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more of q. 19
| author | ht |
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| date | Sat, 21 Nov 2009 13:56:56 +0000 |
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| 2 xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><head><title>Bilingual Aquinas Questions 19--25</title><style> | 4 xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><head><title>Bilingual Aquinas Questions 19--25</title><style> |
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| 5 </style></head><body style="font-family: Bitstream Vera Serif"><?xml-stylesheet type="text/xsl" href="bi.xsl"?><div id="FP.ii" next="FP_Q2" prev="FP_Q1_A10" progress="0.25%" n="ii" title="Treatise on The One God (QQ[2-26])"><h2 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii-p0.1">TREATISE ON THE ONE GOD (QQ19-26)</h2><div id="FP.ii.FP_Q19" next="FP_Q19_A1" prev="FP_Q18_A4" progress="3.41%" n="xviii" title="Question. 19 - THE WILL OF GOD (TWELVE ARTICLES)"> | 7 </style></head><body style="font-family: Bitstream Vera Serif"><div id="FP.ii" next="FP_Q2" prev="FP_Q1_A10" progress="0.25%" n="ii" title="Treatise on The One God (QQ[2-26])"><h2 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii-p0.1">TREATISE ON THE ONE GOD (QQ19-26)</h2><div id="FP.ii.FP_Q19" next="FP_Q19_A1" prev="FP_Q18_A4" progress="3.41%" n="xviii" title="Question. 19 - THE WILL OF GOD (TWELVE ARTICLES)"> |
| 6 <h3 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19-p0.1">Question 19. THE WILL OF GOD (TWELVE ARTICLES)</h3> | 8 <h3 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19-p0.1">Question 19. THE WILL OF GOD (TWELVE ARTICLES)</h3> |
| 7 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><div xml:lang="en"> | 9 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><div xml:lang="en"> |
| 8 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19-p2" shownumber="no"> After considering the things belonging to the divine knowledge, we consider what belongs to the divine will. The first consideration is about the divine will itself; the second about what belongs strictly to His will; the third about what belongs to the intellect in relation to His will. About His will itself there are twelve points of inquiry:</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19-p3" shownumber="no"> (1) Whether there is will in God?</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19-p4" shownumber="no"> (2) Whether God wills things apart from Himself?</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19-p5" shownumber="no"> (3) Whether whatever God wills, He wills necessarily?</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19-p6" shownumber="no"> (4) Whether the will of God is the cause of things?</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19-p7" shownumber="no"> (5) Whether any cause can be assigned to the divine will?</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19-p8" shownumber="no"> (6) Whether the divine will is always fulfilled?</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19-p9" shownumber="no"> (7) Whether the will of God is mutable?</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19-p10" shownumber="no"> (8) Whether the will of God imposes necessity on the things willed?</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19-p11" shownumber="no"> (9) Whether there is in God the will of evil?</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19-p12" shownumber="no"> (10) Whether God has free will?</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19-p13" shownumber="no"> (11) Whether the will of expression is distinguished in God?</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19-p14" shownumber="no"> (12) Whether five expressions of will are rightly assigned to the divine will?</p> | 10 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19-p2" shownumber="no"> After considering the things belonging to the divine knowledge, we consider what belongs to the divine will. The first consideration is about the divine will itself; the second about what belongs strictly to His will; the third about what belongs to the intellect in relation to His will. About His will itself there are twelve points of inquiry:</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19-p3" shownumber="no"> (1) Whether there is will in God?</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19-p4" shownumber="no"> (2) Whether God wills things apart from Himself?</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19-p5" shownumber="no"> (3) Whether whatever God wills, He wills necessarily?</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19-p6" shownumber="no"> (4) Whether the will of God is the cause of things?</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19-p7" shownumber="no"> (5) Whether any cause can be assigned to the divine will?</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19-p8" shownumber="no"> (6) Whether the divine will is always fulfilled?</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19-p9" shownumber="no"> (7) Whether the will of God is mutable?</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19-p10" shownumber="no"> (8) Whether the will of God imposes necessity on the things willed?</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19-p11" shownumber="no"> (9) Whether there is in God the will of evil?</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19-p12" shownumber="no"> (10) Whether God has free will?</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19-p13" shownumber="no"> (11) Whether the will of expression is distinguished in God?</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19-p14" shownumber="no"> (12) Whether five expressions of will are rightly assigned to the divine will?</p> |
| 9 </div></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 pr."><a name="29179"><span class="ref">[29179] | 11 </div></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 pr."><a name="29179"><span class="ref">[29179] |
| 10 Iª q. 19 pr.</span></a> Post considerationem eorum quae ad | 12 Iª q. 19 pr.</span></a> Post considerationem eorum quae ad |
| 933 dicendum quod causa prima tunc potest impediri a suo effectu per | 935 dicendum quod causa prima tunc potest impediri a suo effectu per |
| 934 defectum causae secundae, quando non est universaliter prima, sub | 936 defectum causae secundae, quando non est universaliter prima, sub |
| 935 se omnes causas comprehendens, quia sic effectus nullo modo posset | 937 se omnes causas comprehendens, quia sic effectus nullo modo posset |
| 936 suum ordinem evadere. Et sic est de voluntate Dei, ut dictum | 938 suum ordinem evadere. Et sic est de voluntate Dei, ut dictum |
| 937 est.</p></div></div> | 939 est.</p></div></div> |
| 938 </div><div id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A7" next="FP_Q19_A8" prev="FP_Q19_A6" progress="3.62%" n="vii" title="Article. 7 - Whether the will of God is changeable?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A7-p0.1">Whether the will of God is changeable?</h4><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A7-p2" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the Will of God is changeable. For the Lord says (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Gen.6.7" parsed="vul|Gen|6|7|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A7-p2.1" passage="Gn. 6:7">Gn. 6:7</scripRef>): "It repenteth Me that I have made man." But whoever repents of what he has done, has a changeable will. Therefore God has a changeable will.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A7-p3" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it is said in the person of the Lord: "I will speak against a nation and against a kingdom, to root out, and to pull down, and to destroy it; but if that nation shall repent of its evil, I also will repent of the evil that I have thought to do to them" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Jer.18.7-Jer.18.8" parsed="vul|Jer|18|7|18|8" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A7-p3.1" passage="Jer. 18:7,8">Jer. 18:7,8</scripRef>) Therefore God has a changeable will.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A7-p4" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, whatever God does, He does voluntarily. But God does not always do the same thing, for at one time He ordered the law to be observed, and at another time forbade it. Therefore He has a changeable will.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A7-p5" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 4:</b> Further, God does not will of necessity what He wills, as said before <a id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A7-p5.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A3" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">(A[3])</a>. Therefore He can both will and not will the same thing. But whatever can incline to either of two opposites, is changeable substantially; and that which can exist in a place or not in that place, is changeable locally. Therefore God is changeable as regards His will.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A7-p6" shownumber="no"><b>On the contrary,</b> It is said: "God is not as a man, that He should lie, nor as the son of man, that He should be changed" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Num.23.19" parsed="vul|Num|23|19|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A7-p6.1" passage="Num. 23:19">Num. 23:19</scripRef>).</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A7-p7" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> The will of God is entirely unchangeable. On this point we must consider that to change the will is one thing; to will that certain things should be changed is another. It is possible to will a thing to be done now, and its contrary afterwards; and yet for the will to remain permanently the same: whereas the will would be changed, if one should begin to will what before he had not willed; or cease to will what he had willed before. This cannot happen, unless | 940 </div><div id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A7" next="FP_Q19_A8" |
| 941 prev="FP_Q19_A6" progress="3.62%" n="vii" title="Article. 7 - Whether | |
| 942 the will of God is changeable?"><h4 xml:lang="en" | |
| 943 id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A7-p0.1">Whether the will of God is | |
| 944 changeable?</h4><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div | |
| 945 style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" | |
| 946 id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A7-p2" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It | |
| 947 seems that the Will of God is changeable. For the Lord says (<scripRef | |
| 948 osisRef="Bible.vul:Gen.6.7" parsed="vul|Gen|6|7|0|0" | |
| 949 id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A7-p2.1" | |
| 950 passage="Gn. 6:7">Gn. 6:7</scripRef>): "It repenteth Me that I have | |
| 951 made man." But whoever repents of what he has done, has a changeable | |
| 952 will. Therefore God has a changeable will.</p></div><div style="width: | |
| 953 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 7 arg. 1"><a name="29238"><span class= | |
| 954 "ref">[29238] Iª q. 19 a. 7 arg. 1</span></a> Ad septimum sic | |
| 955 proceditur. Videtur quod voluntas Dei sit mutabilis. Dicit enim | |
| 956 dominus Genes. VI, <i>poenitet me fecisse hominem</i>. Sed | |
| 957 quemcumque poenitet de eo quod fecit, habet mutabilem voluntatem. | |
| 958 Ergo Deus habet mutabilem voluntatem.</p></div></div><div | |
| 959 style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: | |
| 960 left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A7-p3" | |
| 961 shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it is said in the person | |
| 962 of the Lord: "I will speak against a nation and against a kingdom, to | |
| 963 root out, and to pull down, and to destroy it; but if that nation | |
| 964 shall repent of its evil, I also will repent of the evil that I have | |
| 965 thought to do to them" (<scripRef | |
| 966 osisRef="Bible.vul:Jer.18.7-Jer.18.8" parsed="vul|Jer|18|7|18|8" | |
| 967 id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A7-p3.1" | |
| 968 passage="Jer. 18:7,8">Jer. 18:7,8</scripRef>) Therefore God has a | |
| 969 changeable will.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p | |
| 970 xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 7 arg. 2"><a name="29239"><span class= | |
| 971 "ref">[29239] Iª q. 19 a. 7 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 972 Ierem. XVIII, ex persona domini dicitur, <i>loquar adversus gentem | |
| 973 et adversus regnum, ut eradicem et destruam et disperdam illud; sed | |
| 974 si poenitentiam egerit gens illa a malo suo, agam et ego | |
| 975 poenitentiam super malo quod cogitavi ut facerem ei</i>. Ergo Deus | |
| 976 habet mutabilem voluntatem.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; | |
| 977 margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p | |
| 978 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A7-p4" | |
| 979 shownumber="no"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, whatever God does, He | |
| 980 does voluntarily. But God does not always do the same thing, for at | |
| 981 one time He ordered the law to be observed, and at another time | |
| 982 forbade it. Therefore He has a changeable will.</p></div><div | |
| 983 style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 7 arg. 3"><a name="29240"><span class= | |
| 984 "ref">[29240] Iª q. 19 a. 7 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 985 quidquid Deus facit, voluntarie facit. Sed Deus non semper eadem | |
| 986 facit, nam quandoque praecepit legalia observari, quandoque | |
| 987 prohibuit. Ergo habet mutabilem voluntatem.</p></div></div><div | |
| 988 style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: | |
| 989 left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A7-p5" | |
| 990 shownumber="no"><b>Objection 4:</b> Further, God does not will of | |
| 991 necessity what He wills, as said before <a | |
| 992 id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A7-p5.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A3" | |
| 993 shape="rect" xml:link="simple">(A[3])</a>. Therefore He can both will | |
| 994 and not will the same thing. But whatever can incline to either of two | |
| 995 opposites, is changeable substantially; and that which can exist in a | |
| 996 place or not in that place, is changeable locally. Therefore God is | |
| 997 changeable as regards His will.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; | |
| 998 float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 7 arg. 4"><a name="29241"><span class= | |
| 999 "ref">[29241] Iª q. 19 a. 7 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, Deus | |
| 1000 non ex necessitate vult quod vult, ut supra dictum est. Ergo potest | |
| 1001 velle et non velle idem. Sed omne quod habet potentiam ad opposita, | |
| 1002 est mutabile, sicut quod potest esse et non esse, est mutabile | |
| 1003 secundum substantiam; et quod potest esse hic et non esse hic, est | |
| 1004 mutabile secundum locum. Ergo Deus est mutabilis secundum | |
| 1005 voluntatem.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: | |
| 1006 .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" | |
| 1007 id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A7-p6" shownumber="no"><b>On the contrary,</b> | |
| 1008 It is said: "God is not as a man, that He should lie, nor as the son | |
| 1009 of man, that He should be changed" (<scripRef | |
| 1010 osisRef="Bible.vul:Num.23.19" parsed="vul|Num|23|19|0|0" | |
| 1011 id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A7-p6.1" | |
| 1012 passage="Num. 23:19">Num. 23:19</scripRef>).</p></div><div | |
| 1013 style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 7 s. c."><a name="29242"><span class= | |
| 1014 "ref">[29242] Iª q. 19 a. 7 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est | |
| 1015 quod dicitur Num. XXIII, <i>non est Deus, quasi homo, ut mentiatur; | |
| 1016 neque ut filius hominis, ut mutetur</i>.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A7-p7" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> The will of God is entirely unchangeable. On this point we must consider that to change the will is one thing; to will that certain things should be changed is another. It is possible to will a thing to be done now, and its contrary afterwards; and yet for the will to remain permanently the same: whereas the will would be changed, if one should begin to will what before he had not willed; or cease to will what he had willed before. This cannot happen, unless | |
| 939 we presuppose change either in the knowledge or in the disposition of the substance of the willer. For since the will regards good, a man may in two ways begin to will a thing. In one way when that thing begins to be good for him, and this does not take place without a change in him. Thus when the cold weather begins, it becomes good to sit by the fire; though it was not so before. In another way when he knows for the first time that a thing is good for him, though he did not know it before; | 1017 we presuppose change either in the knowledge or in the disposition of the substance of the willer. For since the will regards good, a man may in two ways begin to will a thing. In one way when that thing begins to be good for him, and this does not take place without a change in him. Thus when the cold weather begins, it becomes good to sit by the fire; though it was not so before. In another way when he knows for the first time that a thing is good for him, though he did not know it before; |
| 940 hence we take counsel in order to know what is good for us. Now it has already been shown that both the substance of God and His knowledge are entirely unchangeable (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A7-p7.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q9.FP_Q9_A1" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">Q[9], A[1]</a>; <a id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A7-p7.2" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A15" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">Q[14], A[15]</a>). Therefore His will must be entirely unchangeable.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A7-p8" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> These words of the Lord are to be understood metaphorically, and according to the likeness of our nature. For when we repent, we destroy what we have made; although we may even do so without change of will; as, when a man wills to make a thing, at the same time intending to destroy it later. Therefore God is said to have repented, by way of comparison with our mode of acting, in so far as by the deluge He destroyed from the face of the earth man whom | 1018 hence we take counsel in order to know what is good for us. Now it |
| 941 He had made.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A7-p9" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The will of God, as it is the first and universal cause, does not exclude intermediate causes that have power to produce certain effects. Since however all intermediate causes are inferior in power to the first cause, there are many things in the divine power, knowledge and will that are not included in the order of inferior causes. Thus in the case of the raising of Lazarus, one who looked only on inferior causes might have said: "Lazarus will not | 1019 has already been shown that both the substance of God and His |
| 1020 knowledge are entirely unchangeable (<a | |
| 1021 id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A7-p7.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q9.FP_Q9_A1" | |
| 1022 shape="rect" xml:link="simple">Q[9], A[1]</a>; <a | |
| 1023 id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A7-p7.2" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A15" | |
| 1024 shape="rect" xml:link="simple">Q[14], A[15]</a>). Therefore His will | |
| 1025 must be entirely unchangeable.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: | |
| 1026 right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 7 co."><a name="29243"><span class= | |
| 1027 "ref">[29243] Iª q. 19 a. 7 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum | |
| 1028 quod voluntas Dei est omnino immutabilis. Sed circa hoc | |
| 1029 considerandum est, quod aliud est mutare voluntatem; et aliud est | |
| 1030 velle aliquarum rerum mutationem. Potest enim aliquis, eadem | |
| 1031 voluntate immobiliter permanente, velle quod nunc fiat hoc, et | |
| 1032 postea fiat contrarium. Sed tunc voluntas mutaretur, si aliquis | |
| 1033 inciperet velle quod prius non voluit, vel desineret velle quod | |
| 1034 voluit. Quod quidem accidere non potest, nisi praesupposita | |
| 1035 mutatione vel ex parte cognitionis, vel circa dispositionem | |
| 1036 substantiae ipsius volentis. Cum enim voluntas sit boni, aliquis de | |
| 1037 novo dupliciter potest incipere aliquid velle. Uno modo sic, quod | |
| 1038 de novo incipiat sibi illud esse bonum. Quod non est absque | |
| 1039 mutatione eius, sicut adveniente frigore, incipit esse bonum sedere | |
| 1040 ad ignem, quod prius non erat. Alio modo sic, quod de novo | |
| 1041 cognoscat illud esse sibi bonum, cum prius hoc ignorasset, ad hoc | |
| 1042 enim consiliamur, ut sciamus quid nobis sit bonum. Ostensum est | |
| 1043 autem supra quod tam substantia Dei quam eius scientia est omnino | |
| 1044 immutabilis. Unde oportet voluntatem eius omnino esse | |
| 1045 immutabilem.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A7-p8" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> These words of the Lord are to be understood metaphorically, and according to the likeness of our nature. For when we repent, we destroy what we have made; although we may even do so without change of will; as, when a man wills to make a thing, at the same time intending to destroy it later. Therefore God is said to have repented, by way of comparison with our mode of acting, in so far as by the deluge He destroyed from the face of the earth man whom | |
| 1046 He had made.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p | |
| 1047 xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 7 ad 1"><a name="29244"><span class= | |
| 1048 "ref">[29244] Iª q. 19 a. 7 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo | |
| 1049 dicendum quod illud verbum domini metaphorice intelligendum est, | |
| 1050 secundum similitudinem nostram, cum enim nos poenitet, destruimus | |
| 1051 quod fecimus. Quamvis hoc esse possit absque mutatione voluntatis, | |
| 1052 cum etiam aliquis homo, absque mutatione voluntatis, interdum velit | |
| 1053 aliquid facere, simul intendens postea illud destruere. Sic igitur | |
| 1054 Deus poenituisse dicitur, secundum similitudinem operationis, | |
| 1055 inquantum hominem quem fecerat, per diluvium a facie terrae | |
| 1056 delevit.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A7-p9" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The will of God, as it is the first and universal cause, does not exclude intermediate causes that have power to produce certain effects. Since however all intermediate causes are inferior in power to the first cause, there are many things in the divine power, knowledge and will that are not included in the order of inferior causes. Thus in the case of the raising of Lazarus, one who looked only on inferior causes might have said: "Lazarus will not | |
| 942 rise again," but looking at the divine first cause might have said: "Lazarus will rise again." And God wills both: that is, that in the order of the inferior cause a thing shall happen; but that in the order of the higher cause it shall not happen; or He may will conversely. We may say, then, that God sometimes declares that a thing shall happen according as it falls under the order of inferior causes, as of nature, or merit, which yet does not happen as not being in the designs of the divine | 1057 rise again," but looking at the divine first cause might have said: "Lazarus will rise again." And God wills both: that is, that in the order of the inferior cause a thing shall happen; but that in the order of the higher cause it shall not happen; or He may will conversely. We may say, then, that God sometimes declares that a thing shall happen according as it falls under the order of inferior causes, as of nature, or merit, which yet does not happen as not being in the designs of the divine |
| 943 and higher cause. Thus He foretold to Ezechias: "Take order with thy house, for thou shalt die, and not live" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Isa.38.1" parsed="vul|Isa|38|1|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A7-p9.1" passage="Is. 38:1">Is. 38:1</scripRef>). Yet this did not take place, since from eternity it was otherwise disposed in the divine knowledge and will, which is unchangeable. Hence Gregory says (Moral. xvi, 5): "The sentence of God changes, but not His counsel"---that is to say, the counsel of His will. When therefore He says, "I also will repent," His words must be understood metaphorically. For | 1058 and higher cause. Thus He foretold to Ezechias: "Take order with thy house, for thou shalt die, and not live" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Isa.38.1" parsed="vul|Isa|38|1|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A7-p9.1" passage="Is. 38:1">Is. 38:1</scripRef>). Yet this did not take place, since from eternity it was otherwise disposed in the divine knowledge and will, which is unchangeable. Hence Gregory says (Moral. xvi, 5): "The sentence of God changes, but not His counsel"---that is to say, the counsel of His will. When therefore He says, "I also will repent," His words must be understood metaphorically. For |
| 944 men seem to repent, when they do not fulfill what they have threatened.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A7-p10" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> It does not follow from this argument that God has a will that changes, but that He sometimes wills that things should change.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A7-p11" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Although God's willing a thing is not by absolute necessity, yet it is necessary by supposition, on account of the unchangeableness of the divine will, as has been said above <a id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A7-p11.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A3" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">(A[3])</a>.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div></div><div id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A8" next="FP_Q19_A9" prev="FP_Q19_A7" progress="3.65%" n="viii" title="Article. 8 - Whether the will of God imposes necessity on the things willed?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A8-p0.1">Whether the will of God imposes necessity on the things willed?</h4> | 1059 men seem to repent, when they do not fulfill what they have |
| 945 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A8-p2" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the will of God imposes necessity on the things willed. For Augustine says (Enchiridion 103): "No one is saved, except whom God has willed to be saved. He must therefore be asked to will it; for if He wills it, it must necessarily be."</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div> | 1060 threatened.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p |
| 946 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A8-p3" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, every cause that cannot be hindered, produces its effect necessarily, because, as the Philosopher says (Phys. ii, 84) "Nature always works in the same way, if there is nothing to hinder it." But the will of God cannot be hindered. For the Apostle says (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Rom.9.19" parsed="vul|Rom|9|19|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A8-p3.1" passage="Rom. 9:19">Rom. 9:19</scripRef>): "Who resisteth His will?" Therefore the will of God imposes necessity on the things willed.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div> | 1061 xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 7 ad 2"><a name="29245"><span class= |
| 1062 "ref">[29245] Iª q. 19 a. 7 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 1063 dicendum quod voluntas Dei, cum sit causa prima et universalis, non | |
| 1064 excludit causas medias, in quarum virtute est ut aliqui effectus | |
| 1065 producantur. Sed quia omnes causae mediae non adaequant virtutem | |
| 1066 causae primae, multa sunt in virtute et scientia et voluntate | |
| 1067 divina, quae non continentur sub ordine causarum inferiorum; sicut | |
| 1068 resuscitatio Lazari. Unde aliquis respiciens ad causas inferiores, | |
| 1069 dicere poterat, Lazarus non resurget, respiciens vero ad causam | |
| 1070 primam divinam, poterat dicere, Lazarus resurget. Et utrumque horum | |
| 1071 Deus vult, scilicet quod aliquid quandoque sit futurum secundum | |
| 1072 causam inferiorem, quod tamen futurum non sit secundum causam | |
| 1073 superiorem; vel e converso. Sic ergo dicendum est quod Deus | |
| 1074 aliquando pronuntiat aliquid futurum, secundum quod continetur in | |
| 1075 ordine causarum inferiorum, ut puta secundum dispositionem naturae | |
| 1076 vel meritorum; quod tamen non fit, quia aliter est in causa | |
| 1077 superiori divina. Sicut cum praedixit Ezechiae, <i>dispone domui | |
| 1078 tuae, quia morieris et non vives</i>, ut habetur Isaiae XXXVIII; | |
| 1079 neque tamen ita evenit, quia ab aeterno aliter fuit in scientia et | |
| 1080 voluntate divina, quae immutabilis est. Propter quod dicit | |
| 1081 Gregorius, quod <i>Deus immutat sententiam, non tamen mutat | |
| 1082 consilium</i>, scilicet voluntatis suae. Quod ergo dicit, | |
| 1083 poenitentiam agam ego, intelligitur metaphorice dictum, nam homines | |
| 1084 quando non implent quod comminati sunt, poenitere | |
| 1085 videntur.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: | |
| 1086 .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" | |
| 1087 id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A7-p10" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection | |
| 1088 3:</b> It does not follow from this argument that God has a will that | |
| 1089 changes, but that He sometimes wills that things should | |
| 1090 change.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p | |
| 1091 xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 7 ad 3"><a name="29246"><span class= | |
| 1092 "ref">[29246] Iª q. 19 a. 7 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 1093 dicendum quod ex ratione illa non potest concludi quod Deus habeat | |
| 1094 mutabilem voluntatem; sed quod mutationem velit.</p></div></div><div | |
| 1095 style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: | |
| 1096 left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A7-p11" | |
| 1097 shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Although God's willing a | |
| 1098 thing is not by absolute necessity, yet it is necessary by | |
| 1099 supposition, on account of the unchangeableness of the divine will, as | |
| 1100 has been said above <a id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A7-p11.1" | |
| 1101 href="#FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A3" shape="rect" | |
| 1102 xml:link="simple">(A[3])</a>.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: | |
| 1103 right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 7 ad 4"><a name="29247"><span class= | |
| 1104 "ref">[29247] Iª q. 19 a. 7 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum | |
| 1105 dicendum quod, licet Deum velle aliquid non sit necessarium | |
| 1106 absolute, tamen necessarium est ex suppositione, propter | |
| 1107 immutabilitatem divinae voluntatis, ut supra dictum est.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A8" next="FP_Q19_A9" prev="FP_Q19_A7" progress="3.65%" n="viii" title="Article. 8 - Whether the will of God imposes necessity on the things willed?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A8-p0.1">Whether the will of God imposes necessity on the things willed?</h4> | |
| 1108 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; | |
| 1109 float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A8-p2" | |
| 1110 shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the will of God | |
| 1111 imposes necessity on the things willed. For Augustine says | |
| 1112 (Enchiridion 103): "No one is saved, except whom God has willed to be | |
| 1113 saved. He must therefore be asked to will it; for if He wills it, it | |
| 1114 must necessarily be."</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: | |
| 1115 right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 8 arg. 1"><a name="29248"><span class= | |
| 1116 "ref">[29248] Iª q. 19 a. 8 arg. 1</span></a> Ad octavum sic | |
| 1117 proceditur. Videtur quod voluntas Dei rebus volitis necessitatem | |
| 1118 imponat. Dicit enim Augustinus, in Enchirid., <i>nullus fit salvus, | |
| 1119 nisi quem Deus voluerit salvari. Et ideo rogandus est ut velit, | |
| 1120 quia necesse est fieri, si voluerit</i>.</p></div></div> | |
| 1121 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; | |
| 1122 float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A8-p3" | |
| 1123 shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, every cause that cannot | |
| 1124 be hindered, produces its effect necessarily, because, as the | |
| 1125 Philosopher says (Phys. ii, 84) "Nature always works in the same way, | |
| 1126 if there is nothing to hinder it." But the will of God cannot be | |
| 1127 hindered. For the Apostle says (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Rom.9.19" | |
| 1128 parsed="vul|Rom|9|19|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A8-p3.1" | |
| 1129 passage="Rom. 9:19">Rom. 9:19</scripRef>): "Who resisteth His will?" | |
| 1130 Therefore the will of God imposes necessity on the things | |
| 1131 willed.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p | |
| 1132 xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 8 arg. 2"><a name="29249"><span class= | |
| 1133 "ref">[29249] Iª q. 19 a. 8 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, omnis | |
| 1134 causa quae non potest impediri, ex necessitate suum effectum | |
| 1135 producit, quia et natura semper idem operatur, nisi aliquid | |
| 1136 impediat, ut dicitur in II Physic. Sed voluntas Dei non potest | |
| 1137 impediri, dicit enim apostolus, ad Rom. IX, <i>voluntati enim eius | |
| 1138 quis resistit?</i> Ergo voluntas Dei imponit rebus volitis | |
| 1139 necessitatem.</p></div></div> | |
| 947 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A8-p4" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, whatever is necessary by its antecedent cause is necessary absolutely; it is thus necessary that animals should die, being compounded of contrary elements. Now things created by God are related to the divine will as to an antecedent cause, whereby they have necessity. For the conditional statement is true that if God wills a thing, it comes to pass; and every true conditional statement is necessary. It follows therefore that all that God wills is | 1140 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A8-p4" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, whatever is necessary by its antecedent cause is necessary absolutely; it is thus necessary that animals should die, being compounded of contrary elements. Now things created by God are related to the divine will as to an antecedent cause, whereby they have necessity. For the conditional statement is true that if God wills a thing, it comes to pass; and every true conditional statement is necessary. It follows therefore that all that God wills is |
| 948 necessary absolutely.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div> | 1141 necessary absolutely.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: |
| 949 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A8-p5" shownumber="no"><b>On the contrary,</b> All good things that exist God wills to be. If therefore His will imposes necessity on things willed, it follows that all good happens of necessity; and thus there is an end of free will, counsel, and all other such things.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div> | 1142 right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 8 arg. 3"><a name="29250"><span class= |
| 1143 "ref">[29250] Iª q. 19 a. 8 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, illud | |
| 1144 quod habet necessitatem ex priori, est necessarium absolute, sicut | |
| 1145 animal mori est necessarium, quia est ex contrariis compositum. Sed | |
| 1146 res creatae a Deo, comparantur ad voluntatem divinam sicut ad | |
| 1147 aliquid prius, a quo habent necessitatem, cum haec conditionalis | |
| 1148 sit vera, si aliquid Deus vult, illud est; omnis autem | |
| 1149 conditionalis vera est necessaria. Sequitur ergo quod omne quod | |
| 1150 Deus vult, sit necessarium absolute.</p></div></div> | |
| 1151 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; | |
| 1152 float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A8-p5" | |
| 1153 shownumber="no"><b>On the contrary,</b> All good things that exist God | |
| 1154 wills to be. If therefore His will imposes necessity on things willed, | |
| 1155 it follows that all good happens of necessity; and thus there is an | |
| 1156 end of free will, counsel, and all other such things.</p></div><div | |
| 1157 style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 8 s. c."><a name="29251"><span class= | |
| 1158 "ref">[29251] Iª q. 19 a. 8 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra, omnia | |
| 1159 bona quae fiunt, Deus vult fieri. Si igitur eius voluntas imponat | |
| 1160 rebus volitis necessitatem, sequitur quod omnia bona ex necessitate | |
| 1161 eveniunt. Et sic perit liberum arbitrium et consilium, et omnia | |
| 1162 huiusmodi.</p></div></div> | |
| 950 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><div xml:lang="en"> | 1163 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><div xml:lang="en"> |
| 951 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A8-p6" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> The divine will imposes necessity on some things willed but not on all. The reason of this some have chosen to assign to intermediate causes, holding that what God produces by necessary causes is necessary; and what He produces by contingent causes contingent.</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A8-p7" shownumber="no"> This does not seem to be a sufficient explanation, for two reasons. First, because the effect of a first cause is contingent on account of the secondary cause, from the fact that the effect of the first cause is hindered by deficiency in the second cause, as the sun's power is hindered by a defect in the plant. But no defect of a secondary cause can hinder God's will from producing its effect. Secondly, because if the distinction between the contingent and the necessary is to be | 1164 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A8-p6" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> The divine will imposes necessity on some things willed but not on all. The reason of this some have chosen to assign to intermediate causes, holding that what God produces by necessary causes is necessary; and what He produces by contingent causes contingent.</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A8-p7" shownumber="no"> This does not seem to be a sufficient explanation, for two reasons. First, because the effect of a first cause is contingent on account of the secondary cause, from the fact that the effect of the first cause is hindered by deficiency in the second cause, as the sun's power is hindered by a defect in the plant. But no defect of a secondary cause can hinder God's will from producing its effect. Secondly, because if the distinction between the contingent and the necessary is to be |
| 952 referred only to secondary causes, this must be independent of the divine intention and will; which is inadmissible. It is better therefore to say that this happens on account of the efficacy of the divine will. For when a cause is efficacious to act, the effect follows upon the cause, not only as to the thing done, but also as to its manner of being done or of being. Thus from defect of active power in the seed it may happen that a child is born unlike its father in accidental points, that | 1165 referred only to secondary causes, this must be independent of the divine intention and will; which is inadmissible. It is better therefore to say that this happens on account of the efficacy of the divine will. For when a cause is efficacious to act, the effect follows upon the cause, not only as to the thing done, but also as to its manner of being done or of being. Thus from defect of active power in the seed it may happen that a child is born unlike its father in accidental points, that |
| 953 belong to its manner of being. Since then the divine will is perfectly efficacious, it follows not only that things are done, which God wills to be done, but also that they are done in the way that He wills. Now God wills some things to be done necessarily, some contingently, to the right ordering of things, for the building up of the universe. Therefore to some effects He has attached necessary causes, that cannot fail; but to others defectible and contingent causes, from which arise | 1166 belong to its manner of being. Since then the divine will is perfectly efficacious, it follows not only that things are done, which God wills to be done, but also that they are done in the way that He wills. Now God wills some things to be done necessarily, some contingently, to the right ordering of things, for the building up of the universe. Therefore to some effects He has attached necessary causes, that cannot fail; but to others defectible and contingent causes, from which arise |
| 954 contingent effects. Hence it is not because the proximate causes are contingent that the effects willed by God happen contingently, but because God prepared contingent causes for them, it being His will that they should happen contingently.</p> | 1167 contingent effects. Hence it is not because the proximate causes are contingent that the effects willed by God happen contingently, but because God prepared contingent causes for them, it being His will that they should happen contingently.</p> |
| 955 </div></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div> | 1168 </div></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 8 co."><a name="29252"><span class= |
| 956 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A8-p8" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> By the words of Augustine we must understand a necessity in things willed by God that is not absolute, but conditional. For the conditional statement that if God wills a thing it must necessarily be, is necessarily true.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div> | 1169 "ref">[29252] Iª q. 19 a. 8 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum |
| 957 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A8-p9" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> From the very fact that nothing resists the divine will, it follows that not only those things happen that God wills to happen, but that they happen necessarily or contingently according to His will.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div> | 1170 quod divina voluntas quibusdam volitis necessitatem imponit, non |
| 958 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A8-p10" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Consequents have necessity from their antecedents according to the mode of the antecedents. Hence things effected by the divine will have that kind of necessity that God wills them to have, either absolute or conditional. Not all things, therefore, are absolute necessities.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div> | 1171 autem omnibus. Cuius quidem rationem aliqui assignare voluerunt ex |
| 959 </div><div id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A9" next="FP_Q19_A10" prev="FP_Q19_A8" progress="3.68%" n="ix" title="Article. 9 - Whether God wills evils?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A9-p0.1">Whether God wills evils?</h4><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A9-p2" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God wills evils. For every good that exists, God wills. But it is a good that evil should exist. For Augustine says (Enchiridion 95): "Although evil in so far as it is evil is not a good, yet it is good that not only good things should exist, but also evil things." Therefore God wills evil things.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A9-p3" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv, 23): "Evil would conduce to the perfection of everything," i.e. the universe. And Augustine says (Enchiridion 10,11): "Out of all things is built up the admirable beauty of the universe, wherein even that which is called evil, properly ordered and disposed, commends the good more evidently in that good is more pleasing and praiseworthy when contrasted with evil." But God wills all that appertains to the perfection and | 1172 causis mediis quia ea quae producit per causas necessarias, sunt |
| 960 beauty of the universe, for this is what God desires above all things in His creatures. Therefore God wills evil.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A9-p4" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, that evil should exist, and should not exist, are contradictory opposites. But God does not will that evil should not exist; otherwise, since various evils do exist, God's will would not always be fulfilled. Therefore God wills that evil should exist.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A9-p5" shownumber="no"><b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (Qq. 83,3): "No wise man is the cause of another man becoming worse. Now God surpasses all men in wisdom. Much less therefore is God the cause of man becoming worse; and when He is said to be the cause of a thing, He is said to will it." Therefore it is not by God's will that man becomes worse. Now it is clear that every evil makes a thing worse. Therefore God wills not evil things.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A9-p6" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> Since the ratio of good is the ratio of appetibility, as said before (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A9-p6.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q5.FP_Q5_A1" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">Q[5], A[1]</a>), and since evil is opposed to good, it is impossible that any evil, as such, should be sought for by the appetite, either natural, or animal, or by the intellectual appetite which is the will. Nevertheless evil may be sought accidentally, so far as it accompanies a good, as appears in each of the appetites. For a natural agent intends not privation or | 1173 necessaria; ea vero quae producit per causas contingentes, sunt |
| 1174 contingentia. Sed hoc non videtur sufficienter dictum, propter duo. | |
| 1175 Primo quidem, quia effectus alicuius primae causae est contingens | |
| 1176 propter causam secundam, ex eo quod impeditur effectus causae | |
| 1177 primae per defectum causae secundae; sicut virtus solis per | |
| 1178 defectum plantae impeditur. Nullus autem defectus causae secundae | |
| 1179 impedire potest quin voluntas Dei effectum suum producat. Secundo, | |
| 1180 quia, si distinctio contingentium a necessariis referatur solum in | |
| 1181 causas secundas, sequitur hoc esse praeter intentionem et | |
| 1182 voluntatem divinam, quod est inconveniens. Et ideo melius dicendum | |
| 1183 est, quod hoc contingit propter efficaciam divinae voluntatis. Cum | |
| 1184 enim aliqua causa efficax fuerit ad agendum, effectus consequitur | |
| 1185 causam non tantum secundum id quod fit, sed etiam secundum modum | |
| 1186 fiendi vel essendi, ex debilitate enim virtutis activae in semine, | |
| 1187 contingit quod filius nascitur dissimilis patri in accidentibus, | |
| 1188 quae pertinent ad modum essendi. Cum igitur voluntas divina sit | |
| 1189 efficacissima, non solum sequitur quod fiant ea quae Deus vult | |
| 1190 fieri; sed quod eo modo fiant, quo Deus ea fieri vult. Vult autem | |
| 1191 quaedam fieri Deus necessario, et quaedam contingenter, ut sit ordo | |
| 1192 in rebus, ad complementum universi. Et ideo quibusdam effectibus | |
| 1193 aptavit causas necessarias, quae deficere non possunt, ex quibus | |
| 1194 effectus de necessitate proveniunt, quibusdam autem aptavit causas | |
| 1195 contingentes defectibiles, ex quibus effectus contingenter | |
| 1196 eveniunt. Non igitur propterea effectus voliti a Deo, eveniunt | |
| 1197 contingenter, quia causae proximae sunt contingentes, sed propterea | |
| 1198 quia Deus voluit eos contingenter evenire, contingentes causas ad | |
| 1199 eos praeparavit.</p></div></div> | |
| 1200 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; | |
| 1201 float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A8-p8" | |
| 1202 shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> By the words of Augustine | |
| 1203 we must understand a necessity in things willed by God that is not | |
| 1204 absolute, but conditional. For the conditional statement that if God | |
| 1205 wills a thing it must necessarily be, is necessarily | |
| 1206 true.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 8 ad 1"><a name="29253"><span class= | |
| 1207 "ref">[29253] Iª q. 19 a. 8 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo | |
| 1208 dicendum quod per illud verbum Augustini intelligenda est | |
| 1209 necessitas in rebus volitis a Deo, non absoluta, sed conditionalis, | |
| 1210 necesse est enim hanc conditionalem veram esse, si Deus hoc vult, | |
| 1211 necesse est hoc esse.</p></div></div> | |
| 1212 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; | |
| 1213 float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A8-p9" | |
| 1214 shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> From the very fact that | |
| 1215 nothing resists the divine will, it follows that not only those things | |
| 1216 happen that God wills to happen, but that they happen necessarily or | |
| 1217 contingently according to His will.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; | |
| 1218 float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 8 ad 2"><a name="29254"><span class= | |
| 1219 "ref">[29254] Iª q. 19 a. 8 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 1220 dicendum quod, ex hoc ipso quod nihil voluntati divinae resistit, | |
| 1221 sequitur quod non solum fiant ea quae Deus vult fieri; sed quod | |
| 1222 fiant contingenter vel necessario, quae sic fieri vult.</p></div></div> | |
| 1223 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; | |
| 1224 float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A8-p10" | |
| 1225 shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Consequents have | |
| 1226 necessity from their antecedents according to the mode of the | |
| 1227 antecedents. Hence things effected by the divine will have that kind | |
| 1228 of necessity that God wills them to have, either absolute or | |
| 1229 conditional. Not all things, therefore, are absolute | |
| 1230 necessities.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p | |
| 1231 xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 8 ad 3"><a name="29255"><span class= | |
| 1232 "ref">[29255] Iª q. 19 a. 8 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 1233 dicendum quod posteriora habent necessitatem a prioribus, secundum | |
| 1234 modum priorum. Unde et ea quae fiunt a voluntate divina, talem | |
| 1235 necessitatem habent, qualem Deus vult ea habere, scilicet, vel | |
| 1236 absolutam, vel conditionalem tantum. Et sic, non omnia sunt | |
| 1237 necessaria absolute.</p></div></div> | |
| 1238 </div><div id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A9" next="FP_Q19_A10" | |
| 1239 prev="FP_Q19_A8" progress="3.68%" n="ix" title="Article. 9 - Whether | |
| 1240 God wills evils?"><h4 xml:lang="en" | |
| 1241 id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A9-p0.1">Whether God wills evils?</h4><div | |
| 1242 style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: | |
| 1243 left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A9-p2" | |
| 1244 shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God wills evils. For | |
| 1245 every good that exists, God wills. But it is a good that evil should | |
| 1246 exist. For Augustine says (Enchiridion 95): "Although evil in so far | |
| 1247 as it is evil is not a good, yet it is good that not only good things | |
| 1248 should exist, but also evil things." Therefore God wills evil | |
| 1249 things.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p | |
| 1250 xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 9 arg. 1"><a name="29256"><span class= | |
| 1251 "ref">[29256] Iª q. 19 a. 9 arg. 1</span></a> Ad nonum sic | |
| 1252 proceditur. Videtur quod voluntas Dei sit malorum. Omne enim bonum | |
| 1253 quod fit, Deus vult. Sed mala fieri bonum est, dicit enim | |
| 1254 Augustinus, in Enchirid., <i>quamvis ea quae mala sunt, inquantum | |
| 1255 mala sunt, non sint bona; tamen, ut non solum bona, sed etiam ut | |
| 1256 sint mala, bonum est</i>. Ergo Deus vult mala.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A9-p3" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv, 23): "Evil would conduce to the perfection of everything," i.e. the universe. And Augustine says (Enchiridion 10,11): "Out of all things is built up the admirable beauty of the universe, wherein even that which is called evil, properly ordered and disposed, commends the good more evidently in that good is more pleasing and praiseworthy when contrasted with evil." But God wills all that appertains to the perfection and | |
| 1257 beauty of the universe, for this is what God desires above all | |
| 1258 things in His creatures. Therefore God wills evil.</p></div><div | |
| 1259 style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 9 arg. 2"><a name="29257"><span class= | |
| 1260 "ref">[29257] Iª q. 19 a. 9 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, dicit | |
| 1261 Dionysius, IV cap. de Div. Nom., erit malum ad omnis (idest | |
| 1262 universi) perfectionem conferens. Et Augustinus dicit, in | |
| 1263 Enchirid., <i>ex omnibus consistit universitatis admirabilis | |
| 1264 pulchritudo; in qua etiam illud quod malum dicitur, bene ordinatum, | |
| 1265 et loco suo positum, eminentius commendat bona; ut magis placeant, | |
| 1266 et laudabiliora sint, dum comparantur malis</i>. Sed Deus vult omne | |
| 1267 illud quod pertinet ad perfectionem et decorem universi, quia hoc | |
| 1268 est quod Deus maxime vult in creaturis. Ergo Deus vult | |
| 1269 mala.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div | |
| 1270 style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" | |
| 1271 id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A9-p4" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 3:</b> | |
| 1272 Further, that evil should exist, and should not exist, are | |
| 1273 contradictory opposites. But God does not will that evil should not | |
| 1274 exist; otherwise, since various evils do exist, God's will would not | |
| 1275 always be fulfilled. Therefore God wills that evil should | |
| 1276 exist.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" | |
| 1277 title="I q. 19 a. 9 arg. 3"><a name="29258"><span class= | |
| 1278 "ref">[29258] Iª q. 19 a. 9 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, mala | |
| 1279 fieri, et non fieri, sunt contradictorie opposita. Sed Deus non | |
| 1280 vult mala non fieri, quia, cum mala quaedam fiant, non semper | |
| 1281 voluntas Dei impleretur. Ergo Deus vult mala | |
| 1282 fieri.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div | |
| 1283 style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" | |
| 1284 id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A9-p5" shownumber="no"><b>On the contrary,</b> | |
| 1285 Augustine says (Qq. 83,3): "No wise man is the cause of another man | |
| 1286 becoming worse. Now God surpasses all men in wisdom. Much less | |
| 1287 therefore is God the cause of man becoming worse; and when He is said | |
| 1288 to be the cause of a thing, He is said to will it." Therefore it is | |
| 1289 not by God's will that man becomes worse. Now it is clear that every | |
| 1290 evil makes a thing worse. Therefore God wills not evil | |
| 1291 things.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p | |
| 1292 xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 9 s. c."><a name="29259"><span class= | |
| 1293 "ref">[29259] Iª q. 19 a. 9 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est | |
| 1294 quod dicit Augustinus, in libro octoginta trium quaest., <i>nullo | |
| 1295 sapiente homine auctore, fit homo deterior; est autem Deus omni | |
| 1296 sapiente homine praestantior; multo igitur minus, Deo auctore, fit | |
| 1297 aliquis deterior. Illo autem auctore cum dicitur, illo volente | |
| 1298 dicitur</i>. Non ergo volente Deo, fit homo deterior. Constat autem | |
| 1299 quod quolibet malo fit aliquid deterius. Ergo Deus non vult | |
| 1300 mala.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A9-p6" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> Since the ratio of good is the ratio of appetibility, as said before (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A9-p6.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q5.FP_Q5_A1" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">Q[5], A[1]</a>), and since evil is opposed to good, it is impossible that any evil, as such, should be sought for by the appetite, either natural, or animal, or by the intellectual appetite which is the will. Nevertheless evil may be sought accidentally, so far as it accompanies a good, as appears in each of the appetites. For a natural agent intends not privation or | |
| 961 corruption, but the form to which is annexed the privation of some other form, and the generation of one thing, which implies the corruption of another. Also when a lion kills a stag, his object is food, to obtain which the killing of the animal is only the means. Similarly the fornicator has merely pleasure for his object, and the deformity of sin is only an accompaniment. Now the evil that accompanies one good, is the privation of another good. Never therefore would evil be sought after, not | 1301 corruption, but the form to which is annexed the privation of some other form, and the generation of one thing, which implies the corruption of another. Also when a lion kills a stag, his object is food, to obtain which the killing of the animal is only the means. Similarly the fornicator has merely pleasure for his object, and the deformity of sin is only an accompaniment. Now the evil that accompanies one good, is the privation of another good. Never therefore would evil be sought after, not |
| 962 even accidentally, unless the good that accompanies the evil were more desired than the good of which the evil is the privation. Now God wills no good more than He wills His own goodness; yet He wills one good more than another. Hence He in no way wills the evil of sin, which is the privation of right order towards the divine good. The evil of natural defect, or of punishment, He does will, by willing the good to which such evils are attached. Thus in willing justice He wills punishment; and in | 1302 even accidentally, unless the good that accompanies the evil were more desired than the good of which the evil is the privation. Now God wills no good more than He wills His own goodness; yet He wills one good more than another. Hence He in no way wills the evil of sin, which is the privation of right order towards the divine good. The evil of natural defect, or of punishment, He does will, by willing the good to which such evils are attached. Thus in willing justice He wills punishment; and in |
| 963 willing the preservation of the natural order, He wills some things to be naturally corrupted.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A9-p7" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Some have said that although God does not will evil, yet He wills that evil should be or be done, because, although evil is not a good, yet it is good that evil should be or be done. This they said because things evil in themselves are ordered to some good end; and this order they thought was expressed in the words "that evil should be or be done." This, however, is not correct; since evil is not of itself ordered to good, but accidentally. For it is | 1303 willing the preservation of the natural order, He wills some things |
| 964 beside the intention of the sinner, that any good should follow from his sin; as it was beside the intention of tyrants that the patience of the martyrs should shine forth from all their persecutions. It cannot therefore be said that such an ordering to good is implied in the statement that it is a good thing that evil should be or be done, since nothing is judged of by that which appertains to it accidentally, but by that which belongs to it essentially.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A9-p8" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Evil does not operate towards the perfection and beauty of the universe, except accidentally, as said above (ad 1). Therefore Dionysius in saying that "evil would conduce to the perfection of the universe," draws a conclusion by reduction to an absurdity.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A9-p9" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The statements that evil exists, and that evil exists not, are opposed as contradictories; yet the statements that anyone wills evil to exist and that he wills it not to be, are not so opposed; since either is affirmative. God therefore neither wills evil to be done, nor wills it not to be done, but wills to permit evil to be done; and this is a good.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div></div><div id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A10" next="FP_Q19_A11" prev="FP_Q19_A9" progress="3.71%" n="x" title="Article. 10 - Whether God has free-will?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A10-p0.1">Whether God has free-will?</h4><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A10-p2" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God has not free-will. For Jerome says, in a homily on the prodigal son [*Ep. 146, ad Damas.]; "God alone is He who is not liable to sin, nor can be liable: all others, as having free-will, can be inclined to either side."</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A10-p3" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, free-will is the faculty of the reason and will, by which good and evil are chosen. But God does not will evil, as has been said <a id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A10-p3.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A9" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">(A[9])</a>. Therefore there is not free-will in God.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A10-p4" shownumber="no"><b>On the contrary,</b> Ambrose says (De Fide ii, 3): "The Holy Spirit divideth unto each one as He will, namely, according to the free choice of the will, not in obedience to necessity."</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A10-p5" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> We have free-will with respect to what we will not of necessity, nor be natural instinct. For our will to be happy does not appertain to free-will, but to natural instinct. Hence other animals, that are moved to act by natural instinct, are not said to be moved by free-will. Since then God necessarily wills His own goodness, but other things not necessarily, as shown above <a id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A10-p5.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A3" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">(A[3])</a>, He has free will with respect to what He does not | 1304 to be naturally corrupted.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: |
| 1305 right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 9 co."><a name="29260"><span class= | |
| 1306 "ref">[29260] Iª q. 19 a. 9 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum | |
| 1307 quod, cum ratio boni sit ratio appetibilis, ut supra dictum est, | |
| 1308 malum autem opponatur bono; impossibile est quod aliquod malum, | |
| 1309 inquantum huiusmodi, appetatur, neque appetitu naturali, neque | |
| 1310 animali, neque intellectuali, qui est voluntas. Sed aliquod malum | |
| 1311 appetitur per accidens, inquantum consequitur ad aliquod bonum. Et | |
| 1312 hoc apparet in quolibet appetitu. Non enim agens naturale intendit | |
| 1313 privationem vel corruptionem; sed formam, cui coniungitur privatio | |
| 1314 alterius formae; et generationem unius, quae est corruptio | |
| 1315 alterius. Leo etiam, occidens cervum, intendit cibum, cui | |
| 1316 coniungitur occisio animalis. Similiter fornicator intendit | |
| 1317 delectationem, cui coniungitur deformitas culpae. Malum autem quod | |
| 1318 coniungitur alicui bono, est privatio alterius boni. Nunquam igitur | |
| 1319 appeteretur malum, nec per accidens, nisi bonum cui coniungitur | |
| 1320 malum, magis appeteretur quam bonum quod privatur per malum. Nullum | |
| 1321 autem bonum Deus magis vult quam suam bonitatem, vult tamen aliquod | |
| 1322 bonum magis quam aliud quoddam bonum. Unde malum culpae, quod | |
| 1323 privat ordinem ad bonum divinum, Deus nullo modo vult. Sed malum | |
| 1324 naturalis defectus, vel malum poenae vult, volendo aliquod bonum, | |
| 1325 cui coniungitur tale malum, sicut, volendo iustitiam, vult poenam; | |
| 1326 et volendo ordinem naturae servari, vult quaedam naturaliter | |
| 1327 corrumpi.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A9-p7" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Some have said that although God does not will evil, yet He wills that evil should be or be done, because, although evil is not a good, yet it is good that evil should be or be done. This they said because things evil in themselves are ordered to some good end; and this order they thought was expressed in the words "that evil should be or be done." This, however, is not correct; since evil is not of itself ordered to good, but accidentally. For it is | |
| 1328 beside the intention of the sinner, that any good should follow from | |
| 1329 his sin; as it was beside the intention of tyrants that the patience | |
| 1330 of the martyrs should shine forth from all their persecutions. It | |
| 1331 cannot therefore be said that such an ordering to good is implied in | |
| 1332 the statement that it is a good thing that evil should be or be done, | |
| 1333 since nothing is judged of by that which appertains to it | |
| 1334 accidentally, but by that which belongs to it | |
| 1335 essentially.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p | |
| 1336 xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 9 ad 1"><a name="29261"><span class= | |
| 1337 "ref">[29261] Iª q. 19 a. 9 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo | |
| 1338 dicendum quod quidam dixerunt quod, licet Deus non velit mala, vult | |
| 1339 tamen mala esse vel fieri, quia, licet mala non sint bona, bonum | |
| 1340 tamen est mala esse vel fieri. Quod ideo dicebant, quia ea quae in | |
| 1341 se mala sunt, ordinantur ad aliquod bonum, quem quidem ordinem | |
| 1342 importari credebant in hoc quod dicitur, mala esse vel fieri. Sed | |
| 1343 hoc non recte dicitur. Quia malum non ordinatur ad bonum per se, | |
| 1344 sed per accidens. Praeter intentionem enim peccantis est, quod ex | |
| 1345 hoc sequatur aliquod bonum; sicut praeter intentionem tyrannorum | |
| 1346 fuit, quod ex eorum persecutionibus claresceret patientia martyrum. | |
| 1347 Et ideo non potest dici quod talis ordo ab bonum importetur per hoc | |
| 1348 quod dicitur, quod malum esse vel fieri sit bonum, quia nihil | |
| 1349 iudicatur secundum illud quod competit ei per accidens, sed | |
| 1350 secundum illud quod competit ei per se.</p></div></div><div | |
| 1351 style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: | |
| 1352 left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A9-p8" | |
| 1353 shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Evil does not operate | |
| 1354 towards the perfection and beauty of the universe, except | |
| 1355 accidentally, as said above (ad 1). Therefore Dionysius in saying that | |
| 1356 "evil would conduce to the perfection of the universe," draws a | |
| 1357 conclusion by reduction to an absurdity.</p></div><div style="width: | |
| 1358 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 9 ad 2"><a name="29262"><span class= | |
| 1359 "ref">[29262] Iª q. 19 a. 9 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 1360 dicendum quod malum non operatur ad perfectionem et decorem | |
| 1361 universi nisi per accidens, ut dictum est. Unde et hoc quod dicit | |
| 1362 Dionysius, quod malum est ad universi perfectionem conferens, | |
| 1363 concludit inducendo quasi ad inconveniens.</p></div></div><div | |
| 1364 style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: | |
| 1365 left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A9-p9" | |
| 1366 shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The statements that evil | |
| 1367 exists, and that evil exists not, are opposed as contradictories; yet | |
| 1368 the statements that anyone wills evil to exist and that he wills it | |
| 1369 not to be, are not so opposed; since either is affirmative. God | |
| 1370 therefore neither wills evil to be done, nor wills it not to be done, | |
| 1371 but wills to permit evil to be done; and this is a good.</p></div><div | |
| 1372 style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 9 ad 3"><a name="29263"><span class= | |
| 1373 "ref">[29263] Iª q. 19 a. 9 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 1374 dicendum quod, licet mala fieri, et mala non fieri, contradictorie | |
| 1375 opponantur; tamen velle mala fieri, et velle mala non fieri, non | |
| 1376 opponuntur contradictorie, cum utrumque sit affirmativum. Deus | |
| 1377 igitur neque vult mala fieri, neque vult mala non fieri, sed vult | |
| 1378 permittere mala fieri. Et hoc est bonum.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A10" next="FP_Q19_A11" prev="FP_Q19_A9" progress="3.71%" n="x" title="Article. 10 - Whether God has free-will?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A10-p0.1">Whether God has free-will?</h4><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A10-p2" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God has not free-will. For Jerome says, in a homily on the prodigal son [*Ep. 146, ad Damas.]; "God alone is He who is not liable to sin, nor can be liable: all others, as having free-will, can be inclined to either side."</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A10-p3" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, free-will is the faculty of the reason and will, by which good and evil are chosen. But God does not will evil, as has been said <a id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A10-p3.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A9" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">(A[9])</a>. Therefore there is not free-will in God.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A10-p4" shownumber="no"><b>On the contrary,</b> Ambrose says (De Fide ii, 3): "The Holy Spirit divideth unto each one as He will, namely, according to the free choice of the will, not in obedience to necessity."</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A10-p5" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> We have free-will with respect to what we will not of necessity, nor be natural instinct. For our will to be happy does not appertain to free-will, but to natural instinct. Hence other animals, that are moved to act by natural instinct, are not said to be moved by free-will. Since then God necessarily wills His own goodness, but other things not necessarily, as shown above <a id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A10-p5.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A3" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">(A[3])</a>, He has free will with respect to what He does not | |
| 965 necessarily will.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A10-p6" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Jerome seems to deny free-will to God not simply, but only as regards the inclination to sin.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A10-p7" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Since the evil of sin consists in turning away from the divine goodness, by which God wills all things, as above shown (De Fide ii, 3), it is manifestly impossible for Him to will the evil of sin; yet He can make choice of one of two opposites, inasmuch as He can will a thing to be, or not to be. In the same way we ourselves, without sin, can will to sit down, and not will to sit down.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div></div><div id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A11" next="FP_Q19_A12" prev="FP_Q19_A10" progress="3.73%" n="xi" title="Article. 11 - Whether the will of expression is to be distinguished in God?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A11-p0.1">Whether the will of expression is to be distinguished in God?</h4><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A11-p2" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the will of expression is not to be distinguished in God. For as the will of God is the cause of things, so is His wisdom. But no expressions are assigned to the divine wisdom. Therefore no expressions ought to be assigned to the divine will.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A11-p3" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, every expression that is not in agreement with the mind of him who expresses himself, is false. If therefore the expressions assigned to the divine will are not in agreement with that will, they are false. But if they do agree, they are superfluous. No expressions therefore must be assigned to the divine will.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A11-p4" shownumber="no"><b>On the contrary,</b> The will of God is one, since it is the very essence of God. Yet sometimes it is spoken of as many, as in the words of<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Ps.110.2" parsed="vul|Ps|110|2|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A11-p4.1" passage=" Ps. 110:2"> Ps. 110:2</scripRef>: "Great are the works of the Lord, sought out according to all His wills." Therefore sometimes the sign must be taken for the will.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A11-p5" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> Some things are said of God in their strict sense; others by metaphor, as appears from what has been said before (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A11-p5.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A3" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">Q[13], A[3]</a>). When certain human passions are predicated of the Godhead metaphorically, this is done because of a likeness in the effect. Hence a thing that is in us a sign of some passion, is signified metaphorically in God under the name of that passion. Thus with us it is usual for an angry man to punish, so that | 1379 necessarily will.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A10-p6" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Jerome seems to deny free-will to God not simply, but only as regards the inclination to sin.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A10-p7" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Since the evil of sin consists in turning away from the divine goodness, by which God wills all things, as above shown (De Fide ii, 3), it is manifestly impossible for Him to will the evil of sin; yet He can make choice of one of two opposites, inasmuch as He can will a thing to be, or not to be. In the same way we ourselves, without sin, can will to sit down, and not will to sit down.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div></div><div id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A11" next="FP_Q19_A12" prev="FP_Q19_A10" progress="3.73%" n="xi" title="Article. 11 - Whether the will of expression is to be distinguished in God?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A11-p0.1">Whether the will of expression is to be distinguished in God?</h4><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A11-p2" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the will of expression is not to be distinguished in God. For as the will of God is the cause of things, so is His wisdom. But no expressions are assigned to the divine wisdom. Therefore no expressions ought to be assigned to the divine will.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A11-p3" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, every expression that is not in agreement with the mind of him who expresses himself, is false. If therefore the expressions assigned to the divine will are not in agreement with that will, they are false. But if they do agree, they are superfluous. No expressions therefore must be assigned to the divine will.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A11-p4" shownumber="no"><b>On the contrary,</b> The will of God is one, since it is the very essence of God. Yet sometimes it is spoken of as many, as in the words of<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Ps.110.2" parsed="vul|Ps|110|2|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A11-p4.1" passage=" Ps. 110:2"> Ps. 110:2</scripRef>: "Great are the works of the Lord, sought out according to all His wills." Therefore sometimes the sign must be taken for the will.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A11-p5" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> Some things are said of God in their strict sense; others by metaphor, as appears from what has been said before (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A11-p5.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A3" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">Q[13], A[3]</a>). When certain human passions are predicated of the Godhead metaphorically, this is done because of a likeness in the effect. Hence a thing that is in us a sign of some passion, is signified metaphorically in God under the name of that passion. Thus with us it is usual for an angry man to punish, so that |
| 966 punishment becomes an expression of anger. Therefore punishment itself is signified by the word anger, when anger is attributed to God. In the same way, what is usually with us an expression of will, is sometimes metaphorically called will in God; just as when anyone lays down a precept, it is a sign that he wishes that precept obeyed. Hence a divine precept is sometimes called by metaphor the will of God, as in the words: "Thy will be done on earth, as it is in heaven" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Matt.6.10" parsed="vul|Matt|6|10|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A11-p5.2" passage="Mat. 6:10">Mat. | 1380 punishment becomes an expression of anger. Therefore punishment itself is signified by the word anger, when anger is attributed to God. In the same way, what is usually with us an expression of will, is sometimes metaphorically called will in God; just as when anyone lays down a precept, it is a sign that he wishes that precept obeyed. Hence a divine precept is sometimes called by metaphor the will of God, as in the words: "Thy will be done on earth, as it is in heaven" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Matt.6.10" parsed="vul|Matt|6|10|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A11-p5.2" passage="Mat. 6:10">Mat. |
| 967 6:10</scripRef>). There is, however, this difference between will and anger, that anger is never attributed to God properly, since in its primary meaning it includes passion; whereas will is attributed to Him properly. Therefore in God there are distinguished will in its proper sense, and will as attributed to Him by metaphor. Will in its proper sense is called the will of good pleasure; and will metaphorically taken is the will of expression, inasmuch as the sign itself of will is called | 1381 6:10</scripRef>). There is, however, this difference between will and anger, that anger is never attributed to God properly, since in its primary meaning it includes passion; whereas will is attributed to Him properly. Therefore in God there are distinguished will in its proper sense, and will as attributed to Him by metaphor. Will in its proper sense is called the will of good pleasure; and will metaphorically taken is the will of expression, inasmuch as the sign itself of will is called |
| 968 will.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A11-p6" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Knowledge is not the cause of a thing being done, unless through the will. For we do not put into act what we know, unless we will to do so. Accordingly expression is not attributed to knowledge, but to will.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A11-p7" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Expressions of will are called divine wills, not as being signs that God wills anything; but because what in us is the usual expression of our will, is called the divine will in God. Thus punishment is not a sign that there is anger in God; but it is called anger in Him, from the fact that it is an expression of anger in ourselves.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div></div><div id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A12" next="FP_Q20" prev="FP_Q19_A11" progress="3.75%" n="xii" title="Article. 12 - Whether five expressions of will are rightly assigned to the divine will?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A12-p0.1">Whether five expressions of will are rightly assigned to the divine will?</h4> | 1382 will.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A11-p6" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Knowledge is not the cause of a thing being done, unless through the will. For we do not put into act what we know, unless we will to do so. Accordingly expression is not attributed to knowledge, but to will.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A11-p7" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Expressions of will are called divine wills, not as being signs that God wills anything; but because what in us is the usual expression of our will, is called the divine will in God. Thus punishment is not a sign that there is anger in God; but it is called anger in Him, from the fact that it is an expression of anger in ourselves.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div></div><div id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A12" next="FP_Q20" prev="FP_Q19_A11" progress="3.75%" n="xii" title="Article. 12 - Whether five expressions of will are rightly assigned to the divine will?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A12-p0.1">Whether five expressions of will are rightly assigned to the divine will?</h4> |
| 969 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A12-p2" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that five expressions of will---namely, prohibition, precept, counsel, operation, and permission---are not rightly assigned to the divine will. For the same things that God bids us do by His precept or counsel, these He sometimes operates in us, and the same things that He prohibits, these He sometimes permits. They ought not therefore to be enumerated as distinct.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div> | 1383 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A12-p2" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that five expressions of will---namely, prohibition, precept, counsel, operation, and permission---are not rightly assigned to the divine will. For the same things that God bids us do by His precept or counsel, these He sometimes operates in us, and the same things that He prohibits, these He sometimes permits. They ought not therefore to be enumerated as distinct.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div> |
