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2 xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><head><title>Bilingual Aquinas Questions 19--25</title><style> 4 xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><head><title>Bilingual Aquinas Questions 19--25</title><style>
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5 </style></head><body style="font-family: Bitstream Vera Serif"><?xml-stylesheet type="text/xsl" href="bi.xsl"?><div id="FP.ii" next="FP_Q2" prev="FP_Q1_A10" progress="0.25%" n="ii" title="Treatise on The One God (QQ[2-26])"><h2 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii-p0.1">TREATISE ON THE ONE GOD (QQ19-26)</h2><div id="FP.ii.FP_Q19" next="FP_Q19_A1" prev="FP_Q18_A4" progress="3.41%" n="xviii" title="Question. 19 - THE WILL OF GOD (TWELVE ARTICLES)"> 7 </style></head><body style="font-family: Bitstream Vera Serif"><div id="FP.ii" next="FP_Q2" prev="FP_Q1_A10" progress="0.25%" n="ii" title="Treatise on The One God (QQ[2-26])"><h2 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii-p0.1">TREATISE ON THE ONE GOD (QQ19-26)</h2><div id="FP.ii.FP_Q19" next="FP_Q19_A1" prev="FP_Q18_A4" progress="3.41%" n="xviii" title="Question. 19 - THE WILL OF GOD (TWELVE ARTICLES)">
6 <h3 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19-p0.1">Question 19. THE WILL OF GOD (TWELVE ARTICLES)</h3> 8 <h3 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19-p0.1">Question 19. THE WILL OF GOD (TWELVE ARTICLES)</h3>
7 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><div xml:lang="en"> 9 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><div xml:lang="en">
8 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19-p2" shownumber="no"> After considering the things belonging to the divine knowledge, we consider what belongs to the divine will. The first consideration is about the divine will itself; the second about what belongs strictly to His will; the third about what belongs to the intellect in relation to His will. About His will itself there are twelve points of inquiry:</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19-p3" shownumber="no"> (1) Whether there is will in God?</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19-p4" shownumber="no"> (2) Whether God wills things apart from Himself?</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19-p5" shownumber="no"> (3) Whether whatever God wills, He wills necessarily?</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19-p6" shownumber="no"> (4) Whether the will of God is the cause of things?</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19-p7" shownumber="no"> (5) Whether any cause can be assigned to the divine will?</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19-p8" shownumber="no"> (6) Whether the divine will is always fulfilled?</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19-p9" shownumber="no"> (7) Whether the will of God is mutable?</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19-p10" shownumber="no"> (8) Whether the will of God imposes necessity on the things willed?</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19-p11" shownumber="no"> (9) Whether there is in God the will of evil?</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19-p12" shownumber="no"> (10) Whether God has free will?</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19-p13" shownumber="no"> (11) Whether the will of expression is distinguished in God?</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19-p14" shownumber="no"> (12) Whether five expressions of will are rightly assigned to the divine will?</p> 10 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19-p2" shownumber="no"> After considering the things belonging to the divine knowledge, we consider what belongs to the divine will. The first consideration is about the divine will itself; the second about what belongs strictly to His will; the third about what belongs to the intellect in relation to His will. About His will itself there are twelve points of inquiry:</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19-p3" shownumber="no"> (1) Whether there is will in God?</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19-p4" shownumber="no"> (2) Whether God wills things apart from Himself?</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19-p5" shownumber="no"> (3) Whether whatever God wills, He wills necessarily?</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19-p6" shownumber="no"> (4) Whether the will of God is the cause of things?</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19-p7" shownumber="no"> (5) Whether any cause can be assigned to the divine will?</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19-p8" shownumber="no"> (6) Whether the divine will is always fulfilled?</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19-p9" shownumber="no"> (7) Whether the will of God is mutable?</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19-p10" shownumber="no"> (8) Whether the will of God imposes necessity on the things willed?</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19-p11" shownumber="no"> (9) Whether there is in God the will of evil?</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19-p12" shownumber="no"> (10) Whether God has free will?</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19-p13" shownumber="no"> (11) Whether the will of expression is distinguished in God?</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19-p14" shownumber="no"> (12) Whether five expressions of will are rightly assigned to the divine will?</p>
9 </div></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 pr."><a name="29179"><span class="ref">[29179] 11 </div></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 pr."><a name="29179"><span class="ref">[29179]
10 I&ordf; q. 19 pr.</span></a> Post considerationem eorum quae ad 12 I&ordf; q. 19 pr.</span></a> Post considerationem eorum quae ad
933 dicendum quod causa prima tunc potest impediri a suo effectu per 935 dicendum quod causa prima tunc potest impediri a suo effectu per
934 defectum causae secundae, quando non est universaliter prima, sub 936 defectum causae secundae, quando non est universaliter prima, sub
935 se omnes causas comprehendens, quia sic effectus nullo modo posset 937 se omnes causas comprehendens, quia sic effectus nullo modo posset
936 suum ordinem evadere. Et sic est de voluntate Dei, ut dictum 938 suum ordinem evadere. Et sic est de voluntate Dei, ut dictum
937 est.</p></div></div> 939 est.</p></div></div>
938 </div><div id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A7" next="FP_Q19_A8" prev="FP_Q19_A6" progress="3.62%" n="vii" title="Article. 7 - Whether the will of God is changeable?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A7-p0.1">Whether the will of God is changeable?</h4><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A7-p2" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the Will of God is changeable. For the Lord says (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Gen.6.7" parsed="vul|Gen|6|7|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A7-p2.1" passage="Gn. 6:7">Gn. 6:7</scripRef>): "It repenteth Me that I have made man." But whoever repents of what he has done, has a changeable will. Therefore God has a changeable will.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A7-p3" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it is said in the person of the Lord: "I will speak against a nation and against a kingdom, to root out, and to pull down, and to destroy it; but if that nation shall repent of its evil, I also will repent of the evil that I have thought to do to them" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Jer.18.7-Jer.18.8" parsed="vul|Jer|18|7|18|8" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A7-p3.1" passage="Jer. 18:7,8">Jer. 18:7,8</scripRef>) Therefore God has a changeable will.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A7-p4" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, whatever God does, He does voluntarily. But God does not always do the same thing, for at one time He ordered the law to be observed, and at another time forbade it. Therefore He has a changeable will.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A7-p5" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 4:</b> Further, God does not will of necessity what He wills, as said before <a id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A7-p5.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A3" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">(A[3])</a>. Therefore He can both will and not will the same thing. But whatever can incline to either of two opposites, is changeable substantially; and that which can exist in a place or not in that place, is changeable locally. Therefore God is changeable as regards His will.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A7-p6" shownumber="no"><b>On the contrary,</b> It is said: "God is not as a man, that He should lie, nor as the son of man, that He should be changed" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Num.23.19" parsed="vul|Num|23|19|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A7-p6.1" passage="Num. 23:19">Num. 23:19</scripRef>).</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A7-p7" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> The will of God is entirely unchangeable. On this point we must consider that to change the will is one thing; to will that certain things should be changed is another. It is possible to will a thing to be done now, and its contrary afterwards; and yet for the will to remain permanently the same: whereas the will would be changed, if one should begin to will what before he had not willed; or cease to will what he had willed before. This cannot happen, unless 940 </div><div id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A7" next="FP_Q19_A8"
941 prev="FP_Q19_A6" progress="3.62%" n="vii" title="Article. 7 - Whether
942 the will of God is changeable?"><h4 xml:lang="en"
943 id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A7-p0.1">Whether the will of God is
944 changeable?</h4><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div
945 style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en"
946 id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A7-p2" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It
947 seems that the Will of God is changeable. For the Lord says (<scripRef
948 osisRef="Bible.vul:Gen.6.7" parsed="vul|Gen|6|7|0|0"
949 id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A7-p2.1"
950 passage="Gn. 6:7">Gn. 6:7</scripRef>): "It repenteth Me that I have
951 made man." But whoever repents of what he has done, has a changeable
952 will. Therefore God has a changeable will.</p></div><div style="width:
953 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 7 arg. 1"><a name="29238"><span class=
954 "ref">[29238] I&ordf; q. 19 a. 7 arg. 1</span></a> Ad septimum sic
955 proceditur. Videtur quod voluntas Dei sit mutabilis. Dicit enim
956 dominus Genes. VI, <i>poenitet me fecisse hominem</i>. Sed
957 quemcumque poenitet de eo quod fecit, habet mutabilem voluntatem.
958 Ergo Deus habet mutabilem voluntatem.</p></div></div><div
959 style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float:
960 left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A7-p3"
961 shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it is said in the person
962 of the Lord: "I will speak against a nation and against a kingdom, to
963 root out, and to pull down, and to destroy it; but if that nation
964 shall repent of its evil, I also will repent of the evil that I have
965 thought to do to them" (<scripRef
966 osisRef="Bible.vul:Jer.18.7-Jer.18.8" parsed="vul|Jer|18|7|18|8"
967 id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A7-p3.1"
968 passage="Jer. 18:7,8">Jer. 18:7,8</scripRef>) Therefore God has a
969 changeable will.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
970 xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 7 arg. 2"><a name="29239"><span class=
971 "ref">[29239] I&ordf; q. 19 a. 7 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
972 Ierem. XVIII, ex persona domini dicitur, <i>loquar adversus gentem
973 et adversus regnum, ut eradicem et destruam et disperdam illud; sed
974 si poenitentiam egerit gens illa a malo suo, agam et ego
975 poenitentiam super malo quod cogitavi ut facerem ei</i>. Ergo Deus
976 habet mutabilem voluntatem.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both;
977 margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p
978 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A7-p4"
979 shownumber="no"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, whatever God does, He
980 does voluntarily. But God does not always do the same thing, for at
981 one time He ordered the law to be observed, and at another time
982 forbade it. Therefore He has a changeable will.</p></div><div
983 style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 7 arg. 3"><a name="29240"><span class=
984 "ref">[29240] I&ordf; q. 19 a. 7 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
985 quidquid Deus facit, voluntarie facit. Sed Deus non semper eadem
986 facit, nam quandoque praecepit legalia observari, quandoque
987 prohibuit. Ergo habet mutabilem voluntatem.</p></div></div><div
988 style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float:
989 left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A7-p5"
990 shownumber="no"><b>Objection 4:</b> Further, God does not will of
991 necessity what He wills, as said before <a
992 id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A7-p5.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A3"
993 shape="rect" xml:link="simple">(A[3])</a>. Therefore He can both will
994 and not will the same thing. But whatever can incline to either of two
995 opposites, is changeable substantially; and that which can exist in a
996 place or not in that place, is changeable locally. Therefore God is
997 changeable as regards His will.</p></div><div style="width: 45%;
998 float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 7 arg. 4"><a name="29241"><span class=
999 "ref">[29241] I&ordf; q. 19 a. 7 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, Deus
1000 non ex necessitate vult quod vult, ut supra dictum est. Ergo potest
1001 velle et non velle idem. Sed omne quod habet potentiam ad opposita,
1002 est mutabile, sicut quod potest esse et non esse, est mutabile
1003 secundum substantiam; et quod potest esse hic et non esse hic, est
1004 mutabile secundum locum. Ergo Deus est mutabilis secundum
1005 voluntatem.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top:
1006 .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en"
1007 id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A7-p6" shownumber="no"><b>On the contrary,</b>
1008 It is said: "God is not as a man, that He should lie, nor as the son
1009 of man, that He should be changed" (<scripRef
1010 osisRef="Bible.vul:Num.23.19" parsed="vul|Num|23|19|0|0"
1011 id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A7-p6.1"
1012 passage="Num. 23:19">Num. 23:19</scripRef>).</p></div><div
1013 style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 7 s. c."><a name="29242"><span class=
1014 "ref">[29242] I&ordf; q. 19 a. 7 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
1015 quod dicitur Num. XXIII, <i>non est Deus, quasi homo, ut mentiatur;
1016 neque ut filius hominis, ut mutetur</i>.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A7-p7" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> The will of God is entirely unchangeable. On this point we must consider that to change the will is one thing; to will that certain things should be changed is another. It is possible to will a thing to be done now, and its contrary afterwards; and yet for the will to remain permanently the same: whereas the will would be changed, if one should begin to will what before he had not willed; or cease to will what he had willed before. This cannot happen, unless
939 we presuppose change either in the knowledge or in the disposition of the substance of the willer. For since the will regards good, a man may in two ways begin to will a thing. In one way when that thing begins to be good for him, and this does not take place without a change in him. Thus when the cold weather begins, it becomes good to sit by the fire; though it was not so before. In another way when he knows for the first time that a thing is good for him, though he did not know it before; 1017 we presuppose change either in the knowledge or in the disposition of the substance of the willer. For since the will regards good, a man may in two ways begin to will a thing. In one way when that thing begins to be good for him, and this does not take place without a change in him. Thus when the cold weather begins, it becomes good to sit by the fire; though it was not so before. In another way when he knows for the first time that a thing is good for him, though he did not know it before;
940 hence we take counsel in order to know what is good for us. Now it has already been shown that both the substance of God and His knowledge are entirely unchangeable (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A7-p7.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q9.FP_Q9_A1" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">Q[9], A[1]</a>; <a id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A7-p7.2" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A15" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">Q[14], A[15]</a>). Therefore His will must be entirely unchangeable.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A7-p8" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> These words of the Lord are to be understood metaphorically, and according to the likeness of our nature. For when we repent, we destroy what we have made; although we may even do so without change of will; as, when a man wills to make a thing, at the same time intending to destroy it later. Therefore God is said to have repented, by way of comparison with our mode of acting, in so far as by the deluge He destroyed from the face of the earth man whom 1018 hence we take counsel in order to know what is good for us. Now it
941 He had made.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A7-p9" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The will of God, as it is the first and universal cause, does not exclude intermediate causes that have power to produce certain effects. Since however all intermediate causes are inferior in power to the first cause, there are many things in the divine power, knowledge and will that are not included in the order of inferior causes. Thus in the case of the raising of Lazarus, one who looked only on inferior causes might have said: "Lazarus will not 1019 has already been shown that both the substance of God and His
1020 knowledge are entirely unchangeable (<a
1021 id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A7-p7.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q9.FP_Q9_A1"
1022 shape="rect" xml:link="simple">Q[9], A[1]</a>; <a
1023 id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A7-p7.2" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A15"
1024 shape="rect" xml:link="simple">Q[14], A[15]</a>). Therefore His will
1025 must be entirely unchangeable.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float:
1026 right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 7 co."><a name="29243"><span class=
1027 "ref">[29243] I&ordf; q. 19 a. 7 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
1028 quod voluntas Dei est omnino immutabilis. Sed circa hoc
1029 considerandum est, quod aliud est mutare voluntatem; et aliud est
1030 velle aliquarum rerum mutationem. Potest enim aliquis, eadem
1031 voluntate immobiliter permanente, velle quod nunc fiat hoc, et
1032 postea fiat contrarium. Sed tunc voluntas mutaretur, si aliquis
1033 inciperet velle quod prius non voluit, vel desineret velle quod
1034 voluit. Quod quidem accidere non potest, nisi praesupposita
1035 mutatione vel ex parte cognitionis, vel circa dispositionem
1036 substantiae ipsius volentis. Cum enim voluntas sit boni, aliquis de
1037 novo dupliciter potest incipere aliquid velle. Uno modo sic, quod
1038 de novo incipiat sibi illud esse bonum. Quod non est absque
1039 mutatione eius, sicut adveniente frigore, incipit esse bonum sedere
1040 ad ignem, quod prius non erat. Alio modo sic, quod de novo
1041 cognoscat illud esse sibi bonum, cum prius hoc ignorasset, ad hoc
1042 enim consiliamur, ut sciamus quid nobis sit bonum. Ostensum est
1043 autem supra quod tam substantia Dei quam eius scientia est omnino
1044 immutabilis. Unde oportet voluntatem eius omnino esse
1045 immutabilem.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A7-p8" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> These words of the Lord are to be understood metaphorically, and according to the likeness of our nature. For when we repent, we destroy what we have made; although we may even do so without change of will; as, when a man wills to make a thing, at the same time intending to destroy it later. Therefore God is said to have repented, by way of comparison with our mode of acting, in so far as by the deluge He destroyed from the face of the earth man whom
1046 He had made.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
1047 xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 7 ad 1"><a name="29244"><span class=
1048 "ref">[29244] I&ordf; q. 19 a. 7 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
1049 dicendum quod illud verbum domini metaphorice intelligendum est,
1050 secundum similitudinem nostram, cum enim nos poenitet, destruimus
1051 quod fecimus. Quamvis hoc esse possit absque mutatione voluntatis,
1052 cum etiam aliquis homo, absque mutatione voluntatis, interdum velit
1053 aliquid facere, simul intendens postea illud destruere. Sic igitur
1054 Deus poenituisse dicitur, secundum similitudinem operationis,
1055 inquantum hominem quem fecerat, per diluvium a facie terrae
1056 delevit.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A7-p9" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The will of God, as it is the first and universal cause, does not exclude intermediate causes that have power to produce certain effects. Since however all intermediate causes are inferior in power to the first cause, there are many things in the divine power, knowledge and will that are not included in the order of inferior causes. Thus in the case of the raising of Lazarus, one who looked only on inferior causes might have said: "Lazarus will not
942 rise again," but looking at the divine first cause might have said: "Lazarus will rise again." And God wills both: that is, that in the order of the inferior cause a thing shall happen; but that in the order of the higher cause it shall not happen; or He may will conversely. We may say, then, that God sometimes declares that a thing shall happen according as it falls under the order of inferior causes, as of nature, or merit, which yet does not happen as not being in the designs of the divine 1057 rise again," but looking at the divine first cause might have said: "Lazarus will rise again." And God wills both: that is, that in the order of the inferior cause a thing shall happen; but that in the order of the higher cause it shall not happen; or He may will conversely. We may say, then, that God sometimes declares that a thing shall happen according as it falls under the order of inferior causes, as of nature, or merit, which yet does not happen as not being in the designs of the divine
943 and higher cause. Thus He foretold to Ezechias: "Take order with thy house, for thou shalt die, and not live" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Isa.38.1" parsed="vul|Isa|38|1|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A7-p9.1" passage="Is. 38:1">Is. 38:1</scripRef>). Yet this did not take place, since from eternity it was otherwise disposed in the divine knowledge and will, which is unchangeable. Hence Gregory says (Moral. xvi, 5): "The sentence of God changes, but not His counsel"---that is to say, the counsel of His will. When therefore He says, "I also will repent," His words must be understood metaphorically. For 1058 and higher cause. Thus He foretold to Ezechias: "Take order with thy house, for thou shalt die, and not live" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Isa.38.1" parsed="vul|Isa|38|1|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A7-p9.1" passage="Is. 38:1">Is. 38:1</scripRef>). Yet this did not take place, since from eternity it was otherwise disposed in the divine knowledge and will, which is unchangeable. Hence Gregory says (Moral. xvi, 5): "The sentence of God changes, but not His counsel"---that is to say, the counsel of His will. When therefore He says, "I also will repent," His words must be understood metaphorically. For
944 men seem to repent, when they do not fulfill what they have threatened.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A7-p10" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> It does not follow from this argument that God has a will that changes, but that He sometimes wills that things should change.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A7-p11" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Although God's willing a thing is not by absolute necessity, yet it is necessary by supposition, on account of the unchangeableness of the divine will, as has been said above <a id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A7-p11.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A3" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">(A[3])</a>.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div></div><div id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A8" next="FP_Q19_A9" prev="FP_Q19_A7" progress="3.65%" n="viii" title="Article. 8 - Whether the will of God imposes necessity on the things willed?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A8-p0.1">Whether the will of God imposes necessity on the things willed?</h4> 1059 men seem to repent, when they do not fulfill what they have
945 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A8-p2" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the will of God imposes necessity on the things willed. For Augustine says (Enchiridion 103): "No one is saved, except whom God has willed to be saved. He must therefore be asked to will it; for if He wills it, it must necessarily be."</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div> 1060 threatened.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
946 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A8-p3" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, every cause that cannot be hindered, produces its effect necessarily, because, as the Philosopher says (Phys. ii, 84) "Nature always works in the same way, if there is nothing to hinder it." But the will of God cannot be hindered. For the Apostle says (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Rom.9.19" parsed="vul|Rom|9|19|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A8-p3.1" passage="Rom. 9:19">Rom. 9:19</scripRef>): "Who resisteth His will?" Therefore the will of God imposes necessity on the things willed.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div> 1061 xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 7 ad 2"><a name="29245"><span class=
1062 "ref">[29245] I&ordf; q. 19 a. 7 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
1063 dicendum quod voluntas Dei, cum sit causa prima et universalis, non
1064 excludit causas medias, in quarum virtute est ut aliqui effectus
1065 producantur. Sed quia omnes causae mediae non adaequant virtutem
1066 causae primae, multa sunt in virtute et scientia et voluntate
1067 divina, quae non continentur sub ordine causarum inferiorum; sicut
1068 resuscitatio Lazari. Unde aliquis respiciens ad causas inferiores,
1069 dicere poterat, Lazarus non resurget, respiciens vero ad causam
1070 primam divinam, poterat dicere, Lazarus resurget. Et utrumque horum
1071 Deus vult, scilicet quod aliquid quandoque sit futurum secundum
1072 causam inferiorem, quod tamen futurum non sit secundum causam
1073 superiorem; vel e converso. Sic ergo dicendum est quod Deus
1074 aliquando pronuntiat aliquid futurum, secundum quod continetur in
1075 ordine causarum inferiorum, ut puta secundum dispositionem naturae
1076 vel meritorum; quod tamen non fit, quia aliter est in causa
1077 superiori divina. Sicut cum praedixit Ezechiae, <i>dispone domui
1078 tuae, quia morieris et non vives</i>, ut habetur Isaiae XXXVIII;
1079 neque tamen ita evenit, quia ab aeterno aliter fuit in scientia et
1080 voluntate divina, quae immutabilis est. Propter quod dicit
1081 Gregorius, quod <i>Deus immutat sententiam, non tamen mutat
1082 consilium</i>, scilicet voluntatis suae. Quod ergo dicit,
1083 poenitentiam agam ego, intelligitur metaphorice dictum, nam homines
1084 quando non implent quod comminati sunt, poenitere
1085 videntur.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top:
1086 .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en"
1087 id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A7-p10" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection
1088 3:</b> It does not follow from this argument that God has a will that
1089 changes, but that He sometimes wills that things should
1090 change.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
1091 xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 7 ad 3"><a name="29246"><span class=
1092 "ref">[29246] I&ordf; q. 19 a. 7 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
1093 dicendum quod ex ratione illa non potest concludi quod Deus habeat
1094 mutabilem voluntatem; sed quod mutationem velit.</p></div></div><div
1095 style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float:
1096 left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A7-p11"
1097 shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Although God's willing a
1098 thing is not by absolute necessity, yet it is necessary by
1099 supposition, on account of the unchangeableness of the divine will, as
1100 has been said above <a id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A7-p11.1"
1101 href="#FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A3" shape="rect"
1102 xml:link="simple">(A[3])</a>.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float:
1103 right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 7 ad 4"><a name="29247"><span class=
1104 "ref">[29247] I&ordf; q. 19 a. 7 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum
1105 dicendum quod, licet Deum velle aliquid non sit necessarium
1106 absolute, tamen necessarium est ex suppositione, propter
1107 immutabilitatem divinae voluntatis, ut supra dictum est.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A8" next="FP_Q19_A9" prev="FP_Q19_A7" progress="3.65%" n="viii" title="Article. 8 - Whether the will of God imposes necessity on the things willed?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A8-p0.1">Whether the will of God imposes necessity on the things willed?</h4>
1108 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
1109 float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A8-p2"
1110 shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the will of God
1111 imposes necessity on the things willed. For Augustine says
1112 (Enchiridion 103): "No one is saved, except whom God has willed to be
1113 saved. He must therefore be asked to will it; for if He wills it, it
1114 must necessarily be."</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float:
1115 right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 8 arg. 1"><a name="29248"><span class=
1116 "ref">[29248] I&ordf; q. 19 a. 8 arg. 1</span></a> Ad octavum sic
1117 proceditur. Videtur quod voluntas Dei rebus volitis necessitatem
1118 imponat. Dicit enim Augustinus, in Enchirid., <i>nullus fit salvus,
1119 nisi quem Deus voluerit salvari. Et ideo rogandus est ut velit,
1120 quia necesse est fieri, si voluerit</i>.</p></div></div>
1121 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
1122 float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A8-p3"
1123 shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, every cause that cannot
1124 be hindered, produces its effect necessarily, because, as the
1125 Philosopher says (Phys. ii, 84) "Nature always works in the same way,
1126 if there is nothing to hinder it." But the will of God cannot be
1127 hindered. For the Apostle says (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Rom.9.19"
1128 parsed="vul|Rom|9|19|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A8-p3.1"
1129 passage="Rom. 9:19">Rom. 9:19</scripRef>): "Who resisteth His will?"
1130 Therefore the will of God imposes necessity on the things
1131 willed.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
1132 xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 8 arg. 2"><a name="29249"><span class=
1133 "ref">[29249] I&ordf; q. 19 a. 8 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, omnis
1134 causa quae non potest impediri, ex necessitate suum effectum
1135 producit, quia et natura semper idem operatur, nisi aliquid
1136 impediat, ut dicitur in II Physic. Sed voluntas Dei non potest
1137 impediri, dicit enim apostolus, ad Rom. IX, <i>voluntati enim eius
1138 quis resistit?</i> Ergo voluntas Dei imponit rebus volitis
1139 necessitatem.</p></div></div>
947 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A8-p4" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, whatever is necessary by its antecedent cause is necessary absolutely; it is thus necessary that animals should die, being compounded of contrary elements. Now things created by God are related to the divine will as to an antecedent cause, whereby they have necessity. For the conditional statement is true that if God wills a thing, it comes to pass; and every true conditional statement is necessary. It follows therefore that all that God wills is 1140 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A8-p4" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, whatever is necessary by its antecedent cause is necessary absolutely; it is thus necessary that animals should die, being compounded of contrary elements. Now things created by God are related to the divine will as to an antecedent cause, whereby they have necessity. For the conditional statement is true that if God wills a thing, it comes to pass; and every true conditional statement is necessary. It follows therefore that all that God wills is
948 necessary absolutely.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div> 1141 necessary absolutely.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float:
949 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A8-p5" shownumber="no"><b>On the contrary,</b> All good things that exist God wills to be. If therefore His will imposes necessity on things willed, it follows that all good happens of necessity; and thus there is an end of free will, counsel, and all other such things.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div> 1142 right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 8 arg. 3"><a name="29250"><span class=
1143 "ref">[29250] I&ordf; q. 19 a. 8 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, illud
1144 quod habet necessitatem ex priori, est necessarium absolute, sicut
1145 animal mori est necessarium, quia est ex contrariis compositum. Sed
1146 res creatae a Deo, comparantur ad voluntatem divinam sicut ad
1147 aliquid prius, a quo habent necessitatem, cum haec conditionalis
1148 sit vera, si aliquid Deus vult, illud est; omnis autem
1149 conditionalis vera est necessaria. Sequitur ergo quod omne quod
1150 Deus vult, sit necessarium absolute.</p></div></div>
1151 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
1152 float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A8-p5"
1153 shownumber="no"><b>On the contrary,</b> All good things that exist God
1154 wills to be. If therefore His will imposes necessity on things willed,
1155 it follows that all good happens of necessity; and thus there is an
1156 end of free will, counsel, and all other such things.</p></div><div
1157 style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 8 s. c."><a name="29251"><span class=
1158 "ref">[29251] I&ordf; q. 19 a. 8 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra, omnia
1159 bona quae fiunt, Deus vult fieri. Si igitur eius voluntas imponat
1160 rebus volitis necessitatem, sequitur quod omnia bona ex necessitate
1161 eveniunt. Et sic perit liberum arbitrium et consilium, et omnia
1162 huiusmodi.</p></div></div>
950 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><div xml:lang="en"> 1163 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><div xml:lang="en">
951 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A8-p6" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> The divine will imposes necessity on some things willed but not on all. The reason of this some have chosen to assign to intermediate causes, holding that what God produces by necessary causes is necessary; and what He produces by contingent causes contingent.</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A8-p7" shownumber="no"> This does not seem to be a sufficient explanation, for two reasons. First, because the effect of a first cause is contingent on account of the secondary cause, from the fact that the effect of the first cause is hindered by deficiency in the second cause, as the sun's power is hindered by a defect in the plant. But no defect of a secondary cause can hinder God's will from producing its effect. Secondly, because if the distinction between the contingent and the necessary is to be 1164 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A8-p6" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> The divine will imposes necessity on some things willed but not on all. The reason of this some have chosen to assign to intermediate causes, holding that what God produces by necessary causes is necessary; and what He produces by contingent causes contingent.</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A8-p7" shownumber="no"> This does not seem to be a sufficient explanation, for two reasons. First, because the effect of a first cause is contingent on account of the secondary cause, from the fact that the effect of the first cause is hindered by deficiency in the second cause, as the sun's power is hindered by a defect in the plant. But no defect of a secondary cause can hinder God's will from producing its effect. Secondly, because if the distinction between the contingent and the necessary is to be
952 referred only to secondary causes, this must be independent of the divine intention and will; which is inadmissible. It is better therefore to say that this happens on account of the efficacy of the divine will. For when a cause is efficacious to act, the effect follows upon the cause, not only as to the thing done, but also as to its manner of being done or of being. Thus from defect of active power in the seed it may happen that a child is born unlike its father in accidental points, that 1165 referred only to secondary causes, this must be independent of the divine intention and will; which is inadmissible. It is better therefore to say that this happens on account of the efficacy of the divine will. For when a cause is efficacious to act, the effect follows upon the cause, not only as to the thing done, but also as to its manner of being done or of being. Thus from defect of active power in the seed it may happen that a child is born unlike its father in accidental points, that
953 belong to its manner of being. Since then the divine will is perfectly efficacious, it follows not only that things are done, which God wills to be done, but also that they are done in the way that He wills. Now God wills some things to be done necessarily, some contingently, to the right ordering of things, for the building up of the universe. Therefore to some effects He has attached necessary causes, that cannot fail; but to others defectible and contingent causes, from which arise 1166 belong to its manner of being. Since then the divine will is perfectly efficacious, it follows not only that things are done, which God wills to be done, but also that they are done in the way that He wills. Now God wills some things to be done necessarily, some contingently, to the right ordering of things, for the building up of the universe. Therefore to some effects He has attached necessary causes, that cannot fail; but to others defectible and contingent causes, from which arise
954 contingent effects. Hence it is not because the proximate causes are contingent that the effects willed by God happen contingently, but because God prepared contingent causes for them, it being His will that they should happen contingently.</p> 1167 contingent effects. Hence it is not because the proximate causes are contingent that the effects willed by God happen contingently, but because God prepared contingent causes for them, it being His will that they should happen contingently.</p>
955 </div></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div> 1168 </div></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 8 co."><a name="29252"><span class=
956 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A8-p8" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> By the words of Augustine we must understand a necessity in things willed by God that is not absolute, but conditional. For the conditional statement that if God wills a thing it must necessarily be, is necessarily true.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div> 1169 "ref">[29252] I&ordf; q. 19 a. 8 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
957 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A8-p9" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> From the very fact that nothing resists the divine will, it follows that not only those things happen that God wills to happen, but that they happen necessarily or contingently according to His will.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div> 1170 quod divina voluntas quibusdam volitis necessitatem imponit, non
958 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A8-p10" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Consequents have necessity from their antecedents according to the mode of the antecedents. Hence things effected by the divine will have that kind of necessity that God wills them to have, either absolute or conditional. Not all things, therefore, are absolute necessities.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div> 1171 autem omnibus. Cuius quidem rationem aliqui assignare voluerunt ex
959 </div><div id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A9" next="FP_Q19_A10" prev="FP_Q19_A8" progress="3.68%" n="ix" title="Article. 9 - Whether God wills evils?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A9-p0.1">Whether God wills evils?</h4><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A9-p2" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God wills evils. For every good that exists, God wills. But it is a good that evil should exist. For Augustine says (Enchiridion 95): "Although evil in so far as it is evil is not a good, yet it is good that not only good things should exist, but also evil things." Therefore God wills evil things.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A9-p3" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv, 23): "Evil would conduce to the perfection of everything," i.e. the universe. And Augustine says (Enchiridion 10,11): "Out of all things is built up the admirable beauty of the universe, wherein even that which is called evil, properly ordered and disposed, commends the good more evidently in that good is more pleasing and praiseworthy when contrasted with evil." But God wills all that appertains to the perfection and 1172 causis mediis quia ea quae producit per causas necessarias, sunt
960 beauty of the universe, for this is what God desires above all things in His creatures. Therefore God wills evil.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A9-p4" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, that evil should exist, and should not exist, are contradictory opposites. But God does not will that evil should not exist; otherwise, since various evils do exist, God's will would not always be fulfilled. Therefore God wills that evil should exist.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A9-p5" shownumber="no"><b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (Qq. 83,3): "No wise man is the cause of another man becoming worse. Now God surpasses all men in wisdom. Much less therefore is God the cause of man becoming worse; and when He is said to be the cause of a thing, He is said to will it." Therefore it is not by God's will that man becomes worse. Now it is clear that every evil makes a thing worse. Therefore God wills not evil things.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A9-p6" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> Since the ratio of good is the ratio of appetibility, as said before (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A9-p6.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q5.FP_Q5_A1" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">Q[5], A[1]</a>), and since evil is opposed to good, it is impossible that any evil, as such, should be sought for by the appetite, either natural, or animal, or by the intellectual appetite which is the will. Nevertheless evil may be sought accidentally, so far as it accompanies a good, as appears in each of the appetites. For a natural agent intends not privation or 1173 necessaria; ea vero quae producit per causas contingentes, sunt
1174 contingentia. Sed hoc non videtur sufficienter dictum, propter duo.
1175 Primo quidem, quia effectus alicuius primae causae est contingens
1176 propter causam secundam, ex eo quod impeditur effectus causae
1177 primae per defectum causae secundae; sicut virtus solis per
1178 defectum plantae impeditur. Nullus autem defectus causae secundae
1179 impedire potest quin voluntas Dei effectum suum producat. Secundo,
1180 quia, si distinctio contingentium a necessariis referatur solum in
1181 causas secundas, sequitur hoc esse praeter intentionem et
1182 voluntatem divinam, quod est inconveniens. Et ideo melius dicendum
1183 est, quod hoc contingit propter efficaciam divinae voluntatis. Cum
1184 enim aliqua causa efficax fuerit ad agendum, effectus consequitur
1185 causam non tantum secundum id quod fit, sed etiam secundum modum
1186 fiendi vel essendi, ex debilitate enim virtutis activae in semine,
1187 contingit quod filius nascitur dissimilis patri in accidentibus,
1188 quae pertinent ad modum essendi. Cum igitur voluntas divina sit
1189 efficacissima, non solum sequitur quod fiant ea quae Deus vult
1190 fieri; sed quod eo modo fiant, quo Deus ea fieri vult. Vult autem
1191 quaedam fieri Deus necessario, et quaedam contingenter, ut sit ordo
1192 in rebus, ad complementum universi. Et ideo quibusdam effectibus
1193 aptavit causas necessarias, quae deficere non possunt, ex quibus
1194 effectus de necessitate proveniunt, quibusdam autem aptavit causas
1195 contingentes defectibiles, ex quibus effectus contingenter
1196 eveniunt. Non igitur propterea effectus voliti a Deo, eveniunt
1197 contingenter, quia causae proximae sunt contingentes, sed propterea
1198 quia Deus voluit eos contingenter evenire, contingentes causas ad
1199 eos praeparavit.</p></div></div>
1200 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
1201 float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A8-p8"
1202 shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> By the words of Augustine
1203 we must understand a necessity in things willed by God that is not
1204 absolute, but conditional. For the conditional statement that if God
1205 wills a thing it must necessarily be, is necessarily
1206 true.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 8 ad 1"><a name="29253"><span class=
1207 "ref">[29253] I&ordf; q. 19 a. 8 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
1208 dicendum quod per illud verbum Augustini intelligenda est
1209 necessitas in rebus volitis a Deo, non absoluta, sed conditionalis,
1210 necesse est enim hanc conditionalem veram esse, si Deus hoc vult,
1211 necesse est hoc esse.</p></div></div>
1212 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
1213 float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A8-p9"
1214 shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> From the very fact that
1215 nothing resists the divine will, it follows that not only those things
1216 happen that God wills to happen, but that they happen necessarily or
1217 contingently according to His will.</p></div><div style="width: 45%;
1218 float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 8 ad 2"><a name="29254"><span class=
1219 "ref">[29254] I&ordf; q. 19 a. 8 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
1220 dicendum quod, ex hoc ipso quod nihil voluntati divinae resistit,
1221 sequitur quod non solum fiant ea quae Deus vult fieri; sed quod
1222 fiant contingenter vel necessario, quae sic fieri vult.</p></div></div>
1223 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
1224 float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A8-p10"
1225 shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Consequents have
1226 necessity from their antecedents according to the mode of the
1227 antecedents. Hence things effected by the divine will have that kind
1228 of necessity that God wills them to have, either absolute or
1229 conditional. Not all things, therefore, are absolute
1230 necessities.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
1231 xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 8 ad 3"><a name="29255"><span class=
1232 "ref">[29255] I&ordf; q. 19 a. 8 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
1233 dicendum quod posteriora habent necessitatem a prioribus, secundum
1234 modum priorum. Unde et ea quae fiunt a voluntate divina, talem
1235 necessitatem habent, qualem Deus vult ea habere, scilicet, vel
1236 absolutam, vel conditionalem tantum. Et sic, non omnia sunt
1237 necessaria absolute.</p></div></div>
1238 </div><div id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A9" next="FP_Q19_A10"
1239 prev="FP_Q19_A8" progress="3.68%" n="ix" title="Article. 9 - Whether
1240 God wills evils?"><h4 xml:lang="en"
1241 id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A9-p0.1">Whether God wills evils?</h4><div
1242 style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float:
1243 left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A9-p2"
1244 shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God wills evils. For
1245 every good that exists, God wills. But it is a good that evil should
1246 exist. For Augustine says (Enchiridion 95): "Although evil in so far
1247 as it is evil is not a good, yet it is good that not only good things
1248 should exist, but also evil things." Therefore God wills evil
1249 things.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
1250 xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 9 arg. 1"><a name="29256"><span class=
1251 "ref">[29256] I&ordf; q. 19 a. 9 arg. 1</span></a> Ad nonum sic
1252 proceditur. Videtur quod voluntas Dei sit malorum. Omne enim bonum
1253 quod fit, Deus vult. Sed mala fieri bonum est, dicit enim
1254 Augustinus, in Enchirid., <i>quamvis ea quae mala sunt, inquantum
1255 mala sunt, non sint bona; tamen, ut non solum bona, sed etiam ut
1256 sint mala, bonum est</i>. Ergo Deus vult mala.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A9-p3" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv, 23): "Evil would conduce to the perfection of everything," i.e. the universe. And Augustine says (Enchiridion 10,11): "Out of all things is built up the admirable beauty of the universe, wherein even that which is called evil, properly ordered and disposed, commends the good more evidently in that good is more pleasing and praiseworthy when contrasted with evil." But God wills all that appertains to the perfection and
1257 beauty of the universe, for this is what God desires above all
1258 things in His creatures. Therefore God wills evil.</p></div><div
1259 style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 9 arg. 2"><a name="29257"><span class=
1260 "ref">[29257] I&ordf; q. 19 a. 9 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, dicit
1261 Dionysius, IV cap. de Div. Nom., erit malum ad omnis (idest
1262 universi) perfectionem conferens. Et Augustinus dicit, in
1263 Enchirid., <i>ex omnibus consistit universitatis admirabilis
1264 pulchritudo; in qua etiam illud quod malum dicitur, bene ordinatum,
1265 et loco suo positum, eminentius commendat bona; ut magis placeant,
1266 et laudabiliora sint, dum comparantur malis</i>. Sed Deus vult omne
1267 illud quod pertinet ad perfectionem et decorem universi, quia hoc
1268 est quod Deus maxime vult in creaturis. Ergo Deus vult
1269 mala.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div
1270 style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en"
1271 id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A9-p4" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 3:</b>
1272 Further, that evil should exist, and should not exist, are
1273 contradictory opposites. But God does not will that evil should not
1274 exist; otherwise, since various evils do exist, God's will would not
1275 always be fulfilled. Therefore God wills that evil should
1276 exist.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la"
1277 title="I q. 19 a. 9 arg. 3"><a name="29258"><span class=
1278 "ref">[29258] I&ordf; q. 19 a. 9 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, mala
1279 fieri, et non fieri, sunt contradictorie opposita. Sed Deus non
1280 vult mala non fieri, quia, cum mala quaedam fiant, non semper
1281 voluntas Dei impleretur. Ergo Deus vult mala
1282 fieri.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div
1283 style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en"
1284 id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A9-p5" shownumber="no"><b>On the contrary,</b>
1285 Augustine says (Qq. 83,3): "No wise man is the cause of another man
1286 becoming worse. Now God surpasses all men in wisdom. Much less
1287 therefore is God the cause of man becoming worse; and when He is said
1288 to be the cause of a thing, He is said to will it." Therefore it is
1289 not by God's will that man becomes worse. Now it is clear that every
1290 evil makes a thing worse. Therefore God wills not evil
1291 things.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
1292 xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 9 s. c."><a name="29259"><span class=
1293 "ref">[29259] I&ordf; q. 19 a. 9 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
1294 quod dicit Augustinus, in libro octoginta trium quaest., <i>nullo
1295 sapiente homine auctore, fit homo deterior; est autem Deus omni
1296 sapiente homine praestantior; multo igitur minus, Deo auctore, fit
1297 aliquis deterior. Illo autem auctore cum dicitur, illo volente
1298 dicitur</i>. Non ergo volente Deo, fit homo deterior. Constat autem
1299 quod quolibet malo fit aliquid deterius. Ergo Deus non vult
1300 mala.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A9-p6" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> Since the ratio of good is the ratio of appetibility, as said before (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A9-p6.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q5.FP_Q5_A1" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">Q[5], A[1]</a>), and since evil is opposed to good, it is impossible that any evil, as such, should be sought for by the appetite, either natural, or animal, or by the intellectual appetite which is the will. Nevertheless evil may be sought accidentally, so far as it accompanies a good, as appears in each of the appetites. For a natural agent intends not privation or
961 corruption, but the form to which is annexed the privation of some other form, and the generation of one thing, which implies the corruption of another. Also when a lion kills a stag, his object is food, to obtain which the killing of the animal is only the means. Similarly the fornicator has merely pleasure for his object, and the deformity of sin is only an accompaniment. Now the evil that accompanies one good, is the privation of another good. Never therefore would evil be sought after, not 1301 corruption, but the form to which is annexed the privation of some other form, and the generation of one thing, which implies the corruption of another. Also when a lion kills a stag, his object is food, to obtain which the killing of the animal is only the means. Similarly the fornicator has merely pleasure for his object, and the deformity of sin is only an accompaniment. Now the evil that accompanies one good, is the privation of another good. Never therefore would evil be sought after, not
962 even accidentally, unless the good that accompanies the evil were more desired than the good of which the evil is the privation. Now God wills no good more than He wills His own goodness; yet He wills one good more than another. Hence He in no way wills the evil of sin, which is the privation of right order towards the divine good. The evil of natural defect, or of punishment, He does will, by willing the good to which such evils are attached. Thus in willing justice He wills punishment; and in 1302 even accidentally, unless the good that accompanies the evil were more desired than the good of which the evil is the privation. Now God wills no good more than He wills His own goodness; yet He wills one good more than another. Hence He in no way wills the evil of sin, which is the privation of right order towards the divine good. The evil of natural defect, or of punishment, He does will, by willing the good to which such evils are attached. Thus in willing justice He wills punishment; and in
963 willing the preservation of the natural order, He wills some things to be naturally corrupted.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A9-p7" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Some have said that although God does not will evil, yet He wills that evil should be or be done, because, although evil is not a good, yet it is good that evil should be or be done. This they said because things evil in themselves are ordered to some good end; and this order they thought was expressed in the words "that evil should be or be done." This, however, is not correct; since evil is not of itself ordered to good, but accidentally. For it is 1303 willing the preservation of the natural order, He wills some things
964 beside the intention of the sinner, that any good should follow from his sin; as it was beside the intention of tyrants that the patience of the martyrs should shine forth from all their persecutions. It cannot therefore be said that such an ordering to good is implied in the statement that it is a good thing that evil should be or be done, since nothing is judged of by that which appertains to it accidentally, but by that which belongs to it essentially.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A9-p8" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Evil does not operate towards the perfection and beauty of the universe, except accidentally, as said above (ad 1). Therefore Dionysius in saying that "evil would conduce to the perfection of the universe," draws a conclusion by reduction to an absurdity.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A9-p9" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The statements that evil exists, and that evil exists not, are opposed as contradictories; yet the statements that anyone wills evil to exist and that he wills it not to be, are not so opposed; since either is affirmative. God therefore neither wills evil to be done, nor wills it not to be done, but wills to permit evil to be done; and this is a good.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div></div><div id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A10" next="FP_Q19_A11" prev="FP_Q19_A9" progress="3.71%" n="x" title="Article. 10 - Whether God has free-will?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A10-p0.1">Whether God has free-will?</h4><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A10-p2" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God has not free-will. For Jerome says, in a homily on the prodigal son [*Ep. 146, ad Damas.]; "God alone is He who is not liable to sin, nor can be liable: all others, as having free-will, can be inclined to either side."</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A10-p3" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, free-will is the faculty of the reason and will, by which good and evil are chosen. But God does not will evil, as has been said <a id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A10-p3.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A9" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">(A[9])</a>. Therefore there is not free-will in God.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A10-p4" shownumber="no"><b>On the contrary,</b> Ambrose says (De Fide ii, 3): "The Holy Spirit divideth unto each one as He will, namely, according to the free choice of the will, not in obedience to necessity."</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A10-p5" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> We have free-will with respect to what we will not of necessity, nor be natural instinct. For our will to be happy does not appertain to free-will, but to natural instinct. Hence other animals, that are moved to act by natural instinct, are not said to be moved by free-will. Since then God necessarily wills His own goodness, but other things not necessarily, as shown above <a id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A10-p5.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A3" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">(A[3])</a>, He has free will with respect to what He does not 1304 to be naturally corrupted.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float:
1305 right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 9 co."><a name="29260"><span class=
1306 "ref">[29260] I&ordf; q. 19 a. 9 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
1307 quod, cum ratio boni sit ratio appetibilis, ut supra dictum est,
1308 malum autem opponatur bono; impossibile est quod aliquod malum,
1309 inquantum huiusmodi, appetatur, neque appetitu naturali, neque
1310 animali, neque intellectuali, qui est voluntas. Sed aliquod malum
1311 appetitur per accidens, inquantum consequitur ad aliquod bonum. Et
1312 hoc apparet in quolibet appetitu. Non enim agens naturale intendit
1313 privationem vel corruptionem; sed formam, cui coniungitur privatio
1314 alterius formae; et generationem unius, quae est corruptio
1315 alterius. Leo etiam, occidens cervum, intendit cibum, cui
1316 coniungitur occisio animalis. Similiter fornicator intendit
1317 delectationem, cui coniungitur deformitas culpae. Malum autem quod
1318 coniungitur alicui bono, est privatio alterius boni. Nunquam igitur
1319 appeteretur malum, nec per accidens, nisi bonum cui coniungitur
1320 malum, magis appeteretur quam bonum quod privatur per malum. Nullum
1321 autem bonum Deus magis vult quam suam bonitatem, vult tamen aliquod
1322 bonum magis quam aliud quoddam bonum. Unde malum culpae, quod
1323 privat ordinem ad bonum divinum, Deus nullo modo vult. Sed malum
1324 naturalis defectus, vel malum poenae vult, volendo aliquod bonum,
1325 cui coniungitur tale malum, sicut, volendo iustitiam, vult poenam;
1326 et volendo ordinem naturae servari, vult quaedam naturaliter
1327 corrumpi.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A9-p7" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Some have said that although God does not will evil, yet He wills that evil should be or be done, because, although evil is not a good, yet it is good that evil should be or be done. This they said because things evil in themselves are ordered to some good end; and this order they thought was expressed in the words "that evil should be or be done." This, however, is not correct; since evil is not of itself ordered to good, but accidentally. For it is
1328 beside the intention of the sinner, that any good should follow from
1329 his sin; as it was beside the intention of tyrants that the patience
1330 of the martyrs should shine forth from all their persecutions. It
1331 cannot therefore be said that such an ordering to good is implied in
1332 the statement that it is a good thing that evil should be or be done,
1333 since nothing is judged of by that which appertains to it
1334 accidentally, but by that which belongs to it
1335 essentially.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
1336 xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 9 ad 1"><a name="29261"><span class=
1337 "ref">[29261] I&ordf; q. 19 a. 9 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
1338 dicendum quod quidam dixerunt quod, licet Deus non velit mala, vult
1339 tamen mala esse vel fieri, quia, licet mala non sint bona, bonum
1340 tamen est mala esse vel fieri. Quod ideo dicebant, quia ea quae in
1341 se mala sunt, ordinantur ad aliquod bonum, quem quidem ordinem
1342 importari credebant in hoc quod dicitur, mala esse vel fieri. Sed
1343 hoc non recte dicitur. Quia malum non ordinatur ad bonum per se,
1344 sed per accidens. Praeter intentionem enim peccantis est, quod ex
1345 hoc sequatur aliquod bonum; sicut praeter intentionem tyrannorum
1346 fuit, quod ex eorum persecutionibus claresceret patientia martyrum.
1347 Et ideo non potest dici quod talis ordo ab bonum importetur per hoc
1348 quod dicitur, quod malum esse vel fieri sit bonum, quia nihil
1349 iudicatur secundum illud quod competit ei per accidens, sed
1350 secundum illud quod competit ei per se.</p></div></div><div
1351 style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float:
1352 left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A9-p8"
1353 shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Evil does not operate
1354 towards the perfection and beauty of the universe, except
1355 accidentally, as said above (ad 1). Therefore Dionysius in saying that
1356 "evil would conduce to the perfection of the universe," draws a
1357 conclusion by reduction to an absurdity.</p></div><div style="width:
1358 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 9 ad 2"><a name="29262"><span class=
1359 "ref">[29262] I&ordf; q. 19 a. 9 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
1360 dicendum quod malum non operatur ad perfectionem et decorem
1361 universi nisi per accidens, ut dictum est. Unde et hoc quod dicit
1362 Dionysius, quod malum est ad universi perfectionem conferens,
1363 concludit inducendo quasi ad inconveniens.</p></div></div><div
1364 style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float:
1365 left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A9-p9"
1366 shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The statements that evil
1367 exists, and that evil exists not, are opposed as contradictories; yet
1368 the statements that anyone wills evil to exist and that he wills it
1369 not to be, are not so opposed; since either is affirmative. God
1370 therefore neither wills evil to be done, nor wills it not to be done,
1371 but wills to permit evil to be done; and this is a good.</p></div><div
1372 style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 9 ad 3"><a name="29263"><span class=
1373 "ref">[29263] I&ordf; q. 19 a. 9 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
1374 dicendum quod, licet mala fieri, et mala non fieri, contradictorie
1375 opponantur; tamen velle mala fieri, et velle mala non fieri, non
1376 opponuntur contradictorie, cum utrumque sit affirmativum. Deus
1377 igitur neque vult mala fieri, neque vult mala non fieri, sed vult
1378 permittere mala fieri. Et hoc est bonum.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A10" next="FP_Q19_A11" prev="FP_Q19_A9" progress="3.71%" n="x" title="Article. 10 - Whether God has free-will?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A10-p0.1">Whether God has free-will?</h4><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A10-p2" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God has not free-will. For Jerome says, in a homily on the prodigal son [*Ep. 146, ad Damas.]; "God alone is He who is not liable to sin, nor can be liable: all others, as having free-will, can be inclined to either side."</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A10-p3" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, free-will is the faculty of the reason and will, by which good and evil are chosen. But God does not will evil, as has been said <a id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A10-p3.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A9" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">(A[9])</a>. Therefore there is not free-will in God.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A10-p4" shownumber="no"><b>On the contrary,</b> Ambrose says (De Fide ii, 3): "The Holy Spirit divideth unto each one as He will, namely, according to the free choice of the will, not in obedience to necessity."</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A10-p5" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> We have free-will with respect to what we will not of necessity, nor be natural instinct. For our will to be happy does not appertain to free-will, but to natural instinct. Hence other animals, that are moved to act by natural instinct, are not said to be moved by free-will. Since then God necessarily wills His own goodness, but other things not necessarily, as shown above <a id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A10-p5.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A3" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">(A[3])</a>, He has free will with respect to what He does not
965 necessarily will.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A10-p6" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Jerome seems to deny free-will to God not simply, but only as regards the inclination to sin.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A10-p7" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Since the evil of sin consists in turning away from the divine goodness, by which God wills all things, as above shown (De Fide ii, 3), it is manifestly impossible for Him to will the evil of sin; yet He can make choice of one of two opposites, inasmuch as He can will a thing to be, or not to be. In the same way we ourselves, without sin, can will to sit down, and not will to sit down.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div></div><div id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A11" next="FP_Q19_A12" prev="FP_Q19_A10" progress="3.73%" n="xi" title="Article. 11 - Whether the will of expression is to be distinguished in God?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A11-p0.1">Whether the will of expression is to be distinguished in God?</h4><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A11-p2" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the will of expression is not to be distinguished in God. For as the will of God is the cause of things, so is His wisdom. But no expressions are assigned to the divine wisdom. Therefore no expressions ought to be assigned to the divine will.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A11-p3" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, every expression that is not in agreement with the mind of him who expresses himself, is false. If therefore the expressions assigned to the divine will are not in agreement with that will, they are false. But if they do agree, they are superfluous. No expressions therefore must be assigned to the divine will.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A11-p4" shownumber="no"><b>On the contrary,</b> The will of God is one, since it is the very essence of God. Yet sometimes it is spoken of as many, as in the words of<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Ps.110.2" parsed="vul|Ps|110|2|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A11-p4.1" passage=" Ps. 110:2"> Ps. 110:2</scripRef>: "Great are the works of the Lord, sought out according to all His wills." Therefore sometimes the sign must be taken for the will.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A11-p5" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> Some things are said of God in their strict sense; others by metaphor, as appears from what has been said before (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A11-p5.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A3" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">Q[13], A[3]</a>). When certain human passions are predicated of the Godhead metaphorically, this is done because of a likeness in the effect. Hence a thing that is in us a sign of some passion, is signified metaphorically in God under the name of that passion. Thus with us it is usual for an angry man to punish, so that 1379 necessarily will.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A10-p6" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Jerome seems to deny free-will to God not simply, but only as regards the inclination to sin.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A10-p7" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Since the evil of sin consists in turning away from the divine goodness, by which God wills all things, as above shown (De Fide ii, 3), it is manifestly impossible for Him to will the evil of sin; yet He can make choice of one of two opposites, inasmuch as He can will a thing to be, or not to be. In the same way we ourselves, without sin, can will to sit down, and not will to sit down.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div></div><div id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A11" next="FP_Q19_A12" prev="FP_Q19_A10" progress="3.73%" n="xi" title="Article. 11 - Whether the will of expression is to be distinguished in God?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A11-p0.1">Whether the will of expression is to be distinguished in God?</h4><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A11-p2" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the will of expression is not to be distinguished in God. For as the will of God is the cause of things, so is His wisdom. But no expressions are assigned to the divine wisdom. Therefore no expressions ought to be assigned to the divine will.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A11-p3" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, every expression that is not in agreement with the mind of him who expresses himself, is false. If therefore the expressions assigned to the divine will are not in agreement with that will, they are false. But if they do agree, they are superfluous. No expressions therefore must be assigned to the divine will.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A11-p4" shownumber="no"><b>On the contrary,</b> The will of God is one, since it is the very essence of God. Yet sometimes it is spoken of as many, as in the words of<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Ps.110.2" parsed="vul|Ps|110|2|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A11-p4.1" passage=" Ps. 110:2"> Ps. 110:2</scripRef>: "Great are the works of the Lord, sought out according to all His wills." Therefore sometimes the sign must be taken for the will.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A11-p5" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> Some things are said of God in their strict sense; others by metaphor, as appears from what has been said before (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A11-p5.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A3" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">Q[13], A[3]</a>). When certain human passions are predicated of the Godhead metaphorically, this is done because of a likeness in the effect. Hence a thing that is in us a sign of some passion, is signified metaphorically in God under the name of that passion. Thus with us it is usual for an angry man to punish, so that
966 punishment becomes an expression of anger. Therefore punishment itself is signified by the word anger, when anger is attributed to God. In the same way, what is usually with us an expression of will, is sometimes metaphorically called will in God; just as when anyone lays down a precept, it is a sign that he wishes that precept obeyed. Hence a divine precept is sometimes called by metaphor the will of God, as in the words: "Thy will be done on earth, as it is in heaven" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Matt.6.10" parsed="vul|Matt|6|10|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A11-p5.2" passage="Mat. 6:10">Mat. 1380 punishment becomes an expression of anger. Therefore punishment itself is signified by the word anger, when anger is attributed to God. In the same way, what is usually with us an expression of will, is sometimes metaphorically called will in God; just as when anyone lays down a precept, it is a sign that he wishes that precept obeyed. Hence a divine precept is sometimes called by metaphor the will of God, as in the words: "Thy will be done on earth, as it is in heaven" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Matt.6.10" parsed="vul|Matt|6|10|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A11-p5.2" passage="Mat. 6:10">Mat.
967 6:10</scripRef>). There is, however, this difference between will and anger, that anger is never attributed to God properly, since in its primary meaning it includes passion; whereas will is attributed to Him properly. Therefore in God there are distinguished will in its proper sense, and will as attributed to Him by metaphor. Will in its proper sense is called the will of good pleasure; and will metaphorically taken is the will of expression, inasmuch as the sign itself of will is called 1381 6:10</scripRef>). There is, however, this difference between will and anger, that anger is never attributed to God properly, since in its primary meaning it includes passion; whereas will is attributed to Him properly. Therefore in God there are distinguished will in its proper sense, and will as attributed to Him by metaphor. Will in its proper sense is called the will of good pleasure; and will metaphorically taken is the will of expression, inasmuch as the sign itself of will is called
968 will.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A11-p6" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Knowledge is not the cause of a thing being done, unless through the will. For we do not put into act what we know, unless we will to do so. Accordingly expression is not attributed to knowledge, but to will.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A11-p7" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Expressions of will are called divine wills, not as being signs that God wills anything; but because what in us is the usual expression of our will, is called the divine will in God. Thus punishment is not a sign that there is anger in God; but it is called anger in Him, from the fact that it is an expression of anger in ourselves.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div></div><div id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A12" next="FP_Q20" prev="FP_Q19_A11" progress="3.75%" n="xii" title="Article. 12 - Whether five expressions of will are rightly assigned to the divine will?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A12-p0.1">Whether five expressions of will are rightly assigned to the divine will?</h4> 1382 will.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A11-p6" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Knowledge is not the cause of a thing being done, unless through the will. For we do not put into act what we know, unless we will to do so. Accordingly expression is not attributed to knowledge, but to will.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A11-p7" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Expressions of will are called divine wills, not as being signs that God wills anything; but because what in us is the usual expression of our will, is called the divine will in God. Thus punishment is not a sign that there is anger in God; but it is called anger in Him, from the fact that it is an expression of anger in ourselves.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div></div><div id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A12" next="FP_Q20" prev="FP_Q19_A11" progress="3.75%" n="xii" title="Article. 12 - Whether five expressions of will are rightly assigned to the divine will?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A12-p0.1">Whether five expressions of will are rightly assigned to the divine will?</h4>
969 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A12-p2" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that five expressions of will---namely, prohibition, precept, counsel, operation, and permission---are not rightly assigned to the divine will. For the same things that God bids us do by His precept or counsel, these He sometimes operates in us, and the same things that He prohibits, these He sometimes permits. They ought not therefore to be enumerated as distinct.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div> 1383 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A12-p2" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that five expressions of will---namely, prohibition, precept, counsel, operation, and permission---are not rightly assigned to the divine will. For the same things that God bids us do by His precept or counsel, these He sometimes operates in us, and the same things that He prohibits, these He sometimes permits. They ought not therefore to be enumerated as distinct.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/></div>