</p> + <p id="FP_Q76-p4"> (2) Whether the intellectual principle is multiplied numerically according to the number of bodies; or is there one intelligence + for all men? + </p> + <p id="FP_Q76-p5"> (3) Whether in the body the form of which is an intellectual principle, there is some other soul?</p> + <p id="FP_Q76-p6"> (4) Whether in the body there is any other substantial form?</p> + <p id="FP_Q76-p7"> (5) Of the qualities required in the body of which the intellectual principle is the form?</p> + <p id="FP_Q76-p8"> (6) Whether it be united to such a body by means of another body?</p> + <p id="FP_Q76-p9"> (7) Whether by means of an accident?</p> + <p id="FP_Q76-p10"> (8) Whether the soul is wholly in each part of the body?</p> + <div id="FP_Q76_A1" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q76.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q76_A2.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q76_A1-p0.1">Whether the intellectual principle is united to the body as its form?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q76_A1-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q76_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the intellectual principle is not united to the body as its form. For the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 4) + that the intellect is "separate," and that it is not the act of any body. Therefore it is not united to the body as its form. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q76_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, every form is determined according to the nature of the matter of which it is the form; otherwise no proportion + would be required between matter and form. Therefore if the intellect were united to the body as its form, since every body + has a determinate nature, it would follow that the intellect has a determinate nature; and thus, it would not be capable of + knowing all things, as is clear from what has been said ( + <a id="FP_Q76_A1-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q75_A2.html">Q[75], A[2]</a>); + which is contrary to the nature of the intellect. Therefore the intellect is not united to the body as its form. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q76_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, whatever receptive power is an act of a body, receives a form materially and individually; for what is received + must be received according to the condition of the receiver. But the form of the thing understood is not received into the + intellect materially and individually, but rather immaterially and universally: otherwise the intellect would not be capable + of the knowledge of immaterial and universal objects, but only of individuals, like the senses. + Therefore the intellect is not united to the body as its form. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q76_A1-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, power and action have the same subject; for the same subject is what can, and does, act. But the intellectual action + is not the action of a body, as appears from above ( + <a id="FP_Q76_A1-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q75_A2.html">Q[75], A[2]</a>). Therefore neither is the intellectual faculty a power of the body. But virtue or power cannot be more abstract or more + simple than the essence from which the faculty or power is derived. Therefore neither is the substance of the intellect the + form + of a body. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q76_A1-p6"> + <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, whatever has "per se" existence is not united to the body as its form; because a form is that by which a thing exists: + so that the very existence of a form does not belong to the form by itself. But the intellectual principle has "per se" existence + and is subsistent, as was said above ( + <a id="FP_Q76_A1-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q75_A2.html">Q[75], A[2]</a>). Therefore it is not united to the body as its form. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q76_A1-p7"> + <b>Objection 6:</b> Further, whatever exists in a thing by reason of its nature exists in it always. But to be united to matter belongs to the + form by reason of its nature; because form is the act of matter, not by an accidental quality, but by its own essence; otherwise + matter and form would not make a thing substantially one, but only accidentally one. Therefore a form cannot be without its + own proper matter. But the intellectual principle, since it is incorruptible, as was + shown above ( + <a id="FP_Q76_A1-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q75_A6.html">Q[75], A[6]</a>), remains separate from the body, after the dissolution of the body. Therefore the intellectual principle is not united to + the body as its form. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q76_A1-p8"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> According to the Philosopher, Metaph. viii (Did. vii 2), difference is derived from the form. But the difference which constitutes + man is "rational," which is applied to man on account of his intellectual principle. Therefore the intellectual principle + is the form of man. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q76_A1-p9"> + <b>I answer that,</b> We must assert that the intellect which is the principle of intellectual operation is the form of the human body. For that + whereby primarily anything acts is a form of the thing to which the act is to be attributed: for instance, that whereby a + body is primarily healed is health, and that whereby the soul knows primarily is knowledge; hence health is a form of the + body, and knowledge is a form of the soul. The reason is because nothing acts except so far as + it is in act; wherefore a thing acts by that whereby it is in act. Now it is clear that the first thing by which the body + lives is the soul. And as life appears through various operations in different degrees of living things, that whereby we primarily + perform each of all these vital actions is the soul. For the soul is the primary principle of our nourishment, sensation, + and local movement; and likewise of our understanding. Therefore this principle by which we primarily understand, whether + it + be called the intellect or the intellectual soul, is the form of the body. This is the demonstration used by Aristotle (De + Anima ii, 2). + </p> + <p id="FP_Q76_A1-p10"> But if anyone says that the intellectual soul is not the form of the body he must first explain how it is that this action + of understanding is the action of this particular man; for each one is conscious that it is himself who understands. Now an + action may be attributed to anyone in three ways, as is clear from the Philosopher (Phys. v, 1); for a thing is said to move + or act, either by virtue of its whole self, for instance, as a physician heals; or by virtue of a part, as a + man sees by his eye; or through an accidental quality, as when we say that something that is white builds, because it is accidental + to the builder to be white. So when we say that Socrates or Plato understands, it is clear that this is not attributed to + him accidentally; since it is ascribed to him as man, which is predicated of him essentially. We must therefore say either + that Socrates understands by virtue of his whole self, as Plato maintained, holding that man is an intellectual soul; or + that intelligence is a part of Socrates. The first cannot stand, as was shown above ( + <a id="FP_Q76_A1-p10.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q75_A4.html">Q[75], A[4]</a>), for this reason, that it is one and the same man who is conscious both that he understands, and that he senses. But one + cannot sense without a body: therefore the body must be some part of man. It follows therefore that the intellect by which + Socrates understands is a part of Socrates, so that in some way it is united to the body of Socrates. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q76_A1-p11"> The Commentator held that this union is through the intelligible species, as having a double subject, in the possible intellect, + and in the phantasms which are in the corporeal organs. Thus through the intelligible species the possible intellect is linked + to the body of this or that particular man. But this link or union does not sufficiently explain the fact, that the act of + the intellect is the act of Socrates. This can be clearly seen from comparison with the sensitive + faculty, from which Aristotle proceeds to consider things relating to the intellect. For the relation of phantasms to the + intellect is like the relation of colors to the sense of sight, as he says De Anima iii, 5,7. Therefore, as the species of + colors are in the sight, so are the species of phantasms in the possible intellect. Now it is clear that because the colors, + the images of which are in the sight, are on a wall, the action of seeing is not attributed to the wall: for we do not say + that + the wall sees, but rather that it is seen. Therefore, from the fact that the species of phantasms are in the possible intellect, + it does not follow that Socrates, in whom are the phantasms, understands, but that he or his phantasms are understood. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q76_A1-p12"> Some, however, tried to maintain that the intellect is united to the body as its motor; and hence that the intellect and + body form one thing so that the act of the intellect could be attributed to the whole. This is, however, absurd for many reasons. + First, because the intellect does not move the body except through the appetite, the movement of which presupposes the operation + of the intellect. The reason therefore why Socrates understands is not because he is moved by his + intellect, but rather, contrariwise, he is moved by his intellect because he understands. Secondly, because since Socrates + is an individual in a nature of one essence composed of matter and form, if the intellect be not the form, it follows that + it must be outside the essence, and then the intellect is the whole Socrates as a motor to the thing moved. Whereas the act + of intellect remains in the agent, and does not pass into something else, as does the action of heating. Therefore the action + of + understanding cannot be attributed to Socrates for the reason that he is moved by his intellect. Thirdly, because the action + of a motor is never attributed to the thing moved, except as to an instrument; as the action of a carpenter to a saw. Therefore + if understanding is attributed to Socrates, as the action of what moves him, it follows that it is attributed to him as to + an instrument. This is contrary to the teaching of the Philosopher, who holds that understanding is not possible through a + corporeal instrument (De Anima iii, 4). Fourthly, because, although the action of a part be attributed to the whole, as the + action of the eye is attributed to a man; yet it is never attributed to another part, except perhaps indirectly; for we do + not say that the hand sees because the eye sees. Therefore if the intellect and Socrates are united in the above manner, the + action of the intellect cannot be attributed to Socrates. If, however, Socrates be a whole composed of a union of the intellect + with whatever else belongs to Socrates, and still the intellect be united to those other things only as a motor, it follows + that Socrates is not one absolutely, and consequently neither a being absolutely, for a thing is a being according as it is + one. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q76_A1-p13"> There remains, therefore, no other explanation than that given by Aristotle---namely, that this particular man understands, + because the intellectual principle is his form. Thus from the very operation of the intellect it is made clear that the intellectual + principle is united to the body as its form. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q76_A1-p14"> The same can be clearly shown from the nature of the human species. For the nature of each thing is shown by its operation. + Now the proper operation of man as man is to understand; because he thereby surpasses all other animals. Whence Aristotle + concludes (Ethic. x, 7) that the ultimate happiness of man must consist in this operation as properly belonging to him. Man + must therefore derive his species from that which is the principle of this operation. But the species of anything + is derived from its form. It follows therefore that the intellectual principle is the proper form of man. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q76_A1-p15"> But we must observe that the nobler a form is, the more it rises above corporeal matter, the less it is merged in matter, + and the more it excels matter by its power and its operation; hence we find that the form of a mixed body has another operation + not caused by its elemental qualities. And the higher we advance in the nobility of forms, the more we find that the power + of the form excels the elementary matter; as the vegetative soul excels the form of the metal, and the + sensitive soul excels the vegetative soul. Now the human soul is the highest and noblest of forms. Wherefore it excels corporeal + matter in its power by the fact that it has an operation and a power in which corporeal matter has no share whatever. This + power is called the intellect. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q76_A1-p16"> It is well to remark that if anyone holds that the soul is composed of matter and form, it would follow that in no way could + the soul be the form of the body. For since the form is an act, and matter is only in potentiality, that which is composed + of matter and form cannot be the form of another by virtue of itself as a whole. But if it is a form by virtue of some part + of itself, then that part which is the form we call the soul, and that of which it is the form we call the + "primary animate," as was said above ( + <a id="FP_Q76_A1-p16.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q75_A5.html">Q[75], A[5]</a>). + </p> + <p id="FP_Q76_A1-p17"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As the Philosopher says (Phys. ii, 2), the ultimate natural form to which the consideration of the natural philosopher is + directed is indeed separate; yet it exists in matter. He proves this from the fact that "man and the sun generate man from + matter." It is separate indeed according to its intellectual power, because the intellectual power does not belong to a corporeal + organ, as the power of seeing is the act of the eye; for understanding is an act + which cannot be performed by a corporeal organ, like the act of seeing. But it exists in matter so far as the soul itself, + to which this power belongs, is the form of the body, and the term of human generation. And so the Philosopher says (De Anima + iii) that the intellect is separate, because it is not the faculty of a corporeal organ. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q76_A1-p18"> From this it is clear how to answer the Second and Third objections: since, in order that man may be able to understand all + things by means of his intellect, and that his intellect may understand immaterial things and universals, it is sufficient + that the intellectual power be not the act of the body. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q76_A1-p19"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> The human soul, by reason of its perfection, is not a form merged in matter, or entirely embraced by matter. Therefore there + is nothing to prevent some power thereof not being the act of the body, although the soul is essentially the form of the body. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q76_A1-p20"> + <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> The soul communicates that existence in which it subsists to the corporeal matter, out of which and the intellectual soul + there results unity of existence; so that the existence of the whole composite is also the existence of the soul. This is + not the case with other non-subsistent forms. For this reason the human soul retains its own existence after the dissolution + of the body; whereas it is not so with other forms. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q76_A1-p21"> + <b>Reply to Objection 6:</b> To be united to the body belongs to the soul by reason of itself, as it belongs to a light body by reason of itself to be + raised up. And as a light body remains light, when removed from its proper place, retaining meanwhile an aptitude and an inclination + for its proper place; so the human soul retains its proper existence when separated from the body, having an aptitude and + a natural inclination to be united to the body. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q76_A1-p22"></p> + <p id="FP_Q76_A1-p23"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q76.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q76_A2.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q76_A2" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q76_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q76_A3.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q76_A2-p0.1">Whether the intellectual principle is multiplied according to the number of bodies?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q76_A2-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q76_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the intellectual principle is not multiplied according to the number of bodies, but that there is one + intellect in all men. For an immaterial substance is not multiplied in number within one species. But the human soul is an + immaterial substance; since it is not composed of matter and form as was shown above ( + <a id="FP_Q76_A2-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q75_A5.html">Q[75], A[5]</a>). Therefore there are not many human souls in one species. But all men are of one species. + Therefore there is but one intellect in all men. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q76_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, when the cause is removed, the effect is also removed. Therefore, if human souls were multiplied according to the + number of bodies, it follows that the bodies being removed, the number of souls would not remain; but from all the souls there + would be but a single remainder. This is heretical; for it would do away with the distinction of rewards and punishments. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q76_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if my intellect is distinct from your intellect, my intellect is an individual, and so is yours; for individuals + are things which differ in number but agree in one species. Now whatever is received into anything must be received according + to the condition of the receiver. Therefore the species of things would be received individually into my intellect, and also + into yours: which is contrary to the nature of the intellect which knows universals. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q76_A2-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, the thing understood is in the intellect which understands. If, therefore, my intellect is distinct from yours, + what is understood by me must be distinct from what is understood by you; and consequently it will be reckoned as something + individual, and be only potentially something understood; so that the common intention will have to be abstracted from both; + since from things diverse something intelligible common to them may be abstracted. But this is + contrary to the nature of the intellect; for then the intellect would seem not to be distinct from the imagination. It seems, + therefore, to follow that there is one intellect in all men. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q76_A2-p6"> + <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, when the disciple receives knowledge from the master, it cannot be said that the master's knowledge begets knowledge + in the disciple, because then also knowledge would be an active form, such as heat is, which is clearly false. It seems, therefore, + that the same individual knowledge which is in the master is communicated to the disciple; which cannot be, unless there is + one intellect in both. Seemingly, therefore, the intellect of the disciple and + master is but one; and, consequently, the same applies to all men. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q76_A2-p7"> + <b>Objection 6:</b> Further, Augustine (De Quant. Animae xxxii) says: "If I were to say that there are many human souls, I should laugh at myself." + But the soul seems to be one chiefly on account of the intellect. Therefore there is one intellect of all men. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q76_A2-p8"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Phys. ii, 3) that the relation of universal causes to universals is like the relation of particular + causes to individuals. But it is impossible that a soul, one in species, should belong to animals of different species. Therefore + it is impossible that one individual intellectual soul should belong to several individuals. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q76_A2-p9"> + <b>I answer that,</b> It is absolutely impossible for one intellect to belong to all men. This is clear if, as Plato maintained, man is the intellect + itself. For it would follow that Socrates and Plato are one man; and that they are not distinct from each other, except by + something outside the essence of each. The distinction between Socrates and Plato would be no other than that of one man with + a tunic and another with a cloak; which is quite absurd. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q76_A2-p10"> It is likewise clear that this is impossible if, according to the opinion of Aristotle (De Anima ii, 2), it is supposed that + the intellect is a part or a power of the soul which is the form of man. For it is impossible for many distinct individuals + to have one form, as it is impossible for them to have one existence, for the form is the principle of existence. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q76_A2-p11"> Again, this is clearly impossible, whatever one may hold as to the manner of the union of the intellect to this or that man. + For it is manifest that, supposing there is one principal agent, and two instruments, we can say that there is one agent absolutely, + but several actions; as when one man touches several things with his two hands, there will be one who touches, but two contacts. + If, on the contrary, we suppose one instrument and several principal agents, we might say that + there are several agents, but one act; for example, if there be many drawing a ship by means of a rope; there will be many + drawing, but one pull. If, however, there is one principal agent, and one instrument, we say that there is one agent and one + action, as when the smith strikes with one hammer, there is one striker and one stroke. Now it is clear that no matter how + the intellect is united or coupled to this or that man, the intellect has the precedence of all the other things which appertain + to man; for the sensitive powers obey the intellect, and are at its service. Therefore, if we suppose two men to have several + intellects and one sense---for instance, if two men had one eye---there would be several seers, but one sight. But if there + is one intellect, no matter how diverse may be all those things of which the intellect makes use as instruments, in no way + is it possible to say that Socrates and Plato are otherwise than one understanding man. And if to this we add that to + understand, which is the act of the intellect, is not affected by any organ other than the intellect itself; it will further + follow that there is but one agent and one action: that is to say that all men are but one "understander," and have but one + act of understanding, in regard, that is, of one intelligible object. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q76_A2-p12"> However, it would be possible to distinguish my intellectual action form yours by the distinction of the phantasms---that + is to say, were there one phantasm of a stone in me, and another in you---if the phantasm itself, as it is one thing in me + and another in you, were a form of the possible intellect; since the same agent according to divers forms produces divers + actions; as, according to divers forms of things with regard to the same eye, there are divers visions. But the + phantasm itself is not a form of the possible intellect; it is the intelligible species abstracted from the phantasm that + is a form. Now in one intellect, from different phantasms of the same species, only one intelligible species is abstracted; + as appears in one man, in whom there may be different phantasms of a stone; yet from all of them only one intelligible species + of a stone is abstracted; by which the intellect of that one man, by one operation, understands the nature of a stone, + notwithstanding the diversity of phantasms. Therefore, if there were one intellect for all men, the diversity of phantasms + which are in this one and that one would not cause a diversity of intellectual operation in this man and that man. It follows, + therefore, that it is altogether impossible and unreasonable to maintain that there exists one intellect for all men. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q76_A2-p13"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Although the intellectual soul, like an angel, has no matter from which it is produced, yet it is the form of a certain matter; + in which it is unlike an angel. Therefore, according to the division of matter, there are many souls of one species; while + it is quite impossible for many angels to be of one species. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q76_A2-p14"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Everything has unity in the same way that it has being; consequently we must judge of the multiplicity of a thing as we judge + of its being. Now it is clear that the intellectual soul, by virtue of its very being, is united to the body as its form; + yet, after the dissolution of the body, the intellectual soul retains its own being. In like manner the multiplicity of souls + is in proportion to the multiplicity of the bodies; yet, after the dissolution of + the bodies, the souls retain their multiplied being. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q76_A2-p15"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Individuality of the intelligent being, or of the species whereby it understands, does not exclude the understanding of universals; + otherwise, since separate intellects are subsistent substances, and consequently individual, they could not understand universals. + But the materiality of the knower, and of the species whereby it knows, impedes the knowledge of the universal. For as every + action is according to the mode of the form by which the agent + acts, as heating is according to the mode of the heat; so knowledge is according to the mode of the species by which the knower + knows. Now it is clear that common nature becomes distinct and multiplied by reason of the individuating principles which + come from the matter. Therefore if the form, which is the means of knowledge, is material---that is, not abstracted from material + conditions---its likeness to the nature of a species or genus will be according to the distinction and multiplication + of that nature by means of individuating principles; so that knowledge of the nature of a thing in general will be impossible. + But if the species be abstracted from the conditions of individual matter, there will be a likeness of the nature without + those things which make it distinct and multiplied; thus there will be knowledge of the universal. Nor does it matter, as + to this particular point, whether there be one intellect or many; because, even if there were but one, it would necessarily + be + an individual intellect, and the species whereby it understands, an individual species. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q76_A2-p16"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Whether the intellect be one or many, what is understood is one; for what is understood is in the intellect, not according + to its own nature, but according to its likeness; for "the stone is not in the soul, but its likeness is," as is said, De + Anima iii, 8. Yet it is the stone which is understood, not the likeness of the stone; except by a reflection of the intellect + on itself: otherwise, the objects of sciences would not be things, but only + intelligible species. Now it happens that different things, according to different forms, are likened to the same thing. And + since knowledge is begotten according to the assimilation of the knower to the thing known, it follows that the same thing + may happen to be known by several knowers; as is apparent in regard to the senses; for several see the same color, according + to different likenesses. In the same way several intellects understand one object understood. But there is this difference, + according to the opinion of Aristotle, between the sense and the intelligence---that a thing is perceived by the sense according + to the disposition which it has outside the soul ---that is, in its individuality; whereas the nature of the thing understood + is indeed outside the soul, but the mode according to which it exists outside the soul is not the mode according to which + it is understood. For the common nature is understood as apart from the individuating principles; whereas such is not its + mode of existence outside the soul. But, according to the opinion of Plato, the thing understood exists outside the soul in + the same condition as those under which it is understood; for he supposed that the natures of things exist separate from matter. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q76_A2-p17"> + <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> One knowledge exists in the disciple and another in the master. How it is caused will be shown later on ( + <a id="FP_Q76_A2-p17.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q117_A1.html">Q[117], A[1]</a>). + </p> + <p id="FP_Q76_A2-p18"> + <b>Reply to Objection 6:</b> Augustine denies a plurality of souls, that would involve a plurality of species. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q76_A2-p19"></p> + <p id="FP_Q76_A2-p20"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q76_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q76_A3.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q76_A3" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q76_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q76_A4.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q76_A3-p0.1">Whether besides the intellectual soul there are in man other souls essentially different from one another?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q76_A3-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q76_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that besides the intellectual soul there are in man other souls essentially different from one another, such + as the sensitive soul and the nutritive soul. For corruptible and incorruptible are not of the same substance. But the intellectual + soul is incorruptible; whereas the other souls, as the sensitive and the nutritive, are corruptible, as was shown above ( + <a id="FP_Q76_A3-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q75_A6.html">Q[75], A[6]</a>). Therefore in man the essence of the intellectual + soul, the sensitive soul, and the nutritive soul, cannot be the same. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q76_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, if it be said that the sensitive soul in man is incorruptible; on the contrary, "corruptible and incorruptible differ + generically," says the Philosopher, Metaph. x (Did. ix, 10). But the sensitive soul in the horse, the lion, and other brute + animals, is corruptible. If, therefore, in man it be incorruptible, the sensitive soul in man and brute animals will not be + of the same "genus." Now an animal is so called from its having a sensitive soul; and, + therefore, "animal" will not be one genus common to man and other animals, which is absurd. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q76_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the Philosopher says, Metaph. viii (Did. vii, 2), that the genus is taken from the matter, and difference from the + form. But "rational," which is the difference constituting man, is taken from the intellectual soul; while he is called "animal" + by reason of his having a body animated by a sensitive soul. Therefore the intellectual soul may be compared to the body animated + by a sensitive soul, as form to matter. Therefore in man the intellectual soul is + not essentially the same as the sensitive soul, but presupposes it as a material subject. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q76_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is said in the book De Ecclesiasticis Dogmatibus xv: "Nor do we say that there are two souls in one man, as James and + other Syrians write; one, animal, by which the body is animated, and which is mingled with the blood; the other, spiritual, + which obeys the reason; but we say that it is one and the same soul in man, that both gives life to the body by being united + to it, and orders itself by its own reasoning." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q76_A3-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Plato held that there were several souls in one body, distinct even as to organs, to which souls he referred the different + vital actions, saying that the nutritive power is in the liver, the concupiscible in the heart, and the power of knowledge + in the brain. Which opinion is rejected by Aristotle (De Anima ii, 2), with regard to those parts of the soul which use corporeal + organs; for this reason, that in those animals which continue to live when they have + been divided in each part are observed the operations of the soul, as sense and appetite. Now this would not be the case if + the various principles of the soul's operations were essentially different, and distributed in the various parts of the body. + But with regard to the intellectual part, he seems to leave it in doubt whether it be "only logically" distinct from the other + parts of the soul, "or also locally." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q76_A3-p7"> The opinion of Plato might be maintained if, as he held, the soul was supposed to be united to the body, not as its form, + but as its motor. For it involves nothing unreasonable that the same movable thing be moved by several motors; and still less + if it be moved according to its various parts. If we suppose, however, that the soul is united to the body as its form, it + is quite impossible for several essentially different souls to be in one body. This can be made clear by three + different reasons. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q76_A3-p8"> In the first place, an animal would not be absolutely one, in which there were several souls. For nothing is absolutely one + except by one form, by which a thing has existence: because a thing has from the same source both existence and unity; and + therefore things which are denominated by various forms are not absolutely one; as, for instance, "a white man." If, therefore, + man were 'living' by one form, the vegetative soul, and 'animal' by another form, the sensitive soul, and + "man" by another form, the intellectual soul, it would follow that man is not absolutely one. Thus Aristotle argues, Metaph. + viii (Did. vii, 6), against Plato, that if the idea of an animal is distinct from the idea of a biped, then a biped animal + is not absolutely one. For this reason, against those who hold that there are several souls in the body, he asks (De Anima + i, 5), "what contains them?"---that is, what makes them one? It cannot be said that they are united by the one body; because + rather does the soul contain the body and make it one, than the reverse. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q76_A3-p9"> Secondly, this is proved to be impossible by the manner in which one thing is predicated of another. Those things which are + derived from various forms are predicated of one another, either accidentally, (if the forms are not ordered to one another, + as when we say that something white is sweet), or essentially, in the second manner of essential predication, (if the forms + are ordered one to another, the subject belonging to the definition of the predicate; as a surface is + presupposed to color; so that if we say that a body with a surface is colored, we have the second manner of essential predication.) + Therefore, if we have one form by which a thing is an animal, and another form by which it is a man, it follows either that + one of these two things could not be predicated of the other, except accidentally, supposing these two forms not to be ordered + to one another---or that one would be predicated of the other according to the second manner of essential + predication, if one soul be presupposed to the other. But both of these consequences are clearly false: because "animal" is + predicated of man essentially and not accidentally; and man is not part of the definition of an animal, but the other way + about. Therefore of necessity by the same form a thing is animal and man; otherwise man would not really be the thing which + is an animal, so that animal can be essentially predicated of man. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q76_A3-p10"> Thirdly, this is shown to be impossible by the fact that when one operation of the soul is intense it impedes another, which + could never be the case unless the principle of action were essentially one. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q76_A3-p11"> We must therefore conclude that in man the sensitive soul, the intellectual soul, and the nutritive soul are numerically + one soul. This can easily be explained, if we consider the differences of species and forms. For we observe that the species + and forms of things differ from one another, as the perfect and imperfect; as in the order of things, the animate are more + perfect than the inanimate, and animals more perfect than plants, and man than brute animals; and in each of these + genera there are various degrees. For this reason Aristotle, Metaph. viii (Did. vii, 3), compares the species of things to + numbers, which differ in species by the addition or subtraction of unity. And (De Anima ii, 3) he compares the various souls + to the species of figures, one of which contains another; as a pentagon contains and exceeds a tetragon. Thus the intellectual + soul contains virtually whatever belongs to the sensitive soul of brute animals, and to the nutritive souls of plants. + Therefore, as a surface which is of a pentagonal shape, is not tetragonal by one shape, and pentagonal by another---since + a tetragonal shape would be superfluous as contained in the pentagonal---so neither is Socrates a man by one soul, and animal + by another; but by one and the same soul he is both animal and man. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q76_A3-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The sensitive soul is incorruptible, not by reason of its being sensitive, but by reason of its being intellectual. When, + therefore, a soul is sensitive only, it is corruptible; but when with sensibility it has also intellectuality, it is incorruptible. + For although sensibility does not give incorruptibility, yet it cannot deprive intellectuality of its incorruptibility. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q76_A3-p13"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Not forms, but composites, are classified either generically or specifically. Now man is corruptible like other animals. + And so the difference of corruptible and incorruptible which is on the part of the forms does not involve a generic difference + between man and the other animals. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q76_A3-p14"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The embryo has first of all a soul which is merely sensitive, and when this is removed, it is supplanted by a more perfect + soul, which is both sensitive and intellectual: as will be shown further on ( + <a id="FP_Q76_A3-p14.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q118_A2.html">Q[118], A[2]</a>, ad 2). + </p> + <p id="FP_Q76_A3-p15"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> We must not consider the diversity of natural things as proceeding from the various logical notions or intentions, which + flow from our manner of understanding, because reason can apprehend one and the same thing in various ways. Therefore since, + as we have said, the intellectual soul contains virtually what belongs to the sensitive soul, and something more, reason can + consider separately what belongs to the power of the sensitive soul, as something + imperfect and material. And because it observes that this is something common to man and to other animals, it forms thence + the notion of the "genus"; while that wherein the intellectual soul exceeds the sensitive soul, it takes as formal and perfecting; + thence it gathers the "difference" of man. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q76_A3-p16"></p> + <p id="FP_Q76_A3-p17"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q76_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q76_A4.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q76_A4" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q76_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q76_A5.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q76_A4-p0.1">Whether in man there is another form besides the intellectual soul?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q76_A4-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q76_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that in man there is another form besides the intellectual soul. For the Philosopher says (De Anima ii, 1), + that "the soul is the act of a physical body which has life potentially." Therefore the soul is to the body as a form of matter. + But the body has a substantial form by which it is a body. Therefore some other substantial form in the body precedes the + soul. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q76_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, man moves himself as every animal does. Now everything that moves itself is divided into two parts, of which one + moves, and the other is moved, as the Philosopher proves (Phys. viii, 5). But the part which moves is the soul. Therefore + the other part must be such that it can be moved. But primary matter cannot be moved (Phys. v, 1), since it is a being only + potentially; indeed everything that is moved is a body. Therefore in man and in every animal + there must be another substantial form, by which the body is constituted. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q76_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the order of forms depends on their relation to primary matter; for "before" and "after" apply by comparison to + some beginning. Therefore if there were not in man some other substantial form besides the rational soul, and if this were + to inhere immediately to primary matter; it would follow that it ranks among the most imperfect forms which inhere to matter + immediately. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q76_A4-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, the human body is a mixed body. Now mingling does not result from matter alone; for then we should have mere corruption. + Therefore the forms of the elements must remain in a mixed body; and these are substantial forms. Therefore in the human body + there are other substantial forms besides the intellectual soul. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q76_A4-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Of one thing there is but one substantial being. But the substantial form gives substantial being. Therefore of one thing + there is but one substantial form. But the soul is the substantial form of man. Therefore it is impossible for there to be + in man another substantial form besides the intellectual soul. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q76_A4-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> If we suppose that the intellectual soul is not united to the body as its form, but only as its motor, as the Platonists + maintain, it would necessarily follow that in man there is another substantial form, by which the body is established in its + being as movable by the soul. If, however, the intellectual soul be united to the body as its substantial form, as we have + said above + <a id="FP_Q76_A4-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q76_A1.html">(A[1])</a>, it is impossible for another substantial form + besides the intellectual soul to be found in man. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q76_A4-p8"> In order to make this evident, we must consider that the substantial form differs from the accidental form in this, that + the accidental form does not make a thing to be "simply," but to be "such," as heat does not make a thing to be simply, but + only to be hot. Therefore by the coming of the accidental form a thing is not said to be made or generated simply, but to + be made such, or to be in some particular condition; and in like manner, when an accidental form is removed, a thing + is said to be corrupted, not simply, but relatively. Now the substantial form gives being simply; therefore by its coming + a thing is said to be generated simply; and by its removal to be corrupted simply. For this reason, the old natural philosophers, + who held that primary matter was some actual being---for instance, fire or air, or something of that sort---maintained that + nothing is generated simply, or corrupted simply; and stated that "every becoming is nothing but an alteration," as we + read, Phys. i, 4. Therefore, if besides the intellectual soul there pre-existed in matter another substantial form by which + the subject of the soul were made an actual being, it would follow that the soul does not give being simply; and consequently + that it is not the substantial form: and so at the advent of the soul there would not be simple generation; nor at its removal + simple corruption, all of which is clearly false. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q76_A4-p9"> Whence we must conclude, that there is no other substantial form in man besides the intellectual soul; and that the soul, + as it virtually contains the sensitive and nutritive souls, so does it virtually contain all inferior forms, and itself alone + does whatever the imperfect forms do in other things. The same is to be said of the sensitive soul in brute animals, and of + the nutritive soul in plants, and universally of all more perfect forms with regard to the imperfect. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q76_A4-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Aristotle does not say that the soul is the act of a body only, but "the act of a physical organic body which has life potentially"; + and that this potentiality "does not reject the soul." Whence it is clear that when the soul is called the act, the soul itself + is included; as when we say that heat is the act of what is hot, and light of what is lucid; not as though lucid and light + were two separate things, but because a thing is made lucid by the + light. In like manner, the soul is said to be the "act of a body," etc., because by the soul it is a body, and is organic, + and has life potentially. Yet the first act is said to be in potentiality to the second act, which is operation; for such + a potentiality "does not reject"---that is, does not exclude---the soul. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q76_A4-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The soul does not move the body by its essence, as the form of the body, but by the motive power, the act of which presupposes + the body to be already actualized by the soul: so that the soul by its motive power is the part which moves; and the animate + body is the part moved. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q76_A4-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> We observe in matter various degrees of perfection, as existence, living, sensing, and understanding. Now what is added is + always more perfect. Therefore that form which gives matter only the first degree of perfection is the most imperfect; while + that form which gives the first, second, and third degree, and so on, is the most perfect: and yet it inheres to matter immediately. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q76_A4-p13"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Avicenna held that the substantial forms of the elements remain entire in the mixed body; and that the mixture is made by + the contrary qualities of the elements being reduced to an average. But this is impossible, because the various forms of the + elements must necessarily be in various parts of matter; for the distinction of which we must suppose dimensions, without + which matter cannot be divisible. Now matter subject to dimension is not to be found + except in a body. But various bodies cannot be in the same place. Whence it follows that elements in the mixed body would + be distinct as to situation. And then there would not be a real mixture which is in respect of the whole; but only a mixture + apparent to sense, by the juxtaposition of particles. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q76_A4-p14"> Averroes maintained that the forms of elements, by reason of their imperfection, are a medium between accidental and substantial + forms, and so can be "more" or "less"; and therefore in the mixture they are modified and reduced to an average, so that one + form emerges from them. But this is even still more impossible. For the substantial being of each thing consists in something + indivisible, and every addition and subtraction varies the species, as in numbers, as stated in Metaph. + viii (Did. vii, 3); and consequently it is impossible for any substantial form to receive "more" or "less." Nor is it less + impossible for anything to be a medium between substance and accident. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q76_A4-p15"> Therefore we must say, in accordance with the Philosopher (De Gener. i, 10), that the forms of the elements remain in the + mixed body, not actually but virtually. For the proper qualities of the elements remain, though modified; and in them is the + power of the elementary forms. This quality of the mixture is the proper disposition for the substantial form of the mixed + body; for instance, the form of a stone, or of any sort of soul. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q76_A4-p16"></p> + <p id="FP_Q76_A4-p17"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q76_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q76_A5.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q76_A5" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q76_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q76_A6.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q76_A5-p0.1">Whether the intellectual soul is properly united to such a body?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q76_A5-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q76_A5-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the intellectual soul is improperly united to such a body. For matter must be proportionate to the form. + But the intellectual soul is incorruptible. Therefore it is not properly united to a corruptible body. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q76_A5-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the intellectual soul is a perfectly immaterial form; a proof whereof is its operation in which corporeal matter + does not share. But the more subtle is the body, the less has it of matter. Therefore the soul should be united to a most + subtle body, to fire, for instance, and not to a mixed body, still less to a terrestrial body. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q76_A5-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, since the form is the principle of the species, one form cannot produce a variety of species. But the intellectual + soul is one form. Therefore, it should not be united to a body which is composed of parts belonging to various species. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q76_A5-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, what is susceptible of a more perfect form should itself be more perfect. But the intellectual soul is the most + perfect of souls. Therefore since the bodies of other animals are naturally provided with a covering, for instance, with hair + instead of clothes, and hoofs instead of shoes; and are, moreover, naturally provided with arms, as claws, teeth, and horns; + it seems that the intellectual soul should not have been united to a body which is imperfect + as being deprived of the above means of protection. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q76_A5-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (De Anima ii, 1), that "the soul is the act of a physical organic body having life potentially." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q76_A5-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Since the form is not for the matter, but rather the matter for the form, we must gather from the form the reason why the + matter is such as it is; and not conversely. Now the intellectual soul, as we have seen above ( + <a id="FP_Q76_A5-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q55_A2.html">Q[55], A[2]</a>) in the order of nature, holds the lowest place among intellectual substances; inasmuch as it is not naturally gifted with + the knowledge of truth, as the angels are; but has to gather knowledge from + individual things by way of the senses, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. vii). But nature never fails in necessary things: therefore + the intellectual soul had to be endowed not only with the power of understanding, but also with the power of feeling. Now + the action of the senses is not performed without a corporeal instrument. Therefore it behooved the intellectual soul to be + united to a body fitted to be a convenient organ of sense. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q76_A5-p8"> Now all the other senses are based on the sense of touch. But the organ of touch requires to be a medium between contraries, + such as hot and cold, wet and dry, and the like, of which the sense of touch has the perception; thus it is in potentiality + with regard to contraries, and is able to perceive them. Therefore the more the organ of touch is reduced to an equable complexion, + the more sensitive will be the touch. But the intellectual soul has the power of sense in all its + completeness; because what belongs to the inferior nature pre-exists more perfectly in the superior, as Dionysius says (Div. + Nom. v). Therefore the body to which the intellectual soul is united should be a mixed body, above others reduced to the most + equable complexion. For this reason among animals, man has the best sense of touch. And among men, those who have the best + sense of touch have the best intelligence. A sign of which is that we observe "those who are refined in body are well endowed + in mind," as stated in De Anima ii, 9. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q76_A5-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Perhaps someone might attempt to answer this by saying that before sin the human body was incorruptible. This answer does + not seem sufficient; because before sin the human body was immortal not by nature, but by a gift of Divine grace; otherwise + its immortality would not be forfeited through sin, as neither was the immortality of the devil. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q76_A5-p10"> Therefore we answer otherwise by observing that in matter two conditions are to be found; one which is chosen in order that + the matter be suitable to the form; the other which follows by force of the first disposition. The artisan, for instance, + for the form of the saw chooses iron adapted for cutting through hard material; but that the teeth of the saw may become blunt + and rusted, follows by force of the matter itself. So the intellectual soul requires a body of equable + complexion, which, however, is corruptible by force of its matter. If, however, it be said that God could avoid this, we answer + that in the formation of natural things we do not consider what God might do; but what is suitable to the nature of things, + as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. ii, 1). God, however, provided in this case by applying a remedy against death in the gift + of grace. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q76_A5-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> A body is not necessary to the intellectual soul by reason of its intellectual operation considered as such; but on account + of the sensitive power, which requires an organ of equable temperament. Therefore the intellectual soul had to be united to + such a body, and not to a simple element, or to a mixed body, in which fire was in excess; because otherwise there could not + be an equability of temperament. And this body of an equable temperament has a + dignity of its own by reason of its being remote from contraries, thereby resembling in a way a heavenly body. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q76_A5-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The parts of an animal, for instance, the eye, hand, flesh, and bones, and so forth, do not make the species; but the whole + does, and therefore, properly speaking, we cannot say that these are of different species, but that they are of various dispositions. + This is suitable to the intellectual soul, which, although it be one in its essence, yet on account of its perfection, is + manifold in power: and therefore, for its various operations it requires + various dispositions in the parts of the body to which it is united. For this reason we observe that there is a greater variety + of parts in perfect than in imperfect animals; and in these a greater variety than in plants. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q76_A5-p13"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> The intellectual soul as comprehending universals, has a power extending to the infinite; therefore it cannot be limited + by nature to certain fixed natural notions, or even to certain fixed means whether of defence or of clothing, as is the case + with other animals, the souls of which are endowed with knowledge and power in regard to fixed particular things. Instead + of all these, man has by nature his reason and his hands, which are "the organs of + organs" (De Anima iii), since by their means man can make for himself instruments of an infinite variety, and for any number + of purposes. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q76_A5-p14"></p> + <p id="FP_Q76_A5-p15"></p> + <p id="FP_Q76_A5-p16"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q76_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q76_A6.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q76_A6" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q76_A5.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q76_A7.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q76_A6-p0.1">Whether the intellectual soul is united to the body through the medium of accidental dispositions?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q76_A6-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q76_A6-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the intellectual soul is united to the body through the medium of accidental dispositions. For every form + exists in its proper disposed matter. But dispositions to a form are accidents. Therefore we must presuppose accidents to + be in matter before the substantial form; and therefore before the soul, since the soul is a substantial form. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q76_A6-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, various forms of one species require various parts of matter. But various parts of matter are unintelligible without + division in measurable quantities. Therefore we must suppose dimensions in matter before the substantial forms, which are + many belonging to one species. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q76_A6-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, what is spiritual is connected with what is corporeal by virtual contact. But the virtue of the soul is its power. + Therefore it seems that the soul is united to the body by means of a power, which is an accident. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q76_A6-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Accident is posterior to substance, both in the order of time and in the order of reason, as the Philosopher says, Metaph. + vii (Did. vi, 1). Therefore it is unintelligible that any accidental form exist in matter before the soul, which is the substantial + form. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q76_A6-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> If the soul were united to the body, merely as a motor, there would be nothing to prevent the existence of certain dispositions + mediating between the soul and the body; on the contrary, they would be necessary, for on the part of the soul would be required + the power to move the body; and on the part of the body, a certain aptitude to be moved by the soul. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q76_A6-p7"> If, however, the intellectual soul is united to the body as the substantial form, as we have already said above + <a id="FP_Q76_A6-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q76_A1.html">(A[1])</a>, it is impossible for any accidental disposition to come between the body and the soul, or between any substantial form whatever + and its matter. The reason is because since matter is in potentiality to all manner of acts in a certain order, what is absolutely + first among the acts must be understood as being first in matter. Now the first + among all acts is existence. Therefore, it is impossible for matter to be apprehended as hot, or as having quantity, before + it is actual. But matter has actual existence by the substantial form, which makes it to exist absolutely, as we have said + above + <a id="FP_Q76_A6-p7.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q76_A4.html">(A[4])</a>. Wherefore it is impossible for any accidental dispositions to pre-exist in matter before the substantial form, and consequently + before the soul. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q76_A6-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As appears from what has been already said + <a id="FP_Q76_A6-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q76_A4.html">(A[4])</a>, the more perfect form virtually contains whatever belongs to the inferior forms; therefore while remaining one and the same, + it perfects matter according to the various degrees of perfection. For the same essential form makes man an actual being, + a body, a living being, an animal, and a man. Now it is clear that to every "genus" follow its own proper accidents. Therefore + as + matter is apprehended as perfected in its existence, before it is understood as corporeal, and so on; so those accidents which + belong to existence are understood to exist before corporeity; and thus dispositions are understood in matter before the form, + not as regards all its effects, but as regards the subsequent effect. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q76_A6-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Dimensions of quantity are accidents consequent to the corporeity which belongs to the whole matter. Wherefore matter, once + understood as corporeal and measurable, can be understood as distinct in its various parts, and as receptive of different + forms according to the further degrees of perfection. For although it is essentially the same form which gives matter the + various degrees of perfection, as we have said (ad 1), yet it is considered as + different when brought under the observation of reason. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q76_A6-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> A spiritual substance which is united to a body as its motor only, is united thereto by power or virtue. But the intellectual + soul is united by its very being to the body as a form; and yet it guides and moves the body by its power and virtue. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q76_A6-p11"></p> + <p id="FP_Q76_A6-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q76_A5.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q76_A7.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q76_A7" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q76_A6.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q76_A8.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q76_A7-p0.1">Whether the soul is united to the animal body by means of a body?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q76_A7-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q76_A7-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the soul is united to the animal body by means of a body. For Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. vii, 19), that "the + soul administers the body by light," that is, by fire, "and by air, which is most akin to a spirit." But fire and air are + bodies. Therefore the soul is united to the human body by means of a body. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q76_A7-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, a link between two things seems to be that thing the removal of which involves the cessation of their union. But + when breathing ceases, the soul is separated from the body. Therefore the breath, which is a subtle body, is the means of + union between soul and body. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q76_A7-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, things which are very distant from one another, are not united except by something between them. But the intellectual + soul is very distant from the body, both because it is incorporeal, and because it is incorruptible. Therefore it seems to + be united to the body by means of an incorruptible body, and such would be some heavenly light, which would harmonize the + elements, and unite them together. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q76_A7-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (De Anima ii, 1): "We need not ask if the soul and body are one, as neither do we ask if wax and its + shape are one." But the shape is united to the wax without a body intervening. Therefore also the soul is thus united to the + body. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q76_A7-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> If the soul, according to the Platonists, were united to the body merely as a motor, it would be right to say that some other + bodies must intervene between the soul and body of man, or any animal whatever; for a motor naturally moves what is distant + from it by means of something nearer. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q76_A7-p7"> If, however, the soul is united to the body as its form, as we have said + <a id="FP_Q76_A7-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q76_A1.html">(A[1])</a>, it is impossible for it to be united by means of another body. The reason of this is that a thing is one, according as it + is a being. Now the form, through itself, makes a thing to be actual since it is itself essentially an act; nor does it give + existence by means of something else. Wherefore the unity of a thing composed of matter and form, is by virtue of the form + itself, + which by reason of its very nature is united to matter as its act. Nor is there any other cause of union except the agent, + which causes matter to be in act, as the Philosopher says, Metaph. viii (Did. vii, 6). + </p> + <p id="FP_Q76_A7-p8"> From this it is clear how false are the opinions of those who maintained the existence of some mediate bodies between the + soul and body of man. Of these certain Platonists said that the intellectual soul has an incorruptible body naturally united + to it, from which it is never separated, and by means of which it is united to the corruptible body of man. Others said that + the soul is united to the body by means of a corporeal spirit. Others said it is united to the body by means of + light, which, they say, is a body and of the nature of the fifth essence; so that the vegetative soul would be united to the + body by means of the light of the sidereal heaven; the sensible soul, by means of the light of the crystal heaven; and the + intellectual soul by means of the light of the empyrean heaven. Now all this is fictious and ridiculous: for light is not + a body; and the fifth essence does not enter materially into the composition of a mixed body (since it is unchangeable), but + only + virtually: and lastly, because the soul is immediately united to the body as the form to matter. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q76_A7-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Augustine speaks there of the soul as it moves the body; whence he uses the word "administration." It is true that it moves + the grosser parts of the body by the more subtle parts. And the first instrument of the motive power is a kind of spirit, + as the Philosopher says in De causa motus animalium (De mot. animal. x). + </p> + <p id="FP_Q76_A7-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The union of soul and body ceases at the cessation of breath, not because this is the means of union, but because of the + removal of that disposition by which the body is disposed for such a union. Nevertheless the breath is a means of moving, + as the first instrument of motion. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q76_A7-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The soul is indeed very distant from the body, if we consider the condition of each separately: so that if each had a separate + existence, many means of connection would have to intervene. But inasmuch as the soul is the form of the body, it has not + an existence apart from the existence of the body, but by its own existence is united to the body immediately. This is the + case with every form which, if considered as an act, is very distant from matter, + which is a being only in potentiality. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q76_A7-p12"></p> + <p id="FP_Q76_A7-p13"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q76_A6.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q76_A8.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q76_A8" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q76_A7.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q77.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q76_A8-p0.1">Whether the soul is in each part of the body?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q76_A8-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q76_A8-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the whole soul is not in each part of the body; for the Philosopher says in De causa motus animalium (De + mot. animal. x): "It is not necessary for the soul to be in each part of the body; it suffices that it be in some principle + of the body causing the other parts to live, for each part has a natural movement of its own." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q76_A8-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the soul is in the body of which it is the act. But it is the act of an organic body. Therefore it exists only in + an organic body. But each part of the human body is not an organic body. Therefore the whole soul is not in each part. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q76_A8-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the Philosopher says (De Anima. ii, 1) that the relation of a part of the soul to a part of the body, such as the + sight to the pupil of the eye, is the same as the relation of the soul to the whole body of an animal. If, therefore, the + whole soul is in each part of the body, it follows that each part of the body is an animal. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q76_A8-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, all the powers of the soul are rooted in the essence of the soul. If, therefore, the whole soul be in each part + of the body, it follows that all the powers of the soul are in each part of the body; thus the sight will be in the ear, and + hearing in the eye, and this is absurd. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q76_A8-p6"> + <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, if the whole soul is in each part of the body, each part of the body is immediately dependent on the soul. Thus + one part would not depend on another; nor would one part be nobler than another; which is clearly untrue. Therefore the soul + is not in each part of the body. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q76_A8-p7"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Trin. vi, 6), that "in each body the whole soul is in the whole body, and in each part is entire." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q76_A8-p8"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As we have said, if the soul were united to the body merely as its motor, we might say that it is not in each part of the + body, but only in one part through which it would move the others. But since the soul is united to the body as its form, it + must necessarily be in the whole body, and in each part thereof. For it is not an accidental form, but the substantial form + of the body. Now the substantial form perfects not only the whole, but each part of the + whole. For since a whole consists of parts, a form of the whole which does not give existence to each of the parts of the + body, is a form consisting in composition and order, such as the form of a house; and such a form is accidental. But the soul + is a substantial form; and therefore it must be the form and the act, not only of the whole, but also of each part. Therefore, + on the withdrawal of the soul, as we do not speak of an animal or a man unless equivocally, as we speak of a painted animal + or a stone animal; so is it with the hand, the eye, the flesh and bones, as the Philosopher says (De Anima ii, 1). A proof + of which is, that on the withdrawal of the soul, no part of the body retains its proper action; although that which retains + its species, retains the action of the species. But act is in that which it actuates: wherefore the soul must be in the whole + body, and in each part thereof. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q76_A8-p9"> That it is entire in each part thereof, may be concluded from this, that since a whole is that which is divided into parts, + there are three kinds of totality, corresponding to three kinds of division. There is a whole which is divided into parts + of quantity, as a whole line, or a whole body. There is also a whole which is divided into logical and essential parts: as + a thing defined is divided into the parts of a definition, and a composite into matter and form. There is, + further, a third kind of whole which is potential, divided into virtual parts. The first kind of totality does not apply to + forms, except perhaps accidentally; and then only to those forms, which have an indifferent relationship to a quantitative + whole and its parts; as whiteness, as far as its essence is concerned, is equally disposed to be in the whole surface and + in each part of the surface; and, therefore, the surface being divided, the whiteness is accidentally divided. But a form + which + requires variety in the parts, such as a soul, and specially the soul of perfect animals, is not equally related to the whole + and the parts: hence it is not divided accidentally when the whole is divided. So therefore quantitative totality cannot be + attributed to the soul, either essentially or accidentally. But the second kind of totality, which depends on logical and + essential perfection, properly and essentially belongs to forms: and likewise the virtual totality, because a form is the + principle of operation. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q76_A8-p10"> Therefore if it be asked whether the whole whiteness is in the whole surface and in each part thereof, it is necessary to + distinguish. If we mean quantitative totality which whiteness has accidentally, then the whole whiteness is not in each part + of the surface. The same is to be said of totality of power: since the whiteness which is in the whole surface moves the sight + more than the whiteness which is in a small part thereof. But if we mean totality of species and essence, + then the whole whiteness is in each part of a surface. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q76_A8-p11"> Since, however, the soul has not quantitative totality, neither essentially, nor accidentally, as we have seen; it is enough + to say that the whole soul is in each part of the body, by totality of perfection and of essence, but not by totality of power. + For it is not in each part of the body, with regard to each of its powers; but with regard to sight, it is in the eye; and + with regard to hearing, it is in the ear; and so forth. We must observe, however, that since the soul + requires variety of parts, its relation to the whole is not the same as its relation to the parts; for to the whole it is + compared primarily and essentially, as to its proper and proportionate perfectible; but to the parts, secondarily, inasmuch + as they are ordained to the whole. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q76_A8-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The Philosopher is speaking there of the motive power of the soul. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q76_A8-p13"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The soul is the act of an organic body, as of its primary and proportionate perfectible. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q76_A8-p14"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> An animal is that which is composed of a soul and a whole body, which is the soul's primary and proportionate perfectible. + Thus the soul is not in a part. Whence it does not follow that a part of an animal is an animal. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q76_A8-p15"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Some of the powers of the soul are in it according as it exceeds the entire capacity of the body, namely the intellect and + the will; whence these powers are not said to be in any part of the body. Other powers are common to the soul and body; wherefore + each of these powers need not be wherever the soul is, but only in that part of the body, which is adapted to the operation + of such a power. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q76_A8-p16"> + <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> One part of the body is said to be nobler than another, on account of the various powers, of which the parts of the body + are the organs. For that part which is the organ of a nobler power, is a nobler part of the body: as also is that part which + serves the same power in a nobler manner. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q76_A8-p17"></p> + <p id="FP_Q76_A8-p18"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q76_A7.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q77.html"></a> + </div> + <a href="summa.FP_Q75_A7.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q76_A1.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q77" class="div3"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q76_A8.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q77_A1.html"></a> + <h3 id="FP_Q77-p0.1">OF THOSE THINGS WHICH BELONG TO THE POWERS OF THE SOUL IN GENERAL (EIGHT ARTICLES)</h3> + <p id="FP_Q77-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q77-p2"> We proceed to consider those things which belong to the powers of the soul; first, in general, secondly, in particular. Under + the first head there are eight points of inquiry: + </p> + <p id="FP_Q77-p3"> (1) Whether the essence of the soul is its power?</p> + <p id="FP_Q77-p4"> (2) Whether there is one power of the soul, or several?</p> + <p id="FP_Q77-p5"> (3) How the powers of the soul are distinguished from one another?</p> + <p id="FP_Q77-p6"> (4) Of the orders of the powers, one to another;</p> + <p id="FP_Q77-p7"> (5) Whether the powers of the soul are in it as in their subject?</p> + <p id="FP_Q77-p8"> (6) Whether the powers flow from the essence of the soul?</p> + <p id="FP_Q77-p9"> (7) Whether one power rises from another?</p> + <p id="FP_Q77-p10"> (8) Whether all the powers of the soul remain in the soul after death?</p> + <div id="FP_Q77_A1" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q77.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q77_A2.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q77_A1-p0.1">Whether the essence of the soul is its power?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q77_A1-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q77_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the essence of the soul is its power. For Augustine says (De Trin. ix, 4), that "mind, knowledge, and + love are in the soul substantially, or, which is the same thing, essentially": and (De Trin. x, 11), that "memory, understanding, + and will are one life, one mind, one essence." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q77_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the soul is nobler than primary matter. But primary matter is its own potentiality. Much more therefore is the soul + its own power. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q77_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the substantial form is simpler than the accidental form; a sign of which is that the substantial form is not intensified + or relaxed, but is indivisible. But the accidental form is its own power. Much more therefore is that substantial form which + is the soul. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q77_A1-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, we sense by the sensitive power and we understand by the intellectual power. But "that by which we first sense and + understand" is the soul, according to the Philosopher (De Anima ii, 2). Therefore the soul is its own power. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q77_A1-p6"> + <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, whatever does not belong to the essence is an accident. Therefore if the power of the soul is something else besides + the essence thereof, it is an accident, which is contrary to Augustine, who says that the foregoing (see OBJ 1) "are not in + the soul as in a subject as color or shape, or any other quality, or quantity, are in a body; for whatever is so, does not + exceed the subject in which it is: Whereas the mind can love and know other things" (De + Trin. ix, 4). + </p> + <p id="FP_Q77_A1-p7"> + <b>Objection 6:</b> Further, " a simple form cannot be a subject." But the soul is a simple form; since it is not composed of matter and form, + as we have said above ( + <a id="FP_Q77_A1-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q75_A5.html">Q[75], A[5]</a>). Therefore the power of the soul cannot be in it as in a subject. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q77_A1-p8"> + <b>Objection 7:</b> Further, an accident is not the principle of a substantial difference. But sensitive and rational are substantial differences; + and they are taken from sense and reason, which are powers of the soul. Therefore the powers of the soul are not accidents; + and so it would seem that the power of the soul is its own essence. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q77_A1-p9"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Dionysius (Coel. Hier. xi) says that "heavenly spirits are divided into essence, power, and operation." Much more, then, + in the soul is the essence distinct from the virtue or power. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q77_A1-p10"> + <b>I answer that,</b> It is impossible to admit that the power of the soul is its essence, although some have maintained it. For the present purpose + this may be proved in two ways. First, because, since power and act divide being and every kind of being, we must refer a + power and its act to the same genus. Therefore, if the act be not in the genus of substance, the power directed to that act + cannot be in the genus of substance. Now the operation of the soul is not in the genus of + substance; for this belongs to God alone, whose operation is His own substance. Wherefore the Divine power which is the principle + of His operation is the Divine Essence itself. This cannot be true either of the soul, or of any creature; as we have said + above when speaking of the angels ( + <a id="FP_Q77_A1-p10.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q54_A3.html">Q[54], A[3]</a>). Secondly, this may be also shown to be impossible in the soul. For the soul by its very essence is an act. Therefore if + the very essence of the soul were the immediate + principle of operation, whatever has a soul would always have actual vital actions, as that which has a soul is always an + actually living thing. For as a form the soul is not an act ordained to a further act, but the ultimate term of generation. + Wherefore, for it to be in potentiality to another act, does not belong to it according to its essence, as a form, but according + to its power. So the soul itself, as the subject of its power, is called the first act, with a further relation to the + second act. Now we observe that what has a soul is not always actual with respect to its vital operations; whence also it + is said in the definition of the soul, that it is "the act of a body having life potentially"; which potentiality, however, + "does not exclude the soul." Therefore it follows that the essence of the soul is not its power. For nothing is in potentiality + by reason of an act, as act. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q77_A1-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Augustine is speaking of the mind as it knows and loves itself. Thus knowledge and love as referred to the soul as known + and loved, are substantially or essentially in the soul, for the very substance or essence of the soul is known and loved. + In the same way are we to understand what he says in the other passage, that those things are "one life, one mind, one essence." + Or, as some say, this passage is true in the sense in which the potential whole is + predicated of its parts, being midway between the universal whole, and the integral whole. For the universal whole is in each + part according to its entire essence and power; as animal in a man and in a horse; and therefore it is properly predicated + of each part. But the integral whole is not in each part, neither according to its whole essence, nor according to its whole + power. Therefore in no way can it be predicated of each part; yet in a way it is predicated, though improperly, of all the + parts together; as if we were to say that the wall, roof, and foundations are a house. But the potential whole is in each + part according to its whole essence, not, however, according to its whole power. Therefore in a way it can be predicated of + each part, but not so properly as the universal whole. In this sense, Augustine says that the memory, understanding, and the + will are the one essence of the soul. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q77_A1-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The act to which primary matter is in potentiality is the substantial form. Therefore the potentiality of matter is nothing + else but its essence. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q77_A1-p13"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Action belongs to the composite, as does existence; for to act belongs to what exists. Now the composite has substantial + existence through the substantial form; and it operates by the power which results from the substantial form. Hence an active + accidental form is to the substantial form of the agent (for instance, heat compared to the form of fire) as the power of + the soul is to the soul. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q77_A1-p14"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> That the accidental form is a principle of action is due to the substantial form. Therefore the substantial form is the first + principle of action; but not the proximate principle. In this sense the Philosopher says that "the soul is that whereby we + understand and sense." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q77_A1-p15"> + <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> If we take accident as meaning what is divided against substance, then there can be no medium between substance and accident; + because they are divided by affirmation and negation, that is, according to existence in a subject, and non-existence in a + subject. In this sense, as the power of the soul is not its essence, it must be an accident; and it belongs to the second + species of accident, that of quality. But if we take accident as one of the five + universals, in this sense there is a medium between substance and accident. For the substance is all that belongs to the essence + of a thing; whereas whatever is beyond the essence of a thing cannot be called accident in this sense; but only what is not + caused by the essential principle of the species. For the 'proper' does not belong to the essence of a thing, but is caused + by the essential principles of the species; wherefore it is a medium between the essence and accident thus understood. In + this sense the powers of the soul may be said to be a medium between substance and accident, as being natural properties of + the soul. When Augustine says that knowledge and love are not in the soul as accidents in a subject, this must be understood + in the sense given above, inasmuch as they are compared to the soul, not as loving and knowing, but as loved and known. His + argument proceeds in this sense; for if love were in the soul loved as in a subject, it would follow that an accident + transcends its subject, since even other things are loved through the soul. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q77_A1-p16"> + <b>Reply to Objection 6:</b> Although the soul is not composed of matter and form, yet it has an admixture of potentiality, as we have said above ( + <a id="FP_Q77_A1-p16.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q75_A5.html">Q[75], A[5]</a>, ad 4); and for this reason it can be the subject of an accident. The statement quoted is verified in God, Who is the Pure + Act; in treating of which subject Boethius employs that phrase (De Trin. i). + </p> + <p id="FP_Q77_A1-p17"> + <b>Reply to Objection 7:</b> Rational and sensitive, as differences, are not taken from the powers of sense and reason, but from the sensitive and rational + soul itself. But because substantial forms, which in themselves are unknown to us, are known by their accidents; nothing prevents + us from sometimes substituting accidents for substantial differences. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q77_A1-p18"></p> + <p id="FP_Q77_A1-p19"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q77.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q77_A2.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q77_A2" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q77_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q77_A3.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q77_A2-p0.1">Whether there are several powers of the soul?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q77_A2-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q77_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that there are not several powers of the soul. For the intellectual soul approaches nearest to the likeness + of God. But in God there is one simple power: and therefore also in the intellectual soul. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q77_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the higher a power is, the more unified it is. But the intellectual soul excels all other forms in power. Therefore + above all others it has one virtue or power. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q77_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, to operate belongs to what is in act. But by the one essence of the soul, man has actual existence in the different + degrees of perfection, as we have seen above ( + <a id="FP_Q77_A2-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q76_A3.html">Q[76], AA[3]</a>,4). Therefore by the one power of the soul he performs operations of various degrees. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q77_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher places several powers in the soul (De Anima ii, 2,3). + </p> + <p id="FP_Q77_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Of necessity we must place several powers in the soul. To make this evident, we observe that, as the Philosopher says (De + Coelo ii, 12), the lowest order of things cannot acquire perfect goodness, but they acquire a certain imperfect goodness, + by few movements; and those which belong to a higher order acquire perfect goodness by many movements; and those yet higher + acquire perfect goodness by few movements; and the highest perfection is found in those things + which acquire perfect goodness without any movement whatever. Thus he is least of all disposed of health, who can only acquire + imperfect health by means of a few remedies; better disposed is he who can acquire perfect health by means of many remedies; + and better still, he who can by few remedies; best of all is he who has perfect health without any remedies. We conclude, + therefore, that things which are below man acquire a certain limited goodness; and so they have a few determinate operations + and powers. But man can acquire universal and perfect goodness, because he can acquire beatitude. Yet he is in the last degree, + according to his nature, of those to whom beatitude is possible; therefore the human soul requires many and various operations + and powers. But to angels a smaller variety of powers is sufficient. In God there is no power or action beyond His own Essence. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q77_A2-p7"> There is yet another reason why the human soul abounds in a variety of powers---because it is on the confines of spiritual + and corporeal creatures; and therefore the powers of both meet together in the soul. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q77_A2-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The intellectual soul approaches to the Divine likeness, more than inferior creatures, in being able to acquire perfect goodness; + although by many and various means; and in this it falls short of more perfect creatures. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q77_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> A unified power is superior if it extends to equal things: but a multiform power is superior to it, if it is over many things. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q77_A2-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> One thing has one substantial existence, but may have several operations. So there is one essence of the soul, with several + powers. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q77_A2-p11"></p> + <p id="FP_Q77_A2-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q77_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q77_A3.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q77_A3" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q77_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q77_A4.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q77_A3-p0.1">Whether the powers are distinguished by their acts and objects? </h4> + <p id="FP_Q77_A3-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q77_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the powers of the soul are not distinguished by acts and objects. For nothing is determined to its species + by what is subsequent and extrinsic to it. But the act is subsequent to the power; and the object is extrinsic to it. Therefore + the soul's powers are not specifically distinct by acts and objects. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q77_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, contraries are what differ most from each other. Therefore if the powers are distinguished by their objects, it + follows that the same power could not have contrary objects. This is clearly false in almost all the powers; for the power + of vision extends to white and black, and the power to taste to sweet and bitter. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q77_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if the cause be removed, the effect is removed. Hence if the difference of powers came from the difference of objects, + the same object would not come under different powers. This is clearly false; for the same thing is known by the cognitive + power, and desired by the appetitive. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q77_A3-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, that which of itself is the cause of anything, is the cause thereof, wherever it is. But various objects which belong + to various powers, belong also to some one power; as sound and color belong to sight and hearing, which are different powers, + yet they come under the one power of common sense. Therefore the powers are not distinguished according to the difference + of their objects. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q77_A3-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Things that are subsequent are distinguished by what precedes. But the Philosopher says (De Anima ii, 4) that "acts and operations + precede the powers according to reason; and these again are preceded by their opposites," that is their objects. Therefore + the powers are distinguished according to their acts and objects. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q77_A3-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> A power as such is directed to an act. Wherefore we seek to know the nature of a power from the act to which it is directed, + and consequently the nature of a power is diversified, as the nature of the act is diversified. Now the nature of an act is + diversified according to the various natures of the objects. For every act is either of an active power or of a passive power. + Now, the object is to the act of a passive power, as the principle and moving cause: + for color is the principle of vision, inasmuch as it moves the sight. On the other hand, to the act of an active power the + object is a term and end; as the object of the power of growth is perfect quantity, which is the end of growth. Now, from + these two things an act receives its species, namely, from its principle, or from its end or term; for the act of heating + differs from the act of cooling, in this, that the former proceeds from something hot, which is the active principle, to heat; + the + latter from something cold, which is the active principle, to cold. Therefore the powers are of necessity distinguished by + their acts and objects. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q77_A3-p8"> Nevertheless, we must observe that things which are accidental do not change the species. For since to be colored is accidental + to an animal, its species is not changed by a difference of color, but by a difference in that which belongs to the nature + of an animal, that is to say, by a difference in the sensitive soul, which is sometimes rational, and sometimes otherwise. + Hence "rational" and "irrational" are differences dividing animal, constituting its various species. In like + manner therefore, not any variety of objects diversifies the powers of the soul, but a difference in that to which the power + of its very nature is directed. Thus the senses of their very nature are directed to the passive quality which of itself is + divided into color, sound, and the like, and therefore there is one sensitive power with regard to color, namely, the sight, + and another with regard to sound, namely, hearing. But it is accidental to a passive quality, for instance, to something + colored, to be a musician or a grammarian, great or small, a man or a stone. Therefore by reason of such differences the powers + of the soul are not distinct. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q77_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Act, though subsequent in existence to power, is, nevertheless, prior to it in intention and logically; as the end is with + regard to the agent. And the object, although extrinsic, is, nevertheless, the principle or end of the action; and those conditions + which are intrinsic to a thing, are proportionate to its principle and end. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q77_A3-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> If any power were to have one of two contraries as such for its object, the other contrary would belong to another power. + But the power of the soul does not regard the nature of the contrary as such, but rather the common aspect of both contraries; + as sight does not regard white as such, but as color. This is because of two contraries one, in a manner, includes the idea + of the other, since they are to one another as perfect and imperfect. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q77_A3-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Nothing prevents things which coincide in subject, from being considered under different aspects; therefore they can belong + to various powers of the soul. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q77_A3-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> The higher power of itself regards a more universal formality of the object than the lower power; because the higher a power + is, to a greater number of things does it extend. Therefore many things are combined in the one formality of the object, which + the higher power considers of itself; while they differ in the formalities regarded by the lower powers of themselves. Thus + it is that various objects belong to various lower powers; which objects, + however, are subject to one higher power. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q77_A3-p13"></p> + <p id="FP_Q77_A3-p14"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q77_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q77_A4.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q77_A4" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q77_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q77_A5.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q77_A4-p0.1">Whether among the powers of the soul there is order?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q77_A4-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q77_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that there is no order among the powers of the soul. For in those things which come under one division, there + is no before and after, but all are naturally simultaneous. But the powers of the soul are contradistinguished from one another. + Therefore there is no order among them. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q77_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the powers of the soul are referred to their objects and to the soul itself. On the part of the soul, there is not + order among them, because the soul is one. In like manner the objects are various and dissimilar, as color and sound. Therefore + there is no order among the powers of the soul. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q77_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, where there is order among powers, we find that the operation of one depends on the operation of another. But the + action of one power of the soul does not depend on that of another; for sight can act independently of hearing, and conversely. + Therefore there is no order among the powers of the soul. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q77_A4-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher (De Anima ii, 3) compares the parts or powers of the soul to figures. But figures have an order among themselves. + Therefore the powers of the soul have order. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q77_A4-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Since the soul is one, and the powers are many; and since a number of things that proceed from one must proceed in a certain + order; there must be some order among the powers of the soul. Accordingly we may observe a triple order among them, two of + which correspond to the dependence of one power on another; while the third is taken from the order of the objects. Now the + dependence of one power on another can be taken in two ways; according to the order of + nature, forasmuch as perfect things are by their nature prior to imperfect things; and according to the order of generation + and time; forasmuch as from being imperfect, a thing comes to be perfect. Thus, according to the first kind of order among + the powers, the intellectual powers are prior to the sensitive powers; wherefore they direct them and command them. Likewise + the sensitive powers are prior in this order to the powers of the nutritive soul. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q77_A4-p7"> In the second kind of order, it is the other way about. For the powers of the nutritive soul are prior by way of generation + to the powers of the sensitive soul; for which, therefore, they prepare the body. The same is to be said of the sensitive + powers with regard to the intellectual. But in the third kind of order, certain sensitive powers are ordered among themselves, + namely, sight, hearing, and smelling. For the visible naturally comes first; since it is common to higher and + lower bodies. But sound is audible in the air, which is naturally prior to the mingling of elements, of which smell is the + result. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q77_A4-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The species of a given genus are to one another as before and after, like numbers and figures, if considered in their nature; + although they may be said to be simultaneous, according as they receive the predication of the common genus. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q77_A4-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> This order among the powers of the soul is both on the part of the soul (which, though it be one according to its essence, + has a certain aptitude to various acts in a certain order) and on the part of the objects, and furthermore on the part of + the acts, as we have said above. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q77_A4-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This argument is verified as regards those powers among which order of the third kind exists. Those powers among which the + two other kinds of order exist are such that the action of one depends on another. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q77_A4-p11"></p> + <p id="FP_Q77_A4-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q77_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q77_A5.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q77_A5" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q77_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q77_A6.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q77_A5-p0.1">Whether all the powers of the soul are in the soul as their subject?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q77_A5-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q77_A5-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that all the powers of the soul are in the soul as their subject. For as the powers of the body are to the + body; so are the powers of the soul to the soul. But the body is the subject of the corporeal powers. Therefore the soul is + the subject of the powers of the soul. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q77_A5-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the operations of the powers of the soul are attributed to the body by reason of the soul; because, as the Philosopher + says (De Anima ii, 2), "The soul is that by which we sense and understand primarily." But the natural principles of the operations + of the soul are the powers. Therefore the powers are primarily in the soul. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q77_A5-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 7,24) that the soul senses certain things, not through the body, in fact, without + the body, as fear and such like; and some things through the body. But if the sensitive powers were not in the soul alone + as their subject, the soul could not sense anything without the body. Therefore the soul is the subject of the sensitive powers; + and for a similar reason, of all the other powers. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q77_A5-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (De Somno et Vigilia i) that "sensation belongs neither to the soul, nor to the body, but to the composite." + Therefore the sensitive power is in "the composite" as its subject. Therefore the soul alone is not the subject of all the + powers. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q77_A5-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The subject of operative power is that which is able to operate, for every accident denominates its proper subject. Now the + same is that which is able to operate, and that which does operate. Wherefore the "subject of power" is of necessity "the + subject of operation," as again the Philosopher says in the beginning of De Somno et Vigilia. Now, it is clear from what we + have said above ( + <a id="FP_Q77_A5-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q75_A2.html">Q[75], AA[2]</a>,3; + <a id="FP_Q77_A5-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q76_A1.html">Q[76], + A[1] + </a>, ad 1), that some operations of the soul are performed without a corporeal organ, as understanding and will. Hence the powers + of these operations are in the soul as their subject. But some operations of the soul are performed by means of corporeal + organs; as sight by the eye, and hearing by the ear. And so it is with all the other operations of the nutritive and sensitive + parts. Therefore the powers which are the principles of these operations have their subject in the composite, and + not in the soul alone. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q77_A5-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> All the powers are said to belong to the soul, not as their subject, but as their principle; because it is by the soul that + the composite has the power to perform such operations. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q77_A5-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> All such powers are primarily in the soul, as compared to the composite; not as in their subject, but as in their principle. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q77_A5-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Plato's opinion was that sensation is an operation proper to the soul, just as understanding is. Now in many things relating + to Philosophy Augustine makes use of the opinions of Plato, not asserting them as true, but relating them. However, as far + as the present question is concerned, when it is said that the soul senses some things with the body, and some without the + body, this can be taken in two ways. Firstly, the words "with the body or without + the body" may determine the act of sense in its mode of proceeding from the sentient. Thus the soul senses nothing without + the body, because the action of sensation cannot proceed from the soul except by a corporeal organ. Secondly, they may be + understood as determining the act of sense on the part of the object sensed. Thus the soul senses some things with the body, + that is, things existing in the body, as when it feels a wound or something of that sort; while it senses some things without + the + body, that is, which do not exist in the body, but only in the apprehension of the soul, as when it feels sad or joyful on + hearing something. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q77_A5-p10"></p> + <p id="FP_Q77_A5-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q77_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q77_A6.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q77_A6" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q77_A5.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q77_A7.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q77_A6-p0.1">Whether the powers of the soul flow from its essence?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q77_A6-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q77_A6-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the powers of the soul do not flow from its essence. For different things do not proceed from one simple + thing. But the essence of the soul is one and simple. Since, therefore, the powers of the soul are many and various, they + cannot proceed from its essence. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q77_A6-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, that from which a thing proceeds is its cause. But the essence of the soul cannot be said to be the cause of the + powers; as is clear if one considers the different kinds of causes. Therefore the powers of the soul do not flow from its + essence. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q77_A6-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, emanation involves some sort of movement. But nothing is moved by itself, as the Philosopher proves (Phys. vii, + 1,2); except, perhaps, by reason of a part of itself, as an animal is said to be moved by itself, because one part thereof + moves and another is moved. Neither is the soul moved, as the Philosopher proves (De Anima i, 4). Therefore the soul does + not produce its powers within itself. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q77_A6-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The powers of the soul are its natural properties. But the subject is the cause of its proper accidents; whence also it is + included in the definition of accident, as is clear from Metaph. vii (Did. vi, 4). Therefore the powers of the soul proceed + from its essence as their cause. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q77_A6-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The substantial and the accidental form partly agree and partly differ. They agree in this, that each is an act; and that + by each of them something is after a manner actual. They differ, however, in two respects. First, because the substantial + form makes a thing to exist absolutely, and its subject is something purely potential. But the accidental form does not make + a thing to exist absolutely but to be such, or so great, or in some particular condition; for + its subject is an actual being. Hence it is clear that actuality is observed in the substantial form prior to its being observed + in the subject: and since that which is first in a genus is the cause in that genus, the substantial form causes existence + in its subject. On the other hand, actuality is observed in the subject of the accidental form prior to its being observed + in the accidental form; wherefore the actuality of the accidental form is caused by the actuality of the subject. So the + subject, forasmuch as it is in potentiality, is receptive of the accidental form: but forasmuch as it is in act, it produces + it. This I say of the proper and "per se" accident; for with regard to the extraneous accident, the subject is receptive only, + the accident being caused by an extrinsic agent. Secondly, substantial and accidental forms differ, because, since that which + is the less principal exists for the sake of that which is the more principal, matter therefore exists on account of the + substantial form; while on the contrary, the accidental form exists on account of the completeness of the subject. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q77_A6-p7"> Now it is clear, from what has been said + <a id="FP_Q77_A6-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q77_A5.html">(A[5])</a>, that either the subject of the soul's powers is the soul itself alone, which can be the subject of an accident, forasmuch + as it has something of potentiality, as we have said above (A[1], ad 6); or else this subject is the composite. Now the composite + is actual by the soul. Whence it is clear that all the powers of the soul, whether their subject be the soul alone, or the + composite, flow from the essence + of the soul, as from their principle; because it has already been said that the accident is caused by the subject according + as it is actual, and is received into it according as it is in potentiality. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q77_A6-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> From one simple thing many things may proceed naturally, in a certain order; or again if there be diversity of recipients. + Thus, from the one essence of the soul many and various powers proceed; both because order exists among these powers; and + also by reason of the diversity of the corporeal organs. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q77_A6-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The subject is both the final cause, and in a way the active cause, of its proper accident. It is also as it were the material + cause, inasmuch as it is receptive of the accident. From this we may gather that the essence of the soul is the cause of all + its powers, as their end, and as their active principle; and of some as receptive thereof. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q77_A6-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The emanation of proper accidents from their subject is not by way of transmutation, but by a certain natural resultance; + thus one thing results naturally from another, as color from light. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q77_A6-p11"></p> + <p id="FP_Q77_A6-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q77_A5.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q77_A7.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q77_A7" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q77_A6.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q77_A8.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q77_A7-p0.1">Whether one power of the soul arises from another?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q77_A7-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q77_A7-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that one power of the soul does not arise from another. For if several things arise together, one of them does + not arise from another. But all the powers of the soul are created at the same time with the soul. Therefore one of them does + not arise from another. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q77_A7-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the power of the soul arises from the soul as an accident from the subject. But one power of the soul cannot be + the subject of another; because nothing is the accident of an accident. Therefore one power does not arise from another. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q77_A7-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, one opposite does not arise from the other opposite; but everything arises from that which is like it in species. + Now the powers of the soul are oppositely divided, as various species. Therefore one of them does not proceed from another. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q77_A7-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Powers are known by their actions. But the action of one power is caused by the action of another power, as the action of + the imagination by the action of the senses. Therefore one power of the soul is caused by another. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q77_A7-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> In those things which proceed from one according to a natural order, as the first is the cause of all, so that which is nearer + to the first is, in a way, the cause of those which are more remote. Now it has been shown above + <a id="FP_Q77_A7-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q77_A4.html">(A[4])</a> that among the powers of the soul there are several kinds of order. Therefore one power of the soul proceeds from the essence + of the soul by the medium of another. But since the essence of the soul is + compared to the powers both as a principle active and final, and as a receptive principle, either separately by itself, or + together with the body; and since the agent and the end are more perfect, while the receptive principle, as such, is less + perfect; it follows that those powers of the soul which precede the others, in the order of perfection and nature, are the + principles of the others, after the manner of the end and active principle. For we see that the senses are for the sake of + the + intelligence, and not the other way about. The senses, moreover, are a certain imperfect participation of the intelligence; + wherefore, according to their natural origin, they proceed from the intelligence as the imperfect from the perfect. But considered + as receptive principles, the more perfect powers are principles with regard to the others; thus the soul, according as it + has the sensitive power, is considered as the subject, and as something material with regard to the intelligence. On this + account, the more imperfect powers precede the others in the order of generation, for the animal is generated before the man. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q77_A7-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As the power of the soul flows from the essence, not by a transmutation, but by a certain natural resultance, and is simultaneous + with the soul, so is it the case with one power as regards another. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q77_A7-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> An accident cannot of itself be the subject of an accident; but one accident is received prior to another into substance, + as quantity prior to quality. In this sense one accident is said to be the subject of another; as surface is of color, inasmuch + as substance receives an accident through the means of another. The same thing may be said of the powers of the soul. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q77_A7-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The powers of the soul are opposed to one another, as perfect and imperfect; as also are the species of numbers and figures. + But this opposition does not prevent the origin of one from another, because imperfect things naturally proceed from perfect + things. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q77_A7-p10"></p> + <p id="FP_Q77_A7-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q77_A6.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q77_A8.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q77_A8" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q77_A7.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q78.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q77_A8-p0.1">Whether all the powers remain in the soul when separated from the body?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q77_A8-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q77_A8-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that all the powers of the soul remain in the soul separated from the body. For we read in the book De Spiritu + et Anima that "the soul withdraws from the body, taking with itself sense and imagination, reason and intelligence, concupiscibility + and irascibility." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q77_A8-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the powers of the soul are its natural properties. But properties are always in that to which they belong; and are + never separated from it. Therefore the powers of the soul are in it even after death. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q77_A8-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the powers even of the sensitive soul are not weakened when the body becomes weak; because, as the Philosopher says + (De Anima i, 4), "If an old man were given the eye of a young man, he would see even as well as a young man." But weakness + is the road to corruption. Therefore the powers of the soul are not corrupted when the body is corrupted, but remain in the + separated soul. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q77_A8-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, memory is a power of the sensitive soul, as the Philosopher proves (De Memor. et Remin. 1). But memory remains in + the separated soul; for it was said to the rich glutton whose soul was in hell: "Remember that thou didst receive good things + during thy lifetime" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q77_A8-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Luke.16.25" target="asv">Lk. 16:25</a>). Therefore memory remains in the separated soul; and consequently the other powers of the sensitive part. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q77_A8-p6"> + <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, joy and sorrow are in the concupiscible part, which is a power of the sensitive soul. But it is clear that separate + souls grieve or rejoice at the pains or rewards which they receive. Therefore the concupiscible power remains in the separate + soul. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q77_A8-p7"> + <b>Objection 6:</b> Further, Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 32) that, as the soul, when the body lies senseless, yet not quite dead, sees + some things by imaginary vision; so also when by death the soul is quite separate from the body. But the imagination is a + power of the sensitive part. Therefore the power of the sensitive part remains in the separate soul; and consequently all + the other powers. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q77_A8-p8"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is said (De Eccl. Dogm. xix) that "of two substances only does man consist; the soul with its reason, and the body with + its senses." Therefore the body being dead, the sensitive powers do not remain. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q77_A8-p9"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As we have said already ( + <a id="FP_Q77_A8-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q77_A5.html">AA[5]</a>,6,7), all the powers of the soul belong to the soul alone as their principle. But some powers belong to the soul alone as + their subject; as the intelligence and the will. These powers must remain in the soul, after the destruction of the body. + But other powers are subjected in the composite; as all the powers of the sensitive and nutritive parts. Now accidents cannot + remain after the destruction of the + subject. Wherefore, the composite being destroyed, such powers do not remain actually; but they remain virtually in the soul, + as in their principle or root. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q77_A8-p10"> So it is false that, as some say, these powers remain in the soul even after the corruption of the body. It is much more + false that, as they say also, the acts of these powers remain in the separate soul; because these powers have no act apart + from the corporeal organ. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q77_A8-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> That book has no authority, and so what is there written can be despised with the same facility as it was said; although + we may say that the soul takes with itself these powers, not actually but virtually. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q77_A8-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> These powers, which we say do not actually remain in the separate soul, are not the properties of the soul alone, but of + the composite. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q77_A8-p13"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> These powers are said not to be weakened when the body becomes weak, because the soul remains unchangeable, and is the virtual + principle of these powers. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q77_A8-p14"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> The recollection spoken of there is to be taken in the same way as Augustine (De Trin. x, 11; xiv, 7) places memory in the + mind; not as a part of the sensitive soul. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q77_A8-p15"> + <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> In the separate soul, sorrow and joy are not in the sensitive, but in the intellectual appetite, as in the angels. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q77_A8-p16"> + <b>Reply to Objection 6:</b> Augustine in that passage is speaking as inquiring, not as asserting. Wherefore he retracted some things which he had said + there (Retrac. ii, 24). + </p> + <p id="FP_Q77_A8-p17"></p> + <p id="FP_Q77_A8-p18"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q77_A7.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q78.html"></a> + </div> + <a href="summa.FP_Q76_A8.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q77_A1.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q78" class="div3"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q77_A8.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q78_A1.html"></a> + <h3 id="FP_Q78-p0.1">OF THE SPECIFIC POWERS OF THE SOUL (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3> + <p id="FP_Q78-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q78-p2"> We next treat of the powers of the soul specifically. The theologian, however, has only to inquire specifically concerning + the intellectual and appetitive powers, in which the virtues reside. And since the knowledge of these powers depends to a + certain extent on the other powers, our consideration of the powers of the soul taken specifically will be divided into three + parts: first, we shall consider those powers which are a preamble to the intellect; secondly, the intellectual + powers; thirdly, the appetitive powers. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q78-p3"> Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:</p> + <p id="FP_Q78-p4"> (1) The powers of the soul considered generally;</p> + <p id="FP_Q78-p5"> (2) The various species of the vegetative part;</p> + <p id="FP_Q78-p6"> (3) The exterior senses;</p> + <p id="FP_Q78-p7"> (4) The interior senses.</p> + <div id="FP_Q78_A1" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q78.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q78_A2.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q78_A1-p0.1">Whether there are to be distinguished five genera of powers in the soul?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q78_A1-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q78_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that there are not to be distinguished five genera of powers in the soul---namely, vegetative, sensitive, appetitive, + locomotive, and intellectual. For the powers of the soul are called its parts. But only three parts of the soul are commonly + assigned---namely, the vegetative soul, the sensitive soul, and the rational soul. Therefore there are only three genera of + powers in the soul, and not five. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q78_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the powers of the soul are the principles of its vital operations. Now, in four ways is a thing said to live. For + the Philosopher says (De Anima ii, 2): "In several ways a thing is said to live, and even if only one of these is present, + the thing is said to live; as intellect and sense, local movement and rest, and lastly, movement of decrease and increase + due to nourishment." Therefore there are only four genera of powers of the soul, as the + appetitive is excluded. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q78_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, a special kind of soul ought not to be assigned as regards what is common to all the powers. Now desire is common + to each power of the soul. For sight desires an appropriate visible object; whence we read ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q78_A1-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.40.22" target="asv">Ecclus. 40:22</a>): "The eye desireth favor and beauty, but more than these green sown fields." In the same way every other power desires its + appropriate object. Therefore the appetitive power should not be made a special genus of + the powers of the soul. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q78_A1-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, the moving principle in animals is sense, intellect or appetite, as the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 10). Therefore + the motive power should not be added to the above as a special genus of soul. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q78_A1-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (De Anima ii, 3), "The powers are the vegetative, the sensitive, the appetitive, the locomotion, and + the intellectual." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q78_A1-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> There are five genera of powers of the soul, as above numbered. Of these, three are called souls, and four are called modes + of living. The reason of this diversity lies in the various souls being distinguished accordingly as the operation of the + soul transcends the operation of the corporeal nature in various ways; for the whole corporeal nature is subject to the soul, + and is related to it as its matter and instrument. There exists, therefore, an operation + of the soul which so far exceeds the corporeal nature that it is not even performed by any corporeal organ; and such is the + operation of the "rational soul." Below this, there is another operation of the soul, which is indeed performed through a + corporeal organ, but not through a corporeal quality, and this is the operation of the "sensitive soul"; for though hot and + cold, wet and dry, and other such corporeal qualities are required for the work of the senses, yet they are not required in + such + a way that the operation of the senses takes place by virtue of such qualities; but only for the proper disposition of the + organ. The lowest of the operations of the soul is that which is performed by a corporeal organ, and by virtue of a corporeal + quality. Yet this transcends the operation of the corporeal nature; because the movements of bodies are caused by an extrinsic + principle, while these operations are from an intrinsic principle; for this is common to all the operations of the soul; + since every animate thing, in some way, moves itself. Such is the operation of the "vegetative soul"; for digestion, and what + follows, is caused instrumentally by the action of heat, as the Philosopher says (De Anima ii, 4). + </p> + <p id="FP_Q78_A1-p8"> Now the powers of the soul are distinguished generically by their objects. For the higher a power is, the more universal + is the object to which it extends, as we have said above ( + <a id="FP_Q78_A1-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q77_A3.html">Q[77], A[3]</a>, ad 4). But the object of the soul's operation may be considered in a triple order. For in the soul there is a power the + object of which is only the body that is united to that soul; the powers of this genus are called "vegetative" for the vegetative + power acts only + on the body to which the soul is united. There is another genus in the powers of the soul, which genus regards a more universal + object---namely, every sensible body, not only the body to which the soul is united. And there is yet another genus in the + powers of the soul, which genus regards a still more universal object---namely, not only the sensible body, but all being + in universal. Wherefore it is evident that the latter two genera of the soul's powers have an operation in regard not merely + to that which is united to them, but also to something extrinsic. Now, since whatever operates must in some way be united + to the object about which it operates, it follows of necessity that this something extrinsic, which is the object of the soul's + operation, must be related to the soul in a twofold manner. First, inasmuch as this something extrinsic has a natural aptitude + to be united to the soul, and to be by its likeness in the soul. In this way there are two kinds of powers ---namely, the + "sensitive" in regard to the less common object---the sensible body; and the "intellectual," in regard to the most common + object---universal being. Secondly, forasmuch as the soul itself has an inclination and tendency to the something extrinsic. + And in this way there are again two kinds of powers in the soul: one---the "appetitive"---in respect of which the soul is + referred to something extrinsic as to an end, which is first in the intention; the other---the "locomotive" power---in respect + of + which the soul is referred to something extrinsic as to the term of its operation and movement; for every animal is moved + for the purpose of realizing its desires and intentions. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q78_A1-p9"> The modes of living are distinguished according to the degrees of living things. There are some living things in which there + exists only vegetative power, as the plants. There are others in which with the vegetative there exists also the sensitive, + but not the locomotive power; such as immovable animals, as shellfish. There are others which besides this have locomotive + powers, as perfect animals, which require many things for their life, and consequently movement to seek + necessaries of life from a distance. And there are some living things which with these have intellectual power---namely, men. + But the appetitive power does not constitute a degree of living things; because wherever there is sense there is also appetite + (De Anima ii, 3). + </p> + <p id="FP_Q78_A1-p10"> Thus the first two objectives are hereby solved.</p> + <p id="FP_Q78_A1-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The "natural appetite" is that inclination which each thing has, of its own nature, for something; wherefore by its natural + appetite each power desires something suitable to itself. But the "animal appetite" results from the form apprehended; this + sort of appetite requires a special power of the soul---mere apprehension does not suffice. For a thing is desired as it exists + in its own nature, whereas in the apprehensive power it exists not according to + its own nature, but according to its likeness. Whence it is clear that sight desires naturally a visible object for the purpose + of its act only---namely, for the purpose of seeing; but the animal by the appetitive power desires the thing seen, not merely + for the purpose of seeing it, but also for other purposes. But if the soul did not require things perceived by the senses, + except on account of the actions of the senses, that is, for the purpose of sensing them; there would be no need for a + special genus of appetitive powers, since the natural appetite of the powers would suffice. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q78_A1-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Although sense and appetite are principles of movement in perfect animals, yet sense and appetite, as such, are not sufficient + to cause movement, unless another power be added to them; for immovable animals have sense and appetite, and yet they have + not the power of motion. Now this motive power is not only in the appetite and sense as commanding the movement, but also + in the parts of the body, to make them obey the appetite of the soul which moves + them. Of this we have a sign in the fact that when the members are deprived of their natural disposition, they do not move + in obedience to the appetite. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q78_A1-p13"></p> + <p id="FP_Q78_A1-p14"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q78.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q78_A2.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q78_A2" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q78_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q78_A3.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q78_A2-p0.1">Whether the parts of the vegetative soul are fittingly described as the nutritive, augmentative, and generative?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q78_A2-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q78_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the parts of the vegetative soul are not fittingly described---namely, the nutritive, augmentative, and + generative. For these are called "natural" forces. But the powers of the soul are above the natural forces. Therefore we should + not class the above forces as powers of the soul. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q78_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, we should not assign a particular power of the soul to that which is common to living and non-living things. But + generation is common to all things that can be generated and corrupted, whether living or not living. Therefore the generative + force should not be classed as a power of the soul. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q78_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the soul is more powerful than the body. But the body by the same force gives species and quantity; much more, therefore, + does the soul. Therefore the augmentative power of the soul is not distinct from the generative power. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q78_A2-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, everything is preserved in being by that whereby it exists. But the generative power is that whereby a living thing + exists. Therefore by the same power the living thing is preserved. Now the nutritive force is directed to the preservation + of the living thing (De Anima ii, 4), being "a power which is capable of preserving whatever receives it." Therefore we should + not distinguish the nutritive power from the generative. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q78_A2-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (De Anima ii, 2,4) that the operations of this soul are "generation, the use of food," and (cf. De Anima + iii, 9) "growth." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q78_A2-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The vegetative part has three powers. For the vegetative part, as we have said + <a id="FP_Q78_A2-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q78_A1.html">(A[1])</a>, has for its object the body itself, living by the soul; for which body a triple operation of the soul is required. One is + whereby it acquires existence, and to this is directed the "generative" power. Another is whereby the living body acquires + its due quantity; to this is directed the "augmentative" power. Another is whereby the body of a living + thing is preserved in its existence and in its due quantity; to this is directed the "nutritive" power. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q78_A2-p8"> We must, however, observe a difference among these powers. The nutritive and the augmentative have their effect where they + exist, since the body itself united to the soul grows and is preserved by the augmentative and nutritive powers which exist + in one and the same soul. But the generative power has its effect, not in one and the same body but in another; for a thing + cannot generate itself. Therefore the generative power, in a way, approaches to the dignity of the sensitive + soul, which has an operation extending to extrinsic things, although in a more excellent and more universal manner; for that + which is highest in an inferior nature approaches to that which is lowest in the higher nature, as is made clear by Dionysius + (Div. Nom. vii). Therefore, of these three powers, the generative has the greater finality, nobility, and perfection, as the + Philosopher says (De Anima ii, 4), for it belongs to a thing which is already perfect to "produce another like unto + itself." And the generative power is served by the augmentative and nutritive powers; and the augmentative power by the nutritive. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q78_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Such forces are called natural, both because they produce an effect like that of nature, which also gives existence, quantity + and preservation (although the above forces accomplish these things in a more perfect way); and because those forces perform + their actions instrumentally, through the active and passive qualities, which are the principles of natural actions. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q78_A2-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Generation of inanimate things is entirely from an extrinsic source; whereas the generation of living things is in a higher + way, through something in the living thing itself, which is the semen containing the principle productive of the body. Therefore + there must be in the living thing a power that prepares this semen; and this is the generative power. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q78_A2-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Since the generation of living things is from a semen, it is necessary that in the beginning an animal of small size be generated. + For this reason it must have a power in the soul, whereby it is brought to its appropriate size. But the inanimate body is + generated from determinate matter by an extrinsic agent; therefore it receives at once its nature and its quantity, according + to the condition of the matter. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q78_A2-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> As we have said above + <a id="FP_Q78_A2-p12.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q78_A1.html">(A[1])</a>, the operation of the vegetative principle is performed by means of heat, the property of which is to consume humidity. Therefore, + in order to restore the humidity thus lost, the nutritive power is required, whereby the food is changed into the substance + of the body. This is also necessary for the action of the augmentative and generative powers. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q78_A2-p13"></p> + <p id="FP_Q78_A2-p14"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q78_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q78_A3.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q78_A3" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q78_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q78_A4.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q78_A3-p0.1">Whether the five exterior senses are properly distinguished?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q78_A3-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q78_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem inaccurate to distinguish five exterior senses. But there are many kinds of accidents. Therefore, as powers + are distinguished by their objects, it seems that the senses are multiplied according to the number of the kinds of accidents. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q78_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, magnitude and shape, and other things which are called "common sensibles," are "not sensibles by accident," but + are contradistinguished from them by the Philosopher (De Anima ii, 6). Now the diversity of objects, as such, diversifies + the powers. Since, therefore, magnitude and shape are further from color than sound is, it seems that there is much more need + for another sensitive power than can grasp magnitude or shape than for that which grasps color + or sound. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q78_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, one sense regards one contrariety; as sight regards white and black. But the sense of touch grasps several contraries; + such as hot or cold, damp or dry, and suchlike. Therefore it is not a single sense but several. Therefore there are more than + five senses. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q78_A3-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, a species is not divided against its genus. But taste is a kind of touch. Therefore it should not be classed as + a distinct sense of touch. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q78_A3-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 1): "There is no other besides the five senses." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q78_A3-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The reason of the distinction and number of the senses has been assigned by some to the organs in which one or other of the + elements preponderate, as water, air, or the like. By others it has been assigned to the medium, which is either in conjunction + or extrinsic and is either water or air, or such like. Others have ascribed it to the various natures of the sensible qualities, + according as such quality belongs to a simple body or results from complexity. + But none of these explanations is apt. For the powers are not for the organs, but the organs for the powers; wherefore there + are not various powers for the reason that there are various organs; on the contrary, for this has nature provided a variety + of organs, that they might be adapted to various powers. In the same way nature provided various mediums for the various senses, + according to the convenience of the acts of the powers. And to be cognizant of the natures of sensible qualities does + not pertain to the senses, but to the intellect. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q78_A3-p8"> The reason of the number and distinction of the exterior senses must therefore be ascribed to that which belongs to the senses + properly and "per se." Now, sense is a passive power, and is naturally immuted by the exterior sensible. Wherefore the exterior + cause of such immutation is what is "per se" perceived by the sense, and according to the diversity of that exterior cause + are the sensitive powers diversified. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q78_A3-p9"> Now, immutation is of two kinds, one natural, the other spiritual. Natural immutation takes place by the form of the immuter + being received according to its natural existence, into the thing immuted, as heat is received into the thing heated. Whereas + spiritual immutation takes place by the form of the immuter being received, according to a spiritual mode of existence, into + the thing immuted, as the form of color is received into the pupil which does not thereby become colored. + Now, for the operation of the senses, a spiritual immutation is required, whereby an intention of the sensible form is effected + in the sensile organ. Otherwise, if a natural immutation alone sufficed for the sense's action, all natural bodies would feel + when they undergo alteration. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q78_A3-p10"> But in some senses we find spiritual immutation only, as in "sight" while in others we find not only spiritual but also a + natural immutation; either on the part of the object only, or likewise on the part of the organ. On the part of the object + we find natural immutation, as to place, in sound which is the object of "hearing"; for sound is caused by percussion and + commotion of air: and we find natural immutation by alteration, in odor which is the object of "smelling"; for in + order to exhale an odor, a body must be in a measure affected by heat. On the part of an organ, natural immutation takes place + in "touch" and "taste"; for the hand that touches something hot becomes hot, while the tongue is moistened by the humidity + of the flavored morsel. But the organs of smelling and hearing are not affected in their respective operations by any natural + immutation unless indirectly. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q78_A3-p11"> Now, the sight, which is without natural immutation either in its organ or in its object, is the most spiritual, the most + perfect, and the most universal of all the senses. After this comes the hearing and then the smell, which require a natural + immutation on the part of the object; while local motion is more perfect than, and naturally prior to, the motion of alteration, + as the Philosopher proves (Phys. viii, 7). Touch and taste are the most material of all: of the distinction + of which we shall speak later on (ad 3,4). Hence it is that the three other senses are not exercised through a medium united + to them, to obviate any natural immutation in their organ; as happens as regards these two senses. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q78_A3-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Not every accident has in itself a power of immutation but only qualities of the third species, which are the principles + of alteration: therefore only suchlike qualities are the objects of the senses; because "the senses are affected by the same + things whereby inanimate bodies are affected," as stated in Phys. vii, 2. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q78_A3-p13"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Size, shape, and the like, which are called "common sensibles," are midway between "accidental sensibles" and "proper sensibles," + which are the objects of the senses. For the proper sensibles first, and of their very nature, affect the senses; since they + are qualities that cause alteration. But the common sensibles are all reducible to quantity. As to size and number, it is + clear that they are species of quantity. Shape is a quality about quantity. + Shape is a quality about quantity, since the notion of shape consists of fixing the bounds of magnitude. Movement and rest + are sensed according as the subject is affected in one or more ways in the magnitude of the subject or of its local distance, + as in the movement of growth or of locomotion, or again, according as it is affected in some sensible qualities, as in the + movement of alteration; and thus to sense movement and rest is, in a way, to sense one thing and many. Now quantity is the + proximate subject of the qualities that cause alteration, as surface is of color. Therefore the common sensibles do not move + the senses first and of their own nature, but by reason of the sensible quality; as the surface by reason of color. Yet they + are not accidental sensibles, for they produce a certain variety in the immutation of the senses. For sense is immuted differently + by a large and by a small surface: since whiteness itself is said to be great or small, and therefore it is divided + according to its proper subject. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q78_A3-p14"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As the Philosopher seems to say (De Anima ii, 11), the sense of touch is generically one, but is divided into several specific + senses, and for this reason it extends to various contrarieties; which senses, however, are not separate from one another + in their organ, but are spread throughout the whole body, so that their distinction is not evident. But taste, which perceives + the sweet and the bitter, accompanies touch in the tongue, but not in the whole + body; so it is easily distinguished from touch. We might also say that all those contrarieties agree, each in some proximate + genus, and all in a common genus, which is the common and formal object of touch. Such common genus is, however, unnamed, + just as the proximate genus of hot and cold is unnamed. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q78_A3-p15"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> The sense of taste, according to a saying of the Philosopher (De Anima ii, 9), is a kind of touch existing in the tongue + only. It is not distinct from touch in general, but only from the species of touch distributed in the body. But if touch is + one sense only, on account of the common formality of its object: we must say that taste is distinguished from touch by reason + of a different formality of immutation. For touch involves a natural, and not only + a spiritual, immutation in its organ, by reason of the quality which is its proper object. But the organ of taste is not necessarily + immuted by a natural immutation by reason of the quality which is its proper object, so that the tongue itself becomes sweet + and bitter: but by reason of a quality which is a preamble to, and on which is based, the flavor, which quality is moisture, + the object of touch. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q78_A3-p16"></p> + <p id="FP_Q78_A3-p17"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q78_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q78_A4.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q78_A4" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q78_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q79.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q78_A4-p0.1">Whether the interior senses are suitably distinguished?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q78_A4-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q78_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the interior senses are not suitably distinguished. For the common is not divided against the proper. + Therefore the common sense should not be numbered among the interior sensitive powers, in addition to the proper exterior + senses. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q78_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, there is no need to assign an interior power of apprehension when the proper and exterior sense suffices. But the + proper and exterior senses suffice for us to judge of sensible things; for each sense judges of its proper object. In like + manner they seem to suffice for the perception of their own actions; for since the action of the sense is, in a way, between + the power and its object, it seems that sight must be much more able to perceive its own + vision, as being nearer to it, than the color; and in like manner with the other senses. Therefore for this there is no need + to assign an interior power, called the common sense. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q78_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, according to the Philosopher (De Memor. et Remin. i), the imagination and the memory are passions of the "first + sensitive." But passion is not divided against its subject. Therefore memory and imagination should not be assigned as powers + distinct from the senses. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q78_A4-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, the intellect depends on the senses less than any power of the sensitive part. But the intellect knows nothing but + what it receives from the senses; whence we read (Poster. i, 8), that "those who lack one sense lack one kind of knowledge." + Therefore much less should we assign to the sensitive part a power, which they call the "estimative" power, for the perception + of intentions which the sense does not perceive. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q78_A4-p6"> + <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, the action of the cogitative power, which consists in comparing, adding and dividing, and the action of the reminiscence, + which consists in the use of a kind of syllogism for the sake of inquiry, is not less distant from the actions of the estimative + and memorative powers, than the action of the estimative is from the action of the imagination. Therefore either we must add + the cognitive and reminiscitive to the estimative and memorative powers, or the + estimative and memorative powers should not be made distinct from the imagination. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q78_A4-p7"> + <b>Objection 6:</b> Further, Augustine (Gen. ad lit. xii, 6,7,24) describes three kinds of vision; namely, corporeal, which is the action of + the sense; spiritual, which is an action of the imagination or phantasy; and intellectual, which is an action of the intellect. + Therefore there is no interior power between the sense and intellect, besides the imagination. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q78_A4-p8"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Avicenna (De Anima iv, 1) assigns five interior sensitive powers; namely, "common sense, phantasy, imagination, and the estimative + and memorative powers." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q78_A4-p9"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As nature does not fail in necessary things, there must needs be as many actions of the sensitive soul as may suffice for + the life of a perfect animal. If any of these actions cannot be reduced to the same one principle, they must be assigned to + diverse powers; since a power of the soul is nothing else than the proximate principle of the soul's operation. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q78_A4-p10"> Now we must observe that for the life of a perfect animal, the animal should apprehend a thing not only at the actual time + of sensation, but also when it is absent. Otherwise, since animal motion and action follow apprehension, an animal would not + be moved to seek something absent: the contrary of which we may observe specially in perfect animals, which are moved by progression, + for they are moved towards something apprehended and absent. Therefore an animal through the + sensitive soul must not only receive the species of sensible things, when it is actually affected by them, but it must also + retain and preserve them. Now to receive and retain are, in corporeal things, reduced to diverse principles; for moist things + are apt to receive, but retain with difficulty, while it is the reverse with dry things. Wherefore, since the sensitive power + is the act of a corporeal organ, it follows that the power which receives the species of sensible things must be distinct + from the power which preserves them. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q78_A4-p11"> Again we must observe that if an animal were moved by pleasing and disagreeable things only as affecting the sense, there + would be no need to suppose that an animal has a power besides the apprehension of those forms which the senses perceive, + and in which the animal takes pleasure, or from which it shrinks with horror. But the animal needs to seek or to avoid certain + things, not only because they are pleasing or otherwise to the senses, but also on account of other advantages + and uses, or disadvantages: just as the sheep runs away when it sees a wolf, not on account of its color or shape, but as + a natural enemy: and again a bird gathers together straws, not because they are pleasant to the sense, but because they are + useful for building its nest. Animals, therefore, need to perceive such intentions, which the exterior sense does not perceive. + And some distinct principle is necessary for this; since the perception of sensible forms comes by an immutation caused by + the sensible, which is not the case with the perception of those intentions. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q78_A4-p12"> Thus, therefore, for the reception of sensible forms, the "proper sense" and the "common sense" are appointed, and of their + distinction we shall speak farther on (ad 1,2). But for the retention and preservation of these forms, the "phantasy" or "imagination" + is appointed; which are the same, for phantasy or imagination is as it were a storehouse of forms received through the senses. + Furthermore, for the apprehension of intentions which are not received through the senses, the + "estimative" power is appointed: and for the preservation thereof, the "memorative" power, which is a storehouse of such-like + intentions. A sign of which we have in the fact that the principle of memory in animals is found in some such intention, for + instance, that something is harmful or otherwise. And the very formality of the past, which memory observes, is to be reckoned + among these intentions. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q78_A4-p13"> Now, we must observe that as to sensible forms there is no difference between man and other animals; for they are similarly + immuted by the extrinsic sensible. But there is a difference as to the above intentions: for other animals perceive these + intentions only by some natural instinct, while man perceives them by means of coalition of ideas. Therefore the power by + which in other animals is called the natural estimative, in man is called the "cogitative," which by some sort of + collation discovers these intentions. Wherefore it is also called the "particular reason," to which medical men assign a certain + particular organ, namely, the middle part of the head: for it compares individual intentions, just as the intellectual reason + compares universal intentions. As to the memorative power, man has not only memory, as other animals have in the sudden recollection + of the past; but also "reminiscence" by syllogistically, as it were, seeking for a recollection of the past by + the application of individual intentions. Avicenna, however, assigns between the estimative and the imaginative, a fifth power, + which combines and divides imaginary forms: as when from the imaginary form of gold, and imaginary form of a mountain, we + compose the one form of a golden mountain, which we have never seen. But this operation is not to be found in animals other + than man, in whom the imaginative power suffices thereto. To man also does Averroes attribute this action in his book De + sensu et sensibilibus (viii). So there is no need to assign more than four interior powers of the sensitive part---namely, + the common sense, the imagination, and the estimative and memorative powers. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q78_A4-p14"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The interior sense is called "common" not by predication, as if it were a genus; but as the common root and principle of + the exterior senses. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q78_A4-p15"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The proper sense judges of the proper sensible by discerning it from other things which come under the same sense; for instance, + by discerning white from black or green. But neither sight nor taste can discern white from sweet: because what discerns between + two things must know both. Wherefore the discerning judgment must be assigned to the common sense; to which, as to a common + term, all apprehensions of the senses must be referred: and by which, + again, all the intentions of the senses are perceived; as when someone sees that he sees. For this cannot be done by the proper + sense, which only knows the form of the sensible by which it is immuted, in which immutation the action of sight is completed, + and from immutation follows another in the common sense which perceives the act of vision. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q78_A4-p16"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As one power arises from the soul by means of another, as we have seen above ( + <a id="FP_Q78_A4-p16.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q77_A7.html">Q[77], A[7]</a>), so also the soul is the subject of one power through another. In this way the imagination and the memory are called passions + of the "first sensitive." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q78_A4-p17"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Although the operation of the intellect has its origin in the senses: yet, in the thing apprehended through the senses, the + intellect knows many things which the senses cannot perceive. In like manner does the estimative power, though in a less perfect + manner. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q78_A4-p18"> + <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> The cogitative and memorative powers in man owe their excellence not to that which is proper to the sensitive part; but to + a certain affinity and proximity to the universal reason, which, so to speak, overflows into them. Therefore they are not + distinct powers, but the same, yet more perfect than in other animals. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q78_A4-p19"> + <b>Reply to Objection 6:</b> Augustine calls that vision spiritual which is effected by the images of bodies in the absence of bodies. Whence it is clear + that it is common to all interior apprehensions. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q78_A4-p20"></p> + <p id="FP_Q78_A4-p21"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q78_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q79.html"></a> + </div> + <a href="summa.FP_Q77_A8.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q78_A1.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q79" class="div3"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q78_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q79_A1.html"></a> + <h3 id="FP_Q79-p0.1">OF THE INTELLECTUAL POWERS (THIRTEEN ARTICLES)</h3> + <p id="FP_Q79-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q79-p2"> The next question concerns the intellectual powers, under which head there are thirteen points of inquiry:</p> + <p id="FP_Q79-p3"> (1) Whether the intellect is a power of the soul, or its essence?</p> + <p id="FP_Q79-p4"> (2) If it be a power, whether it is a passive power?</p> + <p id="FP_Q79-p5"> (3) If it is a passive power, whether there is an active intellect?</p> + <p id="FP_Q79-p6"> (4) Whether it is something in the soul?</p> + <p id="FP_Q79-p7"> (5) Whether the active intellect is one in all?</p> + <p id="FP_Q79-p8"> (6) Whether memory is in the intellect?</p> + <p id="FP_Q79-p9"> (7) Whether the memory be distinct from the intellect?</p> + <p id="FP_Q79-p10"> (8) Whether the reason is a distinct power from the intellect?</p> + <p id="FP_Q79-p11"> (9) Whether the superior and inferior reason are distinct powers?</p> + <p id="FP_Q79-p12"> (10) Whether the intelligence is distinct from the intellect?</p> + <p id="FP_Q79-p13"> (11) Whether the speculative and practical intellect are distinct powers?</p> + <p id="FP_Q79-p14"> (12) Whether "synderesis" is a power of the intellectual part?</p> + <p id="FP_Q79-p15"> (13) Whether the conscience is a power of the intellectual part?</p> + <div id="FP_Q79_A1" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q79.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q79_A2.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q79_A1-p0.1">Whether the intellect is a power of the soul?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q79_A1-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q79_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the intellect is not a power of the soul, but the essence of the soul. For the intellect seems to be the + same as the mind. Now the mind is not a power of the soul, but the essence; for Augustine says (De Trin. ix, 2): "Mind and + spirit are not relative things, but denominate the essence." Therefore the intellect is the essence of the soul. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q79_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, different genera of the soul's powers are not united in some one power, but only in the essence of the soul. Now + the appetitive and the intellectual are different genera of the soul's powers as the Philosopher says (De Anima ii, 3), but + they are united in the mind, for Augustine (De Trin. x, 11) places the intelligence and will in the mind. Therefore the mind + and intellect of man is of the very essence of the soul and not a power thereof. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q79_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, according to Gregory, in a homily for the Ascension (xxix in Ev.), "man understands with the angels." But angels + are called "minds" and "intellects." Therefore the mind and intellect of man are not a power of the soul, but the soul itself. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q79_A1-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, a substance is intellectual by the fact that it is immaterial. But the soul is immaterial through its essence. Therefore + it seems that the soul must be intellectual through its essence. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q79_A1-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher assigns the intellectual faculty as a power of the soul (De Anima ii, 3). + </p> + <p id="FP_Q79_A1-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> In accordance with what has been already shown ( + <a id="FP_Q79_A1-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q54_A3.html">Q[54], A[3]</a>; + <a id="FP_Q79_A1-p7.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q77_A1.html">Q[77], A[1]</a>) it is necessary to say that the intellect is a power of the soul, and not the very essence of the soul. For then alone the + essence of that which operates is the immediate principle of operation, when operation itself is its being: for as power is + to operation as its act, so is the essence to being. But in God alone His action of + understanding is His very Being. Wherefore in God alone is His intellect His essence: while in other intellectual creatures, + the intellect is power. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q79_A1-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Sense is sometimes taken for the power, and sometimes for the sensitive soul; for the sensitive soul takes its name from + its chief power, which is sense. And in like manner the intellectual soul is sometimes called intellect, as from its chief + power; and thus we read (De Anima i, 4), that the "intellect is a substance." And in this sense also Augustine says that the + mind is spirit and essence (De Trin. ix, 2; xiv, 16). + </p> + <p id="FP_Q79_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The appetitive and intellectual powers are different genera of powers in the soul, by reason of the different formalities + of their objects. But the appetitive power agrees partly with the intellectual power and partly with the sensitive in its + mode of operation either through a corporeal organ or without it: for appetite follows apprehension. And in this way Augustine + puts the will in the mind; and the Philosopher, in the reason (De Anima iii, 9). + </p> + <p id="FP_Q79_A1-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> In the angels there is no other power besides the intellect, and the will, which follows the intellect. And for this reason + an angel is called a "mind" or an "intellect"; because his whole power consists in this. But the soul has many other powers, + such as the sensitive and nutritive powers, and therefore the comparison fails. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q79_A1-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> The immateriality of the created intelligent substance is not its intellect; and through its immateriality it has the power + of intelligence. Wherefore it follows not that the intellect is the substance of the soul, but that it is its virtue and power. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q79_A1-p12"></p> + <p id="FP_Q79_A1-p13"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q79.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q79_A2.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q79_A2" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q79_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q79_A3.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q79_A2-p0.1">Whether the intellect is a passive power?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q79_A2-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q79_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the intellect is not a passive power. For everything is passive by its matter, and acts by its form. But + the intellectual power results from the immateriality of the intelligent substance. Therefore it seems that the intellect + is not a passive power. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q79_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the intellectual power is incorruptible, as we have said above ( + <a id="FP_Q79_A2-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q79_A6.html">Q[79], A[6]</a>). But "if the intellect is passive, it is corruptible" (De Anima iii, 5). Therefore the intellectual power is not passive. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q79_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the "agent is nobler than the patient," as Augustine (Gen. ad lit. xii, 16) and Aristotle (De Anima iii, 5) says. + But all the powers of the vegetative part are active; yet they are the lowest among the powers of the soul. Much more, therefore, + all the intellectual powers, which are the highest, are active. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q79_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 4) that "to understand is in a way to be passive." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q79_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> To be passive may be taken in three ways. Firstly, in its most strict sense, when from a thing is taken something which belongs + to it by virtue either of its nature, or of its proper inclination: as when water loses coolness by heating, and as when a + man becomes ill or sad. Secondly, less strictly, a thing is said to be passive, when something, whether suitable or unsuitable, + is taken away from it. And in this way not only he who is ill is said to be + passive, but also he who is healed; not only he that is sad, but also he that is joyful; or whatever way he be altered or + moved. Thirdly, in a wide sense a thing is said to be passive, from the very fact that what is in potentiality to something + receives that to which it was in potentiality, without being deprived of anything. And accordingly, whatever passes from potentiality + to act, may be said to be passive, even when it is perfected. And thus with us to understand is to be passive. This is + clear from the following reason. For the intellect, as we have seen above ( + <a id="FP_Q79_A2-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q78_A1.html">Q[78], A[1]</a>), has an operation extending to universal being. We may therefore see whether the intellect be in act or potentiality by + observing first of all the nature of the relation of the intellect to universal being. For we find an intellect whose relation + to universal being is that of the act of all being: and such is the Divine intellect, which is the Essence of God, in which + originally and + virtually, all being pre-exists as in its first cause. And therefore the Divine intellect is not in potentiality, but is pure + act. But no created intellect can be an act in relation to the whole universal being; otherwise it would needs be an infinite + being. Wherefore every created intellect is not the act of all things intelligible, by reason of its very existence; but is + compared to these intelligible things as a potentiality to act. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q79_A2-p7"> Now, potentiality has a double relation to act. There is a potentiality which is always perfected by its act: as the matter + of the heavenly bodies ( + <a id="FP_Q79_A2-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q58_A1.html">Q[58], A[1]</a>). And there is another potentiality which is not always in act, but proceeds from potentiality to act; as we observe in things + that are corrupted and generated. Wherefore the angelic intellect is always in act as regards those things which it can understand, + by reason of its proximity to the first + intellect, which is pure act, as we have said above. But the human intellect, which is the lowest in the order of intelligence + and most remote from the perfection of the Divine intellect, is in potentiality with regard to things intelligible, and is + at first "like a clean tablet on which nothing is written," as the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 4). This is made clear + from the fact, that at first we are only in potentiality to understand, and afterwards we are made to understand actually. + And + so it is evident that with us to understand is "in a way to be passive"; taking passion in the third sense. And consequently + the intellect is a passive power. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q79_A2-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This objection is verified of passion in the first and second senses, which belong to primary matter. But in the third sense + passion is in anything which is reduced from potentiality to act. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q79_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> "Passive intellect" is the name given by some to the sensitive appetite, in which are the passions of the soul; which appetite + is also called "rational by participation," because it "obeys the reason" (Ethic. i, 13). Others give the name of passive + intellect to the cogitative power, which is called the "particular reason." And in each case "passive" may be taken in the + two first senses; forasmuch as this so-called intellect is the act of a corporeal + organ. But the intellect which is in potentiality to things intelligible, and which for this reason Aristotle calls the "possible" + intellect (De Anima iii, 4) is not passive except in the third sense: for it is not an act of a corporeal organ. Hence it + is incorruptible. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q79_A2-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The agent is nobler than the patient, if the action and the passion are referred to the same thing: but not always, if they + refer to different things. Now the intellect is a passive power in regard to the whole universal being: while the vegetative + power is active in regard to some particular thing, namely, the body as united to the soul. Wherefore nothing prevents such + a passive force being nobler than such an active one. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q79_A2-p11"></p> + <p id="FP_Q79_A2-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q79_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q79_A3.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q79_A3" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q79_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q79_A4.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q79_A3-p0.1">Whether there is an active intellect?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q79_A3-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q79_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that there is no active intellect. For as the senses are to things sensible, so is our intellect to things + intelligible. But because sense is in potentiality to things sensible, the sense is not said to be active, but only passive. + Therefore, since our intellect is in potentiality to things intelligible, it seems that we cannot say that the intellect is + active, but only that it is passive. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q79_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, if we say that also in the senses there is something active, such as light: on the contrary, light is required for + sight, inasmuch as it makes the medium to be actually luminous; for color of its own nature moves the luminous medium. But + in the operation of the intellect there is no appointed medium that has to be brought into act. Therefore there is no necessity + for an active intellect. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q79_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the likeness of the agent is received into the patient according to the nature of the patient. But the passive intellect + is an immaterial power. Therefore its immaterial nature suffices for forms to be received into it immaterially. Now a form + is intelligible in act from the very fact that it is immaterial. Therefore there is no need for an active intellect to make + the species actually intelligible. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q79_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 5), "As in every nature, so in the soul is there something by which it becomes all things, + and something by which it makes all things." Therefore we must admit an active intellect. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q79_A3-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> According to the opinion of Plato, there is no need for an active intellect in order to make things actually intelligible; + but perhaps in order to provide intellectual light to the intellect, as will be explained farther on + <a id="FP_Q79_A3-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q79_A4.html">(A[4])</a>. For Plato supposed that the forms of natural things subsisted apart from matter, and consequently that they are intelligible: + since a thing is actually intelligible from the very fact that it is + immaterial. And he called such forms "species or ideas"; from a participation of which, he said that even corporeal matter + was formed, in order that individuals might be naturally established in their proper genera and species: and that our intellect + was formed by such participation in order to have knowledge of the genera and species of things. But since Aristotle did not + allow that forms of natural things exist apart from matter, and as forms existing in matter are not actually intelligible; + it follows that the natures of forms of the sensible things which we understand are not actually intelligible. Now nothing + is reduced from potentiality to act except by something in act; as the senses as made actual by what is actually sensible. + We must therefore assign on the part of the intellect some power to make things actually intelligible, by abstraction of the + species from material conditions. And such is the necessity for an active intellect. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q79_A3-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Sensible things are found in act outside the soul; and hence there is no need for an active sense. Wherefore it is clear + that in the nutritive part all the powers are active, whereas in the sensitive part all are passive: but in the intellectual + part, there is something active and something passive. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q79_A3-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> There are two opinions as to the effect of light. For some say that light is required for sight, in order to make colors + actually visible. And according to this the active intellect is required for understanding, in like manner and for the same + reason as light is required for seeing. But in the opinion of others, light is required for sight; not for the colors to become + actually visible; but in order that the medium may become actually luminous, as + the Commentator says on De Anima ii. And according to this, Aristotle's comparison of the active intellect to light is verified + in this, that as it is required for understanding, so is light required for seeing; but not for the same reason. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q79_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> If the agent pre-exist, it may well happen that its likeness is received variously into various things, on account of their + dispositions. But if the agent does not pre-exist, the disposition of the recipient has nothing to do with the matter. Now + the intelligible in act is not something existing in nature; if we consider the nature of things sensible, which do not subsist + apart from matter. And therefore in order to understand them, the immaterial + nature of the passive intellect would not suffice but for the presence of the active intellect which makes things actually + intelligible by way of abstraction. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q79_A3-p10"></p> + <p id="FP_Q79_A3-p11"></p> + <p id="FP_Q79_A3-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q79_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q79_A4.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q79_A4" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q79_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q79_A5.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q79_A4-p0.1">Whether the active intellect is something in the soul?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q79_A4-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q79_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the active intellect is not something in the soul. For the effect of the active intellect is to give light + for the purpose of understanding. But this is done by something higher than the soul: according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q79_A4-p2.1" href="./asv.html#John.1.9" target="asv"> Jn. 1:9, </a> "He was the true light that enlighteneth every man coming into this world." Therefore the active intellect is not something + in the soul. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q79_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the Philosopher (De Anima iii, 5) says of the active intellect, "that it does not sometimes understand and sometimes + not understand." But our soul does not always understand: sometimes it understands, sometimes it does not understand. Therefore + the active intellect is not something in our soul. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q79_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, agent and patient suffice for action. If, therefore, the passive intellect, which is a passive power, is something + belonging to the soul; and also the active intellect, which is an active power: it follows that a man would always be able + to understand when he wished, which is clearly false. Therefore the active intellect is not something in our soul. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q79_A4-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, the Philosopher (De Anima iii, 5) says that the active intellect is a "substance in actual being." But nothing can + be in potentiality and in act with regard to the same thing. If, therefore, the passive intellect, which is in potentiality + to all things intelligible, is something in the soul, it seems impossible for the active intellect to be also something in + our soul. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q79_A4-p6"> + <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, if the active intellect is something in the soul, it must be a power. For it is neither a passion nor a habit; since + habits and passions are not in the nature of agents in regard to the passivity of the soul; but rather passion is the very + action of the passive power; while habit is something which results from acts. But every power flows from the essence of the + soul. It would therefore follow that the active intellect flows from the essence of the + soul. And thus it would not be in the soul by way of participation from some higher intellect: which is unfitting. Therefore + the active intellect is not something in our soul. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q79_A4-p7"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 5), that "it is necessary for these differences," namely, the passive and active intellect, + "to be in the soul." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q79_A4-p8"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The active intellect, of which the Philosopher speaks, is something in the soul. In order to make this evident, we must observe + that above the intellectual soul of man we must needs suppose a superior intellect, from which the soul acquires the power + of understanding. For what is such by participation, and what is mobile, and what is imperfect always requires the pre-existence + of something essentially such, immovable and perfect. Now the human soul is called + intellectual by reason of a participation in intellectual power; a sign of which is that it is not wholly intellectual but + only in part. Moreover it reaches to the understanding of truth by arguing, with a certain amount of reasoning and movement. + Again it has an imperfect understanding; both because it does not understand everything, and because, in those things which + it does understand, it passes from potentiality to act. Therefore there must needs be some higher intellect, by which the + soul + is helped to understand. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q79_A4-p9"> Wherefore some held that this intellect, substantially separate, is the active intellect, which by lighting up the phantasms + as it were, makes them to be actually intelligible. But, even supposing the existence of such a separate active intellect, + it would still be necessary to assign to the human soul some power participating in that superior intellect, by which power + the human soul makes things actually intelligible. Just as in other perfect natural things, besides the + universal active causes, each one is endowed with its proper powers derived from those universal causes: for the sun alone + does not generate man; but in man is the power of begetting man: and in like manner with other perfect animals. Now among + these lower things nothing is more perfect than the human soul. Wherefore we must say that in the soul is some power derived + from a higher intellect, whereby it is able to light up the phantasms. And we know this by experience, since we perceive that + we + abstract universal forms from their particular conditions, which is to make them actually intelligible. Now no action belongs + to anything except through some principle formally inherent therein; as we have said above of the passive intellect ( + <a id="FP_Q79_A4-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q76_A1.html">Q[76], A[1]</a>). Therefore the power which is the principle of this action must be something in the soul. For this reason Aristotle (De + Anima iii, 5) compared the active intellect to light, which is something received into the air: + while Plato compared the separate intellect impressing the soul to the sun, as Themistius says in his commentary on De Anima + iii. But the separate intellect, according to the teaching of our faith, is God Himself, Who is the soul's Creator, and only + beatitude; as will be shown later on ( + <a id="FP_Q79_A4-p9.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q90_A3.html">Q[90], A[3]</a>; FS, + <a id="FP_Q79_A4-p9.3" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q3_A7.html">Q[3], A[7]</a>). Wherefore the human soul derives its intellectual light from Him, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q79_A4-p9.4" href="./asv.html#Ps.4.7" target="asv"> Ps. 4:7, </a> "The light of Thy + countenance, O Lord, is signed upon us." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q79_A4-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> That true light enlightens as a universal cause, from which the human soul derives a particular power, as we have explained. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q79_A4-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The Philosopher says those words not of the active intellect, but of the intellect in act: of which he had already said: + "Knowledge in act is the same as the thing." Or, if we refer those words to the active intellect, then they are said because + it is not owing to the active intellect that sometimes we do, and sometimes we do not understand, but to the intellect which + is in potentiality. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q79_A4-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> If the relation of the active intellect to the passive were that of the active object to a power, as, for instance, of the + visible in act to the sight; it would follow that we could understand all things instantly, since the active intellect is + that which makes all things (in act). But now the active intellect is not an object, rather is it that whereby the objects + are made to be in act: for which, besides the presence of the active intellect, we + require the presence of phantasms, the good disposition of the sensitive powers, and practice in this sort of operation; since + through one thing understood, other things come to be understood, as from terms are made propositions, and from first principles, + conclusions. From this point of view it matters not whether the active intellect is something belonging to the soul, or something + separate from the soul. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q79_A4-p13"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> The intellectual soul is indeed actually immaterial, but it is in potentiality to determinate species. On the contrary, phantasms + are actual images of certain species, but are immaterial in potentiality. Wherefore nothing prevents one and the same soul, + inasmuch as it is actually immaterial, having one power by which it makes things actually immaterial, by abstraction from + the conditions of individual matter: which power is called the "active + intellect"; and another power, receptive of such species, which is called the "passive intellect" by reason of its being in + potentiality to such species. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q79_A4-p14"> + <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> Since the essence of the soul is immaterial, created by the supreme intellect, nothing prevents that power which it derives + from the supreme intellect, and whereby it abstracts from matter, flowing from the essence of the soul, in the same way as + its other powers. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q79_A4-p15"></p> + <p id="FP_Q79_A4-p16"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q79_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q79_A5.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q79_A5" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q79_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q79_A6.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q79_A5-p0.1">Whether the active intellect is one in all?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q79_A5-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q79_A5-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that there is one active intellect in all. For what is separate from the body is not multiplied according to + the number of bodies. But the active intellect is "separate," as the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 5). Therefore it is not + multiplied in the many human bodies, but is one for all men. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q79_A5-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the active intellect is the cause of the universal, which is one in many. But that which is the cause of unity is + still more itself one. Therefore the active intellect is the same in all. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q79_A5-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, all men agree in the first intellectual concepts. But to these they assent by the active intellect. Therefore all + agree in one active intellect. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q79_A5-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 5) that the active intellect is as a light. But light is not the same in the various + things enlightened. Therefore the same active intellect is not in various men. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q79_A5-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The truth about this question depends on what we have already said + <a id="FP_Q79_A5-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q79_A4.html">(A[4])</a>. For if the active intellect were not something belonging to the soul, but were some separate substance, there would be one + active intellect for all men. And this is what they mean who hold that there is one active intellect for all. But if the active + intellect is something belonging to the soul, as one of its powers, we are bound to say that there are as many + active intellects as there are souls, which are multiplied according to the number of men, as we have said above ( + <a id="FP_Q79_A5-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q76_A2.html">Q[76], A[2]</a>). For it is impossible that one same power belong to various substances. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q79_A5-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The Philosopher proves that the active intellect is separate, by the fact that the passive intellect is separate: because, + as he says (De Anima iii, 5), "the agent is more noble than the patient." Now the passive intellect is said to be separate, + because it is not the act of any corporeal organ. And in the same sense the active intellect is also called "separate"; but + not as a separate substance. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q79_A5-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The active intellect is the cause of the universal, by abstracting it from matter. But for this purpose it need not be the + same intellect in all intelligent beings; but it must be one in its relationship to all those things from which it abstracts + the universal, with respect to which things the universal is one. And this befits the active intellect inasmuch as it is immaterial. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q79_A5-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> All things which are of one species enjoy in common the action which accompanies the nature of the species, and consequently + the power which is the principle of such action; but not so as that power be identical in all. Now to know the first intelligible + principles is the action belonging to the human species. Wherefore all men enjoy in common the power which is the principle + of this action: and this power is the active intellect. But there is no need + for it to be identical in all. Yet it must be derived by all from one principle. And thus the possession by all men in common + of the first principles proves the unity of the separate intellect, which Plato compares to the sun; but not the unity of + the active intellect, which Aristotle compares to light. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q79_A5-p10"></p> + <p id="FP_Q79_A5-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q79_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q79_A6.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q79_A6" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q79_A5.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q79_A7.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q79_A6-p0.1">Whether memory is in the intellectual part of the soul?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q79_A6-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q79_A6-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that memory is not in the intellectual part of the soul. For Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 2,3,8) that to the + higher part of the soul belongs those things which are not "common to man and beast." But memory is common to man and beast, + for he says (De Trin. xii, 2,3,8) that "beasts can sense corporeal things through the senses of the body, and commit them + to memory." Therefore memory does not belong to the intellectual part of the soul. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q79_A6-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, memory is of the past. But the past is said of something with regard to a fixed time. Memory, therefore, knows a + thing under a condition of a fixed time; which involves knowledge under the conditions of "here" and "now." But this is not + the province of the intellect, but of the sense. Therefore memory is not in the intellectual part, but only in the sensitive. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q79_A6-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, in the memory are preserved the species of those things of which we are not actually thinking. But this cannot happen + in the intellect, because the intellect is reduced to act by the fact that the intelligible species are received into it. + Now the intellect in act implies understanding in act; and therefore the intellect actually understands all things of which + it has the species. Therefore the memory is not in the intellectual part. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q79_A6-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Trin. x, 11) that "memory, understanding, and will are one mind." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q79_A6-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Since it is of the nature of the memory to preserve the species of those things which are not actually apprehended, we must + first of all consider whether the intelligible species can thus be preserved in the intellect: because Avicenna held that + this was impossible. For he admitted that this could happen in the sensitive part, as to some powers, inasmuch as they are + acts of corporeal organs, in which certain species may be preserved apart from actual + apprehension. But in the intellect, which has no corporeal organ, nothing but what is intelligible exists. Wherefore every + thing of which the likeness exists in the intellect must be actually understood. Thus, therefore, according to him, as soon + as we cease to understand something actually, the species of that thing ceases to be in our intellect, and if we wish to understand + that thing anew, we must turn to the active intellect, which he held to be a separate substance, in order that the + intelligible species may thence flow again into our passive intellect. And from the practice and habit of turning to the active + intellect there is formed, according to him, a certain aptitude in the passive intellect for turning to the active intellect; + which aptitude he calls the habit of knowledge. According, therefore, to this supposition, nothing is preserved in the intellectual + part that is not actually understood: wherefore it would not be possible to admit memory in the intellectual + part. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q79_A6-p7"> But this opinion is clearly opposed to the teaching of Aristotle. For he says (De Anima iii, 4) that, when the passive intellect + "is identified with each thing as knowing it, it is said to be in act," and that "this happens when it can operate of itself. + And, even then, it is in potentiality, but not in the same way as before learning and discovering." Now, the passive intellect + is said to be each thing, inasmuch as it receives the intelligible species of each thing. To the + fact, therefore, that it receives the species of intelligible things it owes its being able to operate when it wills, but + not so that it be always operating: for even then is it in potentiality in a certain sense, though otherwise than before the + act of understanding---namely, in the sense that whoever has habitual knowledge is in potentiality to actual consideration. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q79_A6-p8"> The foregoing opinion is also opposed to reason. For what is received into something is received according to the conditions + of the recipient. But the intellect is of a more stable nature, and is more immovable than corporeal nature. If, therefore, + corporeal matter holds the forms which it receives, not only while it actually does something through them, but also after + ceasing to act through them, much more cogent reason is there for the intellect to receive the species + unchangeably and lastingly, whether it receive them from things sensible, or derive them from some superior intellect. Thus, + therefore, if we take memory only for the power of retaining species, we must say that it is in the intellectual part. But + if in the notion of memory we include its object as something past, then the memory is not in the intellectual, but only in + the sensitive part, which apprehends individual things. For past, as past, since it signifies being under a condition of fixed + time, is something individual. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q79_A6-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Memory, if considered as retentive of species, is not common to us and other animals. For species are not retained in the + sensitive part of the soul only, but rather in the body and soul united: since the memorative power is the act of some organ. + But the intellect in itself is retentive of species, without the association of any corporeal organ. Wherefore the Philosopher + says (De Anima iii, 4) that "the soul is the seat of the species, not the whole + soul, but the intellect." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q79_A6-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The condition of past may be referred to two things---namely, to the object which is known, and to the act of knowledge. + These two are found together in the sensitive part, which apprehends something from the fact of its being immuted by a present + sensible: wherefore at the same time an animal remembers to have sensed before in the past, and to have sensed some past sensible + thing. But as concerns the intellectual part, the past is accidental, and is + not in itself a part of the object of the intellect. For the intellect understands man, as man: and to man, as man, it is + accidental that he exist in the present, past, or future. But on the part of the act, the condition of past, even as such, + may be understood to be in the intellect, as well as in the senses. Because our soul's act of understanding is an individual + act, existing in this or that time, inasmuch as a man is said to understand now, or yesterday, or tomorrow. And this is not + incompatible with the intellectual nature: for such an act of understanding, though something individual, is yet an immaterial + act, as we have said above of the intellect ( + <a id="FP_Q79_A6-p10.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q76_A1.html">Q[76], A[1]</a>); and therefore, as the intellect understands itself, though it be itself an individual intellect, so also it understands + its act of understanding, which is an individual act, in the past, present, or future. In this way, then, the notion of memory, + in as far as it regards past events, is + preserved in the intellect, forasmuch as it understands that it previously understood: but not in the sense that it understands + the past as something "here" and "now." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q79_A6-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The intelligible species is sometimes in the intellect only in potentiality, and then the intellect is said to be in potentiality. + Sometimes the intelligible species is in the intellect as regards the ultimate completion of the act, and then it understands + in act. And sometimes the intelligible species is in a middle state, between potentiality and act: and then we have habitual + knowledge. In this way the intellect retains the species, even when it + does not understand in act. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q79_A6-p12"></p> + <p id="FP_Q79_A6-p13"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q79_A5.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q79_A7.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q79_A7" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q79_A6.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q79_A8.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q79_A7-p0.1">Whether the intellectual memory is a power distinct from the intellect?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q79_A7-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q79_A7-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the intellectual memory is distinct from the intellect. For Augustine (De Trin. x, 11) assigns to the + soul memory, understanding, and will. But it is clear that the memory is a distinct power from the will. Therefore it is also + distinct from the intellect. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q79_A7-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the reason of distinction among the powers in the sensitive part is the same as in the intellectual part. But memory + in the sensitive part is distinct from sense, as we have said ( + <a id="FP_Q79_A7-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q78_A4.html">Q[78], A[4]</a>). Therefore memory in the intellectual part is distinct from the intellect. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q79_A7-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, according to Augustine (De Trin. x, 11; xi, 7), memory, understanding, and will are equal to one another, and one + flows from the other. But this could not be if memory and intellect were the same power. Therefore they are not the same power. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q79_A7-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> From its nature the memory is the treasury or storehouse of species. But the Philosopher (De Anima iii) attributes this to + the intellect, as we have said (A[6], ad 1). Therefore the memory is not another power from the intellect. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q79_A7-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As has been said above ( + <a id="FP_Q79_A7-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q77_A3.html">Q[77], A[3]</a>), the powers of the soul are distinguished by the different formal aspects of their objects: since each power is defined + in reference to that thing to which it is directed and which is its object. It has also been said above ( + <a id="FP_Q79_A7-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q59_A4.html">Q[59], A[4]</a>) that if any power by its nature be directed to an object according to the common ratio of the object, that power will not + be + differentiated according to the individual differences of that object: just as the power of sight, which regards its object + under the common ratio of color, is not differentiated by differences of black and white. Now, the intellect regards its object + under the common ratio of being: since the passive intellect is that "in which all are in potentiality." Wherefore the passive + intellect is not differentiated by any difference of being. Nevertheless there is a distinction between the power of the + active intellect and of the passive intellect: because as regards the same object, the active power which makes the object + to be in act must be distinct from the passive power, which is moved by the object existing in act. Thus the active power + is compared to its object as a being in act is to a being in potentiality; whereas the passive power, on the contrary, is + compared to its object as being in potentiality is to a being in act. Therefore there can be no other difference of powers + in the + intellect, but that of passive and active. Wherefore it is clear that memory is not a distinct power from the intellect: for + it belongs to the nature of a passive power to retain as well as to receive. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q79_A7-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Although it is said (3 Sent. D, 1) that memory, intellect, and will are three powers, this is not in accordance with the + meaning of Augustine, who says expressly (De Trin. xiv) that "if we take memory, intelligence, and will as always present + in the soul, whether we actually attend to them or not, they seem to pertain to the memory only. And by intelligence I mean + that by which we understand when actually thinking; and by will I mean that love or + affection which unites the child and its parent." Wherefore it is clear that Augustine does not take the above three for three + powers; but by memory he understands the soul's habit of retention; by intelligence, the act of the intellect; and by will, + the act of the will. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q79_A7-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Past and present may differentiate the sensitive powers, but not the intellectual powers, for the reason give above. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q79_A7-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Intelligence arises from memory, as act from habit; and in this way it is equal to it, but not as a power to a power. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q79_A7-p10"></p> + <p id="FP_Q79_A7-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q79_A6.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q79_A8.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q79_A8" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q79_A7.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q79_A9.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q79_A8-p0.1">Whether the reason is distinct from the intellect?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q79_A8-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q79_A8-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the reason is a distinct power from the intellect. For it is stated in De Spiritu et Anima that "when + we wish to rise from lower things to higher, first the sense comes to our aid, then imagination, then reason, then the intellect." + Therefore the reason is distinct from the intellect, as imagination is from sense. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q79_A8-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Boethius says (De Consol. iv, 6), that intellect is compared to reason, as eternity to time. But it does not belong + to the same power to be in eternity and to be in time. Therefore reason and intellect are not the same power. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q79_A8-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, man has intellect in common with the angels, and sense in common with the brutes. But reason, which is proper to + man, whence he is called a rational animal, is a power distinct from sense. Therefore is it equally true to say that it is + distinct from the intellect, which properly belongs to the angel: whence they are called intellectual. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q79_A8-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. iii, 20) that "that in which man excels irrational animals is reason, or mind, or intelligence + or whatever appropriate name we like to give it." Therefore, reason, intellect and mind are one power. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q79_A8-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Reason and intellect in man cannot be distinct powers. We shall understand this clearly if we consider their respective actions. + For to understand is simply to apprehend intelligible truth: and to reason is to advance from one thing understood to another, + so as to know an intelligible truth. And therefore angels, who according to their nature, possess perfect knowledge of intelligible + truth, have no need to advance from one thing to another; but apprehend + the truth simply and without mental discussion, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. vii). But man arrives at the knowledge of intelligible + truth by advancing from one thing to another; and therefore he is called rational. Reasoning, therefore, is compared to understanding, + as movement is to rest, or acquisition to possession; of which one belongs to the perfect, the other to the imperfect. And + since movement always proceeds from something immovable, and ends in something at rest; hence it is that + human reasoning, by way of inquiry and discovery, advances from certain things simply understood---namely, the first principles; + and, again, by way of judgment returns by analysis to first principles, in the light of which it examines what it has found. + Now it is clear that rest and movement are not to be referred to different powers, but to one and the same, even in natural + things: since by the same nature a thing is moved towards a certain place. Much more, therefore, by the same power do we + understand and reason: and so it is clear that in man reason and intellect are the same power. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q79_A8-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> That enumeration is made according to the order of actions, not according to the distinction of powers. Moreover, that book + is not of great authority. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q79_A8-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The answer is clear from what we have said. For eternity is compared to time as immovable to movable. And thus Boethius compared + the intellect to eternity, and reason to time. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q79_A8-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Other animals are so much lower than man that they cannot attain to the knowledge of truth, which reason seeks. But man attains, + although imperfectly, to the knowledge of intelligible truth, which angels know. Therefore in the angels the power of knowledge + is not of a different genus fro that which is in the human reason, but is compared to it as the perfect to the imperfect. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q79_A8-p10"></p> + <p id="FP_Q79_A8-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q79_A7.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q79_A9.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q79_A9" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q79_A8.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q79_A10.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q79_A9-p0.1">Whether the higher and lower reason are distinct powers?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q79_A9-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q79_A9-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the higher and lower reason are distinct powers. For Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 4,7), that the image + of the Trinity is in the higher part of the reason, and not in the lower. But the parts of the soul are its powers. Therefore + the higher and lower reason are two powers. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q79_A9-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, nothing flows from itself. Now, the lower reason flows from the higher, and is ruled and directed by it. Therefore + the higher reason is another power from the lower. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q79_A9-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 1) that "the scientific part" of the soul, by which the soul knows necessary things, + is another principle, and another part from the "opinionative" and "reasoning" part by which it knows contingent things. And + he proves this from the principle that for those things which are "generically different, generically different parts of the + soul are ordained." Now contingent and necessary are generically different, as + corruptible and incorruptible. Since, therefore, necessary is the same as eternal, and temporal the same as contingent, it + seems that what the Philosopher calls the "scientific" part must be the same as the higher reason, which, according to Augustine + (De Trin. xii, 7) "is intent on the consideration and consultation of things eternal"; and that what the Philosopher calls + the "reasoning" or "opinionative" part is the same as the lower reason, which, according to Augustine, "is intent on the + disposal of temporal things." Therefore the higher reason is another power than the lower. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q79_A9-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii) that "opinion rises from the imagination: then the mind by judging of the truth + or error of the opinion discovers the truth: whence" men's (mind) "is derived from" metiendo [measuring]. "And therefore the + intellect regards those things which are already subject to judgment and true decision." Therefore the opinionative power, + which is the lower reason, is distinct from the mind and the intellect, by which we may + understand the higher reason. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q79_A9-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 4) that "the higher and lower reason are only distinct by their functions." Therefore they + are not two powers. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q79_A9-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The higher and lower reason, as they are understood by Augustine, can in no way be two powers of the soul. For he says that + "the higher reason is that which is intent on the contemplation and consultation of things eternal": forasmuch as in contemplation + it sees them in themselves, and in consultation it takes its rules of action from them. But he calls the lower reason that + which "is intent on the disposal of temporal things." Now these two---namely, + eternal and temporal ---are related to our knowledge in this way, that one of them is the means of knowing the other. For + by way of discovery, we come through knowledge of temporal things to that of things eternal, according to the words of the + Apostle ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q79_A9-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.1.20" target="asv">Rom. 1:20</a>), "The invisible things of God are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made": while by way of judgment, + from eternal things already known, we judge of temporal things, and according to laws of + things eternal we dispose of temporal things. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q79_A9-p8"> But it may happen that the medium and what is attained thereby belong to different habits: as the first indemonstrable principles + belong to the habit of the intellect; whereas the conclusions which we draw from them belong to the habit of science. And + so it happens that from the principles of geometry we draw a conclusion in another science---for example, perspective. But + the power of the reason is such that both medium and term belong to it. For the act of the reason is, as it + were, a movement from one thing to another. But the same movable thing passes through the medium and reaches the end. Wherefore + the higher and lower reasons are one and the same power. But according to Augustine they are distinguished by the functions + of their actions, and according to their various habits: for wisdom is attributed to the higher reason, science to the lower. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q79_A9-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> We speak of parts, in whatever way a thing is divided. And so far as reason is divided according to its various acts, the + higher and lower reason are called parts; but not because they are different powers. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q79_A9-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The lower reason is said to flow from the higher, or to be ruled by it, as far as the principles made use of by the lower + reason are drawn from and directed by the principles of the higher reason. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q79_A9-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The "scientific" part, of which the Philosopher speaks, is not the same as the higher reason: for necessary truths are found + even among temporal things, of which natural science and mathematics treat. And the "opinionative" and "ratiocinative" part + is more limited than the lower reason; for it regards only things contingent. Neither must we say, without any qualification, + that a power, by which the intellect knows necessary things, is distinct from a + power by which it knows contingent things: because it knows both under the same objective aspect---namely, under the aspect + of being and truth. Wherefore it perfectly knows necessary things which have perfect being in truth; since it penetrates to + their very essence, from which it demonstrates their proper accidents. On the other hand, it knows contingent things, but + imperfectly; forasmuch as they have but imperfect being and truth. Now perfect and imperfect in the action do not vary the + power, + but they vary the actions as to the mode of acting, and consequently the principles of the actions and the habits themselves. + And therefore the Philosopher postulates two lesser parts of the soul---namely, the "scientific" and the "ratiocinative," + not because they are two powers, but because they are distinct according to a different aptitude for receiving various habits, + concerning the variety of which he inquires. For contingent and necessary, though differing according to their proper + genera, nevertheless agree in the common aspect of being, which the intellect considers, and to which they are variously compared + as perfect and imperfect. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q79_A9-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> That distinction given by Damascene is according to the variety of acts, not according to the variety of powers. For "opinion" + signifies an act of the intellect which leans to one side of a contradiction, whilst in fear of the other. While to "judge" + or "measure" [mensurare] is an act of the intellect, applying certain principles to examine propositions. From this is taken + the word "mens" [mind]. Lastly, to "understand" is to adhere to the formed + judgment with approval. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q79_A9-p13"></p> + <p id="FP_Q79_A9-p14"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q79_A8.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q79_A10.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q79_A10" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q79_A9.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q79_A11.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q79_A10-p0.1">Whether intelligence is a power distinct from intellect?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q79_A10-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q79_A10-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the intelligence is another power than the intellect. For we read in De Spiritu et Anima that "when we + wish to rise from lower to higher things, first the sense comes to our aid, then imagination, then reason, then intellect, + and afterwards intelligence." But imagination and sense are distinct powers. Therefore also intellect and intelligence are + distinct. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q79_A10-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Boethius says (De Consol. v, 4) that "sense considers man in one way, imagination in another, reason in another, + intelligence in another." But intellect is the same power as reason. Therefore, seemingly, intelligence is a distinct power + from intellect, as reason is a distinct power from imagination or sense. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q79_A10-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, "actions came before powers," as the Philosopher says (De Anima ii, 4). But intelligence is an act separate from + others attributed to the intellect. For Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii) that "the first movement is called intelligence; + but that intelligence which is about a certain thing is called intention; that which remains and conforms the soul to that + which is understood is called invention, and invention when it remains in the same man, + examining and judging of itself, is called phronesis [that is, wisdom], and phronesis if dilated makes thought, that is, orderly + internal speech; from which, they say, comes speech expressed by the tongue." Therefore it seems that intelligence is some + special power. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q79_A10-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 6) that "intelligence is of indivisible things in which there is nothing false." But + the knowledge of these things belongs to the intellect. Therefore intelligence is not another power than the intellect. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q79_A10-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> This word "intelligence" properly signifies the intellect's very act, which is to understand. However, in some works translated + from the Arabic, the separate substances which we call angels are called "intelligences," and perhaps for this reason, that + such substances are always actually understanding. But in works translated from the Greek, they are called "intellects" or + "minds." Thus intelligence is not distinct from intellect, as power is from power; but + as act is from power. And such a division is recognized even by the philosophers. For sometimes they assign four intellects---namely, + the "active" and "passive" intellects, the intellect "in habit," and the "actual" intellect. Of which four the active and + passive intellects are different powers; just as in all things the active power is distinct from the passive. But three of + these are distinct, as three states of the passive intellect, which is sometimes in potentiality only, and thus it is + called passive; sometimes it is in the first act, which is knowledge, and thus it is called intellect in habit; and sometimes + it is in the second act, which is to consider, and thus it is called intellect in act, or actual intellect. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q79_A10-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> If this authority is accepted, intelligence there means the act of the intellect. And thus it is divided against intellect + as act against power. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q79_A10-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Boethius takes intelligence as meaning that act of the intellect which transcends the act of the reason. Wherefore he also + says that reason alone belongs to the human race, as intelligence alone belongs to God, for it belongs to God to understand + all things without any investigation. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q79_A10-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> All those acts which Damascene enumerates belong to one power---namely, the intellectual power. For this power first of all + only apprehends something; and this act is called "intelligence." Secondly, it directs what it apprehends to the knowledge + of something else, or to some operation; and this is called "intention." And when it goes on in search of what it "intends," + it is called "invention." When, by reference to something known for certain, it + examines what it has found, it is said to know or to be wise, which belongs to "phronesis" or "wisdom"; for "it belongs to + the wise man to judge," as the Philosopher says (Metaph. i, 2). And when once it has obtained something for certain, as being + fully examined, it thinks about the means of making it known to others; and this is the ordering of "interior speech," from + which proceeds "external speech." For every difference of acts does not make the powers vary, but only what cannot be reduced + to the one same principle, as we have said above ( + <a id="FP_Q79_A10-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q78_A4.html">Q[78], A[4]</a>). + </p> + <p id="FP_Q79_A10-p10"></p> + <p id="FP_Q79_A10-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q79_A9.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q79_A11.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q79_A11" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q79_A10.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q79_A12.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q79_A11-p0.1">Whether the speculative and practical intellects are distinct powers?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q79_A11-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q79_A11-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the speculative and practical intellects are distinct powers. For the apprehensive and motive are different + kinds of powers, as is clear from De Anima ii, 3. But the speculative intellect is merely an apprehensive power; while the + practical intellect is a motive power. Therefore they are distinct powers. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q79_A11-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the different nature of the object differentiates the power. But the object of the speculative intellect is "truth," + and of the practical is "good"; which differ in nature. Therefore the speculative and practical intellect are distinct powers. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q79_A11-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, in the intellectual part, the practical intellect is compared to the speculative, as the estimative is to the imaginative + power in the sensitive part. But the estimative differs from the imaginative, as power form power, as we have said above ( + <a id="FP_Q79_A11-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q78_A4.html">Q[78], A[4]</a>). Therefore also the speculative intellect differs from the practical. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q79_A11-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The speculative intellect by extension becomes practical (De Anima iii, 10). But one power is not changed into another. Therefore + the speculative and practical intellects are not distinct powers. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q79_A11-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The speculative and practical intellects are not distinct powers. The reason of which is that, as we have said above ( + <a id="FP_Q79_A11-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q77_A3.html">Q[77], A[3]</a>), what is accidental to the nature of the object of a power, does not differentiate that power; for it is accidental to a + thing colored to be man, or to be great or small; hence all such things are apprehended by the same power of sight. Now, to + a thing apprehended by the intellect, it is accidental + whether it be directed to operation or not, and according to this the speculative and practical intellects differ. For it + is the speculative intellect which directs what it apprehends, not to operation, but to the consideration of truth; while + the practical intellect is that which directs what it apprehends to operation. And this is what the Philosopher says (De Anima + iii, 10); that "the speculative differs from the practical in its end." Whence each is named from its end: the one speculative, + the other practical---i.e. operative. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q79_A11-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The practical intellect is a motive power, not as executing movement, but as directing towards it; and this belongs to it + according to its mode of apprehension. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q79_A11-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Truth and good include one another; for truth is something good, otherwise it would not be desirable; and good is something + true, otherwise it would not be intelligible. Therefore as the object of the appetite may be something true, as having the + aspect of good, for example, when some one desires to know the truth; so the object of the practical intellect is good directed + to the operation, and under the aspect of truth. For the practical intellect + knows truth, just as the speculative, but it directs the known truth to operation. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q79_A11-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Many differences differentiate the sensitive powers, which do not differentiate the intellectual powers, as we have said + above (A[7] , ad 2; + <a id="FP_Q79_A11-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q77_A3.html">Q[77], A[3]</a>, ad 4). + </p> + <p id="FP_Q79_A11-p10"></p> + <p id="FP_Q79_A11-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q79_A10.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q79_A12.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q79_A12" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q79_A11.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q79_A13.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q79_A12-p0.1">Whether synderesis is a special power of the soul distinct from the others?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q79_A12-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q79_A12-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that "synderesis" is a special power, distinct from the others. For those things which fall under one division, + seem to be of the same genus. But in the gloss of Jerome on + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q79_A12-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Ezek.1.6" target="asv"> Ezech. 1:6, </a> "synderesis" is divided against the irascible, the concupiscible, and the rational, which are powers. Therefore "synderesis" + is a power. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q79_A12-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, opposite things are of the same genus. But "synderesis" and sensuality seem to be opposed to one another because + "synderesis" always incites to good; while sensuality always incites to evil: whence it is signified by the serpent, as is + clear from Augustine (De Trin. xii, 12,13). It seems, therefore, that 'synderesis' is a power just as sensuality is. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q79_A12-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. ii, 10) that in the natural power of judgment there are certain "rules and seeds of + virtue, both true and unchangeable." And this is what we call synderesis. Since, therefore, the unchangeable rules which guide + our judgment belong to the reason as to its higher part, as Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 2), it seems that "synderesis" is + the same as reason: and thus it is a power. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q79_A12-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> According to the Philosopher (Metaph. viii, 2), "rational powers regard opposite things." But "synderesis" does not regard + opposites, but inclines to good only. Therefore "synderesis" is not a power. For if it were a power it would be a rational + power, since it is not found in brute animals. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q79_A12-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> "Synderesis" is not a power but a habit; though some held that it is a power higher than reason; while others [*Cf. Alexander + of Hales, Sum. Theol. II, Q[73]] said that it is reason itself, not as reason, but as a nature. In order to make this clear + we must observe that, as we have said above + <a id="FP_Q79_A12-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q79_A8.html">(A[8])</a>, man's act of reasoning, since it is a kind of movement, proceeds from the understanding of certain things---namely, those + which are + naturally known without any investigation on the part of reason, as from an immovable principle---and ends also at the understanding, + inasmuch as by means of those principles naturally known, we judge of those things which we have discovered by reasoning. + Now it is clear that, as the speculative reason argues about speculative things, so that practical reason argues about practical + things. Therefore we must have, bestowed on us by nature, not only speculative principles, but also practical + principles. Now the first speculative principles bestowed on us by nature do not belong to a special power, but to a special + habit, which is called "the understanding of principles," as the Philosopher explains (Ethic. vi, 6). Wherefore the first + practical principles, bestowed on us by nature, do not belong to a special power, but to a special natural habit, which we + call "synderesis." Whence "synderesis" is said to incite to good, and to murmur at evil, inasmuch as through first principles + we + proceed to discover, and judge of what we have discovered. It is therefore clear that "synderesis" is not a power, but a natural + habit. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q79_A12-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The division given by Jerome is taken from the variety of acts, and not from the variety of powers; and various acts can + belong to one power. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q79_A12-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> In like manner, the opposition of sensuality to "syneresis" is an opposition of acts, and not of the different species of + one genus. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q79_A12-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Those unchangeable notions are the first practical principles, concerning which no one errs; and they are attributed to reason + as to a power, and to "synderesis" as to a habit. Wherefore we judge naturally both by our reason and by "synderesis." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q79_A12-p10"></p> + <p id="FP_Q79_A12-p11"></p> + <p id="FP_Q79_A12-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q79_A11.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q79_A13.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q79_A13" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q79_A12.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q80.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q79_A13-p0.1">Whether conscience be a power?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q79_A13-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q79_A13-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that conscience is a power; for Origen says [*Commentary on + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q79_A13-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.2.15" target="asv"> Rom. 2:15</a>] that "conscience is a correcting and guiding spirit accompanying the soul, by which it is led away from evil and made to + cling to good." But in the soul, spirit designates a power---either the mind itself, according to the text ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q79_A13-p2.2" href="./asv.html#Eph.4.13" target="asv">Eph. 4:13</a>), "Be ye renewed in the spirit of your mind"---or the imagination, whence imaginary vision is + called spiritual, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 7,24). Therefore conscience is a power. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q79_A13-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, nothing is a subject of sin, except a power of the soul. But conscience is a subject of sin; for it is said of some + that "their mind and conscience are defiled" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q79_A13-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Titus.1.15" target="asv">Titus 1:15</a>). Therefore it seems that conscience is a power. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q79_A13-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, conscience must of necessity be either an act, a habit, or a power. But it is not an act; for thus it would not + always exist in man. Nor is it a habit; for conscience is not one thing but many, since we are directed in our actions by + many habits of knowledge. Therefore conscience is a power. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q79_A13-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Conscience can be laid aside. But a power cannot be laid aside. Therefore conscience is not a power. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q79_A13-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Properly speaking, conscience is not a power, but an act. This is evident both from the very name and from those things which + in the common way of speaking are attributed to conscience. For conscience, according to the very nature of the word, implies + the relation of knowledge to something: for conscience may be resolved into "cum alio scientia," i.e. knowledge applied to + an individual case. But the application of knowledge to something is done by some act. + Wherefore from this explanation of the name it is clear that conscience is an act. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q79_A13-p7"> The same is manifest from those things which are attributed to conscience. For conscience is said to witness, to bind, or + incite, and also to accuse, torment, or rebuke. And all these follow the application of knowledge or science to what we do: + which application is made in three ways. One way in so far as we recognize that we have done or not done something; "Thy conscience + knoweth that thou hast often spoken evil of others" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q79_A13-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Eccl.7.23" target="asv">Eccles. 7:23</a>), and according to + this, conscience is said to witness. In another way, so far as through the conscience we judge that something should be done + or not done; and in this sense, conscience is said to incite or to bind. In the third way, so far as by conscience we judge + that something done is well done or ill done, and in this sense conscience is said to excuse, accuse, or torment. Now, it + is clear that all these things follow the actual application of knowledge to what we do. Wherefore, properly speaking, + conscience denominates an act. But since habit is a principle of act, sometimes the name conscience is given to the first + natural habit---namely, 'synderesis': thus Jerome calls 'synderesis' conscience (Gloss. + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q79_A13-p7.2" href="./asv.html#Ezek.1.6" target="asv"> Ezech. 1:6</a>); Basil [*Hom. in princ. Proverb.], the "natural power of judgment," and Damascene [*De Fide Orth. iv. 22] says that it is + the "law of our intellect." For it is customary for causes and effects to be called after one another. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q79_A13-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Conscience is called a spirit, so far as spirit is the same as mind; because conscience is a certain pronouncement of the + mind. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q79_A13-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The conscience is said to be defiled, not as a subject, but as the thing known is in knowledge; so far as someone knows he + is defiled. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q79_A13-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Although an act does not always remain in itself, yet it always remains in its cause, which is power and habit. Now all the + habits by which conscience is formed, although many, nevertheless have their efficacy from one first habit, the habit of first + principles, which is called "synderesis." And for this special reason, this habit is sometimes called conscience, as we have + said above. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q79_A13-p11"></p> + <p id="FP_Q79_A13-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q79_A12.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q80.html"></a> + </div> + <a href="summa.FP_Q78_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q79_A1.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q80" class="div3"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q79_A13.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q80_A1.html"></a> + <h3 id="FP_Q80-p0.1">OF THE APPETITIVE POWERS IN GENERAL (TWO ARTICLES)</h3> + <p id="FP_Q80-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q80-p2"> Next we consider the appetitive powers, concerning which there are four heads of consideration: first, the appetitive powers + in general; second, sensuality; third, the will; fourth, the free-will. Under the first there are two points of inquiry: + </p> + <p id="FP_Q80-p3"> (1) Whether the appetite should be considered a special power of the soul?</p> + <p id="FP_Q80-p4"> (2) Whether the appetite should be divided into intellectual and sensitive as distinct powers?</p> + <p id="FP_Q80-p5"></p> + <div id="FP_Q80_A1" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q80.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q80_A2.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q80_A1-p0.1">Whether the appetite is a special power of the soul?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q80_A1-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q80_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the appetite is not a special power of the soul. For no power of the soul is to be assigned for those + things which are common to animate and to inanimate things. But appetite is common to animate and inanimate things: since + "all desire good," as the Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 1). Therefore the appetite is not a special power of the soul. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q80_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, powers are differentiated by their objects. But what we desire is the same as what we know. Therefore the appetitive + power is not distinct from the apprehensive power. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q80_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the common is not divided from the proper. But each power of the soul desires some particular desirable thing---namely + its own suitable object. Therefore, with regard to this object which is the desirable in general, we should not assign some + particular power distinct from the others, called the appetitive power. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q80_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher distinguishes (De Anima ii, 3) the appetitive from the other powers. Damascene also (De Fide Orth. ii, 22) + distinguishes the appetitive from the cognitive powers. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q80_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> It is necessary to assign an appetitive power to the soul. To make this evident, we must observe that some inclination follows + every form: for example, fire, by its form, is inclined to rise, and to generate its like. Now, the form is found to have + a more perfect existence in those things which participate knowledge than in those which lack knowledge. For in those which + lack knowledge, the form is found to determine each thing only to its own being---that + is, to its nature. Therefore this natural form is followed by a natural inclination, which is called the natural appetite. + But in those things which have knowledge, each one is determined to its own natural being by its natural form, in such a manner + that it is nevertheless receptive of the species of other things: for example, sense receives the species of all things sensible, + and the intellect, of all things intelligible, so that the soul of man is, in a way, all things by sense and + intellect: and thereby, those things that have knowledge, in a way, approach to a likeness to God, "in Whom all things pre-exist," + as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. v). + </p> + <p id="FP_Q80_A1-p7"> Therefore, as forms exist in those things that have knowledge in a higher manner and above the manner of natural forms; so + must there be in them an inclination surpassing the natural inclination, which is called the natural appetite. And this superior + inclination belongs to the appetitive power of the soul, through which the animal is able to desire what it apprehends, and + not only that to which it is inclined by its natural form. And so it is necessary to assign an appetitive + power to the soul. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q80_A1-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Appetite is found in things which have knowledge, above the common manner in which it is found in all things, as we have + said above. Therefore it is necessary to assign to the soul a particular power. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q80_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> What is apprehended and what is desired are the same in reality, but differ in aspect: for a thing is apprehended as something + sensible or intelligible, whereas it is desired as suitable or good. Now, it is diversity of aspect in the objects, and not + material diversity, which demands a diversity of powers. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q80_A1-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Each power of the soul is a form or nature, and has a natural inclination to something. Wherefore each power desires by the + natural appetite that object which is suitable to itself. Above which natural appetite is the animal appetite, which follows + the apprehension, and by which something is desired not as suitable to this or that power, such as sight for seeing, or sound + for hearing; but simply as suitable to the animal. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q80_A1-p11"></p> + <p id="FP_Q80_A1-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q80.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q80_A2.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q80_A2" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q80_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q81.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q80_A2-p0.1">Whether the sensitive and intellectual appetites are distinct powers?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q80_A2-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q80_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the sensitive and intellectual appetites are not distinct powers. For powers are not differentiated by + accidental differences, as we have seen above ( + <a id="FP_Q80_A2-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q77_A3.html">Q[77], A[3]</a>). But it is accidental to the appetible object whether it be apprehended by the sense or by the intellect. Therefore the + sensitive and intellectual appetites are not distinct powers. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q80_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, intellectual knowledge is of universals; and so it is distinct from sensitive knowledge, which is of individual + things. But there is no place for this distinction in the appetitive part: for since the appetite is a movement of the soul + to individual things, seemingly every act of the appetite regards an individual thing. Therefore the intellectual appetite + is not distinguished from the sensitive. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q80_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, as under the apprehensive power, the appetitive is subordinate as a lower power, so also is the motive power. But + the motive power which in man follows the intellect is not distinct from the motive power which in animals follows sense. + Therefore, for a like reason, neither is there distinction in the appetitive part. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q80_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher (De Anima iii, 9) distinguishes a double appetite, and says (De Anima iii, 11) that the higher appetite moves + the lower. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q80_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> We must needs say that the intellectual appetite is a distinct power from the sensitive appetite. For the appetitive power + is a passive power, which is naturally moved by the thing apprehended: wherefore the apprehended appetible is a mover which + is not moved, while the appetite is a mover moved, as the Philosopher says in De Anima iii, 10 and Metaph. xii (Did. xi, 7). + Now things passive and movable are differentiated according to the distinction of the + corresponding active and motive principles; because the motive must be proportionate to the movable, and the active to the + passive: indeed, the passive power itself has its very nature from its relation to its active principle. Therefore, since + what is apprehended by the intellect and what is apprehended by sense are generically different; consequently, the intellectual + appetite is distinct from the sensitive. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q80_A2-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> It is not accidental to the thing desired to be apprehended by the sense or the intellect; on the contrary, this belongs + to it by its nature; for the appetible does not move the appetite except as it is apprehended. Wherefore differences in the + thing apprehended are of themselves differences of the appetible. And so the appetitive powers are distinct according to the + distinction of the things apprehended, as their proper objects. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q80_A2-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The intellectual appetite, though it tends to individual things which exist outside the soul, yet tends to them as standing + under the universal; as when it desires something because it is good. Wherefore the Philosopher says (Rhetoric. ii, 4) that + hatred can regard a universal, as when "we hate every kind of thief." In the same way by the intellectual appetite we may + desire the immaterial good, which is not apprehended by sense, such as knowledge, + virtue, and suchlike. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q80_A2-p9"></p> + <p id="FP_Q80_A2-p10"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q80_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q81.html"></a> + </div> + <a href="summa.FP_Q79_A13.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q80_A1.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q81" class="div3"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q80_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q81_A1.html"></a> + <h3 id="FP_Q81-p0.1">OF THE POWER OF SENSUALITY (THREE ARTICLES)</h3> + <p id="FP_Q81-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q81-p2"> Next we have to consider the power of sensuality, concerning which there are three points of inquiry:</p> + <p id="FP_Q81-p3"> (1) Whether sensuality is only an appetitive power?</p> + <p id="FP_Q81-p4"> (2) Whether it is divided into irascible and concupiscible as distinct powers?</p> + <p id="FP_Q81-p5"> (3) Whether the irascible and concupiscible powers obey reason?</p> + <div id="FP_Q81_A1" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q81.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q81_A2.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q81_A1-p0.1">Whether sensuality is only appetitive?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q81_A1-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q81_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that sensuality is not only appetitive, but also cognitive. For Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 12) that "the + sensual movement of the soul which is directed to the bodily senses is common to us and beasts." But the bodily senses belong + to the apprehensive powers. Therefore sensuality is a cognitive power. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q81_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, things which come under one division seem to be of one genus. But Augustine (De Trin. xii, 12) divides sensuality + against the higher and lower reason, which belong to knowledge. Therefore sensuality also is apprehensive. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q81_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, in man's temptations sensuality stands in the place of the "serpent." But in the temptation of our first parents, + the serpent presented himself as one giving information and proposing sin, which belong to the cognitive power. Therefore + sensuality is a cognitive power. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q81_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Sensuality is defined as "the appetite of things belonging to the body." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q81_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The name sensuality seems to be taken from the sensual movement, of which Augustine speaks (De Trin. xii, 12, 13), just as + the name of a power is taken from its act; for instance, sight from seeing. Now the sensual movement is an appetite following + sensitive apprehension. For the act of the apprehensive power is not so properly called a movement as the act of the appetite: + since the operation of the apprehensive power is completed in the very fact that the + thing apprehended is in the one that apprehends: while the operation of the appetitive power is completed in the fact that + he who desires is borne towards the thing desirable. Therefore the operation of the apprehensive power is likened to rest: + whereas the operation of the appetitive power is rather likened to movement. Wherefore by sensual movement we understand the + operation of the appetitive power: so that sensuality is the name of the sensitive appetite. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q81_A1-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> By saying that the sensual movement of the soul is directed to the bodily senses, Augustine does not give us to understand + that the bodily senses are included in sensuality, but rather that the movement of sensuality is a certain inclination to + the bodily senses, since we desire things which are apprehended through the bodily senses. And thus the bodily senses appertain + to sensuality as a preamble. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q81_A1-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Sensuality is divided against higher and lower reason, as having in common with them the act of movement: for the apprehensive + power, to which belong the higher and lower reason, is a motive power; as is appetite, to which appertains sensuality. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q81_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The serpent not only showed and proposed sin, but also incited to the commission of sin. And in this, sensuality is signified + by the serpent. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q81_A1-p10"></p> + <p id="FP_Q81_A1-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q81.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q81_A2.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q81_A2" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q81_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q81_A3.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q81_A2-p0.1">Whether the sensitive appetite is divided into the irascible and concupiscible as distinct powers?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q81_A2-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q81_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the sensitive appetite is not divided into the irascible and concupiscible as distinct powers. For the + same power of the soul regards both sides of a contrariety, as sight regards both black and white, according to the Philosopher + (De Anima ii, 11). But suitable and harmful are contraries. Since, then, the concupiscible power regards what is suitable, + while the irascible is concerned with what is harmful, it seems that irascible and + concupiscible are the same power in the soul. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q81_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the sensitive appetite regards only what is suitable according to the senses. But such is the object of the concupiscible + power. Therefore there is no sensitive appetite differing from the concupiscible. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q81_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, hatred is in the irascible part: for Jerome says on + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q81_A2-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.13.33" target="asv">Mat. 13:33</a>: "We ought to have the hatred of vice in the irascible power." But hatred is contrary to love, and is in the concupiscible + part. Therefore the concupiscible and irascible are the same powers. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q81_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Gregory of Nyssa (Nemesius, De Natura Hominis) and Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 12) assign two parts to the sensitive appetite, + the irascible and the concupiscible. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q81_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The sensitive appetite is one generic power, and is called sensuality; but it is divided into two powers, which are species + of the sensitive appetite---the irascible and the concupiscible. In order to make this clear, we must observe that in natural + corruptible things there is needed an inclination not only to the acquisition of what is suitable and to the avoiding of what + is harmful, but also to resistance against corruptive and contrary agencies which are + a hindrance to the acquisition of what is suitable, and are productive of harm. For example, fire has a natural inclination, + not only to rise from a lower position, which is unsuitable to it, towards a higher position which is suitable, but also to + resist whatever destroys or hinders its action. Therefore, since the sensitive appetite is an inclination following sensitive + apprehension, as natural appetite is an inclination following the natural form, there must needs be in the sensitive part + two appetitive powers---one through which the soul is simply inclined to seek what is suitable, according to the senses, and + to fly from what is hurtful, and this is called the concupiscible: and another, whereby an animal resists these attacks that + hinder what is suitable, and inflict harm, and this is called the irascible. Whence we say that its object is something arduous, + because its tendency is to overcome and rise above obstacles. Now these two are not to be reduced to one principle: for + sometimes the soul busies itself with unpleasant things, against the inclination of the concupiscible appetite, in order that, + following the impulse of the irascible appetite, it may fight against obstacles. Wherefore also the passions of the irascible + appetite counteract the passions of the concupiscible appetite: since the concupiscence, on being aroused, diminishes anger; + and anger being roused, diminishes concupiscence in many cases. This is clear also from the fact that the irascible is, + as it were, the champion and defender of the concupiscible when it rises up against what hinders the acquisition of the suitable + things which the concupiscible desires, or against what inflicts harm, from which the concupiscible flies. And for this reason + all the passions of the irascible appetite rise from the passions of the concupiscible appetite and terminate in them; for + instance, anger rises from sadness, and having wrought vengeance, terminates in joy. For this reason also the quarrels + of animals are about things concupiscible---namely, food and sex, as the Philosopher says [*De Animal. Histor. viii.]. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q81_A2-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The concupiscible power regards both what is suitable and what is unsuitable. But the object of the irascible power is to + resist the onslaught of the unsuitable. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q81_A2-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As in the apprehensive powers of the sensitive part there is an estimative power, which perceives those things which do not + impress the senses, as we have said above ( + <a id="FP_Q81_A2-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q78_A2.html">Q[78], A[2]</a>); so also in the sensitive appetite there is a certain appetitive power which regards something as suitable, not because + it pleases the senses, but because it is useful to the animal for self-defense: and this is the irascible power. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q81_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Hatred belongs simply to the concupiscible appetite: but by reason of the strife which arises from hatred, it may belong + to the irascible appetite. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q81_A2-p10"></p> + <p id="FP_Q81_A2-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q81_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q81_A3.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q81_A3" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q81_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q82.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q81_A3-p0.1">Whether the irascible and concupiscible appetites obey reason?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q81_A3-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q81_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the irascible and concupiscible appetites do not obey reason. For irascible and concupiscible are parts + of sensuality. But sensuality does not obey reason, wherefore it is signified by the serpent, as Augustine says (De Trin. + xii, 12,13). Therefore the irascible and concupiscible appetites do not obey reason. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q81_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, what obeys a certain thing does not resist it. But the irascible and concupiscible appetites resist reason: according + to the Apostle ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q81_A3-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.7.23" target="asv">Rom. 7:23</a>): "I see another law in my members fighting against the law of my mind." Therefore the irascible and concupiscible appetites + do not obey reason. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q81_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, as the appetitive power is inferior to the rational part of the soul, so also is the sensitive power. But the sensitive + part of the soul does not obey reason: for we neither hear nor see just when we wish. Therefore, in like manner, neither do + the powers of the sensitive appetite, the irascible and concupscible, obey reason. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q81_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 12) that "the part of the soul which is obedient and amenable to reason is divided into + concupiscence and anger." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q81_A3-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> In two ways the irascible and concupiscible powers obey the higher part, in which are the intellect or reason, and the will; + first, as to reason, secondly as to the will. They obey the reason in their own acts, because in other animals the sensitive + appetite is naturally moved by the estimative power; for instance, a sheep, esteeming the wolf as an enemy, is afraid. In + man the estimative power, as we have said above ( + <a id="FP_Q81_A3-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q78_A4.html">Q[78], A[4]</a>), is + replaced by the cogitative power, which is called by some 'the particular reason,' because it compares individual intentions. + Wherefore in man the sensitive appetite is naturally moved by this particular reason. But this same particular reason is naturally + guided and moved according to the universal reason: wherefore in syllogistic matters particular conclusions are drawn from + universal propositions. Therefore it is clear that the universal reason directs the sensitive appetite, which is + divided into concupiscible and irascible; and this appetite obeys it. But because to draw particular conclusions from universal + principles is not the work of the intellect, as such, but of the reason: hence it is that the irascible and concupiscible + are said to obey the reason rather than to obey the intellect. Anyone can experience this in himself: for by applying certain + universal considerations, anger or fear or the like may be modified or excited. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q81_A3-p7"> To the will also is the sensitive appetite subject in execution, which is accomplished by the motive power. For in other + animals movement follows at once the concupiscible and irascible appetites: for instance, the sheep, fearing the wolf, flees + at once, because it has no superior counteracting appetite. On the contrary, man is not moved at once, according to the irascible + and concupiscible appetites: but he awaits the command of the will, which is the superior appetite. For + wherever there is order among a number of motive powers, the second only moves by virtue of the first: wherefore the lower + appetite is not sufficient to cause movement, unless the higher appetite consents. And this is what the Philosopher says (De + Anima iii, 11), that "the higher appetite moves the lower appetite, as the higher sphere moves the lower." In this way, therefore, + the irascible and concupiscible are subject to reason. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q81_A3-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Sensuality is signified by the serpent, in what is proper to it as a sensitive power. But the irascible and concupiscible + powers denominate the sensitive appetite rather on the part of the act, to which they are led by the reason, as we have said. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q81_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As the Philosopher says (Polit. i, 2): "We observe in an animal a despotic and a politic principle: for the soul dominates + the body by a despotic power; but the intellect dominates the appetite by a politic and royal power." For a power is called + despotic whereby a man rules his slaves, who have not the right to resist in any way the orders of the one that commands them, + since they have nothing of their own. But that power is called politic and royal + by which a man rules over free subjects, who, though subject to the government of the ruler, have nevertheless something of + their own, by reason of which they can resist the orders of him who commands. And so, the soul is said to rule the body by + a despotic power, because the members of the body cannot in any way resist the sway of the soul, but at the soul's command + both hand and foot, and whatever member is naturally moved by voluntary movement, are moved at once. But the intellect or + reason + is said to rule the irascible and concupiscible by a politic power: because the sensitive appetite has something of its own, + by virtue whereof it can resist the commands of reason. For the sensitive appetite is naturally moved, not only by the estimative + power in other animals, and in man by the cogitative power which the universal reason guides, but also by the imagination + and sense. Whence it is that we experience that the irascible and concupiscible powers do resist reason, inasmuch as we + sense or imagine something pleasant, which reason forbids, or unpleasant, which reason commands. And so from the fact that + the irascible and concupiscible resist reason in something, we must not conclude that they do not obey. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q81_A3-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The exterior senses require for action exterior sensible things, whereby they are affected, and the presence of which is + not ruled by reason. But the interior powers, both appetitive and apprehensive, do not require exterior things. Therefore + they are subject to the command of reason, which can not only incite or modify the affections of the appetitive power, but + can also form the phantasms of the imagination. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q81_A3-p11"></p> + <p id="FP_Q81_A3-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q81_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q82.html"></a> + </div> + <a href="summa.FP_Q80_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q81_A1.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q82" class="div3"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q81_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q82_A1.html"></a> + <h3 id="FP_Q82-p0.1">OF THE WILL (FIVE ARTICLES)</h3> + <p id="FP_Q82-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q82-p2"> We next consider the will. Under this head there are five points of inquiry:</p> + <p id="FP_Q82-p3"> (1) Whether the will desires something of necessity?</p> + <p id="FP_Q82-p4"> (2) Whether it desires anything of necessity?</p> + <p id="FP_Q82-p5"> (3) Whether it is a higher power than the intellect?</p> + <p id="FP_Q82-p6"> (4) Whether the will moves the intellect?</p> + <p id="FP_Q82-p7"> (5) Whether the will is divided into irascible and concupiscible?</p> + <div id="FP_Q82_A1" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q82.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q82_A2.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q82_A1-p0.1">Whether the will desires something of necessity?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q82_A1-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q82_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the will desires nothing. For Augustine says (De Civ. Dei v, 10) that it anything is necessary, it is + not voluntary. But whatever the will desires is voluntary. Therefore nothing that the will desires is desired of necessity. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q82_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the rational powers, according to the Philosopher (Metaph. viii, 2), extend to opposite things. But the will is + a rational power, because, as he says (De Anima iii, 9), "the will is in the reason." Therefore the will extends to opposite + things, and therefore it is determined to nothing of necessity. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q82_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, by the will we are masters of our own actions. But we are not masters of that which is of necessity. Therefore the + act of the will cannot be necessitated. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q82_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Trin. xiii, 4) that "all desire happiness with one will." Now if this were not necessary, but contingent, + there would at least be a few exceptions. Therefore the will desires something of necessity. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q82_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The word "necessity" is employed in many ways. For that which must be is necessary. Now that a thing must be may belong to + it by an intrinsic principle---either material, as when we say that everything composed of contraries is of necessity corruptible---or + formal, as when we say that it is necessary for the three angles of a triangle to be equal to two right angles. And this is + "natural" and "absolute necessity." In another way, that a thing must be, + belongs to it by reason of something extrinsic, which is either the end or the agent. On the part of the end, as when without + it the end is not to be attained or so well attained: for instance, food is said to be necessary for life, and a horse is + necessary for a journey. This is called "necessity of end," and sometimes also "utility." On the part of the agent, a thing + must be, when someone is forced by some agent, so that he is not able to do the contrary. This is called "necessity of + coercion." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q82_A1-p7"> Now this necessity of coercion is altogether repugnant to the will. For we call that violent which is against the inclination + of a thing. But the very movement of the will is an inclination to something. Therefore, as a thing is called natural because + it is according to the inclination of nature, so a thing is called voluntary because it is according to the inclination of + the will. Therefore, just as it is impossible for a thing to be at the same time violent and natural, so it + is impossible for a thing to be absolutely coerced or violent, and voluntary. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q82_A1-p8"> But necessity of end is not repugnant to the will, when the end cannot be attained except in one way: thus from the will + to cross the sea, arises in the will the necessity to wish for a ship. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q82_A1-p9"> In like manner neither is natural necessity repugnant to the will. Indeed, more than this, for as the intellect of necessity + adheres to the first principles, the will must of necessity adhere to the last end, which is happiness: since the end is in + practical matters what the principle is in speculative matters. For what befits a thing naturally and immovably must be the + root and principle of all else appertaining thereto, since the nature of a thing is the first in everything, + and every movement arises from something immovable. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q82_A1-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The words of Augustine are to be understood of the necessity of coercion. But natural necessity "does not take away the liberty + of the will," as he says himself (De Civ. Dei v, 10). + </p> + <p id="FP_Q82_A1-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The will, so far as it desires a thing naturally, corresponds rather to the intellect as regards natural principles than + to the reason, which extends to opposite things. Wherefore in this respect it is rather an intellectual than a rational power. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q82_A1-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> We are masters of our own actions by reason of our being able to choose this or that. But choice regards not the end, but + "the means to the end," as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 9). Wherefore the desire of the ultimate end does not regard + those actions of which we are masters. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q82_A1-p13"></p> + <p id="FP_Q82_A1-p14"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q82.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q82_A2.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q82_A2" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q82_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q82_A3.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q82_A2-p0.1">Whether the will desires of necessity, whatever it desires?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q82_A2-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q82_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the will desires all things of necessity, whatever it desires. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that + "evil is outside the scope of the will." Therefore the will tends of necessity to the good which is proposed to it. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q82_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the object of the will is compared to the will as the mover to the thing movable. But the movement of the movable + necessarily follows the mover. Therefore it seems that the will's object moves it of necessity. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q82_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, as the thing apprehended by sense is the object of the sensitive appetite, so the thing apprehended by the intellect + is the object of the intellectual appetite, which is called the will. But what is apprehended by the sense moves the sensitive + appetite of necessity: for Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. ix, 14) that "animals are moved by things seen." Therefore it seems + that whatever is apprehended by the intellect moves the will of necessity. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q82_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (Retract. i, 9) that "it is the will by which we sin and live well," and so the will extends to opposite things. + Therefore it does not desire of necessity all things whatsoever it desires. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q82_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The will does not desire of necessity whatsoever it desires. In order to make this evident we must observe that as the intellect + naturally and of necessity adheres to the first principles, so the will adheres to the last end, as we have said already + <a id="FP_Q82_A2-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q82_A1.html">(A[1])</a>. Now there are some things intelligible which have not a necessary connection with the first principles; such as contingent + propositions, the denial of which does not involve a + denial of the first principles. And to such the intellect does not assent of necessity. But there are some propositions which + have a necessary connection with the first principles: such as demonstrable conclusions, a denial of which involves a denial + of the first principles. And to these the intellect assents of necessity, when once it is aware of the necessary connection + of these conclusions with the principles; but it does not assent of necessity until through the demonstration it recognizes + the necessity of such connection. It is the same with the will. For there are certain individual goods which have not a necessary + connection with happiness, because without them a man can be happy: and to such the will does not adhere of necessity. But + there are some things which have a necessary connection with happiness, by means of which things man adheres to God, in Whom + alone true happiness consists. Nevertheless, until through the certitude of the Divine Vision the necessity of such + connection be shown, the will does not adhere to God of necessity, nor to those things which are of God. But the will of the + man who sees God in His essence of necessity adheres to God, just as now we desire of necessity to be happy. It is therefore + clear that the will does not desire of necessity whatever it desires. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q82_A2-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The will can tend to nothing except under the aspect of good. But because good is of many kinds, for this reason the will + is not of necessity determined to one. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q82_A2-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The mover, then, of necessity causes movement in the thing movable, when the power of the mover exceeds the thing movable, + so that its entire capacity is subject to the mover. But as the capacity of the will regards the universal and perfect good, + its capacity is not subjected to any individual good. And therefore it is not of necessity moved by it. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q82_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The sensitive power does not compare different things with each other, as reason does: but it simply apprehends some one + thing. Therefore, according to that one thing, it moves the sensitive appetite in a determinate way. But the reason is a power + that compares several things together: therefore from several things the intellectual appetite---that is, the will---may be + moved; but not of necessity from one thing. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q82_A2-p10"></p> + <p id="FP_Q82_A2-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q82_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q82_A3.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q82_A3" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q82_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q82_A4.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q82_A3-p0.1">Whether the will is a higher power than the intellect? </h4> + <p id="FP_Q82_A3-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q82_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the will is a higher power than the intellect. For the object of the will is good and the end. But the + end is the first and highest cause. Therefore the will is the first and highest power. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q82_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, in the order of natural things we observe a progress from imperfect things to perfect. And this also appears in + the powers of the soul: for sense precedes the intellect, which is more noble. Now the act of the will, in the natural order, + follows the act of the intellect. Therefore the will is a more noble and perfect power than the intellect. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q82_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, habits are proportioned to their powers, as perfections to what they make perfect. But the habit which perfects + the will---namely, charity---is more noble than the habits which perfect the intellect: for it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q82_A3-p4.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.13.2" target="asv">1 Cor. 13:2</a>): "If I should know all mysteries, and if I should have all faith, and have not charity, I am nothing." Therefore the will + is a higher power than the intellect. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q82_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher holds the intellect to be the higher power than the intellect. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q82_A3-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The superiority of one thing over another can be considered in two ways: "absolutely" and "relatively." Now a thing is considered + to be such absolutely which is considered such in itself: but relatively as it is such with regard to something else. If therefore + the intellect and will be considered with regard to themselves, then the intellect is the higher power. And this is clear + if we compare their respective objects to one another. For the object of the + intellect is more simple and more absolute than the object of the will; since the object of the intellect is the very idea + of appetible good; and the appetible good, the idea of which is in the intellect, is the object of the will. Now the more + simple and the more abstract a thing is, the nobler and higher it is in itself; and therefore the object of the intellect + is higher than the object of the will. Therefore, since the proper nature of a power is in its order to its object, it follows + that + the intellect in itself and absolutely is higher and nobler than the will. But relatively and by comparison with something + else, we find that the will is sometimes higher than the intellect, from the fact that the object of the will occurs in something + higher than that in which occurs the object of the intellect. Thus, for instance, I might say that hearing is relatively nobler + than sight, inasmuch as something in which there is sound is nobler than something in which there is color, though + color is nobler and simpler than sound. For as we have said above ( + <a id="FP_Q82_A3-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q16_A1.html">Q[16], A[1]</a>; + <a id="FP_Q82_A3-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q27_A4.html">Q[27], A[4]</a>), the action of the intellect consists in this---that the idea of the thing understood is in the one who understands; while + the act of the will consists in this---that the will is inclined to the thing itself as existing in itself. And therefore + the Philosopher says in Metaph. vi (Did. v, 2) that "good and evil," which are objects of the will, "are in + things," but "truth and error," which are objects of the intellect, "are in the mind." When, therefore, the thing in which + there is good is nobler than the soul itself, in which is the idea understood; by comparison with such a thing, the will is + higher than the intellect. But when the thing which is good is less noble than the soul, then even in comparison with that + thing the intellect is higher than the will. Wherefore the love of God is better than the knowledge of God; but, on the contrary, + the knowledge of corporeal things is better than the love thereof. Absolutely, however, the intellect is nobler than the will. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q82_A3-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The aspect of causality is perceived by comparing one thing to another, and in such a comparison the idea of good is found + to be nobler: but truth signifies something more absolute, and extends to the idea of good itself: wherefore even good is + something true. But, again, truth is something good: forasmuch as the intellect is a thing, and truth its end. And among other + ends this is the most excellent: as also is the intellect among the other + powers. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q82_A3-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> What precedes in order of generation and time is less perfect: for in one and in the same thing potentiality precedes act, + and imperfection precedes perfection. But what precedes absolutely and in the order of nature is more perfect: for thus act + precedes potentiality. And in this way the intellect precedes the will, as the motive power precedes the thing movable, and + as the active precedes the passive; for good which is understood moves the will. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q82_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This reason is verified of the will as compared with what is above the soul. For charity is the virtue by which we love God. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q82_A3-p10"></p> + <p id="FP_Q82_A3-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q82_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q82_A4.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q82_A4" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q82_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q82_A5.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q82_A4-p0.1">Whether the will moves the intellect?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q82_A4-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q82_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the will does not move the intellect. For what moves excels and precedes what is moved, because what moves + is an agent, and "the agent is nobler than the patient," as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 16), and the Philosopher (De + Anima iii, 5). But the intellect excels and precedes the will, as we have said above + <a id="FP_Q82_A4-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q82_A3.html">(A[3])</a>. Therefore the will does not move the intellect. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q82_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, what moves is not moved by what is moved, except perhaps accidentally. But the intellect moves the will, because + the good apprehended by the intellect moves without being moved; whereas the appetite moves and is moved. Therefore the intellect + is not moved by the will. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q82_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, we can will nothing but what we understand. If, therefore, in order to understand, the will moves by willing to + understand, that act of the will must be preceded by another act of the intellect, and this act of the intellect by another + act of the will, and so on indefinitely, which is impossible. Therefore the will does not move the intellect. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q82_A4-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 26): "It is in our power to learn an art or not, as we list." But a thing is in our power + by the will, and we learn art by the intellect. Therefore the will moves the intellect. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q82_A4-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> A thing is said to move in two ways: First, as an end; for instance, when we say that the end moves the agent. In this way + the intellect moves the will, because the good understood is the object of the will, and moves it as an end. Secondly, a thing + is said to move as an agent, as what alters moves what is altered, and what impels moves what is impelled. In this way the + will moves the intellect and all the powers of the soul, as Anselm says (Eadmer, De + Similitudinibus). The reason is, because wherever we have order among a number of active powers, that power which regards + the universal end moves the powers which regard particular ends. And we may observe this both in nature and in things politic. + For the heaven, which aims at the universal preservation of things subject to generation and corruption, moves all inferior + bodies, each of which aims at the preservation of its own species or of the individual. The king also, who aims at the common + good of the whole kingdom, by his rule moves all the governors of cities, each of whom rules over his own particular city. + Now the object of the will is good and the end in general, and each power is directed to some suitable good proper to it, + as sight is directed to the perception of color, and the intellect to the knowledge of truth. Therefore the will as agent + moves all the powers of the soul to their respective acts, except the natural powers of the vegetative part, which are not + subject + to our will. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q82_A4-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The intellect may be considered in two ways: as apprehensive of universal being and truth, and as a thing and a particular + power having a determinate act. In like manner also the will may be considered in two ways: according to the common nature + of its object---that is to say, as appetitive of universal good---and as a determinate power of the soul having a determinate + act. If, therefore, the intellect and the will be compared with one another + according to the universality of their respective objects, then, as we have said above + <a id="FP_Q82_A4-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q82_A3.html">(A[3])</a>, the intellect is simply higher and nobler than the will. If, however, we take the intellect as regards the common nature + of its object and the will as a determinate power, then again the intellect is higher and nobler than the will, because under + the notion of being and truth is contained both the will itself, and its act, and its object. Wherefore the intellect understands + the will, and its act, and its object, just as it understands other species of things, as stone or wood, which are contained + in the common notion of being and truth. But if we consider the will as regards the common nature of its object, which is + good, and the intellect as a thing and a special power; then the intellect itself, and its act, and its object, which is truth, + each of which is some species of good, are contained under the common notion of good. And in this way the will is higher + than the intellect, and can move it. From this we can easily understand why these powers include one another in their acts, + because the intellect understands that the will wills, and the will wills the intellect to understand. In the same way good + is contained in truth, inasmuch as it is an understood truth, and truth in good, inasmuch as it is a desired good. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q82_A4-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The intellect moves the will in one sense, and the will moves the intellect in another, as we have said above. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q82_A4-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> There is no need to go on indefinitely, but we must stop at the intellect as preceding all the rest. For every movement of + the will must be preceded by apprehension, whereas every apprehension is not preceded by an act of the will; but the principle + of counselling and understanding is an intellectual principle higher than our intellect ---namely, God---as also Aristotle + says (Eth. Eudemic. vii, 14), and in this way he explains that there is no need to + proceed indefinitely. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q82_A4-p10"></p> + <p id="FP_Q82_A4-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q82_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q82_A5.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q82_A5" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q82_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q83.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q82_A5-p0.1">Whether we should distinguish irascible and concupiscible parts in the superior appetite?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q82_A5-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q82_A5-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that we ought to distinguish irascible and concupiscible parts in the superior appetite, which is the will. + For the concupiscible power is so called from "concupiscere" [to desire], and the irascible part from "irasci" [to be angry]. + But there is a concupiscence which cannot belong to the sensitive appetite, but only to the intellectual, which is the will; + as the concupiscence of wisdom, of which it is said ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q82_A5-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.6.21" target="asv">Wis. 6:21</a>): "The + concupiscence of wisdom bringeth to the eternal kingdom." There is also a certain anger which cannot belong to the sensitive + appetite, but only to the intellectual; as when our anger is directed against vice. Wherefore Jerome commenting on + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q82_A5-p2.2" href="./asv.html#Matt.13.33" target="asv"> Mat. 13:33 </a>warns us "to have the hatred of vice in the irascible part." Therefore we should distinguish irascible and concupiscible parts + of the intellectual soul as well as in the sensitive. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q82_A5-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, as is commonly said, charity is in the concupiscible, and hope in the irascible part. But they cannot be in the + sensitive appetite, because their objects are not sensible, but intellectual. Therefore we must assign an irascible and concupiscible + power to the intellectual part. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q82_A5-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, it is said (De Spiritu et Anima) that "the soul has these powers"---namely, the irascible, concupiscible, and rational---"before + it is united to the body." But no power of the sensitive part belongs to the soul alone, but to the soul and body united, + as we have said above ( + <a id="FP_Q82_A5-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q78_A5.html">Q[78], AA[5]</a>,8). Therefore the irascible and concupiscible powers are in the will, which is the intellectual appetite. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q82_A5-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Gregory of Nyssa (Nemesius, De Nat. Hom.) says "that the irrational" part of the soul is divided into the desiderative and + irascible, and Damascene says the same (De Fide Orth. ii, 12). And the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 9) "that the will is + in reason, while in the irrational part of the soul are concupiscence and anger," or "desire and animus." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q82_A5-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The irascible and concupiscible are not parts of the intellectual appetite, which is called the will. Because, as was said + above ( + <a id="FP_Q82_A5-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q59_A4.html">Q[59], A[4]</a>; + <a id="FP_Q82_A5-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q79_A7.html">Q[79], A[7]</a>), a power which is directed to an object according to some common notion is not differentiated by special differences which + are contained under that common notion. For instance, because sight regards the visible thing under the common notion of something + colored, the visual power is not multiplied according to the different kinds of color: but if there were a power regarding + white as white, and not as something colored, it would be distinct from a power regarding black as black. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q82_A5-p7"> Now the sensitive appetite does not consider the common notion of good, because neither do the senses apprehend the universal. + And therefore the parts of the sensitive appetite are differentiated by the different notions of particular good: for the + concupiscible regards as proper to it the notion of good, as something pleasant to the senses and suitable to nature: whereas + the irascible regards the notion of good as something that wards off and repels what is hurtful. But the + will regards good according to the common notion of good, and therefore in the will, which is the intellectual appetite, there + is no differentiation of appetitive powers, so that there be in the intellectual appetite an irascible power distinct from + a concupiscible power: just as neither on the part of the intellect are the apprehensive powers multiplied, although they + are on the part of the senses. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q82_A5-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Love, concupiscence, and the like can be understood in two ways. Sometimes they are taken as passions---arising, that is, + with a certain commotion of the soul. And thus they are commonly understood, and in this sense they are only in the sensitive + appetite. They may, however, be taken in another way, as far as they are simple affections without passion or commotion of + the soul, and thus they are acts of the will. And in this sense, too, they are + attributed to the angels and to God. But if taken in this sense, they do not belong to different powers, but only to one power, + which is called the will. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q82_A5-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The will itself may be said to irascible, as far as it wills to repel evil, not from any sudden movement of a passion, but + from a judgment of the reason. And in the same way the will may be said to be concupiscible on account of its desire for good. + And thus in the irascible and concupiscible are charity and hope---that is, in the will as ordered to such acts. And in this + way, too, we may understand the words quoted (De Spiritu et Anima); that the + irascible and concupiscible powers are in the soul before it is united to the body (as long as we understand priority of nature, + and not of time), although there is no need to have faith in what that book says. Whence the answer to the third objection + is clear. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q82_A5-p10"></p> + <p id="FP_Q82_A5-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q82_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q83.html"></a> + </div> + <a href="summa.FP_Q81_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q82_A1.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q83" class="div3"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q82_A5.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q83_A1.html"></a> + <h3 id="FP_Q83-p0.1">OF FREE-WILL (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3> + <p id="FP_Q83-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q83-p2"> We now inquire concerning free-will. Under this head there are four points of inquiry:</p> + <p id="FP_Q83-p3"> (1) Whether man has free-will?</p> + <p id="FP_Q83-p4"> (2) What is free-will---a power, an act, or a habit?</p> + <p id="FP_Q83-p5"> (3) If it is a power, is it appetitive or cognitive?</p> + <p id="FP_Q83-p6"> (4) If it is appetitive, is it the same power as the will, or distinct?</p> + <p id="FP_Q83-p7"></p> + <div id="FP_Q83_A1" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q83.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q83_A2.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q83_A1-p0.1">Whether man has free-will?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q83_A1-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q83_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that man has not free-will. For whoever has free-will does what he wills. But man does not what he wills; for + it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q83_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.7.19" target="asv">Rom. 7:19</a>): "For the good which I will I do not, but the evil which I will not, that I do." Therefore man has not free-will. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q83_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, whoever has free-will has in his power to will or not to will, to do or not to do. But this is not in man's power: + for it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q83_A1-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.9.16" target="asv">Rom. 9:16</a>): "It is not of him that willeth"---namely, to will---"nor of him that runneth"---namely, to run. Therefore man has not free-will. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q83_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, what is "free is cause of itself," as the Philosopher says (Metaph. i, 2). Therefore what is moved by another is + not free. But God moves the will, for it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q83_A1-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Prov.21.1" target="asv">Prov. 21:1</a>): "The heart of the king is in the hand of the Lord; whithersoever He will He shall turn it" and ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q83_A1-p4.2" href="./asv.html#Phil.2.13" target="asv">Phil. 2:13</a>): "It is God Who worketh in you both to will and to accomplish." Therefore man has not free-will. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q83_A1-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, whoever has free-will is master of his own actions. But man is not master of his own actions: for it is written + ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q83_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Jer.10.23" target="asv">Jer. 10:23</a>): "The way of a man is not his: neither is it in a man to walk." Therefore man has not free-will. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q83_A1-p6"> + <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 5): "According as each one is, such does the end seem to him." But it is not in + our power to be of one quality or another; for this comes to us from nature. Therefore it is natural to us to follow some + particular end, and therefore we are not free in so doing. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q83_A1-p7"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q83_A1-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.15.14" target="asv">Ecclus. 15:14</a>): "God made man from the beginning, and left him in the hand of his own counsel"; and the gloss adds: "That is of his free-will." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q83_A1-p8"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Man has free-will: otherwise counsels, exhortations, commands, prohibitions, rewards, and punishments would be in vain. In + order to make this evident, we must observe that some things act without judgment; as a stone moves downwards; and in like + manner all things which lack knowledge. And some act from judgment, but not a free judgment; as brute animals. For the sheep, + seeing the wolf, judges it a thing to be shunned, from a natural and not a free judgment, + because it judges, not from reason, but from natural instinct. And the same thing is to be said of any judgment of brute animals. + But man acts from judgment, because by his apprehensive power he judges that something should be avoided or sought. But because + this judgment, in the case of some particular act, is not from a natural instinct, but from some act of comparison in the + reason, therefore he acts from free judgment and retains the power of being inclined to various things. For reason in + contingent matters may follow opposite courses, as we see in dialectic syllogisms and rhetorical arguments. Now particular + operations are contingent, and therefore in such matters the judgment of reason may follow opposite courses, and is not determinate + to one. And forasmuch as man is rational is it necessary that man have a free-will. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q83_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As we have said above ( + <a id="FP_Q83_A1-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q81_A3.html">Q[81], A[3]</a>, ad 2), the sensitive appetite, though it obeys the reason, yet in a given case can resist by desiring what the reason forbids. + This is therefore the good which man does not when he wishes---namely, "not to desire against reason," as Augustine says. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q83_A1-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Those words of the Apostle are not to be taken as though man does not wish or does not run of his free-will, but because + the free-will is not sufficient thereto unless it be moved and helped by God. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q83_A1-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Free-will is the cause of its own movement, because by his free-will man moves himself to act. But it does not of necessity + belong to liberty that what is free should be the first cause of itself, as neither for one thing to be cause of another need + it be the first cause. God, therefore, is the first cause, Who moves causes both natural and voluntary. And just as by moving + natural causes He does not prevent their acts being natural, so by moving + voluntary causes He does not deprive their actions of being voluntary: but rather is He the cause of this very thing in them; + for He operates in each thing according to its own nature. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q83_A1-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> "Man's way" is said "not to be his" in the execution of his choice, wherein he may be impeded, whether he will or not. The + choice itself, however, is in us, but presupposes the help of God. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q83_A1-p13"> + <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> Quality in man is of two kinds: natural and adventitious. Now the natural quality may be in the intellectual part, or in + the body and its powers. From the very fact, therefore, that man is such by virtue of a natural quality which is in the intellectual + part, he naturally desires his last end, which is happiness. Which desire, indeed, is a natural desire, and is not subject + to free-will, as is clear from what we have said above ( + <a id="FP_Q83_A1-p13.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q82_A1.html">Q[82], AA[1]</a>,2). But on the part of the body and its powers man may be such by virtue of a natural quality, inasmuch as he is of such + a temperament or disposition due to any impression whatever produced by corporeal causes, which cannot affect the intellectual + part, since it is not the act of a corporeal organ. And such as a man is by virtue of a corporeal quality, such also does + his end seem to him, because from such a disposition a man is inclined to choose or reject + something. But these inclinations are subject to the judgment of reason, which the lower appetite obeys, as we have said ( + <a id="FP_Q83_A1-p13.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q81_A3.html">Q[81], A[3]</a>). Wherefore this is in no way prejudicial to free-will. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q83_A1-p14"> The adventitious qualities are habits and passions, by virtue of which a man is inclined to one thing rather than to another. + And yet even these inclinations are subject to the judgment of reason. Such qualities, too, are subject to reason, as it is + in our power either to acquire them, whether by causing them or disposing ourselves to them, or to reject them. And so there + is nothing in this that is repugnant to free-will. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q83_A1-p15"></p> + <p id="FP_Q83_A1-p16"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q83.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q83_A2.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q83_A2" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q83_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q83_A3.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q83_A2-p0.1">Whether free-will is a power?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q83_A2-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q83_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that free-will is not a power. For free-will is nothing but a free judgment. But judgment denominates an act, + not a power. Therefore free-will is not a power. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q83_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, free-will is defined as "the faculty of the will and reason." But faculty denominates a facility of power, which + is due to a habit. Therefore free-will is a habit. Moreover Bernard says (De Gratia et Lib. Arb. 1,2) that free-will is "the + soul's habit of disposing of itself." Therefore it is not a power. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q83_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, no natural power is forfeited through sin. But free-will is forfeited through sin; for Augustine says that "man, + by abusing free-will, loses both it and himself." Therefore free-will is not a power. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q83_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Nothing but a power, seemingly, is the subject of a habit. But free-will is the subject of grace, by the help of which it + chooses what is good. Therefore free-will is a power. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q83_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Although free-will [*Liberum arbitrium---i.e. free judgment] in its strict sense denotes an act, in the common manner of + speaking we call free-will, that which is the principle of the act by which man judges freely. Now in us the principle of + an act is both power and habit; for we say that we know something both by knowledge and by the intellectual power. Therefore + free-will must be either a power or a habit, or a power with a habit. That it is neither a + habit nor a power together with a habit, can be clearly proved in two ways. First of all, because, if it is a habit, it must + be a natural habit; for it is natural to man to have a free-will. But there is not natural habit in us with respect to those + things which come under free-will: for we are naturally inclined to those things of which we have natural habits---for instance, + to assent to first principles: while those things which we are naturally inclined are not subject to free-will, as we + have said of the desire of happiness ( + <a id="FP_Q83_A2-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q82_A1.html">Q[82], AA[1]</a>,2). Wherefore it is against the very notion of free-will that it should be a natural habit. And that it should be a non-natural + habit is against its nature. Therefore in no sense is it a habit. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q83_A2-p7"> Secondly, this is clear because habits are defined as that "by reason of which we are well or ill disposed with regard to + actions and passions" (Ethic. ii, 5); for by temperance we are well-disposed as regards concupiscences, and by intemperance + ill-disposed: and by knowledge we are well-disposed to the act of the intellect when we know the truth, and by the contrary + ill-disposed. But the free-will is indifferent to good and evil choice: wherefore it is impossible for free-will + to be a habit. Therefore it is a power. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q83_A2-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> It is not unusual for a power to be named from its act. And so from this act, which is a free judgment, is named the power + which is the principle of this act. Otherwise, if free-will denominated an act, it would not always remain in man. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q83_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Faculty sometimes denominates a power ready for operation, and in this sense faculty is used in the definition of free-will. + But Bernard takes habit, not as divided against power, but as signifying a certain aptitude by which a man has some sort of + relation to an act. And this may be both by a power and by a habit: for by a power man is, as it were, empowered to do the + action, and by the habit he is apt to act well or ill. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q83_A2-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Man is said to have lost free-will by falling into sin, not as to natural liberty, which is freedom from coercion, but as + regards freedom from fault and unhappiness. Of this we shall treat later in the treatise on Morals in the second part of this + work (FS, Q[85], seqq.; + <a id="FP_Q83_A2-p10.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q109.html">Q[109])</a>. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q83_A2-p11"></p> + <p id="FP_Q83_A2-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q83_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q83_A3.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q83_A3" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q83_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q83_A4.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q83_A3-p0.1">Whether free-will is an appetitive power?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q83_A3-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q83_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that free-will is not an appetitive, but a cognitive power. For Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 27) says that + "free-will straightway accompanies the rational nature." But reason is a cognitive power. Therefore free-will is a cognitive + power. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q83_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, free-will is so called as though it were a free judgment. But to judge is an act of a cognitive power. Therefore + free-will is a cognitive power. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q83_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the principal function of free-will is to choose. But choice seems to belong to knowledge, because it implies a + certain comparison of one thing to another, which belongs to the cognitive power. Therefore free-will is a cognitive power. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q83_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 3) that choice is "the desire of those things which are in us." But desire is an act of + the appetitive power: therefore choice is also. But free-will is that by which we choose. Therefore free-will is an appetitive + power. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q83_A3-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The proper act of free-will is choice: for we say that we have a free-will because we can take one thing while refusing another; + and this is to choose. Therefore we must consider the nature of free-will, by considering the nature of choice. Now two things + concur in choice: one on the part of the cognitive power, the other on the part of the appetitive power. On the part of the + cognitive power, counsel is required, by which we judge one thing to be preferred + to another: and on the part of the appetitive power, it is required that the appetite should accept the judgment of counsel. + Therefore Aristotle (Ethic. vi, 2) leaves it in doubt whether choice belongs principally to the appetitive or the cognitive + power: since he says that choice is either "an appetitive intellect or an intellectual appetite." But (Ethic. iii, 3) he inclines + to its being an intellectual appetite when he describes choice as "a desire proceeding from counsel." And the reason of + this is because the proper object of choice is the means to the end: and this, as such, is in the nature of that good which + is called useful: wherefore since good, as such, is the object of the appetite, it follows that choice is principally an act + of the appetitive power. And thus free-will is an appetitive power. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q83_A3-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The appetitive powers accompany the apprehensive, and in this sense Damascene says that free-will straightway accompanies + the rational power. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q83_A3-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Judgment, as it were, concludes and terminates counsel. Now counsel is terminated, first, by the judgment of reason; secondly, + by the acceptation of the appetite: whence the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 3) says that, "having formed a judgment by counsel, + we desire in accordance with that counsel." And in this sense choice itself is a judgment from which free-will takes its name. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q83_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This comparison which is implied in the choice belongs to the preceding counsel, which is an act of reason. For though the + appetite does not make comparisons, yet forasmuch as it is moved by the apprehensive power which does compare, it has some + likeness of comparison by choosing one in preference to another. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q83_A3-p10"></p> + <p id="FP_Q83_A3-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q83_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q83_A4.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q83_A4" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q83_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q84.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q83_A4-p0.1">Whether free-will is a power distinct from the will?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q83_A4-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q83_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that free-will is a power distinct from the will. For Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 22) that {thelesis} + is one thing and {boulesis} another. But {thelesis} is the will, while {boulesis} seems to be the free-will, because {boulesis}, + according to him, is will as concerning an object by way of comparison between two things. Therefore it seems that free-will + is a distinct power from the will. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q83_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, powers are known by their acts. But choice, which is the act of free-will, is distinct from the act of willing, + because "the act of the will regards the end, whereas choice regards the means to the end" (Ethic. iii, 2). Therefore free-will + is a distinct power from the will. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q83_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the will is the intellectual appetite. But in the intellect there are two powers---the active and the passive. Therefore, + also on the part of the intellectual appetite, there must be another power besides the will. And this, seemingly, can only + be free-will. Therefore free-will is a distinct power from the will. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q83_A4-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 14) free-will is nothing else than the will. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q83_A4-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The appetitive powers must be proportionate to the apprehensive powers, as we have said above ( + <a id="FP_Q83_A4-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q64_A2.html">Q[64], A[2]</a>). Now, as on the part of the intellectual apprehension we have intellect and reason, so on the part of the intellectual appetite + we have will, and free-will which is nothing else but the power of choice. And this is clear from their relations to their + respective objects and acts. For the act of "understanding" implies the simple + acceptation of something; whence we say that we understand first principles, which are known of themselves without any comparison. + But to "reason," properly speaking, is to come from one thing to the knowledge of another: wherefore, properly speaking, we + reason about conclusions, which are known from the principles. In like manner on the part of the appetite to "will" implies + the simple appetite for something: wherefore the will is said to regard the end, which is desired for itself. But to + "choose" is to desire something for the sake of obtaining something else: wherefore, properly speaking, it regards the means + to the end. Now, in matters of knowledge, the principles are related to the conclusion to which we assent on account of the + principles: just as, in appetitive matters, the end is related to the means, which is desired on account of the end. Wherefore + it is evident that as the intellect is to reason, so is the will to the power of choice, which is free-will. But it has + been shown above ( + <a id="FP_Q83_A4-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q79_A8.html">Q[79], A[8]</a>) that it belongs to the same power both to understand and to reason, even as it belongs to the same power to be at rest and + to be in movement. Wherefore it belongs also to the same power to will and to choose: and on this account the will and the + free-will are not two powers, but one. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q83_A4-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> {Boulesis} is distinct from {thelesis} on account of a distinction, not of powers, but of acts. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q83_A4-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Choice and will---that is, the act of willing ---are different acts: yet they belong to the same power, as also to understand + and to reason, as we have said. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q83_A4-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The intellect is compared to the will as moving the will. And therefore there is no need to distinguish in the will an active + and a passive will. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q83_A4-p10"></p> + <p id="FP_Q83_A4-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q83_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q84.html"></a> + </div> + <a href="summa.FP_Q82_A5.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q83_A1.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q84" class="div3"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q83_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q84_A1.html"></a> + <h3 id="FP_Q84-p0.1">HOW THE SOUL WHILE UNITED TO THE BODY UNDERSTANDS CORPOREAL THINGS BENEATH IT (EIGHT ARTICLES)</h3> + <p id="FP_Q84-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q84-p2"> We now have to consider the acts of the soul in regard to the intellectual and the appetitive powers: for the other powers + of the soul do not come directly under the consideration of the theologian. Furthermore, the acts of the appetitive part of + the soul come under the consideration of the science of morals; wherefore we shall treat of them in the second part of this + work, to which the consideration of moral matters belongs. But of the acts of the intellectual part we shall treat + now. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q84-p3"> In treating of these acts we shall proceed in the following order: First, we shall inquire how the soul understands when + united to the body; secondly, how it understands when separated therefrom. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q84-p4"> The former of these inquiries will be threefold: (1) How the soul understands bodies which are beneath it; (2) How it understands + itself and things contained in itself; (3) How it understands immaterial substances, which are above it. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q84-p5"> In treating of the knowledge of corporeal things there are three points to be considered: (1) Through what does the soul + know them? (2) How and in what order does it know them? (3) What does it know in them? + </p> + <p id="FP_Q84-p6"> Under the first head there are eight points of inquiry:</p> + <p id="FP_Q84-p7"> (1) Whether the soul knows bodies through the intellect?</p> + <p id="FP_Q84-p8"> (2) Whether it understands them through its essence, or through any species?</p> + <p id="FP_Q84-p9"> (3) If through some species, whether the species of all things intelligible are naturally innate in the soul?</p> + <p id="FP_Q84-p10"> (4) Whether these species are derived by the soul from certain separate immaterial forms?</p> + <p id="FP_Q84-p11"> (5) Whether our soul sees in the eternal ideas all that it understands?</p> + <p id="FP_Q84-p12"> (6) Whether it acquires intellectual knowledge from the senses?</p> + <p id="FP_Q84-p13"> (7) Whether the intellect can, through the species of which it is possessed, actually understand, without turning to the + phantasms? + </p> + <p id="FP_Q84-p14"> (8) Whether the judgment of the intellect is hindered by an obstacle in the sensitive powers?</p> + <div id="FP_Q84_A1" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q84.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q84_A2.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q84_A1-p0.1">Whether the soul knows bodies through the intellect?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q84_A1-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q84_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the soul does not know bodies through the intellect. For Augustine says (Soliloq. ii, 4) that "bodies + cannot be understood by the intellect; nor indeed anything corporeal unless it can be perceived by the senses." He says also + (Gen. ad lit. xii, 24) that intellectual vision is of those things that are in the soul by their essence. But such are not + bodies. Therefore the soul cannot know bodies through the intellect. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q84_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, as sense is to the intelligible, so is the intellect to the sensible. But the soul can by no means, through the + senses, understand spiritual things, which are intelligible. Therefore by no means can it, through the intellect, know bodies, + which are sensible. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q84_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the intellect is concerned with things that are necessary and unchangeable. But all bodies are mobile and changeable. + Therefore the soul cannot know bodies through the intellect. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q84_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Science is in the intellect. If, therefore, the intellect does not know bodies, it follows that there is no science of bodies; + and thus perishes natural science, which treats of mobile bodies. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q84_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> It should be said in order to elucidate this question, that the early philosophers, who inquired into the natures of things, + thought there was nothing in the world save bodies. And because they observed that all bodies are mobile, and considered them + to be ever in a state of flux, they were of opinion that we can have no certain knowledge of the true nature of things. For + what is in a continual state of flux, cannot be grasped with any degree of certitude, + for it passes away ere the mind can form a judgment thereon: according to the saying of Heraclitus, that "it is not possible + twice to touch a drop of water in a passing torrent," as the Philosopher relates (Metaph. iv, Did. iii, 5). + </p> + <p id="FP_Q84_A1-p7"> After these came Plato, who, wishing to save the certitude of our knowledge of truth through the intellect, maintained that, + besides these things corporeal, there is another genus of beings, separate from matter and movement, which beings he called + "species" or "ideas," by participation of which each one of these singular and sensible things is said to be either a man, + or a horse, or the like. Wherefore he said that sciences and definitions, and whatever appertains to the act of + the intellect, are not referred to these sensible bodies, but to those beings immaterial and separate: so that according to + this the soul does not understand these corporeal things, but the separate species thereof. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q84_A1-p8"> Now this may be shown to be false for two reasons. First, because, since those species are immaterial and immovable, knowledge + of movement and matter would be excluded from science (which knowledge is proper to natural science), and likewise all demonstration + through moving and material causes. Secondly, because it seems ridiculous, when we seek for knowledge of things which are + to us manifest, to introduce other beings, which cannot be the substance of those others, since they + differ from them essentially: so that granted that we have a knowledge of those separate substances, we cannot for that reason + claim to form a judgment concerning these sensible things. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q84_A1-p9"> Now it seems that Plato strayed from the truth because, having observed that all knowledge takes place through some kind + of similitude, he thought that the form of the thing known must of necessity be in the knower in the same manner as in the + thing known. Then he observed that the form of the thing understood is in the intellect under conditions of universality, + immateriality, and immobility: which is apparent from the very operation of the intellect, whose act of understanding + has a universal extension, and is subject to a certain amount of necessity: for the mode of action corresponds to the mode + of the agent's form. Wherefore he concluded that the things which we understand must have in themselves an existence under + the same conditions of immateriality and immobility. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q84_A1-p10"> But there is no necessity for this. For even in sensible things it is to be observed that the form is otherwise in one sensible + than in another: for instance, whiteness may be of great intensity in one, and of a less intensity in another: in one we find + whiteness with sweetness, in another without sweetness. In the same way the sensible form is conditioned differently in the + thing which is external to the soul, and in the senses which receive the forms of sensible things without + receiving matter, such as the color of gold without receiving gold. So also the intellect, according to its own mode, receives + under conditions of immateriality and immobility, the species of material and mobile bodies: for the received is in the receiver + according to the mode of the receiver. We must conclude, therefore, that through the intellect the soul knows bodies by a + knowledge which is immaterial, universal, and necessary. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q84_A1-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> These words of Augustine are to be understood as referring to the medium of intellectual knowledge, and not to its object. + For the intellect knows bodies by understanding them, not indeed through bodies, nor through material and corporeal species; + but through immaterial and intelligible species, which can be in the soul by their own essence. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q84_A1-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xxii, 29), it is not correct to say that as the sense knows only bodies so the intellect knows + only spiritual things; for it follows that God and the angels would not know corporeal things. The reason of this diversity + is that the lower power does not extend to those things that belong to the higher power; whereas the higher power operates + in a more excellent manner those things which belong to the lower power. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q84_A1-p13"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Every movement presupposes something immovable: for when a change of quality occurs, the substance remains unmoved; and when + there is a change of substantial form, matter remains unmoved. Moreover the various conditions of mutable things are themselves + immovable; for instance, though Socrates be not always sitting, yet it is an immovable truth that whenever he does sit he + remains in one place. For this reason there is nothing to hinder our having an + immovable science of movable things. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q84_A1-p14"></p> + <p id="FP_Q84_A1-p15"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q84.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q84_A2.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q84_A2" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q84_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q84_A3.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q84_A2-p0.1">Whether the soul understands corporeal things through its essence?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q84_A2-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q84_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the soul understands corporeal things through its essence. For Augustine says (De Trin. x, 5) that the + soul "collects and lays hold of the images of bodies which are formed in the soul and of the soul: for in forming them it + gives them something of its own substance." But the soul understands bodies by images of bodies. Therefore the soul knows + bodies through its essence, which it employs for the formation of such images, and from which it + forms them. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q84_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 8) that "the soul, after a fashion, is everything." Since, therefore, like is + known by like, it seems that the soul knows corporeal things through itself. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q84_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the soul is superior to corporeal creatures. Now lower things are in higher things in a more eminent way than in + themselves, as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. xii). Therefore all corporeal creatures exist in a more excellent way in the soul + than in themselves. Therefore the soul can know corporeal creatures through its essence. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q84_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Trin. ix, 3) that "the mind gathers knowledge of corporeal things through the bodily senses." But the + soul itself cannot be known through the bodily senses. Therefore it does not know corporeal things through itself. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q84_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The ancient philosophers held that the soul knows bodies through its essence. For it was universally admitted that "like + is known by like." But they thought that the form of the thing known is in the knower in the same mode as in the thing known. + The Platonists however were of a contrary opinion. For Plato, having observed that the intellectual soul has an immaterial + nature, and an immaterial mode of knowledge, held that the forms of things known subsist + immaterially. While the earlier natural philosophers, observing that things known are corporeal and material, held that things + known must exist materially even in the soul that knows them. And therefore, in order to ascribe to the soul a knowledge of + all things, they held that it has the same nature in common with all. And because the nature of a result is determined by + its principles, they ascribed to the soul the nature of a principle; so that those who thought fire to be the principle of + all, held that the soul had the nature of fire; and in like manner as to air and water. Lastly, Empedocles, who held the existence + of our four material elements and two principles of movement, said that the soul was composed of these. Consequently, since + they held that things exist in the soul materially, they maintained that all the soul's knowledge is material, thus failing + to discern intellect from sense. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q84_A2-p7"> But this opinion will not hold. First, because in the material principle of which they spoke, the various results do not + exist save in potentiality. But a thing is not known according as it is in potentiality, but only according as it is in act, + as is shown Metaph. ix (Did. viii, 9): wherefore neither is a power known except through its act. It is therefore insufficient + to ascribe to the soul the nature of the principles in order to explain the fact that it knows all, unless we + further admit in the soul natures and forms of each individual result, for instance, of bone, flesh, and the like; thus does + Aristotle argue against Empedocles (De Anima i, 5). Secondly, because if it were necessary for the thing known to exist materially + in the knower, there would be no reason why things which have a material existence outside the soul should be devoid of knowledge; + why, for instance, if by fire the soul knows fire, that fire also which is outside the soul should not have + knowledge of fire. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q84_A2-p8"> We must conclude, therefore, that material things known must needs exist in the knower, not materially, but immaterially. + The reason of this is, because the act of knowledge extends to things outside the knower: for we know things even that are + external to us. Now by matter the form of a thing is determined to some one thing. Wherefore it is clear that knowledge is + in inverse ratio of materiality. And consequently things that are not receptive of forms save materially, have no + power of knowledge whatever---such as plants, as the Philosopher says (De Anima ii, 12). But the more immaterially a thing + receives the form of the thing known, the more perfect is its knowledge. Therefore the intellect which abstracts the species + not only from matter, but also from the individuating conditions of matter, has more perfect knowledge than the senses, which + receive the form of the thing known, without matter indeed, but subject to material conditions. Moreover, among the senses, + sight has the most perfect knowledge, because it is the least material, as we have remarked above ( + <a id="FP_Q84_A2-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q78_A3.html">Q[78], A[3]</a>): while among intellects the more perfect is the more immaterial. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q84_A2-p9"> It is therefore clear from the foregoing, that if there be an intellect which knows all things by its essence, then its essence + must needs have all things in itself immaterially; thus the early philosophers held that the essence of the soul, that it + may know all things, must be actually composed of the principles of all material things. Now this is proper to God, that His + Essence comprise all things immaterially as effects pre-exist virtually in their cause. God alone, + therefore, understands all things through His Essence: but neither the human soul nor the angels can do so. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q84_A2-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Augustine in that passage is speaking of an imaginary vision, which takes place through the image of bodies. To the formation + of such images the soul gives part of its substance, just as a subject is given in order to be informed by some form. In this + way the soul makes such images from itself; not that the soul or some part of the soul be turned into this or that image; + but just as we say that a body is made into something colored because of its + being informed with color. That this is the sense, is clear from what follows. For he says that the soul "keeps something"---namely, + not informed with such image---"which is able freely to judge of the species of these images": and that this is the "mind" + or "intellect." And he says that the part which is informed with these images---namely, the imagination---is "common to us + and beasts." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q84_A2-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Aristotle did not hold that the soul is actually composed of all things, as did the earlier philosophers; he said that the + soul is all things, "after a fashion," forasmuch as it is in potentiality to all---through the senses, to all things sensible---through + the intellect, to all things intelligible. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q84_A2-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Every creature has a finite and determinate essence. Wherefore although the essence of the higher creature has a certain + likeness to the lower creature, forasmuch as they have something in common generically, yet it has not a complete likeness + thereof, because it is determined to a certain species other than the species of the lower creature. But the Divine Essence + is a perfect likeness of all, whatsoever may be found to exist in things created, being + the universal principle of all. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q84_A2-p13"></p> + <p id="FP_Q84_A2-p14"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q84_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q84_A3.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q84_A3" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q84_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q84_A4.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q84_A3-p0.1">Whether the soul understands all things through innate species?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q84_A3-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q84_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the soul understands all things through innate species. For Gregory says, in a homily for the Ascension + (xxix in Ev.), that "man has understanding in common with the angels." But angels understand all things through innate species: + wherefore in the book De Causis it is said that "every intelligence is full of forms." Therefore the soul also has innate + species of things, by means of which it understands corporeal things. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q84_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the intellectual soul is more excellent than corporeal primary matter. But primary matter was created by God under + the forms to which it has potentiality. Therefore much more is the intellectual soul created by God under intelligible species. + And so the soul understands corporeal things through innate species. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q84_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, no one can answer the truth except concerning what he knows. But even a person untaught and devoid of acquired knowledge, + answers the truth to every question if put to him in orderly fashion, as we find related in the Meno (xv seqq.) of Plato, + concerning a certain individual. Therefore we have some knowledge of things even before we acquire knowledge; which would + not be the case unless we had innate species. Therefore the soul understands corporeal + things through innate species. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q84_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher, speaking of the intellect, says (De Anima iii, 4) that it is like "a tablet on which nothing is written." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q84_A3-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Since form is the principle of action, a thing must be related to the form which is the principle of an action, as it is + to that action: for instance, if upward motion is from lightness, then that which only potentially moves upwards must needs + be only potentially light, but that which actually moves upwards must needs be actually light. Now we observe that man sometimes + is only a potential knower, both as to sense and as to intellect. And he is reduced from + such potentiality to act---through the action of sensible objects on his senses, to the act of sensation---by instruction + or discovery, to the act of understanding. Wherefore we must say that the cognitive soul is in potentiality both to the images + which are the principles of sensing, and to those which are the principles of understanding. For this reason Aristotle (De + Anima iii, 4) held that the intellect by which the soul understands has no innate species, but is at first in potentiality + to + all such species. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q84_A3-p7"> But since that which has a form actually, is sometimes unable to act according to that form on account of some hindrance, + as a light thing may be hindered from moving upwards; for this reason did Plato hold that naturally man's intellect is filled + with all intelligible species, but that, by being united to the body, it is hindered from the realization of its act. But + this seems to be unreasonable. First, because, if the soul has a natural knowledge of all things, it seems + impossible for the soul so far to forget the existence of such knowledge as not to know itself to be possessed thereof: for + no man forgets what he knows naturally; that, for instance, the whole is larger than the part, and such like. And especially + unreasonable does this seem if we suppose that it is natural to the soul to be united to the body, as we have established + above ( + <a id="FP_Q84_A3-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q76_A1.html">Q[76] , A[1]</a>): for it is unreasonable that the natural operation of a thing be totally hindered + by that which belongs to it naturally. Secondly, the falseness of this opinion is clearly proved from the fact that if a sense + be wanting, the knowledge of what is apprehended through that sense is wanting also: for instance, a man who is born blind + can have no knowledge of colors. This would not be the case if the soul had innate images of all intelligible things. We must + therefore conclude that the soul does not know corporeal things through innate species. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q84_A3-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Man indeed has intelligence in common with the angels, but not in the same degree of perfection: just as the lower grades + of bodies, which merely exist, according to Gregory (Homily on Ascension, xxix In Ev.), have not the same degree of perfection + as the higher bodies. For the matter of the lower bodies is not totally completed by its form, but is in potentiality to forms + which it has not: whereas the matter of heavenly bodies is totally completed by + its form, so that it is not in potentiality to any other form, as we have said above ( + <a id="FP_Q84_A3-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q66_A2.html">Q[66], A[2]</a>). In the same way the angelic intellect is perfected by intelligible species, in accordance with its nature; whereas the + human intellect is in potentiality to such species. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q84_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Primary matter has substantial being through its form, consequently it had need to be created under some form: else it would + not be in act. But when once it exists under one form it is in potentiality to others. On the other hand, the intellect does + not receive substantial being through the intelligible species; and therefore there is no comparison. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q84_A3-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> If questions be put in an orderly fashion they proceed from universal self-evident principles to what is particular. Now + by such a process knowledge is produced in the mind of the learner. Wherefore when he answers the truth to a subsequent question, + this is not because he had knowledge previously, but because he thus learns for the first time. For it matters not whether + the teacher proceed from universal principles to conclusions by questioning or by + asserting; for in either case the mind of the listener is assured of what follows by that which preceded. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q84_A3-p11"></p> + <p id="FP_Q84_A3-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q84_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q84_A4.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q84_A4" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q84_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q84_A5.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q84_A4-p0.1">Whether the intelligible species are derived by the soul from certain separate forms?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q84_A4-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q84_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the intelligible species are derived by the soul from some separate forms. For whatever is such by participation + is caused by what is such essentially; for instance, that which is on fire is reduced to fire as the cause thereof. But the + intellectual soul forasmuch as it is actually understanding, participates the thing understood: for, in a way, the intellect + in act is the thing understood in act. Therefore what in itself and in its essence + is understood in act, is the cause that the intellectual soul actually understands. Now that which in its essence is actually + understood is a form existing without matter. Therefore the intelligible species, by which the soul understands, are caused + by some separate forms. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q84_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the intelligible is to the intellect, as the sensible is to the sense. But the sensible species which are in the + senses, and by which we sense, are caused by the sensible object which exists actually outside the soul. Therefore the intelligible + species, by which our intellect understands, are caused by some things actually intelligible, existing outside the soul. But + these can be nothing else than forms separate from matter. Therefore the intelligible + forms of our intellect are derived from some separate substances. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q84_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, whatever is in potentiality is reduced to act by something actual. If, therefore, our intellect, previously in potentiality, + afterwards actually understands, this must needs be caused by some intellect which is always in act. But this is a separate + intellect. Therefore the intelligible species, by which we actually understand, are caused by some separate substances. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q84_A4-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> If this were true we should not need the senses in order to understand. And this is proved to be false especially from the + fact that if a man be wanting in a sense, he cannot have any knowledge of the sensibles corresponding to that sense. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q84_A4-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Some have held that the intelligible species of our intellect are derived from certain separate forms or substances. And + this in two ways. For Plato, as we have said + <a id="FP_Q84_A4-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q84_A1.html">(A[1])</a>, held that the forms of sensible things subsist by themselves without matter; for instance, the form of a man which he called + "per se" man, and the form or idea of a horse which is called "per se" horse, and so forth. He said therefore that these forms + are + participated both by our soul and by corporeal matter; by our soul, to the effect of knowledge thereof, and by corporeal matter + to the effect of existence: so that, just as corporeal matter by participating the idea of a stone, becomes an individuating + stone, so our intellect, by participating the idea of a stone, is made to understand a stone. Now participation of an idea + takes place by some image of the idea in the participator, just as a model is participated by a copy. So just as he held + that the sensible forms, which are in corporeal matter, are derived from the ideas as certain images thereof: so he held that + the intelligible species of our intellect are images of the ideas, derived therefrom. And for this reason, as we have said + above + <a id="FP_Q84_A4-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q84_A1.html">(A[1])</a>, he referred sciences and definitions to those ideas. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q84_A4-p7"> But since it is contrary to the nature of sensible things that their forms should subsist without matter, as Aristotle proves + in many ways (Metaph. vi), Avicenna (De Anima v) setting this opinion aside, held that the intelligible species of all sensible + things, instead of subsisting in themselves without matter, pre-exist immaterially in the separate intellects: from the first + of which, said he, such species are derived by a second, and so on to the last separate intellect which + he called the "active intelligence," from which, according to him, intelligible species flow into our souls, and sensible + species into corporeal matter. And so Avicenna agrees with Plato in this, that the intelligible species of our intellect are + derived from certain separate forms; but these Plato held to subsist of themselves, while Avicenna placed them in the "active + intelligence." They differ, too, in this respect, that Avicenna held that the intelligible species do not remain in our + intellect after it has ceased actually to understand, and that it needs to turn (to the active intellect) in order to receive + them anew. Consequently he does not hold that the soul has innate knowledge, as Plato, who held that the participated ideas + remain immovably in the soul. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q84_A4-p8"> But in this opinion no sufficient reason can be assigned for the soul being united to the body. For it cannot be said that + the intellectual soul is united to the body for the sake of the body: for neither is form for the sake of matter, nor is the + mover for the sake of the moved, but rather the reverse. Especially does the body seem necessary to the intellectual soul, + for the latter's proper operation which is to understand: since as to its being the soul does not depend on the + body. But if the soul by its very nature had an inborn aptitude for receiving intelligible species through the influence of + only certain separate principles, and were not to receive them from the senses, it would not need the body in order to understand: + wherefore to no purpose would it be united to the body. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q84_A4-p9"> But if it be said that our soul needs the senses in order to understand, through being in some way awakened by them to the + consideration of those things, the intelligible species of which it receives from the separate principles: even this seems + an insufficient explanation. For this awakening does not seem necessary to the soul, except in as far as it is overcome by + sluggishness, as the Platonists expressed it, and by forgetfulness, through its union with the body: and thus the + senses would be of no use to the intellectual soul except for the purpose of removing the obstacle which the soul encounters + through its union with the body. Consequently the reason of the union of the soul with the body still remains to be sought. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q84_A4-p10"> And if it be said with Avicenna, that the senses are necessary to the soul, because by them it is aroused to turn to the + "active intelligence" from which it receives the species: neither is this a sufficient explanation. Because if it is natural + for the soul to understand through species derived from the "active intelligence," it follows that at times the soul of an + individual wanting in one of the senses can turn to the active intelligence, either from the inclination of its + very nature, or through being roused by another sense, to the effect of receiving the intelligible species of which the corresponding + sensible species are wanting. And thus a man born blind could have knowledge of colors; which is clearly untrue. We must therefore + conclude that the intelligible species, by which our soul understands, are not derived from separate forms. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q84_A4-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The intelligible species which are participated by our intellect are reduced, as to their first cause, to a first principle + which is by its essence intelligible---namely, God. But they proceed from that principle by means of the sensible forms and + material things, from which we gather knowledge, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. vii). + </p> + <p id="FP_Q84_A4-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Material things, as to the being which they have outside the soul, may be actually sensible, but not actually intelligible. + Wherefore there is no comparison between sense and intellect. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q84_A4-p13"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Our passive intellect is reduced from potentiality to act by some being in act, that is, by the active intellect, which is + a power of the soul, as we have said ( + <a id="FP_Q84_A4-p13.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q79_A4.html">Q[79], A[4]</a>); and not by a separate intelligence, as proximate cause, although perchance as remote cause. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q84_A4-p14"></p> + <p id="FP_Q84_A4-p15"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q84_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q84_A5.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q84_A5" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q84_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q84_A6.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q84_A5-p0.1">Whether the intellectual soul knows material things in the eternal types?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q84_A5-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q84_A5-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the intellectual soul does not know material things in the eternal types. For that in which anything is + known must itself be known more and previously. But the intellectual soul of man, in the present state of life, does not know + the eternal types: for it does not know God in Whom the eternal types exist, but is "united to God as to the unknown," as + Dionysius says (Myst. Theolog. i). Therefore the soul does not know all in the eternal + types. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q84_A5-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q84_A5-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.1.20" target="asv">Rom. 1:20</a>) that "the invisible things of God are clearly seen . . . by the things that are made." But among the invisible things of + God are the eternal types. Therefore the eternal types are known through creatures and not the converse. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q84_A5-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the eternal types are nothing else but ideas, for Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 46) that "ideas are permanent types + existing in the Divine mind." If therefore we say that the intellectual soul knows all things in the eternal types, we come + back to the opinion of Plato who said that all knowledge is derived from them. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q84_A5-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (Confess. xii, 25): "If we both see that what you say is true, and if we both see that what I say is true, + where do we see this, I pray? Neither do I see it in you, nor do you see it in me: but we both see it in the unchangeable + truth which is above our minds." Now the unchangeable truth is contained in the eternal types. Therefore the intellectual + soul knows all true things in the eternal types. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q84_A5-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. ii, 11): "If those who are called philosophers said by chance anything that was true + and consistent with our faith, we must claim it from them as from unjust possessors. For some of the doctrines of the heathens + are spurious imitations or superstitious inventions, which we must be careful to avoid when we renounce the society of the + heathens." Consequently whenever Augustine, who was imbued with the doctrines of the + Platonists, found in their teaching anything consistent with faith, he adopted it: and those thing which he found contrary + to faith he amended. Now Plato held, as we have said above + <a id="FP_Q84_A5-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q84_A4.html">(A[4])</a>, that the forms of things subsist of themselves apart from matter; and these he called ideas, by participation of which he + said that our intellect knows all things: so that just as corporeal matter by participating the idea of a stone becomes a + stone, so our intellect, by + participating the same idea, has knowledge of a stone. But since it seems contrary to faith that forms of things themselves, + outside the things themselves and apart from matter, as the Platonists held, asserting that "per se" life or "per se" wisdom + are creative substances, as Dionysius relates (Div. Nom. xi); therefore Augustine (QQ. 83, qu. 46), for the ideas defended + by Plato, substituted the types of all creatures existing in the Divine mind, according to which types all things are made + in + themselves, and are known to the human soul. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q84_A5-p7"> When, therefore, the question is asked: Does the human soul know all things in the eternal types? we must reply that one + thing is said to be known in another in two ways. First, as in an object itself known; as one may see in a mirror the images + of things reflected therein. In this way the soul, in the present state of life, cannot see all things in the eternal types; + but the blessed who see God, and all things in Him, thus know all things in the eternal types. Secondly, on + thing is said to be known in another as in a principle of knowledge: thus we might say that we see in the sun what we see + by the sun. And thus we must needs say that the human soul knows all things in the eternal types, since by participation of + these types we know all things. For the intellectual light itself which is in us, is nothing else than a participated likeness + of the uncreated light, in which are contained the eternal types. Whence it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q84_A5-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.4.6" target="asv">Ps. 4:6,7</a>), "Many + say: Who showeth us good things?" which question the Psalmist answers, "The light of Thy countenance, O Lord, is signed upon + us," as though he were to say: By the seal of the Divine light in us, all things are made known to us. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q84_A5-p8"> But since besides the intellectual light which is in us, intelligible species, which are derived from things, are required + in order for us to have knowledge of material things; therefore this same knowledge is not due merely to a participation of + the eternal types, as the Platonists held, maintaining that the mere participation of ideas sufficed for knowledge. Wherefore + Augustine says (De Trin. iv, 16): "Although the philosophers prove by convincing arguments that all things + occur in time according to the eternal types, were they able to see in the eternal types, or to find out from them how many + kinds of animals there are and the origin of each? Did they not seek for this information from the story of times and places?" + </p> + <p id="FP_Q84_A5-p9"> But that Augustine did not understand all things to be known in their "eternal types" or in the "unchangeable truth," as + though the eternal types themselves were seen, is clear from what he says (QQ. 83, qu. 46)---viz. that "not each and every + rational soul can be said to be worthy of that vision," namely, of the eternal types, "but only those that are holy and pure," + such as the souls of the blessed. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q84_A5-p10"> From what has been said the objections are easily solved.</p> + <p id="FP_Q84_A5-p11"></p> + <p id="FP_Q84_A5-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q84_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q84_A6.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q84_A6" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q84_A5.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q84_A7.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q84_A6-p0.1">Whether intellectual knowledge is derived from sensible things?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q84_A6-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q84_A6-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that intellectual knowledge is not derived from sensible things. For Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 9) that "we + cannot expect to learn the fulness of truth from the senses of the body." This he proves in two ways. First, because "whatever + the bodily senses reach, is continually being changed; and what is never the same cannot be perceived." Secondly, because, + "whatever we perceive by the body, even when not present to the senses, may be present to + the imagination, as when we are asleep or angry: yet we cannot discern by the senses, whether what we perceive be the sensible + object or the deceptive image thereof. Now nothing can be perceived which cannot be distinguished from its counterfeit." And + so he concludes that we cannot expect to learn the truth from the senses. But intellectual knowledge apprehends the truth. + Therefore intellectual knowledge cannot be conveyed by the senses. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q84_A6-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 16): "We must not thing that the body can make any impression on the spirit, as + though the spirit were to supply the place of matter in regard to the body's action; for that which acts is in every way more + excellent than that which it acts on." Whence he concludes that "the body does not cause its image in the spirit, but the + spirit causes it in itself." Therefore intellectual knowledge is not derived from sensible + things. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q84_A6-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, an effect does not surpass the power of its cause. But intellectual knowledge extends beyond sensible things: for + we understand some things which cannot be perceived by the senses. Therefore intellectual knowledge is not derived from sensible + things. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q84_A6-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Metaph. i, 1; Poster. ii, 15) that the principle of knowledge is in the senses. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q84_A6-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> On this point the philosophers held three opinions. For Democritus held that "all knowledge is caused by images issuing from + the bodies we think of and entering into our souls," as Augustine says in his letter to Dioscorus (cxviii, 4). And Aristotle + says (De Somn. et Vigil.) that Democritus held that knowledge is cause by a "discharge of images." And the reason for this + opinion was that both Democritus and the other early philosophers did not distinguish + between intellect and sense, as Aristotle relates (De Anima iii, 3). Consequently, since the sense is affected by the sensible, + they thought that all our knowledge is affected by this mere impression brought about by sensible things. Which impression + Democritus held to be caused by a discharge of images. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q84_A6-p7"> Plato, on the other hand, held that the intellect is distinct from the senses: and that it is an immaterial power not making + use of a corporeal organ for its action. And since the incorporeal cannot be affected by the corporeal, he held that intellectual + knowledge is not brought about by sensible things affecting the intellect, but by separate intelligible forms being participated + by the intellect, as we have said above ( + <a id="FP_Q84_A6-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q84_A4.html">AA[4]</a> ,5). Moreover he held that + sense is a power operating of itself. Consequently neither is sense, since it is a spiritual power, affected by the sensible: + but the sensible organs are affected by the sensible, the result being that the soul is in a way roused to form within itself + the species of the sensible. Augustine seems to touch on this opinion (Gen. ad lit. xii, 24) where he says that the "body + feels not, but the soul through the body, which it makes use of as a kind of messenger, for reproducing within itself what + is + announced from without." Thus according to Plato, neither does intellectual knowledge proceed from sensible knowledge, nor + sensible knowledge exclusively from sensible things; but these rouse the sensible soul to the sentient act, while the senses + rouse the intellect to the act of understanding. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q84_A6-p8"> Aristotle chose a middle course. For with Plato he agreed that intellect and sense are different. But he held that the sense + has not its proper operation without the cooperation of the body; so that to feel is not an act of the soul alone, but of + the "composite." And he held the same in regard to all the operations of the sensitive part. Since, therefore, it is not unreasonable + that the sensible objects which are outside the soul should produce some effect in the "composite," + Aristotle agreed with Democritus in this, that the operations of the sensitive part are caused by the impression of the sensible + on the sense: not by a discharge, as Democritus said, but by some kind of operation. For Democritus maintained that every + operation is by way of a discharge of atoms, as we gather from De Gener. i, 8. But Aristotle held that the intellect has an + operation which is independent of the body's cooperation. Now nothing corporeal can make an impression on the incorporeal. + And therefore in order to cause the intellectual operation according to Aristotle, the impression caused by the sensible does + not suffice, but something more noble is required, for "the agent is more noble than the patient," as he says (De Gener. i, + 5). Not, indeed, in the sense that the intellectual operation is effected in us by the mere intellectual operation is effected + in us by the mere impression of some superior beings, as Plato held; but that the higher and more noble agent which he + calls the active intellect, of which we have spoken above ( + <a id="FP_Q84_A6-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q79_A3.html">Q[79], AA[3]</a>,4) causes the phantasms received from the senses to be actually intelligible, by a process of abstraction. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q84_A6-p9"> According to this opinion, then, on the part of the phantasms, intellectual knowledge is caused by the senses. But since + the phantasms cannot of themselves affect the passive intellect, and require to be made actually intelligible by the active + intellect, it cannot be said that sensible knowledge is the total and perfect cause of intellectual knowledge, but rather + that it is in a way the material cause. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q84_A6-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Those words of Augustine mean that we must not expect the entire truth from the senses. For the light of the active intellect + is needed, through which we achieve the unchangeable truth of changeable things, and discern things themselves from their + likeness. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q84_A6-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> In this passage Augustine speaks not of intellectual but of imaginary knowledge. And since, according to the opinion of Plato, + the imagination has an operation which belongs to the soul only, Augustine, in order to show that corporeal images are impressed + on the imagination, not by bodies but by the soul, uses the same argument as Aristotle does in proving that the active intellect + must be separate, namely, because "the agent is more noble than the + patient." And without doubt, according to the above opinion, in the imagination there must needs be not only a passive but + also an active power. But if we hold, according to the opinion of Aristotle, that the action of the imagination, is an action + of the "composite," there is no difficulty; because the sensible body is more noble than the organ of the animal, in so far + as it is compared to it as a being in act to a being in potentiality; even as the object actually colored is compared to the + pupil which is potentially colored. It may, however, be said, although the first impression of the imagination is through + the agency of the sensible, since "fancy is movement produced in accordance with sensation" (De Anima iii, 3), that nevertheless + there is in man an operation which by synthesis and analysis forms images of various things, even of things not perceived + by the senses. And Augustine's words may be taken in this sense. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q84_A6-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Sensitive knowledge is not the entire cause of intellectual knowledge. And therefore it is not strange that intellectual + knowledge should extend further than sensitive knowledge. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q84_A6-p13"></p> + <p id="FP_Q84_A6-p14"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q84_A5.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q84_A7.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q84_A7" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q84_A6.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q84_A8.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q84_A7-p0.1">Whether the intellect can actually understand through the intelligible species of which it is possessed, without turning to + the phantasms? + </h4> + <p id="FP_Q84_A7-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q84_A7-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the intellect can actually understand through the intelligible species of which it is possessed, without + turning to the phantasms. For the intellect is made actual by the intelligible species by which it is informed. But if the + intellect is in act, it understands. Therefore the intelligible species suffices for the intellect to understand actually, + without turning to the phantasms. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q84_A7-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the imagination is more dependent on the senses than the intellect on the imagination. But the imagination can actually + imagine in the absence of the sensible. Therefore much more can the intellect understand without turning to the phantasms. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q84_A7-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> There are no phantasms of incorporeal things: for the imagination does not transcend time and space. If, therefore, our intellect + cannot understand anything actually without turning to the phantasms, it follows that it cannot understand anything incorporeal. + Which is clearly false: for we understand truth, and God, and the angels. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q84_A7-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 7) that "the soul understands nothing without a phantasm." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q84_A7-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> In the present state of life in which the soul is united to a passible body, it is impossible for our intellect to understand + anything actually, except by turning to the phantasms. First of all because the intellect, being a power that does not make + use of a corporeal organ, would in no way be hindered in its act through the lesion of a corporeal organ, if for its act there + were not required the act of some power that does make use of a corporeal organ. Now + sense, imagination and the other powers belonging to the sensitive part, make use of a corporeal organ. Wherefore it is clear + that for the intellect to understand actually, not only when it acquires fresh knowledge, but also when it applies knowledge + already acquired, there is need for the act of the imagination and of the other powers. For when the act of the imagination + is hindered by a lesion of the corporeal organ, for instance in a case of frenzy; or when the act of the memory is hindered, + as in the case of lethargy, we see that a man is hindered from actually understanding things of which he had a previous knowledge. + Secondly, anyone can experience this of himself, that when he tries to understand something, he forms certain phantasms to + serve him by way of examples, in which as it were he examines what he is desirous of understanding. For this reason it is + that when we wish to help someone to understand something, we lay examples before him, from which he forms phantasms for + the purpose of understanding. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q84_A7-p7"> Now the reason of this is that the power of knowledge is proportioned to the thing known. Wherefore the proper object of + the angelic intellect, which is entirely separate from a body, is an intelligible substance separate from a body. Whereas + the proper object of the human intellect, which is united to a body, is a quiddity or nature existing in corporeal matter; + and through such natures of visible things it rises to a certain knowledge of things invisible. Now it belongs to + such a nature to exist in an individual, and this cannot be apart from corporeal matter: for instance, it belongs to the nature + of a stone to be in an individual stone, and to the nature of a horse to be in an individual horse, and so forth. Wherefore + the nature of a stone or any material thing cannot be known completely and truly, except in as much as it is known as existing + in the individual. Now we apprehend the individual through the senses and the imagination. And, therefore, for the + intellect to understand actually its proper object, it must of necessity turn to the phantasms in order to perceive the universal + nature existing in the individual. But if the proper object of our intellect were a separate form; or if, as the Platonists + say, the natures of sensible things subsisted apart from the individual; there would be no need for the intellect to turn + to the phantasms whenever it understands. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q84_A7-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The species preserved in the passive intellect exist there habitually when it does not understand them actually, as we have + said above ( + <a id="FP_Q84_A7-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q79_A6.html">Q[79], A[6]</a>). Wherefore for us to understand actually, the fact that the species are preserved does not suffice; we need further to make + use of them in a manner befitting the things of which they are the species, which things are natures existing in individuals. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q84_A7-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Even the phantasm is the likeness of an individual thing; wherefore the imagination does not need any further likeness of + the individual, whereas the intellect does. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q84_A7-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Incorporeal things, of which there are no phantasms, are known to us by comparison with sensible bodies of which there are + phantasms. Thus we understand truth by considering a thing of which we possess the truth; and God, as Dionysius says (Div. + Nom. i), we know as cause, by way of excess and by way of remotion. Other incorporeal substances we know, in the present state + of life, only by way of remotion or by some comparison to corporeal things. And, + therefore, when we understand something about these things, we need to turn to phantasms of bodies, although there are no + phantasms of the things themselves. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q84_A7-p11"></p> + <p id="FP_Q84_A7-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q84_A6.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q84_A8.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q84_A8" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q84_A7.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q85.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q84_A8-p0.1">Whether the judgment of the intellect is hindered through suspension of the sensitive powers?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q84_A8-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q84_A8-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the judgment of the intellect is not hindered by suspension of the sensitive powers. For the superior + does not depend on the inferior. But the judgment of the intellect is higher than the senses. Therefore the judgment of the + intellect is not hindered through suspension of the senses. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q84_A8-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, to syllogize is an act of the intellect. But during sleep the senses are suspended, as is said in De Somn. et Vigil. + i and yet it sometimes happens to us to syllogize while asleep. Therefore the judgment of the intellect is not hindered through + suspension of the senses. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q84_A8-p4"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> What a man does while asleep, against the moral law, is not imputed to him as a sin; as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, + 15). But this would not be the case if man, while asleep, had free use of his reason and intellect. Therefore the judgment + of the intellect is hindered by suspension of the senses. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q84_A8-p5"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As we have said above + <a id="FP_Q84_A8-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q84_A7.html">(A[7])</a>, our intellect's proper and proportionate object is the nature of a sensible thing. Now a perfect judgment concerning anything + cannot be formed, unless all that pertains to that thing's nature be known; especially if that be ignored which is the term + and end of judgment. Now the Philosopher says (De Coel. iii), that "as the end of a practical science is action, so the end + of natural science is that which + is perceived principally through the senses"; for the smith does not seek knowledge of a knife except for the purpose of action, + in order that he may produce a certain individual knife; and in like manner the natural philosopher does not seek to know + the nature of a stone and of a horse, save for the purpose of knowing the essential properties of those things which he perceives + with his senses. Now it is clear that a smith cannot judge perfectly of a knife unless he knows the action of the + knife: and in like manner the natural philosopher cannot judge perfectly of natural things, unless he knows sensible things. + But in the present state of life whatever we understand, we know by comparison to natural sensible things. Consequently it + is not possible for our intellect to form a perfect judgment, while the senses are suspended, through which sensible things + are known to us. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q84_A8-p6"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Although the intellect is superior to the senses, nevertheless in a manner it receives from the senses, and its first and + principal objects are founded in sensible things. And therefore suspension of the senses necessarily involves a hindrance + to the judgment of the intellect. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q84_A8-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The senses are suspended in the sleeper through certain evaporations and the escape of certain exhalations, as we read in + De Somn. et Vigil. iii. And, therefore, according to the amount of such evaporation, the senses are more or less suspended. + For when the amount is considerable, not only are the senses suspended, but also the imagination, so that there are no phantasms; + thus does it happen, especially when a man falls asleep after eating and + drinking copiously. If, however, the evaporation be somewhat less, phantasms appear, but distorted and without sequence; thus + it happens in a case of fever. And if the evaporation be still more attenuated, the phantasms will have a certain sequence: + thus especially does it happen towards the end of sleep in sober men and those who are gifted with a strong imagination. If + the evaporation be very slight, not only does the imagination retain its freedom, but also the common sense is partly freed; + so that sometimes while asleep a man may judge that what he sees is a dream, discerning, as it were, between things, and their + images. Nevertheless, the common sense remains partly suspended; and therefore, although it discriminates some images from + the reality, yet is it always deceived in some particular. Therefore, while man is asleep, according as sense and imagination + are free, so is the judgment of his intellect unfettered, though not entirely. Consequently, if a man syllogizes while + asleep, when he wakes up he invariably recognizes a flaw in some respect. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q84_A8-p8"></p> + <p id="FP_Q84_A8-p9"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q84_A7.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q85.html"></a> + </div> + <a href="summa.FP_Q83_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q84_A1.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q85" class="div3"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q84_A8.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q85_A1.html"></a> + <h3 id="FP_Q85-p0.1">OF THE MODE AND ORDER OF UNDERSTANDING (EIGHT ARTICLES)</h3> + <p id="FP_Q85-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q85-p2"> We come now to consider the mode and order of understanding. Under this head there are eight points of inquiry:</p> + <p id="FP_Q85-p3"> (1) Whether our intellect understands by abstracting the species from the phantasms?</p> + <p id="FP_Q85-p4"> (2) Whether the intelligible species abstracted from the phantasms are what our intellect understands, or that whereby it + understands? + </p> + <p id="FP_Q85-p5"> (3) Whether our intellect naturally first understands the more universal?</p> + <p id="FP_Q85-p6"> (4) Whether our intellect can know many things at the same time?</p> + <p id="FP_Q85-p7"> (5) Whether our intellect understands by the process of composition and division?</p> + <p id="FP_Q85-p8"> (6) Whether the intellect can err?</p> + <p id="FP_Q85-p9"> (7) Whether one intellect can understand better than another?</p> + <p id="FP_Q85-p10"> (8) Whether our intellect understands the indivisible before the divisible?</p> + <p id="FP_Q85-p11"></p> + <div id="FP_Q85_A1" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q85.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q85_A2.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q85_A1-p0.1">Whether our intellect understands corporeal and material things by abstraction from phantasms?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q85_A1-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q85_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that our intellect does not understand corporeal and material things by abstraction from the phantasms. For + the intellect is false if it understands an object otherwise than as it really is. Now the forms of material things do not + exist as abstracted from the particular things represented by the phantasms. Therefore, if we understand material things by + abstraction of the species from the phantasm, there will be error in the intellect. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q85_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, material things are those natural things which include matter in their definition. But nothing can be understood + apart from that which enters into its definition. Therefore material things cannot be understood apart from matter. Now matter + is the principle of individualization. Therefore material things cannot be understood by abstraction of the universal from + the particular, which is the process whereby the intelligible species is abstracted from the + phantasm. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q85_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 7) that the phantasm is to the intellectual soul what color is to the sight. + But seeing is not caused by abstraction of species from color, but by color impressing itself on the sight. Therefore neither + does the act of understanding take place by abstraction of something from the phantasm, but by the phantasm impressing itself + on the intellect. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q85_A1-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 5) there are two things in the intellectual soul---the passive intellect and + the active intellect. But it does not belong to the passive intellect to abstract the intelligible species from the phantasm, + but to receive them when abstracted. Neither does it seem to be the function of the active intellect, which is related to + the phantasm, as light is to color; since light does not abstract anything from color, but + rather streams on to it. Therefore in no way do we understand by abstraction from phantasms. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q85_A1-p6"> + <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, the Philosopher (De Anima iii, 7) says that "the intellect understands the species in the phantasm"; and not, therefore, + by abstraction. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q85_A1-p7"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 4) that "things are intelligible in proportion as they are separate from matter." Therefore + material things must needs be understood according as they are abstracted from matter and from material images, namely, phantasms. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q85_A1-p8"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above ( + <a id="FP_Q85_A1-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q84_A7.html">Q[84], A[7]</a>), the object of knowledge is proportionate to the power of knowledge. Now there are three grades of the cognitive powers. + For one cognitive power, namely, the sense, is the act of a corporeal organ. And therefore the object of every sensitive power + is a form as existing in corporeal matter. And since such matter is the principle of individuality, therefore every power + of the sensitive part can only have + knowledge of the individual. There is another grade of cognitive power which is neither the act of a corporeal organ, nor + in any way connected with corporeal matter; such is the angelic intellect, the object of whose cognitive power is therefore + a form existing apart from matter: for though angels know material things, yet they do not know them save in something immaterial, + namely, either in themselves or in God. But the human intellect holds a middle place: for it is not the act of an organ; + yet it is a power of the soul which is the form the body, as is clear from what we have said above ( + <a id="FP_Q85_A1-p8.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q76_A1.html">Q[76], A[1]</a>). And therefore it is proper to it to know a form existing individually in corporeal matter, but not as existing in this + individual matter. But to know what is in individual matter, not as existing in such matter, is to abstract the form from + individual matter which is represented by the phantasms. Therefore we must needs say that our intellect understands + material things by abstracting from the phantasms; and through material things thus considered we acquire some knowledge of + immaterial things, just as, on the contrary, angels know material things through the immaterial. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q85_A1-p9"> But Plato, considering only the immateriality of the human intellect, and not its being in a way united to the body, held + that the objects of the intellect are separate ideas; and that we understand not by abstraction, but by participating things + abstract, as stated above ( + <a id="FP_Q85_A1-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q84_A1.html">Q[84] , A[1]</a>). + </p> + <p id="FP_Q85_A1-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Abstraction may occur in two ways: First, by way of composition and division; thus we may understand that one thing does + not exist in some other, or that it is separate therefrom. Secondly, by way of simple and absolute consideration; thus we + understand one thing without considering the other. Thus for the intellect to abstract one from another things which are not + really abstract from one another, does, in the first mode of abstraction, imply + falsehood. But, in the second mode of abstraction, for the intellect to abstract things which are not really abstract from + one another, does not involve falsehood, as clearly appears in the case of the senses. For if we understood or said that color + is not in a colored body, or that it is separate from it, there would be error in this opinion or assertion. But if we consider + color and its properties, without reference to the apple which is colored; or if we express in word what we thus + understand, there is no error in such an opinion or assertion, because an apple is not essential to color, and therefore color + can be understood independently of the apple. Likewise, the things which belong to the species of a material thing, such as + a stone, or a man, or a horse, can be thought of apart from the individualizing principles which do not belong to the notion + of the species. This is what we mean by abstracting the universal from the particular, or the intelligible species from the + phantasm; that is, by considering the nature of the species apart from its individual qualities represented by the phantasms. + If, therefore, the intellect is said to be false when it understands a thing otherwise than as it is, that is so, if the word + "otherwise" refers to the thing understood; for the intellect is false when it understands a thing otherwise than as it is; + and so the intellect would be false if it abstracted the species of a stone from its matter in such a way as to regard the + species as not existing in matter, as Plato held. But it is not so, if the word "otherwise" be taken as referring to the one + who understands. For it is quite true that the mode of understanding, in one who understands, is not the same as the mode + of a thing in existing: since the thing understood is immaterially in the one who understands, according to the mode of the + intellect, and not materially, according to the mode of a material thing. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q85_A1-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Some have thought that the species of a natural thing is a form only, and that matter is not part of the species. If that + were so, matter would not enter into the definition of natural things. Therefore it must be said otherwise, that matter is + twofold, common, and "signate" or individual; common, such as flesh and bone; and individual, as this flesh and these bones. + The intellect therefore abstracts the species of a natural thing from the individual + sensible matter, but not from the common sensible matter; for example, it abstracts the species of man from "this flesh and + these bones," which do not belong to the species as such, but to the individual (Metaph. vii, Did. vi, 10), and need not be + considered in the species: whereas the species of man cannot be abstracted by the intellect form "flesh and bones." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q85_A1-p12"> Mathematical species, however, can be abstracted by the intellect from sensible matter, not only from individual, but also + from common matter; not from common intelligible matter, but only from individual matter. For sensible matter is corporeal + matter as subject to sensible qualities, such as being cold or hot, hard or soft, and the like: while intelligible matter + is substance as subject to quantity. Now it is manifest that quantity is in substance before other sensible + qualities are. Hence quantities, such as number, dimension, and figures, which are the terminations of quantity, can be considered + apart from sensible qualities; and this is to abstract them from sensible matter; but they cannot be considered without understanding + the substance which is subject to the quantity; for that would be to abstract them from common intelligible matter. Yet they + can be considered apart from this or that substance; for that is to abstract them from individual + intelligible matter. But some things can be abstracted even from common intelligible matter, such as "being," "unity," "power," + "act," and the like; all these can exist without matter, as is plain regarding immaterial things. Because Plato failed to + consider the twofold kind of abstraction, as above explained (ad 1), he held that all those things which we have stated to + be abstracted by the intellect, are abstract in reality. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q85_A1-p13"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Colors, as being in individual corporeal matter, have the same mode of existence as the power of sight: therefore they can + impress their own image on the eye. But phantasms, since they are images of individuals, and exist in corporeal organs, have + not the same mode of existence as the human intellect, and therefore have not the power of themselves to make an impression + on the passive intellect. This is done by the power of the active intellect which + by turning towards the phantasm produces in the passive intellect a certain likeness which represents, as to its specific + conditions only, the thing reflected in the phantasm. It is thus that the intelligible species is said to be abstracted from + the phantasm; not that the identical form which previously was in the phantasm is subsequently in the passive intellect, as + a body transferred from one place to another. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q85_A1-p14"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Not only does the active intellect throw light on the phantasm: it does more; by its own power it abstracts the intelligible + species from the phantasm. It throws light on the phantasm, because, just as the sensitive part acquires a greater power by + its conjunction with the intellectual part, so by the power of the active intellect the phantasms are made more fit for the + abstraction therefrom of intelligible intentions. Furthermore, the active + intellect abstracts the intelligible species from the phantasm, forasmuch as by the power of the active intellect we are able + to disregard the conditions of individuality, and to take into our consideration the specific nature, the image of which informs + the passive intellect. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q85_A1-p15"> + <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> Our intellect both abstracts the intelligible species from the phantasms, inasmuch as it considers the natures of things + in universal, and, nevertheless, understands these natures in the phantasms since it cannot understand even the things of + which it abstracts the species, without turning to the phantasms, as we have said above ( + <a id="FP_Q85_A1-p15.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q84_A7.html">Q[84], A[7]</a>). + </p> + <p id="FP_Q85_A1-p16"></p> + <p id="FP_Q85_A1-p17"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q85.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q85_A2.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q85_A2" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q85_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q85_A3.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q85_A2-p0.1">Whether the intelligible species abstracted from the phantasm is related to our intellect as that which is understood?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q85_A2-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q85_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the intelligible species abstracted from the phantasm is related to our intellect as that which is understood. + For the understood in act is in the one who understands: since the understood in act is the intellect itself in act. But nothing + of what is understood is in the intellect actually understanding, save the abstracted intelligible species. Therefore this + species is what is actually understood. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q85_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, what is actually understood must be in something; else it would be nothing. But it is not in something outside the + soul: for, since what is outside the soul is material, nothing therein can be actually understood. Therefore what is actually + understood is in the intellect. Consequently it can be nothing else than the aforesaid intelligible species. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q85_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the Philosopher says (1 Peri Herm. i) that "words are signs of the passions in the soul." But words signify the + things understood, for we express by word what we understand. Therefore these passions of the soul---viz. the intelligible + species, are what is actually understood. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q85_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The intelligible species is to the intellect what the sensible image is to the sense. But the sensible image is not what + is perceived, but rather that by which sense perceives. Therefore the intelligible species is not what is actually understood, + but that by which the intellect understands. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q85_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Some have asserted that our intellectual faculties know only the impression made on them; as, for example, that sense is + cognizant only of the impression made on its own organ. According to this theory, the intellect understands only its own impression, + namely, the intelligible species which it has received, so that this species is what is understood. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q85_A2-p7"> This is, however, manifestly false for two reasons. First, because the things we understand are the objects of science; therefore + if what we understand is merely the intelligible species in the soul, it would follow that every science would not be concerned + with objects outside the soul, but only with the intelligible species within the soul; thus, according to the teaching of + the Platonists all science is about ideas, which they held to be actually understood [* + <a id="FP_Q85_A2-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q84_A1.html">Q[84], A[1]</a>]. Secondly, it is untrue, because it would lead to the opinion of the ancients who maintained that "whatever seems, is true" + [*Aristotle, Metaph. iii. 5], and that consequently contradictories are true simultaneously. For if the faculty knows its + own impression only, it can judge of that only. Now a thing seems according to the impression made on the cognitive faculty. + Consequently the cognitive faculty will always judge of its own impression as such; and so + every judgment will be true: for instance, if taste perceived only its own impression, when anyone with a healthy taste perceives + that honey is sweet, he would judge truly; and if anyone with a corrupt taste perceives that honey is bitter, this would be + equally true; for each would judge according to the impression on his taste. Thus every opinion would be equally true; in + fact, every sort of apprehension. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q85_A2-p8"> Therefore it must be said that the intelligible species is related to the intellect as that by which it understands: which + is proved thus. There is a twofold action (Metaph. ix, Did. viii, 8), one which remains in the agent; for instance, to see + and to understand; and another which passes into an external object; for instance, to heat and to cut; and each of these actions + proceeds in virtue of some form. And as the form from which proceeds an act tending to something external is + the likeness of the object of the action, as heat in the heater is a likeness of the thing heated; so the form from which + proceeds an action remaining in the agent is the likeness of the object. Hence that by which the sight sees is the likeness + of the visible thing; and the likeness of the thing understood, that is, the intelligible species, is the form by which the + intellect understands. But since the intellect reflects upon itself, by such reflection it understands both its own act of + intelligence, and the species by which it understands. Thus the intelligible species is that which is understood secondarily; + but that which is primarily understood is the object, of which the species is the likeness. This also appears from the opinion + of the ancient philosophers, who said that "like is known by like." For they said that the soul knows the earth outside itself, + by the earth within itself; and so of the rest. If, therefore, we take the species of the earth instead of the earth, + according to Aristotle (De Anima iii, 8), who says "that a stone is not in the soul, but only the likeness of the stone"; + it follows that the soul knows external things by means of its intelligible species. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q85_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The thing understood is in the intellect by its own likeness; and it is in this sense that we say that the thing actually + understood is the intellect in act, because the likeness of the thing understood is the form of the intellect, as the likeness + of a sensible thing is the form of the sense in act. Hence it does not follow that the intelligible species abstracted is + what is actually understood; but rather that it is the likeness thereof. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q85_A2-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> In these words "the thing actually understood" there is a double implication---the thing which is understood, and the fact + that it is understood. In like manner the words "abstract universal" imply two things, the nature of a thing and its abstraction + or universality. Therefore the nature itself to which it occurs to be understood, abstracted or considered as universal is + only in individuals; but that it is understood, abstracted or considered as + universal is in the intellect. We see something similar to this is in the senses. For the sight sees the color of the apple + apart from its smell. If therefore it be asked where is the color which is seen apart from the smell, it is quite clear that + the color which is seen is only in the apple: but that it be perceived apart from the smell, this is owing to the sight, forasmuch + as the faculty of sight receives the likeness of color and not of smell. In like manner humanity understood is only in + this or that man; but that humanity be apprehended without conditions of individuality, that is, that it be abstracted and + consequently considered as universal, occurs to humanity inasmuch as it is brought under the consideration of the intellect, + in which there is a likeness of the specific nature, but not of the principles of individuality. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q85_A2-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> There are two operations in the sensitive part. One, in regard of impression only, and thus the operation of the senses takes + place by the senses being impressed by the sensible. The other is formation, inasmuch as the imagination forms for itself + an image of an absent thing, or even of something never seen. Both of these operations are found in the intellect. For in + the first place there is the passion of the passive intellect as informed by the + intelligible species; and then the passive intellect thus informed forms a definition, or a division, or a composition, expressed + by a word. Wherefore the concept conveyed by a word is its definition; and a proposition conveys the intellect's division + or composition. Words do not therefore signify the intelligible species themselves; but that which the intellect forms for + itself for the purpose of judging of external things. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q85_A2-p12"></p> + <p id="FP_Q85_A2-p13"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q85_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q85_A3.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q85_A3" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q85_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q85_A4.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q85_A3-p0.1">Whether the more universal is first in our intellectual cognition?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q85_A3-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q85_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the more universal is not first in our intellectual cognition. For what is first and more known in its + own nature, is secondarily and less known in relation to ourselves. But universals come first as regards their nature, because + "that is first which does not involve the existence of its correlative" (Categor. ix). Therefore the universals are secondarily + known as regards our intellect. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q85_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the composition precedes the simple in relation to us. But universals are the more simple. Therefore they are known + secondarily by us. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q85_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the Philosopher says (Phys. i, 1), that the object defined comes in our knowledge before the parts of its definition. + But the more universal is part of the definition of the less universal, as "animal" is part of the definition of "man." Therefore + the universals are secondarily known by us. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q85_A3-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, we know causes and principles by their effects. But universals are principles. Therefore universals are secondarily + known by us. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q85_A3-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> "We must proceed from the universal to the singular and individual" (Phys. i, 1) + </p> + <p id="FP_Q85_A3-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> In our knowledge there are two things to be considered. First, that intellectual knowledge in some degree arises from sensible + knowledge: and, because sense has singular and individual things for its object, and intellect has the universal for its object, + it follows that our knowledge of the former comes before our knowledge of the latter. Secondly, we must consider that our + intellect proceeds from a state of potentiality to a state of actuality; and every + power thus proceeding from potentiality to actuality comes first to an incomplete act, which is the medium between potentiality + and actuality, before accomplishing the perfect act. The perfect act of the intellect is complete knowledge, when the object + is distinctly and determinately known; whereas the incomplete act is imperfect knowledge, when the object is known indistinctly, + and as it were confusedly. A thing thus imperfectly known, is known partly in act and partly in potentiality, and + hence the Philosopher says (Phys. i, 1), that "what is manifest and certain is known to us at first confusedly; afterwards + we know it by distinguishing its principles and elements." Now it is evident that to know an object that comprises many things, + without proper knowledge of each thing contained in it, is to know that thing confusedly. In this way we can have knowledge + not only of the universal whole, which contains parts potentially, but also of the integral whole; for each whole can be + known confusedly, without its parts being known. But to know distinctly what is contained in the universal whole is to know + the less common, as to "animal" indistinctly is to know it as "animal"; whereas to know "animal" distinctly is know it as + "rational" or "irrational animal," that is, to know a man or a lion: therefore our intellect knows "animal" before it knows + man; and the same reason holds in comparing any more universal idea with the less universal. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q85_A3-p8"> Moreover, as sense, like the intellect, proceeds from potentiality to act, the same order of knowledge appears in the senses. + For by sense we judge of the more common before the less common, in reference both to place and time; in reference to place, + when a thing is seen afar off it is seen to be a body before it is seen to be an animal; and to be an animal before it is + seen to be a man, and to be a man before it seen to be Socrates or Plato; and the same is true as regards + time, for a child can distinguish man from not man before he distinguishes this man from that, and therefore "children at + first call men fathers, and later on distinguish each one from the others" (Phys. i, 1). The reason of this is clear: because + he who knows a thing indistinctly is in a state of potentiality as regards its principle of distinction; as he who knows "genus" + is in a state of potentiality as regards "difference." Thus it is evident that indistinct knowledge is midway between + potentiality and act. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q85_A3-p9"> We must therefore conclude that knowledge of the singular and individual is prior, as regards us, to the knowledge of the + universal; as sensible knowledge is prior to intellectual knowledge. But in both sense and intellect the knowledge of the + more common precedes the knowledge of the less common. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q85_A3-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The universal can be considered in two ways. First, the universal nature may be considered together with the intention of + universality. And since the intention of universality---viz. the relation of one and the same to many---is due to intellectual + abstraction, the universal thus considered is a secondary consideration. Hence it is said (De Anima i, 1) that the "universal + animal is either nothing or something secondary." But according to Plato, who + held that universals are subsistent, the universal considered thus would be prior to the particular, for the latter, according + to him, are mere participations of the subsistent universals which he called ideas. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q85_A3-p11"> Secondly, the universal can be considered in the nature itself---for instance, animality or humanity as existing in the individual. + And thus we must distinguish two orders of nature: one, by way of generation and time; and thus the imperfect and the potential + come first. In this way the more common comes first in the order of nature; as appears clearly in the generation of man and + animal; for "the animal is generated before man," as the Philosopher says (De Gener. Animal ii, 3). + The other order is the order of perfection or of the intention of nature: for instance, act considered absolutely is naturally + prior to potentiality, and the perfect to the imperfect: thus the less common comes naturally before the more common; as man + comes before animal. For the intention of nature does not stop at the generation of animal but goes on to the generation of + man. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q85_A3-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The more common universal may be compared to the less common, as the whole, and as the part. As the whole, considering that + in the more universal is potentially contained not only the less universal, but also other things, as in "animal" is contained + not only "man" but also "horse." As part, considering that the less common contains in its idea not only the more common, + but also more; as "man" contains not only "animal" but also "rational." Therefore + "animal" in itself comes into our knowledge before "man"; but "man" comes before "animal" considered as part of the same idea. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q85_A3-p13"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> A part can be known in two ways. First, absolutely considered in itself; and thus nothing prevents the parts being known + before the whole, as stones are known before a house is known. Secondly as belonging to a certain whole; and thus we must + needs know the whole before its parts. For we know a house vaguely before we know its different parts. So likewise principles + of definition are known before the thing defined is known; otherwise the thing defined + would not be known at all. But as parts of the definition they are known after. For we know man vaguely as man before we know + how to distinguish all that belongs to human nature. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q85_A3-p14"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> The universal, as understood with the intention of universality, is, indeed, in a way, a principle of knowledge, in so far + as the intention of universality results from the mode of understanding by way of abstraction. But what is a principle of + knowledge is not of necessity a principle of existence, as Plato thought: since at times we know a cause through its effect, + and substance through accidents. Wherefore the universal thus considered, according + to the opinion of Aristotle, is neither a principle of existence, nor a substance, as he makes clear (Metaph. vii, Did. vi, + 13). But if we consider the generic or specific nature itself as existing in the singular, thus in a way it is in the nature + of a formal principle in regard to the singulars: for the singular is the result of matter, while the idea of species is from + the form. But the generic nature is compared to the specific nature rather after the fashion of a material principle, + because the generic nature is taken from that which is material in a thing, while the idea of species is taken from that which + is formal: thus the notion of animal is taken from the sensitive part, whereas the notion of man is taken from the intellectual + part. Thus it is that the ultimate intention of nature is to the species and not to the individual, or the genus: because + the form is the end of generation, while matter is for the sake of the form. Neither is it necessary that, as regards us, + knowledge of any cause or principle should be secondary: since at times through sensible causes we become acquainted with + unknown effects, and sometimes conversely. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q85_A3-p15"></p> + <p id="FP_Q85_A3-p16"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q85_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q85_A4.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q85_A4" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q85_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q85_A5.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q85_A4-p0.1">Whether we can understand many things at the same time?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q85_A4-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q85_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that we can understand many things at the same time. For intellect is above time, whereas the succession of + before and after belongs to time. Therefore the intellect does not understand different things in succession, but at the same + time. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q85_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, there is nothing to prevent different forms not opposed to each other from actually being in the same subject, as, + for instance, color and smell are in the apple. But intelligible species are not opposed to each other. Therefore there is + nothing to prevent the same intellect being in act as regards different intelligible species, and thus it can understand many + things at the same time. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q85_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the intellect understands a whole at the same time, such as a man or a house. But a whole contains many parts. Therefore + the intellect understands many things at the same time. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q85_A4-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, we cannot know the difference between two things unless we know both at the same time (De Anima iii, 2), and the + same is to be said of any other comparison. But our intellect knows the difference and comparison between one thing and another. + Therefore it knows many things at the same time. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q85_A4-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is said (Topic. ii, 10) that "understanding is of one thing only, knowledge is of many." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q85_A4-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The intellect can, indeed, understand many things as one, but not as many: that is to say by "one" but not by "many" intelligible + species. For the mode of every action follows the form which is the principle of that action. Therefore whatever things the + intellect can understand under one species, it can understand at the same time: hence it is that God sees all things at the + same time, because He sees all in one, that is, in His Essence. But whatever things + the intellect understands under different species, it does not understand at the same time. The reason of this is that it + is impossible for one and the same subject to be perfected at the same time by many forms of one genus and diverse species, + just as it is impossible for one and the same body at the same time to have different colors or different shapes. Now all + intelligible species belong to one genus, because they are the perfections of one intellectual faculty: although the things + which + the species represent belong to different genera. Therefore it is impossible for one and the same intellect to be perfected + at the same time by different intelligible species so as actually to understand different things. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q85_A4-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The intellect is above that time, which is the measure of the movement of corporeal things. But the multitude itself of intelligible + species causes a certain vicissitude of intelligible operations, according as one operation succeeds another. And this vicissitude + is called time by Augustine, who says (Gen. ad lit. viii, 20,22), that "God moves the spiritual creature through time." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q85_A4-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Not only is it impossible for opposite forms to exist at the same time in the same subject, but neither can any forms belonging + to the same genus, although they be not opposed to one another, as is clear from the examples of colors and shapes. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q85_A4-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Parts can be understood in two ways. First, in a confused way, as existing in the whole, and thus they are known through + the one form of the whole, and so are known together. In another way they are known distinctly: thus each is known by its + species; and so they are not understood at the same time. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q85_A4-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> If the intellect sees the difference or comparison between one thing and another, it knows both in relation to their difference + or comparison; just, as we have said above (ad 3), as it knows the parts in the whole. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q85_A4-p12"></p> + <p id="FP_Q85_A4-p13"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q85_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q85_A5.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q85_A5" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q85_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q85_A6.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q85_A5-p0.1">Whether our intellect understands by composition and division?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q85_A5-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q85_A5-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that our intellect does not understand by composition and division. For composition and division are only of + many; whereas the intellect cannot understand many things at the same time. Therefore it cannot understand by composition + and division. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q85_A5-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, every composition and division implies past, present, or future time. But the intellect abstracts from time, as + also from other individual conditions. Therefore the intellect does not understand by composition and division. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q85_A5-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the intellect understands things by a process of assimilation to them. But composition and division are not in things, + for nothing is in things but what is signified by the predicate and the subject, and which is one and the same, provided that + the composition be true, for "man" is truly what "animal" is. Therefore the intellect does not act by composition and division. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q85_A5-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Words signify the conceptions of the intellect, as the Philosopher says (Peri Herm. i). But in words we find composition + and division, as appears in affirmative and negative propositions. Therefore the intellect acts by composition and division. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q85_A5-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The human intellect must of necessity understand by composition and division. For since the intellect passes from potentiality + to act, it has a likeness to things which are generated, which do not attain to perfection all at once but acquire it by degrees: + so likewise the human intellect does not acquire perfect knowledge by the first act of apprehension; but it first apprehends + something about its object, such as its quiddity, and this is its first and + proper object; and then it understands the properties, accidents, and the various relations of the essence. Thus it necessarily + compares one thing with another by composition or division; and from one composition and division it proceeds to another, + which is the process of reasoning. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q85_A5-p7"> But the angelic and the Divine intellect, like all incorruptible things, have their perfection at once from the beginning. + Hence the angelic and the Divine intellect have the entire knowledge of a thing at once and perfectly; and hence also in knowing + the quiddity of a thing they know at once whatever we can know by composition, division, and reasoning. Therefore the human + intellect knows by composition, division and reasoning. But the Divine intellect and the angelic intellect + know, indeed, composition, division, and reasoning, not by the process itself, but by understanding the simple essence. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q85_A5-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Composition and division of the intellect are made by differentiating and comparing. Hence the intellect knows many things + by composition and division, as by knowing the difference and comparison of things. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q85_A5-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Although the intellect abstracts from the phantasms, it does not understand actually without turning to the phantasms, as + we have said + <a id="FP_Q85_A5-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q85_A1.html">(A[1];</a> + <a id="FP_Q85_A5-p9.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q84_A7.html">Q[84], A[7]</a>). And forasmuch as it turns to the phantasms, composition and division of the intellect involve time. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q85_A5-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The likeness of a thing is received into the intellect according to the mode of the intellect, not according to the mode + of the thing. Wherefore something on the part of the thing corresponds to the composition and division of the intellect; but + it does not exist in the same way in the intellect and in the thing. For the proper object of the human intellect is the quiddity + of a material thing, which comes under the action of the senses and the + imagination. Now in a material thing there is a twofold composition. First, there is the composition of form with matter; + and to this corresponds that composition of the intellect whereby the universal whole is predicated of its part: for the genus + is derived from common matter, while the difference that completes the species is derived from the form, and the particular + from individual matter. The second comparison is of accident with subject: and to this real composition corresponds that + composition of the intellect, whereby accident is predicated of subject, as when we say "the man is white." Nevertheless composition + of the intellect differs from composition of things; for in the latter the things are diverse, whereas composition of the + intellect is a sign of the identity of the components. For the above composition of the intellect does not imply that "man" + and "whiteness" are identical, but the assertion, "the man is white," means that "the man is something having + whiteness": and the subject, which is a man, is identified with a subject having whiteness. It is the same with the composition + of form and matter: for animal signifies that which has a sensitive nature; rational, that which has an intellectual nature; + man, that which has both; and Socrates that which has all these things together with individual matter; and according to this + kind of identity our intellect predicates the composition of one thing with another. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q85_A5-p11"></p> + <p id="FP_Q85_A5-p12"></p> + <p id="FP_Q85_A5-p13"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q85_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q85_A6.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q85_A6" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q85_A5.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q85_A7.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q85_A6-p0.1">Whether the intellect can be false?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q85_A6-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q85_A6-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the intellect can be false; for the Philosopher says (Metaph. vi, Did. v, 4) that "truth and falsehood + are in the mind." But the mind and intellect are the same, as is shown above ( + <a id="FP_Q85_A6-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q79_A1.html">Q[79], A[1]</a>). Therefore falsehood may be in the mind. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q85_A6-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, opinion and reasoning belong to the intellect. But falsehood exists in both. Therefore falsehood can be in the intellect. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q85_A6-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, sin is in the intellectual faculty. But sin involves falsehood: for "those err that work evil" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q85_A6-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Prov.14.22" target="asv">Prov. 14:22</a>). Therefore falsehood can be in the intellect. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q85_A6-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 32), that "everyone who is deceived, does not rightly understand that wherein he is deceived." + And the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 10), that "the intellect is always true." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q85_A6-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The Philosopher (De Anima iii, 6) compares intellect with sense on this point. For sense is not deceived in its proper object, + as sight in regard to color; has accidentally through some hindrance occurring to the sensile organ---for example, the taste + of a fever-stricken person judges a sweet thing to be bitter, through his tongue being vitiated by ill humors. Sense, however, + may be deceived as regards common sensible objects, as size or figure; when, for + example, it judges the sun to be only a foot in diameter, whereas in reality it exceeds the earth in size. Much more is sense + deceived concerning accidental sensible objects, as when it judges that vinegar is honey by reason of the color being the + same. The reason of this is evident; for every faculty, as such, is "per se" directed to its proper object; and things of + this kind are always the same. Hence, as long as the faculty exists, its judgment concerning its own proper object does not + fail. + Now the proper object of the intellect is the "quiddity" of a material thing; and hence, properly speaking, the intellect + is not at fault concerning this quiddity; whereas it may go astray as regards the surroundings of the thing in its essence + or quiddity, in referring one thing to another, as regards composition or division, or also in the process of reasoning. Therefore, + also in regard to those propositions, which are understood, the intellect cannot err, as in the case of first principles + from which arises infallible truth in the certitude of scientific conclusions. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q85_A6-p7"> The intellect, however, may be accidentally deceived in the quiddity of composite things, not by the defect of its organ, + for the intellect is a faculty that is independent of an organ; but on the part of the composition affecting the definition, + when, for instance, the definition of a thing is false in relation to something else, as the definition of a circle applied + to a triangle; or when a definition is false in itself as involving the composition of things incompatible; as, + for instance, to describe anything as "a rational winged animal." Hence as regards simple objects not subject to composite + definitions we cannot be deceived unless, indeed, we understand nothing whatever about them, as is said Metaph. ix, Did. viii, + 10. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q85_A6-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The Philosopher says that falsehood is in the intellect in regard to composition and division. The same answer applies to + the Second Objection concerning opinion and reasoning, and to the Third Objection, concerning the error of the sinner, who + errs in the practical judgment of the appetible object. But in the absolute consideration of the quiddity of a thing, and + of those things which are known thereby, the intellect is never deceived. In this sense + are to be understood the authorities quoted in proof of the opposite conclusion. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q85_A6-p9"></p> + <p id="FP_Q85_A6-p10"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q85_A5.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q85_A7.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q85_A7" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q85_A6.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q85_A8.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q85_A7-p0.1">Whether one person can understand one and the same thing better than another can?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q85_A7-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q85_A7-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that one person cannot understand one and the same thing better than another can. For Augustine says (QQ. 83, + qu. 32), "Whoever understands a thing otherwise than as it is, does not understand it at all. Hence it is clear that there + is a perfect understanding, than which none other is more perfect: and therefore there are not infinite degrees of understanding + a thing: nor can one person understand a thing better than another can." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q85_A7-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the intellect is true in its act of understanding. But truth, being a certain equality between thought and thing, + is not subject to more or less; for a thing cannot be said to be more or less equal. Therefore a thing cannot be more or less + understood. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q85_A7-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the intellect is the most formal of all that is in man. But different forms cause different species. Therefore if + one man understands better than another, it would seem that they do not belong to the same species. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q85_A7-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Experience shows that some understand more profoundly than do others; as one who carries a conclusion to its first principles + and ultimate causes understands it better than the one who reduces it only to its proximate causes. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q85_A7-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> A thing being understood more by one than by another may be taken in two senses. First, so that the word "more" be taken + as determining the act of understanding as regards the thing understood; and thus, one cannot understand the same thing more + than another, because to understand it otherwise than as it is, either better or worse, would entail being deceived, and such + a one would not understand it, as Augustine argues (QQ. 83, qu. 32). In another sense the + word "more" can be taken as determining the act of understanding on the part of him who understands; and so one may understand + the same thing better than someone else, through having a greater power of understanding: just as a man may see a thing better + with his bodily sight, whose power is greater, and whose sight is more perfect. The same applies to the intellect in two ways. + First, as regards the intellect itself, which is more perfect. For it is plain that the better the disposition of a + body, the better the soul allotted to it; which clearly appears in things of different species: and the reason thereof is + that act and form are received into matter according to matter's capacity: thus because some men have bodies of better disposition, + their souls have a greater power of understanding, wherefore it is said (De Anima ii, 9), that "it is to be observed that + those who have soft flesh are of apt mind." Secondly, this occurs in regard to the lower powers of which the intellect has + need in its operation: for those in whom the imaginative, cogitative, and memorative powers are of better disposition, are + better disposed to understand. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q85_A7-p7"> The reply to the First Objection is clear from the above; likewise the reply to the Second, for the truth of the intellect + consists in the intellect understanding a thing as it is. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q85_A7-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The difference of form which is due only to the different disposition of matter, causes not a specific but only a numerical + difference: for different individuals have different forms, diversified according to the difference of matter. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q85_A7-p9"></p> + <p id="FP_Q85_A7-p10"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q85_A6.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q85_A8.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q85_A8" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q85_A7.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q86.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q85_A8-p0.1">Whether the intellect understands the indivisible before the divisible?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q85_A8-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q85_A8-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the intellect understands the indivisible before the divisible. For the Philosopher says (Phys. i, 1) + that "we understand and know from the knowledge of principles and elements." But principles are indivisible, and elements + are of divisible things. Therefore the indivisible is known to us before the divisible. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q85_A8-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the definition of a thing contains what is known previously, for a definition "proceeds from the first and more + known," as is said Topic. vi, 4. But the indivisible is part of the definition of the divisible; as a point comes into the + definition of a line; for as Euclid says, "a line is length without breadth, the extremities of which are points"; also unity + comes into the definition of number, for "number is multitude measured by one," as is said + Metaph. x, Did. ix, 6. Therefore our intellect understands the indivisible before the divisible. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q85_A8-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, "Like is known by like." But the indivisible is more like to the intellect than is the divisible; because "the intellect + is simple" (De Anima iii, 4). Therefore our intellect first knows the indivisible. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q85_A8-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is said (De Anima iii, 6) that "the indivisible is expressed as a privation." But privation is known secondarily. Therefore + likewise is the indivisible. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q85_A8-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The object of our intellect in its present state is the quiddity of a material thing, which it abstracts from the phantasms, + as above stated ( + <a id="FP_Q85_A8-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q84_A7.html">Q[84], A[7]</a>). And since that which is known first and of itself by our cognitive power is its proper object, we must consider its relationship + to that quiddity in order to discover in what order the indivisible is known. Now the indivisible is threefold, as is said + De Anima iii, 6. First, the + continuous is indivisible, since actually it is undivided, although potentially divisible: and this indivisible is known to + us before its division, which is a division into parts: because confused knowledge is prior to distinct knowledge, as we have + said above + <a id="FP_Q85_A8-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q85_A3.html">(A[3])</a>. Secondly, the indivisible is so called in relation to species, as man's reason is something indivisible. This way, also, + the indivisible is understood before its division into logical parts, as we have + said above (De Anima iii, 6); and again before the intellect disposes and divides by affirmation and negation. The reason + of this is that both these kinds of indivisible are understood by the intellect of itself, as being its proper object. The + third kind of indivisible is what is altogether indivisible, as a point and unity, which cannot be divided either actually + or potentially. And this indivisible is known secondarily, through the privation of divisibility. Wherefore a point is defined + by + way of privation "as that which has no parts"; and in like manner the notion of "one" is that is "indivisible," as stated + in Metaph. x, Did. ix, 1. And the reason of this is that this indivisible has a certain opposition to a corporeal being, the + quiddity of which is the primary and proper object of the intellect. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q85_A8-p7"> But if our intellect understood by participation of certain separate indivisible (forms), as the Platonists maintained, it + would follow that a like indivisible is understood primarily; for according to the Platonists what is first is first participated + by things. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q85_A8-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> In the acquisition of knowledge, principles and elements are not always (known) first: for sometimes from sensible effects + we arrive at the knowledge of principles and intelligible causes. But in perfect knowledge, the knowledge of effects always + depends on the knowledge of principles and elements: for as the Philosopher says in the same passage: "Then do we consider + that we know, when we can resolve principles into their causes." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q85_A8-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> A point is not included in the definition of a line in general: for it is manifest that in a line of indefinite length, and + in a circular line, there is no point, save potentially. Euclid defines a finite straight line: and therefore he mentions + a point in the definition, as the limit in the definition of that which is limited. Unity is the measure of number: wherefore + it is included in the definition of a measured number. But it is not included in + the definition of the divisible, but rather conversely. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q85_A8-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The likeness through which we understand is the species of the known in the knower; therefore a thing is known first, not + on account of its natural likeness to the cognitive power, but on account of the power's aptitude for the object: otherwise + sight would perceive hearing rather than color. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q85_A8-p11"></p> + <p id="FP_Q85_A8-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q85_A7.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q86.html"></a> + </div> + <a href="summa.FP_Q84_A8.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q85_A1.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q86" class="div3"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q85_A8.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q86_A1.html"></a> + <h3 id="FP_Q86-p0.1">WHAT OUR INTELLECT KNOWS IN MATERIAL THINGS (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3> + <p id="FP_Q86-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q86-p2"> We now have to consider what our intellect knows in material things. Under this head there are four points of inquiry:</p> + <p id="FP_Q86-p3"> (1) Whether it knows singulars?</p> + <p id="FP_Q86-p4"> (2) Whether it knows the infinite?</p> + <p id="FP_Q86-p5"> (3) Whether it knows contingent things?</p> + <p id="FP_Q86-p6"> (4) Whether it knows future things?</p> + <div id="FP_Q86_A1" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q86.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q86_A2.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q86_A1-p0.1">Whether our intellect knows singulars?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q86_A1-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q86_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that our intellect knows singulars. For whoever knows composition, knows the terms of composition. But our + intellect knows this composition; "Socrates is a man": for it belongs to the intellect to form a proposition. Therefore our + intellect knows this singular, Socrates. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q86_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the practical intellect directs to action. But action has relation to singular things. Therefore the intellect knows + the singular. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q86_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, our intellect understands itself. But in itself it is a singular, otherwise it would have no action of its own; + for actions belong to singulars. Therefore our intellect knows singulars. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q86_A1-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, a superior power can do whatever is done by an inferior power. But sense knows the singular. Much more, therefore, + can the intellect know it. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q86_A1-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Phys. i, 5), that "the universal is known by reason; and the singular is known by sense." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q86_A1-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Our intellect cannot know the singular in material things directly and primarily. The reason of this is that the principle + of singularity in material things is individual matter, whereas our intellect, as have said above ( + <a id="FP_Q86_A1-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q85_A1.html">Q[85], A[1]</a>), understands by abstracting the intelligible species from such matter. Now what is abstracted from individual matter is + the universal. Hence our intellect knows directly the universal only. But + indirectly, and as it were by a kind of reflection, it can know the singular, because, as we have said above ( + <a id="FP_Q86_A1-p7.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q85_A7.html">Q[85], A[7]</a>), even after abstracting the intelligible species, the intellect, in order to understand, needs to turn to the phantasms + in which it understands the species, as is said De Anima iii, 7. Therefore it understands the universal directly through the + intelligible species, and indirectly the singular represented by the phantasm. And thus it forms the + proposition "Socrates is a man." Wherefore the reply to the first objection is clear. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q86_A1-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The choice of a particular thing to be done is as the conclusion of a syllogism formed by the practical intellect, as is + said Ethic. vii, 3. But a singular proposition cannot be directly concluded from a universal proposition, except through the + medium of a singular proposition. Therefore the universal principle of the practical intellect does not move save through + the medium of the particular apprehension of the sensitive part, as is said De Anima + iii, 11. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q86_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Intelligibility is incompatible with the singular not as such, but as material, for nothing can be understood otherwise than + immaterially. Therefore if there be an immaterial singular such as the intellect, there is no reason why it should not be + intelligible. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q86_A1-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> The higher power can do what the lower power can, but in a more eminent way. Wherefore what the sense knows materially and + concretely, which is to know the singular directly, the intellect knows immaterially and in the abstract, which is to know + the universal. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q86_A1-p11"></p> + <p id="FP_Q86_A1-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q86.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q86_A2.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q86_A2" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q86_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q86_A3.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q86_A2-p0.1">Whether our intellect can know the infinite?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q86_A2-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q86_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that our intellect can know the infinite. For God excels all infinite things. But our intellect can know God, + as we have said above ( + <a id="FP_Q86_A2-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q12_A1.html">Q[12], A[1]</a>). Much more, therefore, can our intellect know all other infinite things. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q86_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, our intellect can naturally know "genera" and "species." But there is an infinity of species in some genera, as + in number, proportion, and figure. Therefore our intellect can know the infinite. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q86_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if one body can coexist with another in the same place, there is nothing to prevent an infinite number of bodies + being in one place. But one intelligible species can exist with another in the same intellect, for many things can be habitually + known at the same time. Therefore our intellect can have an habitual knowledge of an infinite number of things. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q86_A2-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, as the intellect is not a corporeal faculty, as we have said ( + <a id="FP_Q86_A2-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q76_A1.html">Q[76], A[1]</a>), it appears to be an infinite power. But an infinite power has a capacity for an infinite object. Therefore our intellect + can know the infinite. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q86_A2-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is said (Phys. i, 4) that "the infinite, considered as such, is unknown." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q86_A2-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Since a faculty and its object are proportional to each other, the intellect must be related to the infinite, as is its object, + which is the quiddity of a material thing. Now in material things the infinite does not exist actually, but only potentially, + in the sense of one succeeding another, as is said Phys. iii, 6. Therefore infinity is potentially in our mind through its + considering successively one thing after another: because never does our intellect + understand so many things, that it cannot understand more. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q86_A2-p8"> On the other hand, our intellect cannot understand the infinite either actually or habitually. Not actually, for our intellect + cannot know actually at the same time, except what it knows through one species. But the infinite is not represented by one + species, for if it were it would be something whole and complete. Consequently it cannot be understood except by a successive + consideration of one part after another, as is clear from its definition (Phys. iii, 6): for the infinite + is that "from which, however much we may take, there always remains something to be taken." Thus the infinite could not be + known actually, unless all its parts were counted: which is impossible. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q86_A2-p9"> For the same reason we cannot have habitual knowledge of the infinite: because in us habitual knowledge results from actual + consideration: since by understanding we acquire knowledge, as is said Ethic. ii, 1. Wherefore it would not be possible for + us to have a habit of an infinity of things distinctly known, unless we had already considered the entire infinity thereof, + counting them according to the succession of our knowledge: which is impossible. And therefore neither actually + nor habitually can our intellect know the infinite, but only potentially as explained above. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q86_A2-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As we have said above ( + <a id="FP_Q86_A2-p10.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q7_A1.html">Q[7], A[1]</a>), God is called infinite, because He is a form unlimited by matter; whereas in material things, the term 'infinite' is applied + to that which is deprived of any formal term. And form being known in itself, whereas matter cannot be known without form, + it follows that the material infinite is in itself unknowable. But the formal infinite, God, is of Himself known; but He is + unknown to us by reason + of our feeble intellect, which in its present state has a natural aptitude for material objects only. Therefore we cannot + know God in our present life except through material effects. In the future life this defect of intellect will be removed + by the state of glory, when we shall be able to see the Essence of God Himself, but without being able to comprehend Him. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q86_A2-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The nature of our mind is to know species abstracted from phantasms; therefore it cannot know actually or habitually species + of numbers or figures that are not in the imagination, except in a general way and in their universal principles; and this + is to know them potentially and confusedly. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q86_A2-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> If two or more bodies were in the same place, there would be no need for them to occupy the place successively, in order + for the things placed to be counted according to this succession of occupation. On the other hand, the intelligible species + enter into our intellect successively; since many things cannot be actually understood at the same time: and therefore there + must be a definite and not an infinite number of species in our intellect. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q86_A2-p13"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> As our intellect is infinite in power, so does it know the infinite. For its power is indeed infinite inasmuch as it is not + terminated by corporeal matter. Moreover it can know the universal, which is abstracted from individual matter, and which + consequently is not limited to one individual, but, considered in itself, extends to an infinite number of individuals. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q86_A2-p14"></p> + <p id="FP_Q86_A2-p15"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q86_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q86_A3.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q86_A3" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q86_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q86_A4.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q86_A3-p0.1">Whether our intellect can know contingent things?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q86_A3-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q86_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the intellect cannot know contingent things: because, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 6), the objects + of understanding, wisdom and knowledge are not contingent, but necessary things. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q86_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, as stated in Phys. iv, 12, "what sometimes is and sometimes is not, is measured by time." Now the intellect abstracts + from time, and from other material conditions. Therefore, as it is proper to a contingent thing sometime to be and sometime + not to be, it seems that contingent things are not known by the intellect. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q86_A3-p4"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> All knowledge is in the intellect. But some sciences are of the contingent things, as the moral sciences, the objects of + which are human actions subject to free-will; and again, the natural sciences in as far as they relate to things generated + and corruptible. Therefore the intellect knows contingent things. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q86_A3-p5"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Contingent things can be considered in two ways; either as contingent, or as containing some element of necessity, since + every contingent thing has in it something necessary: for example, that Socrates runs, is in itself contingent; but the relation + of running to motion is necessary, for it is necessary that Socrates move if he runs. Now contingency arises from matter, + for contingency is a potentiality to be or not to be, and potentiality belongs to matter; + whereas necessity results from form, because whatever is consequent on form is of necessity in the subject. But matter is + the individualizing principle: whereas the universal comes from the abstraction of the form from the particular matter. Moreover + it was laid down above + <a id="FP_Q86_A3-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q86_A1.html">(A[1])</a> that the intellect of itself and directly has the universal for its object; while the object of sense is the singular, which + in a certain way is the indirect object of the intellect, as we have + said above + <a id="FP_Q86_A3-p5.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q86_A1.html">(A[1])</a>. Therefore the contingent, considered as such, is known directly by sense and indirectly by the intellect; while the universal + and necessary principles of contingent things are known only by the intellect. Hence if we consider the objects of science + in their universal principles, then all science is of necessary things. But if we consider the things themselves, thus some + sciences are of necessary things, some of contingent things. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q86_A3-p6"> From which the replies to the objections are clear.</p> + <p id="FP_Q86_A3-p7"></p> + <p id="FP_Q86_A3-p8"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q86_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q86_A4.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q86_A4" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q86_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q87.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q86_A4-p0.1">Whether our intellect can know the future?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q86_A4-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q86_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that our intellect knows the future. For our intellect knows by means of intelligible species abstracted from + the "here" and "now," and related indifferently to all time. But it can know the present. Therefore it can know the future. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q86_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, man, while his senses are in suspense, can know some future things, as in sleep, and in frenzy. But the intellect + is freer and more vigorous when removed from sense. Therefore the intellect of its own nature can know the future. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q86_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> The intellectual knowledge of man is superior to any knowledge of brutes. But some animals know the future; thus crows by + their frequent cawing foretell rain. Therefore much more can the intellect know the future. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q86_A4-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q86_A4-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Eccl.8.6" target="asv">Eccles. 8:6,7</a>), "There is a great affliction for man, because he is ignorant of things past; and things to come he cannot know by any messenger." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q86_A4-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> We must apply the same distinction to future things, as we applied above + <a id="FP_Q86_A4-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q86_A3.html">(A[3])</a> to contingent things. For future things considered as subject to time are singular, and the human intellect knows them by + reflection only, as stated above + <a id="FP_Q86_A4-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q86_A1.html">(A[1])</a>. But the principles of future things may be universal; and thus they may enter the domain of the intellect and become the + objects of science. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q86_A4-p7"> Speaking, however, of the knowledge of the future in a general way, we must observe that the future may be known in two ways: + either in itself, or in its cause. The future cannot be known in itself save by God alone; to Whom even that is present which + in the course of events is future, forasmuch as from eternity His glance embraces the whole course of time, as we have said + above when treating of God's knowledge ( + <a id="FP_Q86_A4-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q14_A13.html">Q[14], A[13]</a>). But forasmuch as it exists + in its cause, the future can be known by us also. And if, indeed, the cause be such as to have a necessary connection with + its future result, then the future is known with scientific certitude, just as the astronomer foresees the future eclipse. + If, however, the cause be such as to produce a certain result more frequently than not, then can the future be known more + or less conjecturally, according as its cause is more or less inclined to produce the effect. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q86_A4-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This argument considers that knowledge which is drawn from universal causal principles; from these the future may be known, + according to the order of the effects to the cause. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q86_A4-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As Augustine says (Confess. xii [*Gen. ad lit. xii. 13]), the soul has a certain power of forecasting, so that by its very + nature it can know the future; hence when withdrawn from corporeal sense, and, as it were, concentrated on itself, it shares + in the knowledge of the future. Such an opinion would be reasonable if we were to admit that the soul receives knowledge by + participating the ideas as the Platonists maintained, because in that case the soul + by its nature would know the universal causes of all effects, and would only be impeded in its knowledge by the body, and + hence when withdrawn from the corporeal senses it would know the future. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q86_A4-p10"> But since it is connatural to our intellect to know things, not thus, but by receiving its knowledge from the senses; it + is not natural for the soul to know the future when withdrawn from the senses: rather does it know the future by the impression + of superior spiritual and corporeal causes; of spiritual causes, when by Divine power the human intellect is enlightened through + the ministry of angels, and the phantasms are directed to the knowledge of future events; or, by the + influence of demons, when the imagination is moved regarding the future known to the demons, as explained above ( + <a id="FP_Q86_A4-p10.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q57_A3.html">Q[57], A[3]</a>). The soul is naturally more inclined to receive these impressions of spiritual causes when it is withdrawn from the senses, + as it is then nearer to the spiritual world, and freer from external distractions. The same may also come from superior corporeal + causes. For it is clear that superior bodies influence inferior bodies. Hence, in consequence + of the sensitive faculties being acts of corporeal organs, the influence of the heavenly bodies causes the imagination to + be affected, and so, as the heavenly bodies cause many future events, the imagination receives certain images of some such + events. These images are perceived more at night and while we sleep than in the daytime and while we are awake, because, as + stated in De Somn. et Vigil. ii [*De Divinat. per somn. ii.], "impressions made by day are evanescent. The night air is calmer, + when silence reigns, hence bodily impressions are made in sleep, when slight internal movements are felt more than in wakefulness, + and such movements produce in the imagination images from which the future may be foreseen." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q86_A4-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Brute animals have no power above the imagination wherewith to regulate it, as man has his reason, and therefore their imagination + follows entirely the influence of the heavenly bodies. Thus from such animals' movements some future things, such as rain + and the like, may be known rather from human movements directed by reason. Hence the Philosopher says (De Somn. et Vig.), + that "some who are most imprudent are most far-seeing; for their intelligence is + not burdened with cares, but is as it were barren and bare of all anxiety moving at the caprice of whatever is brought to + bear on it." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q86_A4-p12"></p> + <p id="FP_Q86_A4-p13"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q86_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q87.html"></a> + </div> + <a href="summa.FP_Q85_A8.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q86_A1.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q87" class="div3"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q86_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q87_A1.html"></a> + <h3 id="FP_Q87-p0.1">HOW THE INTELLECTUAL SOUL KNOWS ITSELF AND ALL WITHIN ITSELF (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3> + <p id="FP_Q87-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q87-p2"> We have now to consider how the intellectual soul knows itself and all within itself. Under this head there are four points + of inquiry: + </p> + <p id="FP_Q87-p3"> (1) Whether the soul knows itself by its own essence?</p> + <p id="FP_Q87-p4"> (2) Whether it knows its own habits?</p> + <p id="FP_Q87-p5"> (3) How does the intellect know its own act?</p> + <p id="FP_Q87-p6"> (4) How does it know the act of the will?</p> + <div id="FP_Q87_A1" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q87.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q87_A2.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q87_A1-p0.1">Whether the intellectual soul knows itself by its essence?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q87_A1-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q87_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the intellectual soul knows itself by its own essence. For Augustine says (De Trin. ix, 3), that "the + mind knows itself, because it is incorporeal." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q87_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, both angels and human souls belong to the genus of intellectual substance. But an angel understands itself by its + own essence. Therefore likewise does the human soul. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q87_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, "in things void of matter, the intellect and that which is understood are the same" (De Anima iii, 4). But the human + mind is void of matter, not being the act of a body as stated above ( + <a id="FP_Q87_A1-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q76_A1.html">Q[76], A[1]</a>). Therefore the intellect and its object are the same in the human mind; and therefore the human mind understands itself + by its own essence. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q87_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is said (De Anima iii, 4) that "the intellect understands itself in the same way as it understands other things." But + it understands other things, not by their essence, but by their similitudes. Therefore it does not understand itself by its + own essence. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q87_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Everything is knowable so far as it is in act, and not, so far as it is in potentiality (Metaph. ix, Did. viii, 9): for a + thing is a being, and is true, and therefore knowable, according as it is actual. This is quite clear as regards sensible + things, for the eye does not see what is potentially, but what is actually colored. In like manner it is clear that the intellect, + so far as it knows material things, does not know save what is in act: and hence it + does not know primary matter except as proportionate to form, as is stated Phys. i, 7. Consequently immaterial substances + are intelligible by their own essence according as each one is actual by its own essence. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q87_A1-p7"> Therefore it is that the Essence of God, the pure and perfect act, is simply and perfectly in itself intelligible; and hence + God by His own Essence knows Himself, and all other things also. The angelic essence belongs, indeed, to the genus of intelligible + things as "act," but not as a "pure act," nor as a "complete act," and hence the angel's act of intelligence is not completed + by his essence. For although an angel understands himself by his own essence, still he cannot + understand all other things by his own essence; for he knows things other than himself by their likenesses. Now the human + intellect is only a potentiality in the genus of intelligible beings, just as primary matter is a potentiality as regards + sensible beings; and hence it is called "possible" [*Possibilis---elsewhere in this translation rendered "passive"---Ed.]. + Therefore in its essence the human mind is potentially understanding. Hence it has in itself the power to understand, but + not to be + understood, except as it is made actual. For even the Platonists asserted than an order of intelligible beings existed above + the order of intellects, forasmuch as the intellect understands only by participation of the intelligible; for they said that + the participator is below what it participates. If, therefore, the human intellect, as the Platonists held, became actual + by participating separate intelligible forms, it would understand itself by such participation of incorporeal beings. But + as + in this life our intellect has material and sensible things for its proper natural object, as stated above ( + <a id="FP_Q87_A1-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q84_A7.html">Q[84], A[7]</a>), it understands itself according as it is made actual by the species abstracted from sensible things, through the light + of the active intellect, which not only actuates the intelligible things themselves, but also, by their instrumentality, actuates + the passive intellect. Therefore the intellect knows itself not by its essence, but by its act. This + happens in two ways: In the first place, singularly, as when Socrates or Plato perceives that he has an intellectual soul + because he perceives that he understands. In the second place, universally, as when we consider the nature of the human mind + from knowledge of the intellectual act. It is true, however, that the judgment and force of this knowledge, whereby we know + the nature of the soul, comes to us according to the derivation of our intellectual light from the Divine Truth which contains + the types of all things as above stated ( + <a id="FP_Q87_A1-p7.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q84_A5.html">Q[84], A[5]</a>). Hence Augustine says (De Trin. ix, 6): "We gaze on the inviolable truth whence we can as perfectly as possible define, + not what each man's mind is, but what it ought to be in the light of the eternal types." There is, however, a difference between + these two kinds of knowledge, and it consists in this, that the mere presence of the mind suffices for the first; the mind + itself being the principle of action whereby it + perceives itself, and hence it is said to know itself by its own presence. But as regards the second kind of knowledge, the + mere presence of the mind does not suffice, and there is further required a careful and subtle inquiry. Hence many are ignorant + of the soul's nature, and many have erred about it. So Augustine says (De Trin. x, 9), concerning such mental inquiry: "Let + the mind strive not to see itself as if it were absent, but to discern itself as present"---i.e. to know how it differs + from other things; which is to know its essence and nature. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q87_A1-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The mind knows itself by means of itself, because at length it acquires knowledge of itself, though led thereto by its own + act: because it is itself that it knows since it loves itself, as he says in the same passage. For a thing can be called self-evident + in two ways, either because we can know it by nothing else except itself, as first principles are called self-evident; or + because it is not accidentally knowable, as color is visible of itself, + whereas substance is visible by its accident. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q87_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The essence of an angel is an act in the genus of intelligible things, and therefore it is both intellect and the thing understood. + Hence an angel apprehends his own essence through itself: not so the human mind, which is either altogether in potentiality + to intelligible things---as is the passive intellect---or is the act of intelligible things abstracted from the phantasms---as + is the active intellect. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q87_A1-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This saying of the Philosopher is universally true in every kind of intellect. For as sense in act is the sensible in act, + by reason of the sensible likeness which is the form of sense in act, so likewise the intellect in act is the object understood + in act, by reason of the likeness of the thing understood, which is the form of the intellect in act. So the human intellect, + which becomes actual by the species of the object understood, is itself + understood by the same species as by its own form. Now to say that in "things without matter the intellect and what is understood + are the same," is equal to saying that "as regards things actually understood the intellect and what is understood are the + same." For a thing is actually understood in that it is immaterial. But a distinction must be drawn: since the essences of + some things are immaterial---as the separate substances called angels, each of which is understood and understands, whereas + there are other things whose essences are not wholly immaterial, but only the abstract likenesses thereof. Hence the Commentator + says (De Anima iii) that the proposition quoted is true only of separate substances; because in a sense it is verified in + their regard, and not in regard of other substances, as already stated (Reply OBJ 2). + </p> + <p id="FP_Q87_A1-p11"></p> + <p id="FP_Q87_A1-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q87.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q87_A2.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q87_A2" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q87_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q87_A3.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q87_A2-p0.1">Whether our intellect knows the habits of the soul by their essence?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q87_A2-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q87_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that our intellect knows the habits of the soul by their essence. For Augustine says (De Trin. xiii, 1): "Faith + is not seen in the heart wherein it abides, as the soul of a man may be seen by another from the movement of the body; but + we know most certainly that it is there, and conscience proclaims its existence"; and the same principle applies to the other + habits of the soul. Therefore the habits of the soul are not known by their acts, but by + themselves. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q87_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, material things outside the soul are known by their likeness being present in the soul, and are said therefore to + be known by their likenesses. But the soul's habits are present by their essence in the soul. Therefore the habits of the + soul are known by their essence. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q87_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, "whatever is the cause of a thing being such is still more so." But habits and intelligible species cause things + to be known by the soul. Therefore they are still more known by the soul in themselves. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q87_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Habits like powers are the principles of acts. But as is said (De Anima ii, 4), "acts and operations are logically prior + to powers." Therefore in the same way they are prior to habits; and thus habits, like the powers, are known by their acts. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q87_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> A habit is a kind of medium between mere power and mere act. Now, it has been said + <a id="FP_Q87_A2-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q87_A1.html">(A[1])</a> that nothing is known but as it is actual: therefore so far as a habit fails in being a perfect act, it falls short in being + of itself knowable, and can be known only by its act; thus, for example, anyone knows he has a habit from the fact that he + can produce the act proper to that habit; or he may inquire into the nature and idea of the habit + by considering the act. The first kind of knowledge of the habit arises from its being present, for the very fact of its presence + causes the act whereby it is known. The second kind of knowledge of the habit arises from a careful inquiry, as is explained + above of the mind + <a id="FP_Q87_A2-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q87_A1.html">(A[1])</a>. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q87_A2-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Although faith is not known by external movement of the body, it is perceived by the subject wherein it resides, by the interior + act of the heart. For no one knows that he has faith unless he knows that he believes. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q87_A2-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Habits are present in our intellect, not as its object since, in the present state of life, our intellect's object is the + nature of a material thing as stated above ( + <a id="FP_Q87_A2-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q84_A7.html">Q[84], A[7]</a>), but as that by which it understands. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q87_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The axiom, "whatever is the cause of a thing being such, is still more so," is true of things that are of the same order, + for instance, of the same kind of cause; for example, we may say that health is desirable on account of life, and therefore + life is more desirable still. But if we take things of different orders the axiom is not true: for we may say that health + is caused by medicine, but it does not follow that medicine is more desirable than + health, for health belongs to the order of final causes, whereas medicine belongs to the order of efficient causes. So of + two things belonging essentially to the order of the objects of knowledge, the one which is the cause of the other being known, + is the more known, as principles are more known than conclusions. But habit as such does not belong to the order of objects + of knowledge; nor are things known on account of the habit, as on account of an object known, but as on account of a + disposition or form whereby the subject knows: and therefore the argument does not prove. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q87_A2-p10"></p> + <p id="FP_Q87_A2-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q87_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q87_A3.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q87_A3" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q87_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q87_A4.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q87_A3-p0.1">Whether our intellect knows its own act?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q87_A3-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q87_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that our intellect does not know its own act. For what is known is the object of the knowing faculty. But the + act differs from the object. Therefore the intellect does not know its own act. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q87_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, whatever is known is known by some act. If, then, the intellect knows its own act, it knows it by some act, and + again it knows that act by some other act; this is to proceed indefinitely, which seems impossible. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q87_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the intellect has the same relation to its act as sense has to its act. But the proper sense does not feel its own + act, for this belongs to the common sense, as stated De Anima iii, 2. Therefore neither does the intellect understand its + own act. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q87_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Trin. x, 11), "I understand that I understand." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q87_A3-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above ( + <a id="FP_Q87_A3-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q87_A1.html">AA[1]</a>,2) a thing is intelligible according as it is in act. Now the ultimate perfection of the intellect consists in its own operation: + for this is not an act tending to something else in which lies the perfection of the work accomplished, as building is the + perfection of the thing built; but it remains in the agent as its perfection and act, as is said Metaph. ix, Did. viii, 8. + Therefore the first thing understood + of the intellect is its own act of understanding. This occurs in different ways with different intellects. For there is an + intellect, namely, the Divine, which is Its own act of intelligence, so that in God the understanding of His intelligence, + and the understanding of His Essence, are one and the same act, because His Essence is His act of understanding. But there + is another intellect, the angelic, which is not its own act of understanding, as we have said above ( + <a id="FP_Q87_A3-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q79_A1.html">Q[79], + A[1] + </a>), and yet the first object of that act is the angelic essence. Wherefore although there is a logical distinction between + the act whereby he understands that he understands, and that whereby he understands his essence, yet he understands both by + one and the same act; because to understand his own essence is the proper perfection of his essence, and by one and the same + act is a thing, together with its perfection, understood. And there is yet another, namely, the human intellect, which + neither is its own act of understanding, nor is its own essence the first object of its act of understanding, for this object + is the nature of a material thing. And therefore that which is first known by the human intellect is an object of this kind, + and that which is known secondarily is the act by which that object is known; and through the act the intellect itself is + known, the perfection of which is this act of understanding. For this reason did the Philosopher assert that objects are known + before acts, and acts before powers (De Anima ii, 4). + </p> + <p id="FP_Q87_A3-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The object of the intellect is something universal, namely, "being" and "the true," in which the act also of understanding + is comprised. Wherefore the intellect can understand its own act. But not primarily, since the first object of our intellect, + in this state of life, is not every being and everything true, but "being" and "true," as considered in material things, as + we have said above ( + <a id="FP_Q87_A3-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q84_A7.html">Q[84], A[7]</a>), from which it acquires + knowledge of all other things. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q87_A3-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The intelligent act of the human intellect is not the act and perfection of the material nature understood, as if the nature + of the material thing and intelligent act could be understood by one act; just as a thing and its perfection are understood + by one act. Hence the act whereby the intellect understands a stone is distinct from the act whereby it understands that it + understands a stone; and so on. Nor is there any difficulty in the intellect being + thus potentially infinite, as explained above ( + <a id="FP_Q87_A3-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q86_A2.html">Q[86], A[2]</a>). + </p> + <p id="FP_Q87_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The proper sense feels by reason of the immutation in the material organ caused by the external sensible. A material object, + however, cannot immute itself; but one is immuted by another, and therefore the act of the proper sense is perceived by the + common sense. The intellect, on the contrary, does not perform the act of understanding by the material immutation of an organ; + and so there is no comparison. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q87_A3-p10"></p> + <p id="FP_Q87_A3-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q87_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q87_A4.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q87_A4" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q87_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q88.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q87_A4-p0.1">Whether the intellect understands the act of the will?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q87_A4-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q87_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the intellect does not understand the act of the will. For nothing is known by the intellect, unless it + be in some way present in the intellect. But the act of the will is not in the intellect; since the will and the intellect + are distinct. Therefore the act of the will is not known by the intellect. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q87_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the act is specified by the object. But the object of the will is not the same as the object of the intellect. Therefore + the act of the will is specifically distinct from the object of the intellect, and therefore the act of the will is not known + by the intellect. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q87_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Augustine (Confess. x, 17) says of the soul's affections that "they are known neither by images as bodies are known; nor + by their presence, like the arts; but by certain notions." Now it does not seem that there can be in the soul any other notions + of things but either the essences of things known or the likenesses thereof. Therefore it seems impossible for the intellect + to known such affections of the soul as the acts of the will. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q87_A4-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Trin. x, 11), "I understand that I will." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q87_A4-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above ( + <a id="FP_Q87_A4-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q59_A1.html">Q[59], A[1]</a>), the act of the will is nothing but an inclination consequent on the form understood; just as the natural appetite is an + inclination consequent on the natural form. Now the inclination of a thing resides in it according to its mode of existence; + and hence the natural inclination resides in a natural thing naturally, and the inclination called the sensible appetite is + in the sensible thing sensibly; and + likewise the intelligible inclination, which is the act of the will, is in the intelligent subject intelligibly as in its + principle and proper subject. Hence the Philosopher expresses himself thus (De Anima iii, 9)---that "the will is in the reason." + Now whatever is intelligibly in an intelligent subject, is understood by that subject. Therefore the act of the will is understood + by the intellect, both inasmuch as one knows that one wills; and inasmuch as one knows the nature of this act, and + consequently, the nature of its principle which is the habit or power. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q87_A4-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This argument would hold good if the will and the intellect were in different subjects, as they are distinct powers; for + then whatever was in the will would not be in the intellect. But as both are rooted in the same substance of the soul, and + since one is in a certain way the principle of the other, consequently what is in the will is, in a certain way, also in the + intellect. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q87_A4-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The "good" and the "true" which are the objects of the will and of the intellect, differ logically, but one is contained + in the other, as we have said above ( + <a id="FP_Q87_A4-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q82_A4.html">Q[82], A[4]</a>, ad 1; + <a id="FP_Q87_A4-p8.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q16_A4.html">Q[16], A[4]</a>, ad 1); for the true is good and the good is true. Therefore the objects of the will fall under the intellect, and those + of the intellect can fall under the will. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q87_A4-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The affections of the soul are in the intellect not by similitude only, like bodies; nor by being present in their subject, + as the arts; but as the thing caused is in its principle, which contains some notion of the thing caused. And so Augustine + says that the soul's affections are in the memory by certain notions. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q87_A4-p10"></p> + <p id="FP_Q87_A4-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q87_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q88.html"></a> + </div> + <a href="summa.FP_Q86_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q87_A1.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q88" class="div3"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q87_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q88_A1.html"></a> + <h3 id="FP_Q88-p0.1">HOW THE HUMAN SOUL KNOWS WHAT IS ABOVE ITSELF (THREE ARTICLES)</h3> + <p id="FP_Q88-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q88-p2"> We must now consider how the human soul knows what is above itself, viz. immaterial substances. Under this head there are + three points of inquiry: + </p> + <p id="FP_Q88-p3"> (1) Whether the human soul in the present state of life can understand the immaterial substances called angels, in themselves?</p> + <p id="FP_Q88-p4"> (2) Whether it can arrive at the knowledge thereof by the knowledge of material things?</p> + <p id="FP_Q88-p5"> (3) Whether God is the first object of our knowledge?</p> + <div id="FP_Q88_A1" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q88.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q88_A2.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q88_A1-p0.1">Whether the human soul in the present state of life can understand immaterial substances in themselves?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q88_A1-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q88_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the human soul in the present state of life can understand immaterial substances in themselves. For Augustine + (De Trin. ix, 3) says: "As the mind itself acquires the knowledge of corporeal things by means of the corporeal senses, so + it gains from itself the knowledge of incorporeal things." But these are the immaterial substances. Therefore the human mind + understands immaterial substances. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q88_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, like is known by like. But the human mind is more akin to immaterial than to material things; since its own nature + is immaterial, as is clear from what we have said above ( + <a id="FP_Q88_A1-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q76_A1.html">Q[76], A[1]</a>). Since then our mind understands material things, much more is it able to understand immaterial things. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q88_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the fact that objects which are in themselves most sensible are not most felt by us, comes from sense being corrupted + by their very excellence. But the intellect is not subject to such a corrupting influence from its object, as is stated De + Anima iii, 4. Therefore things which are in themselves in the highest degree of intelligibility, are likewise to us most intelligible. + As material things, however, are intelligible only so far as we make them + actually so by abstracting them from material conditions, it is clear that those substances are more intelligible in themselves + whose nature is immaterial. Therefore they are much more known to us than are material things. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q88_A1-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, the Commentator says (Metaph. ii) that "nature would be frustrated in its end" were we unable to understand abstract + substances, "because it would have made what in itself is naturally intelligible not to be understood at all." But in nature + nothing is idle or purposeless. Therefore immaterial substances can be understood by us. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q88_A1-p6"> + <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, as sense is to the sensible, so is intellect to the intelligible. But our sight can see all things corporeal, whether + superior and incorruptible; or lower and corruptible. Therefore our intellect can understand all intelligible substances, + even the superior and immaterial. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q88_A1-p7"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q88_A1-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.9.16" target="asv">Wis. 9:16</a>): "The things that are in heaven, who shall search out?" But these substances are said to be in heaven, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q88_A1-p7.2" href="./asv.html#Matt.18.10" target="asv"> Mat. 18:10, </a> "Their angels in heaven," etc. Therefore immaterial substances cannot be known by human investigation. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q88_A1-p8"> + <b>I answer that,</b> In the opinion of Plato, immaterial substances are not only understood by us, but are the objects we understand first of + all. For Plato taught that immaterial subsisting forms, which he called "Ideas," are the proper objects of our intellect, + and thus first and "per se" understood by us; and, further, that material objects are known by the soul inasmuch as phantasy + and sense are mixed up with the mind. Hence the purer the intellect is, so much the more + clearly does it perceive the intelligible truth of immaterial things. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q88_A1-p9"> But in Aristotle's opinion, which experience corroborates, our intellect in its present state of life has a natural relationship + to the natures of material things; and therefore it can only understand by turning to the phantasms, as we have said above + ( + <a id="FP_Q88_A1-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q84_A7.html">Q[84], A[7]</a>). Thus it clearly appears that immaterial substances which do not fall under sense and imagination, cannot first and "per + se" be known by us, according to the mode of knowledge which experience + proves us to have. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q88_A1-p10"> Nevertheless Averroes (Comment. De Anima iii) teaches that in this present life man can in the end arrive at the knowledge + of separate substances by being coupled or united to some separate substance, which he calls the "active intellect," and which, + being a separate substance itself, can naturally understand separate substances. Hence, when it is perfectly united to us + so that by its means we are able to understand perfectly, we also shall be able to understand separate + substances, as in the present life through the medium of the passive intellect united to us, we can understand material things. + Now he said that the active intellect is united to us, thus. For since we understand by means of both the active intellect + and intelligible objects, as, for instance, we understand conclusions by principles understood; it is clear that the active + intellect must be compared to the objects understood, either as the principal agent is to the instrument, or as form to + matter. For an action is ascribed to two principles in one of these two ways; to a principal agent and to an instrument, as + cutting to the workman and the saw; to a form and its subject, as heating to heat and fire. In both these ways the active + intellect can be compared to the intelligible object as perfection is to the perfectible, and as act is to potentiality. Now + a subject is made perfect and receives its perfection at one and the same time, as the reception of what is actually visible + synchronizes with the reception of light in the eye. Therefore the passive intellect receives the intelligible object and + the active intellect together; and the more numerous the intelligible objects received, so much the nearer do we come to the + point of perfect union between ourselves and the active intellect; so much so that when we understand all the intelligible + objects, the active intellect becomes one with us, and by its instrumentality we can understand all things material and + immaterial. In this he makes the ultimate happiness of man to consist. Nor, as regards the present inquiry, does it matter + whether the passive intellect in that state of happiness understands separate substances by the instrumentality of the active + intellect, as he himself maintains, or whether (as he says Alexander holds) the passive intellect can never understand separate + substances (because according to him it is corruptible), but man understands separate substances by means of the active + intellect. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q88_A1-p11"> This opinion, however, is untrue. First, because, supposing the active intellect to be a separate substance, we could not + formally understand by its instrumentality, for the medium of an agent's formal action consists in its form and act, since + every agent acts according to its actuality, as was said of the passive intellect ( + <a id="FP_Q88_A1-p11.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q70_A1.html">Q[70], A[1]</a>). Secondly, this opinion is untrue, because in the above explanation, the active intellect, supposing it to be a + separate substance, would not be joined to us in its substance, but only in its light, as participated in things understood; + and would not extend to the other acts of the active intellect so as to enable us to understand immaterial substances; just + as when we see colors set off by the sun, we are not united to the substance of the sun so as to act like the sun, but its + light only is united to us, that we may see the colors. Thirdly, this opinion is untrue, because granted that, as above + explained, the active intellect were united to us in substance, still it is not said that it is wholly so united in regard + to one intelligible object, or two; but rather in regard to all intelligible objects. But all such objects together do not + equal the force of the active intellect, as it is a much greater thing to understand separate substances than to understand + all material things. Hence it clearly follows that the knowledge of all material things would not make the active intellect + to be + so united to us as to enable us by its instrumentality to understand separate substances. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q88_A1-p12"> Fourthly, this opinion is untrue, because it is hardly possible for anyone in this world to understand all material things: + and thus no one, or very few, could reach to perfect felicity; which is against what the Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 9), that + happiness is a "kind of common good, communicable to all capable of virtue." Further, it is unreasonable that only the few + of any species attain to the end of the species. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q88_A1-p13"> Fifthly, the Philosopher expressly says (Ethic. i, 10), that happiness is "an operation according to perfect virtue"; and + after enumerating many virtues in the tenth book, he concludes (Ethic. i, 7) that ultimate happiness consisting in the knowledge + of the highest things intelligible is attained through the virtue of wisdom, which in the sixth chapter he had named as the + chief of speculative sciences. Hence Aristotle clearly places the ultimate felicity of man in the knowledge + of separate substances, obtainable by speculative science; and not by being united to the active intellect as some imagined. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q88_A1-p14"> Sixthly, as was shown above ( + <a id="FP_Q88_A1-p14.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q79_A4.html">Q[79], A[4]</a>), the active intellect is not a separate substance; but a faculty of the soul, extending itself actively to the same objects + to which the passive intellect extends receptively; because, as is stated (De Anima iii, 5), the passive intellect is "all + things potentially," and the active intellect is "all things in act." Therefore both intellects, according to the present + state of life, extend to material things only, + which are made actually intelligible by the active intellect, and are received in the passive intellect. Hence in the present + state of life we cannot understand separate immaterial substances in themselves, either by the passive or by the active intellect. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q88_A1-p15"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Augustine may be taken to mean that the knowledge of incorporeal things in the mind can be gained by the mind itself. This + is so true that philosophers also say that the knowledge concerning the soul is a principle for the knowledge of separate + substances. For by knowing itself, it attains to some knowledge of incorporeal substances, such as is within its compass; + not that the knowledge of itself gives it a perfect and absolute knowledge of them. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q88_A1-p16"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The likeness of nature is not a sufficient cause of knowledge; otherwise what Empedocles said would be true ---that the soul + needs to have the nature of all in order to know all. But knowledge requires that the likeness of the thing known be in the + knower, as a kind of form thereof. Now our passive intellect, in the present state of life, is such that it can be informed + with similitudes abstracted from phantasms: and therefore it knows material things + rather than immaterial substances. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q88_A1-p17"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> There must needs be some proportion between the object and the faculty of knowledge; such as of the active to the passive, + and of perfection to the perfectible. Hence that sensible objects of great power are not grasped by the senses, is due not + merely to the fact that they corrupt the organ, but also to their being improportionate to the sensitive power. And thus it + is that immaterial substances are improportionate to our intellect, in our present + state of life, so that it cannot understand them. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q88_A1-p18"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> This argument of the Commentator fails in several ways. First, because if separate substances are not understood by us, it + does not follow that they are not understood by any intellect; for they are understood by themselves, and by one another. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q88_A1-p19"> Secondly, to be understood by us is not the end of separate substances: while only that is vain and purposeless, which fails + to attain its end. It does not follow, therefore, that immaterial substances are purposeless, even if they are not understood + by us at all. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q88_A1-p20"> + <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> Sense knows bodies, whether superior or inferior, in the same way, that is, by the sensible acting on the organ. But we do + not understand material and immaterial substances in the same way. The former we understand by a process of abstraction, which + is impossible in the case of the latter, for there are no phantasms of what is immaterial. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q88_A1-p21"></p> + <p id="FP_Q88_A1-p22"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q88.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q88_A2.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q88_A2" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q88_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q88_A3.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q88_A2-p0.1">Whether our intellect can understand immaterial substances through its knowledge of material things?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q88_A2-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q88_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that our intellect can know immaterial substances through the knowledge of material things. For Dionysius says + (Coel. Hier. i) that "the human mind cannot be raised up to immaterial contemplation of the heavenly hierarchies, unless it + is led thereto by material guidance according to its own nature." Therefore we can be led by material things to know immaterial + substances. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q88_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, science resides in the intellect. But there are sciences and definitions of immaterial substances; for Damascene + defines an angel (De Fide Orth. ii, 3); and we find angels treated of both in theology and philosophy. Therefore immaterial + substances can be understood by us. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q88_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the human soul belongs to the genus of immaterial substances. But it can be understood by us through its act by + which it understands material things. Therefore also other material substances can be understood by us, through their material + effects. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q88_A2-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, the only cause which cannot be comprehended through its effects is that which is infinitely distant from them, and + this belongs to God alone. Therefore other created immaterial substances can be understood by us through material things. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q88_A2-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Dionysius says (Div. Nom. i) that "intelligible things cannot be understood through sensible things, nor composite things + through simple, nor incorporeal through corporeal." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q88_A2-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Averroes says (De Anima iii) that a philosopher named Avempace [*Ibn-Badja, Arabian Philosopher; ob. 1183] taught that by + the understanding of natural substances we can be led, according to true philosophical principles, to the knowledge of immaterial + substances. For since the nature of our intellect is to abstract the quiddity of material things from matter, anything material + residing in that abstracted quiddity can again be made subject to abstraction; and + as the process of abstraction cannot go on forever, it must arrive at length at some immaterial quiddity, absolutely without + matter; and this would be the understanding of immaterial substance. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q88_A2-p8"> Now this opinion would be true, were immaterial substances the forms and species of these material things; as the Platonists + supposed. But supposing, on the contrary, that immaterial substances differ altogether from the quiddity of material things, + it follows that however much our intellect abstract the quiddity of material things from matter, it could never arrive at + anything akin to immaterial substance. Therefore we are not able perfectly to understand immaterial substances + through material substances. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q88_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> From material things we can rise to some kind of knowledge of immaterial things, but not to the perfect knowledge thereof; + for there is no proper and adequate proportion between material and immaterial things, and the likenesses drawn from material + things for the understanding of immaterial things are very dissimilar therefrom, as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. ii). + </p> + <p id="FP_Q88_A2-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Science treats of higher things principally by way of negation. Thus Aristotle (De Coel. i, 3) explains the heavenly bodies + by denying to them inferior corporeal properties. Hence it follows that much less can immaterial substances be known by us + in such a way as to make us know their quiddity; but we may have a scientific knowledge of them by way of negation and by + their relation to material things. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q88_A2-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The human soul understands itself through its own act of understanding, which is proper to it, showing perfectly its power + and nature. But the power and nature of immaterial substances cannot be perfectly known through such act, nor through any + other material thing, because there is no proportion between the latter and the power of the former. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q88_A2-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Created immaterial substances are not in the same natural genus as material substances, for they do not agree in power or + in matter; but they belong to the same logical genus, because even immaterial substances are in the predicament of substance, + as their essence is distinct from their existence. But God has no connection with material things, as regards either natural + genus or logical genus; because God is in no genus, as stated above ( + <a id="FP_Q88_A2-p12.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q3_A5.html">Q[3], A[5]</a>). Hence through the likeness derived from material things we can know something positive concerning the angels, according + to some common notion, though not according to the specific nature; whereas we cannot acquire any such knowledge at all about + God. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q88_A2-p13"></p> + <p id="FP_Q88_A2-p14"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q88_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q88_A3.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q88_A3" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q88_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q89.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q88_A3-p0.1">Whether God is the first object known by the human mind?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q88_A3-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q88_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that God is the first object known by the human mind. For that object in which all others are known, and by + which we judge others, is the first thing known to us; as light is to the eye, and first principles to the intellect. But + we know all things in the light of the first truth, and thereby judge of all things, as Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 2; De + Vera Relig. xxxi; [*Confess. xii, 25]). Therefore God is the first object known to us. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q88_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, whatever causes a thing to be such is more so. But God is the cause of all our knowledge; for He is "the true light + which enlighteneth every man that cometh into this world" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q88_A3-p3.1" href="./asv.html#John.1.9" target="asv">Jn. 1:9</a>). Therefore God is our first and most known object. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q88_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, what is first known in the image is the exemplar to which it is made. But in our mind is the image of God, as Augustine + says (De Trin. xii, 4,7). Therefore God is the first object known to our mind. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q88_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> "No man hath seen God at any time" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q88_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#John.1.18" target="asv">Jn. 1:18</a>). + </p> + <p id="FP_Q88_A3-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Since the human intellect in the present state of life cannot understand even immaterial created substances + <a id="FP_Q88_A3-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q88_A1.html">(A[1])</a>, much less can it understand the essence of the uncreated substance. Hence it must be said simply that God is not the first + object of our knowledge. Rather do we know God through creatures, according to the Apostle ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q88_A3-p6.2" href="./asv.html#Rom.1.20" target="asv">Rom. 1:20</a>), "the invisible things of God are clearly seen, being understood by the + things that are made": while the first object of our knowledge in this life is the "quiddity of a material thing," which is + the proper object of our intellect, as appears above in many passages ( + <a id="FP_Q88_A3-p6.3" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q84_A7.html">Q[84], A[7]</a>; + <a id="FP_Q88_A3-p6.4" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q85_A8.html">Q[85], A[8]</a>; + <a id="FP_Q88_A3-p6.5" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q87_A2.html">Q[87], A[2]</a>, ad 2) + </p> + <p id="FP_Q88_A3-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> We see and judge of all things in the light of the first truth, forasmuch as the light itself of our mind, whether natural + or gratuitous, is nothing else than the impression of the first truth upon it, as stated above ( + <a id="FP_Q88_A3-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q12_A2.html">Q[12], A[2]</a>). Hence, as the light itself of our intellect is not the object it understands, much less can it be said that God is the + first object known by our intellect. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q88_A3-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The axiom, "Whatever causes a thing to be such is more so," must be understood of things belonging to one and the same order, + as explained above ( + <a id="FP_Q88_A3-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q81_A2.html">Q[81], A[2]</a>, ad 3). Other things than God are known because of God; not as if He were the first known object, but because He is the first + cause of our faculty of knowledge. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q88_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> If there existed in our souls a perfect image of God, as the Son is the perfect image of the Father, our mind would know + God at once. But the image in our mind is imperfect; hence the argument does not prove. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q88_A3-p10"></p> + <p id="FP_Q88_A3-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q88_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q89.html"></a> + </div> + <a href="summa.FP_Q87_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q88_A1.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q89" class="div3"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q88_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q89_A1.html"></a> + <h3 id="FP_Q89-p0.1">OF THE KNOWLEDGE OF THE SEPARATED SOUL (EIGHT ARTICLES)</h3> + <p id="FP_Q89-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q89-p2"> We must now consider the knowledge of the separated soul. Under this head there are eight points of inquiry:</p> + <p id="FP_Q89-p3"> (1) Whether the soul separated from the body can understand?</p> + <p id="FP_Q89-p4"> (2) Whether it understands separate substances?</p> + <p id="FP_Q89-p5"> (3) Whether it understands all natural things?</p> + <p id="FP_Q89-p6"> (4) Whether it understands individuals and singulars?</p> + <p id="FP_Q89-p7"> (5) Whether the habits of knowledge acquired in this life remain?</p> + <p id="FP_Q89-p8"> (6) Whether the soul can use the habit of knowledge here acquired?</p> + <p id="FP_Q89-p9"> (7) Whether local distance impedes the separated soul's knowledge?</p> + <p id="FP_Q89-p10"> (8) Whether souls separated from the body know what happens here?</p> + <div id="FP_Q89_A1" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q89.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q89_A2.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q89_A1-p0.1">Whether the separated soul can understand anything?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q89_A1-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q89_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the soul separated from the body can understand nothing at all. For the Philosopher says (De Anima i, + 4) that "the understanding is corrupted together with its interior principle." But by death all human interior principles + are corrupted. Therefore also the intellect itself is corrupted. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q89_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the human soul is hindered from understanding when the senses are tied, and by a distracted imagination, as explained + above ( + <a id="FP_Q89_A1-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q84_A7.html">Q[84], AA[7]</a>,8). But death destroys the senses and imagination, as we have shown above ( + <a id="FP_Q89_A1-p3.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q77_A8.html">Q[77], A[8]</a>). Therefore after death the soul understands nothing. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q89_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if the separated soul can understand, this must be by means of some species. But it does not understand by means + of innate species, because it has none such; being at first "like a tablet on which nothing is written": nor does it understand + by species abstracted from things, for it does not then possess organs of sense and imagination which are necessary for the + abstraction of species: nor does it understand by means of species, formerly abstracted + and retained in the soul; for if that were so, a child's soul would have no means of understanding at all: nor does it understand + by means of intelligible species divinely infused, for such knowledge would not be natural, such as we treat of now, but the + effect of grace. Therefore the soul apart from the body understands nothing. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q89_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (De Anima i, 1), "If the soul had no proper operation, it could not be separated from the body." But + the soul is separated from the body; therefore it has a proper operation and above all, that which consists in intelligence. + Therefore the soul can understand when it is apart from the body. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q89_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The difficulty in solving this question arises from the fact that the soul united to the body can understand only by turning + to the phantasms, as experience shows. Did this not proceed from the soul's very nature, but accidentally through its being + bound up with the body, as the Platonists said, the difficulty would vanish; for in that case when the body was once removed, + the soul would at once return to its own nature, and would understand intelligible + things simply, without turning to the phantasms, as is exemplified in the case of other separate substances. In that case, + however, the union of soul and body would not be for the soul's good, for evidently it would understand worse in the body + than out of it; but for the good of the body, which would be unreasonable, since matter exists on account of the form, and + not the form for the sake of matter. But if we admit that the nature of the soul requires it to understand by turning to the + phantasms, it will seem, since death does not change its nature, that it can then naturally understand nothing; as the phantasms + are wanting to which it may turn. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q89_A1-p7"> To solve this difficulty we must consider that as nothing acts except so far as it is actual, the mode of action in every + agent follows from its mode of existence. Now the soul has one mode of being when in the body, and another when apart from + it, its nature remaining always the same; but this does not mean that its union with the body is an accidental thing, for, + on the contrary, such union belongs to its very nature, just as the nature of a light object is not changed, when + it is in its proper place, which is natural to it, and outside its proper place, which is beside its nature. The soul, therefore, + when united to the body, consistently with that mode of existence, has a mode of understanding, by turning to corporeal phantasms, + which are in corporeal organs; but when it is separated from the body, it has a mode of understanding, by turning to simply + intelligible objects, as is proper to other separate substances. Hence it is as natural for the soul to understand + by turning to the phantasms as it is for it to be joined to the body; but to be separated from the body is not in accordance + with its nature, and likewise to understand without turning to the phantasms is not natural to it; and hence it is united + to the body in order that it may have an existence and an operation suitable to its nature. But here again a difficulty arises. + For since nature is always ordered to what is best, and since it is better to understand by turning to simply intelligible + objects than by turning to the phantasms; God should have ordered the soul's nature so that the nobler way of understanding + would have been natural to it, and it would not have needed the body for that purpose. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q89_A1-p8"> In order to resolve this difficulty we must consider that while it is true that it is nobler in itself to understand by turning + to something higher than to understand by turning to phantasms, nevertheless such a mode of understanding was not so perfect + as regards what was possible to the soul. This will appear if we consider that every intellectual substance possesses intellective + power by the influence of the Divine light, which is one and simple in its first principle, and the + farther off intellectual creatures are from the first principle so much the more is the light divided and diversified, as + is the case with lines radiating from the centre of a circle. Hence it is that God by His one Essence understands all things; + while the superior intellectual substances understand by means of a number of species, which nevertheless are fewer and more + universal and bestow a deeper comprehension of things, because of the efficaciousness of the intellectual power of such + natures: whereas the inferior intellectual natures possess a greater number of species, which are less universal, and bestow + a lower degree of comprehension, in proportion as they recede from the intellectual power of the higher natures. If, therefore, + the inferior substances received species in the same degree of universality as the superior substances, since they are not + so strong in understanding, the knowledge which they would derive through them would be imperfect, and of a general and + confused nature. We can see this to a certain extent in man, for those who are of weaker intellect fail to acquire perfect + knowledge through the universal conceptions of those who have a better understanding, unless things are explained to them + singly and in detail. Now it is clear that in the natural order human souls hold the lowest place among intellectual substances. + But the perfection of the universe required various grades of being. If, therefore, God had willed souls to understand in + the + same way as separate substances, it would follow that human knowledge, so far from being perfect, would be confused and general. + Therefore to make it possible for human souls to possess perfect and proper knowledge, they were so made that their nature + required them to be joined to bodies, and thus to receive the proper and adequate knowledge of sensible things from the sensible + things themselves; thus we see in the case of uneducated men that they have to be taught by sensible examples. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q89_A1-p9"> It is clear then that it was for the soul's good that it was united to a body, and that it understands by turning to the + phantasms. Nevertheless it is possible for it to exist apart from the body, and also to understand in another way. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q89_A1-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The Philosopher's words carefully examined will show that he said this on the previous supposition that understanding is + a movement of body and soul as united, just as sensation is, for he had not as yet explained the difference between intellect + and sense. We may also say that he is referring to the way of understanding by turning to phantasms. This is also the meaning + of the second objection. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q89_A1-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The separated soul does not understand by way of innate species, nor by species abstracted then, nor only by species retained, + and this the objection proves; but the soul in that state understands by means of participated species arising from the influence + of the Divine light, shared by the soul as by other separate substances; though in a lesser degree. Hence as soon as it ceases + to act by turning to corporeal (phantasms), the soul turns at once to + the superior things; nor is this way of knowledge unnatural, for God is the author of the influx of both of the light of grace + and of the light of nature. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q89_A1-p12"></p> + <p id="FP_Q89_A1-p13"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q89.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q89_A2.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q89_A2" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q89_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q89_A3.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q89_A2-p0.1">Whether the separated soul understands separate substances?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q89_A2-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q89_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the separated soul does not understand separate substances. For the soul is more perfect when joined to + the body than when existing apart from it, being an essential part of human nature; and every part of a whole is more perfect + when it exists in that whole. But the soul in the body does not understand separate substances as shown above ( + <a id="FP_Q89_A2-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q88_A1.html">Q[88], A[1]</a>). Therefore much less is it able to do so when apart from the + body. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q89_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, whatever is known is known either by its presence or by its species. But separate substances cannot be known to + the soul by their presence, for God alone can enter into the soul; nor by means of species abstracted by the soul from an + angel, for an angel is more simple than a soul. Therefore the separated soul cannot at all understand separate substances. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q89_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, some philosophers said that the ultimate happiness of man consists in the knowledge of separate substances. If, + therefore, the separated soul can understand separate substances, its happiness would be secured by its separation alone; + which cannot be reasonably be said. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q89_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Souls apart from the body know other separated souls; as we see in the case of the rich man in hell, who saw Lazarus and + Abraham ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q89_A2-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Luke.16.23" target="asv">Lk. 16:23</a>). Therefore separated souls see the devils and the angels. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q89_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Augustine says (De Trin. ix, 3), "our mind acquires the knowledge of incorporeal things by itself"---i.e. by knowing itself + ( + <a id="FP_Q89_A2-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q88_A1.html">Q[88], A[1]</a>, ad 1). Therefore from the knowledge which the separated soul has of itself, we can judge how it knows other separate things. + Now it was said above + <a id="FP_Q89_A2-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q89_A1.html">(A[1])</a>, that as long as it is united to the body the soul understands by turning to phantasms, and therefore it does not + understand itself save through becoming actually intelligent by means of ideas abstracted from phantasms; for thus it understands + itself through its own act, as shown above ( + <a id="FP_Q89_A2-p6.3" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q87_A1.html">Q[87], A[1]</a>). When, however, it is separated from the body, it understands no longer by turning to phantasms, but by turning to simply + intelligible objects; hence in that state it understands itself through itself. Now, every separate substance "understands + what is above itself and what is below + itself, according to the mode of its substance" (De Causis viii): for a thing is understood according as it is in the one + who understands; while one thing is in another according to the nature of that in which it is. And the mode of existence of + a separated soul is inferior to that of an angel, but is the same as that of other separated souls. Therefore the soul apart + from the body has perfect knowledge of other separated souls, but it has an imperfect and defective knowledge of the angels + so + far as its natural knowledge is concerned. But the knowledge of glory is otherwise. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q89_A2-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The separated soul is, indeed, less perfect considering its nature in which it communicates with the nature of the body: + but it has a greater freedom of intelligence, since the weight and care of the body is a clog upon the clearness of its intelligence + in the present life. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q89_A2-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The separated soul understands the angels by means of divinely impressed ideas; which, however, fail to give perfect knowledge + of them, forasmuch as the nature of the soul is inferior to that of an angel. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q89_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Man's ultimate happiness consists not in the knowledge of any separate substances; but in the knowledge of God, Who is seen + only by grace. The knowledge of other separate substances if perfectly understood gives great happiness---not final and ultimate + happiness. But the separated soul does not understand them perfectly, as was shown above in this article. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q89_A2-p10"></p> + <p id="FP_Q89_A2-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q89_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q89_A3.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q89_A3" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q89_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q89_A4.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q89_A3-p0.1">Whether the separated soul knows all natural things?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q89_A3-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q89_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the separated soul knows all natural things. For the types of all natural things exist in separate substances. + Therefore, as separated souls know separate substances, they also know all natural things. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q89_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, whoever understands the greater intelligible, will be able much more to understand the lesser intelligible. But + the separated soul understands immaterial substances, which are in the highest degree of intelligibility. Therefore much more + can it understand all natural things which are in a lower degree of intelligibility. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q89_A3-p4"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The devils have greater natural knowledge than the separated soul; yet they do not know all natural things, but have to learn + many things by long experience, as Isidore says (De Summo Bono i). Therefore neither can the separated soul know all natural + things. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q89_A3-p5"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above + <a id="FP_Q89_A3-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q89_A1.html">(A[1])</a>, the separated soul, like the angels, understands by means of species, received from the influence of the Divine light. Nevertheless, + as the soul by nature is inferior to an angel, to whom this kind of knowledge is natural, the soul apart from the body through + such species does not receive perfect knowledge, but only a general and confused kind of knowledge. Separated souls, therefore, + have the same relation + through such species to imperfect and confused knowledge of natural things as the angels have to the perfect knowledge thereof. + Now angels through such species know all natural things perfectly; because all that God has produced in the respective natures + of natural things has been produced by Him in the angelic intelligence, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. ii, 8). Hence it follows + that separated souls know all natural things not with a certain and proper knowledge, but in a general and confused + manner. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q89_A3-p6"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Even an angel does not understand all natural things through his substance, but through certain species, as stated above + ( + <a id="FP_Q89_A3-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q87_A1.html">Q[87], A[1]</a>). So it does not follow that the soul knows all natural things because it knows separate substances after a fashion. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q89_A3-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As the soul separated from the body does not perfectly understand separate substances, so neither does it know all natural + things perfectly; but it knows them confusedly, as above explained in this article. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q89_A3-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Isidore speaks of the knowledge of the future which neither angels, nor demons, nor separated souls, know except so far as + future things pre-exist in their causes or are known by Divine revelation. But we are here treating of the knowledge of natural + things. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q89_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Knowledge acquired here by study is proper and perfect; the knowledge of which we speak is confused. Hence it does not follow + that to study in order to learn is useless. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q89_A3-p10"></p> + <p id="FP_Q89_A3-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q89_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q89_A4.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q89_A4" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q89_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q89_A5.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q89_A4-p0.1">Whether the separated soul knows singulars?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q89_A4-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q89_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the separated soul does not know singulars. For no cognitive power besides the intellect remains in the + separated soul, as is clear from what has been said above ( + <a id="FP_Q89_A4-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q77_A8.html">Q[77], A[8]</a>). But the intellect cannot know singulars, as we have shown ( + <a id="FP_Q89_A4-p2.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q86_A1.html">Q[86], A[1]</a>). Therefore the separated soul cannot know singulars. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q89_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the knowledge of the singular is more determinate than knowledge of the universal. But the separated soul has no + determinate knowledge of the species of natural things, therefore much less can it know singulars. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q89_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if it knew the singulars, yet not by sense, for the same reason it would know all singulars. But it does not know + all singulars. Therefore it knows none. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q89_A4-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The rich man in hell said: "I have five brethren" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q89_A4-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Luke.16.28" target="asv">Lk. 16:28</a>). + </p> + <p id="FP_Q89_A4-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Separated souls know some singulars, but not all, not even all present singulars. To understand this, we must consider that + there is a twofold way of knowing things, one by means of abstraction from phantasms, and in this way singulars cannot be + directly known by the intellect, but only indirectly, as stated above ( + <a id="FP_Q89_A4-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q86_A1.html">Q[86], A[1]</a>). The other way of understanding is by the infusion of species by God, and in that way it is possible for + the intellect to know singulars. For as God knows all things, universal and singular, by His Essence, as the cause of universal + and individual principles ( + <a id="FP_Q89_A4-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q14_A2.html">Q[14], A[2]</a>), so likewise separate substances can know singulars by species which are a kind of participated similitude of the Divine + Essence. There is a difference, however, between angels and separated souls in the fact that through these species the angels + have a perfect and proper knowledge of things; whereas + separated have only a confused knowledge. Hence the angels, by reason of their perfect intellect, through these species, know + not only the specific natures of things, but also the singulars contained in those species; whereas separated souls by these + species know only those singulars to which they are determined by former knowledge in this life, or by some affection, or + by natural aptitude, or by the disposition of the Divine order; because whatever is received into anything is conditioned + according to the mode of the recipient. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q89_A4-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The intellect does not know the singular by way of abstraction; neither does the separated soul know it thus; but as explained + above. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q89_A4-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The knowledge of the separated soul is confined to those species or individuals to which the soul has some kind of determinate + relation, as we have said. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q89_A4-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The separated soul has not the same relation to all singulars, but one relation to some, and another to others. Therefore + there is not the same reason why it should know all singulars. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q89_A4-p10"></p> + <p id="FP_Q89_A4-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q89_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q89_A5.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q89_A5" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q89_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q89_A6.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q89_A5-p0.1">Whether the habit of knowledge here acquired remains in the separated soul?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q89_A5-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q89_A5-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the habit of knowledge acquired in this life does not remain in the soul separated from the body: for + the Apostle says: "Knowledge shall be destroyed" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q89_A5-p2.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.13.8" target="asv">1 Cor. 13:8</a>). + </p> + <p id="FP_Q89_A5-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, some in this world who are less good enjoy knowledge denied to others who are better. If, therefore, the habit of + knowledge remained in the soul after death, it would follow that some who are less good would, even in the future life, excel + some who are better; which seems unreasonable. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q89_A5-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, separated souls will possess knowledge by influence of the Divine light. Supposing, therefore, that knowledge here + acquired remained in the separated soul, it would follow that two forms of the same species would co-exist in the same subject + which cannot be. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q89_A5-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, the Philosopher says (Praedic. vi, 4,5), that "a habit is a quality hard to remove: yet sometimes knowledge is destroyed + by sickness or the like." But in this life there is no change so thorough as death. Therefore it seems that the habit of knowledge + is destroyed by death. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q89_A5-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Jerome says (Ep. liii, ad Paulinum), "Let us learn on earth that kind of knowledge which will remain with us in heaven." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q89_A5-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Some say that the habit of knowledge resides not in the intellect itself, but in the sensitive powers, namely, the imaginative, + cogitative, and memorative, and that the intelligible species are not kept in the passive intellect. If this were true, it + would follow that when the body is destroyed by death, knowledge here acquired would also be entirely destroyed. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q89_A5-p8"> But, since knowledge resides in the intellect, which is "the abode of species," as the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 4), + the habit of knowledge here acquired must be partly in the aforesaid sensitive powers and partly in the intellect. This can + be seen by considering the very actions from which knowledge arises. For "habits are like the actions whereby they are acquired" + (Ethic. ii, 1). Now the actions of the intellect, by which knowledge is here acquired, are performed by the + mind turning to the phantasms in the aforesaid sensitive powers. Hence through such acts the passive intellect acquires a + certain facility in considering the species received: and the aforesaid sensitive powers acquire a certain aptitude in seconding + the action of the intellect when it turns to them to consider the intelligible object. But as the intellectual act resides + chiefly and formally in the intellect itself, whilst it resides materially and dispositively in the inferior powers, the same + distinction is to be applied to habit. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q89_A5-p9"> Knowledge, therefore, acquired in the present life does not remain in the separated soul, as regards what belongs to the + sensitive powers; but as regards what belongs to the intellect itself, it must remain; because, as the Philosopher says (De + Long. et Brev. Vitae ii), a form may be corrupted in two ways; first, directly, when corrupted by its contrary, as heat, by + cold; and secondly, indirectly, when its subject is corrupted. Now it is evident that human knowledge is not + corrupted through corruption of the subject, for the intellect is an incorruptible faculty, as above stated ( + <a id="FP_Q89_A5-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q79_A2.html">Q[79], A[2]</a>, ad 2). Neither can the intelligible species in the passive intellect be corrupted by their contrary; for there is no contrary + to intelligible "intentions," above all as regards simple intelligence of "what a thing is." But contrariety may exist in + the intellect as regards mental composition and division, or also reasoning; so far as what is false in + statement or argument is contrary to truth. And thus knowledge may be corrupted by its contrary when a false argument seduces + anyone from the knowledge of truth. For this reason the Philosopher in the above work mentions two ways in which knowledge + is corrupted directly: namely, "forgetfulness" on the part of the memorative power, and "deception" on the part of a false + argument. But these have no place in the separated soul. Therefore we must conclude that the habit of knowledge, so far as + it + is in the intellect, remains in the separated soul. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q89_A5-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The Apostle is not speaking of knowledge as a habit, but as to the act of knowing; and hence he says, in proof of the assertion + quoted, "Now, I know in part." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q89_A5-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As a less good man may exceed a better man in bodily stature, so the same kind of man may have a habit of knowledge in the + future life which a better man may not have. Such knowledge, however, cannot be compared with the other prerogatives enjoyed + by the better man. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q89_A5-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> These two kinds of knowledge are not of the same species, so there is no impossibility. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q89_A5-p13"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> This objection considers the corruption of knowledge on the part of the sensitive powers. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q89_A5-p14"></p> + <p id="FP_Q89_A5-p15"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q89_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q89_A6.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q89_A6" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q89_A5.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q89_A7.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q89_A6-p0.1">Whether the act of knowledge acquired here remains in the separated soul?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q89_A6-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q89_A6-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the act of knowledge here acquired does not remain in the separated soul. For the Philosopher says (De + Anima i, 4), that when the body is corrupted, "the soul neither remembers nor loves." But to consider what is previously known + is an act of memory. Therefore the separated soul cannot retain an act of knowledge here acquired. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q89_A6-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, intelligible species cannot have greater power in the separated soul than they have in the soul united to the body. + But in this life we cannot understand by intelligible species without turning to phantasms, as shown above ( + <a id="FP_Q89_A6-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q84_A7.html">Q[84], A[7]</a>). Therefore the separated soul cannot do so, and thus it cannot understand at all by intelligible species acquired in this + life. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q89_A6-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 1), that "habits produce acts similar to those whereby they are acquired." But + the habit of knowledge is acquired here by acts of the intellect turning to phantasms: therefore it cannot produce any other + acts. These acts, however, are not adapted to the separated soul. Therefore the soul in the state of separation cannot produce + any act of knowledge acquired in this life. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q89_A6-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It was said to Dives in hell ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q89_A6-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Luke.16.25" target="asv">Lk. 16:25</a>): "Remember thou didst receive good things in thy lifetime." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q89_A6-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Action offers two things for our consideration---its species and its mode. Its species comes from the object, whereto the + faculty of knowledge is directed by the (intelligible) species, which is the object's similitude; whereas the mode is gathered + from the power of the agent. Thus that a person see a stone is due to the species of the stone in his eye; but that he see + it clearly, is due to the eye's visual power. Therefore as the intelligible species remain + in the separated soul, as stated above + <a id="FP_Q89_A6-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q89_A5.html">(A[5])</a>, and since the state of the separated soul is not the same as it is in this life, it follows that through the intelligible + species acquired in this life the soul apart from the body can understand what it understood formerly, but in a different + way; not by turning to phantasms, but by a mode suited to a soul existing apart from the body. Thus the act of knowledge here + acquired remains in the separated soul, but in a + different way. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q89_A6-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The Philosopher speaks of remembrance, according as memory belongs to the sensitive part, but not as belonging in a way to + the intellect, as explained above ( + <a id="FP_Q89_A6-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q79_A6.html">Q[79], A[6]</a>). + </p> + <p id="FP_Q89_A6-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The different mode of intelligence is produced by the different state of the intelligent soul; not by diversity of species. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q89_A6-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The acts which produce a habit are like the acts caused by that habit, in species, but not in mode. For example, to do just + things, but not justly, that is, pleasurably, causes the habit of political justice, whereby we act pleasurably. (Cf. Aristotle, + Ethic. v, 8: Magn. Moral. i, 34). + </p> + <p id="FP_Q89_A6-p10"></p> + <p id="FP_Q89_A6-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q89_A5.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q89_A7.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q89_A7" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q89_A6.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q89_A8.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q89_A7-p0.1">Whether local distance impedes the knowledge in the separated soul?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q89_A7-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q89_A7-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that local distance impedes the separated soul's knowledge. For Augustine says (De Cura pro Mort. xiii), that + "the souls of the dead are where they cannot know what is done here." But they know what is done among themselves. Therefore + local distance impedes the knowledge in the separated soul. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q89_A7-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Augustine says (De Divin. Daemon. iii), that "the demon's rapidity of movement enables them to tell things unknown + to us." But agility of movement would be useless in that respect unless their knowledge was impeded by local distance; which, + therefore, is a much greater hindrance to the knowledge of the separated soul, whose nature is inferior to the demon's. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q89_A7-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, as there is distance of place, so is there distance of time. But distance of time impedes knowledge in the separated + soul, for the soul is ignorant of the future. Therefore it seems that distance of place also impedes its knowledge. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q89_A7-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q89_A7-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Luke.16.23" target="asv">Lk. 16:23</a>), that Dives, "lifting up his eyes when he was in torment, saw Abraham afar off." Therefore local distance does not impede + knowledge in the separated soul. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q89_A7-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Some have held that the separated soul knows the singular by abstraction from the sensible. If that were so, it might be + that local distance would impede its knowledge; for either the sensible would need to act upon the soul, or the soul upon + the sensible, and in either case a determinate distance would be necessary. This is, however, impossible because abstraction + of the species from the sensible is done through the senses and other sensible faculties which + do not remain actually in the soul apart from the body. But the soul when separated understands singulars by species derived + from the Divine light, which is indifferent to what is near or distant. Hence knowledge in the separated soul is not hindered + by local distance. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q89_A7-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Augustine says that the souls of the departed cannot see what is done here, not because they are 'there,' as if impeded by + local distance; but for some other cause, as we shall explain + <a id="FP_Q89_A7-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q89_A8.html">(A[8])</a>. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q89_A7-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Augustine speaks there in accordance with the opinion that demons have bodies naturally united to them, and so have sensitive + powers, which require local distance. In the same book he expressly sets down this opinion, though apparently rather by way + of narration than of assertion, as we may gather from De Civ. Dei xxi, 10. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q89_A7-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The future, which is distant in time, does not actually exist, and therefore is not knowable in itself, because so far as + a thing falls short of being, so far does it fall short of being knowable. But what is locally distant exists actually, and + is knowable in itself. Hence we cannot argue from distance of time to distance of place. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q89_A7-p10"></p> + <p id="FP_Q89_A7-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q89_A6.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q89_A8.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q89_A8" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q89_A7.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q90.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q89_A8-p0.1">Whether separated souls know that takes place on earth?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q89_A8-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q89_A8-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that separated souls know what takes place on earth; for otherwise they would have no care for it, as they + have, according to what Dives said ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q89_A8-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Luke.16.27" target="asv">Lk. 16:27,28</a>), "I have five brethren . . . he may testify unto them, lest they also come into the place of torments." Therefore separated + souls know what passes on earth. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q89_A8-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the dead often appear to the living, asleep or awake, and tell them of what takes place there; as Samuel appeared + to Saul ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q89_A8-p3.1" href="./asv.html#iKgs.28.11" target="asv">1 Kings 28:11</a>). But this could not be unless they knew what takes place here. Therefore they know what takes place on earth. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q89_A8-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, separated souls know what happens among themselves. If, therefore, they do not know what takes place among us, it + must be by reason of local distance; which has been shown to be false + <a id="FP_Q89_A8-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q89_A7.html">(A[7])</a>. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q89_A8-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q89_A8-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Job.14.21" target="asv">Job 14:21</a>): "He will not understand whether his children come to honor or dishonor." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q89_A8-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> By natural knowledge, of which we are treating now, the souls of the dead do not know what passes on earth. This follows + from what has been laid down + <a id="FP_Q89_A8-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q89_A4.html">(A[4])</a>, since the separated soul has knowledge of singulars, by being in a way determined to them, either by some vestige of previous + knowledge or affection, or by the Divine order. Now the souls departed are in a state of separation from the living, both + by Divine order and by their + mode of existence, whilst they are joined to the world of incorporeal spiritual substances; and hence they are ignorant of + what goes on among us. Whereof Gregory gives the reason thus: "The dead do not know how the living act, for the life of the + spirit is far from the life of the flesh; and so, as corporeal things differ from incorporeal in genus, so they are distinct + in knowledge" (Moral. xii). Augustine seems to say the same (De Cura pro Mort. xiii), when he asserts that, "the souls of + the + dead have no concern in the affairs of the living." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q89_A8-p7"> Gregory and Augustine, however, seem to be divided in opinion as regards the souls of the blessed in heaven, for Gregory + continues the passage above quoted: "The case of the holy souls is different, for since they see the light of Almighty God, + we cannot believe that external things are unknown to them." But Augustine (De Cura pro Mort. xiii) expressly says: "The dead, + even the saints do not know what is done by the living or by their own children," as a gloss quotes on the + text, "Abraham hath not known us" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q89_A8-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.63.16" target="asv">Is. 63:16</a>). He confirms this opinion by saying that he was not visited, nor consoled in sorrow by his mother, as when she was alive; + and he could not think it possible that she was less kind when in a happier state; and again by the fact that the Lord promised + to king Josias that he should die, lest he should see his people's afflictions ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q89_A8-p7.2" href="./asv.html#." target="asv">4 Kings 22:20</a>). Yet Augustine says this in doubt; and premises, "Let every one take, as he pleases, + what I say." Gregory, on the other hand, is positive, since he says, "We cannot believe." His opinion, indeed, seems to be + the more probable one---that the souls of the blessed who see God do know all that passes here. For they are equal to the + angels, of whom Augustine says that they know what happens among those living on earth. But as the souls of the blessed are + most perfectly united to Divine justice, they do not suffer from sorrow, nor do they interfere in mundane affairs, except + in + accordance with Divine justice. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q89_A8-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The souls of the departed may care for the living, even if ignorant of their state; just as we care for the dead by pouring + forth prayer on their behalf, though we are ignorant of their state. Moreover, the affairs of the living can be made known + to them not immediately, but the souls who pass hence thither, or by angels and demons, or even by "the revelation of the + Holy Ghost," as Augustine says in the same book. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q89_A8-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> That the dead appear to the living in any way whatever is either by the special dispensation of God; in order that the souls + of the dead may interfere in affairs of the living---and this is to be accounted as miraculous. Or else such apparitions occur + through the instrumentality of bad or good angels, without the knowledge of the departed; as may likewise happen when the + living appear, without their own knowledge, to others living, as Augustine says + in the same book. And so it may be said of Samuel that he appeared through Divine revelation; according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q89_A8-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.46.23" target="asv"> Ecclus. 46:23, </a> "he slept, and told the king the end of his life." Or, again, this apparition was procured by the demons; unless, indeed, + the authority of Ecclesiasticus be set aside through not being received by the Jews as canonical Scripture. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q89_A8-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This kind of ignorance does not proceed from the obstacle of local distance, but from the cause mentioned above. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q89_A8-p11"></p> + <p id="FP_Q89_A8-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q89_A7.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q90.html"></a> + </div> + <a href="summa.FP_Q88_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q89_A1.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q90" class="div3"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q89_A8.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q90_A1.html"></a> + <h3 id="FP_Q90-p0.1">OF THE FIRST PRODUCTION OF MAN'S SOUL (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3> + <p id="FP_Q90-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q90-p2"> After the foregoing we must consider the first production of man, concerning which there are four subjects of treatment: + (1) the production of man himself; (2) the end of this production; (3) the state and condition of the first man; (4) the place + of his abode. Concerning the production of man, there are three things to be considered: (1) the production of man's soul; + (2) the production of man's body; (3) the production of the woman. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q90-p3"> Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:</p> + <p id="FP_Q90-p4"> (1) Whether man's soul was something made, or was of the Divine substance?</p> + <p id="FP_Q90-p5"> (2) Whether, if made, it was created?</p> + <p id="FP_Q90-p6"> (3) Whether it was made by angelic instrumentality?</p> + <p id="FP_Q90-p7"> (4) Whether it was made before the body?</p> + <div id="FP_Q90_A1" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q90.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q90_A2.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q90_A1-p0.1">Whether the soul was made or was of God's substance?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q90_A1-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q90_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the soul was not made, but was God's substance. For it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q90_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.2.7" target="asv">Gn. 2:7</a>): "God formed man of the slime of the earth, and breathed into his face the breath of life, and man was made a living soul." + But he who breathes sends forth something of himself. Therefore the soul, whereby man lives, is of the Divine substance. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q90_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, as above explained ( + <a id="FP_Q90_A1-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q75_A5.html">Q[75], A[5]</a>), the soul is a simple form. But a form is an act. Therefore the soul is a pure act; which applies to God alone. Therefore + the soul is of God's substance. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q90_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, things that exist and do differ are the same. But God and the mind exist, and in no way differ, for they could only + be differentiated by certain differences, and thus would be composite. Therefore God and the human mind are the same. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q90_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine (De Orig. Animae iii, 15) mentions certain opinions which he calls "exceedingly and evidently perverse, and contrary + to the Catholic Faith," among which the first is the opinion that "God made the soul not out of nothing, but from Himself." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q90_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> To say that the soul is of the Divine substance involves a manifest improbability. For, as is clear from what has been said + ( + <a id="FP_Q90_A1-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q77_A2.html">Q[77] , A[2]</a>; + <a id="FP_Q90_A1-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q79_A2.html">Q[79], A[2]</a>; + <a id="FP_Q90_A1-p6.3" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q84_A6.html">Q[84], A[6]</a>), the human soul is sometimes in a state of potentiality to the act of intelligence ---acquires its knowledge somehow from + things---and thus has various powers; all of which are incompatible with the Divine Nature, Which is + a pure act---receives nothing from any other---and admits of no variety in itself, as we have proved ( + <a id="FP_Q90_A1-p6.4" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q3_A1.html">Q[3], AA[1]</a>,7; + <a id="FP_Q90_A1-p6.5" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q9_A1.html">Q[9], A[1]</a>). + </p> + <p id="FP_Q90_A1-p7"> This error seems to have originated from two statements of the ancients. For those who first began to observe the nature + of things, being unable to rise above their imagination, supposed that nothing but bodies existed. Therefore they said that + God was a body, which they considered to be the principle of other bodies. And since they held that the soul was of the same + nature as that body which they regarded as the first principle, as is stated De Anima i, 2, it followed that the + soul was of the nature of God Himself. According to this supposition, also, the Manichaeans, thinking that God was corporeal + light, held that the soul was part of that light bound up with the body. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q90_A1-p8"> Then a further step in advance was made, and some surmised the existence of something incorporeal, not apart from the body, + but the form of a body; so that Varro said, "God is a soul governing the world by movement and reason," as Augustine relates + (De Civ. Dei vii, 6 [*The words as quoted are to be found iv. 31.]) So some supposed man's soul to be part of that one soul, + as man is a part of the whole world; for they were unable to go so far as to understand the different degrees + of spiritual substance, except according to the distinction of bodies. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q90_A1-p9"> But, all these theories are impossible, as proved above ( + <a id="FP_Q90_A1-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q3_A1.html">Q[3], AA[1]</a>,8; and + <a id="FP_Q90_A1-p9.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q75_A1.html">Q[75], A[1]</a>), wherefore it is evidently false that the soul is of the substance of God. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q90_A1-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The term "breathe" is not to be taken in the material sense; but as regards the act of God, to breathe [spirare], is the + same as to "make a spirit." Moreover, in the material sense, man by breathing does not send forth anything of his own substance, + but an extraneous thing. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q90_A1-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Although the soul is a simple form in its essence, yet it is not its own existence, but is a being by participation, as above + explained ( + <a id="FP_Q90_A1-p11.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q75_A5.html">Q[75], A[5]</a>, ad 4). Therefore it is not a pure act like God. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q90_A1-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> That which differs, properly speaking, differs in something; wherefore we seek for difference where we find also resemblance. + For this reason things which differ must in some way be compound; since they differ in something, and in something resemble + each other. In this sense, although all that differ are diverse, yet all things that are diverse do not differ. For simple + things are diverse; yet do not differ from one another by differences which enter + into their composition. For instance, a man and a horse differ by the difference of rational and irrational; but we cannot + say that these again differ by some further difference. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q90_A1-p13"></p> + <p id="FP_Q90_A1-p14"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q90.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q90_A2.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q90_A2" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q90_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q90_A3.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q90_A2-p0.1">Whether the soul was produced by creation?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q90_A2-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q90_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the soul was not produced by creation. For that which has in itself something material is produced from + matter. But the soul is in part material, since it is not a pure act. Therefore the soul was made of matter; and hence it + was not created. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q90_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, every actuality of matter is educed from the potentiality of that matter; for since matter is in potentiality to + act, any act pre-exists in matter potentially. But the soul is the act of corporeal matter, as is clear from its definition. + Therefore the soul is educed from the potentiality of matter. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q90_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the soul is a form. Therefore, if the soul is created, all other forms also are created. Thus no forms would come + into existence by generation; which is not true. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q90_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q90_A2-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.1.27" target="asv">Gn. 1:27</a>): "God created man to His own image." But man is like to God in his soul. Therefore the soul was created. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q90_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The rational soul can be made only by creation; which, however, is not true of other forms. The reason is because, since + to be made is the way to existence, a thing must be made in such a way as is suitable to its mode of existence. Now that properly + exists which itself has existence; as it were, subsisting in its own existence. Wherefore only substances are properly and + truly called beings; whereas an accident has not existence, but something is (modified) + by it, and so far is it called a being; for instance, whiteness is called a being, because by it something is white. Hence + it is said Metaph. vii, Did. vi, 1 that an accident should be described as "of something rather than as something." The same + is to be said of all non-subsistent forms. Therefore, properly speaking, it does not belong to any non-existing form to be + made; but such are said to be made through the composite substances being made. On the other hand, the rational soul is a + subsistent form, as above explained ( + <a id="FP_Q90_A2-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q75_A2.html">Q[75], A[2]</a>). Wherefore it is competent to be and to be made. And since it cannot be made of pre-existing matter---whether corporeal, + which would render it a corporeal being---or spiritual, which would involve the transmutation of one spiritual substance into + another, we must conclude that it cannot exist except by creation. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q90_A2-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The soul's simple essence is as the material element, while its participated existence is its formal element; which participated + existence necessarily co-exists with the soul's essence, because existence naturally follows the form. The same reason holds + if the soul is supposed to be composed of some spiritual matter, as some maintain; because the said matter is not in potentiality + to another form, as neither is the matter of a celestial body; + otherwise the soul would be corruptible. Wherefore the soul cannot in any way be made of pre-existent matter. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q90_A2-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The production of act from the potentiality of matter is nothing else but something becoming actually that previously was + in potentiality. But since the rational soul does not depend in its existence on corporeal matter, and is subsistent, and + exceeds the capacity of corporeal matter, as we have seen ( + <a id="FP_Q90_A2-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q75_A2.html">Q[75], A[2]</a>), it is not educed from the potentiality of matter. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q90_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As we have said, there is no comparison between the rational soul and other forms. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q90_A2-p10"></p> + <p id="FP_Q90_A2-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q90_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q90_A3.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q90_A3" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q90_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q90_A4.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q90_A3-p0.1">Whether the rational soul is produced by God immediately?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q90_A3-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q90_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the rational soul is not immediately made by God, but by the instrumentality of the angels. For spiritual + things have more order than corporeal things. But inferior bodies are produced by means of the superior, as Dionysius says + (Div. Nom. iv). Therefore also the inferior spirits, who are the rational souls, are produced by means of the superior spirits, + the angels. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q90_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the end corresponds to the beginning of things; for God is the beginning and end of all. Therefore the issue of + things from their beginning corresponds to the forwarding of them to their end. But "inferior things are forwarded by the + higher," as Dionysius says (Eccl. Hier. v); therefore also the inferior are produced into existence by the higher, and souls + by angels. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q90_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, "perfect is that which can produce its like," as is stated Metaph. v. But spiritual substances are much more perfect + than corporeal. Therefore, since bodies produce their like in their own species, much more are angels able to produce something + specifically inferior to themselves; and such is the rational soul. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q90_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q90_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.2.7" target="asv">Gn. 2:7</a>) that God Himself "breathed into the face of man the breath of life." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q90_A3-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Some have held that angels, acting by the power of God, produce rational souls. But this is quite impossible, and is against + faith. For it has been proved that the rational soul cannot be produced except by creation. Now, God alone can create; for + the first agent alone can act without presupposing the existence of anything; while the second cause always presupposes something + derived from the first cause, as above explained ( + <a id="FP_Q90_A3-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q75_A3.html">Q[75], + A[3] + </a>): and every agent, that presupposes something to its act, acts by making a change therein. Therefore everything else acts + by producing a change, whereas God alone acts by creation. Since, therefore, the rational soul cannot be produced by a change + in matter, it cannot be produced, save immediately by God. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q90_A3-p7"> Thus the replies to the objections are clear. For that bodies produce their like or something inferior to themselves, and + that the higher things lead forward the inferior---all these things are effected through a certain transmutation. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q90_A3-p8"></p> + <p id="FP_Q90_A3-p9"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q90_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q90_A4.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q90_A4" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q90_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q91.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q90_A4-p0.1">Whether the human soul was produced before the body?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q90_A4-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q90_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the human soul was made before the body. For the work of creation preceded the work of distinction and + adornment, as shown above ( + <a id="FP_Q90_A4-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q66_A1.html">Q[66], A[1]</a>; + <a id="FP_Q90_A4-p2.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q70_A1.html">Q[70], A[1]</a>). But the soul was made by creation; whereas the body was made at the end of the work of adornment. Therefore the soul of + man was made before the body. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q90_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the rational soul has more in common with the angels than with the brute animals. But angels were created before + bodies, or at least, at the beginning with corporeal matter; whereas the body of man was formed on the sixth day, when also + the animals were made. Therefore the soul of man was created before the body. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q90_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the end is proportionate to the beginning. But in the end the soul outlasts the body. Therefore in the beginning + it was created before the body. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q90_A4-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The proper act is produced in its proper potentiality. Therefore since the soul is the proper act of the body, the soul was + produced in the body. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q90_A4-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Origen (Peri Archon i, 7,8) held that not only the soul of the first man, but also the souls of all men were created at the + same time as the angels, before their bodies: because he thought that all spiritual substances, whether souls or angels, are + equal in their natural condition, and differ only by merit; so that some of them---namely, the souls of men or of heavenly + bodies---are united to bodies while others remain in their different orders entirely free + from matter. Of this opinion we have already spoken ( + <a id="FP_Q90_A4-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q47_A2.html">Q[47], A[2]</a>); and so we need say nothing about it here. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q90_A4-p7"> Augustine, however (Gen. ad lit. vii, 24), says that the soul of the first man was created at the same time as the angels, + before the body, for another reason; because he supposes that the body of man, during the work of the six days, was produced, + not actually, but only as to some "causal virtues"; which cannot be said of the soul, because neither was it made of any pre-existing + corporeal or spiritual matter, nor could it be produced from any created virtue. Therefore it seems + that the soul itself, during the work of the six days, when all things were made, was created, together with the angels; and + that afterwards, by its own will, was joined to the service of the body. But he does not say this by way of assertion; as + his words prove. For he says (Gen. ad lit. vii, 29): "We may believe, if neither Scripture nor reason forbid, that man was + made on the sixth day, in the sense that his body was created as to its causal virtue in the elements of the world, but that + the + soul was already created." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q90_A4-p8"> Now this could be upheld by those who hold that the soul has of itself a complete species and nature, and that it is not + united to the body as its form, but as its administrator. But if the soul is united to the body as its form, and is naturally + a part of human nature, the above supposition is quite impossible. For it is clear that God made the first things in their + perfect natural state, as their species required. Now the soul, as a part of human nature, has its natural + perfection only as united to the body. Therefore it would have been unfitting for the soul to be created without the body. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q90_A4-p9"> Therefore, if we admit the opinion of Augustine about the work of the six days ( + <a id="FP_Q90_A4-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q74_A2.html">Q[74], A[2]</a>), we may say that the human soul preceded in the work of the six days by a certain generic similitude, so far as it has intellectual + nature in common with the angels; but was itself created at the same time as the body. According to the other saints, both + the body and soul of the first man were produced in the work of the six days. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q90_A4-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> If the soul by its nature were a complete species, so that it might be created as to itself, this reason would prove that + the soul was created by itself in the beginning. But as the soul is naturally the form of the body, it was necessarily created, + not separately, but in the body. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q90_A4-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The same observation applies to the second objection. For if the soul had a species of itself it would have something still + more in common with the angels. But, as the form of the body, it belongs to the animal genus, as a formal principle. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q90_A4-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> That the soul remains after the body, is due to a defect of the body, namely, death. Which defect was not due when the soul + was first created. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q90_A4-p13"></p> + <p id="FP_Q90_A4-p14"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q90_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q91.html"></a> + </div> + <a href="summa.FP_Q89_A8.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q90_A1.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q91" class="div3"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q90_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q91_A1.html"></a> + <h3 id="FP_Q91-p0.1">THE PRODUCTION OF THE FIRST MAN'S BODY (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3> + <p id="FP_Q91-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q91-p2"> We have now to consider the production of the first man's body. Under this head there are four points of inquiry:</p> + <p id="FP_Q91-p3"> (1) The matter from which it was produced;</p> + <p id="FP_Q91-p4"> (2) The author by whom it was produced;</p> + <p id="FP_Q91-p5"> (3) The disposition it received in its production;</p> + <p id="FP_Q91-p6"> (4) The mode and order of its production.</p> + <p id="FP_Q91-p7"></p> + <div id="FP_Q91_A1" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q91.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q91_A2.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q91_A1-p0.1">Whether the body of the first man was made of the slime of the earth?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q91_A1-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q91_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the body of the first man was not made of the slime of the earth. For it is an act of greater power to + make something out of nothing than out of something; because "not being" is farther off from actual existence than "being + in potentiality." But since man is the most honorable of God's lower creatures, it was fitting that in the production of man's + body, the power of God should be most clearly shown. Therefore it should not have been made + of the slime of the earth, but out of nothing. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q91_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the heavenly bodies are nobler than earthly bodies. But the human body has the greatest nobility; since it is perfected + by the noblest form, which is the rational soul. Therefore it should not be made of an earthly body, but of a heavenly body. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q91_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, fire and air are nobler than earth and water, as is clear from their subtlety. Therefore, since the human body is + most noble, it should rather have been made of fire and air than of the slime of the earth. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q91_A1-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, the human body is composed of the four elements. Therefore it was not made of the slime of the earth, but of the + four elements. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q91_A1-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q91_A1-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.2.7" target="asv">Gn. 2:7</a>): "God made man of the slime of the earth." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q91_A1-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As God is perfect in His works, He bestowed perfection on all of them according to their capacity: "God's works are perfect" + ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q91_A1-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Deut.32.4" target="asv">Dt. 32:4</a>). He Himself is simply perfect by the fact that "all things are pre-contained" in Him, not as component parts, but as "united + in one simple whole," as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. v); in the same way as various effects pre-exist in their cause, according + to its one virtue. This perfection is bestowed on the angels, inasmuch as + all things which are produced by God in nature through various forms come under their knowledge. But on man this perfection + is bestowed in an inferior way. For he does not possess a natural knowledge of all natural things, but is in a manner composed + of all things, since he has in himself a rational soul of the genus of spiritual substances, and in likeness to the heavenly + bodies he is removed from contraries by an equable temperament. As to the elements, he has them in their very substance, + yet in such a way that the higher elements, fire and air, predominate in him by their power; for life is mostly found where + there is heat, which is from fire; and where there is humor, which is of the air. But the inferior elements abound in man + by their substance; otherwise the mingling of elements would not be evenly balanced, unless the inferior elements, which have + the less power, predominated in quantity. Therefore the body of man is said to have been formed from the slime of the earth; + because earth and water mingled are called slime, and for this reason man is called 'a little world,' because all creatures + of the world are in a way to be found in him. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q91_A1-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The power of the Divine Creator was manifested in man's body when its matter was produced by creation. But it was fitting + that the human body should be made of the four elements, that man might have something in common with the inferior bodies, + as being something between spiritual and corporeal substances. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q91_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Although the heavenly body is in itself nobler than the earthly body, yet for the acts of the rational soul the heavenly + body is less adapted. For the rational soul receives the knowledge of truth in a certain way through the senses, the organs + of which cannot be formed of a heavenly body which is impassible. Nor is it true that something of the fifth essence enters + materially into the composition of the human body, as some say, who suppose that the + soul is united to the body by means of light. For, first of all, what they say is false---that light is a body. Secondly, + it is impossible for something to be taken from the fifth essence, or from a heavenly body, and to be mingled with the elements, + since a heavenly body is impassible; wherefore it does not enter into the composition of mixed bodies, except as in the effects + of its power. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q91_A1-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> If fire and air, whose action is of greater power, predominated also in quantity in the human body, they would entirely draw + the rest into themselves, and there would be no equality in the mingling, such as is required in the composition of man, for + the sense of touch, which is the foundation of the other senses. For the organ of any particular sense must not actually have + the contraries of which that sense has the perception, but only potentially; + either in such a way that it is entirely void of the whole "genus" of such contraries---thus, for instance, the pupil of the + eye is without color, so as to be in potentiality as regards all colors; which is not possible in the organ of touch, since + it is composed of the very elements, the qualities of which are perceived by that sense---or so that the organ is a medium + between two contraries, as much needs be the case with regard to touch; for the medium is in potentiality to the extremes. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q91_A1-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> In the slime of the earth are earth, and water binding the earth together. Of the other elements, Scripture makes no mention, + because they are less in quantity in the human body, as we have said; and because also in the account of the Creation no mention + is made of fire and air, which are not perceived by senses of uncultured men such as those to whom the Scripture was immediately + addressed. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q91_A1-p12"></p> + <p id="FP_Q91_A1-p13"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q91.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q91_A2.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q91_A2" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q91_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q91_A3.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q91_A2-p0.1">Whether the human body was immediately produced by God?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q91_A2-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q91_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the human body was not produced by God immediately. For Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 4), that "corporeal + things are disposed by God through the angels." But the human body was made of corporeal matter, as stated above + <a id="FP_Q91_A2-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q91_A1.html">(A[1])</a>. Therefore it was produced by the instrumentality of the angels, and not immediately by God. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q91_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, whatever can be made by a created power, is not necessarily produced immediately by God. But the human body can + be produced by the created power of a heavenly body; for even certain animals are produced from putrefaction by the active + power of a heavenly body; and Albumazar says that man is not generated where heat and cold are extreme, but only in temperate + regions. Therefore the human body was not necessarily produced immediately by God. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q91_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, nothing is made of corporeal matter except by some material change. But all corporeal change is caused by a movement + of a heavenly body, which is the first movement. Therefore, since the human body was produced from corporeal matter, it seems + that a heavenly body had part in its production. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q91_A2-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. vii, 24) that man's body was made during the work of the six days, according to the + causal virtues which God inserted in corporeal creatures; and that afterwards it was actually produced. But what pre-exists + in the corporeal creature by reason of causal virtues can be produced by some corporeal body. Therefore the human body was + produced by some created power, and not immediately by God. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q91_A2-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q91_A2-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.17.1" target="asv">Ecclus. 17:1</a>): "God created man out of the earth." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q91_A2-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The first formation of the human body could not be by the instrumentality of any created power, but was immediately from + God. Some, indeed, supposed that the forms which are in corporeal matter are derived from some immaterial forms; but the Philosopher + refutes this opinion (Metaph. vii), for the reason that forms cannot be made in themselves, but only in the composite, as + we have explained ( + <a id="FP_Q91_A2-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q65_A4.html">Q[65], A[4]</a>); and because the agent must + be like its effect, it is not fitting that a pure form, not existing in matter, should produce a form which is in matter, + and which form is only made by the fact that the composite is made. So a form which is in matter can only be the cause of + another form that is in matter, according as composite is made by composite. Now God, though He is absolutely immaterial, + can alone by His own power produce matter by creation: wherefore He alone can produce a form in matter, without the aid of + any + preceding material form. For this reason the angels cannot transform a body except by making use of something in the nature + of a seed, as Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 19). Therefore as no pre-existing body has been formed whereby another body of + the same species could be generated, the first human body was of necessity made immediately by God. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q91_A2-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Although the angels are the ministers of God, as regards what He does in bodies, yet God does something in bodies beyond + the angels' power, as, for instance, raising the dead, or giving sight to the blind: and by this power He formed the body + of the first man from the slime of the earth. Nevertheless the angels could act as ministers in the formation of the body + of the first man, in the same way as they will do at the last resurrection by collecting + the dust. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q91_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Perfect animals, produced from seed, cannot be made by the sole power of a heavenly body, as Avicenna imagined; although + the power of a heavenly body may assist by co-operation in the work of natural generation, as the Philosopher says (Phys. + ii, 26), "man and the sun beget man from matter." For this reason, a place of moderate temperature is required for the production + of man and other animals. But the power of heavenly bodies suffices for the + production of some imperfect animals from properly disposed matter: for it is clear that more conditions are required to produce + a perfect than an imperfect thing. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q91_A2-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The movement of the heavens causes natural changes; but not changes that surpass the order of nature, and are caused by the + Divine Power alone, as for the dead to be raised to life, or the blind to see: like to which also is the making of man from + the slime of the earth. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q91_A2-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> An effect may be said to pre-exist in the causal virtues of creatures, in two ways. First, both in active and in passive + potentiality, so that not only can it be produced out of pre-existing matter, but also that some pre-existing creature can + produce it. Secondly, in passive potentiality only; that is, that out of pre-existing matter it can be produced by God. In + this sense, according to Augustine, the human body pre-existed in the previous work in + their causal virtues. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q91_A2-p12"></p> + <p id="FP_Q91_A2-p13"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q91_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q91_A3.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q91_A3" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q91_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q91_A4.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q91_A3-p0.1">Whether the body of man was given an apt disposition?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q91_A3-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q91_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the body of man was not given an apt disposition. For since man is the noblest of animals, his body ought + to be the best disposed in what is proper to an animal, that is, in sense and movement. But some animals have sharper senses + and quicker movement than man; thus dogs have a keener smell, and birds a swifter flight. Therefore man's body was not aptly + disposed. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q91_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, perfect is what lacks nothing. But the human body lacks more than the body of other animals, for these are provided + with covering and natural arms of defense, in which man is lacking. Therefore the human body is very imperfectly disposed. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q91_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, man is more distant from plants than he is from the brutes. But plants are erect in stature, while brutes are prone + in stature. Therefore man should not be of erect stature. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q91_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q91_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Eccl.7.30" target="asv">Eccles. 7:30</a>): "God made man right." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q91_A3-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> All natural things were produced by the Divine art, and so may be called God's works of art. Now every artist intends to + give to his work the best disposition; not absolutely the best, but the best as regards the proposed end; and even if this + entails some defect, the artist cares not: thus, for instance, when man makes himself a saw for the purpose of cutting, he + makes it of iron, which is suitable for the object in view; and he does not prefer to make it + of glass, though this be a more beautiful material, because this very beauty would be an obstacle to the end he has in view. + Therefore God gave to each natural being the best disposition; not absolutely so, but in the view of its proper end. This + is what the Philosopher says (Phys. ii, 7): "And because it is better so, not absolutely, but for each one's substance." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q91_A3-p7"> Now the proximate end of the human body is the rational soul and its operations; since matter is for the sake of the form, + and instruments are for the action of the agent. I say, therefore, that God fashioned the human body in that disposition which + was best, as most suited to such a form and to such operations. If defect exists in the disposition of the human body, it + is well to observe that such defect arises as a necessary result of the matter, from the conditions required in + the body, in order to make it suitably proportioned to the soul and its operations. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q91_A3-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The sense of touch, which is the foundation of the other senses, is more perfect in man than in any other animal; and for + this reason man must have the most equable temperament of all animals. Moreover man excels all other animals in the interior + sensitive powers, as is clear from what we have said above ( + <a id="FP_Q91_A3-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q78_A4.html">Q[78], A[4]</a>). But by a kind of necessity, man falls short of the other animals in some of the exterior senses; thus of all + animals he has the least sense of smell. For man needs the largest brain as compared to the body; both for his greater freedom + of action in the interior powers required for the intellectual operations, as we have seen above ( + <a id="FP_Q91_A3-p8.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q84_A7.html">Q[84], A[7]</a>); and in order that the low temperature of the brain may modify the heat of the heart, which has to be considerable in man + for him to be able to stand erect. So that size of the brain, by reason of its humidity, is an impediment to the + smell, which requires dryness. In the same way, we may suggest a reason why some animals have a keener sight, and a more acute + hearing than man; namely, on account of a hindrance to his senses arising necessarily from the perfect equability of his temperament. + The same reason suffices to explain why some animals are more rapid in movement than man, since this excellence of speed is + inconsistent with the equability of the human temperament. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q91_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Horns and claws, which are the weapons of some animals, and toughness of hide and quantity of hair or feathers, which are + the clothing of animals, are signs of an abundance of the earthly element; which does not agree with the equability and softness + of the human temperament. Therefore such things do not suit the nature of man. Instead of these, he has reason and hands whereby + he can make himself arms and clothes, and other necessaries of life, of + infinite variety. Wherefore the hand is called by Aristotle (De Anima iii, 8), "the organ of organs." Moreover this was more + becoming to the rational nature, which is capable of conceiving an infinite number of things, so as to make for itself an + infinite number of instruments. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q91_A3-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> An upright stature was becoming to man for four reasons. First, because the senses are given to man, not only for the purpose + of procuring the necessaries of life, which they are bestowed on other animals, but also for the purpose of knowledge. Hence, + whereas the other animals take delight in the objects of the senses only as ordered to food and sex, man alone takes pleasure + in the beauty of sensible objects for its own sake. Therefore, as the senses + are situated chiefly in the face, other animals have the face turned to the ground, as it were for the purpose of seeking + food and procuring a livelihood; whereas man has his face erect, in order that by the senses, and chiefly by sight, which + is more subtle and penetrates further into the differences of things, he may freely survey the sensible objects around him, + both heavenly and earthly, so as to gather intelligible truth from all things. Secondly, for the greater freedom of the acts + of the + interior powers; the brain, wherein these actions are, in a way, performed, not being low down, but lifted up above other + parts of the body. Thirdly, because if man's stature were prone to the ground he would need to use his hands as fore-feet; + and thus their utility for other purposes would cease. Fourthly, because if man's stature were prone to the ground, and he + used his hands as fore-feet, he would be obliged to take hold of his food with his mouth. Thus he would have a protruding + mouth, + with thick and hard lips, and also a hard tongue, so as to keep it from being hurt by exterior things; as we see in other + animals. Moreover, such an attitude would quite hinder speech, which is reason's proper operation. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q91_A3-p11"> Nevertheless, though of erect stature, man is far above plants. For man's superior part, his head, is turned towards the + superior part of the world, and his inferior part is turned towards the inferior world; and therefore he is perfectly disposed + as to the general situation of his body. Plants have the superior part turned towards the lower world, since their roots correspond + to the mouth; and their inferior part towards the upper world. But brute animals have a middle + disposition, for the superior part of the animal is that by which it takes food, and the inferior part that by which it rids + itself of the surplus. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q91_A3-p12"></p> + <p id="FP_Q91_A3-p13"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q91_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q91_A4.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q91_A4" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q91_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q92.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q91_A4-p0.1">Whether the production of the human body is fittingly described in Scripture?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q91_A4-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q91_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the production of the human body is not fittingly described in Scripture. For, as the human body was made + by God, so also were the other works of the six days. But in the other works it is written, "God said; Let it be made, and + it was made." Therefore the same should have been said of man. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q91_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the human body was made by God immediately, as explained above + <a id="FP_Q91_A4-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q91_A2.html">(A[2])</a>. Therefore it was not fittingly said, "Let us make man." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q91_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the form of the human body is the soul itself which is the breath of life. Therefore, having said, "God made man + of the slime of the earth," he should not have added: "And He breathed into him the breath of life." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q91_A4-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, the soul, which is the breath of life, is in the whole body, and chiefly in the heart. Therefore it was not fittingly + said: "He breathed into his face the breath of life." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q91_A4-p6"> + <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, the male and female sex belong to the body, while the image of God belongs to the soul. But the soul, according + to Augustine (Gen. ad lit. vii, 24), was made before the body. Therefore having said: "To His image He made them," he should + not have added, "male and female He created them." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q91_A4-p7"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Is the authority of Scripture. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q91_A4-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As Augustine observes (Gen. ad lit. vi, 12), man surpasses other things, not in the fact that God Himself made man, as though + He did not make other things; since it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q91_A4-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.101.26" target="asv">Ps. 101:26</a>), "The work of Thy hands is the heaven," and elsewhere ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q91_A4-p8.2" href="./asv.html#Ps.94.5" target="asv">Ps. 94:5</a>), "His hands laid down the dry land"; but in this, that man is made to God's image. Yet in describing man's production, Scripture + uses a special way of + speaking, to show that other things were made for man's sake. For we are accustomed to do with more deliberation and care + what we have chiefly in mind. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q91_A4-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> We must not imagine that when God said "Let us make man," He spoke to the angels, as some were perverse enough to think. + But by these words is signified the plurality of the Divine Person, Whose image is more clearly expressed in man. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q91_A4-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Some have thought that man's body was formed first in priority of time, and that afterwards the soul was infused into the + formed body. But it is inconsistent with the perfection of the production of things, that God should have made either the + body without the soul, or the soul without the body, since each is a part of human nature. This is especially unfitting as + regards the body, for the body depends on the soul, and not the soul on the body. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q91_A4-p11"> To remove the difficulty some have said that the words, "God made man," must be understood of the production of the body + with the soul; and that the subsequent words, "and He breathed into his face the breath of life," should be understood of + the Holy Ghost; as the Lord breathed on His Apostles, saying, "Receive ye the Holy Ghost" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q91_A4-p11.1" href="./asv.html#John.20.22" target="asv">Jn. 20:22</a>). But this explanation, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiii, 24), is excluded by the very words of Scripture. For we + read farther on, "And man was made a living soul"; which words the Apostle ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q91_A4-p11.2" href="./asv.html#iCor.15.45" target="asv">1 Cor. 15:45</a>) refers not to spiritual life, but to animal life. Therefore, by breath of life we must understand the soul, so that the + words, "He breathed into his face the breath of life," are a sort of exposition of what goes before; for the soul is the form + of the body. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q91_A4-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Since vital operations are more clearly seen in man's face, on account of the senses which are there expressed; therefore + Scripture says that the breath of life was breathed into man's face. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q91_A4-p13"> + <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> According to Augustine (Gen. ad lit. iv, 34), the works of the six days were done all at one time; wherefore according to + him man's soul, which he holds to have been made with the angels, was not made before the sixth day; but on the sixth day + both the soul of the first man was made actually, and his body in its causal elements. But other doctors hold that on the + sixth day both body and soul of man were actually made. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q91_A4-p14"></p> + <p id="FP_Q91_A4-p15"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q91_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q92.html"></a> + </div> + <a href="summa.FP_Q90_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q91_A1.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q92" class="div3"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q91_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q92_A1.html"></a> + <h3 id="FP_Q92-p0.1">THE PRODUCTION OF THE WOMAN (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3> + <p id="FP_Q92-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q92-p2"> We must next consider the production of the woman. Under this head there are four points of inquiry:</p> + <p id="FP_Q92-p3"> (1) Whether the woman should have been made in that first production of things?</p> + <p id="FP_Q92-p4"> (2) Whether the woman should have been made from man?</p> + <p id="FP_Q92-p5"> (3) Whether of man's rib?</p> + <p id="FP_Q92-p6"> (4) Whether the woman was made immediately by God?</p> + <div id="FP_Q92_A1" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q92.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q92_A2.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q92_A1-p0.1">Whether the woman should have been made in the first production of things?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q92_A1-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q92_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the woman should not have been made in the first production of things. For the Philosopher says (De Gener. + ii, 3), that "the female is a misbegotten male." But nothing misbegotten or defective should have been in the first production + of things. Therefore woman should not have been made at that first production. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q92_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, subjection and limitation were a result of sin, for to the woman was it said after sin ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q92_A1-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.3.16" target="asv">Gn. 3:16</a>): "Thou shalt be under the man's power"; and Gregory says that, "Where there is no sin, there is no inequality." But woman + is naturally of less strength and dignity than man; "for the agent is always more honorable than the patient," as Augustine + says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 16). Therefore woman should not have been made in the first + production of things before sin. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q92_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, occasions of sin should be cut off. But God foresaw that the woman would be an occasion of sin to man. Therefore + He should not have made woman. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q92_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q92_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.2.18" target="asv">Gn. 2:18</a>): "It is not good for man to be alone; let us make him a helper like to himself." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q92_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> It was necessary for woman to be made, as the Scripture says, as a "helper" to man; not, indeed, as a helpmate in other works, + as some say, since man can be more efficiently helped by another man in other works; but as a helper in the work of generation. + This can be made clear if we observe the mode of generation carried out in various living things. Some living things do not + possess in themselves the power of generation, but are generated by some other + specific agent, such as some plants and animals by the influence of the heavenly bodies, from some fitting matter and not + from seed: others possess the active and passive generative power together; as we see in plants which are generated from seed; + for the noblest vital function in plants is generation. Wherefore we observe that in these the active power of generation + invariably accompanies the passive power. Among perfect animals the active power of generation belongs to the male sex, and + the + passive power to the female. And as among animals there is a vital operation nobler than generation, to which their life is + principally directed; therefore the male sex is not found in continual union with the female in perfect animals, but only + at the time of coition; so that we may consider that by this means the male and female are one, as in plants they are always + united; although in some cases one of them preponderates, and in some the other. But man is yet further ordered to a still + nobler vital action, and that is intellectual operation. Therefore there was greater reason for the distinction of these two + forces in man; so that the female should be produced separately from the male; although they are carnally united for generation. + Therefore directly after the formation of woman, it was said: "And they shall be two in one flesh" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q92_A1-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.2.24" target="asv">Gn. 2:24</a>). + </p> + <p id="FP_Q92_A1-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As regards the individual nature, woman is defective and misbegotten, for the active force in the male seed tends to the + production of a perfect likeness in the masculine sex; while the production of woman comes from defect in the active force + or from some material indisposition, or even from some external influence; such as that of a south wind, which is moist, as + the Philosopher observes (De Gener. Animal. iv, 2). On the other hand, as regards human + nature in general, woman is not misbegotten, but is included in nature's intention as directed to the work of generation. + Now the general intention of nature depends on God, Who is the universal Author of nature. Therefore, in producing nature, + God formed not only the male but also the female. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q92_A1-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Subjection is twofold. One is servile, by virtue of which a superior makes use of a subject for his own benefit; and this + kind of subjection began after sin. There is another kind of subjection which is called economic or civil, whereby the superior + makes use of his subjects for their own benefit and good; and this kind of subjection existed even before sin. For good order + would have been wanting in the human family if some were not governed by others + wiser than themselves. So by such a kind of subjection woman is naturally subject to man, because in man the discretion of + reason predominates. Nor is inequality among men excluded by the state of innocence, as we shall prove ( + <a id="FP_Q92_A1-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q96_A3.html">Q[96], A[3]</a>). + </p> + <p id="FP_Q92_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> If God had deprived the world of all those things which proved an occasion of sin, the universe would have been imperfect. + Nor was it fitting for the common good to be destroyed in order that individual evil might be avoided; especially as God is + so powerful that He can direct any evil to a good end. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q92_A1-p10"></p> + <p id="FP_Q92_A1-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q92.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q92_A2.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q92_A2" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q92_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q92_A3.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q92_A2-p0.1">Whether woman should have been made from man?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q92_A2-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q92_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that woman should not have been made from man. For sex belongs both to man and animals. But in the other animals + the female was not made from the male. Therefore neither should it have been so with man. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q92_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, things of the same species are of the same matter. But male and female are of the same species. Therefore, as man + was made of the slime of the earth, so woman should have been made of the same, and not from man. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q92_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, woman was made to be a helpmate to man in the work of generation. But close relationship makes a person unfit for + that office; hence near relations are debarred from intermarriage, as is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q92_A2-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Lev.18.6" target="asv">Lev. 18:6</a>). Therefore woman should not have been made from man. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q92_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q92_A2-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.17.5" target="asv">Ecclus. 17:5</a>): "He created of him," that is, out of man, "a helpmate like to himself," that is, woman. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q92_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> When all things were first formed, it was more suitable for the woman to be made from man that (for the female to be from + the male) in other animals. First, in order thus to give the first man a certain dignity consisting in this, that as God is + the principle of the whole universe, so the first man, in likeness to God, was the principle of the whole human race. Wherefore + Paul says that "God made the whole human race from one" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q92_A2-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Acts.17.26" target="asv">Acts + 17:26 + </a>). Secondly, that man might love woman all the more, and cleave to her more closely, knowing her to be fashioned from himself. + Hence it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q92_A2-p6.2" href="./asv.html#Gen.2.23" target="asv">Gn. 2:23,24</a>): "She was taken out of man, wherefore a man shall leave father and mother, and shall cleave to his wife." This was most + necessary as regards the human race, in which the male and female live together for life; which is not the case with other + animals. Thirdly, because, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. + viii, 12), the human male and female are united, not only for generation, as with other animals, but also for the purpose + of domestic life, in which each has his or her particular duty, and in which the man is the head of the woman. Wherefore it + was suitable for the woman to be made out of man, as out of her principle. Fourthly, there is a sacramental reason for this. + For by this is signified that the Church takes her origin from Christ. Wherefore the Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q92_A2-p6.3" href="./asv.html#Eph.5.32" target="asv">Eph. + 5:32 + </a>): "This is a great sacrament; but I speak in Christ and in the Church." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q92_A2-p7"> Reply OBJ 1 is clear from the foregoing.</p> + <p id="FP_Q92_A2-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Matter is that from which something is made. Now created nature has a determinate principle; and since it is determined to + one thing, it has also a determinate mode of proceeding. Wherefore from determinate matter it produces something in a determinate + species. On the other hand, the Divine Power, being infinite, can produce things of the same species out of any matter, such + as a man from the slime of the earth, and a woman from out of man. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q92_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> A certain affinity arises from natural generation, and this is an impediment to matrimony. Woman, however, was not produced + from man by natural generation, but by the Divine Power alone. Wherefore Eve is not called the daughter of Adam; and so this + argument does not prove. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q92_A2-p10"></p> + <p id="FP_Q92_A2-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q92_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q92_A3.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q92_A3" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q92_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q92_A4.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q92_A3-p0.1">Whether the woman was fittingly made from the rib of man?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q92_A3-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q92_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the woman should not have been formed from the rib of man. For the rib was much smaller than the woman's + body. Now from a smaller thing a larger thing can be made only---either by addition (and then the woman ought to have been + described as made out of that which was added, rather than out of the rib itself)---or by rarefaction, because, as Augustine + says (Gen. ad lit. x): "A body cannot increase in bulk except by rarefaction." But the + woman's body is not more rarefied than man's---at least, not in the proportion of a rib to Eve's body. Therefore Eve was not + formed from a rib of Adam. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q92_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, in those things which were first created there was nothing superfluous. Therefore a rib of Adam belonged to the + integrity of his body. So, if a rib was removed, his body remained imperfect; which is unreasonable to suppose. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q92_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, a rib cannot be removed from man without pain. But there was no pain before sin. Therefore it was not right for + a rib to be taken from the man, that Eve might be made from it. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q92_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q92_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.2.22" target="asv">Gn. 2:22</a>): "God built the rib, which He took from Adam, into a woman." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q92_A3-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> It was right for the woman to be made from a rib of man. First, to signify the social union of man and woman, for the woman + should neither "use authority over man," and so she was not made from his head; nor was it right for her to be subject to + man's contempt as his slave, and so she was not made from his feet. Secondly, for the sacramental signification; for from + the side of Christ sleeping on the Cross the Sacraments flowed---namely, blood and water---on + which the Church was established. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q92_A3-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Some say that the woman's body was formed by a material increase, without anything being added; in the same way as our Lord + multiplied the five loaves. But this is quite impossible. For such an increase of matter would either be by a change of the + very substance of the matter itself, or by a change of its dimensions. Not by change of the substance of the matter, both + because matter, considered in itself, is quite unchangeable, since it has a potential + existence, and has nothing but the nature of a subject, and because quantity and size are extraneous to the essence of matter + itself. Wherefore multiplication of matter is quite unintelligible, as long as the matter itself remains the same without + anything added to it; unless it receives greater dimensions. This implies rarefaction, which is for the same matter to receive + greater dimensions, as the Philosopher says (Phys. iv). To say, therefore, that the same matter is enlarged, without being + rarefied, is to combine contradictories ---viz. the definition with the absence of the thing defined. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q92_A3-p8"> Wherefore, as no rarefaction is apparent in such multiplication of matter, we must admit an addition of matter: either by + creation, or which is more probable, by conversion. Hence Augustine says (Tract. xxiv in Joan.) that "Christ filled five thousand + men with five loaves, in the same way as from a few seeds He produces the harvest of corn"---that is, by transformation of + the nourishment. Nevertheless, we say that the crowds were fed with five loaves, or that woman was made from + the rib, because an addition was made to the already existing matter of the loaves and of the rib. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q92_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The rib belonged to the integral perfection of Adam, not as an individual, but as the principle of the human race; just as + the semen belongs to the perfection of the begetter, and is released by a natural and pleasurable operation. Much more, therefore, + was it possible that by the Divine power the body of the woman should be produced from the man's rib. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q92_A3-p10"> From this it is clear how to answer the third objection.</p> + <p id="FP_Q92_A3-p11"></p> + <p id="FP_Q92_A3-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q92_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q92_A4.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q92_A4" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q92_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q93.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q92_A4-p0.1">Whether the woman was formed immediately by God?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q92_A4-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q92_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the woman was not formed immediately by God. For no individual is produced immediately by God from another + individual alike in species. But the woman was made from a man who is of the same species. Therefore she was not made immediately + by God. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q92_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Augustine (De Trin. iii, 4) says that corporeal things are governed by God through the angels. But the woman's body + was formed from corporeal matter. Therefore it was made through the ministry of the angels, and not immediately by God. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q92_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, those things which pre-exist in creatures as to their causal virtues are produced by the power of some creature, + and not immediately by God. But the woman's body was produced in its causal virtues among the first created works, as Augustine + says (Gen. ad lit. ix, 15). Therefore it was not produced immediately by God. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q92_A4-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says, in the same work: "God alone, to Whom all nature owes its existence, could form or build up the woman from + the man's rib." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q92_A4-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As was said above (A[2], ad 2), the natural generation of every species is from some determinate matter. Now the matter whence + man is naturally begotten is the human semen of man or woman. Wherefore from any other matter an individual of the human species + cannot naturally be generated. Now God alone, the Author of nature, can produce an effect into existence outside the ordinary + course of nature. Therefore God alone could produce either a man from the slime + of the earth, or a woman from the rib of man. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q92_A4-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This argument is verified when an individual is begotten, by natural generation, from that which is like it in the same species. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q92_A4-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. ix, 15), we do not know whether the angels were employed by God in the formation of the woman; + but it is certain that, as the body of man was not formed by the angels from the slime of the earth, so neither was the body + of the woman formed by them from the man's rib. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q92_A4-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. ix, 18): "The first creation of things did not demand that woman should be made thus; it + made it possible for her to be thus made." Therefore the body of the woman did indeed pre-exist in these causal virtues, in + the things first created; not as regards active potentiality, but as regards a potentiality passive in relation to the active + potentiality of the Creator. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q92_A4-p10"></p> + <p id="FP_Q92_A4-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q92_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q93.html"></a> + </div> + <a href="summa.FP_Q91_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q92_A1.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q93" class="div3"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q92_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q93_A1.html"></a> + <h3 id="FP_Q93-p0.1">THE END OR TERM OF THE PRODUCTION OF MAN (NINE ARTICLES)</h3> + <p id="FP_Q93-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q93-p2"> We now treat of the end or term of man's production, inasmuch as he is said to be made "to the image and likeness of God." + There are under this head nine points of inquiry: + </p> + <p id="FP_Q93-p3"> (1) Whether the image of God is in man?</p> + <p id="FP_Q93-p4"> (2) Whether the image of God is in irrational creatures?</p> + <p id="FP_Q93-p5"> (3) Whether the image of God is in the angels more than in man?</p> + <p id="FP_Q93-p6"> (4) Whether the image of God is in every man?</p> + <p id="FP_Q93-p7"> (5) Whether the image of God is in man by comparison with the Essence, or with all the Divine Persons, or with one of them?</p> + <p id="FP_Q93-p8"> (6) Whether the image of God is in man, as to his mind only?</p> + <p id="FP_Q93-p9"> (7) Whether the image of God is in man's power or in his habits and acts?</p> + <p id="FP_Q93-p10"> (8) Whether the image of God is in man by comparison with every object?</p> + <p id="FP_Q93-p11"> (9) Of the difference between "image" and "likeness."</p> + <div id="FP_Q93_A1" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q93.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q93_A2.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q93_A1-p0.1">Whether the image of God is in man?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q93_A1-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q93_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the image of God is not in man. For it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q93_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.40.18" target="asv">Is. 40:18</a>): "To whom have you likened God? or what image will you make for Him?" + </p> + <p id="FP_Q93_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, to be the image of God is the property of the First-Begotten, of Whom the Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q93_A1-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Col.1.15" target="asv">Col. 1:15</a>): "Who is the image of the invisible God, the First-Born of every creature." Therefore the image of God is not to be found + in man. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q93_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Hilary says (De Synod [*Super i can. Synod. Ancyr.]) that "an image is of the same species as that which it represents"; + and he also says that "an image is the undivided and united likeness of one thing adequately representing another." But there + is no species common to both God and man; nor can there be a comparison of equality between God and man. Therefore there can + be no image of God in man. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q93_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q93_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.1.26" target="asv">Gn. 1:26</a>): "Let Us make man to Our own image and likeness." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q93_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 74): "Where an image exists, there forthwith is likeness; but where there is likeness, there + is not necessarily an image." Hence it is clear that likeness is essential to an image; and that an image adds something to + likeness---namely, that it is copied from something else. For an "image" is so called because it is produced as an imitation + of something else; wherefore, for instance, an egg, however much like and equal to + another egg, is not called an image of the other egg, because it is not copied from it. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q93_A1-p7"> But equality does not belong to the essence of an image; for as Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 74): "Where there is an image + there is not necessarily equality," as we see in a person's image reflected in a glass. Yet this is of the essence of a perfect + image; for in a perfect image nothing is wanting that is to be found in that of which it is a copy. Now it is manifest that + in man there is some likeness to God, copied from God as from an exemplar; yet this likeness is not one of + equality, for such an exemplar infinitely excels its copy. Therefore there is in man a likeness to God; not, indeed, a perfect + likeness, but imperfect. And Scripture implies the same when it says that man was made "to" God's likeness; for the preposition + "to" signifies a certain approach, as of something at a distance. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q93_A1-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The Prophet speaks of bodily images made by man. Therefore he says pointedly: "What image will you make for Him?" But God + made a spiritual image to Himself in man. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q93_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The First-Born of creatures is the perfect Image of God, reflecting perfectly that of which He is the Image, and so He is + said to be the "Image," and never "to the image." But man is said to be both "image" by reason of the likeness; and "to the + image" by reason of the imperfect likeness. And since the perfect likeness to God cannot be except in an identical nature, + the Image of God exists in His first-born Son; as the image of the king is in his son, + who is of the same nature as himself: whereas it exists in man as in an alien nature, as the image of the king is in a silver + coin, as Augustine says explains in De decem Chordis (Serm. ix, al, xcvi, De Tempore). + </p> + <p id="FP_Q93_A1-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As unity means absence of division, a species is said to be the same as far as it is one. Now a thing is said to be one not + only numerically, specifically, or generically, but also according to a certain analogy or proportion. In this sense a creature + is one with God, or like to Him; but when Hilary says "of a thing which adequately represents another," this is to be understood + of a perfect image. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q93_A1-p11"></p> + <p id="FP_Q93_A1-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q93.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q93_A2.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q93_A2" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q93_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q93_A3.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q93_A2-p0.1">Whether the image of God is to be found in irrational creatures?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q93_A2-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q93_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the image of God is to be found in irrational creatures. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. ii): "Effects are + contingent images of their causes." But God is the cause not only of rational, but also of irrational creatures. Therefore + the image of God is to be found in irrational creatures. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q93_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the more distinct a likeness is, the nearer it approaches to the nature of an image. But Dionysius says (Div. Nom. + iv) that "the solar ray has a very great similitude to the Divine goodness." Therefore it is made to the image of God. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q93_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the more perfect anything is in goodness, the more it is like God. But the whole universe is more perfect in goodness + than man; for though each individual thing is good, all things together are called "very good" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q93_A2-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.1.31" target="asv">Gn. 1:31</a>). Therefore the whole universe is to the image of God, and not only man. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q93_A2-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, Boethius (De Consol. iii) says of God: "Holding the world in His mind, and forming it into His image." Therefore + the whole world is to the image of God, and not only the rational creature. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q93_A2-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. vi, 12): "Man's excellence consists in the fact that God made him to His own image by giving + him an intellectual soul, which raises him above the beasts of the field." Therefore things without intellect are not made + to God's image. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q93_A2-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Not every likeness, not even what is copied from something else, is sufficient to make an image; for if the likeness be only + generic, or existing by virtue of some common accident, this does not suffice for one thing to be the image of another. For + instance, a worm, though from man it may originate, cannot be called man's image, merely because of the generic likeness. + Nor, if anything is made white like something else, can we say that it is the image of that + thing; for whiteness is an accident belonging to many species. But the nature of an image requires likeness in species; thus + the image of the king exists in his son: or, at least, in some specific accident, and chiefly in the shape; thus, we speak + of a man's image in copper. Whence Hilary says pointedly that "an image is of the same species." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q93_A2-p8"> Now it is manifest that specific likeness follows the ultimate difference. But some things are like to God first and most + commonly because they exist; secondly, because they live; and thirdly because they know or understand; and these last, as + Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 51) "approach so near to God in likeness, that among all creatures nothing comes nearer to Him." + It is clear, therefore, that intellectual creatures alone, properly speaking, are made to God's image. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q93_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Everything imperfect is a participation of what is perfect. Therefore even what falls short of the nature of an image, so + far as it possesses any sort of likeness to God, participates in some degree the nature of an image. So Dionysius says that + effects are "contingent images of their causes"; that is, as much as they happen [contingit] to be so, but not absolutely. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q93_A2-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Dionysius compares the solar ray to Divine goodness, as regards its causality; not as regards its natural dignity which is + involved in the idea of an image. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q93_A2-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The universe is more perfect in goodness than the intellectual creature as regards extension and diffusion; but intensively + and collectively the likeness to the Divine goodness is found rather in the intellectual creature, which has a capacity for + the highest good. Or else we may say that a part is not rightly divided against the whole, but only against another part. + Wherefore, when we say that the intellectual nature alone is to the image of God, we + do not mean that the universe in any part is not to God's image, but that the other parts are excluded. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q93_A2-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Boethius here uses the word "image" to express the likeness which the product of an art bears to the artistic species in + the mind of the artist. Thus every creature is an image of the exemplar type thereof in the Divine mind. We are not, however, + using the word "image" in this sense; but as it implies a likeness in nature, that is, inasmuch as all things, as being, are + like to the First Being; as living, like to the First Life; and as intelligent, + like to the Supreme Wisdom. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q93_A2-p13"></p> + <p id="FP_Q93_A2-p14"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q93_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q93_A3.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q93_A3" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q93_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q93_A4.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q93_A3-p0.1">Whether the angels are more to the image of God than man is?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q93_A3-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q93_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the angels are not more to the image of God than man is. For Augustine says in a sermon de Imagine xliii + (de verbis Apost. xxvii) that God granted to no other creature besides man to be to His image. Therefore it is not true to + say that the angels are more than man to the image of God. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q93_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, according to Augustine (QQ. 83, qu. 51), "man is so much to God's image that God did not make any creature to be + between Him and man: and therefore nothing is more akin to Him." But a creature is called God's image so far as it is akin + to God. Therefore the angels are not more to the image of God than man. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q93_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, a creature is said to be to God's image so far as it is of an intellectual nature. But the intellectual nature does + not admit of intensity or remissness; for it is not an accidental thing, since it is a substance. Therefore the angels are + not more to the image of God than man. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q93_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Gregory says (Hom. in Evang. xxxiv): "The angel is called a "seal of resemblance" [ + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q93_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Ezek.28.12" target="asv">Ezech. 28:12</a>] because in him the resemblance of the Divine image is wrought with greater expression." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q93_A3-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> We may speak of God's image in two ways. First, we may consider in it that in which the image chiefly consists, that is, + the intellectual nature. Thus the image of God is more perfect in the angels than in man, because their intellectual nature + is more perfect, as is clear from what has been said ( + <a id="FP_Q93_A3-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q58_A3.html">Q[58], A[3]</a>; + <a id="FP_Q93_A3-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q79_A8.html">Q[79], A[8]</a>). Secondly, we may consider the image of God in man as regards its accidental qualities, + so far as to observe in man a certain imitation of God, consisting in the fact that man proceeds from man, as God from God; + and also in the fact that the whole human soul is in the whole body, as God from God; and also in the fact that the whole + human soul is in the whole body, and again, in every part, as God is in regard to the whole world. In these and the like things + the image of God is more perfect in man than it is in the angels. But these do not of themselves belong to the nature of the + Divine image in man, unless we presuppose the first likeness, which is in the intellectual nature; otherwise even brute animals + would be to God's image. Therefore, as in their intellectual nature, the angels are more to the image of God than man is, + we must grant that, absolutely speaking, the angels are more to the image of God than man is, but that in some respects man + is more like to God. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q93_A3-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Augustine excludes the inferior creatures bereft of reason from the image of God; but not the angels. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q93_A3-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As fire is said to be specifically the most subtle of bodies, while, nevertheless, one kind of fire is more subtle than another; + so we say that nothing is more like to God than the human soul in its generic and intellectual nature, because as Augustine + had said previously, "things which have knowledge, are so near to Him in likeness that of all creatures none are nearer." + Wherefore this does not mean that the angels are not more to God's image. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q93_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> When we say that substance does not admit of more or less, we do not mean that one species of substance is not more perfect + than another; but that one and the same individual does not participate in its specific nature at one time more than at another; + nor do we mean that a species of substance is shared among different individuals in a greater or lesser degree. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q93_A3-p10"></p> + <p id="FP_Q93_A3-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q93_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q93_A4.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q93_A4" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q93_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q93_A5.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q93_A4-p0.1">Whether the image of God is found in every man?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q93_A4-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q93_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the image of God is not found in every man. For the Apostle says that "man is the image of God, but woman + is the image [Vulg. glory] of man" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q93_A4-p2.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.11.7" target="asv">1 Cor. 11:7</a>). Therefore, as woman is an individual of the human species, it is clear that every individual is not an image of God. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q93_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q93_A4-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.8.29" target="asv">Rom. 8:29</a>): "Whom God foreknew, He also predestined to be made conformable to the image of His Son." But all men are not predestined. + Therefore all men have not the conformity of image. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q93_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, likeness belongs to the nature of the image, as above explained + <a id="FP_Q93_A4-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q93_A1.html">(A[1])</a>. But by sin man becomes unlike God. Therefore he loses the image of God. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q93_A4-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q93_A4-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.38.7" target="asv">Ps. 38:7</a>): "Surely man passeth as an image." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q93_A4-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Since man is said to be the image of God by reason of his intellectual nature, he is the most perfectly like God according + to that in which he can best imitate God in his intellectual nature. Now the intellectual nature imitates God chiefly in this, + that God understands and loves Himself. Wherefore we see that the image of God is in man in three ways. First, inasmuch as + man possesses a natural aptitude for understanding and loving God; and this aptitude + consists in the very nature of the mind, which is common to all men. Secondly, inasmuch as man actually and habitually knows + and loves God, though imperfectly; and this image consists in the conformity of grace. Thirdly, inasmuch as man knows and + loves God perfectly; and this image consists in the likeness of glory. Wherefore on the words, "The light of Thy countenance, + O Lord, is signed upon us" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q93_A4-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.4.7" target="asv">Ps. 4:7</a>), the gloss distinguishes a threefold image of "creation," of + "re-creation," and of "likeness." The first is found in all men, the second only in the just, the third only in the blessed. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q93_A4-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The image of God, in its principal signification, namely the intellectual nature, is found both in man and in woman. Hence + after the words, "To the image of God He created him," it is added, "Male and female He created them" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q93_A4-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.1.27" target="asv">Gn. 1:27</a>). Moreover it is said "them" in the plural, as Augustine (Gen. ad lit. iii, 22) remarks, lest it should be thought that both + sexes were united in one individual. But in a secondary sense the image of + God is found in man, and not in woman: for man is the beginning and end of woman; as God is the beginning and end of every + creature. So when the Apostle had said that "man is the image and glory of God, but woman is the glory of man," he adds his + reason for saying this: "For man is not of woman, but woman of man; and man was not created for woman, but woman for man." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q93_A4-p8"> Reply OBJ 2 and 3: These reasons refer to the image consisting in the conformity of grace and glory.</p> + <p id="FP_Q93_A4-p9"></p> + <p id="FP_Q93_A4-p10"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q93_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q93_A5.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q93_A5" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q93_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q93_A6.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q93_A5-p0.1">Whether the image of God is in man according to the Trinity of Persons?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q93_A5-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q93_A5-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the image of God does not exist in man as to the Trinity of Persons. For Augustine says (Fulgentius De + Fide ad Petrum i): "One in essence is the Godhead of the Holy Trinity; and one is the image to which man was made." And Hilary + (De Trin. v) says: "Man is made to the image of that which is common in the Trinity." Therefore the image of God in man is + of the Divine Essence, and not of the Trinity of Persons. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q93_A5-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it is said (De Eccl. Dogmat.) that the image of God in man is to be referred to eternity. Damascene also says (De + Fide Orth. ii, 12) that the image of God in man belongs to him as "an intelligent being endowed with free-will and self-movement." + Gregory of Nyssa (De Homin. Opificio xvi) also asserts that, when Scripture says that "man was made to the image of God, it + means that human nature was made a participator of all good: for the Godhead is the + fulness of goodness." Now all these things belong more to the unity of the Essence than to the distinction of the Persons. + Therefore the image of God in man regards, not the Trinity of Persons, but the unity of the Essence. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q93_A5-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, an image leads to the knowledge of that of which it is the image. Therefore, if there is in man the image of God + as to the Trinity of Persons; since man can know himself by his natural reason, it follows that by his natural knowledge man + could know the Trinity of the Divine Persons; which is untrue, as was shown above ( + <a id="FP_Q93_A5-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q32_A1.html">Q[32], A[1]</a>). + </p> + <p id="FP_Q93_A5-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, the name of Image is not applicable to any of the Three Persons, but only to the Son; for Augustine says (De Trin. + vi, 2) that "the Son alone is the image of the Father." Therefore, if in man there were an image of God as regards the Person, + this would not be an image of the Trinity, but only of the Son. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q93_A5-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Hilary says (De Trin. iv): "The plurality of the Divine Persons is proved from the fact that man is said to have been made + to the image of God." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q93_A5-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> as we have seen ( + <a id="FP_Q93_A5-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q40_A2.html">Q[40], A[2]</a>), the distinction of the Divine Persons is only according to origin, or, rather, relations of origin. Now the mode of origin + is not the same in all things, but in each thing is adapted to the nature thereof; animated things being produced in one way, + and inanimate in another; animals in one way, and plants in another. Wherefore it is manifest that the distinction of the + Divine Persons is suitable to the + Divine Nature; and therefore to be to the image of God by imitation of the Divine Nature does not exclude being to the same + image by the representation of the Divine Persons: but rather one follows from the other. We must, therefore, say that in + man there exists the image of God, both as regards the Divine Nature and as regards the Trinity of Persons; for also in God + Himself there is one Nature in Three Persons. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q93_A5-p8"> Thus it is clear how to solve the first two objections.</p> + <p id="FP_Q93_A5-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This argument would avail if the image of God in man represented God in a perfect manner. But, as Augustine says (De Trin. + xv, 6), there is a great difference between the trinity within ourselves and the Divine Trinity. Therefore, as he there says: + "We see, rather than believe, the trinity which is in ourselves; whereas we believe rather than see that God is Trinity." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q93_A5-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Some have said that in man there is an image of the Son only. Augustine rejects this opinion (De Trin. xii, 5,6). First, + because as the Son is like to the Father by a likeness of essence, it would follow of necessity if man were made in likeness + to the Son, that he is made to the likeness of the Father. Secondly, because if man were made only to the image of the Son, + the Father would not have said, "Let Us make man to Our own image and likeness"; but + "to Thy image." When, therefore, it is written, "He made him to the image of God," the sense is not that the Father made man + to the image of the Son only, Who is God, as some explained it, but that the Divine Trinity made man to Its image, that is, + of the whole Trinity. When it is said that God "made man to His image," this can be understood in two ways: first, so that + this preposition "to" points to the term of the making, and then the sense is, "Let Us make man in such a way that Our image + may be in him." Secondly, this preposition 'to' may point to the exemplar cause, as when we say, "This book is made (like) + to that one." Thus the image of God is the very Essence of God, Which is incorrectly called an image forasmuch as image is + put for the exemplar. Or, as some say, the Divine Essence is called an image because thereby one Person imitates another. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q93_A5-p11"></p> + <p id="FP_Q93_A5-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q93_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q93_A6.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q93_A6" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q93_A5.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q93_A7.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q93_A6-p0.1">Whether the image of God is in man as regards the mind only?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q93_A6-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q93_A6-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the image of God is not only in man's mind. For the Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q93_A6-p2.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.11.7" target="asv">1 Cor. 11:7</a>) that "the man is the image . . . of God." But man is not only mind. Therefore the image of God is to be observed not only + in his mind. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q93_A6-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q93_A6-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.1.27" target="asv">Gn. 1:27</a>): "God created man to His own image; to the image of God He created him; male and female He created them." But the distinction + of male and female is in the body. Therefore the image of God is also in the body, and not only in the mind. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q93_A6-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, an image seems to apply principally to the shape of a thing. But shape belongs to the body. Therefore the image + of God is to be seen in man's body also, and not in his mind. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q93_A6-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, according to Augustine (Gen. ad lit. xii, 7,24) there is a threefold vision in us, "corporeal," "spiritual," or + imaginary, and "intellectual." Therefore, if in the intellectual vision that belongs to the mind there exists in us a trinity + by reason of which we are made to the image of God, for the like reason there must be another trinity in the others. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q93_A6-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q93_A6-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Eph.4.23" target="asv">Eph. 4:23,24</a>): "Be renewed in the spirit of your mind, and put on the new man." Whence we are given to understand that our renewal which + consists in putting on the new man, belongs to the mind. Now, he says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q93_A6-p6.2" href="./asv.html#Col.3.10" target="asv">Col. 3:10</a>): "Putting on the new" man; "him who is renewed unto knowledge" of God, "according to the image of Him that created him," + where the renewal which consists in putting on the new man + is ascribed to the image of God. Therefore to be to the image of God belongs to the mind only. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q93_A6-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> While in all creatures there is some kind of likeness to God, in the rational creature alone we find a likeness of "image" + as we have explained above ( + <a id="FP_Q93_A6-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q93_A1.html">AA[1]</a>,2); whereas in other creatures we find a likeness by way of a "trace." Now the intellect or mind is that whereby the rational + creature excels other creatures; wherefore this image of God is not found even in the rational creature except in the mind; + while in the other parts, + which the rational creature may happen to possess, we find the likeness of a "trace," as in other creatures to which, in reference + to such parts, the rational creature can be likened. We may easily understand the reason of this if we consider the way in + which a "trace," and the way in which an "image," represents anything. An "image" represents something by likeness in species, + as we have said; while a "trace" represents something by way of an effect, which represents the cause in such a way as + not to attain to the likeness of species. For imprints which are left by the movements of animals are called "traces": so + also ashes are a trace of fire, and desolation of the land a trace of a hostile army. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q93_A6-p8"> Therefore we may observe this difference between rational creatures and others, both as to the representation of the likeness + of the Divine Nature in creatures, and as to the representation in them of the uncreated Trinity. For as to the likeness of + the Divine Nature, rational creatures seem to attain, after a fashion, to the representation of the species, inasmuch as they + imitate God, not only in being and life, but also in intelligence, as above explained + <a id="FP_Q93_A6-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q93_A2.html">(A[2])</a>; whereas other creatures do not understand, although we observe in them a certain trace of the Intellect that created them, + if we consider their disposition. Likewise as the uncreated Trinity is distinguished by the procession of the Word from the + Speaker, and of Love from both of these, as we have seen ( + <a id="FP_Q93_A6-p8.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q28_A3.html">Q[28], A[3]</a>); so we may say that in rational creatures wherein we find a procession of the word in the intellect, and a procession of + the + love in the will, there exists an image of the uncreated Trinity, by a certain representation of the species. In other creatures, + however, we do not find the principle of the word, and the word and love; but we do see in them a certain trace of the existence + of these in the Cause that produced them. For in the fact that a creature has a modified and finite nature, proves that it + proceeds from a principle; while its species points to the (mental) word of the maker, just as the shape of a house + points to the idea of the architect; and order points to the maker's love by reason of which he directs the effect to a good + end; as also the use of the house points to the will of the architect. So we find in man a likeness to God by way of an "image" + in his mind; but in the other parts of his being by way of a "trace." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q93_A6-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Man is called to the image of God; not that he is essentially an image; but that the image of God is impressed on his mind; + as a coin is an image of the king, as having the image of the king. Wherefore there is no need to consider the image of God + as existing in every part of man. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q93_A6-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 5), some have thought that the image of God was not in man individually, but severally. + They held that "the man represents the Person of the Father; those born of man denote the person of the Son; and that the + woman is a third person in likeness to the Holy Ghost, since she so proceeded from man as not to be his son or daughter." + All of this is manifestly absurd; first, because it would follow that the Holy Ghost is + the principle of the Son, as the woman is the principle of the man's offspring; secondly, because one man would be only the + image of one Person; thirdly, because in that case Scripture should not have mentioned the image of God in man until after + the birth of the offspring. Therefore we must understand that when Scripture had said, "to the image of God He created him," + it added, "male and female He created them," not to imply that the image of God came through the distinction of sex, but that + the image of God belongs to both sexes, since it is in the mind, wherein there is no sexual distinction of sex, but that the + image of God belongs to both sexes, since it is in the mind, wherein there is no sexual distinction. Wherefore the Apostle + ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q93_A6-p10.1" href="./asv.html#Col.3.10" target="asv">Col. 3:10</a>), after saying, "According to the image of Him that created him," added, "Where there is neither male nor female" [*these + words are in reality from + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q93_A6-p10.2" href="./asv.html#Gal.3.28" target="asv"> Gal. 3:28</a>] (Vulg. "neither Gentile nor Jew"). + </p> + <p id="FP_Q93_A6-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Although the image of God in man is not to be found in his bodily shape, yet because "the body of man alone among terrestrial + animals is not inclined prone to the ground, but is adapted to look upward to heaven, for this reason we may rightly say that + it is made to God's image and likeness, rather than the bodies of other animals," as Augustine remarks (QQ. 83, qu. 51). But + this is not to be understood as though the image of God were in man's body; + but in the sense that the very shape of the human body represents the image of God in the soul by way of a trace. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q93_A6-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Both in the corporeal and in the imaginary vision we may find a trinity, as Augustine says (De Trin. xi, 2). For in corporeal + vision there is first the species of the exterior body; secondly, the act of vision, which occurs by the impression on the + sight of a certain likeness of the said species; thirdly, the intention of the will applying the sight to see, and to rest + on what is seen. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q93_A6-p13"> Likewise, in the imaginary vision we find first the species kept in the memory; secondly, the vision itself, which is caused + by the penetrative power of the soul, that is, the faculty of imagination, informed by the species; and thirdly, we find the + intention of the will joining both together. But each of these trinities falls short of the Divine image. For the species + of the external body is extrinsic to the essence of the soul; while the species in the memory, though not + extrinsic to the soul, is adventitious to it; and thus in both cases the species falls short of representing the connaturality + and co-eternity of the Divine Persons. The corporeal vision, too, does not proceed only from the species of the external body, + but from this, and at the same time from the sense of the seer; in like manner imaginary vision is not from the species only + which is preserved in the memory, but also from the imagination. For these reasons the procession of the Son from the + Father alone is not suitably represented. Lastly the intention of the will joining the two together, does not proceed from + them either in corporeal or spiritual vision. Wherefore the procession of the Holy Ghost from the Father and the Son is not + thus properly represented. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q93_A6-p14"></p> + <p id="FP_Q93_A6-p15"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q93_A5.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q93_A7.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q93_A7" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q93_A6.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q93_A8.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q93_A7-p0.1">Whether the image of God is to be found in the acts of the soul?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q93_A7-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q93_A7-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the image of God is not found in the acts of the soul. For Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xi, 26), that "man + was made to God's image, inasmuch as we exist and know that we exist, and love this existence and knowledge." But to exist + does not signify an act. Therefore the image of God is not to be found in the soul's acts. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q93_A7-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Augustine (De Trin. ix, 4) assigns God's image in the soul to these three things---mind, knowledge, and love. But + mind does not signify an act, but rather the power or the essence of the intellectual soul. Therefore the image of God does + not extend to the acts of the soul. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q93_A7-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Augustine (De Trin. x, 11) assigns the image of the Trinity in the soul to "memory, understanding, and will." But + these three are "natural powers of the soul," as the Master of the Sentences says (1 Sent. D iii). Therefore the image of + God is in the powers, and does not extend to the acts of the soul. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q93_A7-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, the image of the Trinity always remains in the soul. But an act does not always remain. Therefore the image of God + does not extend to the acts. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q93_A7-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine (De Trin. xi, 2 seqq.) assigns the trinity in the lower part of the soul, in relation to the actual vision, whether + sensible or imaginative. Therefore, also, the trinity in the mind, by reason of which man is like to God's image, must be + referred to actual vision. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q93_A7-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As above explained + <a id="FP_Q93_A7-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q93_A2.html">(A[2])</a>, a certain representation of the species belongs to the nature of an image. Hence, if the image of the Divine Trinity is + to be found in the soul, we must look for it where the soul approaches the nearest to a representation of the species of the + Divine Persons. Now the Divine Persons are distinct from each other by reason of the procession of the Word from the Speaker, + and the procession of Love connecting + Both. But in our soul word "cannot exist without actual thought," as Augustine says (De Trin. xiv, 7). Therefore, first and + chiefly, the image of the Trinity is to be found in the acts of the soul, that is, inasmuch as from the knowledge which we + possess, by actual thought we form an internal word; and thence break forth into love. But, since the principles of acts are + the habits and powers, and everything exists virtually in its principle, therefore, secondarily and consequently, the image + of + the Trinity may be considered as existing in the powers, and still more in the habits, forasmuch as the acts virtually exist + therein. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q93_A7-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Our being bears the image of God so far as if is proper to us, and excels that of the other animals, that is to say, in so + far as we are endowed with a mind. Therefore, this trinity is the same as that which Augustine mentions (De Trin. ix, 4), + and which consists in mind, knowledge, and love. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q93_A7-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Augustine observed this trinity, first, as existing in the mind. But because the mind, though it knows itself entirely in + a certain degree, yet also in a way does not know itself---namely, as being distinct from others (and thus also it searches + itself, as Augustine subsequently proves---De Trin. x, 3,4); therefore, as though knowledge were not in equal proportion to + mind, he takes three things in the soul which are proper to the mind, namely, memory, + understanding, and will; which everyone is conscious of possessing; and assigns the image of the Trinity pre-eminently to + these three, as though the first assignation were in part deficient. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q93_A7-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As Augustine proves (De Trin. xiv, 7), we may be said to understand, will, and to love certain things, both when we actually + consider them, and when we do not thing of them. When they are not under our actual consideration, they are objects of our + memory only, which, in his opinion, is nothing else than habitual retention of knowledge and love [*Cf. + <a id="FP_Q93_A7-p10.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q79_A7.html">Q[79], A[7]</a>, ad 1]. "But since," as he says, "a word cannot be there without + actual thought (for we think everything that we say, even if we speak with that interior word belonging to no nation's tongue), + this image chiefly consists in these three things, memory, understanding, and will. And by understanding I mean here that + whereby we understand with actual thought; and by will, love, or dilection I mean that which unites this child with its parent." + From which it is clear that he places the image of the Divine Trinity more in actual understanding and will, than in + these as existing in the habitual retention of the memory; although even thus the image of the Trinity exists in the soul + in a certain degree, as he says in the same place. Thus it is clear that memory, understanding, and will are not three powers + as stated in the Sentences. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q93_A7-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Someone might answer by referring to Augustine's statement (De Trin. xiv, 6), that "the mind ever remembers itself, ever + understands itself, ever loves itself"; which some take to mean that the soul ever actually understands, and loves itself. + But he excludes this interpretation by adding that "it does not always think of itself as actually distinct from other things." + Thus it is clear that the soul always understands and loves itself, not actually + but habitually; though we might say that by perceiving its own act, it understands itself whenever it understands anything. + But since it is not always actually understanding, as in the case of sleep, we must say that these acts, although not always + actually existing, yet ever exist in their principles, the habits and powers. Wherefore, Augustine says (De Trin. xiv, 4): + "If the rational soul is made to the image of God in the sense that it can make use of reason and intellect to understand + and + consider God, then the image of God was in the soul from the beginning of its existence." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q93_A7-p12"></p> + <p id="FP_Q93_A7-p13"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q93_A6.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q93_A8.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q93_A8" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q93_A7.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q93_A9.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q93_A8-p0.1">Whether the image of the Divine Trinity is in the soul only by comparison with God as its object?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q93_A8-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q93_A8-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the image of the Divine Trinity is in the soul not only by comparison with God as its object. For the + image of the Divine Trinity is to be found in the soul, as shown above + <a id="FP_Q93_A8-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q93_A7.html">(A[7])</a>, according as the word in us proceeds from the speaker; and love from both. But this is to be found in us as regards any + object. Therefore the image of the Divine Trinity is in our mind as regards any object. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q93_A8-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 4) that "when we seek trinity in the soul, we seek it in the whole of the soul, without + separating the process of reasoning in temporal matters from the consideration of things eternal." Therefore the image of + the Trinity is to be found in the soul, even as regards temporal objects. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q93_A8-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, it is by grace that we can know and love God. If, therefore, the image of the Trinity is found in the soul by reason + of the memory, understanding, and will or love of God, this image is not in man by nature but by grace, and thus is not common + to all. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q93_A8-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, the saints in heaven are most perfectly conformed to the image of God by the beatific vision; wherefore it is written + ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q93_A8-p5.1" href="./asv.html#iiCor.3.18" target="asv">2 Cor. 3:18</a>): "We . . . are transformed into the same image from glory to glory." But temporal things are known by the beatific vision. + Therefore the image of God exists in us even according to temporal things. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q93_A8-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Trin. xiv, 12): "The image of God exists in the mind, not because it has a remembrance of itself, loves + itself, and understands itself; but because it can also remember, understand, and love God by Whom it was made." Much less, + therefore, is the image of God in the soul, in respect of other objects. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q93_A8-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As above explained ( + <a id="FP_Q93_A8-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q93_A2.html">AA[2]</a>,7), image means a likeness which in some degree, however small, attains to a representation of the species. Wherefore we + need to seek in the image of the Divine Trinity in the soul some kind of representation of species of the Divine Persons, + so far as this is possible to a creature. Now the Divine Persons, as above stated ( + <a id="FP_Q93_A8-p7.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q93_A6.html">AA[6]</a>,7), are distinguished from each other according to the + procession of the word from the speaker, and the procession of love from both. Moreover the Word of God is born of God by + the knowledge of Himself; and Love proceeds from God according as He loves Himself. But it is clear that diversity of objects + diversifies the species of word and love; for in the human mind the species of a stone is specifically different from that + of a horse, which also the love regarding each of them is specifically different. Hence we refer the Divine image in man to + the + verbal concept born of the knowledge of God, and to the love derived therefrom. Thus the image of God is found in the soul + according as the soul turns to God, or possesses a nature that enables it to turn to God. Now the mind may turn towards an + object in two ways: directly and immediately, or indirectly and mediately; as, for instance, when anyone sees a man reflected + in a looking-glass he may be said to be turned towards that man. So Augustine says (De Trin. xiv, 8), the "the mind remembers + itself, understands itself, and loves itself. If we perceive this, we perceive a trinity, not, indeed, God, but, nevertheless, + rightly called the image of God." But this is due to the fact, not that the mind reflects on itself absolutely, but that thereby + it can furthermore turn to God, as appears from the authority quoted above (Arg. On the contrary). + </p> + <p id="FP_Q93_A8-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> For the notion of an image it is not enough that something proceed from another, but it is also necessary to observe what + proceeds and whence it proceeds; namely, that what is Word of God proceeds from knowledge of God. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q93_A8-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> In all the soul we may see a kind of trinity, not, however, as though besides the action of temporal things and the contemplation + of eternal things, "any third thing should be required to make up the trinity," as he adds in the same passage. But in that + part of the reason which is concerned with temporal things, "although a trinity may be found; yet the image of God is not + to be seen there," as he says farther on; forasmuch as this knowledge of + temporal things is adventitious to the soul. Moreover even the habits whereby temporal things are known are not always present; + but sometimes they are actually present, and sometimes present only in memory even after they begin to exist in the soul. + Such is clearly the case with faith, which comes to us temporally for this present life; while in the future life faith will + no longer exist, but only the remembrance of faith. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q93_A8-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The meritorious knowledge and love of God can be in us only by grace. Yet there is a certain natural knowledge and love as + seen above ( + <a id="FP_Q93_A8-p10.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q12_A12.html">Q[12], A[12]</a>; + <a id="FP_Q93_A8-p10.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q56_A3.html">Q[56], A[3]</a>; + <a id="FP_Q93_A8-p10.3" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q60_A5.html">Q[60], A[5]</a>). This, too, is natural that the mind, in order to understand God, can make use of reason, in which sense we have already + said that the image of God abides ever in the soul; "whether this image of God be + so obsolete," as it were clouded, "as almost to amount to nothing," as in those who have not the use of reason; "or obscured + and disfigured," as in sinners; or "clear and beautiful," as in the just; as Augustine says (De Trin. xiv, 6). + </p> + <p id="FP_Q93_A8-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> By the vision of glory temporal things will be seen in God Himself; and such a vision of things temporal will belong to the + image of God. This is what Augustine means (De Trin. xiv, 6), when he says that "in that nature to which the mind will blissfully + adhere, whatever it sees it will see as unchangeable"; for in the Uncreated Word are the types of all creatures. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q93_A8-p12"></p> + <p id="FP_Q93_A8-p13"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q93_A7.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q93_A9.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q93_A9" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q93_A8.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q94.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q93_A9-p0.1">Whether "likeness" is properly distinguished from "image"?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q93_A9-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q93_A9-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that "likeness" is not properly distinguished from "image." For "genus" is not properly distinguished from + "species." Now, "likeness" is to "image" as genus to species: because, "where there is image, forthwith there is likeness, + but not conversely" as Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 74). Therefore "likeness" is not properly to be distinguished from "image." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q93_A9-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the nature of the image consists not only in the representation of the Divine Persons, but also in the representation + of the Divine Essence, to which representation belong immortality and indivisibility. So it is not true to say that the "likeness + is in the essence because it is immortal and indivisible; whereas the image is in other things" (Sent. ii, D, xvi). + </p> + <p id="FP_Q93_A9-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the image of God in man is threefold---the image of nature, of grace, and of glory, as above explained + <a id="FP_Q93_A9-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q93_A4.html">(A[4])</a>. But innocence and righteousness belong to grace. Therefore it is incorrectly said (Sent. ii, D, xvi) "that the image is + taken from the memory, the understanding and the will, while the likeness is from innocence and righteousness." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q93_A9-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, knowledge of truth belongs to the intellect, and love of virtue to the will; which two things are parts of the image. + Therefore it is incorrect to say (Sent. ii, D, xvi) that "the image consists in the knowledge of truth, and the likeness in + the love of virtue." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q93_A9-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 51): "Some consider that these two were mentioned not without reason, namely "image" and "likeness," + since, if they meant the same, one would have sufficed." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q93_A9-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Likeness is a kind of unity, for oneness in quality causes likeness, as the Philosopher says (Metaph. v, Did. iv, 15). Now, + since "one" is a transcendental, it is both common to all, and adapted to each single thing, just as the good and the true. + Wherefore, as the good can be compared to each individual thing both as its preamble, and as subsequent to it, as signifying + some perfection in it, so also in the same way there exists a kind of comparison between + "likeness" and "image." For the good is a preamble to man, inasmuch as man is an individual good; and, again, the good is + subsequent to man, inasmuch as we may say of a certain man that he is good, by reason of his perfect virtue. In like manner, + likeness may be considered in the light of a preamble to image, inasmuch as it is something more general than image, as we + have said above + <a id="FP_Q93_A9-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q93_A1.html">(A[1])</a>: and, again, it may be considered as subsequent to image, inasmuch as it + signifies a certain perfection of image. For we say that an image is like or unlike what it represents, according as the representation + is perfect or imperfect. Thus likeness may be distinguished from image in two ways: first as its preamble and existing in + more things, and in this sense likeness regards things which are more common than the intellectual properties, wherein the + image is properly to be seen. In this sense it is stated (QQ. 83, qu. 51) that "the spirit" (namely, the mind) without + doubt was made to the image of God. "But the other parts of man," belonging to the soul's inferior faculties, or even to the + body, "are in the opinion of some made to God's likeness." In this sense he says (De Quant. Animae ii) that the likeness of + God is found in the soul's incorruptibility; for corruptible and incorruptible are differences of universal beings. But likeness + may be considered in another way, as signifying the expression and perfection of the image. In this sense Damascene says + (De Fide Orth. ii, 12) that the image implies "an intelligent being, endowed with free-will and self-movement, whereas likeness + implies a likeness of power, as far as this may be possible in man." In the same sense "likeness" is said to belong to "the + love of virtue": for there is no virtue without love of virtue. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q93_A9-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> "Likeness" is not distinct from "image" in the general notion of "likeness" (for thus it is included in "image"); but so + far as any "likeness" falls short of "image," or again, as it perfects the idea of "image." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q93_A9-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The soul's essence belongs to the "image," as representing the Divine Essence in those things which belong to the intellectual + nature; but not in those conditions subsequent to general notions of being, such as simplicity and indissolubility. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q93_A9-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Even certain virtues are natural to the soul, at least, in their seeds, by reason of which we may say that a natural "likeness" + exists in the soul. Nor it is unfitting to us the term "image" from one point of view and from another the term "likeness." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q93_A9-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Love of the word, which is knowledge loved, belongs to the nature of "image"; but love of virtue belongs to "likeness," as + virtue itself belongs to likeness. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q93_A9-p12"></p> + <p id="FP_Q93_A9-p13"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q93_A8.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q94.html"></a> + </div> + <a href="summa.FP_Q92_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q93_A1.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q94" class="div3"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q93_A9.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q94_A1.html"></a> + <h3 id="FP_Q94-p0.1">OF THE STATE AND CONDITION OF THE FIRST MAN AS REGARDS HIS INTELLECT (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3> + <p id="FP_Q94-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q94-p2"> We next consider the state or condition of the first man; first, as regards his soul; secondly, as regards his body. Concerning + the first there are two things to be considered: (1) The condition of man as to his intellect; (2) the condition of man as + to his will. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q94-p3"> Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:</p> + <p id="FP_Q94-p4"> (1) Whether the first man saw the Essence of God?</p> + <p id="FP_Q94-p5"> (2) Whether he could see the separate substances, that is, the angels?</p> + <p id="FP_Q94-p6"> (3) Whether he possessed all knowledge?</p> + <p id="FP_Q94-p7"> (4) Whether he could err or be deceived?</p> + <div id="FP_Q94_A1" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q94.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q94_A2.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q94_A1-p0.1">Whether the first man saw God through His Essence?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q94_A1-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q94_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the first man saw God through His Essence. For man's happiness consists in the vision of the Divine Essence. + But the first man, "while established in paradise, led a life of happiness in the enjoyment of all things," as Damascene says + (De Fide Orth. ii, 11). And Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 10): "If man was gifted with the same tastes as now, how happy + must he have been in paradise, that place of ineffable happiness!" Therefore the first + man in paradise saw God through His Essence. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q94_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, loc. cit.) that "the first man lacked nothing which his good-will might obtain." + But our good-will can obtain nothing better than the vision of the Divine Essence. Therefore man saw God through His Essence. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q94_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the vision of God is His Essence is whereby God is seen without a medium or enigma. But man in the state of innocence + "saw God immediately," as the Master of the Sentences asserts (Sent. iv, D, i). He also saw without an enigma, for an enigma + implies obscurity, as Augustine says (De Trin. xv, 9). Now, obscurity resulted from sin. Therefore man in the primitive state + saw God through His Essence. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q94_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q94_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.15.46" target="asv">1 Cor. 15:46</a>): "That was not first which is spiritual, but that which is natural." But to see God through His Essence is most spiritual. + Therefore the first man in the primitive state of his natural life did not see God through His Essence. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q94_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The first man did not see God through His Essence if we consider the ordinary state of that life; unless, perhaps, it be + said that he saw God in a vision, when "God cast a deep sleep upon Adam" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q94_A1-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.2.21" target="asv">Gn. 2:21</a>). The reason is because, since in the Divine Essence is beatitude itself, the intellect of a man who sees the Divine Essence + has the same relation to God as a man has to beatitude. Now it is clear that man cannot willingly be turned away from beatitude, + since naturally and necessarily he desires it, and shuns unhappiness. Wherefore no one who sees the Essence of God can willingly + turn away from God, which means to sin. Hence all who see God through His Essence are so firmly established in the love of + God, that for eternity they can never sin. Therefore, as Adam did sin, it is clear that he did not see God through His Essence. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q94_A1-p7"> Nevertheless he knew God with a more perfect knowledge than we do now. Thus in a sense his knowledge was midway between our + knowledge in the present state, and the knowledge we shall have in heaven, when we see God through His Essence. To make this + clear, we must consider that the vision of God through His Essence is contradistinguished from the vision of God through His + creatures. Now the higher the creature is, and the more like it is to God, the more clearly is God seen in + it; for instance, a man is seen more clearly through a mirror in which his image is the more clearly expressed. Thus God is + seen in a much more perfect manner through His intelligible effects than through those which are only sensible or corporeal. + But in his present state man is impeded as regards the full and clear consideration of intelligible creatures, because he + is distracted by and occupied with sensible things. Now, it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q94_A1-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Eccl.7.30" target="asv">Eccles. 7:30</a>): "God made man + right." And man was made right by God in this sense, that in him the lower powers were subjected to the higher, and the higher + nature was made so as not to be impeded by the lower. Wherefore the first man was not impeded by exterior things from a clear + and steady contemplation of the intelligible effects which he perceived by the radiation of the first truth, whether by a + natural or by a gratuitous knowledge. Hence Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xi, 33) that, "perhaps God used to speak to the + first man as He speaks to the angels; by shedding on his mind a ray of the unchangeable truth, yet without bestowing on him + the experience of which the angels are capable in the participation of the Divine Essence." Therefore, through these intelligible + effects of God, man knew God then more clearly than we know Him now. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q94_A1-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Man was happy in paradise, but not with that perfect happiness to which he was destined, which consists in the vision of + the Divine Essence. He was, however, endowed with "a life of happiness in a certain measure," as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. + xi, 18), so far as he was gifted with natural integrity and perfection. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q94_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> A good will is a well-ordered will; but the will of the first man would have been ill-ordered had he wished to have, while + in the state of merit, what had been promised to him as a reward. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q94_A1-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> A medium (of knowledge) is twofold; one through which, and, at the same time, in which, something is seen, as, for example, + a man is seen through a mirror, and is seen with the mirror: another kind of medium is that whereby we attain to the knowledge + of something unknown; such as the medium in a demonstration. God was seen without this second kind of medium, but not without + the first kind. For there was no need for the first man to attain to the + knowledge of God by demonstration drawn from an effect, such as we need; since he knew God simultaneously in His effects, + especially in the intelligible effects, according to His capacity. Again, we must remark that the obscurity which is implied + in the word enigma may be of two kinds: first, so far as every creature is something obscure when compared with the immensity + of the Divine light; and thus Adam saw God in an enigma, because he saw Him in a created effect: secondly, we may take + obscurity as an effect of sin, so far as man is impeded in the consideration of intelligible things by being preoccupied with + sensible things; in which sense Adam did not see God in an enigma. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q94_A1-p11"></p> + <p id="FP_Q94_A1-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q94.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q94_A2.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q94_A2" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q94_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q94_A3.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q94_A2-p0.1">Whether Adam in the state of innocence saw the angels through their essence?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q94_A2-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q94_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that Adam, in the state of innocence, saw the angels through their essence. For Gregory says (Dialog. iv, 1): + "In paradise man was accustomed to enjoy the words of God; and by purity of heart and loftiness of vision to have the company + of the good angels." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q94_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the soul in the present state is impeded from the knowledge of separate substances by union with a corruptible body + which "is a load upon the soul," as is written + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q94_A2-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.9.15" target="asv"> Wis. 9:15.</a> Wherefore the separate soul can see separate substances, as above explained ( + <a id="FP_Q94_A2-p3.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q89_A2.html">Q[89], A[2]</a>). But the body of the first man was not a load upon his soul; for the latter was not corruptible. Therefore he was able to + see separate + substances. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q94_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, one separate substance knows another separate substance, by knowing itself (De Causis xiii). But the soul of the + first man knew itself. Therefore it knew separate substances. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q94_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The soul of Adam was of the same nature as ours. But our souls cannot now understand separate substances. Therefore neither + could Adam's soul. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q94_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The state of the human soul may be distinguished in two ways. First, from a diversity of mode in its natural existence; and + in this point the state of the separate soul is distinguished from the state of the soul joined to the body. Secondly, the + state of the soul is distinguished in relation to integrity and corruption, the state of natural existence remaining the same: + and thus the state of innocence is distinct from the state of man after sin. For man's + soul, in the state of innocence, was adapted to perfect and govern the body; wherefore the first man is said to have been + made into a "living soul"; that is, a soul giving life to the body---namely animal life. But he was endowed with integrity + as to this life, in that the body was entirely subject to the soul, hindering it in no way, as we have said above + <a id="FP_Q94_A2-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q94_A1.html">(A[1])</a>. Now it is clear from what has been already said ( + <a id="FP_Q94_A2-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q84_A7.html">Q[84], A[7]</a>; + <a id="FP_Q94_A2-p6.3" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q85_A1.html">Q[85], A[1]</a>; + <a id="FP_Q94_A2-p6.4" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q89_A1.html">Q[89], A[1]</a>) that since the soul is adapted to perfect and govern the body, as regards animal life, it is fitting that it should have + that mode of understanding which is by turning to phantasms. Wherefore this mode of understanding was becoming to the soul + of the first man also. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q94_A2-p7"> Now, in virtue of this mode of understanding, there are three degrees of movement in the soul, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. + iv). The first is by the soul "passing from exterior things to concentrate its powers on itself"; the second is by the soul + ascending "so as to be associated with the united superior powers," namely the angels; the third is when the soul is "led + on" yet further "to the supreme good," that is, to God. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q94_A2-p8"> In virtue of the first movement of the soul from exterior things to itself, the soul's knowledge is perfected. This is because + the intellectual operation of the soul has a natural order to external things, as we have said above ( + <a id="FP_Q94_A2-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q87_A3.html">Q[87], A[3]</a>): and so by the knowledge thereof, our intellectual operation can be known perfectly, as an act through its object. And through + the intellectual operation itself, the human intellect can be known perfectly, as a power + through its proper act. But in the second movement we do not find perfect knowledge. Because, since the angel does not understand + by turning to phantasms, but by a far more excellent process, as we have said above ( + <a id="FP_Q94_A2-p8.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q55_A2.html">Q[55], A[2]</a>); the above-mentioned mode of knowledge, by which the soul knows itself, is not sufficient to lead it to the knowledge of + an angel. Much less does the third movement lead to perfect knowledge: for even the angels themselves, by the fact that they + know themselves, are not able to arrive at the knowledge of the Divine Substance, by reason of its surpassing excellence. + Therefore the soul of the first man could not see the angels in their essence. Nevertheless he had a more excellent mode of + knowledge regarding the angels than we possess, because his knowledge of intelligible things within him was more certain and + fixed than our knowledge. And it was on account of this excellence of knowledge that Gregory says that "he enjoyed the company + of the angelic spirits." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q94_A2-p9"> This makes clear the reply to the first objection.</p> + <p id="FP_Q94_A2-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> That the soul of the first man fell short of the knowledge regarding separate substances, was not owing to the fact that + the body was a load upon it; but to the fact that its connatural object fell short of the excellence of separate substances. + We, in our present state, fall short on account of both these reasons. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q94_A2-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The soul of the first man was not able to arrive at knowledge of separate substances by means of its self-knowledge, as we + have shown above; for even each separate substance knows others in its own measure. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q94_A2-p12"></p> + <p id="FP_Q94_A2-p13"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q94_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q94_A3.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q94_A3" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q94_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q94_A4.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q94_A3-p0.1">Whether the first man knew all things?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q94_A3-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q94_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the first man did not know all things. For if he had such knowledge it would be either by acquired species, + or by connatural species, or by infused species. Not, however, by acquired species; for this kind of knowledge is acquired + by experience, as stated in Metaph. i, 1; and the first man had not then gained experience of all things. Nor through connatural + species, because he was of the same nature as we are; and our soul, as Aristotle says + (De Anima iii, 4), is "like a clean tablet on which nothing is written." And if his knowledge came by infused species, it + would have been of a different kind from ours, which we acquire from things themselves. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q94_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, individuals of the same species have the same way of arriving at perfection. Now other men have not, from the beginning, + knowledge of all things, but they acquire it in the course of time according to their capacity. Therefore neither did Adam + know all things when he was first created. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q94_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the present state of life is given to man in order that his soul may advance in knowledge and merit; indeed, the + soul seems to be united to the body for that purpose. Now man would have advanced in merit in that state of life; therefore + also in knowledge. Therefore he was not endowed with knowledge of all things. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q94_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Man named the animals ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q94_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.2.20" target="asv">Gn. 2:20</a>). But names should be adapted to the nature of things. Therefore Adam knew the animals' natures; and in like manner he was + possessed of the knowledge of all other things. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q94_A3-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> In the natural order, perfection comes before imperfection, as act precedes potentiality; for whatever is in potentiality + is made actual only by something actual. And since God created things not only for their own existence, but also that they + might be the principles of other things; so creatures were produced in their perfect state to be the principles as regards + others. Now man can be the principle of another man, not only by generation of the body, but + also by instruction and government. Hence, as the first man was produced in his perfect state, as regards his body, for the + work of generation, so also was his soul established in a perfect state to instruct and govern others. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q94_A3-p7"> Now no one can instruct others unless he has knowledge, and so the first man was established by God in such a manner as to + have knowledge of all those things for which man has a natural aptitude. And such are whatever are virtually contained in + the first self-evident principles, that is, whatever truths man is naturally able to know. Moreover, in order to direct his + own life and that of others, man needs to know not only those things which can be naturally known, but also things + surpassing natural knowledge; because the life of man is directed to a supernatural end: just as it is necessary for us to + know the truths of faith in order to direct our own lives. Wherefore the first man was endowed with such a knowledge of these + supernatural truths as was necessary for the direction of human life in that state. But those things which cannot be known + by merely human effort, and which are not necessary for the direction of human life, were not known by the first man; such + as + the thoughts of men, future contingent events, and some individual facts, as for instance the number of pebbles in a stream; + and the like. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q94_A3-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The first man had knowledge of all things by divinely infused species. Yet his knowledge was not different from ours; as + the eyes which Christ gave to the man born blind were not different from those given by nature. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q94_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> To Adam, as being the first man, was due to a degree of perfection which was not due to other men, as is clear from what + is above explained. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q94_A3-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Adam would have advanced in natural knowledge, not in the number of things known, but in the manner of knowing; because what + he knew speculatively he would subsequently have known by experience. But as regards supernatural knowledge, he would also + have advanced as regards the number of things known, by further revelation; as the angels advance by further enlightenment. + Moreover there is no comparison between advance in knowledge and advance in merit; + since one man cannot be a principle of merit to another, although he can be to another a principle of knowledge. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q94_A3-p11"></p> + <p id="FP_Q94_A3-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q94_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q94_A4.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q94_A4" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q94_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q95.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q94_A4-p0.1">Whether man in his first state could be deceived?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q94_A4-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q94_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that man in his primitive state could have been deceived. For the Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q94_A4-p2.1" href="./asv.html#iTim.2.14" target="asv">1 Tim. 2:14</a>) that "the woman being seduced was in the transgression." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q94_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the Master says (Sent. ii, D, xxi) that, "the woman was not frightened at the serpent speaking, because she thought + that he had received the faculty of speech from God." But this was untrue. Therefore before sin the woman was deceived. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q94_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, it is natural that the farther off anything is from us, the smaller it seems to be. Now, the nature of the eyes + is not changed by sin. Therefore this would have been the case in the state of innocence. Wherefore man would have been deceived + in the size of what he saw, just as he is deceived now. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q94_A4-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 2) that, in sleep the soul adheres to the images of things as if they were the + things themselves. But in the state of innocence man would have eaten and consequently have slept and dreamed. Therefore he + would have been deceived, adhering to images as to realities. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q94_A4-p6"> + <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, the first man would have been ignorant of other men's thoughts, and of future contingent events, as stated above + + <a id="FP_Q94_A4-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q94_A3.html">(A[3])</a>. So if anyone had told him what was false about these things, he would have been deceived. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q94_A4-p7"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. iii, 18): "To regard what is true as false, is not natural to man as created; but is a punishment + of man condemned." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q94_A4-p8"> + <b>I answer that,</b> in the opinion of some, deception may mean two things; namely, any slight surmise, in which one adheres to what is false, + as though it were true, but without the assent of belief---or it may mean a firm belief. Thus before sin Adam could not be + deceived in either of these ways as regards those things to which his knowledge extended; but as regards things to which his + knowledge did not extend, he might have been deceived, if we take deception in the wide + sense of the term for any surmise without assent of belief. This opinion was held with the idea that it is not derogatory + to man to entertain a false opinion in such matters, and that provided he does not assent rashly, he is not to be blamed. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q94_A4-p9"> Such an opinion, however, is not fitting as regards the integrity of the primitive state of life; because, as Augustine says + (De Civ. Dei xiv, 10), in that state of life "sin was avoided without struggle, and while it remained so, no evil could exist." + Now it is clear that as truth is the good of the intellect, so falsehood is its evil, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, + 2). So that, as long as the state of innocence continued, it was impossible for the human intellect to + assent to falsehood as if it were truth. For as some perfections, such as clarity, were lacking in the bodily members of the + first man, though no evil could be therein; so there could be in his intellect the absence of some knowledge, but no false + opinion. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q94_A4-p10"> This is clear also from the very rectitude of the primitive state, by virtue of which, while the soul remained subject to + God, the lower faculties in man were subject to the higher, and were no impediment to their action. And from what has preceded + ( + <a id="FP_Q94_A4-p10.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q85_A6.html">Q[85], A[6]</a>), it is clear that as regards its proper object the intellect is ever true; and hence it is never deceived of itself; but + whatever deception occurs must be ascribed to some lower faculty, such as + the imagination or the like. Hence we see that when the natural power of judgment is free we are not deceived by such images, + but only when it is not free, as is the case in sleep. Therefore it is clear that the rectitude of the primitive state was + incompatible with deception of the intellect. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q94_A4-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Though the woman was deceived before she sinned in deed, still it was not till she had already sinned by interior pride. + For Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xi, 30) that "the woman could not have believed the words of the serpent, had she not already + acquiesced in the love of her own power, and in a presumption of self-conceit." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q94_A4-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The woman thought that the serpent had received this faculty, not as acting in accordance with nature, but by virtue of some + supernatural operation. We need not, however, follow the Master of the Sentences in this point. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q94_A4-p13"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Were anything presented to the imagination or sense of the first man, not in accordance with the nature of things, he would + not have been deceived, for his reason would have enabled him to judge the truth. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q94_A4-p14"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> A man is not accountable for what occurs during sleep; as he has not then the use of his reason, wherein consists man's proper + action. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q94_A4-p15"> + <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> If anyone had said something untrue as regards future contingencies, or as regards secret thoughts, man in the primitive + state would not have believed it was so: but he might have believed that such a thing was possible; which would not have been + to entertain a false opinion. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q94_A4-p16"> It might also be said that he would have been divinely guided from above, so as not to be deceived in a matter to which his + knowledge did not extend. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q94_A4-p17"> If any object, as some do, that he was not guided, when tempted, though he was then most in need of guidance, we reply that + man had already sinned in his heart, and that he failed to have recourse to the Divine aid. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q94_A4-p18"></p> + <p id="FP_Q94_A4-p19"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q94_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q95.html"></a> + </div> + <a href="summa.FP_Q93_A9.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q94_A1.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q95" class="div3"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q94_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q95_A1.html"></a> + <h3 id="FP_Q95-p0.1">OF THINGS PERTAINING TO THE FIRST MAN'S WILL---NAMELY, GRACE AND RIGHTEOUSNESS (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3> + <p id="FP_Q95-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q95-p2"> We next consider what belongs to the will of the first man; concerning which there are two points of treatment: (1) the grace + and righteousness of the first man; (2) the use of righteousness as regards his dominion over other things. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q95-p3"> Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:</p> + <p id="FP_Q95-p4"> (1) Whether the first man was created in grace?</p> + <p id="FP_Q95-p5"> (2) Whether in the state of innocence he had passions of the soul?</p> + <p id="FP_Q95-p6"> (3) Whether he had all virtues?</p> + <p id="FP_Q95-p7"> (4) Whether what he did would have been as meritorious as now?</p> + <div id="FP_Q95_A1" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q95.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q95_A2.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q95_A1-p0.1">Whether the first man was created in grace?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q95_A1-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q95_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the first man was not created in grace. For the Apostle, distinguishing between Adam and Christ, says + ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q95_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.15.45" target="asv">1 Cor. 15:45</a>): "The first Adam was made into a living soul; the last Adam into a quickening spirit." But the spirit is quickened by grace. + Therefore Christ alone was made in grace. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q95_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Augustine says (QQ. Vet. et Nov. Test., qu. 123) [*Work of an anonymous author, among the supposititious works of + St. Augustine] that "Adam did not possess the Holy Ghost." But whoever possesses grace has the Holy Ghost. Therefore Adam + was not created in grace. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q95_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Augustine says (De Correp. et Grat. x) that "God so ordered the life of the angels and men, as to show first what + they could do by free-will, then what they could do by His grace, and by the discernment of righteousness." God thus first + created men and angels in the state of natural free-will only; and afterwards bestowed grace on them. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q95_A1-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, the Master says (Sent. ii, D, xxiv): "When man was created he was given sufficient help to stand, but not sufficient + to advance." But whoever has grace can advance by merit. Therefore the first man was not created in grace. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q95_A1-p6"> + <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, the reception of grace requires the consent of the recipient, since thereby a kind of spiritual marriage takes place + between God and the soul. But consent presupposes existence. Therefore man did not receive grace in the first moment of his + creation. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q95_A1-p7"> + <b>Objection 6:</b> Further, nature is more distant from grace than grace is from glory, which is but grace consummated. But in man grace precedes + glory. Therefore much more did nature precede grace. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q95_A1-p8"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Man and angel are both ordained to grace. But the angels were created in grace, for Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xii, 9): + "God at the same time fashioned their nature and endowed them with grace." Therefore man also was created in grace. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q95_A1-p9"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Some say that man was not created in grace; but that it was bestowed on him subsequently before sin: and many authorities + of the Saints declare that man possessed grace in the state of innocence. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q95_A1-p10"> But the very rectitude of the primitive state, wherewith man was endowed by God, seems to require that, as others say, he + was created in grace, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q95_A1-p10.1" href="./asv.html#Eccl.7.30" target="asv"> Eccles. 7:30, </a> "God made man right." For this rectitude consisted in his reason being subject to God, the lower powers to reason, and the + body to the soul: and the first subjection was the cause of both the second and the third; since while reason was subject + to God, the lower powers remained subject to + reason, as Augustine says [*Cf. De Civ. Dei xiii, 13; De Pecc. Merit. et Remiss. i, 16]. Now it is clear that such a subjection + of the body to the soul and of the lower powers to reason, was not from nature; otherwise it would have remained after sin; + since even in the demons the natural gifts remained after sin, as Dionysius declared (Div. Nom. iv). Hence it is clear that + also the primitive subjection by virtue of which reason was subject to God, was not a merely natural gift, but a + supernatural endowment of grace; for it is not possible that the effect should be of greater efficiency than the cause. Hence + Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiii, 13) that, "as soon as they disobeyed the Divine command, and forfeited Divine grace, they + were ashamed of their nakedness, for they felt the impulse of disobedience in the flesh, as though it were a punishment corresponding + to their own disobedience." Hence if the loss of grace dissolved the obedience of the flesh to the soul, we may + gather that the inferior powers were subjected to the soul through grace existing therein. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q95_A1-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The Apostle in these words means to show that there is a spiritual body, if there is an animal body, inasmuch as the spiritual + life of the body began in Christ, who is "the firstborn of the dead," as the body's animal life began in Adam. From the Apostle's + words, therefore, we cannot gather that Adam had no spiritual life in his soul; but that he had not spiritual life as regards + the body. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q95_A1-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As Augustine says in the same passage, it is not disputed that Adam, like other just souls, was in some degree gifted with + the Holy Ghost; but "he did not possess the Holy Ghost, as the faithful possess Him now," who are admitted to eternal happiness + directly after death. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q95_A1-p13"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This passage from Augustine does not assert that angels or men were created with natural free-will before they possessed + grace; but that God shows first what their free-will could do before being confirmed in grace, and what they acquired afterwards + by being so confirmed. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q95_A1-p14"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> The Master here speaks according to the opinion of those who held that man was not created in grace, but only in a state + of nature. We may also say that, though man was created in grace, yet it was not by virtue of the nature wherein he was created + that he could advance by merit, but by virtue of the grace which was added. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q95_A1-p15"> + <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> As the motion of the will is not continuous there is nothing against the first man having consented to grace even in the + first moment of his existence. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q95_A1-p16"> + <b>Reply to Objection 6:</b> We merit glory by an act of grace; but we do not merit grace by an act of nature; hence the comparison fails. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q95_A1-p17"></p> + <p id="FP_Q95_A1-p18"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q95.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q95_A2.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q95_A2" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q95_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q95_A3.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q95_A2-p0.1">Whether passions existed in the soul of the first man?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q95_A2-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q95_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the first man's soul had no passions. For by the passions of the soul "the flesh lusteth against the spirit" + ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q95_A2-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Gal.5.7" target="asv">Gal. 5:7</a>). But this did not happen in the state of innocence. Therefore in the state of innocence there were no passions of the soul. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q95_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Adam's soul was nobler than his body. But his body was impassible. Therefore no passions were in his soul. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q95_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the passions of the soul are restrained by the moral virtues. But in Adam the moral virtues were perfect. Therefore + the passions were entirely excluded from him. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q95_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 10) that "in our first parents there was undisturbed love of God," and other passions of + the soul. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q95_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The passions of the soul are in the sensual appetite, the object of which is good and evil. Wherefore some passions of the + soul are directed to what is good, as love and joy; others to what is evil, as fear and sorrow. And since in the primitive + state, evil was neither present nor imminent, nor was any good wanting which a good-will could desire to have then, as Augustine + says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 10), therefore Adam had no passion with evil as its object; such + as fear, sorrow, and the like; neither had he passions in respect of good not possessed, but to be possessed then, as burning + concupiscence. But those passions which regard present good, as joy and love; or which regard future good to be had at the + proper time, as desire and hope that casteth not down, existed in the state of innocence; otherwise, however, than as they + exist in ourselves. For our sensual appetite, wherein the passions reside, is not entirely subject to reason; hence at times + our passions forestall and hinder reason's judgment; at other times they follow reason's judgment, accordingly as the sensual + appetite obeys reason to some extent. But in the state of innocence the inferior appetite was wholly subject to reason: so + that in that state the passions of the soul existed only as consequent upon the judgment of reason. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q95_A2-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The flesh lusts against the spirit by the rebellion of the passions against reason; which could not occur in the state of + innocence. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q95_A2-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The human body was impassible in the state of innocence as regards the passions which alter the disposition of nature, as + will be explained later on ( + <a id="FP_Q95_A2-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q97_A2.html">Q[97], A[2]</a>); likewise the soul was impassible as regards the passions which impede the free use of reason. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q95_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Perfection of moral virtue does not wholly take away the passions, but regulates them; for the temperate man desires as he + ought to desire, and what he ought to desire, as stated in Ethic. iii, 11. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q95_A2-p10"></p> + <p id="FP_Q95_A2-p11"></p> + <p id="FP_Q95_A2-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q95_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q95_A3.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q95_A3" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q95_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q95_A4.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q95_A3-p0.1">Whether Adam had all the virtues?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q95_A3-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q95_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that Adam had not all the virtues. For some virtues are directed to curb passions: thus immoderate concupiscence + is restrained by temperance, and immoderate fear by fortitude. But in the state of innocence no immoderation existed in the + passions. Therefore neither did these virtues then exist. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q95_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, some virtues are concerned with the passions which have evil as their object; as meekness with anger; fortitude + with fear. But these passions did not exist in the state of innocence, as stated above + <a id="FP_Q95_A3-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q95_A2.html">(A[2])</a>. Therefore neither did those virtues exist then. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q95_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, penance is a virtue that regards sin committed. Mercy, too, is a virtue concerned with unhappiness. But in the state + of innocence neither sin nor unhappiness existed. Therefore neither did those virtues exist. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q95_A3-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, perseverance is a virtue. But Adam possessed it not; as proved by his subsequent sin. Therefore he possessed not + every virtue. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q95_A3-p6"> + <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, faith is a virtue. But it did not exist in the state of innocence; for it implies an obscurity of knowledge which + seems to be incompatible with the perfection of the primitive state. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q95_A3-p7"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says, in a homily (Serm. contra Judaeos): "The prince of sin overcame Adam who was made from the slime of the earth + to the image of God, adorned with modesty, restrained by temperance, refulgent with brightness." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q95_A3-p8"> + <b>I answer that,</b> in the state of innocence man in a certain sense possessed all the virtues; and this can be proved from what precedes. For + it was shown above + <a id="FP_Q95_A3-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q95_A1.html">(A[1])</a> that such was the rectitude of the primitive state, that reason was subject to God, and the lower powers to reason. Now the + virtues are nothing but those perfections whereby reason is directed to God, and the inferior powers regulated according to + the dictate of reason, as will be + explained in the Treatise on the Virtues (FS, + <a id="FP_Q95_A3-p8.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q63_A2.html">Q[63], A[2]</a>). Wherefore the rectitude of the primitive state required that man should in a sense possess every virtue. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q95_A3-p9"> It must, however, be noted that some virtues of their very nature do not involve imperfection, such as charity and justice; + and these virtues did exist in the primitive state absolutely, both in habit and in act. But other virtues are of such a nature + as to imply imperfection either in their act, or on the part of the matter. If such imperfection be consistent with the perfection + of the primitive state, such virtues necessarily existed in that state; as faith, which is of things + not seen, and hope which is of things not yet possessed. For the perfection of that state did not extend to the vision of + the Divine Essence, and the possession of God with the enjoyment of final beatitude. Hence faith and hope could exist in the + primitive state, both as to habit and as to act. But any virtue which implies imperfection incompatible with the perfection + of the primitive state, could exist in that state as a habit, but not as to the act; for instance, penance, which is sorrow + for + sin committed; and mercy, which is sorrow for others' unhappiness; because sorrow, guilt, and unhappiness are incompatible + with the perfection of the primitive state. Wherefore such virtues existed as habits in the first man, but not as to their + acts; for he was so disposed that he would repent, if there had been a sin to repent for; and had he seen unhappiness in his + neighbor, he would have done his best to remedy it. This is in accordance with what the Philosopher says, "Shame, which regards + what is ill done, may be found in a virtuous man, but only conditionally; as being so disposed that he would be ashamed if + he did wrong" (Ethic. iv, 9). + </p> + <p id="FP_Q95_A3-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> It is accidental to temperance and fortitude to subdue superabundant passion, in so far as they are in a subject which happens + to have superabundant passions, and yet those virtues are 'per se' competent to moderate the passions. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q95_A3-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Passions which have evil for their object were incompatible with the perfection of the primitive state, if that evil be in + the one affected by the passion; such as fear and sorrow. But passions which relate to evil in another are not incompatible + with the perfection of the primitive state; for in that state man could hate the demons' malice, as he could love God's goodness. + Thus the virtues which relate to such passions could exist in the primitive + state, in habit and in act. Virtues, however, relating to passions which regard evil in the same subject, if relating to such + passions only, could not exist in the primitive state in act, but only in habit, as we have said above of penance and of mercy. + But other virtues there are which have relation not to such passions only, but to others; such as temperance, which relates + not only to sorrow, but also to joy; and fortitude, which relates not only to fear, but also to daring and hope. Thus the + act of temperance could exist in the primitive state, so far as it moderates pleasure; and in like manner, fortitude, as moderating + daring and hope, but not as moderating sorrow and fear. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q95_A3-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> appears from what has been said above. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q95_A3-p13"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Perseverance may be taken in two ways: in one sense as a particular virtue, signifying a habit whereby a man makes a choice + of persevering in good; in that sense Adam possessed perseverance. In another sense it is taken as a circumstance of virtue; + signifying a certain uninterrupted continuation of virtue; in which sense Adam did not possess perseverance. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q95_A3-p14"> + <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> appears from what has been said above. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q95_A3-p15"></p> + <p id="FP_Q95_A3-p16"></p> + <p id="FP_Q95_A3-p17"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q95_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q95_A4.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q95_A4" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q95_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q96.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q95_A4-p0.1">Whether the actions of the first man were less meritorious than ours are?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q95_A4-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q95_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the actions of the first man were less meritorious than ours are. For grace is given to us through the + mercy of God, Who succors most those who are most in need. Now we are more in need of grace than was man in the state of innocence. + Therefore grace is more copiously poured out upon us; and since grace is the source of merit, our actions are more meritorious. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q95_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, struggle and difficulty are required for merit; for it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q95_A4-p3.1" href="./asv.html#iiTim.2.5" target="asv">2 Tim. 2:5</a>): "He . . . is not crowned except he strive lawfully" and the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 3): "The object of virtue is the + difficult and the good." But there is more strife and difficulty now. Therefore there is greater efficacy for merit. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q95_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the Master says (Sent. ii., D, xxiv) that "man would not have merited in resisting temptation; whereas he does merit + now, when he resists." Therefore our actions are more meritorious than in the primitive state. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q95_A4-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> if such were the case, man would be better off after sinning. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q95_A4-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Merit as regards degree may be gauged in two ways. First, in its root, which is grace and charity. Merit thus measured corresponds + in degree to the essential reward, which consists in the enjoyment of God; for the greater the charity whence our actions + proceed, the more perfectly shall we enjoy God. Secondly, the degree of merit is measured by the degree of the action itself. + This degree is of two kinds, absolute and proportional. The widow who put two mites + into the treasury performed a deed of absolutely less degree than the others who put great sums therein. But in proportionate + degree the widow gave more, as Our Lord said; because she gave more in proportion to her means. In each of these cases the + degree of merit corresponds to the accidental reward, which consists in rejoicing for created good. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q95_A4-p7"> We conclude therefore that in the state of innocence man's works were more meritorious than after sin was committed, if we + consider the degree of merit on the part of grace, which would have been more copious as meeting with no obstacle in human + nature: and in like manner, if we consider the absolute degree of the work done; because, as man would have had greater virtue, + he would have performed greater works. But if we consider the proportionate degree, a greater reason for + merit exists after sin, on account of man's weakness; because a small deed is more beyond the capacity of one who works with + difficulty than a great deed is beyond one who performs it easily. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q95_A4-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> After sin man requires grace for more things than before sin; but he does not need grace more; forasmuch as man even before + sin required grace to obtain eternal life, which is the chief reason for the need of grace. But after sin man required grace + also for the remission of sin, and for the support of his weakness. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q95_A4-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Difficulty and struggle belong to the degree of merit according to the proportionate degree of the work done, as above explained. + It is also a sign of the will's promptitude striving after what is difficult to itself: and the promptitude of the will is + caused by the intensity of charity. Yet it may happen that a person performs an easy deed with as prompt a will as another + performs an arduous deed; because he is ready to do even what may be difficult + to him. But the actual difficulty, by its penal character, enables the deed to satisfy for sin. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q95_A4-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The first man would not have gained merit in resisting temptation, according to the opinion of those who say that he did + not possess grace; even as now there is no merit to those who have not grace. But in this point there is a difference, inasmuch + as in the primitive state there was no interior impulse to evil, as in our present state. Hence man was more able then than + now to resist temptation even without grace. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q95_A4-p11"></p> + <p id="FP_Q95_A4-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q95_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q96.html"></a> + </div> + <a href="summa.FP_Q94_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q95_A1.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q96" class="div3"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q95_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q96_A1.html"></a> + <h3 id="FP_Q96-p0.1">OF THE MASTERSHIP BELONGING TO MAN IN THE STATE OF INNOCENCE (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3> + <p id="FP_Q96-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q96-p2"> We next consider the mastership which belonged to man in the state of innocence. Under this head there are four points of + inquiry: + </p> + <p id="FP_Q96-p3"> (1) Whether man in the state of innocence was master over the animals?</p> + <p id="FP_Q96-p4"> (2) Whether he was master over all creatures?</p> + <p id="FP_Q96-p5"> (3) Whether in the state of innocence all men were equal?</p> + <p id="FP_Q96-p6"> (4) Whether in that state man would have been master over men?</p> + <div id="FP_Q96_A1" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q96.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q96_A2.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q96_A1-p0.1">Whether Adam in the state of innocence had mastership over the animals?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q96_A1-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q96_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that in the state of innocence Adam had no mastership over the animals. For Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. ix, + 14), that the animals were brought to Adam, under the direction of the angels, to receive their names from him. But the angels + need not have intervened thus, if man himself were master over the animals. Therefore in the state of innocence man had no + mastership of the animals. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q96_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it is unfitting that elements hostile to one another should be brought under the mastership of one. But many animals + are hostile to one another, as the sheep and the wolf. Therefore all animals were not brought under the mastership of man. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q96_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Jerome says [*The words quoted are not in St. Jerome's works. St. Thomas may have had in mind Bede, Hexaem., as + quoted in the Glossa ordinaria on + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q96_A1-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.1.26" target="asv"> Gn. 1:26</a>]: "God gave man mastership over the animals, although before sin he had no need of them: for God foresaw that after sin animals + would become useful to man." Therefore, at least before sin, it was unfitting for man to make use of his mastership. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q96_A1-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, it is proper to a master to command. But a command is not given rightly save to a rational being. Therefore man + had no mastership over the irrational animals. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q96_A1-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q96_A1-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.1.26" target="asv">Gn. 1:26</a>): "Let him have dominion over the fishes of the sea, and the birds of the air, and the beasts of the earth" [Vulg."and the + whole earth"]. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q96_A1-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As above stated ( + <a id="FP_Q96_A1-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q95_A1.html">Q[95], A[1]</a>) for his disobedience to God, man was punished by the disobedience of those creatures which should be subject to him. Therefore + in the state of innocence, before man had disobeyed, nothing disobeyed him that was naturally subject to him. Now all animals + are naturally subject to man. This can be proved in three ways. First, from the order observed by nature; for just as in the + generation of things we + perceive a certain order of procession of the perfect from the imperfect (thus matter is for the sake of form; and the imperfect + form, for the sake of the perfect), so also is there order in the use of natural things; thus the imperfect are for the use + of the perfect; as the plants make use of the earth for their nourishment, and animals make use of plants, and man makes use + of both plants and animals. Therefore it is in keeping with the order of nature, that man should be master over animals. + Hence the Philosopher says (Polit. i, 5) that the hunting of wild animals is just and natural, because man thereby exercises + a natural right. Secondly, this is proved by the order of Divine Providence which always governs inferior things by the superior. + Wherefore, as man, being made to the image of God, is above other animals, these are rightly subject to his government. Thirdly, + this is proved from a property of man and of other animals. For we see in the latter a certain participated + prudence of natural instinct, in regard to certain particular acts; whereas man possesses a universal prudence as regards + all practical matters. Now whatever is participated is subject to what is essential and universal. Therefore the subjection + of other animals to man is proved to be natural. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q96_A1-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> A higher power can do many things that an inferior power cannot do to those which are subject to them. Now an angel is naturally + higher than man. Therefore certain things in regard to animals could be done by angels, which could not be done by man; for + instance, the rapid gathering together of all the animals. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q96_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> In the opinion of some, those animals which now are fierce and kill others, would, in that state, have been tame, not only + in regard to man, but also in regard to other animals. But this is quite unreasonable. For the nature of animals was not changed + by man's sin, as if those whose nature now it is to devour the flesh of others, would then have lived on herbs, as the lion + and falcon. Nor does Bede's gloss on + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q96_A1-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.1.30" target="asv">Gn. 1:30</a>, say that trees and herbs were + given as food to all animals and birds, but to some. Thus there would have been a natural antipathy between some animals. + They would not, however, on this account have been excepted from the mastership of man: as neither at present are they for + that reason excepted from the mastership of God, Whose Providence has ordained all this. Of this Providence man would have + been the executor, as appears even now in regard to domestic animals, since fowls are given by men as food to the trained + falcon. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q96_A1-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> In the state of innocence man would not have had any bodily need of animals---neither for clothing, since then they were + naked and not ashamed, there being no inordinate motions of concupiscence---nor for food, since they fed on the trees of paradise---nor + to carry him about, his body being strong enough for that purpose. But man needed animals in order to have experimental knowledge + of their natures. This is signified by the fact that God led the + animals to man, that he might give them names expressive of their respective natures. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q96_A1-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> All animals by their natural instinct have a certain participation of prudence and reason: which accounts for the fact that + cranes follow their leader, and bees obey their queen. So all animals would have obeyed man of their own accord, as in the + present state some domestic animals obey him. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q96_A1-p12"></p> + <p id="FP_Q96_A1-p13"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q96.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q96_A2.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q96_A2" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q96_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q96_A3.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q96_A2-p0.1">Whether man had mastership over all other creatures?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q96_A2-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q96_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that in the state of innocence man would not have had mastership over all other creatures. For an angel naturally + has a greater power than man. But, as Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 8), "corporeal matter would not have obeyed even the holy + angels." Much less therefore would it have obeyed man in the state of innocence. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q96_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the only powers of the soul existing in plants are nutritive, augmentative, and generative. Now these doe not naturally + obey reason; as we can see in the case of any one man. Therefore, since it is by his reason that man is competent to have + mastership, it seems that in the state of innocence man had no dominion over plants. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q96_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, whosoever is master of a thing, can change it. But man could not have changed the course of the heavenly bodies; + for this belongs to God alone, as Dionysius says (Ep. ad Polycarp. vii). Therefore man had no dominion over them. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q96_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q96_A2-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.1.26" target="asv">Gn. 1:26</a>): "That he may have dominion over . . . every creature." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q96_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Man in a certain sense contains all things; and so according as he is master of what is within himself, in the same way he + can have mastership over other things. Now we may consider four things in man: his "reason," which makes him like to the angels'; + his "sensitive powers," whereby he is like the animals; his "natural forces," which liken him to the plants; and "the body + itself," wherein he is like to inanimate things. Now in man reason has the position of + a master and not of a subject. Wherefore man had no mastership over the angels in the primitive state; so when we read "all + creatures," we must understand the creatures which are not made to God's image. Over the sensitive powers, as the irascible + and concupiscible, which obey reason in some degree, the soul has mastership by commanding. So in the state of innocence man + had mastership over the animals by commanding them. But of the natural powers and the body itself man is master not by + commanding, but by using them. Thus also in the state of innocence man's mastership over plants and inanimate things consisted + not in commanding or in changing them, but in making use of them without hindrance. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q96_A2-p7"> The answers to the objections appear from the above.</p> + <p id="FP_Q96_A2-p8"></p> + <p id="FP_Q96_A2-p9"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q96_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q96_A3.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q96_A3" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q96_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q96_A4.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q96_A3-p0.1">Whether men were equal in the state of innocence?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q96_A3-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q96_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that in the state of innocence all would have been equal. For Gregory says (Moral. xxi): "Where there is no + sin, there is no inequality." But in the state of innocence there was no sin. Therefore all were equal. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q96_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, likeness and equality are the basis of mutual love, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q96_A3-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.13.19" target="asv"> Ecclus. 13:19, </a> "Every beast loveth its like; so also every man him that is nearest to himself." Now in that state there was among men an + abundance of love, which is the bond of peace. Therefore all were equal in the state of innocence. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q96_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the cause ceasing, the effect also ceases. But the cause of present inequality among men seems to arise, on the + part of God, from the fact that He rewards some and punishes others; and on the part of nature, from the fact that some, through + a defect of nature, are born weak and deficient, others strong and perfect, which would not have been the case in the primitive + state. Therefore, etc. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q96_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q96_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.13.1" target="asv">Rom. 13:1</a>): "The things which are of God, are well ordered" [Vulg."Those that are, are ordained of God"]. But order chiefly consists + in inequality; for Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix, 13): "Order disposes things equal and unequal in their proper place." + Therefore in the primitive state, which was most proper and orderly, inequality would have existed. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q96_A3-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> We must needs admit that in the primitive state there would have been some inequality, at least as regards sex, because generation + depends upon diversity of sex: and likewise as regards age; for some would have been born of others; nor would sexual union + have been sterile. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q96_A3-p7"> Moreover, as regards the soul, there would have been inequality as to righteousness and knowledge. For man worked not of + necessity, but of his own free-will, by virtue of which man can apply himself, more or less, to action, desire, or knowledge; + hence some would have made a greater advance in virtue and knowledge than others. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q96_A3-p8"> There might also have been bodily disparity. For the human body was not entirely exempt from the laws of nature, so as not + to receive from exterior sources more or less advantage and help: since indeed it was dependent on food wherewith to sustain + life. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q96_A3-p9"> So we may say that, according to the climate, or the movement of the stars, some would have been born more robust in body + than others, and also greater, and more beautiful, and all ways better disposed; so that, however, in those who were thus + surpassed, there would have been no defect or fault either in soul or body. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q96_A3-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> By those words Gregory means to exclude such inequality as exists between virtue and vice; the result of which is that some + are placed in subjection to others as a penalty. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q96_A3-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Equality is the cause of equality in mutual love. Yet between those who are unequal there can be a greater love than between + equals; although there be not an equal response: for a father naturally loves his son more than a brother loves his brother; + although the son does not love his father as much as he is loved by him. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q96_A3-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The cause of inequality could be on the part of God; not indeed that He would punish some and reward others, but that He + would exalt some above others; so that the beauty of order would the more shine forth among men. Inequality might also arise + on the part of nature as above described, without any defect of nature. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q96_A3-p13"></p> + <p id="FP_Q96_A3-p14"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q96_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q96_A4.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q96_A4" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q96_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q97.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q96_A4-p0.1">Whether in the state of innocence man would have been master over man?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q96_A4-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q96_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that in the state of innocence man would not have been master over man. For Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix, + 15): "God willed that man, who was endowed with reason and made to His image, should rule over none but irrational creatures; + not over men, but over cattle." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q96_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, what came into the world as a penalty for sin would not have existed in the state of innocence. But man was made + subject to man as a penalty; for after sin it was said to the woman ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q96_A4-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.3.16" target="asv">Gn. 3:16</a>): "Thou shalt be under thy husband's power." Therefore in the state of innocence man would not have been subject to man. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q96_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, subjection is opposed to liberty. But liberty is one of the chief blessings, and would not have been lacking in + the state of innocence, "where nothing was wanting that man's good-will could desire," as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, + 10). Therefore man would not have been master over man in the state of innocence. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q96_A4-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The condition of man in the state of innocence was not more exalted than the condition of the angels. But among the angels + some rule over others; and so one order is called that of "Dominations." Therefore it was not beneath the dignity of the state + of innocence that one man should be subject to another. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q96_A4-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Mastership has a twofold meaning. First, as opposed to slavery, in which sense a master means one to whom another is subject + as a slave. In another sense mastership is referred in a general sense to any kind of subject; and in this sense even he who + has the office of governing and directing free men, can be called a master. In the state of innocence man could have been + a master of men, not in the former but in the latter sense. This distinction is founded on + the reason that a slave differs from a free man in that the latter has the disposal of himself, as is stated in the beginning + of the Metaphysics, whereas a slave is ordered to another. So that one man is master of another as his slave when he refers + the one whose master he is, to his own---namely the master's use. And since every man's proper good is desirable to himself, + and consequently it is a grievous matter to anyone to yield to another what ought to be one's own, therefore such dominion + implies of necessity a pain inflicted on the subject; and consequently in the state of innocence such a mastership could not + have existed between man and man. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q96_A4-p7"> But a man is the master of a free subject, by directing him either towards his proper welfare, or to the common good. Such + a kind of mastership would have existed in the state of innocence between man and man, for two reasons. First, because man + is naturally a social being, and so in the state of innocence he would have led a social life. Now a social life cannot exist + among a number of people unless under the presidency of one to look after the common good; for many, as such, + seek many things, whereas one attends only to one. Wherefore the Philosopher says, in the beginning of the Politics, that + wherever many things are directed to one, we shall always find one at the head directing them. Secondly, if one man surpassed + another in knowledge and virtue, this would not have been fitting unless these gifts conduced to the benefit of others, according + to + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q96_A4-p7.1" href="./asv.html#iPet.4.10" target="asv">1 Pet. 4:10, </a> "As every man hath received grace, ministering the same one to another." Wherefore + Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix, 14): "Just men command not by the love of domineering, but by the service of counsel": and + (De Civ. Dei xix, 15): "The natural order of things requires this; and thus did God make man." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q96_A4-p8"> From this appear the replies to the objections which are founded on the first-mentioned mode of mastership.</p> + <p id="FP_Q96_A4-p9"></p> + <p id="FP_Q96_A4-p10"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q96_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q97.html"></a> + </div> + <a href="summa.FP_Q95_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q96_A1.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q97" class="div3"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q96_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q97_A1.html"></a> + <h3 id="FP_Q97-p0.1">OF THE PRESERVATION OF THE INDIVIDUAL IN THE PRIMITIVE STATE (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3> + <p id="FP_Q97-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q97-p2"> We next consider what belongs to the bodily state of the first man: first, as regards the preservation of the individual; + secondly, as regards the preservation of the species. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q97-p3"> Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:</p> + <p id="FP_Q97-p4"> (1) Whether man in the state of innocence was immortal?</p> + <p id="FP_Q97-p5"> (2) Whether he was impassible?</p> + <p id="FP_Q97-p6"> (3) Whether he stood in need of food?</p> + <p id="FP_Q97-p7"> (4) Whether he would have obtained immortality by the tree of life?</p> + <p id="FP_Q97-p8"></p> + <div id="FP_Q97_A1" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q97.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q97_A2.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q97_A1-p0.1">Whether in the state of innocence man would have been immortal?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q97_A1-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q97_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that in the state of innocence man was not immortal. For the term "mortal" belongs to the definition of man. + But if you take away the definition, you take away the thing defined. Therefore as long as man was man he could not be immortal. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q97_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, corruptible and incorruptible are generically distinct, as the Philosopher says (Metaph. x, Did. ix, 10). But there + can be no passing from one genus to another. Therefore if the first man was incorruptible, man could not be corruptible in + the present state. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q97_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if man were immortal in the state of innocence, this would have been due either to nature or to grace. Not to nature, + for since nature does not change within the same species, he would also have been immortal now. Likewise neither would this + be owing to grace; for the first man recovered grace by repentance, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q97_A1-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.10.2" target="asv"> Wis. 10:2</a>: "He brought him out of his sins." Hence he would have regained his immortality; which is clearly not + the case. Therefore man was not immortal in the state of innocence. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q97_A1-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, immortality is promised to man as a reward, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q97_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Rev.21.4" target="asv"> Apoc. 21:4</a>: "Death shall be no more." But man was not created in the state of reward, but that he might deserve the reward. Therefore + man was not immortal in the state of innocence. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q97_A1-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q97_A1-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.5.12" target="asv">Rom. 5:12</a>): "By sin death came into the world." Therefore man was immortal before sin. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q97_A1-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> A thing may be incorruptible in three ways. First, on the part of matter---that is to say, either because it possesses no + matter, like an angel; or because it possesses matter that is in potentiality to one form only, like the heavenly bodies. + Such things as these are incorruptible by their very nature. Secondly, a thing is incorruptible in its form, inasmuch as being + by nature corruptible, yet it has an inherent disposition which preserves it wholly from + corruption; and this is called incorruptibility of glory; because as Augustine says (Ep. ad Dioscor.): "God made man's soul + of such a powerful nature, that from its fulness of beatitude, there redounds to the body a fulness of health, with the vigor + of incorruption." Thirdly, a thing may be incorruptible on the part of its efficient cause; in this sense man was incorruptible + and immortal in the state of innocence. For, as Augustine says (QQ. Vet. et Nov. Test. qu. 19 [*Work of an anonymous + author, among the supposititious works of St. Augustine]): "God made man immortal as long as he did not sin; so that he might + achieve for himself life or death." For man's body was indissoluble not by reason of any intrinsic vigor of immortality, but + by reason of a supernatural force given by God to the soul, whereby it was enabled to preserve the body from all corruption + so long as it remained itself subject to God. This entirely agrees with reason; for since the rational soul surpasses the + capacity of corporeal matter, as above explained ( + <a id="FP_Q97_A1-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q76_A1.html">Q[76], A[1]</a>), it was most properly endowed at the beginning with the power of preserving the body in a manner surpassing the capacity + of corporeal matter. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q97_A1-p8"> Reply OBJ 1 and 2: These objections are founded on natural incorruptibility and immortality.</p> + <p id="FP_Q97_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This power of preserving the body was not natural to the soul, but was the gift of grace. And though man recovered grace + as regards remission of guilt and the merit of glory; yet he did not recover immortality, the loss of which was an effect + of sin; for this was reserved for Christ to accomplish, by Whom the defect of nature was to be restored into something better, + as we shall explain further on (TP, + <a id="FP_Q97_A1-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q14_A4.html">Q[14] , A[4]</a>, ad 1). + </p> + <p id="FP_Q97_A1-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> The promised reward of the immortality of glory differs from the immortality which was bestowed on man in the state of innocence. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q97_A1-p11"></p> + <p id="FP_Q97_A1-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q97.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q97_A2.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q97_A2" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q97_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q97_A3.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q97_A2-p0.1">Whether in the state of innocence man would have been passible?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q97_A2-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q97_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that in the state of innocence man was passible. For "sensation is a kind of passion." But in the state of + innocence man would have been sensitive. Therefore he would have been passible. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q97_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, sleep is a kind of passion. Now, man slept in the state of innocence, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q97_A2-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.2.21" target="asv"> Gn. 2:21, </a> "God cast a deep sleep upon Adam." Therefore he would have been passible. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q97_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the same passage goes on to say that "He took a rib out of Adam." Therefore he was passible even to the degree of + the cutting out of part of his body. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q97_A2-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, man's body was soft. But a soft body is naturally passible as regards a hard body; therefore if a hard body had + come in contact with the soft body of the first man, the latter would have suffered from the impact. Therefore the first man + was passible. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q97_A2-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Had man been passible, he would have been also corruptible, because, as the Philosopher says (Top. vi, 3): "Excessive suffering + wastes the very substance." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q97_A2-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> "Passion" may be taken in two senses. First, in its proper sense, and thus a thing is said to suffer when changed from its + natural disposition. For passion is the effect of action; and in nature contraries are mutually active or passive, according + as one thing changes another from its natural disposition. Secondly, "passion" can be taken in a general sense for any kind + of change, even if belonging to the perfecting process of nature. Thus understanding and + sensation are said to be passions. In this second sense, man was passible in the state of innocence, and was passive both + in soul and body. In the first sense, man was impassible, both in soul and body, as he was likewise immortal; for he could + curb his passion, as he could avoid death, so long as he refrained from sin. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q97_A2-p8"> Thus it is clear how to reply to the first two objections; since sensation and sleep do not remove from man his natural disposition, + but are ordered to his natural welfare. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q97_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As already explained ( + <a id="FP_Q97_A2-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q92_A3.html">Q[92], A[3]</a>, ad 2), the rib was in Adam as the principle of the human race, as the semen in man, who is a principle through generation. + Hence as man does not suffer any natural deterioration by seminal issue; so neither did he through the separation of the rib. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q97_A2-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Man's body in the state of innocence could be preserved from suffering injury from a hard body; partly by the use of his + reason, whereby he could avoid what was harmful; and partly also by Divine Providence, so preserving him, that nothing of + a harmful nature could come upon him unawares. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q97_A2-p11"></p> + <p id="FP_Q97_A2-p12"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q97_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q97_A3.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q97_A3" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q97_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q97_A4.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q97_A3-p0.1">Whether in the state of innocence man had need of food?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q97_A3-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q97_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that in the state of innocence man did not require food. For food is necessary for man to restore what he has + lost. But Adam's body suffered no loss, as being incorruptible. Therefore he had no need of food. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q97_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, food is needed for nourishment. But nourishment involves passibility. Since, then, man's body was impassible; it + does not appear how food could be needful to him. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q97_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, we need food for the preservation of life. But Adam could preserve his life otherwise; for had he not sinned, he + would not have died. Therefore he did not require food. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q97_A3-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, the consumption of food involves voiding of the surplus, which seems unsuitable to the state of innocence. Therefore + it seems that man did not take food in the primitive state. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q97_A3-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q97_A3-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.2.16" target="asv">Gn. 2:16</a>): "Of every tree in paradise ye shall [Vulg. 'thou shalt'] eat." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q97_A3-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> In the state of innocence man had an animal life requiring food; but after the resurrection he will have a spiritual life + needing no food. In order to make this clear, we must observe that the rational soul is both soul and spirit. It is called + a soul by reason of what it possesses in common with other souls---that is, as giving life to the body; whence it is written + ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q97_A3-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.2.7" target="asv">Gn. 2:7</a>): "Man was made into a living soul"; that is, a soul giving + life to the body. But the soul is called a spirit according to what properly belongs to itself, and not to other souls, as + possessing an intellectual immaterial power. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q97_A3-p8"> Thus in the primitive state, the rational soul communicated to the body what belonged to itself as a soul; and so the body + was called "animal" [*From 'anima', a soul; Cf. + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q97_A3-p8.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.15.44" target="asv">1 Cor. 15:44 </a>seqq.], through having its life from the soul. Now the first principle of life in these inferior creatures as the Philosopher + says (De Anima ii, 4) is the vegetative soul: the operations of which are the use of food, generation, and growth. Wherefore + such operations befitted + man in the state of innocence. But in the final state, after the resurrection, the soul will, to a certain extent, communicate + to the body what properly belongs to itself as a spirit; immortality to everyone; impassibility, glory, and power to the good, + whose bodies will be called "spiritual." So, after the resurrection, man will not require food; whereas he required it in + the state of innocence. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q97_A3-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As Augustine says (QQ. Vet. et Nov. Test. qu. 19 [*Works of an anonymous author, among the supposititious works of St. Augustine]): + "How could man have an immortal body, which was sustained by food? Since an immortal being needs neither food nor drink." + For we have explained + <a id="FP_Q97_A3-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q97_A1.html">(A[1])</a> that the immortality of the primitive state was based on a supernatural force in the soul, and not on any intrinsic disposition + of the body: so + that by the action of heat, the body might lose part of its humid qualities; and to prevent the entire consumption of the + humor, man was obliged to take food. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q97_A3-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> A certain passion and alteration attends nutriment, on the part of the food changed into the substance of the thing nourished. + So we cannot thence conclude that man's body was passible, but that the food taken was passible; although this kind of passion + conduced to the perfection of the nature. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q97_A3-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> If man had not taken food he would have sinned; as he also sinned by taking the forbidden fruit. For he was told at the same + time, to abstain from the tree of knowledge of good and evil, and to eat of every other tree of Paradise. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q97_A3-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Some say that in the state of innocence man would not have taken more than necessary food, so that there would have been + nothing superfluous; which, however, is unreasonable to suppose, as implying that there would have been no faecal matter. + Wherefore there was need for voiding the surplus, yet so disposed by God as to be decorous and suitable to the state. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q97_A3-p13"></p> + <p id="FP_Q97_A3-p14"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q97_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q97_A4.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q97_A4" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q97_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q98.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q97_A4-p0.1">Whether in the state of innocence man would have acquired immortality by the tree of life?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q97_A4-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q97_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that the tree of life could not be the cause of immortality. For nothing can act beyond its own species; as + an effect does not exceed its cause. But the tree of life was corruptible, otherwise it could not be taken as food; since + food is changed into the substance of the thing nourished. Therefore the tree of life could not give incorruptibility or immortality. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q97_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, effects caused by the forces of plants and other natural agencies are natural. If therefore the tree of life caused + immortality, this would have been natural immortality. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q97_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, this would seem to be reduced to the ancient fable, that the gods, by eating a certain food, became immortal; which + the Philosopher ridicules (Metaph. iii, Did. ii, 4). + </p> + <p id="FP_Q97_A4-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q97_A4-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.3.22" target="asv">Gn. 3:22</a>): "Lest perhaps he put forth his hand, and take of the tree of life, and eat, and live for ever." Further, Augustine says + (QQ. Vet. et Nov. Test. qu. 19 [*Work of an anonymous author, among the supposititious works of St. Augustine]): "A taste + of the tree of life warded off corruption of the body; and even after sin man would have remained immortal, had he been allowed + to eat of the tree of life." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q97_A4-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> The tree of life in a certain degree was the cause of immortality, but not absolutely. To understand this, we must observe + that in the primitive state man possessed, for the preservation of life, two remedies, against two defects. One of these defects + was the lost of humidity by the action of natural heat, which acts as the soul's instrument: as a remedy against such loss + man was provided with food, taken from the other trees of paradise, as now we are + provided with the food, which we take for the same purpose. The second defect, as the Philosopher says (De Gener. i, 5), arises + from the fact that the humor which is caused from extraneous sources, being added to the humor already existing, lessens the + specific active power: as water added to wine takes at first the taste of wine, then, as more water is added, the strength + of the wine is diminished, till the wine becomes watery. In like manner, we may observe that at first the active force of + the species is so strong that it is able to transform so much of the food as is required to replace the lost tissue, as well + as what suffices for growth; later on, however, the assimilated food does not suffice for growth, but only replaces what is + lost. Last of all, in old age, it does not suffice even for this purpose; whereupon the body declines, and finally dies from + natural causes. Against this defect man was provided with a remedy in the tree of life; for its effect was to strengthen the + force of the species against the weakness resulting from the admixture of extraneous nutriment. Wherefore Augustine says (De + Civ. Dei xiv, 26): "Man had food to appease his hunger, drink to slake his thirst; and the tree of life to banish the breaking + up of old age"; and (QQ. Vet. et Nov. Test. qu. 19 [*Work of an anonymous author, among the supposititious works of St. Augustine]) + "The tree of life, like a drug, warded off all bodily corruption." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q97_A4-p7"> Yet it did not absolutely cause immortality; for neither was the soul's intrinsic power of preserving the body due to the + tree of life, nor was it of such efficiency as to give the body a disposition to immortality, whereby it might become indissoluble; + which is clear from the fact that every bodily power is finite; so the power of the tree of life could not go so far as to + give the body the prerogative of living for an infinite time, but only for a definite time. For it is + manifest that the greater a force is, the more durable is its effect; therefore, since the power of the tree of life was finite, + man's life was to be preserved for a definite time by partaking of it once; and when that time had elapsed, man was to be + either transferred to a spiritual life, or had need to eat once more of the tree of life. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q97_A4-p8"> From this the replies to the objections clearly appear. For the first proves that the tree of life did not absolutely cause + immortality; while the others show that it caused incorruption by warding off corruption, according to the explanation above + given. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q97_A4-p9"></p> + <p id="FP_Q97_A4-p10"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q97_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q98.html"></a> + </div> + <a href="summa.FP_Q96_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q97_A1.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q98" class="div3"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q97_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q98_A1.html"></a> + <h3 id="FP_Q98-p0.1">OF THE PRESERVATION OF THE SPECIES (TWO ARTICLES)</h3> + <p id="FP_Q98-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q98-p2"> We next consider what belongs to the preservation of the species; and, first, of generation; secondly, of the state of the + offspring. Under the first head there are two points of inquiry: + </p> + <p id="FP_Q98-p3"> (1) Whether in the state of innocence there would have been generation?</p> + <p id="FP_Q98-p4"> (2) Whether generation would have been through coition?</p> + <div id="FP_Q98_A1" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q98.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q98_A2.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q98_A1-p0.1">Whether in the state of innocence generation existed?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q98_A1-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q98_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem there would have been no generation in the state of innocence. For, as stated in Phys. v, 5, "corruption is + contrary to generation." But contraries affect the same subject: also there would have been no corruption in the state of + innocence. Therefore neither would there have been generation. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q98_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the object of generation is the preservation in the species of that which is corruptible in the individual. Wherefore + there is no generation in those individual things which last for ever. But in the state of innocence man would have lived + for ever. Therefore in the state of innocence there would have been no generation. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q98_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, by generation man is multiplied. But the multiplication of masters requires the division of property, to avoid confusion + of mastership. Therefore, since man was made master of the animals, it would have been necessary to make a division of rights + when the human race increased by generation. This is against the natural law, according to which all things are in common, + as Isidore says (Etym. v, 4). Therefore there would have been no generation in the + state of innocence. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q98_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q98_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.1.28" target="asv">Gn. 1:28</a>): "Increase and multiply, and fill the earth." But this increase could not come about save by generation, since the original + number of mankind was two only. Therefore there would have been generation in the state of innocence. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q98_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> In the state of innocence there would have been generation of offspring for the multiplication of the human race; otherwise + man's sin would have been very necessary, for such a great blessing to be its result. We must, therefore, observe that man, + by his nature, is established, as it were, midway between corruptible and incorruptible creatures, his soul being naturally + incorruptible, while his body is naturally corruptible. We must also observe that nature's + purpose appears to be different as regards corruptible and incorruptible things. For that seems to be the direct purpose of + nature, which is invariable and perpetual; while what is only for a time is seemingly not the chief purpose of nature, but + as it were, subordinate to something else; otherwise, when it ceased to exist, nature's purpose would become void. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q98_A1-p7"> Therefore, since in things corruptible none is everlasting and permanent except the species, it follows that the chief purpose + of nature is the good of the species; for the preservation of which natural generation is ordained. On the other hand, incorruptible + substances survive, not only in the species, but also in the individual; wherefore even the individuals are included in the + chief purpose of nature. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q98_A1-p8"> Hence it belongs to man to beget offspring, on the part of the naturally corruptible body. But on the part of the soul, which + is incorruptible, it is fitting that the multitude of individuals should be the direct purpose of nature, or rather of the + Author of nature, Who alone is the Creator of the human soul. Wherefore, to provide for the multiplication of the human race, + He established the begetting of offspring even in the state of innocence. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q98_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> In the state of innocence the human body was in itself corruptible, but it could be preserved from corruption by the soul. + Therefore, since generation belongs to things corruptible, man was not to be deprived thereof. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q98_A1-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Although generation in the state of innocence might not have been required for the preservation of the species, yet it would + have been required for the multiplication of the individual. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q98_A1-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> In our present state a division of possessions is necessary on account of the multiplicity of masters, inasmuch as community + of possession is a source of strife, as the Philosopher says (Politic. ii, 5). In the state of innocence, however, the will + of men would have been so ordered that without any danger of strife they would have used in common, according to each one's + need, those things of which they were masters---a state of things to be observed + even now among many good men. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q98_A1-p12"></p> + <p id="FP_Q98_A1-p13"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q98.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q98_A2.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q98_A2" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q98_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q99.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q98_A2-p0.1">Whether in the state of innocence there would have been generation by coition?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q98_A2-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q98_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that generation by coition would not have existed in the state of innocence. For, as Damascene says (De Fide + Orth. ii, 11; iv, 25), the first man in the terrestrial Paradise was "like an angel." But in the future state of the resurrection, + when men will be like the angels, "they shall neither marry nor be married," as is written + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q98_A2-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.22.30" target="asv">Mat. 22:30</a>. Therefore neither in paradise would there have been generation by coition. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q98_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, our first parents were created at the age of perfect development. Therefore, if generation by coition had existed + before sin, they would have had intercourse while still in paradise: which was not the case according to Scripture ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q98_A2-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.4.1" target="asv">Gn. 4:1</a>). + </p> + <p id="FP_Q98_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, in carnal intercourse, more than at any other time, man becomes like the beasts, on account of the vehement delight + which he takes therein; whence contingency is praiseworthy, whereby man refrains from such pleasures. But man is compared + to beasts by reason of sin, according to + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q98_A2-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.48.13" target="asv"> Ps. 48:13</a>: "Man, when he was in honor, did not understand; he is compared to senseless beasts, and is become like to them." Therefore, + before sin, there + would have been no such intercourse of man and woman. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q98_A2-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, in the state of innocence there would have been no corruption. But virginal integrity is corrupted by intercourse. + Therefore there would have been no such thing in the state of innocence. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q98_A2-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> God made man and woman before sin ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q98_A2-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.1" target="asv">Gn. 1</a>, + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q98_A2-p6.2" href="./asv.html#Gen.2" target="asv">2</a>). But nothing is void in God's works. Therefore, even if man had not sinned, there would have been such intercourse, to which + the distinction of sex is ordained. Moreover, we are told that woman was made to be a help to man ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q98_A2-p6.3" href="./asv.html#Gen.2.18" target="asv">Gn. 2:18</a>, + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q98_A2-p6.4" href="./asv.html#Gen.2.20" target="asv">20</a>). But she is not fitted to help man except in generation, because another man would have proved a more effective help in + anything else. Therefore there would + have been such generation also in the state of innocence. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q98_A2-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Some of the earlier doctors, considering the nature of concupiscence as regards generation in our present state, concluded + that in the state of innocence generation would not have been effected in the same way. Thus Gregory of Nyssa says (De Hom. + Opif. xvii) that in paradise the human race would have been multiplied by some other means, as the angels were multiplied + without coition by the operation of the Divine Power. He adds that God made man male and + female before sin, because He foreknew the mode of generation which would take place after sin, which He foresaw. But this + is unreasonable. For what is natural to man was neither acquired nor forfeited by sin. Now it is clear that generation by + coition is natural to man by reason of his animal life, which he possessed even before sin, as above explained ( + <a id="FP_Q98_A2-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q97_A3.html">Q[97], A[3]</a>), just as it is natural to other perfect animals, as the corporeal members make it clear. So we cannot + allow that these members would not have had a natural use, as other members had, before sin. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q98_A2-p8"> Thus, as regards generation by coition, there are, in the present state of life, two things to be considered. One, which + comes from nature, is the union of man and woman; for in every act of generation there is an active and a passive principle. + Wherefore, since wherever there is distinction of sex, the active principle is male and the passive is female; the order of + nature demands that for the purpose of generation there should be concurrence of male and female. The second + thing to be observed is a certain deformity of excessive concupiscence, which in the state of innocence would not have existed, + when the lower powers were entirely subject to reason. Wherefore Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 26): "We must be far from + supposing that offspring could not be begotten without concupiscence. All the bodily members would have been equally moved + by the will, without ardent or wanton incentive, with calmness of soul and body." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q98_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> In paradise man would have been like an angel in his spirituality of mind, yet with an animal life in his body. After the + resurrection man will be like an angel, spiritualized in soul and body. Wherefore there is no parallel. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q98_A2-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. ix, 4), our first parents did not come together in paradise, because on account of sin they + were ejected from paradise shortly after the creation of the woman; or because, having received the general Divine command + relative to generation, they awaited the special command relative to time. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q98_A2-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Beasts are without reason. In this way man becomes, as it were, like them in coition, because he cannot moderate concupiscence. + In the state of innocence nothing of this kind would have happened that was not regulated by reason, not because delight of + sense was less, as some say (rather indeed would sensible delight have been the greater in proportion to the greater purity + of nature and the greater sensibility of the body), but because the force of + concupiscence would not have so inordinately thrown itself into such pleasure, being curbed by reason, whose place it is not + to lessen sensual pleasure, but to prevent the force of concupiscence from cleaving to it immoderately. By "immoderately" + I mean going beyond the bounds of reason, as a sober person does not take less pleasure in food taken in moderation than the + glutton, but his concupiscence lingers less in such pleasures. This is what Augustine means by the words quoted, which do + not + exclude intensity of pleasure from the state of innocence, but ardor of desire and restlessness of the mind. Therefore continence + would not have been praiseworthy in the state of innocence, whereas it is praiseworthy in our present state, not because it + removes fecundity, but because it excludes inordinate desire. In that state fecundity would have been without lust. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q98_A2-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 26): In that state "intercourse would have been without prejudice to virginal integrity; + this would have remained intact, as it does in the menses. And just as in giving birth the mother was then relieved, not by + groans of pain, but by the instigations of maturity; so in conceiving, the union was one, not of lustful desire, but of deliberate + action." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q98_A2-p13"></p> + <p id="FP_Q98_A2-p14"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q98_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q99.html"></a> + </div> + <a href="summa.FP_Q97_A4.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q98_A1.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q99" class="div3"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q98_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q99_A1.html"></a> + <h3 id="FP_Q99-p0.1">OF THE CONDITION OF THE OFFSPRING AS TO THE BODY (TWO ARTICLES)</h3> + <p id="FP_Q99-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q99-p2"> We must now consider the condition of the offspring---first, as regards the body; secondly, as regards virtue; thirdly, in + knowledge. Under the first head there are two points of inquiry: + </p> + <p id="FP_Q99-p3"> (1) Whether in the state of innocence children would have had full powers of the body immediately after birth?</p> + <p id="FP_Q99-p4"> (2) Whether all infants would have been of the male sex?</p> + <div id="FP_Q99_A1" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q99.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q99_A2.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q99_A1-p0.1">Whether in the state of innocence children would have had perfect strength of body as to the use of its members immediately + after birth? + </h4> + <p id="FP_Q99_A1-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q99_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that in the state of innocence children would have had perfect strength of the body, as to the use of its members, + immediately after birth. For Augustine says (De Pecc. Merit. et Remiss. i, 38): "This weakness of the body befits their weakness + of mind." But in the state of innocence there would have been no weakness of mind. Therefore neither would there have been + weakness of body in infants. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q99_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, some animals at birth have sufficient strength to use their members. But man is nobler than other animals. Therefore + much more is it natural to man to have strength to use his members at birth; and thus it appears to be a punishment of sin + that he has not that strength. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q99_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, inability to secure a proffered pleasure causes affliction. But if children had not full strength in the use of + their limbs, they would often have been unable to procure something pleasurable offered to them; and so they would have been + afflicted, which was not possible before sin. Therefore, in the state of innocence, children would not have been deprived + of the use of their limbs. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q99_A1-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, the weakness of old age seems to correspond to that of infancy. But in the state of innocence there would have been + no weakness of old age. Therefore neither would there have been such weakness in infancy. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q99_A1-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Everything generated is first imperfect. But in the state of innocence children would have been begotten by generation. Therefore + from the first they would have been imperfect in bodily size and power. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q99_A1-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> By faith alone do we hold truths which are above nature, and what we believe rests on authority. Wherefore, in making any + assertion, we must be guided by the nature of things, except in those things which are above nature, and are made known to + us by Divine authority. Now it is clear that it is as natural as it is befitting to the principles of human nature that children + should not have sufficient strength for the use of their limbs immediately after birth. + Because in proportion to other animals man has naturally a larger brain. Wherefore it is natural, on account of the considerable + humidity of the brain in children, that the nerves which are instruments of movement, should not be apt for moving the limbs. + On the other hand, no Catholic doubts it possible for a child to have, by Divine power, the use of its limbs immediately after + birth. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q99_A1-p8"> Now we have it on the authority of Scripture that "God made man right" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q99_A1-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Eccl.7.30" target="asv">Eccles. 7:30</a>), which rightness, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 11), consists in the perfect subjection of the body to the soul. As, + therefore, in the primitive state it was impossible to find in the human limbs anything repugnant to man's well-ordered will, + so was it impossible for those limbs to fail in executing the will's commands. Now the human will is well ordered when it + tends + to acts which are befitting to man. But the same acts are not befitting to man at every season of life. We must, therefore, + conclude that children would not have had sufficient strength for the use of their limbs for the purpose of performing every + kind of act; but only for the acts befitting the state of infancy, such as suckling, and the like. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q99_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Augustine is speaking of the weakness which we observe in children even as regards those acts which befit the state of infancy; + as is clear from his preceding remark that "even when close to the breast, and longing for it, they are more apt to cry than + to suckle." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q99_A1-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The fact that some animals have the use of their limbs immediately after birth, is due, not to their superiority, since more + perfect animals are not so endowed; but to the dryness of the brain, and to the operations proper to such animals being imperfect, + so that a small amount of strength suffices them. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q99_A1-p11"> Reply OBJ 3 is clear from what we have said above. We may add that they would have desired nothing except with an ordinate + will; and only what was befitting to their state of life. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q99_A1-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> In the state of innocence man would have been born, yet not subject to corruption. Therefore in that state there could have + been certain infantile defects which result from birth; but not senile defects leading to corruption. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q99_A1-p13"></p> + <p id="FP_Q99_A1-p14"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q99.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q99_A2.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q99_A2" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q99_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q100.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q99_A2-p0.1">Whether, in the primitive state, women would have been born?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q99_A2-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q99_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that in the primitive state woman would not have been born. For the Philosopher says (De Gener. Animal. ii, + 3) that woman is a "misbegotten male," as though she were a product outside the purpose of nature. But in that state nothing + would have been unnatural in human generation. Therefore in that state women would not have been born. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q99_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, every agent produces its like, unless prevented by insufficient power or ineptness of matter: thus a small fire + cannot burn green wood. But in generation the active force is in the male. Since, therefore, in the state of innocence man's + active force was not subject to defect, nor was there inept matter on the part of the woman, it seems that males would always + have been born. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q99_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, in the state of innocence generation is ordered to the multiplication of the human race. But the race would have + been sufficiently multiplied by the first man and woman, from the fact that they would have lived for ever. Therefore, in + the state of innocence, there was no need for women to be born. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q99_A2-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Nature's process in generation would have been in harmony with the manner in which it was established by God. But established + male and female in human nature, as it is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q99_A2-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.1" target="asv">Gn. 1</a>, + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q99_A2-p5.2" href="./asv.html#Gen.2" target="asv">2</a>). Therefore also in the state of innocence male and female would have been born. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q99_A2-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Nothing belonging to the completeness of human nature would have been lacking in the state of innocence. And as different + grades belong to the perfection of the universe, so also diversity of sex belongs to the perfection of human nature. Therefore + in the state of innocence, both sexes would have been begotten. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q99_A2-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Woman is said to be a "misbegotten male," as being a product outside the purpose of nature considered in the individual case: + but not against the purpose of universal nature, as above explained ( + <a id="FP_Q99_A2-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q92_A1.html">Q[92], A[1]</a>, ad 2). + </p> + <p id="FP_Q99_A2-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The generation of woman is not occasioned either by a defect of the active force or by inept matter, as the objection proposes; + but sometimes by an extrinsic accidental cause; thus the Philosopher says (De Animal. Histor. vi, 19): "The northern wind + favors the generation of males, and the southern wind that of females": sometimes also by some impression in the soul (of + the parents), which may easily have some effect on the body (of the child). + Especially was this the case in the state of innocence, when the body was more subject to the soul; so that by the mere will + of the parent the sex of the offspring might be diversified. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q99_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The offspring would have been begotten to an animal life, as to the use of food and generation. Hence it was fitting that + all should generate, and not only the first parents. From this it seems to follow that males and females would have been in + equal number. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q99_A2-p10"></p> + <p id="FP_Q99_A2-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q99_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q100.html"></a> + </div> + <a href="summa.FP_Q98_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q99_A1.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q100" class="div3"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q99_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q100_A1.html"></a> + <h3 id="FP_Q100-p0.1">OF THE CONDITION OF THE OFFSPRING AS REGARDS RIGHTEOUSNESS (TWO ARTICLES)</h3> + <p id="FP_Q100-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q100-p2"> We now have to consider the condition of the offspring as to righteousness. Under this head there are two points of inquiry:</p> + <p id="FP_Q100-p3"> (1) Whether men would have been born in a state of righteousness?</p> + <p id="FP_Q100-p4"> (2) Whether they would have been born confirmed in righteousness?</p> + <div id="FP_Q100_A1" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q100.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q100_A2.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q100_A1-p0.1">Whether men would have been born in a state of righteousness?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q100_A1-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q100_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that in the state of innocence men would not have been born in a state of righteousness. For Hugh of St. Victor + says (De Sacram. i): "Before sin the first man would have begotten children sinless; but not heirs to their father's righteousness." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q100_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, righteousness is effected by grace, as the Apostle says ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q100_A1-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.5.16" target="asv">Rom. 5:16</a>, + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q100_A1-p3.2" href="./asv.html#Rom.5.21" target="asv">21</a>). Now grace is not transfused from one to another, for thus it would be natural; but is infused by God alone. Therefore children + would not have been born righteous. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q100_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, righteousness is in the soul. But the soul is not transmitted from the parent. Therefore neither would righteousness + have been transmitted from parents, to the children. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q100_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Anselm says (De Concep. Virg. x): "As long as man did not sin, he would have begotten children endowed with righteousness + together with the rational soul." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q100_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Man naturally begets a specific likeness to himself. Hence whatever accidental qualities result from the nature of the species, + must be alike in parent and child, unless nature fails in its operation, which would not have occurred in the state of innocence. + But individual accidents do not necessarily exist alike in parent and child. Now original righteousness, in which the first + man was created, was an accident pertaining to the nature of the species, not as + caused by the principles of the species, but as a gift conferred by God on the entire human nature. This is clear from the + fact that opposites are of the same genus; and original sin, which is opposed to original righteousness, is called the sin + of nature, wherefore it is transmitted from the parent to the offspring; and for this reason also, the children would have + been assimilated to their parents as regards original righteousness. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q100_A1-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> These words of Hugh are to be understood as referring, not to the habit of righteousness, but to the execution of the act + thereof. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q100_A1-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Some say that children would have been born, not with the righteousness of grace, which is the principle of merit, but with + original righteousness. But since the root of original righteousness, which conferred righteousness on the first man when + he was made, consists in the supernatural subjection of the reason to God, which subjection results from sanctifying grace, + as above explained ( + <a id="FP_Q100_A1-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q95_A1.html">Q[95], A[1]</a>), we must conclude that if + children were born in original righteousness, they would also have been born in grace; thus we have said above that the first + man was created in grace ( + <a id="FP_Q100_A1-p8.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q95_A1.html">Q[95], A[1]</a>). This grace, however, would not have been natural, for it would not have been transfused by virtue of the semen; but would + have been conferred on man immediately on his receiving a rational soul. In the same way the rational soul, which is not transmitted + by the parent, is infused by God as soon as the human + body is apt to receive it. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q100_A1-p9"> From this the reply to the third objection is clear.</p> + <p id="FP_Q100_A1-p10"></p> + <p id="FP_Q100_A1-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q100.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q100_A2.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q100_A2" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q100_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q101.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q100_A2-p0.1">Whether in the state of innocence children would have been born confirmed in righteousness?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q100_A2-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q100_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that in the state of innocence children would have been born confirmed in righteousness. For Gregory says (Moral. + iv) on the words of + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q100_A2-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Job.3.13" target="asv"> Job 3:13</a>: "For now I should have been asleep, etc.: If no sinful corruption had infected our first parent, he would not have begotten + "children of hell"; no children would have been born of him but such as were destined to be saved by the Redeemer." Therefore + all would have been born confirmed + in righteousness. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q100_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Anselm says (Cur Deus Homo i, 18): "If our first parents had lived so as not to yield to temptation, they would + have been confirmed in grace, so that with their offspring they would have been unable to sin any more." Therefore the children + would have been born confirmed in righteousness. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q100_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, good is stronger than evil. But by the sin of the first man there resulted, in those born of him, the necessity + of sin. Therefore, if the first man had persevered in righteousness, his descendants would have derived from him the necessity + of preserving righteousness. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q100_A2-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, the angels who remained faithful to God, while the others sinned, were at once confirmed in grace, so as to be unable + henceforth to sin. In like manner, therefore, man would have been confirmed in grace if he had persevered. But he would have + begotten children like himself. Therefore they also would have been born confirmed in righteousness. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q100_A2-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 10): "Happy would have been the whole human race if neither they---that is our first parents---had + committed any evil to be transmitted to their descendants, nor any of their race had committed any sin for which they would + have been condemned." From which words we gather that even if our first parents had not sinned, any of their descendants might + have done evil; and therefore they would not have been born confirmed in + righteousness. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q100_A2-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> It does not seem possible that in the state of innocence children would have been born confirmed in righteousness. For it + is clear that at their birth they would not have had greater perfection than their parents at the time of begetting. Now the + parents, as long as they begot children, would not have been confirmed in righteousness. For the rational creature is confirmed + in righteousness through the beatitude given by the clear vision of God; and when once + it has seen God, it cannot but cleave to Him Who is the essence of goodness, wherefrom no one can turn away, since nothing + is desired or loved but under the aspect of good. I say this according to the general law; for it may be otherwise in the + case of special privilege, such as we believe was granted to the Virgin Mother of God. And as soon as Adam had attained to + that happy state of seeing God in His Essence, he would have become spiritual in soul and body; and his animal life would + have + ceased, wherein alone there is generation. Hence it is clear that children would not have been born confirmed in righteousness. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q100_A2-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> If Adam had not sinned, he would not have begotten "children of hell" in the sense that they would contract from him sin + which is the cause of hell: yet by sinning of their own free-will they could have become "children of hell." If, however, + they did not become "children of hell" by falling into sin, this would not have been owing to their being confirmed in righteousness, + but to Divine Providence preserving them free from sin. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q100_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Anselm does not say this by way of assertion, but only as an opinion, which is clear from his mode of expression as follows: + "It seems that if they had lived, etc." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q100_A2-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This argument is not conclusive, though Anselm seems to have been influenced by it, as appears from his words above quoted. + For the necessity of sin incurred by the descendants would not have been such that they could not return to righteousness, + which is the case only with the damned. Wherefore neither would the parents have transmitted to their descendants the necessity + of not sinning, which is only in the blessed. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q100_A2-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> There is no comparison between man and the angels; for man's free-will is changeable, both before and after choice; whereas + the angel's is not changeable, as we have said above in treating of the angels ( + <a id="FP_Q100_A2-p11.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q64_A2.html">Q[64], A[2]</a>). + </p> + <p id="FP_Q100_A2-p12"></p> + <p id="FP_Q100_A2-p13"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q100_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q101.html"></a> + </div> + <a href="summa.FP_Q99_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q100_A1.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q101" class="div3"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q100_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q101_A1.html"></a> + <h3 id="FP_Q101-p0.1">OF THE CONDITION OF THE OFFSPRING AS REGARDS KNOWLEDGE (TWO ARTICLES)</h3> + <p id="FP_Q101-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q101-p2"> We next consider the condition of the offspring as to knowledge. Under this head there are two points of inquiry:</p> + <p id="FP_Q101-p3"> (1) Whether in the state of innocence children would have been born with perfect knowledge?</p> + <p id="FP_Q101-p4"> (2) Whether they would have had perfect use of reason at the moment of birth?</p> + <div id="FP_Q101_A1" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q101.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q101_A2.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q101_A1-p0.1">Whether in the state of innocence children would have been born with perfect knowledge?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q101_A1-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q101_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that in the state of innocence children would have been born with perfect knowledge. For Adam would have begotten + children like himself. But Adam was gifted with perfect knowledge ( + <a id="FP_Q101_A1-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q94_A3.html">Q[94], A[3]</a>). Therefore children would have been born of him with perfect knowledge. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q101_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, ignorance is a result of sin, as Bede says (Cf. FS, + <a id="FP_Q101_A1-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q85_A3.html">Q[85], A[3]</a>). But ignorance is privation of knowledge. Therefore before sin children would have had perfect knowledge as soon as they + were born. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q101_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, children would have been gifted with righteousness from birth. But knowledge is required for righteousness, since + it directs our actions. Therefore they would also have been gifted with knowledge. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q101_A1-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> The human soul is naturally "like a blank tablet on which nothing is written," as the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 4). + But the nature of the soul is the same now as it would have been in the state of innocence. Therefore the souls of children + would have been without knowledge at birth. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q101_A1-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As above stated ( + <a id="FP_Q101_A1-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q99_A1.html">Q[99], A[1]</a>), as regards belief in matters which are above nature, we rely on authority alone; and so, when authority is wanting, we + must be guided by the ordinary course of nature. Now it is natural for man to acquire knowledge through the senses, as above + explained ( + <a id="FP_Q101_A1-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q55_A2.html">Q[55], A[2]</a>; + <a id="FP_Q101_A1-p6.3" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q84_A6.html">Q[84], A[6]</a>); and for this reason is the soul united to the body, that it needs it for + its proper operation; and this would not be so if the soul were endowed at birth with knowledge not acquired through the sensitive + powers. We must conclude then, that, in the state of innocence, children would not have been born with perfect knowledge; + but in course of time they would have acquired knowledge without difficulty by discovery or learning. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q101_A1-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The perfection of knowledge was an individual accident of our first parent, so far as he was established as the father and + instructor of the whole human race. Therefore he begot children like himself, not in that respect, but only in those accidents + which were natural or conferred gratuitously on the whole nature. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q101_A1-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Ignorance is privation of knowledge due at some particular time; and this would not have been in children from their birth, + for they would have possessed the knowledge due to them at that time. Hence, no ignorance would have been in them, but only + nescience in regard to certain matters. Such nescience was even in the holy angels, according to Dionysius (Coel. Hier. vii). + </p> + <p id="FP_Q101_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Children would have had sufficient knowledge to direct them to deeds of righteousness, in which men are guided by universal + principles of right; and this knowledge of theirs would have been much more complete than what we have now by nature, as likewise + their knowledge of other universal principles. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q101_A1-p10"></p> + <p id="FP_Q101_A1-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q101.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q101_A2.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q101_A2" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q101_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q102.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q101_A2-p0.1">Whether children would have had perfect use of reason at birth?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q101_A2-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q101_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that children would have had perfect use of reason at birth. For that children have not perfect use of reason + in our present state, is due to the soul being weighed down by the body; which was not the case in paradise, because, as it + is written, "The corruptible body is a load upon the soul" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q101_A2-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.9.15" target="asv">Wis. 9:15</a>). Therefore, before sin and the corruption which resulted therefrom, children would have had the perfect use of reason at + birth. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q101_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, some animals at birth have the use of their natural powers, as the lamb at once flees from the wolf. Much more, + therefore, would men in the state of innocence have had perfect use of reason at birth. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q101_A2-p4"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> In all things produced by generation nature proceeds from the imperfect to the perfect. Therefore children would not have + had the perfect use of reason from the very outset. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q101_A2-p5"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As above stated ( + <a id="FP_Q101_A2-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q84_A7.html">Q[84], A[7]</a>), the use of reason depends in a certain manner on the use of the sensitive powers; wherefore, while the senses are tired + and the interior sensitive powers hampered, man has not the perfect use of reason, as we see in those who are asleep or delirious. + Now the sensitive powers are situate in corporeal organs; and therefore, so long as the latter are hindered, the action of + the former is of necessity + hindered also; and likewise, consequently, the use of reason. Now children are hindered in the use of these powers on account + of the humidity of the brain; wherefore they have perfect use neither of these powers nor of reason. Therefore, in the state + of innocence, children would not have had the perfect use of reason, which they would have enjoyed later on in life. Yet they + would have had a more perfect use than they have now, as to matters regarding that particular state, as explained above + regarding the use of their limbs ( + <a id="FP_Q101_A2-p5.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q99_A1.html">Q[99], A[1]</a>). + </p> + <p id="FP_Q101_A2-p6"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The corruptible body is a load upon the soul, because it hinders the use of reason even in those matters which belong to + man at all ages. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q101_A2-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Even other animals have not at birth such a perfect use of their natural powers as they have later on. This is clear from + the fact that birds teach their young to fly; and the like may be observed in other animals. Moreover a special impediment + exists in man from the humidity of the brain, as we have said above ( + <a id="FP_Q101_A2-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q99_A1.html">Q[99], A[1]</a>). + </p> + <p id="FP_Q101_A2-p8"></p> + <p id="FP_Q101_A2-p9"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q101_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q102.html"></a> + </div> + <a href="summa.FP_Q100_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q101_A1.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q102" class="div3"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q101_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q102_A1.html"></a> + <h3 id="FP_Q102-p0.1">OF MAN'S ABODE, WHICH IS PARADISE (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3> + <p id="FP_Q102-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q102-p2"> We next consider man's abode, which is paradise. Under this head there are four points of inquiry:</p> + <p id="FP_Q102-p3"> (1) Whether paradise is a corporeal place?</p> + <p id="FP_Q102-p4"> (2) Whether it is a place apt for human habitation?</p> + <p id="FP_Q102-p5"> (3) For what purpose was man placed in paradise?</p> + <p id="FP_Q102-p6"> (4) Whether he should have been created in paradise?</p> + <div id="FP_Q102_A1" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q102.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q102_A2.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q102_A1-p0.1">Whether paradise is a corporeal place?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q102_A1-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q102_A1-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that paradise is not a corporeal place. For Bede [*Strabus, Gloss on + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q102_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.2.8" target="asv"> Gn. 2:8</a>] says that "paradise reaches to the lunar circle." But no earthly place answers that description, both because it is contrary + to the nature of the earth to be raised up so high, and because beneath the moon is the region of fire, which would consume + the earth. Therefore paradise is not a corporeal place. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q102_A1-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Scripture mentions four rivers as rising in paradise ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q102_A1-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.2.10" target="asv">Gn. 2:10</a>). But the rivers there mentioned have visible sources elsewhere, as is clear from the Philosopher (Meteor. i). Therefore + paradise is not a corporeal place. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q102_A1-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, although men have explored the entire habitable world, yet none have made mention of the place of paradise. Therefore + apparently it is not a corporeal place. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q102_A1-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, the tree of life is described as growing in paradise. But the tree of life is a spiritual thing, for it is written + of Wisdom that "She is a tree of life to them that lay hold on her" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q102_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Prov.3.18" target="asv">Prov. 3:18</a>). Therefore paradise also is not a corporeal, but a spiritual place. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q102_A1-p6"> + <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, if paradise be a corporeal place, the trees also of paradise must be corporeal. But it seems they were not; for + corporeal trees were produced on the third day, while the planting of the trees of paradise is recorded after the work of + the six days. Therefore paradise was not a corporeal place. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q102_A1-p7"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. viii, 1): "Three general opinions prevail about paradise. Some understand a place merely corporeal; + others a place entirely spiritual; while others, whose opinion, I confess, hold that paradise was both corporeal and spiritual." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q102_A1-p8"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiii, 21): "Nothing prevents us from holding, within proper limits, a spiritual paradise; + so long as we believe in the truth of the events narrated as having there occurred." For whatever Scripture tells us about + paradise is set down as matter of history; and wherever Scripture makes use of this method, we must hold to the historical + truth of the narrative as a foundation of whatever spiritual explanation we may offer. And so + paradise, as Isidore says (Etym. xiv, 3), "is a place situated in the east, its name being the Greek for garden." It was fitting + that it should be in the east; for it is to be believed that it was situated in the most excellent part of the earth. Now + the east is the right hand on the heavens, as the Philosopher explains (De Coel. ii, 2); and the right hand is nobler than + the left: hence it was fitting that God should place the earthly paradise in the east. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q102_A1-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Bede's assertion is untrue, if taken in its obvious sense. It may, however, be explained to mean that paradise reaches to + the moon, not literally, but figuratively; because, as Isidore says (Etym. xiv, 3), the atmosphere there is "a continually + even temperature"; and in this respect it is like the heavenly bodies, which are devoid of opposing elements. Mention, however, + is made of the moon rather than of other bodies, because, of all the heavenly + bodies, the moon is nearest to us, and is, moreover, the most akin to the earth; hence it is observed to be overshadowed by + clouds so as to be almost obscured. Others say that paradise reached to the moon---that is, to the middle space of the air, + where rain, and wind, and the like arise; because the moon is said to have influence on such changes. But in this sense it + would not be a fit place for human dwelling, through being uneven in temperature, and not attuned to the human temperament, + as + is the lower atmosphere in the neighborhood of the earth. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q102_A1-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. viii, 7): "It is probable that man has no idea where paradise was, and that the rivers, whose + sources are said to be known, flowed for some distance underground, and then sprang up elsewhere. For who is not aware that + such is the case with some other streams?" + </p> + <p id="FP_Q102_A1-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The situation of paradise is shut off from the habitable world by mountains, or seas, or some torrid region, which cannot + be crossed; and so people who have written about topography make no mention of it. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q102_A1-p12"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> The tree of life is a material tree, and so called because its fruit was endowed with a life-preserving power as above stated + ( + <a id="FP_Q102_A1-p12.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q97_A4.html">Q[97] , A[4]</a>). Yet it had a spiritual signification; as the rock in the desert was of a material nature, and yet signified Christ. In + like manner the tree of the knowledge of good and evil was a material tree, so called in view of future events; because, after + eating of it, man was to learn, by + experience of the consequent punishment, the difference between the good of obedience and the evil of rebellion. It may also + be said to signify spiritually the free-will as some say. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q102_A1-p13"> + <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> According to Augustine (Gen. ad lit. v, 5, viii, 3), the plants were not actually produced on the third day, but in their + seminal virtues; whereas, after the work of the six days, the plants, both of paradise and others, were actually produced. + According to other holy writers, we ought to say that all the plants were actually produced on the third day, including the + trees of paradise; and what is said of the trees of paradise being planted after the + work of the six days is to be understood, they say, by way of recapitulation. Whence our text reads: "The Lord God had planted + a paradise of pleasure from the beginning" ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q102_A1-p13.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.2.8" target="asv">Gn. 2:8</a>). + </p> + <p id="FP_Q102_A1-p14"></p> + <p id="FP_Q102_A1-p15"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q102.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q102_A2.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q102_A2" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q102_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q102_A3.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q102_A2-p0.1">Whether paradise was a place adapted to be the abode of man?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q102_A2-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q102_A2-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that paradise was not a place adapted to be the abode of man. For man and angels are similarly ordered to beatitude. + But the angels from the very beginning of their existence were made to dwell in the abode of the blessed---that is, the empyrean + heaven. Therefore the place of man's habitation should have been there also. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q102_A2-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, if some definite place were required for man's abode, this would be required on the part either of the soul or of + the body. If on the part of the soul, the place would be in heaven, which is adapted to the nature of the soul; since the + desire of heaven is implanted in all. On the part of the body, there was no need for any other place than the one provided + for other animals. Therefore paradise was not at all adapted to be the abode of man. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q102_A2-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, a place which contains nothing is useless. But after sin, paradise was not occupied by man. Therefore if it were + adapted as a dwelling-place for man, it seems that God made paradise to no purpose. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q102_A2-p5"> + <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, since man is of an even temperament, a fitting place for him should be of even temperature. But paradise was not + of an even temperature; for it is said to have been on the equator---a situation of extreme heat, since twice in the year + the sun passes vertically over the heads of its inhabitants. Therefore paradise was not a fit dwelling-place for man. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q102_A2-p6"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 11): "Paradise was a divinely ordered region, and worthy of him who was made to God's image." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q102_A2-p7"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As above stated ( + <a id="FP_Q102_A2-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q97_A1.html">Q[97], A[1]</a>), Man was incorruptible and immortal, not because his body had a disposition to incorruptibility, but because in his soul + there was a power preserving the body from corruption. Now the human body may be corrupted from within or from without. From + within, the body is corrupted by the consumption of the humors, and by old age, as above explained ( + <a id="FP_Q102_A2-p7.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q97_A4.html">Q[97], A[4]</a>), and man was able to + ward off such corruption by food. Among those things which corrupt the body from without, the chief seems to be an atmosphere + of unequal temperature; and to such corruption a remedy is found in an atmosphere of equable nature. In paradise both conditions + were found; because, as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 11): "Paradise was permeated with the all pervading brightness of + a temperate, pure, and exquisite atmosphere, and decked with ever-flowering plants." Whence it is clear that paradise + was most fit to be a dwelling-place for man, and in keeping with his original state of immortality. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q102_A2-p8"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The empyrean heaven is the highest of corporeal places, and is outside the region of change. By the first of these two conditions, + it is a fitting abode for the angelic nature: for, as Augustine says (De Trin. ii), "God rules corporeal creatures through + spiritual creatures." Hence it is fitting that the spiritual nature should be established above the entire corporeal nature, + as presiding over it. By the second condition, it is a fitting abode for the + state of beatitude, which is endowed with the highest degree of stability. Thus the abode of beatitude was suited to the very + nature of the angel; therefore he was created there. But it is not suited to man's nature, since man is not set as a ruler + over the entire corporeal creation: it is a fitting abode for man in regard only to his beatitude. Wherefore he was not placed + from the beginning in the empyrean heaven, but was destined to be transferred thither in the state of his final + beatitude. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q102_A2-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> It is ridiculous to assert that any particular place is natural to the soul or to any spiritual substances, though some particular + place may have a certain fitness in regard to spiritual substances. For the earthly paradise was a place adapted to man, as + regards both his body and his soul---that is, inasmuch as in his soul was the force which preserved the human body from corruption. + This could not be said of the other animals. Therefore, as Damascene + says (De Fide Orth. ii, 11): "No irrational animal inhabited paradise"; although, by a certain dispensation, the animals were + brought thither by God to Adam; and the serpent was able to trespass therein by the complicity of the devil. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q102_A2-p10"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Paradise did not become useless through being unoccupied by man after sin, just as immortality was not conferred on man in + vain, though he was to lose it. For thereby we learn God's kindness to man, and what man lost by sin. Moreover, some say that + Enoch and Elias still dwell in that paradise. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q102_A2-p11"> + <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Those who say that paradise was on the equinoctial line are of opinion that such a situation is most temperate, on account + of the unvarying equality of day and night; that it is never too cold there, because the sun is never too far off; and never + too hot, because, although the sun passes over the heads of the inhabitants, it does not remain long in that position. However, + Aristotle distinctly says (Meteor. ii, 5) that such a region is uninhabitable + on account of the heat. This seems to be more probable; because, even those regions where the sun does not pass vertically + overhead, are extremely hot on account of the mere proximity of the sun. But whatever be the truth of the matter, we must + hold that paradise was situated in a most temperate situation, whether on the equator or elsewhere. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q102_A2-p12"></p> + <p id="FP_Q102_A2-p13"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q102_A1.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q102_A3.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q102_A3" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q102_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q102_A4.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q102_A3-p0.1">Whether man was placed in paradise to dress it and keep it?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q102_A3-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q102_A3-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that man was not placed in paradise to dress and keep it. For what was brought on him as a punishment of sin + would not have existed in paradise in the state of innocence. But the cultivation of the soil was a punishment of sin ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q102_A3-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.3.17" target="asv">Gn. 3:17</a>). Therefore man was not placed in paradise to dress and keep it. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q102_A3-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, there is no need of a keeper when there is no fear of trespass with violence. But in paradise there was no fear + of trespass with violence. Therefore there was no need for man to keep paradise. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q102_A3-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if man was placed in paradise to dress and keep it, man would apparently have been made for the sake of paradise, + and not contrariwise; which seems to be false. Therefore man was not place in paradise to dress and keep it. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q102_A3-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q102_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.2.15" target="asv">Gn. 2: 15</a>): "The Lord God took man and placed in the paradise of pleasure, to dress and keep it." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q102_A3-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> As Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. viii, 10), these words in Genesis may be understood in two ways. First, in the sense that + God placed man in paradise that He might Himself work in man and keep him, by sanctifying him (for if this work cease, man + at once relapses into darkness, as the air grows dark when the light ceases to shine); and by keeping man from all corruption + and evil. Secondly, that man might dress and keep paradise, which dressing would not have + involved labor, as it did after sin; but would have been pleasant on account of man's practical knowledge of the powers of + nature. Nor would man have kept paradise against a trespasser; but he would have striven to keep paradise for himself lest + he should lose it by sin. All of which was for man's good; wherefore paradise was ordered to man's benefit, and not conversely. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q102_A3-p7"> Whence the Replies to the Objections are made clear.</p> + <p id="FP_Q102_A3-p8"></p> + <p id="FP_Q102_A3-p9"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q102_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q102_A4.html"></a> + </div> + <div id="FP_Q102_A4" class="div4"> + <a href="summa.FP_Q102_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP.x.html"></a> + <h4 id="FP_Q102_A4-p0.1">Whether man was created in paradise?</h4> + <p id="FP_Q102_A4-p1"></p> + <p id="FP_Q102_A4-p2"> + <b>Objection 1:</b> It would seem that man was created in paradise. For the angel was created in his dwelling-place---namely, the empyrean heaven. + But before sin paradise was a fitting abode for man. Therefore it seems that man was created in paradise. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q102_A4-p3"> + <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, other animals remain in the place where they are produced, as the fish in the water, and walking animals on the + earth from which they were made. Now man would have remained in paradise after he was created ( + <a id="FP_Q102_A4-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q97_A4.html">Q[97], A[4]</a>). Therefore he was created in paradise. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q102_A4-p4"> + <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, woman was made in paradise. But man is greater than woman. Therefore much more should man have been made in paradise. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q102_A4-p5"> + <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( + <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q102_A4-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.2.15" target="asv">Gn. 2:15</a>): "God took man and placed him in paradise." + </p> + <p id="FP_Q102_A4-p6"> + <b>I answer that,</b> Paradise was a fitting abode for man as regards the incorruptibility of the primitive state. Now this incorruptibility was + man's, not by nature, but by a supernatural gift of God. Therefore that this might be attributed to God, and not to human + nature, God made man outside of paradise, and afterwards placed him there to live there during the whole of his animal life; + and, having attained to the spiritual life, to be transferred thence to heaven. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q102_A4-p7"> + <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The empyrean heaven was a fitting abode for the angels as regards their nature, and therefore they were created there. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q102_A4-p8"> In the same way I reply to the second objection, for those places befit those animals in their nature.</p> + <p id="FP_Q102_A4-p9"> + <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Woman was made in paradise, not by reason of her own dignity, but on account of the dignity of the principle from which her + body was formed. For the same reason the children would have been born in paradise, where their parents were already. + </p> + <p id="FP_Q102_A4-p10"></p> + <p id="FP_Q102_A4-p11"></p> + <a href="summa.FP_Q102_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP.x.html"></a> + </div> + <a href="summa.FP_Q101_A2.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q102_A1.html"></a> + </div> + <a href="summa.FP_Q74_A3.html"></a> + <a href="summa.FP_Q75.html"></a> + ` + </div> \ No newline at end of file