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13 <body style="font-family: Bitstream Vera Serif"><div id="FP.ii" class="div2"> 13 <body style="font-family: Bitstream Vera Serif"><div id="FP.ii" class="div2">
14 <a href="summa.FP_Q1_A10.html"/> 14
15 <a href="summa.FP_Q2.html"/> 15
16 <h2 id="FP.ii-p0.1">TREATISE ON THE ONE GOD (QQ[2]-26)</h2> 16 <h2 id="FP.ii-p0.1">TREATISE ON THE ONE GOD (QQ[2]-26)</h2>
17 <div id="FP_Q2" class="div3"> 17 <div id="FP_Q2" class="div3">
18 <h3 id="FP_Q2-p0.1">Q. 2. THE EXISTENCE OF GOD (THREE ARTICLES)</h3> 18 <h3 id="FP_Q2-p0.1">Q. 2. THE EXISTENCE OF GOD (THREE ARTICLES)</h3>
19 <div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> 19 <div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4">
20 <p id="FP_Q2-p2"> Because the chief aim of sacred doctrine is to teach the knowledge of God, not only as He is in Himself, but also as He is 20 <p id="FP_Q2-p2"> Because the chief aim of sacred doctrine is to teach the knowledge of God, not only as He is in Himself, but also as He is
104 and subject of the proposition. Therefore, it happens, as Boethius says (Hebdom., the title of which is: "Whether all that 104 and subject of the proposition. Therefore, it happens, as Boethius says (Hebdom., the title of which is: "Whether all that
105 is, 105 is,
106 is good"), "that there are some mental concepts self-evident only to the learned, as that incorporeal substances are not in 106 is good"), "that there are some mental concepts self-evident only to the learned, as that incorporeal substances are not in
107 space." Therefore I say that this proposition, "God exists," of itself is self-evident, for the predicate is the same as the 107 space." Therefore I say that this proposition, "God exists," of itself is self-evident, for the predicate is the same as the
108 subject, because God is His own existence as will be hereafter shown ( 108 subject, because God is His own existence as will be hereafter shown (
109 <a id="FP_Q2_A1-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q3_A4.html">Q[3], A[4]</a>). Now because we do not know the essence of God, the proposition is not self-evident to us; but needs to be demonstrated 109 <a href="#FP_Q3_A4" id="FP_Q2_A1-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[3], A[4]</a>). Now because we do not know the essence of God, the proposition is not self-evident to us; but needs to be demonstrated
110 by things that are more 110 by things that are more
111 known to us, though less known in their nature---namely, by effects. 111 known to us, though less known in their nature---namely, by effects.
112 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 2 a. 1 co."><a name="28303" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28303] Iª q. 2 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum 112 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 2 a. 1 co."><a name="28303" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28303] Iª q. 2 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
113 quod contingit aliquid esse per se notum dupliciter, uno modo, 113 quod contingit aliquid esse per se notum dupliciter, uno modo,
114 secundum se et non quoad nos; alio modo, secundum se et quoad nos. 114 secundum se et non quoad nos; alio modo, secundum se et quoad nos.
516 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q3_A1-p7.1" href="./asv.html#John.4.24" target="asv">Jn. 4:24</a>): "God is a spirit." 516 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q3_A1-p7.1" href="./asv.html#John.4.24" target="asv">Jn. 4:24</a>): "God is a spirit."
517 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 3 a. 1 s. c."><a name="28327" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28327] Iª q. 3 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est 517 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 3 a. 1 s. c."><a name="28327" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28327] Iª q. 3 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
518 quod dicitur Ioan. IV, <i>spiritus est Deus</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q3_A1-p8"> 518 quod dicitur Ioan. IV, <i>spiritus est Deus</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q3_A1-p8">
519 <b>I answer that,</b> It is absolutely true that God is not a body; and this can be shown in three ways. First, because no body is in motion unless 519 <b>I answer that,</b> It is absolutely true that God is not a body; and this can be shown in three ways. First, because no body is in motion unless
520 it be put in motion, as is evident from induction. Now it has been already proved ( 520 it be put in motion, as is evident from induction. Now it has been already proved (
521 <a id="FP_Q3_A1-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q2_A3.html">Q[2], A[3]</a>), that God is the First Mover, and is Himself unmoved. Therefore it is clear that God is not a body. Secondly, because the 521 <a href="#FP_Q2_A3" id="FP_Q3_A1-p8.1" shape="rect">Q[2], A[3]</a>), that God is the First Mover, and is Himself unmoved. Therefore it is clear that God is not a body. Secondly, because the
522 first being must of necessity be in act, and in no way in potentiality. For although in any 522 first being must of necessity be in act, and in no way in potentiality. For although in any
523 single thing that passes from potentiality to actuality, the potentiality is prior in time to the actuality; nevertheless, 523 single thing that passes from potentiality to actuality, the potentiality is prior in time to the actuality; nevertheless,
524 absolutely speaking, actuality is prior to potentiality; for whatever is in potentiality can be reduced into actuality only 524 absolutely speaking, actuality is prior to potentiality; for whatever is in potentiality can be reduced into actuality only
525 by some being in actuality. Now it has been already proved that God is the First Being. It is therefore impossible that in 525 by some being in actuality. Now it has been already proved that God is the First Being. It is therefore impossible that in
526 God there should be any potentiality. But every body is in potentiality because the continuous, as such, is divisible to 526 God there should be any potentiality. But every body is in potentiality because the continuous, as such, is divisible to
550 inquantum corpus, quia sic omne corpus viveret, oportet igitur quod 550 inquantum corpus, quia sic omne corpus viveret, oportet igitur quod
551 vivat per aliquid aliud, sicut corpus nostrum vivit per animam. 551 vivat per aliquid aliud, sicut corpus nostrum vivit per animam.
552 Illud autem per quod vivit corpus, est nobilius quam corpus. 552 Illud autem per quod vivit corpus, est nobilius quam corpus.
553 Impossibile est igitur Deum esse corpus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q3_A1-p9"> 553 Impossibile est igitur Deum esse corpus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q3_A1-p9">
554 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As we have said above ( 554 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As we have said above (
555 <a id="FP_Q3_A1-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q1_A9.html">Q[1], A[9]</a>), Holy Writ puts before us spiritual and divine things under the comparison of corporeal things. Hence, when it attributes 555 <a href="FP_i.html#FP_Q1_A9" id="FP_Q3_A1-p9.1" shape="rect">Q[1], A[9]</a>), Holy Writ puts before us spiritual and divine things under the comparison of corporeal things. Hence, when it attributes
556 to God the three dimensions under the comparison of corporeal quantity, it implies His virtual quantity; thus, by depth, it 556 to God the three dimensions under the comparison of corporeal quantity, it implies His virtual quantity; thus, by depth, it
557 signifies His power of knowing hidden things; by height, the transcendence of His excelling power; by length, the duration 557 signifies His power of knowing hidden things; by height, the transcendence of His excelling power; by length, the duration
558 of His existence; by 558 of His existence; by
559 breadth, His act of love for all. Or, as says Dionysius (Div. Nom. ix), by the depth of God is meant the incomprehensibility 559 breadth, His act of love for all. Or, as says Dionysius (Div. Nom. ix), by the depth of God is meant the incomprehensibility
560 of His essence; by length, the procession of His all-pervading power; by breadth, His overspreading all things, inasmuch as 560 of His essence; by length, the procession of His all-pervading power; by breadth, His overspreading all things, inasmuch as
640 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 3 a. 2 s. c."><a name="28337" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28337] Iª q. 3 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra, omne 640 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 3 a. 2 s. c."><a name="28337" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28337] Iª q. 3 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra, omne
641 compositum ex materia et forma est corpus, quantitas enim dimensiva 641 compositum ex materia et forma est corpus, quantitas enim dimensiva
642 est quae primo inhaeret materiae. Sed Deus non est corpus, ut 642 est quae primo inhaeret materiae. Sed Deus non est corpus, ut
643 ostensum est. Ergo Deus non est compositus ex materia et forma.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q3_A2-p6"> 643 ostensum est. Ergo Deus non est compositus ex materia et forma.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q3_A2-p6">
644 <b>I answer that,</b> It is impossible that matter should exist in God. First, because matter is in potentiality. But we have shown ( 644 <b>I answer that,</b> It is impossible that matter should exist in God. First, because matter is in potentiality. But we have shown (
645 <a id="FP_Q3_A2-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q2_A3.html">Q[2], A[3]</a>) that God is pure act, without any potentiality. Hence it is impossible that God should be composed of matter and form. Secondly, 645 <a href="#FP_Q2_A3" id="FP_Q3_A2-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[2], A[3]</a>) that God is pure act, without any potentiality. Hence it is impossible that God should be composed of matter and form. Secondly,
646 because everything composed of matter and form owes its perfection and goodness to its form; therefore its goodness is participated, 646 because everything composed of matter and form owes its perfection and goodness to its form; therefore its goodness is participated,
647 inasmuch as matter participates the form. Now the 647 inasmuch as matter participates the form. Now the
648 first good and the best---viz. God---is not a participated good, because the essential good is prior to the participated good. 648 first good and the best---viz. God---is not a participated good, because the essential good is prior to the participated good.
649 Hence it is impossible that God should be composed of matter and form. Thirdly, because every agent acts by its form; hence 649 Hence it is impossible that God should be composed of matter and form. Thirdly, because every agent acts by its form; hence
650 the manner in which it has its form is the manner in which it is an agent. Therefore whatever is primarily and essentially 650 the manner in which it has its form is the manner in which it is an agent. Therefore whatever is primarily and essentially
790 sequitur ergo quod Deus sit ens commune praedicabile de omnibus. 790 sequitur ergo quod Deus sit ens commune praedicabile de omnibus.
791 Hoc autem est falsum, secundum illud Sap. XIV, <i>incommunicabile 791 Hoc autem est falsum, secundum illud Sap. XIV, <i>incommunicabile
792 nomen lignis et lapidibus imposuerunt</i>. Ergo esse Dei non est 792 nomen lignis et lapidibus imposuerunt</i>. Ergo esse Dei non est
793 eius essentia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q3_A4-p3"> 793 eius essentia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q3_A4-p3">
794 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, we can know "whether" God exists as said above ( 794 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, we can know "whether" God exists as said above (
795 <a id="FP_Q3_A4-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q2_A2.html">Q[2], A[2]</a>); but we cannot know "what" He is. Therefore God's existence is not the same as His essence---that is, as His quiddity or 795 <a href="#FP_Q2_A2" id="FP_Q3_A4-p3.1" shape="rect">Q[2], A[2]</a>); but we cannot know "what" He is. Therefore God's existence is not the same as His essence---that is, as His quiddity or
796 nature. 796 nature.
797 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 3 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="28349" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28349] Iª q. 3 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, de Deo 797 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 3 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="28349" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28349] Iª q. 3 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, de Deo
798 scire possumus an sit, ut supra dictum est. Non autem possumus 798 scire possumus an sit, ut supra dictum est. Non autem possumus
799 scire quid sit. Ergo non est idem esse Dei, et quod quid est eius, 799 scire quid sit. Ergo non est idem esse Dei, et quod quid est eius,
800 sive quidditas vel natura.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q3_A4-p4"> 800 sive quidditas vel natura.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q3_A4-p4">
815 God; because we call God the first efficient cause. Therefore it is impossible that in God His existence should differ from 815 God; because we call God the first efficient cause. Therefore it is impossible that in God His existence should differ from
816 His essence. Secondly, existence is that which makes every form or nature actual; for goodness and humanity are spoken of 816 His essence. Secondly, existence is that which makes every form or nature actual; for goodness and humanity are spoken of
817 as actual, only because they are spoken of as existing. Therefore existence must be compared to essence, if the latter is 817 as actual, only because they are spoken of as existing. Therefore existence must be compared to essence, if the latter is
818 a distinct reality, as actuality to potentiality. Therefore, since in God there is no potentiality, as shown above 818 a distinct reality, as actuality to potentiality. Therefore, since in God there is no potentiality, as shown above
819 819
820 <a id="FP_Q3_A4-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q3_A1.html">(A[1])</a>, it follows that in Him essence does not differ from existence. Therefore His essence is His existence. Thirdly, because, 820 <a href="#FP_Q3_A1" id="FP_Q3_A4-p5.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>, it follows that in Him essence does not differ from existence. Therefore His essence is His existence. Thirdly, because,
821 just as that which has fire, but is not itself fire, is on fire by participation; so that which has existence but is not existence, 821 just as that which has fire, but is not itself fire, is on fire by participation; so that which has existence but is not existence,
822 is a being by participation. But God is His own essence, as shown above 822 is a being by participation. But God is His own essence, as shown above
823 <a id="FP_Q3_A4-p5.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q3_A3.html">(A[3])</a> if, therefore, He is not His own existence He will be not essential, but participated being. He will not 823 <a href="#FP_Q3_A3" id="FP_Q3_A4-p5.2" shape="rect">(A[3])</a> if, therefore, He is not His own existence He will be not essential, but participated being. He will not
824 therefore be the first being---which is absurd. Therefore God is His own existence, and not merely His own essence. 824 therefore be the first being---which is absurd. Therefore God is His own existence, and not merely His own essence.
825 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 3 a. 4 co."><a name="28351" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28351] Iª q. 3 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum 825 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 3 a. 4 co."><a name="28351" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28351] Iª q. 3 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
826 quod Deus non solum est sua essentia, ut ostensum est, sed etiam 826 quod Deus non solum est sua essentia, ut ostensum est, sed etiam
827 suum esse. Quod quidem multipliciter ostendi potest. Primo quidem, 827 suum esse. Quod quidem multipliciter ostendi potest. Primo quidem,
828 quia quidquid est in aliquo quod est praeter essentiam eius, 828 quia quidquid est in aliquo quod est praeter essentiam eius,
870 modo, esse sine additione, est esse commune.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q3_A4-p7"> 870 modo, esse sine additione, est esse commune.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q3_A4-p7">
871 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> "To be" can mean either of two things. It may mean the act of essence, or it may mean the composition of a proposition effected 871 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> "To be" can mean either of two things. It may mean the act of essence, or it may mean the composition of a proposition effected
872 by the mind in joining a predicate to a subject. Taking "to be" in the first sense, we cannot understand God's existence nor 872 by the mind in joining a predicate to a subject. Taking "to be" in the first sense, we cannot understand God's existence nor
873 His essence; but only in the second sense. We know that this proposition which we form about God when we say "God is," is 873 His essence; but only in the second sense. We know that this proposition which we form about God when we say "God is," is
874 true; and this we know from His effects ( 874 true; and this we know from His effects (
875 <a id="FP_Q3_A4-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q2_A2.html">Q[2], 875 <a href="#FP_Q2_A2" id="FP_Q3_A4-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[2],
876 A[2] 876 A[2]
877 </a>). 877 </a>).
878 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 3 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="28353" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28353] Iª q. 3 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum 878 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 3 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="28353" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28353] Iª q. 3 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
879 dicendum quod esse dupliciter dicitur, uno modo, significat actum 879 dicendum quod esse dupliciter dicitur, uno modo, significat actum
880 essendi; alio modo, significat compositionem propositionis, quam 880 essendi; alio modo, significat compositionem propositionis, quam
1008 quia <i>forma simplex non potest esse subiectum</i>, ut dicit 1008 quia <i>forma simplex non potest esse subiectum</i>, ut dicit
1009 Boetius in Lib. de Trin. Ergo in Deo non potest esse accidens.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q3_A6-p5"> 1009 Boetius in Lib. de Trin. Ergo in Deo non potest esse accidens.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q3_A6-p5">
1010 <b>I answer that,</b> From all we have said, it is clear there can be no accident in God. First, because a subject is compared to its accidents 1010 <b>I answer that,</b> From all we have said, it is clear there can be no accident in God. First, because a subject is compared to its accidents
1011 as potentiality to actuality; for a subject is in some sense made actual by its accidents. But there can be no potentiality 1011 as potentiality to actuality; for a subject is in some sense made actual by its accidents. But there can be no potentiality
1012 in God, as was shown ( 1012 in God, as was shown (
1013 <a id="FP_Q3_A6-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q2_A3.html">Q[2], A[3]</a>). Secondly, because God is His own existence; and as Boethius says (Hebdom.), although every essence may have something superadded 1013 <a href="#FP_Q2_A3" id="FP_Q3_A6-p5.1" shape="rect">Q[2], A[3]</a>). Secondly, because God is His own existence; and as Boethius says (Hebdom.), although every essence may have something superadded
1014 to it, this cannot apply to 1014 to it, this cannot apply to
1015 absolute being: thus a heated substance can have something extraneous to heat added to it, as whiteness, nevertheless absolute 1015 absolute being: thus a heated substance can have something extraneous to heat added to it, as whiteness, nevertheless absolute
1016 heat can have nothing else than heat. Thirdly, because what is essential is prior to what is accidental. Whence as God is 1016 heat can have nothing else than heat. Thirdly, because what is essential is prior to what is accidental. Whence as God is
1017 absolute primal being, there can be in Him nothing accidental. Neither can He have any essential accidents (as the capability 1017 absolute primal being, there can be in Him nothing accidental. Neither can He have any essential accidents (as the capability
1018 of laughing is an essential accident of man), because such accidents are caused by the constituent principles of the 1018 of laughing is an essential accident of man), because such accidents are caused by the constituent principles of the
1073 neither composition of quantitative parts in God, since He is not a body; nor composition of matter and form; nor does His 1073 neither composition of quantitative parts in God, since He is not a body; nor composition of matter and form; nor does His
1074 nature differ from His "suppositum"; nor His essence from His existence; neither is there in Him composition of genus and 1074 nature differ from His "suppositum"; nor His essence from His existence; neither is there in Him composition of genus and
1075 difference, nor of subject and accident. Therefore, it is clear that God is nowise composite, 1075 difference, nor of subject and accident. Therefore, it is clear that God is nowise composite,
1076 but is altogether simple. Secondly, because every composite is posterior to its component parts, and is dependent on them; 1076 but is altogether simple. Secondly, because every composite is posterior to its component parts, and is dependent on them;
1077 but God is the first being, as shown above ( 1077 but God is the first being, as shown above (
1078 <a id="FP_Q3_A7-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q2_A3.html">Q[2], A[3]</a>). Thirdly, because every composite has a cause, for things in themselves different cannot unite unless something causes them 1078 <a href="#FP_Q2_A3" id="FP_Q3_A7-p5.1" shape="rect">Q[2], A[3]</a>). Thirdly, because every composite has a cause, for things in themselves different cannot unite unless something causes them
1079 to unite. But God is uncaused, as shown above ( 1079 to unite. But God is uncaused, as shown above (
1080 <a id="FP_Q3_A7-p5.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q2_A3.html">Q[2], A[3]</a>), since He is the first efficient cause. Fourthly, because in every composite there must 1080 <a href="#FP_Q2_A3" id="FP_Q3_A7-p5.2" shape="rect">Q[2], A[3]</a>), since He is the first efficient cause. Fourthly, because in every composite there must
1081 be potentiality and actuality; but this does not apply to God; for either one of the parts actuates another, or at least all 1081 be potentiality and actuality; but this does not apply to God; for either one of the parts actuates another, or at least all
1082 the parts are potential to the whole. Fifthly, because nothing composite can be predicated of any single one of its parts. 1082 the parts are potential to the whole. Fifthly, because nothing composite can be predicated of any single one of its parts.
1083 And this is evident in a whole made up of dissimilar parts; for no part of a man is a man, nor any of the parts of the foot, 1083 And this is evident in a whole made up of dissimilar parts; for no part of a man is a man, nor any of the parts of the foot,
1084 a foot. But in wholes made up of similar parts, although something which is predicated of the whole may be predicated of a 1084 a foot. But in wholes made up of similar parts, although something which is predicated of the whole may be predicated of a
1085 part (as a part of the air is air, and a part of water, water), nevertheless certain things are predicable of the whole which 1085 part (as a part of the air is air, and a part of water, water), nevertheless certain things are predicable of the whole which
1121 esse potest. Et hanc rationem tangit Hilarius, VII de Trin., 1121 esse potest. Et hanc rationem tangit Hilarius, VII de Trin.,
1122 dicens, <i>Deus, qui virtus est, ex infirmis non continetur, neque 1122 dicens, <i>Deus, qui virtus est, ex infirmis non continetur, neque
1123 qui lux est, ex obscuris coaptatur</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q3_A7-p6"> 1123 qui lux est, ex obscuris coaptatur</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q3_A7-p6">
1124 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Whatever is from God imitates Him, as caused things imitate the first cause. But it is of the essence of a thing to be in 1124 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Whatever is from God imitates Him, as caused things imitate the first cause. But it is of the essence of a thing to be in
1125 some sort composite; because at least its existence differs from its essence, as will be shown hereafter, ( 1125 some sort composite; because at least its existence differs from its essence, as will be shown hereafter, (
1126 <a id="FP_Q3_A7-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q4_A3.html">Q[4], A[3]</a>). 1126 <a href="#FP_Q4_A3" id="FP_Q3_A7-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[4], A[3]</a>).
1127 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 3 a. 7 ad 1"><a name="28370" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28370] Iª q. 3 a. 7 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo 1127 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 3 a. 7 ad 1"><a name="28370" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28370] Iª q. 3 a. 7 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
1128 dicendum quod ea quae sunt a Deo, imitantur Deum sicut causata 1128 dicendum quod ea quae sunt a Deo, imitantur Deum sicut causata
1129 primam causam. Est autem hoc de ratione causati, quod sit aliquo 1129 primam causam. Est autem hoc de ratione causati, quod sit aliquo
1130 modo compositum, quia ad minus esse eius est aliud quam quod quid 1130 modo compositum, quia ad minus esse eius est aliud quam quod quid
1131 est, ut infra patebit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q3_A7-p7"> 1131 est, ut infra patebit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q3_A7-p7">
1132 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> With us composite things are better than simple things, because the perfections of created goodness cannot be found in one 1132 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> With us composite things are better than simple things, because the perfections of created goodness cannot be found in one
1133 simple thing, but in many things. But the perfection of divine goodness is found in one simple thing ( 1133 simple thing, but in many things. But the perfection of divine goodness is found in one simple thing (
1134 <a id="FP_Q3_A7-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q4_A1.html">Q[4], A[1]</a> and 1134 <a href="#FP_Q4_A1" id="FP_Q3_A7-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[4], A[1]</a> and
1135 <a id="FP_Q3_A7-p7.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q6_A2.html">Q[6], A[2]</a>). 1135 <a href="#FP_Q6_A2" id="FP_Q3_A7-p7.2" shape="rect">Q[6], A[2]</a>).
1136 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 3 a. 7 ad 2"><a name="28371" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28371] Iª q. 3 a. 7 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum 1136 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 3 a. 7 ad 2"><a name="28371" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28371] Iª q. 3 a. 7 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
1137 dicendum quod apud nos composita sunt meliora simplicibus, quia 1137 dicendum quod apud nos composita sunt meliora simplicibus, quia
1138 perfectio bonitatis creaturae non invenitur in uno simplici, sed in 1138 perfectio bonitatis creaturae non invenitur in uno simplici, sed in
1139 multis. Sed perfectio divinae bonitatis invenitur in uno simplici, 1139 multis. Sed perfectio divinae bonitatis invenitur in uno simplici,
1140 ut infra ostendetur.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q3_A8" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q3_A8-p0.1">Q. 3. A. 8. Whether God enters into the composition of other things?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q3_A8-p2"> 1140 ut infra ostendetur.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q3_A8" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q3_A8-p0.1">Q. 3. A. 8. Whether God enters into the composition of other things?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q3_A8-p2">
1184 which enters into composition with anything does not act primarily and essentially, but rather the composite so acts; for 1184 which enters into composition with anything does not act primarily and essentially, but rather the composite so acts; for
1185 the hand does not act, but the man by his hand; and, fire warms by its heat. Hence God cannot be part of a compound. Thirdly, 1185 the hand does not act, but the man by his hand; and, fire warms by its heat. Hence God cannot be part of a compound. Thirdly,
1186 because no part of a compound can be absolutely primal among beings---not even matter, nor form, though they are the primal 1186 because no part of a compound can be absolutely primal among beings---not even matter, nor form, though they are the primal
1187 parts of every compound. For matter is merely potential; and potentiality is absolutely posterior to actuality, as is clear 1187 parts of every compound. For matter is merely potential; and potentiality is absolutely posterior to actuality, as is clear
1188 from the foregoing ( 1188 from the foregoing (
1189 <a id="FP_Q3_A8-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q3_A1.html">Q[3], A[1]</a>): while a form which is part of a compound is a participated form; and as that which participates is posterior to that which 1189 <a href="#FP_Q3_A1" id="FP_Q3_A8-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[3], A[1]</a>): while a form which is part of a compound is a participated form; and as that which participates is posterior to that which
1190 is essential, so likewise is that which is participated; as fire in ignited objects is posterior to fire that is essentially 1190 is essential, so likewise is that which is participated; as fire in ignited objects is posterior to fire that is essentially
1191 such. Now it has been proved that God is absolutely primal being ( 1191 such. Now it has been proved that God is absolutely primal being (
1192 <a id="FP_Q3_A8-p7.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q2_A3.html">Q[2], A[3]</a>). 1192 <a href="#FP_Q2_A3" id="FP_Q3_A8-p7.2" shape="rect">Q[2], A[3]</a>).
1193 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 3 a. 8 co."><a name="28377" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28377] Iª q. 3 a. 8 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum 1193 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 3 a. 8 co."><a name="28377" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28377] Iª q. 3 a. 8 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
1194 quod circa hoc fuerunt tres errores. Quidam enim posuerunt quod 1194 quod circa hoc fuerunt tres errores. Quidam enim posuerunt quod
1195 Deus esset anima mundi, ut patet per Augustinum in Lib. VII de 1195 Deus esset anima mundi, ut patet per Augustinum in Lib. VII de
1196 civitate Dei, et ad hoc etiam reducitur, quod quidam dixerunt Deum 1196 civitate Dei, et ad hoc etiam reducitur, quod quidam dixerunt Deum
1197 esse animam primi caeli. Alii autem dixerunt Deum esse principium 1197 esse animam primi caeli. Alii autem dixerunt Deum esse principium
1268 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 4 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="28383" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28383] Iª q. 4 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, Deus 1268 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 4 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="28383" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28383] Iª q. 4 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, Deus
1269 est primum rerum principium. Sed principia rerum videntur esse 1269 est primum rerum principium. Sed principia rerum videntur esse
1270 imperfecta, semen enim est principium animalium et plantarum. Ergo 1270 imperfecta, semen enim est principium animalium et plantarum. Ergo
1271 Deus est imperfectus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q4_A1-p4"> 1271 Deus est imperfectus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q4_A1-p4">
1272 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, as shown above ( 1272 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, as shown above (
1273 <a id="FP_Q4_A1-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q3_A4.html">Q[3], A[4]</a>), God's essence is existence. But existence seems most imperfect, since it is most universal and receptive of all modification. 1273 <a href="#FP_Q3_A4" id="FP_Q4_A1-p4.1" shape="rect">Q[3], A[4]</a>), God's essence is existence. But existence seems most imperfect, since it is most universal and receptive of all modification.
1274 Therefore God is imperfect. 1274 Therefore God is imperfect.
1275 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 4 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="28384" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28384] Iª q. 4 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, 1275 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 4 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="28384" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28384] Iª q. 4 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
1276 ostensum est supra quod essentia Dei est ipsum esse. Sed ipsum esse 1276 ostensum est supra quod essentia Dei est ipsum esse. Sed ipsum esse
1277 videtur esse imperfectissimum, cum sit communissimum, et recipiens 1277 videtur esse imperfectissimum, cum sit communissimum, et recipiens
1278 omnium additiones. Ergo Deus est imperfectus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q4_A1-p5"> 1278 omnium additiones. Ergo Deus est imperfectus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q4_A1-p5">
1340 Unde non comparatur ad alia sicut recipiens ad receptum, sed magis 1340 Unde non comparatur ad alia sicut recipiens ad receptum, sed magis
1341 sicut receptum ad recipiens. Cum enim dico esse hominis, vel equi, 1341 sicut receptum ad recipiens. Cum enim dico esse hominis, vel equi,
1342 vel cuiuscumque alterius, ipsum esse consideratur ut formale et 1342 vel cuiuscumque alterius, ipsum esse consideratur ut formale et
1343 receptum, non autem ut illud cui competit esse.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q4_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q4_A2-p0.1">Q. 4. A. 2. Whether the perfections of all things are in God?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q4_A2-p2"> 1343 receptum, non autem ut illud cui competit esse.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q4_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q4_A2-p0.1">Q. 4. A. 2. Whether the perfections of all things are in God?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q4_A2-p2">
1344 <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the perfections of all things are not in God. For God is simple, as shown above ( 1344 <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the perfections of all things are not in God. For God is simple, as shown above (
1345 <a id="FP_Q4_A2-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q3_A7.html">Q[3], A[7]</a>); whereas the perfections of things are many and diverse. Therefore the perfections of all things are not in God. 1345 <a href="#FP_Q3_A7" id="FP_Q4_A2-p2.1" shape="rect">Q[3], A[7]</a>); whereas the perfections of things are many and diverse. Therefore the perfections of all things are not in God.
1346 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 4 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="28390" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28390] Iª q. 4 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum sic 1346 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 4 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="28390" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28390] Iª q. 4 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum sic
1347 proceditur. Videtur quod in Deo non sint perfectiones omnium rerum. 1347 proceditur. Videtur quod in Deo non sint perfectiones omnium rerum.
1348 Deus enim simplex est, ut ostensum est. Sed perfectiones rerum sunt 1348 Deus enim simplex est, ut ostensum est. Sed perfectiones rerum sunt
1349 multae et diversae. Ergo in Deo non sunt omnes perfectiones 1349 multae et diversae. Ergo in Deo non sunt omnes perfectiones
1350 rerum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q4_A2-p3"> 1350 rerum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q4_A2-p3">
1380 imperfect way, since matter as such is imperfect, and an agent as such is perfect; still to pre-exist virtually in the efficient 1380 imperfect way, since matter as such is imperfect, and an agent as such is perfect; still to pre-exist virtually in the efficient
1381 cause is to pre-exist not in a more imperfect, but in a more perfect way. Since therefore God is the first effective 1381 cause is to pre-exist not in a more imperfect, but in a more perfect way. Since therefore God is the first effective
1382 cause of things, the perfections of all things must pre-exist in God in a more eminent way. Dionysius implies the same line 1382 cause of things, the perfections of all things must pre-exist in God in a more eminent way. Dionysius implies the same line
1383 of argument by saying of God (Div. Nom. v): "It is not that He is this and not that, but that He is all, as the cause of all." 1383 of argument by saying of God (Div. Nom. v): "It is not that He is this and not that, but that He is all, as the cause of all."
1384 Secondly, from what has been already proved, God is existence itself, of itself subsistent ( 1384 Secondly, from what has been already proved, God is existence itself, of itself subsistent (
1385 <a id="FP_Q4_A2-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q3_A4.html">Q[3], A[4]</a>). Consequently, He must contain within Himself the whole perfection of being. For it is clear that if some hot thing has 1385 <a href="#FP_Q3_A4" id="FP_Q4_A2-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[3], A[4]</a>). Consequently, He must contain within Himself the whole perfection of being. For it is clear that if some hot thing has
1386 not the whole perfection of heat, this is because heat is not participated in its full perfection; but if this heat were self-subsisting, 1386 not the whole perfection of heat, this is because heat is not participated in its full perfection; but if this heat were self-subsisting,
1387 nothing of the virtue of heat would be wanting to it. Since therefore God is subsisting being itself, nothing of the perfection 1387 nothing of the virtue of heat would be wanting to it. Since therefore God is subsisting being itself, nothing of the perfection
1388 of being can be wanting to Him. Now all created perfections are included in the perfection of being; for things are perfect, 1388 of being can be wanting to Him. Now all created perfections are included in the perfection of being; for things are perfect,
1389 precisely so far as they have being after some fashion. It follows therefore that the perfection of no one 1389 precisely so far as they have being after some fashion. It follows therefore that the perfection of no one
1390 thing is wanting to God. This line of argument, too, is implied by Dionysius (Div. Nom. v), when he says that, "God exists 1390 thing is wanting to God. This line of argument, too, is implied by Dionysius (Div. Nom. v), when he says that, "God exists
1465 participative. Multo ergo minus aliae creaturae possunt dici Deo 1465 participative. Multo ergo minus aliae creaturae possunt dici Deo
1466 similes.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q4_A3-p3"> 1466 similes.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q4_A3-p3">
1467 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, likeness implies comparison. But there can be no comparison between things in a different "genus." Therefore neither 1467 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, likeness implies comparison. But there can be no comparison between things in a different "genus." Therefore neither
1468 can there be any likeness. Thus we do not say that sweetness is like whiteness. But no creature is in the same "genus" as 1468 can there be any likeness. Thus we do not say that sweetness is like whiteness. But no creature is in the same "genus" as
1469 God: since God is no "genus," as shown above ( 1469 God: since God is no "genus," as shown above (
1470 <a id="FP_Q4_A3-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q3_A5.html">Q[3], A[5]</a>). Therefore no creature is like God. 1470 <a href="#FP_Q3_A5" id="FP_Q4_A3-p3.1" shape="rect">Q[3], A[5]</a>). Therefore no creature is like God.
1471 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 4 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="28399" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28399] Iª q. 4 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, 1471 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 4 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="28399" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28399] Iª q. 4 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
1472 similitudo est comparatio quaedam. Non est autem comparatio eorum 1472 similitudo est comparatio quaedam. Non est autem comparatio eorum
1473 quae sunt diversorum generum; ergo nec similitudo, non enim dicimus 1473 quae sunt diversorum generum; ergo nec similitudo, non enim dicimus
1474 quod dulcedo sit similis albedini. Sed nulla creatura est eiusdem 1474 quod dulcedo sit similis albedini. Sed nulla creatura est eiusdem
1475 generis cum Deo, cum Deus non sit in genere, ut supra ostensum est. 1475 generis cum Deo, cum Deus non sit in genere, ut supra ostensum est.
1621 <b>I answer that,</b> Goodness and being are really the same, and differ only in idea; which is clear from the following argument. The essence 1621 <b>I answer that,</b> Goodness and being are really the same, and differ only in idea; which is clear from the following argument. The essence
1622 of goodness consists in this, that it is in some way desirable. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. i): "Goodness is what all 1622 of goodness consists in this, that it is in some way desirable. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. i): "Goodness is what all
1623 desire." Now it is clear that a thing is desirable only in so far as it is perfect; for all desire their own perfection. But 1623 desire." Now it is clear that a thing is desirable only in so far as it is perfect; for all desire their own perfection. But
1624 everything is perfect so far as it is actual. Therefore it is clear that a thing is perfect 1624 everything is perfect so far as it is actual. Therefore it is clear that a thing is perfect
1625 so far as it exists; for it is existence that makes all things actual, as is clear from the foregoing ( 1625 so far as it exists; for it is existence that makes all things actual, as is clear from the foregoing (
1626 <a id="FP_Q5_A1-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q3_A4.html">Q[3], A[4]</a>; 1626 <a href="#FP_Q3_A4" id="FP_Q5_A1-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[3], A[4]</a>;
1627 <a id="FP_Q5_A1-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q4_A1.html">Q[4], A[1]</a>). Hence it is clear that goodness and being are the same really. But goodness presents the aspect of desirableness, which 1627 <a href="#FP_Q4_A1" id="FP_Q5_A1-p6.2" shape="rect">Q[4], A[1]</a>). Hence it is clear that goodness and being are the same really. But goodness presents the aspect of desirableness, which
1628 being does not present. 1628 being does not present.
1629 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 5 a. 1 co."><a name="28413" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28413] Iª q. 5 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum 1629 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 5 a. 1 co."><a name="28413" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28413] Iª q. 5 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
1630 quod bonum et ens sunt idem secundum rem, sed differunt secundum 1630 quod bonum et ens sunt idem secundum rem, sed differunt secundum
1631 rationem tantum. Quod sic patet. Ratio enim boni in hoc consistit, 1631 rationem tantum. Quod sic patet. Ratio enim boni in hoc consistit,
1632 quod aliquid sit appetibile, unde philosophus, in I Ethic., dicit 1632 quod aliquid sit appetibile, unde philosophus, in I Ethic., dicit
2037 factis, et ita, haec tria ubi magna sunt, magna bona sunt; ubi 2037 factis, et ita, haec tria ubi magna sunt, magna bona sunt; ubi
2038 parva, parva bona sunt; ubi nulla, nullum bonum est</i>. Quod non 2038 parva, parva bona sunt; ubi nulla, nullum bonum est</i>. Quod non
2039 esset, nisi ratio boni in eis consisteret. Ergo ratio boni 2039 esset, nisi ratio boni in eis consisteret. Ergo ratio boni
2040 consistit in modo, specie et ordine.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q5_A5-p8"> 2040 consistit in modo, specie et ordine.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q5_A5-p8">
2041 <b>I answer that,</b> Everything is said to be good so far as it is perfect; for in that way only is it desirable (as shown above 2041 <b>I answer that,</b> Everything is said to be good so far as it is perfect; for in that way only is it desirable (as shown above
2042 <a id="FP_Q5_A5-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q5_A1.html">AA[1]</a>,3). Now a thing is said to be perfect if it lacks nothing according to the mode of its perfection. But since everything is 2042 <a href="#FP_Q5_A1" id="FP_Q5_A5-p8.1" shape="rect">AA[1]</a>,3). Now a thing is said to be perfect if it lacks nothing according to the mode of its perfection. But since everything is
2043 what it is by its form (and since the form presupposes certain things, and from the form certain things necessarily follow), 2043 what it is by its form (and since the form presupposes certain things, and from the form certain things necessarily follow),
2044 in order for a thing to be perfect and good it must have a form, together 2044 in order for a thing to be perfect and good it must have a form, together
2045 with all that precedes and follows upon that form. Now the form presupposes determination or commensuration of its principles, 2045 with all that precedes and follows upon that form. Now the form presupposes determination or commensuration of its principles,
2046 whether material or efficient, and this is signified by the mode: hence it is said that the measure marks the mode. But the 2046 whether material or efficient, and this is signified by the mode: hence it is said that the measure marks the mode. But the
2047 form itself is signified by the species; for everything is placed in its species by its form. Hence the number is said to 2047 form itself is signified by the species; for everything is placed in its species by its form. Hence the number is said to
2263 rationem boni causati. Sed bonum in Deo est sicut in causa, unde ad 2263 rationem boni causati. Sed bonum in Deo est sicut in causa, unde ad
2264 eum pertinet imponere aliis modum, speciem et ordinem. Unde ista 2264 eum pertinet imponere aliis modum, speciem et ordinem. Unde ista
2265 tria sunt in Deo sicut in causa.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q6_A1-p7"> 2265 tria sunt in Deo sicut in causa.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q6_A1-p7">
2266 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> All things, by desiring their own perfection, desire God Himself, inasmuch as the perfections of all things are so many similitudes 2266 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> All things, by desiring their own perfection, desire God Himself, inasmuch as the perfections of all things are so many similitudes
2267 of the divine being; as appears from what is said above ( 2267 of the divine being; as appears from what is said above (
2268 <a id="FP_Q6_A1-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q4_A3.html">Q[4] , A[3]</a>). And so of those things which desire God, some know Him as He is Himself, and this is proper to the rational creature; others 2268 <a href="#FP_Q4_A3" id="FP_Q6_A1-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[4] , A[3]</a>). And so of those things which desire God, some know Him as He is Himself, and this is proper to the rational creature; others
2269 know some participation of His goodness, and this belongs also to sensible knowledge; others have a 2269 know some participation of His goodness, and this belongs also to sensible knowledge; others have a
2270 natural desire without knowledge, as being directed to their ends by a higher intelligence. 2270 natural desire without knowledge, as being directed to their ends by a higher intelligence.
2271 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 6 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="28471" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28471] Iª q. 6 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum 2271 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 6 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="28471" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28471] Iª q. 6 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
2272 dicendum quod omnia, appetendo proprias perfectiones, appetunt 2272 dicendum quod omnia, appetendo proprias perfectiones, appetunt
2273 ipsum Deum, inquantum perfectiones omnium rerum sunt quaedam 2273 ipsum Deum, inquantum perfectiones omnium rerum sunt quaedam
2279 absque cognitione, utpote inclinata ad suos fines ab alio superiori 2279 absque cognitione, utpote inclinata ad suos fines ab alio superiori
2280 cognoscente.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q6_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q6_A2-p0.1">Q. 6. A. 2. Whether God is the supreme good?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q6_A2-p2"> 2280 cognoscente.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q6_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q6_A2-p0.1">Q. 6. A. 2. Whether God is the supreme good?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q6_A2-p2">
2281 <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God is not the supreme good. For the supreme good adds something to good; otherwise it would belong to every 2281 <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God is not the supreme good. For the supreme good adds something to good; otherwise it would belong to every
2282 good. But everything which is an addition to anything else is a compound thing: therefore the supreme good is a compound. 2282 good. But everything which is an addition to anything else is a compound thing: therefore the supreme good is a compound.
2283 But God is supremely simple; as was shown above ( 2283 But God is supremely simple; as was shown above (
2284 <a id="FP_Q6_A2-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q3_A7.html">Q[3], A[7]</a>). Therefore God is not the supreme good. 2284 <a href="#FP_Q3_A7" id="FP_Q6_A2-p2.1" shape="rect">Q[3], A[7]</a>). Therefore God is not the supreme good.
2285 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 6 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="28472" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28472] Iª q. 6 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum sic 2285 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 6 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="28472" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28472] Iª q. 6 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum sic
2286 proceditur. Videtur quod Deus non sit summum bonum. Summum enim 2286 proceditur. Videtur quod Deus non sit summum bonum. Summum enim
2287 bonum addit aliquid supra bonum, alioquin omni bono conveniret. Sed 2287 bonum addit aliquid supra bonum, alioquin omni bono conveniret. Sed
2288 omne quod se habet ex additione ad aliquid, est compositum. Ergo 2288 omne quod se habet ex additione ad aliquid, est compositum. Ergo
2289 summum bonum est compositum. Sed Deus est summe simplex, ut supra 2289 summum bonum est compositum. Sed Deus est summe simplex, ut supra
2300 Sed summum dicitur in comparatione aliorum; sicut summum calidum in 2300 Sed summum dicitur in comparatione aliorum; sicut summum calidum in
2301 comparatione ad omnia calida. Ergo Deus non potest dici summum 2301 comparatione ad omnia calida. Ergo Deus non potest dici summum
2302 bonum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q6_A2-p4"> 2302 bonum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q6_A2-p4">
2303 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, supreme implies comparison. But things not in the same genus are not comparable; as, sweetness is not properly greater 2303 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, supreme implies comparison. But things not in the same genus are not comparable; as, sweetness is not properly greater
2304 or less than a line. Therefore, since God is not in the same genus as other good things, as appears above ( 2304 or less than a line. Therefore, since God is not in the same genus as other good things, as appears above (
2305 <a id="FP_Q6_A2-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q3_A5.html">Q[3], A[5]</a>; 2305 <a href="#FP_Q3_A5" id="FP_Q6_A2-p4.1" shape="rect">Q[3], A[5]</a>;
2306 <a id="FP_Q6_A2-p4.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q4_A3.html">Q[4], A[3]</a>) it seems that God cannot be called the supreme good in relation to others. 2306 <a href="#FP_Q4_A3" id="FP_Q6_A2-p4.2" shape="rect">Q[4], A[3]</a>) it seems that God cannot be called the supreme good in relation to others.
2307 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 6 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="28474" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28474] Iª q. 6 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, summum 2307 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 6 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="28474" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28474] Iª q. 6 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, summum
2308 comparationem importat. Sed quae non sunt unius generis, non sunt 2308 comparationem importat. Sed quae non sunt unius generis, non sunt
2309 comparabilia; sicut dulcedo inconvenienter dicitur maior vel minor 2309 comparabilia; sicut dulcedo inconvenienter dicitur maior vel minor
2310 quam linea. Cum igitur Deus non sit in eodem genere cum aliis 2310 quam linea. Cum igitur Deus non sit in eodem genere cum aliis
2311 bonis, ut ex superioribus patet, videtur quod Deus non possit dici 2311 bonis, ut ex superioribus patet, videtur quod Deus non possit dici
2316 personarum est summum bonum, quod purgatissimis mentibus 2316 personarum est summum bonum, quod purgatissimis mentibus
2317 cernitur</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q6_A2-p6"> 2317 cernitur</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q6_A2-p6">
2318 <b>I answer that,</b> God is the supreme good simply, and not only as existing in any genus or order of things. For good is attributed to God, 2318 <b>I answer that,</b> God is the supreme good simply, and not only as existing in any genus or order of things. For good is attributed to God,
2319 as was said in the preceding article, inasmuch as all desired perfections flow from Him as from the first cause. They do not, 2319 as was said in the preceding article, inasmuch as all desired perfections flow from Him as from the first cause. They do not,
2320 however, flow from Him as from a univocal agent, as shown above ( 2320 however, flow from Him as from a univocal agent, as shown above (
2321 <a id="FP_Q6_A2-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q4_A2.html">Q[4], A[2]</a>); but as from an agent which does not agree with its effects either in species or genus. Now the likeness of an 2321 <a href="#FP_Q4_A2" id="FP_Q6_A2-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[4], A[2]</a>); but as from an agent which does not agree with its effects either in species or genus. Now the likeness of an
2322 effect in the univocal cause is found uniformly; but in the equivocal cause it is found more excellently, as, heat is in the 2322 effect in the univocal cause is found uniformly; but in the equivocal cause it is found more excellently, as, heat is in the
2323 sun more excellently than it is in fire. Therefore as good is in God as in the first, but not the univocal, cause of all things, 2323 sun more excellently than it is in fire. Therefore as good is in God as in the first, but not the univocal, cause of all things,
2324 it must be in Him in a most excellent way; and therefore He is called the supreme good. 2324 it must be in Him in a most excellent way; and therefore He is called the supreme good.
2325 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 6 a. 2 co."><a name="28476" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28476] Iª q. 6 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum 2325 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 6 a. 2 co."><a name="28476" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28476] Iª q. 6 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
2326 quod Deus est summum bonum simpliciter, et non solum in aliquo 2326 quod Deus est summum bonum simpliciter, et non solum in aliquo
2368 quodam alio genere; sed quia ipse est extra genus, et principium 2368 quodam alio genere; sed quia ipse est extra genus, et principium
2369 omnis generis. Et sic comparatur ad alia per excessum. Et huiusmodi 2369 omnis generis. Et sic comparatur ad alia per excessum. Et huiusmodi
2370 comparationem importat summum bonum.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q6_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q6_A3-p0.1">Q. 6. A. 3. Whether to be essentially good belongs to God alone?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q6_A3-p2"> 2370 comparationem importat summum bonum.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q6_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q6_A3-p0.1">Q. 6. A. 3. Whether to be essentially good belongs to God alone?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q6_A3-p2">
2371 <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that to be essentially good does not belong to God alone. For as "one" is convertible with "being," so is "good"; 2371 <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that to be essentially good does not belong to God alone. For as "one" is convertible with "being," so is "good";
2372 as we said above ( 2372 as we said above (
2373 <a id="FP_Q6_A3-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q5_A1.html">Q[5], A[1]</a>). But every being is one essentially, as appears from the Philosopher (Metaph. iv); therefore every being is good essentially. 2373 <a href="#FP_Q5_A1" id="FP_Q6_A3-p2.1" shape="rect">Q[5], A[1]</a>). But every being is one essentially, as appears from the Philosopher (Metaph. iv); therefore every being is good essentially.
2374 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 6 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="28480" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28480] Iª q. 6 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium sic 2374 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 6 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="28480" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28480] Iª q. 6 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium sic
2375 proceditur. Videtur quod esse bonum per essentiam non sit proprium 2375 proceditur. Videtur quod esse bonum per essentiam non sit proprium
2376 Dei. Sicut enim unum convertitur cum ente, ita et bonum, ut supra 2376 Dei. Sicut enim unum convertitur cum ente, ita et bonum, ut supra
2377 habitum est. Sed omne ens est unum per suam essentiam, ut patet per 2377 habitum est. Sed omne ens est unum per suam essentiam, ut patet per
2378 philosophum in IV Metaphys. Ergo omne ens est bonum per suam 2378 philosophum in IV Metaphys. Ergo omne ens est bonum per suam
2408 first perfection of fire consists in its existence, which it has through its own 2408 first perfection of fire consists in its existence, which it has through its own
2409 substantial form; its secondary perfection consists in heat, lightness and dryness, and the like; its third perfection is 2409 substantial form; its secondary perfection consists in heat, lightness and dryness, and the like; its third perfection is
2410 to rest in its own place. This triple perfection belongs to no creature by its own essence; it belongs to God only, in Whom 2410 to rest in its own place. This triple perfection belongs to no creature by its own essence; it belongs to God only, in Whom
2411 alone essence is existence; in Whom there are no accidents; since whatever belongs to others accidentally belongs to Him essentially; 2411 alone essence is existence; in Whom there are no accidents; since whatever belongs to others accidentally belongs to Him essentially;
2412 as, to be powerful, wise and the like, as appears from what is stated above ( 2412 as, to be powerful, wise and the like, as appears from what is stated above (
2413 <a id="FP_Q6_A3-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q3_A6.html">Q[3], A[6]</a>); and 2413 <a href="#FP_Q3_A6" id="FP_Q6_A3-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[3], A[6]</a>); and
2414 He is not directed to anything else as to an end, but is Himself the last end of all things. Hence it is manifest that God 2414 He is not directed to anything else as to an end, but is Himself the last end of all things. Hence it is manifest that God
2415 alone has every kind of perfection by His own essence; therefore He Himself alone is good essentially. 2415 alone has every kind of perfection by His own essence; therefore He Himself alone is good essentially.
2416 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 6 a. 3 co."><a name="28484" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28484] Iª q. 6 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum 2416 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 6 a. 3 co."><a name="28484" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28484] Iª q. 6 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
2417 quod solus Deus est bonus per suam essentiam. Unumquodque enim 2417 quod solus Deus est bonus per suam essentiam. Unumquodque enim
2418 dicitur bonum, secundum quod est perfectum. Perfectio autem 2418 dicitur bonum, secundum quod est perfectum. Perfectio autem
2484 quod omnia sunt bona inquantum sunt. Sed non dicuntur omnia entia 2484 quod omnia sunt bona inquantum sunt. Sed non dicuntur omnia entia
2485 per esse divinum, sed per esse proprium. Ergo non omnia sunt bona 2485 per esse divinum, sed per esse proprium. Ergo non omnia sunt bona
2486 bonitate divina, sed bonitate propria.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q6_A4-p5"> 2486 bonitate divina, sed bonitate propria.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q6_A4-p5">
2487 <b>I answer that,</b> As regards relative things, we must admit extrinsic denomination; as, a thing is denominated "placed" from "place," and "measured" 2487 <b>I answer that,</b> As regards relative things, we must admit extrinsic denomination; as, a thing is denominated "placed" from "place," and "measured"
2488 from "measure." But as regards absolute things opinions differ. Plato held the existence of separate ideas ( 2488 from "measure." But as regards absolute things opinions differ. Plato held the existence of separate ideas (
2489 <a id="FP_Q6_A4-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q84_A4.html">Q[84], A[4]</a>) of all things, and that individuals were denominated by them as participating in the separate ideas; for instance, that 2489 <a href="FP_ix.html#FP_Q84_A4" id="FP_Q6_A4-p5.1" shape="rect">Q[84], A[4]</a>) of all things, and that individuals were denominated by them as participating in the separate ideas; for instance, that
2490 Socrates is called man according to the separate idea of man. Now 2490 Socrates is called man according to the separate idea of man. Now
2491 just as he laid down separate ideas of man and horse which he called absolute man and absolute horse, so likewise he laid 2491 just as he laid down separate ideas of man and horse which he called absolute man and absolute horse, so likewise he laid
2492 down separate ideas of "being" and of "one," and these he called absolute being and absolute oneness; and by participation 2492 down separate ideas of "being" and of "one," and these he called absolute being and absolute oneness; and by participation
2493 of these, everything was called "being" or "one"; and what was thus absolute being and absolute one, he said was the supreme 2493 of these, everything was called "being" or "one"; and what was thus absolute being and absolute one, he said was the supreme
2494 good. And because good is convertible with being, as one is also; he called God the absolute good, from whom all things are 2494 good. And because good is convertible with being, as one is also; he called God the absolute good, from whom all things are
2495 called good by way of participation. 2495 called good by way of participation.
2496 </p><p id="FP_Q6_A4-p6"> Although this opinion appears to be unreasonable in affirming separate ideas of natural things as subsisting of themselves---as 2496 </p><p id="FP_Q6_A4-p6"> Although this opinion appears to be unreasonable in affirming separate ideas of natural things as subsisting of themselves---as
2497 Aristotle argues in many ways---still, it is absolutely true that there is first something which is essentially being and 2497 Aristotle argues in many ways---still, it is absolutely true that there is first something which is essentially being and
2498 essentially good, which we call God, as appears from what is shown above ( 2498 essentially good, which we call God, as appears from what is shown above (
2499 <a id="FP_Q6_A4-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q2_A3.html">Q[2], A[3]</a>), and Aristotle agrees with this. Hence from the first being, essentially such, and good, everything can be called good and 2499 <a href="#FP_Q2_A3" id="FP_Q6_A4-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[2], A[3]</a>), and Aristotle agrees with this. Hence from the first being, essentially such, and good, everything can be called good and
2500 a being, inasmuch as it participates in it by way of a certain assimilation which is far removed and defective; as appears 2500 a being, inasmuch as it participates in it by way of a certain assimilation which is far removed and defective; as appears
2501 from the above ( 2501 from the above (
2502 <a id="FP_Q6_A4-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q4_A3.html">Q[4], A[3]</a>). 2502 <a href="#FP_Q4_A3" id="FP_Q6_A4-p6.2" shape="rect">Q[4], A[3]</a>).
2503 </p><p id="FP_Q6_A4-p7"> Everything is therefore called good from the divine goodness, as from the first exemplary effective and final principle of 2503 </p><p id="FP_Q6_A4-p7"> Everything is therefore called good from the divine goodness, as from the first exemplary effective and final principle of
2504 all goodness. Nevertheless, everything is called good by reason of the similitude of the divine goodness belonging to it, 2504 all goodness. Nevertheless, everything is called good by reason of the similitude of the divine goodness belonging to it,
2505 which is formally its own goodness, whereby it is denominated good. And so of all things there is one goodness, and yet many 2505 which is formally its own goodness, whereby it is denominated good. And so of all things there is one goodness, and yet many
2506 goodnesses. 2506 goodnesses.
2507 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 6 a. 4 co."><a name="28491" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28491] Iª q. 6 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum 2507 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 6 a. 4 co."><a name="28491" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28491] Iª q. 6 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
2556 infinitum est imperfectum, quia habet rationem partis et materiae, 2556 infinitum est imperfectum, quia habet rationem partis et materiae,
2557 ut dicitur in III Physic. Sed Deus est perfectissimus. Ergo non est 2557 ut dicitur in III Physic. Sed Deus est perfectissimus. Ergo non est
2558 infinitus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q7_A1-p3"> 2558 infinitus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q7_A1-p3">
2559 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, according to the Philosopher (Phys. i), finite and infinite belong to quantity. But there is no quantity in God, 2559 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, according to the Philosopher (Phys. i), finite and infinite belong to quantity. But there is no quantity in God,
2560 for He is not a body, as was shown above ( 2560 for He is not a body, as was shown above (
2561 <a id="FP_Q7_A1-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q3_A1.html">Q[3], A[1]</a>). Therefore it does not belong to Him to be infinite. 2561 <a href="#FP_Q3_A1" id="FP_Q7_A1-p3.1" shape="rect">Q[3], A[1]</a>). Therefore it does not belong to Him to be infinite.
2562 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 7 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="28495" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28495] Iª q. 7 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, 2562 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 7 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="28495" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28495] Iª q. 7 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
2563 secundum philosophum in I Physic., finitum et infinitum conveniunt 2563 secundum philosophum in I Physic., finitum et infinitum conveniunt
2564 quantitati. Sed in Deo non est quantitas, cum non sit corpus, ut 2564 quantitati. Sed in Deo non est quantitas, cum non sit corpus, ut
2565 supra ostensum est. Ergo non competit sibi esse infinitum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q7_A1-p4"> 2565 supra ostensum est. Ergo non competit sibi esse infinitum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q7_A1-p4">
2566 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, what is here in such a way as not to be elsewhere, is finite according to place. Therefore that which is a thing 2566 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, what is here in such a way as not to be elsewhere, is finite according to place. Therefore that which is a thing
2587 this one particular thing. Now matter is perfected by the form by which it is made finite; therefore infinite as attributed 2587 this one particular thing. Now matter is perfected by the form by which it is made finite; therefore infinite as attributed
2588 to matter, has the nature of something imperfect; for it is as it were formless matter. On the other hand, form is not made 2588 to matter, has the nature of something imperfect; for it is as it were formless matter. On the other hand, form is not made
2589 perfect by matter, but rather is contracted by matter; and hence the infinite, regarded on the part of the form not determined 2589 perfect by matter, but rather is contracted by matter; and hence the infinite, regarded on the part of the form not determined
2590 by matter, has the nature of something perfect. Now being is the most formal of all things, as appears from what is shown 2590 by matter, has the nature of something perfect. Now being is the most formal of all things, as appears from what is shown
2591 above ( 2591 above (
2592 <a id="FP_Q7_A1-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q4_A1.html">Q[4], A[1]</a>, OBJ[3]). Since therefore the divine being is not a being received in anything, but He is His own subsistent being as was 2592 <a href="#FP_Q4_A1" id="FP_Q7_A1-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[4], A[1]</a>, OBJ[3]). Since therefore the divine being is not a being received in anything, but He is His own subsistent being as was
2593 shown above ( 2593 shown above (
2594 <a id="FP_Q7_A1-p7.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q3_A4.html">Q[3], A[4]</a>), it is clear that God Himself is infinite and perfect. 2594 <a href="#FP_Q3_A4" id="FP_Q7_A1-p7.2" shape="rect">Q[3], A[4]</a>), it is clear that God Himself is infinite and perfect.
2595 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 7 a. 1 co."><a name="28498" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28498] Iª q. 7 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum 2595 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 7 a. 1 co."><a name="28498" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28498] Iª q. 7 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
2596 quod omnes antiqui philosophi attribuunt infinitum primo principio, 2596 quod omnes antiqui philosophi attribuunt infinitum primo principio,
2597 ut dicitur in III Physic., et hoc rationabiliter, considerantes res 2597 ut dicitur in III Physic., et hoc rationabiliter, considerantes res
2598 effluere a primo principio in infinitum. Sed quia quidam erraverunt 2598 effluere a primo principio in infinitum. Sed quia quidam erraverunt
2599 circa naturam primi principii, consequens fuit ut errarent circa 2599 circa naturam primi principii, consequens fuit ut errarent circa
2653 quidquid habet virtutem infinitam, habet essentiam infinitam. Sed 2653 quidquid habet virtutem infinitam, habet essentiam infinitam. Sed
2654 intellectus creatus habet virtutem infinitam, apprehendit enim 2654 intellectus creatus habet virtutem infinitam, apprehendit enim
2655 universale, quod se potest extendere ad infinita singularia. Ergo 2655 universale, quod se potest extendere ad infinita singularia. Ergo
2656 omnis substantia intellectualis creata est infinita.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q7_A2-p4"> 2656 omnis substantia intellectualis creata est infinita.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q7_A2-p4">
2657 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, primary matter is something other than God, as was shown above ( 2657 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, primary matter is something other than God, as was shown above (
2658 <a id="FP_Q7_A2-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q3_A8.html">Q[3], A[8]</a>). But primary matter is infinite. Therefore something besides God can be infinite. 2658 <a href="#FP_Q3_A8" id="FP_Q7_A2-p4.1" shape="rect">Q[3], A[8]</a>). But primary matter is infinite. Therefore something besides God can be infinite.
2659 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 7 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="28504" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28504] Iª q. 7 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, 2659 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 7 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="28504" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28504] Iª q. 7 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
2660 materia prima aliud est a Deo, ut supra ostensum est. Sed materia 2660 materia prima aliud est a Deo, ut supra ostensum est. Sed materia
2661 prima est infinita. Ergo aliquid aliud praeter Deum potest esse 2661 prima est infinita. Ergo aliquid aliud praeter Deum potest esse
2662 infinitum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q7_A2-p5"> 2662 infinitum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q7_A2-p5">
2663 <b>On the contrary,</b> The infinite cannot have a beginning, as said in Phys. iii. But everything outside God is from God as from its first principle. 2663 <b>On the contrary,</b> The infinite cannot have a beginning, as said in Phys. iii. But everything outside God is from God as from its first principle.
3038 being must be His proper effect; as to ignite is the proper effect of fire. Now God 3038 being must be His proper effect; as to ignite is the proper effect of fire. Now God
3039 causes this effect in things not only when they first begin to be, but as long as they are preserved in being; as light is 3039 causes this effect in things not only when they first begin to be, but as long as they are preserved in being; as light is
3040 caused in the air by the sun as long as the air remains illuminated. Therefore as long as a thing has being, God must be present 3040 caused in the air by the sun as long as the air remains illuminated. Therefore as long as a thing has being, God must be present
3041 to it, according to its mode of being. But being is innermost in each thing and most fundamentally inherent in all things 3041 to it, according to its mode of being. But being is innermost in each thing and most fundamentally inherent in all things
3042 since it is formal in respect of everything found in a thing, as was shown above ( 3042 since it is formal in respect of everything found in a thing, as was shown above (
3043 <a id="FP_Q8_A1-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q7_A1.html">Q[7], A[1]</a>). Hence 3043 <a href="#FP_Q7_A1" id="FP_Q8_A1-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[7], A[1]</a>). Hence
3044 it must be that God is in all things, and innermostly. 3044 it must be that God is in all things, and innermostly.
3045 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 8 a. 1 co."><a name="28534" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28534] Iª q. 8 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum 3045 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 8 a. 1 co."><a name="28534" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28534] Iª q. 8 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
3046 quod Deus est in omnibus rebus, non quidem sicut pars essentiae, 3046 quod Deus est in omnibus rebus, non quidem sicut pars essentiae,
3047 vel sicut accidens, sed sicut agens adest ei in quod agit. Oportet 3047 vel sicut accidens, sed sicut agens adest ei in quod agit. Oportet
3048 enim omne agens coniungi ei in quod immediate agit, et sua virtute 3048 enim omne agens coniungi ei in quod immediate agit, et sua virtute
3252 <b>I answer that,</b> God is said to be in a thing in two ways; in one way after the manner of an efficient cause; and thus He is in all things 3252 <b>I answer that,</b> God is said to be in a thing in two ways; in one way after the manner of an efficient cause; and thus He is in all things
3253 created by Him; in another way he is in things as the object of operation is in the operator; and this is proper to the operations 3253 created by Him; in another way he is in things as the object of operation is in the operator; and this is proper to the operations
3254 of the soul, according as the thing known is in the one who knows; and the thing desired in the one desiring. In this second 3254 of the soul, according as the thing known is in the one who knows; and the thing desired in the one desiring. In this second
3255 way God is especially in the rational creature which knows and loves Him actually or 3255 way God is especially in the rational creature which knows and loves Him actually or
3256 habitually. And because the rational creature possesses this prerogative by grace, as will be shown later 3256 habitually. And because the rational creature possesses this prerogative by grace, as will be shown later
3257 <a id="FP_Q8_A3-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q12.html">(Q[12])</a>. He is said to be thus in the saints by grace. 3257 <a href="#FP_Q12" id="FP_Q8_A3-p7.1" shape="rect">(Q[12])</a>. He is said to be thus in the saints by grace.
3258 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 8 a. 3 co."><a name="28552" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28552] Iª q. 8 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum 3258 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 8 a. 3 co."><a name="28552" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28552] Iª q. 8 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
3259 quod Deus dicitur esse in re aliqua dupliciter. Uno modo, per modum 3259 quod Deus dicitur esse in re aliqua dupliciter. Uno modo, per modum
3260 causae agentis, et sic est in omnibus rebus creatis ab ipso. Alio 3260 causae agentis, et sic est in omnibus rebus creatis ab ipso. Alio
3261 modo, sicut obiectum operationis est in operante, quod proprium est 3261 modo, sicut obiectum operationis est in operante, quod proprium est
3262 in operationibus animae, secundum quod cognitum est in cognoscente, 3262 in operationibus animae, secundum quod cognitum est in cognoscente,
3342 alius singularis modus essendi Deum in homine per unionem, de quo 3342 alius singularis modus essendi Deum in homine per unionem, de quo
3343 modo suo loco agetur.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q8_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q8_A4-p0.1">Q. 8. A. 4. Whether to be everywhere belongs to God alone?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q8_A4-p2"> 3343 modo suo loco agetur.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q8_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q8_A4-p0.1">Q. 8. A. 4. Whether to be everywhere belongs to God alone?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q8_A4-p2">
3344 <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that to be everywhere does not belong to God alone. For the universal, according to the Philosopher (Poster. i), 3344 <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that to be everywhere does not belong to God alone. For the universal, according to the Philosopher (Poster. i),
3345 is everywhere, and always; primary matter also, since it is in all bodies, is everywhere. But neither of these is God, as 3345 is everywhere, and always; primary matter also, since it is in all bodies, is everywhere. But neither of these is God, as
3346 appears from what is said above 3346 appears from what is said above
3347 <a id="FP_Q8_A4-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q3.html">(Q[3])</a>. Therefore to be everywhere does not belong to God alone. 3347 <a href="#FP_Q3" id="FP_Q8_A4-p2.1" shape="rect">(Q[3])</a>. Therefore to be everywhere does not belong to God alone.
3348 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 8 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="28557" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28557] Iª q. 8 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum sic 3348 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 8 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="28557" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28557] Iª q. 8 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum sic
3349 proceditur. Videtur quod esse ubique non sit proprium Dei. 3349 proceditur. Videtur quod esse ubique non sit proprium Dei.
3350 Universale enim, secundum philosophum, est ubique et semper, 3350 Universale enim, secundum philosophum, est ubique et semper,
3351 materia etiam prima, cum sit in omnibus corporibus, est ubique. 3351 materia etiam prima, cum sit in omnibus corporibus, est ubique.
3352 Neutrum autem horum est Deus, ut ex praemissis patet. Ergo esse 3352 Neutrum autem horum est Deus, ut ex praemissis patet. Ergo esse
3508 that, absolutely, potentiality is posterior to act. Now everything which is in any way changed, is in some way in potentiality. 3508 that, absolutely, potentiality is posterior to act. Now everything which is in any way changed, is in some way in potentiality.
3509 Hence it is evident that it is impossible for God to be in any way changeable. 3509 Hence it is evident that it is impossible for God to be in any way changeable.
3510 Secondly, because everything which is moved, remains as it was in part, and passes away in part; as what is moved from whiteness 3510 Secondly, because everything which is moved, remains as it was in part, and passes away in part; as what is moved from whiteness
3511 to blackness, remains the same as to substance; thus in everything which is moved, there is some kind of composition to be 3511 to blackness, remains the same as to substance; thus in everything which is moved, there is some kind of composition to be
3512 found. But it has been shown above ( 3512 found. But it has been shown above (
3513 <a id="FP_Q9_A1-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q3_A7.html">Q[3], A[7]</a>) that in God there is no composition, for He is altogether simple. Hence it is manifest that God cannot be moved. Thirdly, 3513 <a href="#FP_Q3_A7" id="FP_Q9_A1-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[3], A[7]</a>) that in God there is no composition, for He is altogether simple. Hence it is manifest that God cannot be moved. Thirdly,
3514 because everything which is moved acquires something 3514 because everything which is moved acquires something
3515 by its movement, and attains to what it had not attained previously. But since God is infinite, comprehending in Himself all 3515 by its movement, and attains to what it had not attained previously. But since God is infinite, comprehending in Himself all
3516 the plenitude of perfection of all being, He cannot acquire anything new, nor extend Himself to anything whereto He was not 3516 the plenitude of perfection of all being, He cannot acquire anything new, nor extend Himself to anything whereto He was not
3517 extended previously. Hence movement in no way belongs to Him. So, some of the ancients, constrained, as it were, by the truth, 3517 extended previously. Hence movement in no way belongs to Him. So, some of the ancients, constrained, as it were, by the truth,
3518 decided that the first principle was immovable. 3518 decided that the first principle was immovable.
3654 created substances are pure from generation and from every variation, as also are incorporeal and immaterial substances." 3654 created substances are pure from generation and from every variation, as also are incorporeal and immaterial substances."
3655 Still, there remains in them a twofold mutability: one as regards their potentiality to their end; and in that way there is 3655 Still, there remains in them a twofold mutability: one as regards their potentiality to their end; and in that way there is
3656 in them a mutability according to choice from good to evil, as Damascene says (De Fide ii, 3,4); the other as regards place, 3656 in them a mutability according to choice from good to evil, as Damascene says (De Fide ii, 3,4); the other as regards place,
3657 inasmuch as by their finite power they attain to certain fresh places---which cannot be said of God, who by His infinity fills 3657 inasmuch as by their finite power they attain to certain fresh places---which cannot be said of God, who by His infinity fills
3658 all places, as was shown above ( 3658 all places, as was shown above (
3659 <a id="FP_Q9_A2-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q8_A2.html">Q[8], A[2]</a>). 3659 <a href="#FP_Q8_A2" id="FP_Q9_A2-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[8], A[2]</a>).
3660 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin">Si autem dicatur aliquid 3660 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin">Si autem dicatur aliquid
3661 mutabile per potentiam in ipso existentem, sic etiam aliquo modo 3661 mutabile per potentiam in ipso existentem, sic etiam aliquo modo
3662 omnis creatura est mutabilis. Est enim in creatura duplex potentia, 3662 omnis creatura est mutabilis. Est enim in creatura duplex potentia,
3663 scilicet activa et passiva. Dico autem potentiam passivam, secundum 3663 scilicet activa et passiva. Dico autem potentiam passivam, secundum
3664 quam aliquid assequi potest suam perfectionem, vel in essendo vel 3664 quam aliquid assequi potest suam perfectionem, vel in essendo vel
3975 quod dicit Hieronymus, ad Marcellam, <i>Deus solus est qui exordium 3975 quod dicit Hieronymus, ad Marcellam, <i>Deus solus est qui exordium
3976 non habet</i>. Quidquid autem exordium habet, non est aeternum. 3976 non habet</i>. Quidquid autem exordium habet, non est aeternum.
3977 Solus ergo Deus est aeternus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q10_A3-p6"> 3977 Solus ergo Deus est aeternus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q10_A3-p6">
3978 <b>I answer that,</b> Eternity truly and properly so called is in God alone, because eternity follows on immutability; as appears from the first 3978 <b>I answer that,</b> Eternity truly and properly so called is in God alone, because eternity follows on immutability; as appears from the first
3979 article. But God alone is altogether immutable, as was shown above ( 3979 article. But God alone is altogether immutable, as was shown above (
3980 <a id="FP_Q10_A3-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q9_A1.html">Q[9], A[1]</a>). Accordingly, however, as some receive immutability from Him, they share in His eternity. Thus some receive immutability 3980 <a href="#FP_Q9_A1" id="FP_Q10_A3-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[9], A[1]</a>). Accordingly, however, as some receive immutability from Him, they share in His eternity. Thus some receive immutability
3981 from God in the way of never ceasing to exist; in that sense it is said of the earth, "it standeth for ever" 3981 from God in the way of never ceasing to exist; in that sense it is said of the earth, "it standeth for ever"
3982 ( 3982 (
3983 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q10_A3-p6.2" href="./asv.html#Eccl.1.4" target="asv">Eccles. 1:4</a>). Again, some things are called eternal in Scripture because of the length of their duration, although they are in nature 3983 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q10_A3-p6.2" href="./asv.html#Eccl.1.4" target="asv">Eccles. 1:4</a>). Again, some things are called eternal in Scripture because of the length of their duration, although they are in nature
3984 corruptible; thus ( 3984 corruptible; thus (
3985 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q10_A3-p6.3" href="./asv.html#Ps.75.5" target="asv">Ps. 75:5</a>) the hills are called "eternal" and we read "of the fruits of the eternal hills." ( 3985 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q10_A3-p6.3" href="./asv.html#Ps.75.5" target="asv">Ps. 75:5</a>) the hills are called "eternal" and we read "of the fruits of the eternal hills." (
4384 last; even in one order of angels. Now according to the first opinion, it must be said that there are many aeviternities as 4384 last; even in one order of angels. Now according to the first opinion, it must be said that there are many aeviternities as
4385 there are many aeviternal things of first degree. But according to the second opinion, it would be necessary to say that there 4385 there are many aeviternal things of first degree. But according to the second opinion, it would be necessary to say that there
4386 is one aeviternity only; because since each thing is measured by the most simple element of its genus, it must be that the 4386 is one aeviternity only; because since each thing is measured by the most simple element of its genus, it must be that the
4387 existence of all aeviternal things should be measured by the existence of the first aeviternal thing, which is all the more 4387 existence of all aeviternal things should be measured by the existence of the first aeviternal thing, which is all the more
4388 simple the nearer it is to the first. Wherefore because the second opinion is truer, as will be shown later ( 4388 simple the nearer it is to the first. Wherefore because the second opinion is truer, as will be shown later (
4389 <a id="FP_Q10_A6-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q47_A2.html">Q[47], A[2]</a>); we concede at present that there is only one aeviternity. 4389 <a href="FP_v.html#FP_Q47_A2" id="FP_Q10_A6-p9.1" shape="rect">Q[47], A[2]</a>); we concede at present that there is only one aeviternity.
4390 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin">Hoc igitur habito, sciendum quod 4390 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin">Hoc igitur habito, sciendum quod
4391 de substantiis spiritualibus duplex fuit opinio. Quidam enim 4391 de substantiis spiritualibus duplex fuit opinio. Quidam enim
4392 dixerunt quod omnes processerunt a Deo in quadam aequalitate, ut 4392 dixerunt quod omnes processerunt a Deo in quadam aequalitate, ut
4393 Origenes dixit; vel etiam multae earum, ut quidam posuerunt. Alii 4393 Origenes dixit; vel etiam multae earum, ut quidam posuerunt. Alii
4394 vero dixerunt quod omnes substantiae spirituales processerunt a Deo 4394 vero dixerunt quod omnes substantiae spirituales processerunt a Deo
4706 any singular thing is "this particular thing" is because it cannot be communicated to many: since that whereby Socrates is 4706 any singular thing is "this particular thing" is because it cannot be communicated to many: since that whereby Socrates is
4707 a man, can be communicated to many; whereas, what makes him this particular man, is only communicable to one. Therefore, if 4707 a man, can be communicated to many; whereas, what makes him this particular man, is only communicable to one. Therefore, if
4708 Socrates were a man by what makes him to be this particular man, as there cannot be many 4708 Socrates were a man by what makes him to be this particular man, as there cannot be many
4709 Socrates, so there could not in that way be many men. Now this belongs to God alone; for God Himself is His own nature, as 4709 Socrates, so there could not in that way be many men. Now this belongs to God alone; for God Himself is His own nature, as
4710 was shown above ( 4710 was shown above (
4711 <a id="FP_Q11_A3-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q3_A3.html">Q[3], A[3]</a>). Therefore, in the very same way God is God, and He is this God. Impossible is it therefore that many Gods should exist. 4711 <a href="#FP_Q3_A3" id="FP_Q11_A3-p5.1" shape="rect">Q[3], A[3]</a>). Therefore, in the very same way God is God, and He is this God. Impossible is it therefore that many Gods should exist.
4712 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 11 a. 3 co."><a name="28670" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28670] Iª q. 11 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum 4712 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 11 a. 3 co."><a name="28670" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28670] Iª q. 11 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
4713 quod Deum esse unum, ex tribus demonstratur. Primo quidem ex eius 4713 quod Deum esse unum, ex tribus demonstratur. Primo quidem ex eius
4714 simplicitate. Manifestum est enim quod illud unde aliquod singulare 4714 simplicitate. Manifestum est enim quod illud unde aliquod singulare
4715 est hoc aliquid, nullo modo est multis communicabile. Illud enim 4715 est hoc aliquid, nullo modo est multis communicabile. Illud enim
4716 unde Socrates est homo, multis communicari potest, sed id unde est 4716 unde Socrates est homo, multis communicari potest, sed id unde est
4718 per id esset homo, per quod est hic homo, sicut non possunt esse 4718 per id esset homo, per quod est hic homo, sicut non possunt esse
4719 plures Socrates, ita non possent esse plures homines. Hoc autem 4719 plures Socrates, ita non possent esse plures homines. Hoc autem
4720 convenit Deo, nam ipse Deus est sua natura, ut supra ostensum est. 4720 convenit Deo, nam ipse Deus est sua natura, ut supra ostensum est.
4721 Secundum igitur idem est Deus, et hic Deus. Impossibile est igitur 4721 Secundum igitur idem est Deus, et hic Deus. Impossibile est igitur
4722 esse plures deos.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q11_A3-p6"> Secondly, this is proved from the infinity of His perfection. For it was shown above ( 4722 esse plures deos.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q11_A3-p6"> Secondly, this is proved from the infinity of His perfection. For it was shown above (
4723 <a id="FP_Q11_A3-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q4_A2.html">Q[4], A[2]</a>) that God comprehends in Himself the whole perfection of being. If then many gods existed, they would necessarily differ 4723 <a href="#FP_Q4_A2" id="FP_Q11_A3-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[4], A[2]</a>) that God comprehends in Himself the whole perfection of being. If then many gods existed, they would necessarily differ
4724 from each other. Something therefore would belong to one which did not belong to another. And if this were a privation, one 4724 from each other. Something therefore would belong to one which did not belong to another. And if this were a privation, one
4725 of them would not be absolutely perfect; but if a perfection, one of them would be without it. So it is impossible 4725 of them would not be absolutely perfect; but if a perfection, one of them would be without it. So it is impossible
4726 for many gods to exist. Hence also the ancient philosophers, constrained as it were by truth, when they asserted an infinite 4726 for many gods to exist. Hence also the ancient philosophers, constrained as it were by truth, when they asserted an infinite
4727 principle, asserted likewise that there was only one such principle. 4727 principle, asserted likewise that there was only one such principle.
4728 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin">Secundo vero, ex infinitate eius perfectionis. 4728 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin">Secundo vero, ex infinitate eius perfectionis.
4804 <b>I answer that,</b> Since "one" is an undivided being, if anything is supremely "one" it must be supremely being, and supremely undivided. Now 4804 <b>I answer that,</b> Since "one" is an undivided being, if anything is supremely "one" it must be supremely being, and supremely undivided. Now
4805 both of these belong to God. For He is supremely being, inasmuch as His being is not determined by any nature to which it 4805 both of these belong to God. For He is supremely being, inasmuch as His being is not determined by any nature to which it
4806 is adjoined; since He is being itself, subsistent, absolutely undetermined. But He is supremely undivided inasmuch as He is 4806 is adjoined; since He is being itself, subsistent, absolutely undetermined. But He is supremely undivided inasmuch as He is
4807 divided neither actually nor potentially, by any mode of division; since He is altogether 4807 divided neither actually nor potentially, by any mode of division; since He is altogether
4808 simple, as was shown above ( 4808 simple, as was shown above (
4809 <a id="FP_Q11_A4-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q3_A7.html">Q[3], A[7]</a>). Hence it is manifest that God is "one" in the supreme degree. 4809 <a href="#FP_Q3_A7" id="FP_Q11_A4-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[3], A[7]</a>). Hence it is manifest that God is "one" in the supreme degree.
4810 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 11 a. 4 co."><a name="28677" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28677] Iª q. 11 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum 4810 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 11 a. 4 co."><a name="28677" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28677] Iª q. 11 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
4811 quod, cum unum sit ens indivisum, ad hoc quod aliquid sit maxime 4811 quod, cum unum sit ens indivisum, ad hoc quod aliquid sit maxime
4812 unum, oportet quod sit et maxime ens et maxime indivisum. Utrumque 4812 unum, oportet quod sit et maxime ens et maxime indivisum. Utrumque
4813 autem competit Deo. Est enim maxime ens, inquantum est non habens 4813 autem competit Deo. Est enim maxime ens, inquantum est non habens
4814 aliquod esse determinatum per aliquam naturam cui adveniat, sed est 4814 aliquod esse determinatum per aliquam naturam cui adveniat, sed est
4883 viderunt nec Archangeli, quod enim creabilis est naturae, qualiter 4883 viderunt nec Archangeli, quod enim creabilis est naturae, qualiter
4884 videre poterit quod increabile est?</i> Dionysius etiam, I cap. de 4884 videre poterit quod increabile est?</i> Dionysius etiam, I cap. de
4885 Div. Nom., loquens de Deo, dicit, <i>neque sensus est eius, neque 4885 Div. Nom., loquens de Deo, dicit, <i>neque sensus est eius, neque
4886 phantasia, neque opinio, nec ratio, nec scientia</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q12_A1-p3"> 4886 phantasia, neque opinio, nec ratio, nec scientia</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q12_A1-p3">
4887 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, everything infinite, as such, is unknown. But God is infinite, as was shown above ( 4887 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, everything infinite, as such, is unknown. But God is infinite, as was shown above (
4888 <a id="FP_Q12_A1-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q7_A1.html">Q[7], A[1]</a>). Therefore in Himself He is unknown. 4888 <a href="#FP_Q7_A1" id="FP_Q12_A1-p3.1" shape="rect">Q[7], A[1]</a>). Therefore in Himself He is unknown.
4889 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="28683" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28683] Iª q. 12 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, omne 4889 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="28683" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28683] Iª q. 12 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, omne
4890 infinitum, inquantum huiusmodi, est ignotum. Sed Deus est 4890 infinitum, inquantum huiusmodi, est ignotum. Sed Deus est
4891 infinitus, ut supra ostensum est. Ergo secundum se est ignotus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q12_A1-p4"> 4891 infinitus, ut supra ostensum est. Ergo secundum se est ignotus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q12_A1-p4">
4892 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the created intellect knows only existing things. For what falls first under the apprehension of the intellect is 4892 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the created intellect knows only existing things. For what falls first under the apprehension of the intellect is
4893 being. Now God is not something existing; but He is rather super-existence, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv). Therefore God 4893 being. Now God is not something existing; but He is rather super-existence, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv). Therefore God
4955 dicit certissimam patris considerationem et comprehensionem, tantam 4955 dicit certissimam patris considerationem et comprehensionem, tantam
4956 quantam pater habet de filio</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q12_A1-p11"> 4956 quantam pater habet de filio</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q12_A1-p11">
4957 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The infinity of matter not made perfect by form, is unknown in itself, because all knowledge comes by the form; whereas the 4957 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The infinity of matter not made perfect by form, is unknown in itself, because all knowledge comes by the form; whereas the
4958 infinity of the form not limited by matter, is in itself supremely known. God is Infinite in this way, and not in the first 4958 infinity of the form not limited by matter, is in itself supremely known. God is Infinite in this way, and not in the first
4959 way: as appears from what was said above ( 4959 way: as appears from what was said above (
4960 <a id="FP_Q12_A1-p11.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q7_A1.html">Q[7], A[1]</a>). 4960 <a href="#FP_Q7_A1" id="FP_Q12_A1-p11.1" shape="rect">Q[7], A[1]</a>).
4961 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="28689" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28689] Iª q. 12 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum 4961 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="28689" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28689] Iª q. 12 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
4962 dicendum quod infinitum quod se tenet ex parte materiae non 4962 dicendum quod infinitum quod se tenet ex parte materiae non
4963 perfectae per formam, ignotum est secundum se, quia omnis cognitio 4963 perfectae per formam, ignotum est secundum se, quia omnis cognitio
4964 est per formam. Sed infinitum quod se tenet ex parte formae non 4964 est per formam. Sed infinitum quod se tenet ex parte formae non
4965 limitatae per materiam, est secundum se maxime notum. Sic autem 4965 limitatae per materiam, est secundum se maxime notum. Sic autem
5034 faculty, whereby the intellect is made capable of seeing God. But on the part of the object seen, which must necessarily be 5034 faculty, whereby the intellect is made capable of seeing God. But on the part of the object seen, which must necessarily be
5035 united to the seer, the essence of God cannot be seen by any created similitude. First, because as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. 5035 united to the seer, the essence of God cannot be seen by any created similitude. First, because as Dionysius says (Div. Nom.
5036 i), "by the similitudes of the inferior order of things, the superior can in no way be known;" as by the likeness of a 5036 i), "by the similitudes of the inferior order of things, the superior can in no way be known;" as by the likeness of a
5037 body the essence of an incorporeal thing cannot be known. Much less therefore can the essence of God be seen by any created 5037 body the essence of an incorporeal thing cannot be known. Much less therefore can the essence of God be seen by any created
5038 likeness whatever. Secondly, because the essence of God is His own very existence, as was shown above ( 5038 likeness whatever. Secondly, because the essence of God is His own very existence, as was shown above (
5039 <a id="FP_Q12_A2-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q3_A4.html">Q[3], A[4]</a>), which cannot be said of any created form; and so no created form can be the similitude representing the essence of God 5039 <a href="#FP_Q3_A4" id="FP_Q12_A2-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[3], A[4]</a>), which cannot be said of any created form; and so no created form can be the similitude representing the essence of God
5040 to the seer. Thirdly, because the divine essence is uncircumscribed, and contains in itself super-eminently whatever 5040 to the seer. Thirdly, because the divine essence is uncircumscribed, and contains in itself super-eminently whatever
5041 can be signified or understood by the created intellect. Now this cannot in any way be represented by any created likeness; 5041 can be signified or understood by the created intellect. Now this cannot in any way be represented by any created likeness;
5042 for every created form is determined according to some aspect of wisdom, or of power, or of being itself, or of some like 5042 for every created form is determined according to some aspect of wisdom, or of power, or of being itself, or of some like
5043 thing. Hence to say that God is seen by some similitude, is to say that the divine essence is not seen at all; which is false. 5043 thing. Hence to say that God is seen by some similitude, is to say that the divine essence is not seen at all; which is false.
5044 </p><p id="FP_Q12_A2-p8"> Therefore it must be said that to see the essence of God, there is required some similitude in the visual faculty, namely, 5044 </p><p id="FP_Q12_A2-p8"> Therefore it must be said that to see the essence of God, there is required some similitude in the visual faculty, namely,
5144 <i>Deum nemo vidit unquam, vel in hac vita, sicut ipse est; vel in 5144 <i>Deum nemo vidit unquam, vel in hac vita, sicut ipse est; vel in
5145 Angelorum vita, sicut visibilia ista quae corporali visione 5145 Angelorum vita, sicut visibilia ista quae corporali visione
5146 cernuntur</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q12_A3-p6"> 5146 cernuntur</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q12_A3-p6">
5147 <b>I answer that,</b> It is impossible for God to be seen by the sense of sight, or by any other sense, or faculty of the sensitive power. For 5147 <b>I answer that,</b> It is impossible for God to be seen by the sense of sight, or by any other sense, or faculty of the sensitive power. For
5148 every such kind of power is the act of a corporeal organ, as will be shown later 5148 every such kind of power is the act of a corporeal organ, as will be shown later
5149 <a id="FP_Q12_A3-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q78.html">(Q[78])</a>. Now act is proportional to the nature which possesses it. Hence no power of that kind can go beyond corporeal things. For 5149 <a href="FP_ix.html#FP_Q78" id="FP_Q12_A3-p6.1" shape="rect">(Q[78])</a>. Now act is proportional to the nature which possesses it. Hence no power of that kind can go beyond corporeal things. For
5150 God is incorporeal, as was shown above ( 5150 God is incorporeal, as was shown above (
5151 <a id="FP_Q12_A3-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q3_A1.html">Q[3], A[1]</a>). Hence He cannot be seen by the 5151 <a href="#FP_Q3_A1" id="FP_Q12_A3-p6.2" shape="rect">Q[3], A[1]</a>). Hence He cannot be seen by the
5152 sense or the imagination, but only by the intellect. 5152 sense or the imagination, but only by the intellect.
5153 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 3 co."><a name="28704" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28704] Iª q. 12 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum 5153 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 3 co."><a name="28704" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28704] Iª q. 12 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
5154 quod impossibile est Deum videri sensu visus, vel quocumque alio 5154 quod impossibile est Deum videri sensu visus, vel quocumque alio
5155 sensu aut potentia sensitivae partis. Omnis enim potentia huiusmodi 5155 sensu aut potentia sensitivae partis. Omnis enim potentia huiusmodi
5156 est actus corporalis organi, ut infra dicetur. Actus autem 5156 est actus corporalis organi, ut infra dicetur. Actus autem
5235 intelligibilis. Si igitur alia intelligibilia per sua naturalia 5235 intelligibilis. Si igitur alia intelligibilia per sua naturalia
5236 intelligere potest, multo magis Deum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q12_A4-p4"> 5236 intelligere potest, multo magis Deum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q12_A4-p4">
5237 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, corporeal sense cannot be raised up to understand incorporeal substance, which is above its nature. Therefore if 5237 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, corporeal sense cannot be raised up to understand incorporeal substance, which is above its nature. Therefore if
5238 to see the essence of God is above the nature of every created intellect, it follows that no created intellect can reach up 5238 to see the essence of God is above the nature of every created intellect, it follows that no created intellect can reach up
5239 to see the essence of God at all. But this is false, as appears from what is said above 5239 to see the essence of God at all. But this is false, as appears from what is said above
5240 <a id="FP_Q12_A4-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q12_A1.html">(A[1])</a>. Therefore it seems that it is natural for a created intellect to see the Divine essence. 5240 <a href="#FP_Q12_A1" id="FP_Q12_A4-p4.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>. Therefore it seems that it is natural for a created intellect to see the Divine essence.
5241 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="28710" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28710] Iª q. 12 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, 5241 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="28710" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28710] Iª q. 12 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
5242 sensus corporeus non potest elevari ad intelligendam substantiam 5242 sensus corporeus non potest elevari ad intelligendam substantiam
5243 incorpoream, quia est supra eius naturam. Si igitur videre Deum per 5243 incorpoream, quia est supra eius naturam. Si igitur videre Deum per
5244 essentiam sit supra naturam cuiuslibet intellectus creati, videtur 5244 essentiam sit supra naturam cuiuslibet intellectus creati, videtur
5245 quod nullus intellectus creatus ad videndum Dei essentiam 5245 quod nullus intellectus creatus ad videndum Dei essentiam
5313 esse participatum. Non igitur potest intellectus creatus Deum per 5313 esse participatum. Non igitur potest intellectus creatus Deum per
5314 essentiam videre, nisi inquantum Deus per suam gratiam se 5314 essentiam videre, nisi inquantum Deus per suam gratiam se
5315 intellectui creato coniungit, ut intelligibile ab ipso.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q12_A4-p7"> 5315 intellectui creato coniungit, ut intelligibile ab ipso.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q12_A4-p7">
5316 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This mode of knowing God is natural to an angel---namely, to know Him by His own likeness refulgent in the angel himself. 5316 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This mode of knowing God is natural to an angel---namely, to know Him by His own likeness refulgent in the angel himself.
5317 But to know God by any created similitude is not to know the essence of God, as was shown above 5317 But to know God by any created similitude is not to know the essence of God, as was shown above
5318 <a id="FP_Q12_A4-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q12_A2.html">(A[2])</a>. Hence it does not follow that an angel can know the essence of God by his own power. 5318 <a href="#FP_Q12_A2" id="FP_Q12_A4-p7.1" shape="rect">(A[2])</a>. Hence it does not follow that an angel can know the essence of God by his own power.
5319 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="28713" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28713] Iª q. 12 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo 5319 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="28713" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28713] Iª q. 12 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
5320 dicendum quod iste modus cognoscendi Deum, est Angelo connaturalis, 5320 dicendum quod iste modus cognoscendi Deum, est Angelo connaturalis,
5321 ut scilicet cognoscat eum per similitudinem eius in ipso Angelo 5321 ut scilicet cognoscat eum per similitudinem eius in ipso Angelo
5322 refulgentem. Sed cognoscere Deum per aliquam similitudinem creatam, 5322 refulgentem. Sed cognoscere Deum per aliquam similitudinem creatam,
5323 non est cognoscere essentiam Dei, ut supra ostensum est. Unde non 5323 non est cognoscere essentiam Dei, ut supra ostensum est. Unde non
5604 has three angles equal to two right angles, he comprehends that truth; whereas if anyone accepts it as a 5604 has three angles equal to two right angles, he comprehends that truth; whereas if anyone accepts it as a
5605 probable opinion because wise men or most men teach it, he cannot be said to comprehend the thing itself, because he does 5605 probable opinion because wise men or most men teach it, he cannot be said to comprehend the thing itself, because he does
5606 not attain to that perfect mode of knowledge of which it is intrinsically capable. But no created intellect can attain to 5606 not attain to that perfect mode of knowledge of which it is intrinsically capable. But no created intellect can attain to
5607 that perfect mode of the knowledge of the Divine intellect whereof it is intrinsically capable. Which thus appears---Everything 5607 that perfect mode of the knowledge of the Divine intellect whereof it is intrinsically capable. Which thus appears---Everything
5608 is knowable according to its actuality. But God, whose being is infinite, as was shown above 5608 is knowable according to its actuality. But God, whose being is infinite, as was shown above
5609 <a id="FP_Q12_A7-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q7.html">(Q[7])</a> is 5609 <a href="#FP_Q7" id="FP_Q12_A7-p7.1" shape="rect">(Q[7])</a> is
5610 infinitely knowable. Now no created intellect can know God infinitely. For the created intellect knows the Divine essence 5610 infinitely knowable. Now no created intellect can know God infinitely. For the created intellect knows the Divine essence
5611 more or less perfectly in proportion as it receives a greater or lesser light of glory. Since therefore the created light 5611 more or less perfectly in proportion as it receives a greater or lesser light of glory. Since therefore the created light
5612 of glory received into any created intellect cannot be infinite, it is clearly impossible for any created intellect to know 5612 of glory received into any created intellect cannot be infinite, it is clearly impossible for any created intellect to know
5613 God in an infinite degree. Hence it is impossible that it should comprehend God. 5613 God in an infinite degree. Hence it is impossible that it should comprehend God.
5614 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 7 co."><a name="28736" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28736] Iª q. 12 a. 7 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum 5614 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 7 co."><a name="28736" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28736] Iª q. 12 a. 7 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
5752 more of its effects can be seen in it. For whoever has a lofty understanding, as soon 5752 more of its effects can be seen in it. For whoever has a lofty understanding, as soon
5753 as one demonstrative principle is put before him can gather the knowledge of many conclusions; but this is beyond one of a 5753 as one demonstrative principle is put before him can gather the knowledge of many conclusions; but this is beyond one of a
5754 weaker intellect, for he needs things to be explained to him separately. And so an intellect can know all the effects of a 5754 weaker intellect, for he needs things to be explained to him separately. And so an intellect can know all the effects of a
5755 cause and the reasons for those effects in the cause itself, if it comprehends the cause wholly. Now no created intellect 5755 cause and the reasons for those effects in the cause itself, if it comprehends the cause wholly. Now no created intellect
5756 can comprehend God wholly, as shown above 5756 can comprehend God wholly, as shown above
5757 <a id="FP_Q12_A8-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q12_A7.html">(A[7])</a>. Therefore no created intellect in seeing God can know 5757 <a href="#FP_Q12_A7" id="FP_Q12_A8-p7.1" shape="rect">(A[7])</a>. Therefore no created intellect in seeing God can know
5758 all that God does or can do, for this would be to comprehend His power; but of what God does or can do any intellect can know 5758 all that God does or can do, for this would be to comprehend His power; but of what God does or can do any intellect can know
5759 the more, the more perfectly it sees God. 5759 the more, the more perfectly it sees God.
5760 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 8 co."><a name="28745" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28745] Iª q. 12 a. 8 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum 5760 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 8 co."><a name="28745" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28745] Iª q. 12 a. 8 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
5761 quod intellectus creatus, videndo divinam essentiam, non videt in 5761 quod intellectus creatus, videndo divinam essentiam, non videt in
5762 ipsa omnia quae facit Deus vel facere potest. Manifestum est enim 5762 ipsa omnia quae facit Deus vel facere potest. Manifestum est enim
6038 Glossa, <i>quandiu hic mortaliter vivitur, videri per quasdam 6038 Glossa, <i>quandiu hic mortaliter vivitur, videri per quasdam
6039 imagines Deus potest; sed per ipsam naturae suae speciem non 6039 imagines Deus potest; sed per ipsam naturae suae speciem non
6040 potest</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q12_A11-p7"> 6040 potest</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q12_A11-p7">
6041 <b>I answer that,</b> God cannot be seen in His essence by a mere human being, except he be separated from this mortal life. The reason is because, 6041 <b>I answer that,</b> God cannot be seen in His essence by a mere human being, except he be separated from this mortal life. The reason is because,
6042 as was said above 6042 as was said above
6043 <a id="FP_Q12_A11-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q12_A4.html">(A[4])</a>, the mode of knowledge follows the mode of the nature of the knower. But our soul, as long as we live in this life, has its 6043 <a href="#FP_Q12_A4" id="FP_Q12_A11-p7.1" shape="rect">(A[4])</a>, the mode of knowledge follows the mode of the nature of the knower. But our soul, as long as we live in this life, has its
6044 being in corporeal matter; hence naturally it knows only what has a form in matter, or what can be known by such a form. Now 6044 being in corporeal matter; hence naturally it knows only what has a form in matter, or what can be known by such a form. Now
6045 it is evident that the Divine essence 6045 it is evident that the Divine essence
6046 cannot be known through the nature of material things. For it was shown above ( 6046 cannot be known through the nature of material things. For it was shown above (
6047 <a id="FP_Q12_A11-p7.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q12_A2.html">AA[2]</a>,9) that the knowledge of God by means of any created similitude is not the vision of His essence. Hence it is impossible 6047 <a href="#FP_Q12_A2" id="FP_Q12_A11-p7.2" shape="rect">AA[2]</a>,9) that the knowledge of God by means of any created similitude is not the vision of His essence. Hence it is impossible
6048 for the soul of man in this life to see the essence of God. This can be seen in the fact that the more our soul is abstracted 6048 for the soul of man in this life to see the essence of God. This can be seen in the fact that the more our soul is abstracted
6049 from corporeal things, the more it is capable of receiving abstract intelligible things. Hence in dreams and alienations of 6049 from corporeal things, the more it is capable of receiving abstract intelligible things. Hence in dreams and alienations of
6050 the bodily senses 6050 the bodily senses
6051 divine revelations and foresight of future events are perceived the more clearly. It is not possible, therefore, that the 6051 divine revelations and foresight of future events are perceived the more clearly. It is not possible, therefore, that the
6052 soul in this mortal life should be raised up to the supreme of intelligible objects, i.e. to the divine essence. 6052 soul in this mortal life should be raised up to the supreme of intelligible objects, i.e. to the divine essence.
6071 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> According to Dionysius (Coel. Hier. iv) a man is said in the Scriptures to see God in the sense that certain figures are 6071 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> According to Dionysius (Coel. Hier. iv) a man is said in the Scriptures to see God in the sense that certain figures are
6072 formed in the senses or imagination, according to some similitude representing in part the divinity. So when Jacob says, "I 6072 formed in the senses or imagination, according to some similitude representing in part the divinity. So when Jacob says, "I
6073 have seen God face to face," this does not mean the Divine essence, but some figure representing God. And this is to be referred 6073 have seen God face to face," this does not mean the Divine essence, but some figure representing God. And this is to be referred
6074 to some high mode of prophecy, so that God seems to speak, though in an imaginary 6074 to some high mode of prophecy, so that God seems to speak, though in an imaginary
6075 vision; as will later be explained (SS, 6075 vision; as will later be explained (SS,
6076 <a id="FP_Q12_A11-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q174.html">Q[174])</a> in treating of the degrees of prophecy. We may also say that Jacob spoke thus to designate some exalted intellectual contemplation, 6076 <a href="unknown.html#FP_Q174" id="FP_Q12_A11-p8.1" shape="rect">Q[174])</a> in treating of the degrees of prophecy. We may also say that Jacob spoke thus to designate some exalted intellectual contemplation,
6077 above the ordinary state. 6077 above the ordinary state.
6078 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 11 ad 1"><a name="28768" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28768] Iª q. 12 a. 11 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo 6078 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 11 ad 1"><a name="28768" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28768] Iª q. 12 a. 11 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
6079 dicendum quod, secundum Dionysium, IV cap. Cael. Hier., sic in 6079 dicendum quod, secundum Dionysium, IV cap. Cael. Hier., sic in
6080 Scripturis dicitur aliquis Deum vidisse, inquantum formatae sunt 6080 Scripturis dicitur aliquis Deum vidisse, inquantum formatae sunt
6081 aliquae figurae, vel sensibiles vel imaginariae, secundum aliquam 6081 aliquae figurae, vel sensibiles vel imaginariae, secundum aliquam
6089 supra communem statum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q12_A11-p9"> 6089 supra communem statum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q12_A11-p9">
6090 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As God works miracles in corporeal things, so also He does supernatural wonders above the common order, raising the minds 6090 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As God works miracles in corporeal things, so also He does supernatural wonders above the common order, raising the minds
6091 of some living in the flesh beyond the use of sense, even up to the vision of His own essence; as Augustine says (Gen. ad 6091 of some living in the flesh beyond the use of sense, even up to the vision of His own essence; as Augustine says (Gen. ad
6092 lit. xii, 26,27,28) of Moses, the teacher of the Jews; and of Paul, the teacher of the Gentiles. This will be treated more 6092 lit. xii, 26,27,28) of Moses, the teacher of the Jews; and of Paul, the teacher of the Gentiles. This will be treated more
6093 fully in the question of rapture (SS, 6093 fully in the question of rapture (SS,
6094 <a id="FP_Q12_A11-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q175.html">Q[175])</a>. 6094 <a href="unknown.html#FP_Q175" id="FP_Q12_A11-p9.1" shape="rect">Q[175])</a>.
6095 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 11 ad 2"><a name="28769" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28769] Iª q. 12 a. 11 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum 6095 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 11 ad 2"><a name="28769" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28769] Iª q. 12 a. 11 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
6096 dicendum quod, sicut Deus miraculose aliquid supernaturaliter in 6096 dicendum quod, sicut Deus miraculose aliquid supernaturaliter in
6097 rebus corporeis operatur, ita etiam et supernaturaliter, et praeter 6097 rebus corporeis operatur, ita etiam et supernaturaliter, et praeter
6098 communem ordinem, mentes aliquorum in hac carne viventium, sed non 6098 communem ordinem, mentes aliquorum in hac carne viventium, sed non
6099 sensibus carnis utentium, usque ad visionem suae essentiae 6099 sensibus carnis utentium, usque ad visionem suae essentiae
6126 suam essentiam sicut intelligibilia in intellectu. Sic autem Deus 6126 suam essentiam sicut intelligibilia in intellectu. Sic autem Deus
6127 est in anima beatorum, non autem in anima nostra; sed per 6127 est in anima beatorum, non autem in anima nostra; sed per
6128 praesentiam, essentiam, et potentiam.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q12_A12" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q12_A12-p0.1">Q. 12. A. 12. Whether God can be known in this life by natural reason?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q12_A12-p2"> 6128 praesentiam, essentiam, et potentiam.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q12_A12" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q12_A12-p0.1">Q. 12. A. 12. Whether God can be known in this life by natural reason?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q12_A12-p2">
6129 <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that by natural reason we cannot know God in this life. For Boethius says (De Consol. v) that "reason does not grasp 6129 <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that by natural reason we cannot know God in this life. For Boethius says (De Consol. v) that "reason does not grasp
6130 simple form." But God is a supremely simple form, as was shown above ( 6130 simple form." But God is a supremely simple form, as was shown above (
6131 <a id="FP_Q12_A12-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q3_A7.html">Q[3], A[7]</a> ). Therefore natural reason cannot attain to know Him. 6131 <a href="#FP_Q3_A7" id="FP_Q12_A12-p2.1" shape="rect">Q[3], A[7]</a> ). Therefore natural reason cannot attain to know Him.
6132 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 12 arg. 1"><a name="28772" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28772] Iª q. 12 a. 12 arg. 1</span></a> Ad duodecimum 6132 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 12 arg. 1"><a name="28772" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28772] Iª q. 12 a. 12 arg. 1</span></a> Ad duodecimum
6133 sic proceditur. Videtur quod per naturalem rationem Deum in hac 6133 sic proceditur. Videtur quod per naturalem rationem Deum in hac
6134 vita cognoscere non possimus. Dicit enim Boetius, in libro de 6134 vita cognoscere non possimus. Dicit enim Boetius, in libro de
6135 Consol., quod <i>ratio non capit simplicem formam</i>. Deus autem 6135 Consol., quod <i>ratio non capit simplicem formam</i>. Deus autem
6136 maxime est simplex forma, ut supra ostensum est. Ergo ad eius 6136 maxime est simplex forma, ut supra ostensum est. Ergo ad eius
6363 quod dicitur Exod. XV, <i>dominus quasi vir pugnator, omnipotens 6363 quod dicitur Exod. XV, <i>dominus quasi vir pugnator, omnipotens
6364 nomen eius</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q13_A1-p6"> 6364 nomen eius</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q13_A1-p6">
6365 <b>I answer that,</b> Since according to the Philosopher (Peri Herm. i), words are signs of ideas, and ideas the similitude of things, it is evident 6365 <b>I answer that,</b> Since according to the Philosopher (Peri Herm. i), words are signs of ideas, and ideas the similitude of things, it is evident
6366 that words relate to the meaning of things signified through the medium of the intellectual conception. It follows therefore 6366 that words relate to the meaning of things signified through the medium of the intellectual conception. It follows therefore
6367 that we can give a name to anything in as far as we can understand it. Now it was shown above ( 6367 that we can give a name to anything in as far as we can understand it. Now it was shown above (
6368 <a id="FP_Q13_A1-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q12_A11.html">Q[12], AA[11]</a>,12) that in this life we cannot see the essence of God; but we know God 6368 <a href="#FP_Q12_A11" id="FP_Q13_A1-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[12], AA[11]</a>,12) that in this life we cannot see the essence of God; but we know God
6369 from creatures as their principle, and also by way of excellence and remotion. In this way therefore He can be named by us 6369 from creatures as their principle, and also by way of excellence and remotion. In this way therefore He can be named by us
6370 from creatures, yet not so that the name which signifies Him expresses the divine essence in itself. Thus the name "man" expresses 6370 from creatures, yet not so that the name which signifies Him expresses the divine essence in itself. Thus the name "man" expresses
6371 the essence of man in himself, since it signifies the definition of man by manifesting his essence; for the idea expressed 6371 the essence of man in himself, since it signifies the definition of man by manifesting his essence; for the idea expressed
6372 by the name is the definition. 6372 by the name is the definition.
6373 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 13 a. 1 co."><a name="28793" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28793] Iª q. 13 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum 6373 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 13 a. 1 co."><a name="28793" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28793] Iª q. 13 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
6503 He is the cause of our life, or that He differs from inanimate bodies. 6503 He is the cause of our life, or that He differs from inanimate bodies.
6504 </p><p id="FP_Q13_A2-p9"> Therefore we must hold a different doctrine---viz. that these names signify the divine substance, and are predicated substantially 6504 </p><p id="FP_Q13_A2-p9"> Therefore we must hold a different doctrine---viz. that these names signify the divine substance, and are predicated substantially
6505 of God, although they fall short of a full representation of Him. Which is proved thus. For these names express God, so far 6505 of God, although they fall short of a full representation of Him. Which is proved thus. For these names express God, so far
6506 as our intellects know Him. Now since our intellect knows God from creatures, it knows Him as far as creatures represent Him. 6506 as our intellects know Him. Now since our intellect knows God from creatures, it knows Him as far as creatures represent Him.
6507 Now it is shown above ( 6507 Now it is shown above (
6508 <a id="FP_Q13_A2-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q4_A2.html">Q[4], A[2]</a>) that God prepossesses in Himself all the 6508 <a href="#FP_Q4_A2" id="FP_Q13_A2-p9.1" shape="rect">Q[4], A[2]</a>) that God prepossesses in Himself all the
6509 perfections of creatures, being Himself simply and universally perfect. Hence every creature represents Him, and is like Him 6509 perfections of creatures, being Himself simply and universally perfect. Hence every creature represents Him, and is like Him
6510 so far as it possesses some perfection; yet it represents Him not as something of the same species or genus, but as the excelling 6510 so far as it possesses some perfection; yet it represents Him not as something of the same species or genus, but as the excelling
6511 principle of whose form the effects fall short, although they derive some kind of likeness thereto, even as the forms of inferior 6511 principle of whose form the effects fall short, although they derive some kind of likeness thereto, even as the forms of inferior
6512 bodies represent the power of the sun. This was explained above ( 6512 bodies represent the power of the sun. This was explained above (
6513 <a id="FP_Q13_A2-p9.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q4_A3.html">Q[4], A[3]</a>), in treating 6513 <a href="#FP_Q4_A3" id="FP_Q13_A2-p9.2" shape="rect">Q[4], A[3]</a>), in treating
6514 of the divine perfection. Therefore the aforesaid names signify the divine substance, but in an imperfect manner, even as 6514 of the divine perfection. Therefore the aforesaid names signify the divine substance, but in an imperfect manner, even as
6515 creatures represent it imperfectly. So when we say, "God is good," the meaning is not, "God is the cause of goodness," or 6515 creatures represent it imperfectly. So when we say, "God is good," the meaning is not, "God is the cause of goodness," or
6516 "God is not evil"; but the meaning is, "Whatever good we attribute to creatures, pre-exists in God," and in a more excellent 6516 "God is not evil"; but the meaning is, "Whatever good we attribute to creatures, pre-exists in God," and in a more excellent
6517 and higher way. Hence it does not follow that God is good, because He causes goodness; but rather, on the contrary, He causes 6517 and higher way. Hence it does not follow that God is good, because He causes goodness; but rather, on the contrary, He causes
6518 goodness in things because He is good; according to what Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 32), "Because He is good, we 6518 goodness in things because He is good; according to what Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 32), "Because He is good, we
6611 secundum quod in se est, sed cognoscimus eam secundum quod 6611 secundum quod in se est, sed cognoscimus eam secundum quod
6612 repraesentatur in perfectionibus creaturarum. Et sic nomina a nobis 6612 repraesentatur in perfectionibus creaturarum. Et sic nomina a nobis
6613 imposita eam significant.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q13_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q13_A3-p0.1">Q. 13. A. 3. Whether any name can be applied to God in its literal sense?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q13_A3-p2"> 6613 imposita eam significant.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q13_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q13_A3-p0.1">Q. 13. A. 3. Whether any name can be applied to God in its literal sense?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q13_A3-p2">
6614 <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that no name is applied literally to God. For all names which we apply to God are taken from creatures; as was explained 6614 <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that no name is applied literally to God. For all names which we apply to God are taken from creatures; as was explained
6615 above 6615 above
6616 <a id="FP_Q13_A3-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q13_A1.html">(A[1])</a>. But the names of creatures are applied to God metaphorically, as when we say, God is a stone, or a lion, or the like. Therefore 6616 <a href="#FP_Q13_A1" id="FP_Q13_A3-p2.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>. But the names of creatures are applied to God metaphorically, as when we say, God is a stone, or a lion, or the like. Therefore
6617 names are applied to God in a metaphorical sense. 6617 names are applied to God in a metaphorical sense.
6618 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 13 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="28805" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28805] Iª q. 13 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium sic 6618 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 13 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="28805" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28805] Iª q. 13 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium sic
6619 proceditur. Videtur quod nullum nomen dicatur de Deo proprie. Omnia 6619 proceditur. Videtur quod nullum nomen dicatur de Deo proprie. Omnia
6620 enim nomina quae de Deo dicimus, sunt a creaturis accepta, ut 6620 enim nomina quae de Deo dicimus, sunt a creaturis accepta, ut
6621 dictum est. Sed nomina creaturarum metaphorice dicuntur de Deo, 6621 dictum est. Sed nomina creaturarum metaphorice dicuntur de Deo,
6739 huiusmodi; cum tamen scriptum sit Ierem. XXXII, <i>fortissime, 6739 huiusmodi; cum tamen scriptum sit Ierem. XXXII, <i>fortissime,
6740 magne, potens, dominus exercituum nomen tibi</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q13_A4-p6"> 6740 magne, potens, dominus exercituum nomen tibi</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q13_A4-p6">
6741 <b>I answer that,</b> These names spoken of God are not synonymous. This would be easy to understand, if we said that these names are used to remove, 6741 <b>I answer that,</b> These names spoken of God are not synonymous. This would be easy to understand, if we said that these names are used to remove,
6742 or to express the relation of cause to creatures; for thus it would follow that there are different ideas as regards the diverse 6742 or to express the relation of cause to creatures; for thus it would follow that there are different ideas as regards the diverse
6743 things denied of God, or as regards diverse effects connoted. But even according to what was said above 6743 things denied of God, or as regards diverse effects connoted. But even according to what was said above
6744 <a id="FP_Q13_A4-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q13_A2.html">(A[2])</a>, that these names signify the divine substance, although in an 6744 <a href="#FP_Q13_A2" id="FP_Q13_A4-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[2])</a>, that these names signify the divine substance, although in an
6745 imperfect manner, it is also clear from what has been said (AA 1,2) that they have diverse meanings. For the idea signified 6745 imperfect manner, it is also clear from what has been said (AA 1,2) that they have diverse meanings. For the idea signified
6746 by the name is the conception in the intellect of the thing signified by the name. But our intellect, since it knows God from 6746 by the name is the conception in the intellect of the thing signified by the name. But our intellect, since it knows God from
6747 creatures, in order to understand God, forms conceptions proportional to the perfections flowing from God to creatures, which 6747 creatures, in order to understand God, forms conceptions proportional to the perfections flowing from God to creatures, which
6748 perfections pre-exist in God unitedly and simply, whereas in creatures they are received and divided and multiplied. As 6748 perfections pre-exist in God unitedly and simply, whereas in creatures they are received and divided and multiplied. As
6749 therefore, to the different perfections of creatures, there corresponds one simple principle represented by different perfections 6749 therefore, to the different perfections of creatures, there corresponds one simple principle represented by different perfections
6874 </p><p id="FP_Q13_A5-p9"> Now names are thus used in two ways: either according as many things are proportionate to one, thus for example "healthy" 6874 </p><p id="FP_Q13_A5-p9"> Now names are thus used in two ways: either according as many things are proportionate to one, thus for example "healthy"
6875 predicated of medicine and urine in relation and in proportion to health of a body, of which the former is the sign and the 6875 predicated of medicine and urine in relation and in proportion to health of a body, of which the former is the sign and the
6876 latter the cause: or according as one thing is proportionate to another, thus "healthy" is said of medicine and animal, since 6876 latter the cause: or according as one thing is proportionate to another, thus "healthy" is said of medicine and animal, since
6877 medicine is the cause of health in the animal body. And in this way some things are said of God and creatures 6877 medicine is the cause of health in the animal body. And in this way some things are said of God and creatures
6878 analogically, and not in a purely equivocal nor in a purely univocal sense. For we can name God only from creatures 6878 analogically, and not in a purely equivocal nor in a purely univocal sense. For we can name God only from creatures
6879 <a id="FP_Q13_A5-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q13_A1.html">(A[1])</a>. Thus whatever is said of God and creatures, is said according to the relation of a creature to God as its principle and 6879 <a href="#FP_Q13_A1" id="FP_Q13_A5-p9.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>. Thus whatever is said of God and creatures, is said according to the relation of a creature to God as its principle and
6880 cause, wherein all perfections of things pre-exist excellently. Now this mode of community of idea is a mean between pure 6880 cause, wherein all perfections of things pre-exist excellently. Now this mode of community of idea is a mean between pure
6881 equivocation and simple univocation. For in analogies the idea is not, as it is in univocals, one and the 6881 equivocation and simple univocation. For in analogies the idea is not, as it is in univocals, one and the
6882 same, yet it is not totally diverse as in equivocals; but a term which is thus used in a multiple sense signifies various 6882 same, yet it is not totally diverse as in equivocals; but a term which is thus used in a multiple sense signifies various
6883 proportions to some one thing; thus "healthy" applied to urine signifies the sign of animal health, and applied to medicine 6883 proportions to some one thing; thus "healthy" applied to urine signifies the sign of animal health, and applied to medicine
6884 signifies the cause of the same health. 6884 signifies the cause of the same health.
6955 univocum, non tamen est omnino aequivocum, quia sic non faceret 6955 univocum, non tamen est omnino aequivocum, quia sic non faceret
6956 sibi simile; sed potest dici agens analogicum, sicut in 6956 sibi simile; sed potest dici agens analogicum, sicut in
6957 praedicationibus omnia univoca reducuntur ad unum primum, non 6957 praedicationibus omnia univoca reducuntur ad unum primum, non
6958 univocum, sed analogicum, quod est ens.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q13_A5-p11"> 6958 univocum, sed analogicum, quod est ens.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q13_A5-p11">
6959 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The likeness of the creature to God is imperfect, for it does not represent one and the same generic thing ( 6959 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The likeness of the creature to God is imperfect, for it does not represent one and the same generic thing (
6960 <a id="FP_Q13_A5-p11.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q4_A3.html">Q[4], A[3]</a>). 6960 <a href="#FP_Q4_A3" id="FP_Q13_A5-p11.1" shape="rect">Q[4], A[3]</a>).
6961 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 13 a. 5 ad 2"><a name="28828" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28828] Iª q. 13 a. 5 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum 6961 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 13 a. 5 ad 2"><a name="28828" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28828] Iª q. 13 a. 5 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
6962 dicendum quod similitudo creaturae ad Deum est imperfecta, quia 6962 dicendum quod similitudo creaturae ad Deum est imperfecta, quia
6963 etiam nec idem secundum genus repraesentat, ut supra dictum 6963 etiam nec idem secundum genus repraesentat, ut supra dictum
6964 est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q13_A5-p12"> 6964 est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q13_A5-p12">
6965 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> God is not the measure proportioned to things measured; hence it is not necessary that God and creatures should be in the 6965 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> God is not the measure proportioned to things measured; hence it is not necessary that God and creatures should be in the
7023 lion in his. Thus it is clear that applied to God the signification of names can be defined only from what is said of creatures. 7023 lion in his. Thus it is clear that applied to God the signification of names can be defined only from what is said of creatures.
7024 But to other names not applied to God in a metaphorical sense, the same rule would apply if they were spoken of God as 7024 But to other names not applied to God in a metaphorical sense, the same rule would apply if they were spoken of God as
7025 the cause only, as some have supposed. For when it is said, "God is good," it would then only mean "God is the cause of the 7025 the cause only, as some have supposed. For when it is said, "God is good," it would then only mean "God is the cause of the
7026 creature's goodness"; thus the term good applied to God would included in its meaning the creature's goodness. Hence "good" 7026 creature's goodness"; thus the term good applied to God would included in its meaning the creature's goodness. Hence "good"
7027 would apply primarily to creatures rather than to God. But as was shown above 7027 would apply primarily to creatures rather than to God. But as was shown above
7028 <a id="FP_Q13_A6-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q13_A2.html">(A[2])</a>, these names are applied to God not as the cause only, but also essentially. For the words, "God is good," or "wise," signify 7028 <a href="#FP_Q13_A2" id="FP_Q13_A6-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[2])</a>, these names are applied to God not as the cause only, but also essentially. For the words, "God is good," or "wise," signify
7029 not only that 7029 not only that
7030 He is the cause of wisdom or goodness, but that these exist in Him in a more excellent way. Hence as regards what the name 7030 He is the cause of wisdom or goodness, but that these exist in Him in a more excellent way. Hence as regards what the name
7031 signifies, these names are applied primarily to God rather than to creatures, because these perfections flow from God to creatures; 7031 signifies, these names are applied primarily to God rather than to creatures, because these perfections flow from God to creatures;
7032 but as regards the imposition of the names, they are primarily applied by us to creatures which we know first. Hence they 7032 but as regards the imposition of the names, they are primarily applied by us to creatures which we know first. Hence they
7033 have a mode of signification which belongs to creatures, as said above 7033 have a mode of signification which belongs to creatures, as said above
7034 <a id="FP_Q13_A6-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q13_A3.html">(A[3])</a>. 7034 <a href="#FP_Q13_A3" id="FP_Q13_A6-p6.2" shape="rect">(A[3])</a>.
7035 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 13 a. 6 co."><a name="28835" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28835] Iª q. 13 a. 6 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum 7035 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 13 a. 6 co."><a name="28835" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28835] Iª q. 13 a. 6 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
7036 quod in omnibus nominibus quae de pluribus analogice dicuntur, 7036 quod in omnibus nominibus quae de pluribus analogice dicuntur,
7037 necesse est quod omnia dicantur per respectum ad unum, et ideo 7037 necesse est quod omnia dicantur per respectum ad unum, et ideo
7038 illud unum oportet quod ponatur in definitione omnium. Et quia 7038 illud unum oportet quod ponatur in definitione omnium. Et quia
7039 ratio quam significat nomen, est definitio, ut dicitur in IV 7039 ratio quam significat nomen, est definitio, ut dicitur in IV
7392 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> We can name a thing according to the knowledge we have of its nature from its properties and effects. Hence because we can 7392 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> We can name a thing according to the knowledge we have of its nature from its properties and effects. Hence because we can
7393 know what stone is in itself from its property, this name "stone" signifies the nature of the stone itself; for it signifies 7393 know what stone is in itself from its property, this name "stone" signifies the nature of the stone itself; for it signifies
7394 the definition of stone, by which we know what it is, for the idea which the name signifies is the definition, as is said 7394 the definition of stone, by which we know what it is, for the idea which the name signifies is the definition, as is said
7395 in Metaph. iv. Now from the divine effects we cannot know the divine nature in 7395 in Metaph. iv. Now from the divine effects we cannot know the divine nature in
7396 itself, so as to know what it is; but only by way of eminence, and by way of causality, and of negation as stated above ( 7396 itself, so as to know what it is; but only by way of eminence, and by way of causality, and of negation as stated above (
7397 <a id="FP_Q13_A8-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q12_A12.html">Q[12], A[12]</a>). Thus the name "God" signifies the divine nature, for this name was imposed to signify something existing above all things, 7397 <a href="#FP_Q12_A12" id="FP_Q13_A8-p8.1" shape="rect">Q[12], A[12]</a>). Thus the name "God" signifies the divine nature, for this name was imposed to signify something existing above all things,
7398 the principle of all things and removed from all things; for those who name God intend to signify all this. 7398 the principle of all things and removed from all things; for those who name God intend to signify all this.
7399 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 13 a. 8 ad 2"><a name="28858" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28858] Iª q. 13 a. 8 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum 7399 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 13 a. 8 ad 2"><a name="28858" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28858] Iª q. 13 a. 8 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
7400 dicendum quod, secundum quod naturam alicuius rei ex eius 7400 dicendum quod, secundum quod naturam alicuius rei ex eius
7401 proprietatibus et effectibus cognoscere possumus, sic eam nomine 7401 proprietatibus et effectibus cognoscere possumus, sic eam nomine
7402 possumus significare. Unde, quia substantiam lapidis ex eius 7402 possumus significare. Unde, quia substantiam lapidis ex eius
7467 we are unable to understand simple self-subsisting forms as they really are, we understand them as compound things having 7467 we are unable to understand simple self-subsisting forms as they really are, we understand them as compound things having
7468 forms in matter; therefore, as was said in the first article, we give them concrete names signifying a nature existing in 7468 forms in matter; therefore, as was said in the first article, we give them concrete names signifying a nature existing in
7469 some "suppositum." Hence, so far as concerns images, the same rules apply to names we impose to signify the nature of compound 7469 some "suppositum." Hence, so far as concerns images, the same rules apply to names we impose to signify the nature of compound
7470 things as to names given to us to signify simple subsisting natures. 7470 things as to names given to us to signify simple subsisting natures.
7471 </p><p id="FP_Q13_A9-p7"> Since, then, this name "God" is given to signify the divine nature as stated above 7471 </p><p id="FP_Q13_A9-p7"> Since, then, this name "God" is given to signify the divine nature as stated above
7472 <a id="FP_Q13_A9-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q13_A8.html">(A[8])</a>, and since the divine nature cannot be multiplied as shown above ( 7472 <a href="#FP_Q13_A8" id="FP_Q13_A9-p7.1" shape="rect">(A[8])</a>, and since the divine nature cannot be multiplied as shown above (
7473 <a id="FP_Q13_A9-p7.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q11_A3.html">Q[11], A[3]</a>), it follows that this name "God" is incommunicable in reality, but communicable in opinion; just in the same way as this 7473 <a href="#FP_Q11_A3" id="FP_Q13_A9-p7.2" shape="rect">Q[11], A[3]</a>), it follows that this name "God" is incommunicable in reality, but communicable in opinion; just in the same way as this
7474 name "sun" would be communicable according to the opinion of those who say there are many suns. Therefore, it is written: 7474 name "sun" would be communicable according to the opinion of those who say there are many suns. Therefore, it is written:
7475 "You served them who 7475 "You served them who
7476 by nature are not gods," ( 7476 by nature are not gods," (
7477 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q13_A9-p7.3" href="./asv.html#Gal.4.8" target="asv">Gal. 4:8</a>), and a gloss adds, "Gods not in nature, but in human opinion." Nevertheless this name "God" is communicable, not in its 7477 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q13_A9-p7.3" href="./asv.html#Gal.4.8" target="asv">Gal. 4:8</a>), and a gloss adds, "Gods not in nature, but in human opinion." Nevertheless this name "God" is communicable, not in its
7478 whole signification, but in some part of it by way of similitude; so that those are called gods who share in divinity by likeness, 7478 whole signification, but in some part of it by way of similitude; so that those are called gods who share in divinity by likeness,
7684 aequivoca, secundum quod includunt in se analoga. Quia et ens, quod 7684 aequivoca, secundum quod includunt in se analoga. Quia et ens, quod
7685 analogice dicitur, aliquando dicitur aequivoce praedicari de 7685 analogice dicitur, aliquando dicitur aequivoce praedicari de
7686 diversis praedicamentis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q13_A10-p12"> 7686 diversis praedicamentis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q13_A10-p12">
7687 <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> Neither a Catholic nor a pagan knows the very nature of God as it is in itself; but each one knows it according to some idea 7687 <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> Neither a Catholic nor a pagan knows the very nature of God as it is in itself; but each one knows it according to some idea
7688 of causality, or excellence, or remotion ( 7688 of causality, or excellence, or remotion (
7689 <a id="FP_Q13_A10-p12.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q12_A12.html">Q[12], A[12]</a>). So a pagan can take this name "God" in the same way when he says an idol is God, as the Catholic does in saying an idol 7689 <a href="#FP_Q12_A12" id="FP_Q13_A10-p12.1" shape="rect">Q[12], A[12]</a>). So a pagan can take this name "God" in the same way when he says an idol is God, as the Catholic does in saying an idol
7690 is not God. But if anyone should be quite ignorant of God altogether, he could not even name Him, unless, perhaps, as we use 7690 is not God. But if anyone should be quite ignorant of God altogether, he could not even name Him, unless, perhaps, as we use
7691 names the meaning of which we know not. 7691 names the meaning of which we know not.
7692 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 13 a. 10 ad 5"><a name="28876" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28876] Iª q. 13 a. 10 ad 5</span></a> Ad quintum 7692 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 13 a. 10 ad 5"><a name="28876" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28876] Iª q. 13 a. 10 ad 5</span></a> Ad quintum
7693 dicendum quod ipsam naturam Dei prout in se est, neque Catholicus 7693 dicendum quod ipsam naturam Dei prout in se est, neque Catholicus
7694 neque Paganus cognoscit, sed uterque cognoscit eam secundum aliquam 7694 neque Paganus cognoscit, sed uterque cognoscit eam secundum aliquam
7730 <i>sic dices eis, qui est misit me ad vos</i>. Ergo hoc nomen qui 7730 <i>sic dices eis, qui est misit me ad vos</i>. Ergo hoc nomen qui
7731 est est maxime proprium nomen Dei.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q13_A11-p6"> 7731 est est maxime proprium nomen Dei.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q13_A11-p6">
7732 <b>I answer that,</b> This name HE WHO IS is most properly applied to God, for three reasons: 7732 <b>I answer that,</b> This name HE WHO IS is most properly applied to God, for three reasons:
7733 </p><p id="FP_Q13_A11-p7"> First, because of its signification. For it does not signify form, but simply existence itself. Hence since the existence 7733 </p><p id="FP_Q13_A11-p7"> First, because of its signification. For it does not signify form, but simply existence itself. Hence since the existence
7734 of God is His essence itself, which can be said of no other ( 7734 of God is His essence itself, which can be said of no other (
7735 <a id="FP_Q13_A11-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q3_A4.html">Q[3], A[4]</a>), it is clear that among other names this one specially denominates God, for everything is denominated by its form. 7735 <a href="#FP_Q3_A4" id="FP_Q13_A11-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[3], A[4]</a>), it is clear that among other names this one specially denominates God, for everything is denominated by its form.
7736 </p><p id="FP_Q13_A11-p8"> Secondly, on account of its universality. For all other names are either less universal, or, if convertible with it, add 7736 </p><p id="FP_Q13_A11-p8"> Secondly, on account of its universality. For all other names are either less universal, or, if convertible with it, add
7737 something above it at least in idea; hence in a certain way they inform and determine it. Now our intellect cannot know the 7737 something above it at least in idea; hence in a certain way they inform and determine it. Now our intellect cannot know the
7738 essence of God itself in this life, as it is in itself, but whatever mode it applies in determining what it understands about 7738 essence of God itself in this life, as it is in itself, but whatever mode it applies in determining what it understands about
7739 God, it falls short of the mode of what God is in Himself. Therefore the less determinate the names are, and the 7739 God, it falls short of the mode of what God is in Himself. Therefore the less determinate the names are, and the
7740 more universal and absolute they are, the more properly they are applied to God. Hence Damascene says (De Fide Orth. i) that, 7740 more universal and absolute they are, the more properly they are applied to God. Hence Damascene says (De Fide Orth. i) that,
7814 ostensum est. Ergo non potest esse subiectum. Sed omne illud de quo 7814 ostensum est. Ergo non potest esse subiectum. Sed omne illud de quo
7815 propositio affirmativa formatur, accipitur ut subiectum. Ergo de 7815 propositio affirmativa formatur, accipitur ut subiectum. Ergo de
7816 Deo propositio affirmativa formari non potest.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q13_A12-p4"> 7816 Deo propositio affirmativa formari non potest.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q13_A12-p4">
7817 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, every intellect is false which understands a thing otherwise than as it is. But God has existence without any composition 7817 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, every intellect is false which understands a thing otherwise than as it is. But God has existence without any composition
7818 as shown above ( 7818 as shown above (
7819 <a id="FP_Q13_A12-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q3_A7.html">Q[3], A[7]</a>). Therefore since every affirmative intellect understands something as compound, it follows that a true affirmative proposition 7819 <a href="#FP_Q3_A7" id="FP_Q13_A12-p4.1" shape="rect">Q[3], A[7]</a>). Therefore since every affirmative intellect understands something as compound, it follows that a true affirmative proposition
7820 about God cannot be made. 7820 about God cannot be made.
7821 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 13 a. 12 arg. 3"><a name="28887" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28887] Iª q. 13 a. 12 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, 7821 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 13 a. 12 arg. 3"><a name="28887" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28887] Iª q. 13 a. 12 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
7822 omnis intellectus intelligens rem aliter quam sit, est falsus. Sed 7822 omnis intellectus intelligens rem aliter quam sit, est falsus. Sed
7823 Deus habet esse absque omni compositione, ut supra probatum est. 7823 Deus habet esse absque omni compositione, ut supra probatum est.
7824 Cum igitur omnis intellectus affirmativus intelligat aliquid cum 7824 Cum igitur omnis intellectus affirmativus intelligat aliquid cum
7972 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="28895" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28895] Iª q. 14 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, 7972 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="28895" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28895] Iª q. 14 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
7973 scientia, cum sit conclusionum, est quaedam cognitio ab alio 7973 scientia, cum sit conclusionum, est quaedam cognitio ab alio
7974 causata, scilicet ex cognitione principiorum. Sed nihil causatum 7974 causata, scilicet ex cognitione principiorum. Sed nihil causatum
7975 est in Deo. Ergo scientia non est in Deo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A1-p4"> 7975 est in Deo. Ergo scientia non est in Deo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A1-p4">
7976 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, all knowledge is universal, or particular. But in God there is no universal or particular ( 7976 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, all knowledge is universal, or particular. But in God there is no universal or particular (
7977 <a id="FP_Q14_A1-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q3_A5.html">Q[3], A[5]</a>). Therefore in God there is not knowledge. 7977 <a href="#FP_Q3_A5" id="FP_Q14_A1-p4.1" shape="rect">Q[3], A[5]</a>). Therefore in God there is not knowledge.
7978 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="28896" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28896] Iª q. 14 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, omnis 7978 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="28896" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28896] Iª q. 14 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, omnis
7979 scientia vel universalis vel particularis est. Sed in Deo non est 7979 scientia vel universalis vel particularis est. Sed in Deo non est
7980 universale et particulare, ut ex superioribus patet; ergo in Deo 7980 universale et particulare, ut ex superioribus patet; ergo in Deo
7981 non est scientia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A1-p5"> 7981 non est scientia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A1-p5">
7982 <b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle says, "O the depth of the riches of the wisdom and of the knowledge of God" ( 7982 <b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle says, "O the depth of the riches of the wisdom and of the knowledge of God" (
7988 non-intelligent beings in that the latter possess only their own form; whereas the intelligent being is naturally adapted 7988 non-intelligent beings in that the latter possess only their own form; whereas the intelligent being is naturally adapted
7989 to have also the form of some other thing; for the idea of the thing known is in the knower. Hence it is manifest that the 7989 to have also the form of some other thing; for the idea of the thing known is in the knower. Hence it is manifest that the
7990 nature of a non-intelligent being is more contracted and limited; whereas the nature of 7990 nature of a non-intelligent being is more contracted and limited; whereas the nature of
7991 intelligent beings has a greater amplitude and extension; therefore the Philosopher says (De Anima iii) that "the soul is 7991 intelligent beings has a greater amplitude and extension; therefore the Philosopher says (De Anima iii) that "the soul is
7992 in a sense all things." Now the contraction of the form comes from the matter. Hence, as we have said above ( 7992 in a sense all things." Now the contraction of the form comes from the matter. Hence, as we have said above (
7993 <a id="FP_Q14_A1-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q7_A1.html">Q[7], A[1]</a>) forms according as they are the more immaterial, approach more nearly to a kind of infinity. Therefore it is clear that 7993 <a href="#FP_Q7_A1" id="FP_Q14_A1-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[7], A[1]</a>) forms according as they are the more immaterial, approach more nearly to a kind of infinity. Therefore it is clear that
7994 the immateriality of a thing is the reason why it is cognitive; and according to the mode of immateriality is 7994 the immateriality of a thing is the reason why it is cognitive; and according to the mode of immateriality is
7995 the mode of knowledge. Hence it is said in De Anima ii that plants do not know, because they are wholly material. But sense 7995 the mode of knowledge. Hence it is said in De Anima ii that plants do not know, because they are wholly material. But sense
7996 is cognitive because it can receive images free from matter, and the intellect is still further cognitive, because it is more 7996 is cognitive because it can receive images free from matter, and the intellect is still further cognitive, because it is more
7997 separated from matter and unmixed, as said in De Anima iii. Since therefore God is in the highest degree of immateriality 7997 separated from matter and unmixed, as said in De Anima iii. Since therefore God is in the highest degree of immateriality
7998 as stated above ( 7998 as stated above (
7999 <a id="FP_Q14_A1-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q7_A1.html">Q[7], A[1]</a>), it follows that He occupies the highest place in knowledge. 7999 <a href="#FP_Q7_A1" id="FP_Q14_A1-p6.2" shape="rect">Q[7], A[1]</a>), it follows that He occupies the highest place in knowledge.
8000 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 1 co."><a name="28898" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28898] Iª q. 14 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum 8000 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 1 co."><a name="28898" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28898] Iª q. 14 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
8001 quod in Deo perfectissime est scientia. Ad cuius evidentiam, 8001 quod in Deo perfectissime est scientia. Ad cuius evidentiam,
8002 considerandum est quod cognoscentia a non cognoscentibus in hoc 8002 considerandum est quod cognoscentia a non cognoscentibus in hoc
8003 distinguuntur, quia non cognoscentia nihil habent nisi formam suam 8003 distinguuntur, quia non cognoscentia nihil habent nisi formam suam
8004 tantum; sed cognoscens natum est habere formam etiam rei alterius, 8004 tantum; sed cognoscens natum est habere formam etiam rei alterius,
8017 adhuc magis cognoscitivus, quia magis separatus est a materia et 8017 adhuc magis cognoscitivus, quia magis separatus est a materia et
8018 immixtus, ut dicitur in III de anima. Unde, cum Deus sit in summo 8018 immixtus, ut dicitur in III de anima. Unde, cum Deus sit in summo
8019 immaterialitatis, ut ex superioribus patet, sequitur quod ipse sit 8019 immaterialitatis, ut ex superioribus patet, sequitur quod ipse sit
8020 in summo cognitionis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A1-p7"> 8020 in summo cognitionis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A1-p7">
8021 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Because perfections flowing from God to creatures exist in a higher state in God Himself ( 8021 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Because perfections flowing from God to creatures exist in a higher state in God Himself (
8022 <a id="FP_Q14_A1-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q4_A2.html">Q[4], A[2]</a>), whenever a name taken from any created perfection is attributed to God, it must be separated in its signification from 8022 <a href="#FP_Q4_A2" id="FP_Q14_A1-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[4], A[2]</a>), whenever a name taken from any created perfection is attributed to God, it must be separated in its signification from
8023 anything that belongs to that imperfect mode proper to creatures. Hence knowledge is not a quality of God, nor a habit; but 8023 anything that belongs to that imperfect mode proper to creatures. Hence knowledge is not a quality of God, nor a habit; but
8024 substance and pure act. 8024 substance and pure act.
8025 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="28899" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28899] Iª q. 14 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo 8025 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="28899" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28899] Iª q. 14 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
8026 dicendum quod, quia perfectiones procedentes a Deo in creaturas, 8026 dicendum quod, quia perfectiones procedentes a Deo in creaturas,
8027 altiori modo sunt in Deo, ut supra dictum est, oportet quod, 8027 altiori modo sunt in Deo, ut supra dictum est, oportet quod,
8029 creaturae Deo attribuitur, secludatur ab eius significatione omne 8029 creaturae Deo attribuitur, secludatur ab eius significatione omne
8030 illud quod pertinet ad imperfectum modum qui competit creaturae. 8030 illud quod pertinet ad imperfectum modum qui competit creaturae.
8031 Unde scientia non est qualitas in Deo vel habitus, sed substantia 8031 Unde scientia non est qualitas in Deo vel habitus, sed substantia
8032 et actus purus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A1-p8"> 8032 et actus purus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A1-p8">
8033 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Whatever is divided and multiplied in creatures exists in God simply and unitedly ( 8033 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Whatever is divided and multiplied in creatures exists in God simply and unitedly (
8034 <a id="FP_Q14_A1-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q13_A4.html">Q[13], A[4]</a>). Now man has different kinds of knowledge, according to the different objects of His knowledge. He has "intelligence" as 8034 <a href="#FP_Q13_A4" id="FP_Q14_A1-p8.1" shape="rect">Q[13], A[4]</a>). Now man has different kinds of knowledge, according to the different objects of His knowledge. He has "intelligence" as
8035 regards the knowledge of principles; he has "science" as regards knowledge of conclusions; he has "wisdom," according as he 8035 regards the knowledge of principles; he has "science" as regards knowledge of conclusions; he has "wisdom," according as he
8036 knows the highest cause; he has "counsel" or "prudence," according as he knows what is to 8036 knows the highest cause; he has "counsel" or "prudence," according as he knows what is to
8037 be done. But God knows all these by one simple act of knowledge, as will be shown 8037 be done. But God knows all these by one simple act of knowledge, as will be shown
8038 <a id="FP_Q14_A1-p8.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q14_A7.html">(A[7])</a>. Hence the simple knowledge of God can be named by all these names; in such a way, however, that there must be removed from 8038 <a href="#FP_Q14_A7" id="FP_Q14_A1-p8.2" shape="rect">(A[7])</a>. Hence the simple knowledge of God can be named by all these names; in such a way, however, that there must be removed from
8039 each of them, so far as they enter into divine predication, everything that savors of imperfection; and everything that expresses 8039 each of them, so far as they enter into divine predication, everything that savors of imperfection; and everything that expresses
8040 perfection is to be retained in them. Hence it is said, "With Him is wisdom and strength, He hath counsel and understanding" 8040 perfection is to be retained in them. Hence it is said, "With Him is wisdom and strength, He hath counsel and understanding"
8041 ( 8041 (
8042 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q14_A1-p8.3" href="./asv.html#Job.12.13" target="asv">Job 12:13</a>). 8042 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q14_A1-p8.3" href="./asv.html#Job.12.13" target="asv">Job 12:13</a>).
8043 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="28900" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28900] Iª q. 14 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum 8043 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="28900" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28900] Iª q. 14 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
8204 comprehendit se, finitum est sibi. Sed Deus est omnibus modis 8204 comprehendit se, finitum est sibi. Sed Deus est omnibus modis
8205 infinitus. Ergo non comprehendit se.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A3-p3"> 8205 infinitus. Ergo non comprehendit se.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A3-p3">
8206 <b>Objection 2:</b> If it is said that God is infinite to us, and finite to Himself, it can be urged to the contrary, that everything in God 8206 <b>Objection 2:</b> If it is said that God is infinite to us, and finite to Himself, it can be urged to the contrary, that everything in God
8207 is truer than it is in us. If therefore God is finite to Himself, but infinite to us, then God is more truly finite than infinite; 8207 is truer than it is in us. If therefore God is finite to Himself, but infinite to us, then God is more truly finite than infinite;
8208 which is against what was laid down above ( 8208 which is against what was laid down above (
8209 <a id="FP_Q14_A3-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q7_A1.html">Q[7], A[1]</a>). Therefore God does not comprehend Himself. 8209 <a href="#FP_Q7_A1" id="FP_Q14_A3-p3.1" shape="rect">Q[7], A[1]</a>). Therefore God does not comprehend Himself.
8210 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="28911" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28911] Iª q. 14 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Si dicatur quod 8210 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="28911" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28911] Iª q. 14 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Si dicatur quod
8211 Deus infinitus est nobis, sed sibi finitus, contra, verius est 8211 Deus infinitus est nobis, sed sibi finitus, contra, verius est
8212 unumquodque secundum quod est apud Deum, quam secundum quod est 8212 unumquodque secundum quod est apud Deum, quam secundum quod est
8213 apud nos. Si igitur Deus sibi ipsi est finitus, nobis autem 8213 apud nos. Si igitur Deus sibi ipsi est finitus, nobis autem
8214 infinitus, verius est Deum esse finitum, quam infinitum. Quod est 8214 infinitus, verius est Deum esse finitum, quam infinitum. Quod est
8225 manifest that God knows Himself as perfectly as He is perfectly knowable. For everything 8225 manifest that God knows Himself as perfectly as He is perfectly knowable. For everything
8226 is knowable according to the mode of its own actuality; since a thing is not known according as it is in potentiality, but 8226 is knowable according to the mode of its own actuality; since a thing is not known according as it is in potentiality, but
8227 in so far as it is in actuality, as said in Metaph. ix. Now the power of God in knowing is as great as His actuality in existing; 8227 in so far as it is in actuality, as said in Metaph. ix. Now the power of God in knowing is as great as His actuality in existing;
8228 because it is from the fact that He is in act and free from all matter and potentiality, that God is cognitive, as shown above 8228 because it is from the fact that He is in act and free from all matter and potentiality, that God is cognitive, as shown above
8229 ( 8229 (
8230 <a id="FP_Q14_A3-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q14_A1.html">AA[1]</a>,2). Whence it is manifest that He knows Himself as much as He is knowable; and for that 8230 <a href="#FP_Q14_A1" id="FP_Q14_A3-p5.1" shape="rect">AA[1]</a>,2). Whence it is manifest that He knows Himself as much as He is knowable; and for that
8231 reason He perfectly comprehends Himself. 8231 reason He perfectly comprehends Himself.
8232 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 3 co."><a name="28913" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28913] Iª q. 14 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum 8232 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 3 co."><a name="28913" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28913] Iª q. 14 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
8233 quod Deus perfecte comprehendit seipsum. Quod sic patet. Tunc enim 8233 quod Deus perfecte comprehendit seipsum. Quod sic patet. Tunc enim
8234 dicitur aliquid comprehendi, quando pervenitur ad finem cognitionis 8234 dicitur aliquid comprehendi, quando pervenitur ad finem cognitionis
8235 ipsius, et hoc est quando res cognoscitur ita perfecte, sicut 8235 ipsius, et hoc est quando res cognoscitur ita perfecte, sicut
8296 si ipsemet non est aliud quam suum intelligere, intelligit se 8296 si ipsemet non est aliud quam suum intelligere, intelligit se
8297 intelligere, et intelligere se intelligere se, et sic in infinitum. 8297 intelligere, et intelligere se intelligere se, et sic in infinitum.
8298 Non ergo ipsum intelligere Dei est eius substantia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A4-p5"> 8298 Non ergo ipsum intelligere Dei est eius substantia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A4-p5">
8299 <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Trin. vii), "In God to be is the same as to be wise." But to be wise is the same thing as to understand. 8299 <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Trin. vii), "In God to be is the same as to be wise." But to be wise is the same thing as to understand.
8300 Therefore in God to be is the same thing as to understand. But God's existence is His substance, as shown above ( 8300 Therefore in God to be is the same thing as to understand. But God's existence is His substance, as shown above (
8301 <a id="FP_Q14_A4-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q3_A4.html">Q[3], A[4]</a>). Therefore the act of God's intellect is His substance. 8301 <a href="#FP_Q3_A4" id="FP_Q14_A4-p5.1" shape="rect">Q[3], A[4]</a>). Therefore the act of God's intellect is His substance.
8302 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 4 s. c."><a name="28919" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28919] Iª q. 14 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est 8302 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 4 s. c."><a name="28919" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28919] Iª q. 14 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
8303 quod dicit Augustinus, Lib. VII de Trin., <i>Deo hoc est esse, quod 8303 quod dicit Augustinus, Lib. VII de Trin., <i>Deo hoc est esse, quod
8304 sapientem esse</i>. Hoc autem est sapientem esse, quod intelligere. 8304 sapientem esse</i>. Hoc autem est sapientem esse, quod intelligere.
8305 Ergo Deo hoc est esse, quod intelligere. Sed esse Dei est eius 8305 Ergo Deo hoc est esse, quod intelligere. Sed esse Dei est eius
8306 substantia, ut supra ostensum est. Ergo intelligere Dei est eius 8306 substantia, ut supra ostensum est. Ergo intelligere Dei est eius
8308 <b>I answer that,</b> It must be said that the act of God's intellect is His substance. For if His act of understanding were other than His substance, 8308 <b>I answer that,</b> It must be said that the act of God's intellect is His substance. For if His act of understanding were other than His substance,
8309 then something else, as the Philosopher says (Metaph. xii), would be the act and perfection of the divine substance, to which 8309 then something else, as the Philosopher says (Metaph. xii), would be the act and perfection of the divine substance, to which
8310 the divine substance would be related, as potentiality is to act, which is altogether impossible; because the act of understanding 8310 the divine substance would be related, as potentiality is to act, which is altogether impossible; because the act of understanding
8311 is the perfection and act of the one understanding. Let us now consider how 8311 is the perfection and act of the one understanding. Let us now consider how
8312 this is. As was laid down above 8312 this is. As was laid down above
8313 <a id="FP_Q14_A4-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q14_A2.html">(A[2])</a>, to understand is not an act passing to anything extrinsic; for it remains in the operator as his own act and perfection; 8313 <a href="#FP_Q14_A2" id="FP_Q14_A4-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[2])</a>, to understand is not an act passing to anything extrinsic; for it remains in the operator as his own act and perfection;
8314 as existence is the perfection of the one existing: just as existence follows on the form, so in like manner to understand 8314 as existence is the perfection of the one existing: just as existence follows on the form, so in like manner to understand
8315 follows on the intelligible species. Now in God there is no form which is something other than His existence, as shown above 8315 follows on the intelligible species. Now in God there is no form which is something other than His existence, as shown above
8316 8316
8317 <a id="FP_Q14_A4-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q3.html">(Q[3])</a>. Hence as His essence itself is also 8317 <a href="#FP_Q3" id="FP_Q14_A4-p6.2" shape="rect">(Q[3])</a>. Hence as His essence itself is also
8318 His intelligible species, it necessarily follows that His act of understanding must be His essence and His existence. 8318 His intelligible species, it necessarily follows that His act of understanding must be His essence and His existence.
8319 </p><p id="FP_Q14_A4-p7"> Thus it follows from all the foregoing that in God, intellect, and the object understood, and the intelligible species, and 8319 </p><p id="FP_Q14_A4-p7"> Thus it follows from all the foregoing that in God, intellect, and the object understood, and the intelligible species, and
8320 His act of understanding are entirely one and the same. Hence when God is said to be understanding, no kind of multiplicity 8320 His act of understanding are entirely one and the same. Hence when God is said to be understanding, no kind of multiplicity
8321 is attached to His substance. 8321 is attached to His substance.
8322 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 4 co."><a name="28920" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28920] Iª q. 14 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum 8322 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 4 co."><a name="28920" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28920] Iª q. 14 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
8389 <b>I answer that,</b> God necessarily knows things other than Himself. For it is manifest that He perfectly understands Himself; otherwise His 8389 <b>I answer that,</b> God necessarily knows things other than Himself. For it is manifest that He perfectly understands Himself; otherwise His
8390 existence would not be perfect, since His existence is His act of understanding. Now if anything is perfectly known, it follows 8390 existence would not be perfect, since His existence is His act of understanding. Now if anything is perfectly known, it follows
8391 of necessity that its power is perfectly known. But the power of anything can be perfectly known only by knowing to what its 8391 of necessity that its power is perfectly known. But the power of anything can be perfectly known only by knowing to what its
8392 power extends. Since therefore the divine power extends to other things by the very fact 8392 power extends. Since therefore the divine power extends to other things by the very fact
8393 that it is the first effective cause of all things, as is clear from the aforesaid ( 8393 that it is the first effective cause of all things, as is clear from the aforesaid (
8394 <a id="FP_Q14_A5-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q2_A3.html">Q[2], A[3]</a>), God must necessarily know things other than Himself. And this appears still more plainly if we add that the every existence 8394 <a href="#FP_Q2_A3" id="FP_Q14_A5-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[2], A[3]</a>), God must necessarily know things other than Himself. And this appears still more plainly if we add that the every existence
8395 of the first effective cause---viz. God---is His own act of understanding. Hence whatever effects pre-exist in God, as in 8395 of the first effective cause---viz. God---is His own act of understanding. Hence whatever effects pre-exist in God, as in
8396 the first cause, must be in His act of understanding, and all things must be in Him according to an intelligible mode: for 8396 the first cause, must be in His act of understanding, and all things must be in Him according to an intelligible mode: for
8397 everything which is in another, is in it according to the mode of that in which it is. 8397 everything which is in another, is in it according to the mode of that in which it is.
8398 </p><p id="FP_Q14_A5-p7"> Now in order to know how God knows things other than Himself, we must consider that a thing is known in two ways: in itself, 8398 </p><p id="FP_Q14_A5-p7"> Now in order to know how God knows things other than Himself, we must consider that a thing is known in two ways: in itself,
8399 and in another. A thing is known in itself when it is known by the proper species adequate to the knowable object; as when 8399 and in another. A thing is known in itself when it is known by the proper species adequate to the knowable object; as when
8470 est species principalis intellecti, quae in Deo nihil est aliud 8470 est species principalis intellecti, quae in Deo nihil est aliud
8471 quam essentia sua, in qua omnes species rerum comprehenduntur. Unde 8471 quam essentia sua, in qua omnes species rerum comprehenduntur. Unde
8472 non oportet quod ipsum intelligere divinum, vel potius ipse Deus, 8472 non oportet quod ipsum intelligere divinum, vel potius ipse Deus,
8473 specificetur per aliud quam per essentiam divinam.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q14_A6" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q14_A6-p0.1">Q. 14. A. 6. Whether God knows things other than Himself by proper knowledge?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A6-p2"> 8473 specificetur per aliud quam per essentiam divinam.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q14_A6" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q14_A6-p0.1">Q. 14. A. 6. Whether God knows things other than Himself by proper knowledge?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A6-p2">
8474 <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God does not know things other than Himself by proper knowledge. For, as was shown 8474 <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God does not know things other than Himself by proper knowledge. For, as was shown
8475 <a id="FP_Q14_A6-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q14_A5.html">(A[5])</a>, God knows things other than Himself, according as they are in Himself. But other things are in Him as in their common and 8475 <a href="#FP_Q14_A5" id="FP_Q14_A6-p2.1" shape="rect">(A[5])</a>, God knows things other than Himself, according as they are in Himself. But other things are in Him as in their common and
8476 universal cause, and are known by God as in their first and universal cause. This is to know them by general, and not by proper 8476 universal cause, and are known by God as in their first and universal cause. This is to know them by general, and not by proper
8477 knowledge. Therefore God knows things besides Himself by general, and not by proper 8477 knowledge. Therefore God knows things besides Himself by general, and not by proper
8478 knowledge. 8478 knowledge.
8479 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 6 arg. 1"><a name="28932" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28932] Iª q. 14 a. 6 arg. 1</span></a> Ad sextum sic 8479 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 6 arg. 1"><a name="28932" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28932] Iª q. 14 a. 6 arg. 1</span></a> Ad sextum sic
8480 proceditur. Videtur quod Deus non cognoscat alia a se propria 8480 proceditur. Videtur quod Deus non cognoscat alia a se propria
8529 when it is reduced from potentiality to act, acquires first a universal and confused knowledge of things, before it knows 8529 when it is reduced from potentiality to act, acquires first a universal and confused knowledge of things, before it knows
8530 them in particular; as proceeding from the imperfect to the perfect, as is clear from Phys. i. If therefore the knowledge 8530 them in particular; as proceeding from the imperfect to the perfect, as is clear from Phys. i. If therefore the knowledge
8531 of God regarding things other than Himself is only universal and not special, it would follow that His 8531 of God regarding things other than Himself is only universal and not special, it would follow that His
8532 understanding would not be absolutely perfect; therefore neither would His being be perfect; and this is against what was 8532 understanding would not be absolutely perfect; therefore neither would His being be perfect; and this is against what was
8533 said above ( 8533 said above (
8534 <a id="FP_Q14_A6-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q4_A1.html">Q[4], A[1]</a>). We must therefore hold that God knows things other than Himself with a proper knowledge; not only in so far as being is 8534 <a href="#FP_Q4_A1" id="FP_Q14_A6-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[4], A[1]</a>). We must therefore hold that God knows things other than Himself with a proper knowledge; not only in so far as being is
8535 common to them, but in so far as one is distinguished from the other. In proof thereof we may observe that some wishing to 8535 common to them, but in so far as one is distinguished from the other. In proof thereof we may observe that some wishing to
8536 show that God knows many things by one, bring forward some examples, as, for 8536 show that God knows many things by one, bring forward some examples, as, for
8537 instance, that if the centre knew itself, it would know all lines that proceed from the centre; or if light knew itself, it 8537 instance, that if the centre knew itself, it would know all lines that proceed from the centre; or if light knew itself, it
8538 would know all colors. 8538 would know all colors.
8539 </p><p id="FP_Q14_A6-p8"> Now these examples although they are similar in part, namely, as regards universal causality, nevertheless they fail in this 8539 </p><p id="FP_Q14_A6-p8"> Now these examples although they are similar in part, namely, as regards universal causality, nevertheless they fail in this
8541 of distinction, but only as regards that in which they communicate. For the diversity of colors is not caused by the light 8541 of distinction, but only as regards that in which they communicate. For the diversity of colors is not caused by the light
8542 only, but by the different disposition of the diaphanous medium which receives it; and likewise, the diversity 8542 only, but by the different disposition of the diaphanous medium which receives it; and likewise, the diversity
8543 of the lines is caused by their different position. Hence it is that this kind of diversity and multitude cannot be known 8543 of the lines is caused by their different position. Hence it is that this kind of diversity and multitude cannot be known
8544 in its principle by proper knowledge, but only in a general way. In God, however, it is otherwise. For it was shown above 8544 in its principle by proper knowledge, but only in a general way. In God, however, it is otherwise. For it was shown above
8545 ( 8545 (
8546 <a id="FP_Q14_A6-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q4_A2.html">Q[4], A[2]</a>) that whatever perfection exists in any creature, wholly pre-exists and is contained in God in an excelling manner. Now not 8546 <a href="#FP_Q4_A2" id="FP_Q14_A6-p8.1" shape="rect">Q[4], A[2]</a>) that whatever perfection exists in any creature, wholly pre-exists and is contained in God in an excelling manner. Now not
8547 only what is common to creatures--viz. being---belongs to their perfection, but also what makes 8547 only what is common to creatures--viz. being---belongs to their perfection, but also what makes
8548 them distinguished from each other; as living and understanding, and the like, whereby living beings are distinguished from 8548 them distinguished from each other; as living and understanding, and the like, whereby living beings are distinguished from
8549 the non-living, and the intelligent from the non-intelligent. Likewise every form whereby each thing is constituted in its 8549 the non-living, and the intelligent from the non-intelligent. Likewise every form whereby each thing is constituted in its
8550 own species, is a perfection; and thus all things pre-exist in God, not only as regards what is common to all, but also as 8550 own species, is a perfection; and thus all things pre-exist in God, not only as regards what is common to all, but also as
8551 regards what distinguishes one thing from another. And therefore as God contains all perfections in Himself, the essence of 8551 regards what distinguishes one thing from another. And therefore as God contains all perfections in Himself, the essence of
8947 omnis scientia vel est causa sciti, vel causatur ab eo. Sed 8947 omnis scientia vel est causa sciti, vel causatur ab eo. Sed
8948 scientia Dei non est causa mali, nec causatur a malo. Ergo scientia 8948 scientia Dei non est causa mali, nec causatur a malo. Ergo scientia
8949 Dei non est malorum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A10-p4"> 8949 Dei non est malorum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A10-p4">
8950 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, everything known is known either by its likeness, or by its opposite. But whatever God knows, He knows through His 8950 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, everything known is known either by its likeness, or by its opposite. But whatever God knows, He knows through His
8951 essence, as is clear from the foregoing 8951 essence, as is clear from the foregoing
8952 <a id="FP_Q14_A10-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q14_A5.html">(A[5])</a>. Now the divine essence neither is the likeness of evil, nor is evil contrary to it; for to the divine essence there is no 8952 <a href="#FP_Q14_A5" id="FP_Q14_A10-p4.1" shape="rect">(A[5])</a>. Now the divine essence neither is the likeness of evil, nor is evil contrary to it; for to the divine essence there is no
8953 contrary, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xii). Therefore God does not know evil things. 8953 contrary, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xii). Therefore God does not know evil things.
8954 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 10 arg. 3"><a name="28966" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28966] Iª q. 14 a. 10 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, omne 8954 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 10 arg. 3"><a name="28966" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28966] Iª q. 14 a. 10 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, omne
8955 quod cognoscitur, cognoscitur per suam similitudinem, vel per suum 8955 quod cognoscitur, cognoscitur per suam similitudinem, vel per suum
8956 oppositum. Quidquid autem cognoscit Deus, cognoscit per suam 8956 oppositum. Quidquid autem cognoscit Deus, cognoscit per suam
8957 essentiam, ut ex dictis patet. Divina autem essentia neque est 8957 essentiam, ut ex dictis patet. Divina autem essentia neque est
9058 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 11 s. c."><a name="28977" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28977] Iª q. 14 a. 11 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est 9058 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 11 s. c."><a name="28977" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28977] Iª q. 14 a. 11 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
9059 quod dicitur, Proverb. XVI, <i>omnes viae hominum patent oculis 9059 quod dicitur, Proverb. XVI, <i>omnes viae hominum patent oculis
9060 eius</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q14_A11-p6"> 9060 eius</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q14_A11-p6">
9061 <b>I answer that,</b> God knows singular things. For all perfections found in creatures pre-exist in God in a higher way, as is clear from the 9061 <b>I answer that,</b> God knows singular things. For all perfections found in creatures pre-exist in God in a higher way, as is clear from the
9062 foregoing ( 9062 foregoing (
9063 <a id="FP_Q14_A11-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q4_A2.html">Q[4], A[2]</a>). Now to know singular things is part of our perfection. Hence God must know singular things. Even the Philosopher considers 9063 <a href="#FP_Q4_A2" id="FP_Q14_A11-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[4], A[2]</a>). Now to know singular things is part of our perfection. Hence God must know singular things. Even the Philosopher considers
9064 it incongruous that anything known by us should be unknown to God; and thus against Empedocles he argues (De Anima i and Metaph. 9064 it incongruous that anything known by us should be unknown to God; and thus against Empedocles he argues (De Anima i and Metaph.
9065 iii) that God would be most ignorant if 9065 iii) that God would be most ignorant if
9066 He did not know discord. Now the perfections which are divided among inferior beings, exist simply and unitedly in God; hence, 9066 He did not know discord. Now the perfections which are divided among inferior beings, exist simply and unitedly in God; hence,
9067 although by one faculty we know the universal and immaterial, and by another we know singular and material things, nevertheless 9067 although by one faculty we know the universal and immaterial, and by another we know singular and material things, nevertheless
9068 God knows both by His simple intellect. 9068 God knows both by His simple intellect.
9075 man. Hence according to the aforesaid mode, God would not know 9075 man. Hence according to the aforesaid mode, God would not know
9076 </p><p id="FP_Q14_A11-p8"> singular things in their singularity.</p><p id="FP_Q14_A11-p9"> On the other hand, others have said that God knows singular things by the application of universal causes to particular effects. 9076 </p><p id="FP_Q14_A11-p8"> singular things in their singularity.</p><p id="FP_Q14_A11-p9"> On the other hand, others have said that God knows singular things by the application of universal causes to particular effects.
9077 But this will not hold; forasmuch as no one can apply a thing to another unless he first knows that thing; hence the said 9077 But this will not hold; forasmuch as no one can apply a thing to another unless he first knows that thing; hence the said
9078 application cannot be the reason of knowing the particular, for it presupposes the knowledge of singular things. 9078 application cannot be the reason of knowing the particular, for it presupposes the knowledge of singular things.
9079 </p><p id="FP_Q14_A11-p10"> Therefore it must be said otherwise, that, since God is the cause of things by His knowledge, as stated above 9079 </p><p id="FP_Q14_A11-p10"> Therefore it must be said otherwise, that, since God is the cause of things by His knowledge, as stated above
9080 <a id="FP_Q14_A11-p10.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q14_A8.html">(A[8])</a>, His knowledge extends as far as His causality extends. Hence as the active power of God extends not only to forms, which 9080 <a href="#FP_Q14_A8" id="FP_Q14_A11-p10.1" shape="rect">(A[8])</a>, His knowledge extends as far as His causality extends. Hence as the active power of God extends not only to forms, which
9081 are the source of universality, but also to matter, as we shall prove further on ( 9081 are the source of universality, but also to matter, as we shall prove further on (
9082 <a id="FP_Q14_A11-p10.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q44_A2.html">Q[44], A[2]</a>), the knowledge of God must extend to singular things, which are individualized by matter. For since 9082 <a href="FP_iv.html#FP_Q44_A2" id="FP_Q14_A11-p10.2" shape="rect">Q[44], A[2]</a>), the knowledge of God must extend to singular things, which are individualized by matter. For since
9083 He knows things other than Himself by His essence, as being the likeness of things, or as their active principle, His essence 9083 He knows things other than Himself by His essence, as being the likeness of things, or as their active principle, His essence
9084 must be the sufficing principle of knowing all things made by Him, not only in the universal, but also in the singular. The 9084 must be the sufficing principle of knowing all things made by Him, not only in the universal, but also in the singular. The
9085 same would apply to the knowledge of the artificer, if it were productive of the whole thing, and not only of the form. 9085 same would apply to the knowledge of the artificer, if it were productive of the whole thing, and not only of the form.
9086 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 11 co."><a name="28978" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28978] Iª q. 14 a. 11 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum 9086 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 11 co."><a name="28978" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28978] Iª q. 14 a. 11 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
9087 quod Deus cognoscit singularia. Omnes enim perfectiones in 9087 quod Deus cognoscit singularia. Omnes enim perfectiones in
9191 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 12 s. c."><a name="28985" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28985] Iª q. 14 a. 12 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est 9191 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 12 s. c."><a name="28985" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28985] Iª q. 14 a. 12 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
9192 quod dicit Augustinus, XII de Civ. Dei, <i>quamvis infinitorum 9192 quod dicit Augustinus, XII de Civ. Dei, <i>quamvis infinitorum
9193 numerorum nullus sit numerus, non est tamen incomprehensibilis ei, 9193 numerorum nullus sit numerus, non est tamen incomprehensibilis ei,
9194 cuius scientiae non est numerus</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q14_A12-p6"> 9194 cuius scientiae non est numerus</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q14_A12-p6">
9195 <b>I answer that,</b> Since God knows not only things actual but also things possible to Himself or to created things, as shown above 9195 <b>I answer that,</b> Since God knows not only things actual but also things possible to Himself or to created things, as shown above
9196 <a id="FP_Q14_A12-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q14_A9.html">(A[9])</a>, and as these must be infinite, it must be held that He knows infinite things. Although the knowledge of vision which has 9196 <a href="#FP_Q14_A9" id="FP_Q14_A12-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[9])</a>, and as these must be infinite, it must be held that He knows infinite things. Although the knowledge of vision which has
9197 relation only to things that are, or will be, or were, is not of infinite things, as some say, for we do not say that the 9197 relation only to things that are, or will be, or were, is not of infinite things, as some say, for we do not say that the
9198 world is eternal, nor that generation and movement will go on for ever, so 9198 world is eternal, nor that generation and movement will go on for ever, so
9199 that individuals be infinitely multiplied; yet, if we consider more attentively, we must hold that God knows infinite things 9199 that individuals be infinitely multiplied; yet, if we consider more attentively, we must hold that God knows infinite things
9200 even by the knowledge of vision. For God knows even the thoughts and affections of hearts, which will be multiplied to infinity 9200 even by the knowledge of vision. For God knows even the thoughts and affections of hearts, which will be multiplied to infinity
9201 as rational creatures go on for ever. 9201 as rational creatures go on for ever.
9242 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The idea of the infinite pertains to quantity, as the Philosopher says (Phys. i). But the idea of quantity implies the order 9242 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The idea of the infinite pertains to quantity, as the Philosopher says (Phys. i). But the idea of quantity implies the order
9243 of parts. Therefore to know the infinite according to the mode of the infinite is to know part after part; and in this way 9243 of parts. Therefore to know the infinite according to the mode of the infinite is to know part after part; and in this way
9244 the infinite cannot be known; for whatever quantity of parts be taken, there will always remain something else outside. But 9244 the infinite cannot be known; for whatever quantity of parts be taken, there will always remain something else outside. But
9245 God does not know the infinite or infinite things, as if He enumerated part after 9245 God does not know the infinite or infinite things, as if He enumerated part after
9246 part; since He knows all things simultaneously, and not successively, as said above 9246 part; since He knows all things simultaneously, and not successively, as said above
9247 <a id="FP_Q14_A12-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q14_A7.html">(A[7])</a>. Hence there is nothing to prevent Him from knowing infinite things. 9247 <a href="#FP_Q14_A7" id="FP_Q14_A12-p8.1" shape="rect">(A[7])</a>. Hence there is nothing to prevent Him from knowing infinite things.
9248 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 12 ad 1"><a name="28987" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28987] Iª q. 14 a. 12 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo 9248 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 12 ad 1"><a name="28987" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28987] Iª q. 14 a. 12 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
9249 dicendum quod <i>infiniti ratio congruit quantitati</i>, secundum 9249 dicendum quod <i>infiniti ratio congruit quantitati</i>, secundum
9250 philosophum in I Physic. De ratione autem quantitatis est ordo 9250 philosophum in I Physic. De ratione autem quantitatis est ordo
9251 partium. Cognoscere ergo infinitum secundum modum infiniti, est 9251 partium. Cognoscere ergo infinitum secundum modum infiniti, est
9252 cognoscere partem post partem. Et sic nullo modo contingit cognosci 9252 cognoscere partem post partem. Et sic nullo modo contingit cognosci
9287 dixerunt, tamen manifestum est quod haberent esse determinatum et 9287 dixerunt, tamen manifestum est quod haberent esse determinatum et
9288 finitum, quia esse eorum esset limitatum ad aliquas determinatas 9288 finitum, quia esse eorum esset limitatum ad aliquas determinatas
9289 naturas. Unde mensurabilia essent secundum scientiam Dei.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q14_A13" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q14_A13-p0.1">Q. 14. A. 13. Whether the knowledge of God is of future contingent things?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A13-p2"> 9289 naturas. Unde mensurabilia essent secundum scientiam Dei.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q14_A13" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q14_A13-p0.1">Q. 14. A. 13. Whether the knowledge of God is of future contingent things?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A13-p2">
9290 <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the knowledge of God is not of future contingent things. For from a necessary cause proceeds a necessary effect. 9290 <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the knowledge of God is not of future contingent things. For from a necessary cause proceeds a necessary effect.
9291 But the knowledge of God is the cause of things known, as said above 9291 But the knowledge of God is the cause of things known, as said above
9292 <a id="FP_Q14_A13-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q14_A8.html">(A[8])</a>. Since therefore that knowledge is necessary, what He knows must also be necessary. Therefore the knowledge of God is not 9292 <a href="#FP_Q14_A8" id="FP_Q14_A13-p2.1" shape="rect">(A[8])</a>. Since therefore that knowledge is necessary, what He knows must also be necessary. Therefore the knowledge of God is not
9293 of contingent things. 9293 of contingent things.
9294 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 13 arg. 1"><a name="28990" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28990] Iª q. 14 a. 13 arg. 1</span></a> Ad 9294 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 13 arg. 1"><a name="28990" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28990] Iª q. 14 a. 13 arg. 1</span></a> Ad
9295 decimumtertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod scientia Dei non sit 9295 decimumtertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod scientia Dei non sit
9296 futurorum contingentium. A causa enim necessaria procedit effectus 9296 futurorum contingentium. A causa enim necessaria procedit effectus
9297 necessarius. Sed scientia Dei est causa scitorum, ut supra dictum 9297 necessarius. Sed scientia Dei est causa scitorum, ut supra dictum
9330 quod dicitur in Psalmo XXXII, <i>qui finxit singillatim corda 9330 quod dicitur in Psalmo XXXII, <i>qui finxit singillatim corda
9331 eorum, qui intelligit omnia opera eorum</i>, scilicet hominum. Sed 9331 eorum, qui intelligit omnia opera eorum</i>, scilicet hominum. Sed
9332 opera hominum sunt contingentia, utpote libero arbitrio subiecta. 9332 opera hominum sunt contingentia, utpote libero arbitrio subiecta.
9333 Ergo Deus scit futura contingentia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q14_A13-p6"> 9333 Ergo Deus scit futura contingentia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q14_A13-p6">
9334 <b>I answer that,</b> Since as was shown above 9334 <b>I answer that,</b> Since as was shown above
9335 <a id="FP_Q14_A13-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q14_A9.html">(A[9])</a>, God knows all things; not only things actual but also things possible to Him and creature; and since some of these are future 9335 <a href="#FP_Q14_A9" id="FP_Q14_A13-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[9])</a>, God knows all things; not only things actual but also things possible to Him and creature; and since some of these are future
9336 contingent to us, it follows that God knows future contingent things. 9336 contingent to us, it follows that God knows future contingent things.
9337 </p><p id="FP_Q14_A13-p7"> In evidence of this, we must consider that a contingent thing can be considered in two ways; first, in itself, in so far 9337 </p><p id="FP_Q14_A13-p7"> In evidence of this, we must consider that a contingent thing can be considered in two ways; first, in itself, in so far
9338 as it is now in act: and in this sense it is not considered as future, but as present; neither is it considered as contingent 9338 as it is now in act: and in this sense it is not considered as future, but as present; neither is it considered as contingent
9339 (as having reference) to one of two terms, but as determined to one; and on account of this it can be infallibly the object 9339 (as having reference) to one of two terms, but as determined to one; and on account of this it can be infallibly the object
9340 of certain knowledge, for instance to the sense of sight, as when I see that Socrates is sitting down. In 9340 of certain knowledge, for instance to the sense of sight, as when I see that Socrates is sitting down. In
9345 as 9345 as
9346 each one of them is actually in itself. And although contingent things become actual successively, nevertheless God knows 9346 each one of them is actually in itself. And although contingent things become actual successively, nevertheless God knows
9347 contingent things not successively, as they are in their own being, as we do but simultaneously. The reason is because His 9347 contingent things not successively, as they are in their own being, as we do but simultaneously. The reason is because His
9348 knowledge is measured by eternity, as is also His being; and eternity being simultaneously whole comprises all time, as said 9348 knowledge is measured by eternity, as is also His being; and eternity being simultaneously whole comprises all time, as said
9349 above ( 9349 above (
9350 <a id="FP_Q14_A13-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q10_A2.html">Q[10], A[2]</a> ). Hence all things that are in time are present to God from eternity, not only 9350 <a href="#FP_Q10_A2" id="FP_Q14_A13-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[10], A[2]</a> ). Hence all things that are in time are present to God from eternity, not only
9351 because He has the types of things present within Him, as some say; but because His glance is carried from eternity over all 9351 because He has the types of things present within Him, as some say; but because His glance is carried from eternity over all
9352 things as they are in their presentiality. Hence it is manifest that contingent things are infallibly known by God, inasmuch 9352 things as they are in their presentiality. Hence it is manifest that contingent things are infallibly known by God, inasmuch
9353 as they are subject to the divine sight in their presentiality; yet they are future contingent things in relation to their 9353 as they are subject to the divine sight in their presentiality; yet they are future contingent things in relation to their
9354 own causes. 9354 own causes.
9355 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 13 co."><a name="28994" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28994] Iª q. 14 a. 13 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum 9355 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 13 co."><a name="28994" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28994] Iª q. 14 a. 13 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
9521 quod dicitur in Psalmo XCIII, <i>dominus scit cogitationes 9521 quod dicitur in Psalmo XCIII, <i>dominus scit cogitationes
9522 hominum</i>. Sed enuntiabilia continentur in cogitationibus 9522 hominum</i>. Sed enuntiabilia continentur in cogitationibus
9523 hominum. Ergo Deus cognoscit enuntiabilia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q14_A14-p5"> 9523 hominum. Ergo Deus cognoscit enuntiabilia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q14_A14-p5">
9524 <b>I answer that,</b> Since it is in the power of our intellect to form enunciations, and since God knows whatever is in His own power or in that 9524 <b>I answer that,</b> Since it is in the power of our intellect to form enunciations, and since God knows whatever is in His own power or in that
9525 of creatures, as said above 9525 of creatures, as said above
9526 <a id="FP_Q14_A14-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q14_A9.html">(A[9])</a>, it follows of necessity that God knows all enunciations that can be formed. 9526 <a href="#FP_Q14_A9" id="FP_Q14_A14-p5.1" shape="rect">(A[9])</a>, it follows of necessity that God knows all enunciations that can be formed.
9527 </p><p id="FP_Q14_A14-p6"> Now just as He knows material things immaterially, and composite things simply, so likewise He knows enunciable things not 9527 </p><p id="FP_Q14_A14-p6"> Now just as He knows material things immaterially, and composite things simply, so likewise He knows enunciable things not
9528 after the manner of enunciable things, as if in His intellect there were composition or division of enunciations; for He knows 9528 after the manner of enunciable things, as if in His intellect there were composition or division of enunciations; for He knows
9529 each thing by simple intelligence, by understanding the essence of each thing; as if we by the very fact that we understand 9529 each thing by simple intelligence, by understanding the essence of each thing; as if we by the very fact that we understand
9530 what man is, were to understand all that can be predicated of man. This, however, does not happen in our 9530 what man is, were to understand all that can be predicated of man. This, however, does not happen in our
9531 intellect, which discourses from one thing to another, forasmuch as the intelligible species represents one thing in such 9531 intellect, which discourses from one thing to another, forasmuch as the intelligible species represents one thing in such
9590 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q14_A15-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Jas.1.17" target="asv">James 1:17</a>). 9590 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q14_A15-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Jas.1.17" target="asv">James 1:17</a>).
9591 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 15 s. c."><a name="29007" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29007] Iª q. 14 a. 15 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est 9591 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 15 s. c."><a name="29007" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29007] Iª q. 14 a. 15 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
9592 quod dicitur Iac. I, quod <i>apud Deum non est transmutatio, neque 9592 quod dicitur Iac. I, quod <i>apud Deum non est transmutatio, neque
9593 vicissitudinis obumbratio</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A15-p6"> 9593 vicissitudinis obumbratio</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A15-p6">
9594 <b>I answer that,</b> Since the knowledge of God is His substance, as is clear from the foregoing 9594 <b>I answer that,</b> Since the knowledge of God is His substance, as is clear from the foregoing
9595 <a id="FP_Q14_A15-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q14_A4.html">(A[4])</a>, just as His substance is altogether immutable, as shown above ( 9595 <a href="#FP_Q14_A4" id="FP_Q14_A15-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[4])</a>, just as His substance is altogether immutable, as shown above (
9596 <a id="FP_Q14_A15-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q9_A1.html">Q[9], A[1]</a>), so His knowledge likewise must be altogether invariable. 9596 <a href="#FP_Q9_A1" id="FP_Q14_A15-p6.2" shape="rect">Q[9], A[1]</a>), so His knowledge likewise must be altogether invariable.
9597 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 15 co."><a name="29008" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29008] Iª q. 14 a. 15 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum 9597 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 15 co."><a name="29008" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29008] Iª q. 14 a. 15 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
9598 quod, cum scientia Dei sit eius substantia, ut ex dictis patet; 9598 quod, cum scientia Dei sit eius substantia, ut ex dictis patet;
9599 sicut substantia eius est omnino immutabilis, ut supra ostensum 9599 sicut substantia eius est omnino immutabilis, ut supra ostensum
9600 est, ita oportet scientiam eius omnino invariabilem esse.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A15-p7"> 9600 est, ita oportet scientiam eius omnino invariabilem esse.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A15-p7">
9601 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> "Lord", "Creator" and the like, import relations to creatures in so far as they are in themselves. But the knowledge of God 9601 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> "Lord", "Creator" and the like, import relations to creatures in so far as they are in themselves. But the knowledge of God
9685 eandem opinionem de re illa retineamus, vel secundum diversas 9685 eandem opinionem de re illa retineamus, vel secundum diversas
9686 opiniones, ut si primo opinemur aliquem sedere, et postea opinemur 9686 opiniones, ut si primo opinemur aliquem sedere, et postea opinemur
9687 eum non sedere. Quorum neutrum potest esse in Deo.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q14_A16" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q14_A16-p0.1">Q. 14. A. 16. Whether God has a speculative knowledge of things?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A16-p2"> 9687 eum non sedere. Quorum neutrum potest esse in Deo.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q14_A16" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q14_A16-p0.1">Q. 14. A. 16. Whether God has a speculative knowledge of things?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A16-p2">
9688 <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God has not a speculative knowledge of things. For the knowledge of God is the cause of things, as shown above 9688 <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God has not a speculative knowledge of things. For the knowledge of God is the cause of things, as shown above
9689 9689
9690 <a id="FP_Q14_A16-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q14_A8.html">(A[8])</a>. But speculative knowledge is not the cause of the things known. Therefore the knowledge of God is not speculative. 9690 <a href="#FP_Q14_A8" id="FP_Q14_A16-p2.1" shape="rect">(A[8])</a>. But speculative knowledge is not the cause of the things known. Therefore the knowledge of God is not speculative.
9691 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 16 arg. 1"><a name="29012" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29012] Iª q. 14 a. 16 arg. 1</span></a> Ad 9691 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 16 arg. 1"><a name="29012" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29012] Iª q. 14 a. 16 arg. 1</span></a> Ad
9692 decimumsextum sic proceditur. Videtur quod Deus de rebus non habeat 9692 decimumsextum sic proceditur. Videtur quod Deus de rebus non habeat
9693 scientiam speculativam. Scientia enim Dei est causa rerum, ut supra 9693 scientiam speculativam. Scientia enim Dei est causa rerum, ut supra
9694 ostensum est. Sed scientia speculativa non est causa rerum 9694 ostensum est. Sed scientia speculativa non est causa rerum
9695 scitarum. Ergo scientia Dei non est speculativa.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A16-p3"> 9695 scitarum. Ergo scientia Dei non est speculativa.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A16-p3">
9808 proceditur. Videtur quod ideae non sint. Dicit enim Dionysius, VII 9808 proceditur. Videtur quod ideae non sint. Dicit enim Dionysius, VII
9809 cap. de Div. Nom., quod Deus non cognoscit res secundum ideam. Sed 9809 cap. de Div. Nom., quod Deus non cognoscit res secundum ideam. Sed
9810 ideae non ponuntur ad aliud, nisi ut per eas cognoscantur res. Ergo 9810 ideae non ponuntur ad aliud, nisi ut per eas cognoscantur res. Ergo
9811 ideae non sunt.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q15_A1-p3"> 9811 ideae non sunt.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q15_A1-p3">
9812 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, God knows all things in Himself, as has been already said ( 9812 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, God knows all things in Himself, as has been already said (
9813 <a id="FP_Q15_A1-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q14_A5.html">Q[14], A[5]</a>). But He does not know Himself through an idea; neither therefore other things. 9813 <a href="#FP_Q14_A5" id="FP_Q15_A1-p3.1" shape="rect">Q[14], A[5]</a>). But He does not know Himself through an idea; neither therefore other things.
9814 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 15 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="29021" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29021] Iª q. 15 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, Deus 9814 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 15 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="29021" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29021] Iª q. 15 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, Deus
9815 in seipso cognoscit omnia, ut supra dictum est. Sed seipsum non 9815 in seipso cognoscit omnia, ut supra dictum est. Sed seipsum non
9816 cognoscit per ideam. Ergo nec alia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q15_A1-p4"> 9816 cognoscit per ideam. Ergo nec alia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q15_A1-p4">
9817 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, an idea is considered to be the principle of knowledge and action. But the divine essence is a sufficient principle 9817 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, an idea is considered to be the principle of knowledge and action. But the divine essence is a sufficient principle
9818 of knowing and effecting all things. It is not therefore necessary to suppose ideas. 9818 of knowing and effecting all things. It is not therefore necessary to suppose ideas.
9837 a man generates a man, or fire generates fire. Whereas in other agents (the form of the thing to be made 9837 a man generates a man, or fire generates fire. Whereas in other agents (the form of the thing to be made
9838 pre-exists) according to intelligible being, as in those that act by the intellect; and thus the likeness of a house pre-exists 9838 pre-exists) according to intelligible being, as in those that act by the intellect; and thus the likeness of a house pre-exists
9839 in the mind of the builder. And this may be called the idea of the house, since the builder intends to build his house like 9839 in the mind of the builder. And this may be called the idea of the house, since the builder intends to build his house like
9840 to the form conceived in his mind. As then the world was not made by chance, but by God acting by His intellect, as will appear 9840 to the form conceived in his mind. As then the world was not made by chance, but by God acting by His intellect, as will appear
9841 later ( 9841 later (
9842 <a id="FP_Q15_A1-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q46_A1.html">Q[46], A[1]</a>), there must exist in the divine mind a form to the likeness of which the 9842 <a href="FP_iv.html#FP_Q46_A1" id="FP_Q15_A1-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[46], A[1]</a>), there must exist in the divine mind a form to the likeness of which the
9843 world was made. And in this the notion of an idea consists. 9843 world was made. And in this the notion of an idea consists.
9844 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 15 a. 1 co."><a name="29024" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29024] Iª q. 15 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum 9844 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 15 a. 1 co."><a name="29024" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29024] Iª q. 15 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
9845 quod necesse est ponere in mente divina ideas. Idea enim Graece, 9845 quod necesse est ponere in mente divina ideas. Idea enim Graece,
9846 Latine forma dicitur, unde per ideas intelliguntur formae aliarum 9846 Latine forma dicitur, unde per ideas intelliguntur formae aliarum
9847 rerum, praeter ipsas res existentes. Forma autem alicuius rei 9847 rerum, praeter ipsas res existentes. Forma autem alicuius rei
10038 proceditur. Videtur quod non omnium quae cognoscit Deus, sint ideae 10038 proceditur. Videtur quod non omnium quae cognoscit Deus, sint ideae
10039 in ipso. Mali enim idea non est in Deo, quia sequeretur malum esse 10039 in ipso. Mali enim idea non est in Deo, quia sequeretur malum esse
10040 in Deo. Sed mala cognoscuntur a Deo. Ergo non omnium quae 10040 in Deo. Sed mala cognoscuntur a Deo. Ergo non omnium quae
10041 cognoscuntur a Deo, sunt ideae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q15_A3-p3"> 10041 cognoscuntur a Deo, sunt ideae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q15_A3-p3">
10042 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, God knows things that neither are, nor will be, nor have been, as has been said above 10042 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, God knows things that neither are, nor will be, nor have been, as has been said above
10043 <a id="FP_Q15_A3-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q15_A9.html">(A[9])</a>. But of such things there are no ideas, since, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. v): "Acts of the divine will are the determining 10043 <a href="#FP_Q15_A9" id="FP_Q15_A3-p3.1" shape="rect">(A[9])</a>. But of such things there are no ideas, since, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. v): "Acts of the divine will are the determining
10044 and effective types of things." Therefore there are not in God ideas of all things known by Him. 10044 and effective types of things." Therefore there are not in God ideas of all things known by Him.
10045 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 15 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="29039" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29039] Iª q. 15 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, Deus 10045 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 15 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="29039" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29039] Iª q. 15 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, Deus
10046 cognoscit ea quae nec sunt nec erunt nec fuerunt, ut supra dictum 10046 cognoscit ea quae nec sunt nec erunt nec fuerunt, ut supra dictum
10047 est. Sed horum non sunt ideae, quia dicit Dionysius, V cap. de Div. 10047 est. Sed horum non sunt ideae, quia dicit Dionysius, V cap. de Div.
10048 Nom., quod <i>exemplaria sunt divinae voluntates, determinativae et 10048 Nom., quod <i>exemplaria sunt divinae voluntates, determinativae et
10117 whereas those that are superadded to the house when completed, such as painting, or any other such thing, are produced through 10117 whereas those that are superadded to the house when completed, such as painting, or any other such thing, are produced through
10118 some other form. Now individual things, according to Plato, have no other idea than that of species; both because particular 10118 some other form. Now individual things, according to Plato, have no other idea than that of species; both because particular
10119 things are individualized by matter, which, as some say, he held to be uncreated and the concause with the idea; and because 10119 things are individualized by matter, which, as some say, he held to be uncreated and the concause with the idea; and because
10120 the intention of nature regards the species, and produces individuals only that in them the species may be preserved. 10120 the intention of nature regards the species, and produces individuals only that in them the species may be preserved.
10121 However, divine providence extends not merely to species; but to individuals as will be shown later ( 10121 However, divine providence extends not merely to species; but to individuals as will be shown later (
10122 <a id="FP_Q15_A3-p11.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q22_A3.html">Q[22], A[3]</a> ). 10122 <a href="#FP_Q22_A3" id="FP_Q15_A3-p11.1" shape="rect">Q[22], A[3]</a> ).
10123 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 15 a. 3 ad 4"><a name="29047" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29047] Iª q. 15 a. 3 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum 10123 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 15 a. 3 ad 4"><a name="29047" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29047] Iª q. 15 a. 3 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum
10124 dicendum quod genera non possunt habere ideam aliam ab idea 10124 dicendum quod genera non possunt habere ideam aliam ab idea
10125 speciei, secundum quod idea significat exemplar, quia nunquam genus 10125 speciei, secundum quod idea significat exemplar, quia nunquam genus
10126 fit nisi in aliqua specie. Similiter etiam est de accidentibus quae 10126 fit nisi in aliqua specie. Similiter etiam est de accidentibus quae
10127 inseparabiliter concomitantur subiectum, quia haec simul fiunt cum 10127 inseparabiliter concomitantur subiectum, quia haec simul fiunt cum
10366 est verum ut cognitum. Et ideo, proprie loquendo, veritas est in 10366 est verum ut cognitum. Et ideo, proprie loquendo, veritas est in
10367 intellectu componente et dividente, non autem in sensu, neque in 10367 intellectu componente et dividente, non autem in sensu, neque in
10368 intellectu cognoscente quod quid est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q16_A2-p6"> And thus the Objections given are solved.</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 16 a. 2 ad arg."><a name="29061" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29061] Iª q. 16 a. 2 ad arg.</span></a> Et per hoc 10368 intellectu cognoscente quod quid est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q16_A2-p6"> And thus the Objections given are solved.</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 16 a. 2 ad arg."><a name="29061" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29061] Iª q. 16 a. 2 ad arg.</span></a> Et per hoc
10369 patet solutio ad obiecta.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q16_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q16_A3-p0.1">Q. 16. A. 3. Whether the true and being are convertible terms?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q16_A3-p2"> 10369 patet solutio ad obiecta.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q16_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q16_A3-p0.1">Q. 16. A. 3. Whether the true and being are convertible terms?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q16_A3-p2">
10370 <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the true and being are not convertible terms. For the true resides properly in the intellect, as stated 10370 <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the true and being are not convertible terms. For the true resides properly in the intellect, as stated
10371 <a id="FP_Q16_A3-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q16_A1.html">(A[1])</a>; but being is properly in things. Therefore they are not convertible. 10371 <a href="#FP_Q16_A1" id="FP_Q16_A3-p2.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>; but being is properly in things. Therefore they are not convertible.
10372 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 16 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="29062" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29062] Iª q. 16 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium sic 10372 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 16 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="29062" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29062] Iª q. 16 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium sic
10373 proceditur. Videtur quod verum et ens non convertantur. Verum enim 10373 proceditur. Videtur quod verum et ens non convertantur. Verum enim
10374 est proprie in intellectu, ut dictum est. Ens autem proprie est in 10374 est proprie in intellectu, ut dictum est. Ens autem proprie est in
10375 rebus. Ergo non convertuntur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q16_A3-p3"> 10375 rebus. Ergo non convertuntur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q16_A3-p3">
10376 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, that which extends to being and not-being is not convertible with being. But the true extends to being and not-being; 10376 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, that which extends to being and not-being is not convertible with being. But the true extends to being and not-being;
10401 quod anima est quodammodo omnia secundum sensum et intellectum. Et 10401 quod anima est quodammodo omnia secundum sensum et intellectum. Et
10402 ideo, sicut bonum convertitur cum ente, ita et verum. Sed tamen, 10402 ideo, sicut bonum convertitur cum ente, ita et verum. Sed tamen,
10403 sicut bonum addit rationem appetibilis supra ens, ita et verum 10403 sicut bonum addit rationem appetibilis supra ens, ita et verum
10404 comparationem ad intellectum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q16_A3-p7"> 10404 comparationem ad intellectum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q16_A3-p7">
10405 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The true resides in things and in the intellect, as said before 10405 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The true resides in things and in the intellect, as said before
10406 <a id="FP_Q16_A3-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q16_A1.html">(A[1])</a>. But the true that is in things is convertible with being as to substance; while the true that is in the intellect is convertible 10406 <a href="#FP_Q16_A1" id="FP_Q16_A3-p7.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>. But the true that is in things is convertible with being as to substance; while the true that is in the intellect is convertible
10407 with being, as the manifestation with the manifested; for this belongs to the nature of truth, as has been said already 10407 with being, as the manifestation with the manifested; for this belongs to the nature of truth, as has been said already
10408 <a id="FP_Q16_A3-p7.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q16_A1.html">(A[1])</a>. It may, however, be said that being also is in the things and in the 10408 <a href="#FP_Q16_A1" id="FP_Q16_A3-p7.2" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>. It may, however, be said that being also is in the things and in the
10409 intellect, as is the true; although truth is primarily in things; and this is so because truth and being differ in idea. 10409 intellect, as is the true; although truth is primarily in things; and this is so because truth and being differ in idea.
10410 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 16 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="29067" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29067] Iª q. 16 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo 10410 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 16 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="29067" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29067] Iª q. 16 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
10411 dicendum quod verum est in rebus et in intellectu, ut dictum est. 10411 dicendum quod verum est in rebus et in intellectu, ut dictum est.
10412 Verum autem quod est in rebus, convertitur cum ente secundum 10412 Verum autem quod est in rebus, convertitur cum ente secundum
10413 substantiam. Sed verum quod est in intellectu, convertitur cum 10413 substantiam. Sed verum quod est in intellectu, convertitur cum
10451 verum. Quod enim est universalius, secundum rationem prius est, ut 10451 verum. Quod enim est universalius, secundum rationem prius est, ut
10452 patet ex I Physic. Sed bonum est universalius quam verum, nam verum 10452 patet ex I Physic. Sed bonum est universalius quam verum, nam verum
10453 est quoddam bonum, scilicet intellectus. Ergo bonum prius est 10453 est quoddam bonum, scilicet intellectus. Ergo bonum prius est
10454 secundum rationem quam verum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q16_A4-p3"> 10454 secundum rationem quam verum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q16_A4-p3">
10455 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, good is in things, but the true in the intellect composing and dividing as said above 10455 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, good is in things, but the true in the intellect composing and dividing as said above
10456 <a id="FP_Q16_A4-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q16_A2.html">(A[2])</a>. But that which is in things is prior to that which is in the intellect. Therefore good is logically prior to the true. 10456 <a href="#FP_Q16_A2" id="FP_Q16_A4-p3.1" shape="rect">(A[2])</a>. But that which is in things is prior to that which is in the intellect. Therefore good is logically prior to the true.
10457 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 16 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="29071" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29071] Iª q. 16 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, bonum 10457 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 16 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="29071" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29071] Iª q. 16 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, bonum
10458 est in rebus, verum autem in compositione et divisione intellectus, 10458 est in rebus, verum autem in compositione et divisione intellectus,
10459 ut dictum est. Sed ea quae sunt in re, sunt priora his quae sunt in 10459 ut dictum est. Sed ea quae sunt in re, sunt priora his quae sunt in
10460 intellectu. Ergo prius est secundum rationem bonum quam verum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q16_A4-p4"> 10460 intellectu. Ergo prius est secundum rationem bonum quam verum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q16_A4-p4">
10461 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, truth is a species of virtue, as is clear from Ethic. iv. But virtue is included under good; since, as Augustine 10461 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, truth is a species of virtue, as is clear from Ethic. iv. But virtue is included under good; since, as Augustine
10513 apprehendit se appetere ens. Unde primo est ratio entis, secundo 10513 apprehendit se appetere ens. Unde primo est ratio entis, secundo
10514 ratio veri, tertio ratio boni, licet bonum sit in rebus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q16_A4-p9"> 10514 ratio veri, tertio ratio boni, licet bonum sit in rebus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q16_A4-p9">
10515 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The virtue which is called "truth" is not truth in general, but a certain kind of truth according to which man shows himself 10515 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The virtue which is called "truth" is not truth in general, but a certain kind of truth according to which man shows himself
10516 in deed and word as he really is. But truth as applied to "life" is used in a particular sense, inasmuch as a man fulfills 10516 in deed and word as he really is. But truth as applied to "life" is used in a particular sense, inasmuch as a man fulfills
10517 in his life that to which he is ordained by the divine intellect, as it has been said that truth exists in other things 10517 in his life that to which he is ordained by the divine intellect, as it has been said that truth exists in other things
10518 <a id="FP_Q16_A4-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q16_A1.html">(A[1])</a>. Whereas the truth of "justice" is found in man as he 10518 <a href="#FP_Q16_A1" id="FP_Q16_A4-p9.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>. Whereas the truth of "justice" is found in man as he
10519 fulfills his duty to his neighbor, as ordained by law. Hence we cannot argue from these particular truths to truth in general. 10519 fulfills his duty to his neighbor, as ordained by law. Hence we cannot argue from these particular truths to truth in general.
10520 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 16 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="29077" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29077] Iª q. 16 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium 10520 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 16 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="29077" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29077] Iª q. 16 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
10521 dicendum quod virtus quae dicitur veritas, non est veritas 10521 dicendum quod virtus quae dicitur veritas, non est veritas
10522 communis, sed quaedam veritas secundum quam homo in dictis et 10522 communis, sed quaedam veritas secundum quam homo in dictis et
10523 factis ostendit se ut est. Veritas autem vitae dicitur 10523 factis ostendit se ut est. Veritas autem vitae dicitur
10552 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q16_A5-p5.1" href="./asv.html#John.14.6" target="asv">Jn. 14:6</a>). 10552 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q16_A5-p5.1" href="./asv.html#John.14.6" target="asv">Jn. 14:6</a>).
10553 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 16 a. 5 s. c."><a name="29081" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29081] Iª q. 16 a. 5 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est 10553 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 16 a. 5 s. c."><a name="29081" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29081] Iª q. 16 a. 5 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
10554 quod dicit dominus, Ioan. XIV, <i>ego sum via, veritas et 10554 quod dicit dominus, Ioan. XIV, <i>ego sum via, veritas et
10555 vita</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q16_A5-p6"> 10555 vita</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q16_A5-p6">
10556 <b>I answer that,</b> As said above 10556 <b>I answer that,</b> As said above
10557 <a id="FP_Q16_A5-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q16_A1.html">(A[1])</a>, truth is found in the intellect according as it apprehends a thing as it is; and in things according as they have being 10557 <a href="#FP_Q16_A1" id="FP_Q16_A5-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>, truth is found in the intellect according as it apprehends a thing as it is; and in things according as they have being
10558 conformable to an intellect. This is to the greatest degree found in God. For His being is not only conformed to His intellect, 10558 conformable to an intellect. This is to the greatest degree found in God. For His being is not only conformed to His intellect,
10559 but it is the very act of His intellect; and His act of understanding is the measure and cause of every other being and of 10559 but it is the very act of His intellect; and His act of understanding is the measure and cause of every other being and of
10560 every other intellect, and He Himself is His 10560 every other intellect, and He Himself is His
10561 own existence and act of understanding. Whence it follows not only that truth is in Him, but that He is truth itself, and 10561 own existence and act of understanding. Whence it follows not only that truth is in Him, but that He is truth itself, and
10562 the sovereign and first truth. 10562 the sovereign and first truth.
10633 one of them according to its proper nature, and from this one the rest are denominated. So 10633 one of them according to its proper nature, and from this one the rest are denominated. So
10634 healthiness is predicated of animal, of urine, and of medicine, not that health is only in the animal; but from the health 10634 healthiness is predicated of animal, of urine, and of medicine, not that health is only in the animal; but from the health
10635 of the animal, medicine is called healthy, in so far as it is the cause of health, and urine is called healthy, in so far 10635 of the animal, medicine is called healthy, in so far as it is the cause of health, and urine is called healthy, in so far
10636 as it indicates health. And although health is neither in medicine nor in urine, yet in either there is something whereby 10636 as it indicates health. And although health is neither in medicine nor in urine, yet in either there is something whereby
10637 the one causes, and the other indicates health. Now we have said 10637 the one causes, and the other indicates health. Now we have said
10638 <a id="FP_Q16_A6-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q16_A1.html">(A[1])</a> that truth resides primarily in the 10638 <a href="#FP_Q16_A1" id="FP_Q16_A6-p5.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a> that truth resides primarily in the
10639 intellect; and secondarily in things, according as they are related to the divine intellect. If therefore we speak of truth, 10639 intellect; and secondarily in things, according as they are related to the divine intellect. If therefore we speak of truth,
10640 as it exists in the intellect, according to its proper nature, then are there many truths in many created intellects; and 10640 as it exists in the intellect, according to its proper nature, then are there many truths in many created intellects; and
10641 even in one and the same intellect, according to the number of things known. Whence a gloss on 10641 even in one and the same intellect, according to the number of things known. Whence a gloss on
10642 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q16_A6-p5.2" href="./asv.html#Ps.11.2" target="asv"> Ps. 11:2, </a> "Truths are decayed from among the children of men," says: "As from one man's face many likenesses are reflected in a mirror, 10642 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q16_A6-p5.2" href="./asv.html#Ps.11.2" target="asv"> Ps. 11:2, </a> "Truths are decayed from among the children of men," says: "As from one man's face many likenesses are reflected in a mirror,
10643 so many truths are reflected from the one divine truth." But if we speak of truth as it is in things, then all things are 10643 so many truths are reflected from the one divine truth." But if we speak of truth as it is in things, then all things are
10722 veritate verum erat, et sic veritas erat antequam inciperet. Et 10722 veritate verum erat, et sic veritas erat antequam inciperet. Et
10723 similiter si ponatur veritatem habere finem, sequitur quod sit 10723 similiter si ponatur veritatem habere finem, sequitur quod sit
10724 postquam desierit, verum enim erit veritatem non esse. Ergo veritas 10724 postquam desierit, verum enim erit veritatem non esse. Ergo veritas
10725 est aeterna.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q16_A7-p6"> 10725 est aeterna.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q16_A7-p6">
10726 <b>On the contrary,</b> God alone is eternal, as laid down before ( 10726 <b>On the contrary,</b> God alone is eternal, as laid down before (
10727 <a id="FP_Q16_A7-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q10_A3.html">Q[10], A[3]</a>). 10727 <a href="#FP_Q10_A3" id="FP_Q16_A7-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[10], A[3]</a>).
10728 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 16 a. 7 s. c."><a name="29096" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29096] Iª q. 16 a. 7 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est 10728 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 16 a. 7 s. c."><a name="29096" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29096] Iª q. 16 a. 7 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
10729 quod solus Deus est aeternus, ut supra habitum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q16_A7-p7"> 10729 quod solus Deus est aeternus, ut supra habitum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q16_A7-p7">
10730 <b>I answer that,</b> The truth of enunciations is no other than the truth of the intellect. For an enunciation resides in the intellect, and in 10730 <b>I answer that,</b> The truth of enunciations is no other than the truth of the intellect. For an enunciation resides in the intellect, and in
10731 speech. Now according as it is in the intellect it has truth of itself: but according as it is in speech, it is called enunciable 10731 speech. Now according as it is in the intellect it has truth of itself: but according as it is in speech, it is called enunciable
10732 truth, according as it signifies some truth of the intellect, not on account of any truth residing in the enunciation, as 10732 truth, according as it signifies some truth of the intellect, not on account of any truth residing in the enunciation, as
10733 though in a subject. Thus urine is called healthy, not from any health within it but 10733 though in a subject. Thus urine is called healthy, not from any health within it but
10734 from the health of an animal which it indicates. In like manner it has been already said that things are called true from 10734 from the health of an animal which it indicates. In like manner it has been already said that things are called true from
10735 the truth of the intellect. Hence, if no intellect were eternal, no truth would be eternal. Now because only the divine intellect 10735 the truth of the intellect. Hence, if no intellect were eternal, no truth would be eternal. Now because only the divine intellect
10736 is eternal, in it alone truth has eternity. Nor does it follow from this that anything else but God is eternal; since the 10736 is eternal, in it alone truth has eternity. Nor does it follow from this that anything else but God is eternal; since the
10737 truth of the divine intellect is God Himself, as shown already 10737 truth of the divine intellect is God Himself, as shown already
10738 <a id="FP_Q16_A7-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q16_A5.html">(A[5])</a>. 10738 <a href="#FP_Q16_A5" id="FP_Q16_A7-p7.1" shape="rect">(A[5])</a>.
10739 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 16 a. 7 co."><a name="29097" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29097] Iª q. 16 a. 7 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum 10739 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 16 a. 7 co."><a name="29097" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29097] Iª q. 16 a. 7 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
10740 quod veritas enuntiabilium non est aliud quam veritas intellectus. 10740 quod veritas enuntiabilium non est aliud quam veritas intellectus.
10741 Enuntiabile enim et est in intellectu, et est in voce. Secundum 10741 Enuntiabile enim et est in intellectu, et est in voce. Secundum
10742 autem quod est in intellectu, habet per se veritatem. Sed secundum 10742 autem quod est in intellectu, habet per se veritatem. Sed secundum
10743 quod est in voce, dicitur verum enuntiabile, secundum quod 10743 quod est in voce, dicitur verum enuntiabile, secundum quod
10843 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q16_A8-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.11.2" target="asv">Ps. 11:2</a>),"Truths are decayed from among the children of men." 10843 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q16_A8-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.11.2" target="asv">Ps. 11:2</a>),"Truths are decayed from among the children of men."
10844 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 16 a. 8 s. c."><a name="29106" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29106] Iª q. 16 a. 8 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est 10844 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 16 a. 8 s. c."><a name="29106" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29106] Iª q. 16 a. 8 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
10845 quod dicitur in Psalmo XI, <i>diminutae sunt veritates a filiis 10845 quod dicitur in Psalmo XI, <i>diminutae sunt veritates a filiis
10846 hominum</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q16_A8-p7"> 10846 hominum</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q16_A8-p7">
10847 <b>I answer that,</b> Truth, properly speaking, resides only in the intellect, as said before 10847 <b>I answer that,</b> Truth, properly speaking, resides only in the intellect, as said before
10848 <a id="FP_Q16_A8-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q16_A1.html">(A[1])</a>; but things are called true in virtue of the truth residing in an intellect. Hence the mutability of truth must be regarded 10848 <a href="#FP_Q16_A1" id="FP_Q16_A8-p7.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>; but things are called true in virtue of the truth residing in an intellect. Hence the mutability of truth must be regarded
10849 from the point of view of the intellect, the truth of which consists in its conformity to the thing understood. Now this conformity 10849 from the point of view of the intellect, the truth of which consists in its conformity to the thing understood. Now this conformity
10850 may vary in two ways, even as any other likeness, through change in one of the two extremes. Hence in 10850 may vary in two ways, even as any other likeness, through change in one of the two extremes. Hence in
10851 one way truth varies on the part of the intellect, from the fact that a change of opinion occurs about a thing which in itself 10851 one way truth varies on the part of the intellect, from the fact that a change of opinion occurs about a thing which in itself
10852 has not changed, and in another way, when the thing is changed, but not the opinion; and in either way there can be a change 10852 has not changed, and in another way, when the thing is changed, but not the opinion; and in either way there can be a change
10853 from true to false. If, then, there is an intellect wherein there can be no alternation of opinions, and the knowledge of 10853 from true to false. If, then, there is an intellect wherein there can be no alternation of opinions, and the knowledge of
10854 which nothing can escape, in this is immutable truth. Now such is the divine intellect, as is clear from what has been said 10854 which nothing can escape, in this is immutable truth. Now such is the divine intellect, as is clear from what has been said
10855 before ( 10855 before (
10856 <a id="FP_Q16_A8-p7.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q14_A15.html">Q[14], A[15]</a>). Hence the truth of the divine intellect is immutable. But the truth of our intellect is mutable; not because it is itself 10856 <a href="#FP_Q14_A15" id="FP_Q16_A8-p7.2" shape="rect">Q[14], A[15]</a>). Hence the truth of the divine intellect is immutable. But the truth of our intellect is mutable; not because it is itself
10857 the subject of change, but in so far as our intellect changes from truth to falsity, for thus forms may be called mutable. 10857 the subject of change, but in so far as our intellect changes from truth to falsity, for thus forms may be called mutable.
10858 Whereas the truth of the divine intellect is that according to which natural things are said to be true, and this is altogether 10858 Whereas the truth of the divine intellect is that according to which natural things are said to be true, and this is altogether
10859 immutable. 10859 immutable.
10860 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 16 a. 8 co."><a name="29107" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29107] Iª q. 16 a. 8 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum 10860 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 16 a. 8 co."><a name="29107" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29107] Iª q. 16 a. 8 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
10861 quod, sicut supra dictum est, veritas proprie est in solo 10861 quod, sicut supra dictum est, veritas proprie est in solo
10941 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 17 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="29114" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29114] Iª q. 17 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, 10941 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 17 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="29114" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29114] Iª q. 17 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
10942 falsum dicitur a fallendo. Sed res non fallunt, ut dicit Augustinus 10942 falsum dicitur a fallendo. Sed res non fallunt, ut dicit Augustinus
10943 in libro de vera Relig., <i>quia non ostendunt aliud quam suam 10943 in libro de vera Relig., <i>quia non ostendunt aliud quam suam
10944 speciem</i>. Ergo falsum in rebus non invenitur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q17_A1-p4"> 10944 speciem</i>. Ergo falsum in rebus non invenitur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q17_A1-p4">
10945 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the true is said to exist in things by conformity to the divine intellect, as stated above 10945 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the true is said to exist in things by conformity to the divine intellect, as stated above
10946 <a id="FP_Q17_A1-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q16.html">(Q[16])</a>. But everything, in so far as it exists, imitates God. Therefore everything is true without admixture of falsity; and thus 10946 <a href="#FP_Q16" id="FP_Q17_A1-p4.1" shape="rect">(Q[16])</a>. But everything, in so far as it exists, imitates God. Therefore everything is true without admixture of falsity; and thus
10947 nothing is false. 10947 nothing is false.
10948 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 17 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="29115" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29115] Iª q. 17 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, verum 10948 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 17 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="29115" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29115] Iª q. 17 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, verum
10949 dicitur in rebus per comparationem ad intellectum divinum, ut supra 10949 dicitur in rebus per comparationem ad intellectum divinum, ut supra
10950 dictum est. Sed quaelibet res, inquantum est, imitatur Deum. Ergo 10950 dictum est. Sed quaelibet res, inquantum est, imitatur Deum. Ergo
10951 quaelibet res vera est, absque falsitate. Et sic nulla res est 10951 quaelibet res vera est, absque falsitate. Et sic nulla res est
11096 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 17 a. 2 s. c."><a name="29125" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29125] Iª q. 17 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est 11096 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 17 a. 2 s. c."><a name="29125" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29125] Iª q. 17 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
11097 quod dicit Augustinus, in libro Soliloq., <i>apparet nos in omnibus 11097 quod dicit Augustinus, in libro Soliloq., <i>apparet nos in omnibus
11098 sensibus similitudine lenocinante falli</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q17_A2-p6"> 11098 sensibus similitudine lenocinante falli</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q17_A2-p6">
11099 <b>I answer that,</b> Falsity is not to be sought in the senses except as truth is in them. Now truth is not in them in such a way as that the 11099 <b>I answer that,</b> Falsity is not to be sought in the senses except as truth is in them. Now truth is not in them in such a way as that the
11100 senses know truth, but in so far as they apprehend sensible things truly, as said above ( 11100 senses know truth, but in so far as they apprehend sensible things truly, as said above (
11101 <a id="FP_Q17_A2-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q16_A2.html">Q[16], A[2]</a>), and this takes place through the senses apprehending things as they are, and hence it happens that falsity exists in the 11101 <a href="#FP_Q16_A2" id="FP_Q17_A2-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[16], A[2]</a>), and this takes place through the senses apprehending things as they are, and hence it happens that falsity exists in the
11102 senses through their apprehending or judging things to be otherwise than they really 11102 senses through their apprehending or judging things to be otherwise than they really
11103 are. 11103 are.
11104 </p><p id="FP_Q17_A2-p7"> The knowledge of things by the senses is in proportion to the existence of their likeness in the senses; and the likeness 11104 </p><p id="FP_Q17_A2-p7"> The knowledge of things by the senses is in proportion to the existence of their likeness in the senses; and the likeness
11105 of a thing can exist in the senses in three ways. In the first way, primarily and of its own nature, as in sight there is 11105 of a thing can exist in the senses in three ways. In the first way, primarily and of its own nature, as in sight there is
11106 the likeness of colors, and of other sensible objects proper to it. Secondly, of its own nature, though not primarily; as 11106 the likeness of colors, and of other sensible objects proper to it. Secondly, of its own nature, though not primarily; as
11192 <b>I answer that,</b> Just as a thing has being by its proper form, so the knowing faculty has knowledge by the likeness of the thing known. Hence, 11192 <b>I answer that,</b> Just as a thing has being by its proper form, so the knowing faculty has knowledge by the likeness of the thing known. Hence,
11193 as natural things cannot fall short of the being that belongs to them by their form, but may fall short of accidental or consequent 11193 as natural things cannot fall short of the being that belongs to them by their form, but may fall short of accidental or consequent
11194 qualities, even as a man may fail to possess two feet, but not fail to be a man; so the faculty of knowing cannot fail in 11194 qualities, even as a man may fail to possess two feet, but not fail to be a man; so the faculty of knowing cannot fail in
11195 knowledge of the thing with the likeness of which it is informed; but may fail 11195 knowledge of the thing with the likeness of which it is informed; but may fail
11196 with regard to something consequent upon that form, or accidental thereto. For it has been said 11196 with regard to something consequent upon that form, or accidental thereto. For it has been said
11197 <a id="FP_Q17_A3-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q17_A2.html">(A[2])</a> that sight is not deceived in its proper sensible, but about common sensibles that are consequent to that object; or about 11197 <a href="#FP_Q17_A2" id="FP_Q17_A3-p5.1" shape="rect">(A[2])</a> that sight is not deceived in its proper sensible, but about common sensibles that are consequent to that object; or about
11198 accidental objects of sense. Now as the sense is directly informed by the likeness of its proper object, so is the intellect 11198 accidental objects of sense. Now as the sense is directly informed by the likeness of its proper object, so is the intellect
11199 by the likeness of the essence of a thing. Hence the intellect is not deceived about the essence of a thing, as neither the 11199 by the likeness of the essence of a thing. Hence the intellect is not deceived about the essence of a thing, as neither the
11200 sense about its proper object. But in affirming and denying, the intellect may be deceived, by attributing to the thing of 11200 sense about its proper object. But in affirming and denying, the intellect may be deceived, by attributing to the thing of
11201 which it understands the essence, something which is not consequent upon it, or is opposed to it. For the intellect is in 11201 which it understands the essence, something which is not consequent upon it, or is opposed to it. For the intellect is in
11202 the same position as regards judging of such things, as sense is as to judging of common, or accidental, sensible objects. 11202 the same position as regards judging of such things, as sense is as to judging of common, or accidental, sensible objects.
11203 There is, however, this difference, as before mentioned regarding truth ( 11203 There is, however, this difference, as before mentioned regarding truth (
11204 <a id="FP_Q17_A3-p5.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q16_A2.html">Q[16], A[2]</a>), that falsity can 11204 <a href="#FP_Q16_A2" id="FP_Q17_A3-p5.2" shape="rect">Q[16], A[2]</a>), that falsity can
11205 exist in the intellect not only because the intellect is conscious of that knowledge, as it is conscious of truth; whereas 11205 exist in the intellect not only because the intellect is conscious of that knowledge, as it is conscious of truth; whereas
11206 in sense falsity does not exist as known, as stated above 11206 in sense falsity does not exist as known, as stated above
11207 <a id="FP_Q17_A3-p5.3" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q17_A2.html">(A[2])</a>. 11207 <a href="#FP_Q17_A2" id="FP_Q17_A3-p5.3" shape="rect">(A[2])</a>.
11208 </p><p id="FP_Q17_A3-p6"> But because falsity of the intellect is concerned essentially only with the composition of the intellect, falsity occurs 11208 </p><p id="FP_Q17_A3-p6"> But because falsity of the intellect is concerned essentially only with the composition of the intellect, falsity occurs
11209 also accidentally in that operation of the intellect whereby it knows the essence of a thing, in so far as composition of 11209 also accidentally in that operation of the intellect whereby it knows the essence of a thing, in so far as composition of
11210 the intellect is mixed up in it. This can take place in two ways. In one way, by the intellect applying to one thing the definition 11210 the intellect is mixed up in it. This can take place in two ways. In one way, by the intellect applying to one thing the definition
11211 proper to another; as that of a circle to a man. Wherefore the definition of one thing is false of another. 11211 proper to another; as that of a circle to a man. Wherefore the definition of one thing is false of another.
11212 In another way, by composing a definition of parts which are mutually exclusive. For thus the definition is not only false 11212 In another way, by composing a definition of parts which are mutually exclusive. For thus the definition is not only false
11516 <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (De Anima ii, 37), "In living things, to live is to be." 11516 <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (De Anima ii, 37), "In living things, to live is to be."
11517 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 18 a. 2 s. c."><a name="29156" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29156] Iª q. 18 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est 11517 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 18 a. 2 s. c."><a name="29156" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29156] Iª q. 18 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
11518 quod dicit philosophus, in II de anima, <i>vivere viventibus est 11518 quod dicit philosophus, in II de anima, <i>vivere viventibus est
11519 esse</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q18_A2-p6"> 11519 esse</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q18_A2-p6">
11520 <b>I answer that,</b> As is clear from what has been said ( 11520 <b>I answer that,</b> As is clear from what has been said (
11521 <a id="FP_Q18_A2-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q17_A3.html">Q[17], A[3]</a>), our intellect, which takes cognizance of the essence of a thing as its proper object, gains knowledge from sense, of which 11521 <a href="#FP_Q17_A3" id="FP_Q18_A2-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[17], A[3]</a>), our intellect, which takes cognizance of the essence of a thing as its proper object, gains knowledge from sense, of which
11522 the proper objects are external accidents. Hence from external appearances we come to the knowledge of the essence of things. 11522 the proper objects are external accidents. Hence from external appearances we come to the knowledge of the essence of things.
11523 And because we name a thing in accordance with our knowledge of it, as is clear from what has already been said ( 11523 And because we name a thing in accordance with our knowledge of it, as is clear from what has already been said (
11524 <a id="FP_Q18_A2-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q13_A1.html">Q[13], A[1]</a>), so from external properties names are often imposed to signify essences. Hence such names are sometimes taken strictly 11524 <a href="#FP_Q13_A1" id="FP_Q18_A2-p6.2" shape="rect">Q[13], A[1]</a>), so from external properties names are often imposed to signify essences. Hence such names are sometimes taken strictly
11525 to denote the essence itself, the signification of which is their principal object; but sometimes, and less strictly, to denote 11525 to denote the essence itself, the signification of which is their principal object; but sometimes, and less strictly, to denote
11526 the properties by reason of which they are imposed. And so we see that the word "body" is used to denote a genus of substances 11526 the properties by reason of which they are imposed. And so we see that the word "body" is used to denote a genus of substances
11527 from the fact of their possessing three dimensions: and is sometimes taken to denote the 11527 from the fact of their possessing three dimensions: and is sometimes taken to denote the
11528 dimensions themselves; in which sense body is said to be a species of quantity. The same must be said of life. The name is 11528 dimensions themselves; in which sense body is said to be a species of quantity. The same must be said of life. The name is
11529 given from a certain external appearance, namely, self-movement, yet not precisely to signify this, but rather a substance 11529 given from a certain external appearance, namely, self-movement, yet not precisely to signify this, but rather a substance
11605 activa distinguitur. Et per hunc etiam modum cognoscere Deum 11605 activa distinguitur. Et per hunc etiam modum cognoscere Deum
11606 dicitur vita aeterna.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q18_A2-p10"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Wherefore the Reply to the Third Objection is clear.</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 18 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="29160" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29160] Iª q. 18 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Unde patet solutio 11606 dicitur vita aeterna.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q18_A2-p10"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Wherefore the Reply to the Third Objection is clear.</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 18 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="29160" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29160] Iª q. 18 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Unde patet solutio
11607 ad tertium.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q18_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q18_A3-p0.1">Q. 18. A. 3. Whether life is properly attributed to God?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q18_A3-p2"> 11607 ad tertium.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q18_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q18_A3-p0.1">Q. 18. A. 3. Whether life is properly attributed to God?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q18_A3-p2">
11608 <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that life is not properly attributed to God. For things are said to live inasmuch as they move themselves, as previously 11608 <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that life is not properly attributed to God. For things are said to live inasmuch as they move themselves, as previously
11609 stated 11609 stated
11610 <a id="FP_Q18_A3-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q18_A2.html">(A[2])</a>. But movement does not belong to God. Neither therefore does life. 11610 <a href="#FP_Q18_A2" id="FP_Q18_A3-p2.1" shape="rect">(A[2])</a>. But movement does not belong to God. Neither therefore does life.
11611 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 18 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="29161" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29161] Iª q. 18 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium sic 11611 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 18 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="29161" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29161] Iª q. 18 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium sic
11612 proceditur. Videtur quod Deo non conveniat vita. Vivere enim 11612 proceditur. Videtur quod Deo non conveniat vita. Vivere enim
11613 dicuntur aliqua secundum quod movent seipsa, ut dictum est. Sed Deo 11613 dicuntur aliqua secundum quod movent seipsa, ut dictum est. Sed Deo
11614 non competit moveri. Ergo neque vivere.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q18_A3-p3"> 11614 non competit moveri. Ergo neque vivere.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q18_A3-p3">
11615 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, in all living things we must needs suppose some principle of life. Hence it is said by the Philosopher (De Anima 11615 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, in all living things we must needs suppose some principle of life. Hence it is said by the Philosopher (De Anima
11790 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q18_A4-p6.1" href="./asv.html#John.1.3" target="asv">Jn. 1:3,4</a>), it is said, "What was made, in Him was life." But all things were made, except God. Therefore all things are life in God. 11790 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q18_A4-p6.1" href="./asv.html#John.1.3" target="asv">Jn. 1:3,4</a>), it is said, "What was made, in Him was life." But all things were made, except God. Therefore all things are life in God.
11791 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 18 a. 4 s. c."><a name="29173" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29173] Iª q. 18 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est 11791 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 18 a. 4 s. c."><a name="29173" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29173] Iª q. 18 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
11792 quod dicitur Ioan. I, <i>quod factum est, in ipso vita erat</i>. 11792 quod dicitur Ioan. I, <i>quod factum est, in ipso vita erat</i>.
11793 Sed omnia praeter Deum facta sunt. Ergo omnia in Deo sunt vita.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q18_A4-p7"> 11793 Sed omnia praeter Deum facta sunt. Ergo omnia in Deo sunt vita.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q18_A4-p7">
11794 <b>I answer that,</b> In God to live is to understand, as before stated 11794 <b>I answer that,</b> In God to live is to understand, as before stated
11795 <a id="FP_Q18_A4-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q18_A3.html">(A[3])</a>. In God intellect, the thing understood, and the act of understanding, are one and the same. Hence whatever is in God as 11795 <a href="#FP_Q18_A3" id="FP_Q18_A4-p7.1" shape="rect">(A[3])</a>. In God intellect, the thing understood, and the act of understanding, are one and the same. Hence whatever is in God as
11796 understood is the very living or life of God. Now, wherefore, since all things that have been made by God are in Him as things 11796 understood is the very living or life of God. Now, wherefore, since all things that have been made by God are in Him as things
11797 understood, it follows that all things in Him are the divine life itself. 11797 understood, it follows that all things in Him are the divine life itself.
11798 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 18 a. 4 co."><a name="29174" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29174] Iª q. 18 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum 11798 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 18 a. 4 co."><a name="29174" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29174] Iª q. 18 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
11799 quod, sicut dictum est, vivere Dei est eius intelligere. In Deo 11799 quod, sicut dictum est, vivere Dei est eius intelligere. In Deo
11800 autem est idem intellectus et quod intelligitur, et ipsum 11800 autem est idem intellectus et quod intelligitur, et ipsum
11949 appetitus animalis. Et sic oportet in Deo esse voluntatem, cum sit 11949 appetitus animalis. Et sic oportet in Deo esse voluntatem, cum sit
11950 in eo intellectus. Et sicut suum intelligere est suum esse, ita 11950 in eo intellectus. Et sicut suum intelligere est suum esse, ita
11951 suum velle.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A1-p7"> 11951 suum velle.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A1-p7">
11952 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Although nothing apart from God is His end, yet He Himself is the end with respect to all things made by Him. And this by 11952 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Although nothing apart from God is His end, yet He Himself is the end with respect to all things made by Him. And this by
11953 His essence, for by His essence He is good, as shown above ( 11953 His essence, for by His essence He is good, as shown above (
11954 <a id="FP_Q19_A1-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q6_A3.html">Q[6], A[3]</a>): for the end has the aspect of good. 11954 <a href="#FP_Q6_A3" id="FP_Q19_A1-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[6], A[3]</a>): for the end has the aspect of good.
11955 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="29185" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29185] Iª q. 19 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo 11955 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="29185" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29185] Iª q. 19 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
11956 dicendum quod, licet nihil aliud a Deo sit finis Dei, tamen ipsemet 11956 dicendum quod, licet nihil aliud a Deo sit finis Dei, tamen ipsemet
11957 est finis respectu omnium quae ab eo fiunt. Et hoc per suam 11957 est finis respectu omnium quae ab eo fiunt. Et hoc per suam
11958 essentiam, cum per suam essentiam sit bonus, ut supra ostensum est, 11958 essentiam, cum per suam essentiam sit bonus, ut supra ostensum est,
11959 finis enim habet rationem boni.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A1-p8"> 11959 finis enim habet rationem boni.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A1-p8">
12008 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q19_A2-p6.1" href="./asv.html#iThess.4.3" target="asv">1 Thess. 4:3</a>): "This is the will of God, your sanctification." 12008 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q19_A2-p6.1" href="./asv.html#iThess.4.3" target="asv">1 Thess. 4:3</a>): "This is the will of God, your sanctification."
12009 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 2 s. c."><a name="29192" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29192] Iª q. 19 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est 12009 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 2 s. c."><a name="29192" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29192] Iª q. 19 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
12010 quod apostolus dicit, I Thess. IV, <i>haec est voluntas Dei, 12010 quod apostolus dicit, I Thess. IV, <i>haec est voluntas Dei,
12011 sanctificatio vestra</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A2-p7"> 12011 sanctificatio vestra</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A2-p7">
12012 <b>I answer that,</b> God wills not only Himself, but other things apart from Himself. This is clear from the comparison which we made above 12012 <b>I answer that,</b> God wills not only Himself, but other things apart from Himself. This is clear from the comparison which we made above
12013 <a id="FP_Q19_A2-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q19_A1.html">(A[1])</a>. For natural things have a natural inclination not only towards their own proper good, to acquire it if not possessed, and, 12013 <a href="#FP_Q19_A1" id="FP_Q19_A2-p7.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>. For natural things have a natural inclination not only towards their own proper good, to acquire it if not possessed, and,
12014 if possessed, to rest therein; but also to spread abroad their own good amongst others, so far as possible. Hence we see that 12014 if possessed, to rest therein; but also to spread abroad their own good amongst others, so far as possible. Hence we see that
12015 every agent, in so far as it is perfect and in act, produces 12015 every agent, in so far as it is perfect and in act, produces
12016 its like. It pertains, therefore, to the nature of the will to communicate as far as possible to others the good possessed; 12016 its like. It pertains, therefore, to the nature of the will to communicate as far as possible to others the good possessed;
12017 and especially does this pertain to the divine will, from which all perfection is derived in some kind of likeness. Hence, 12017 and especially does this pertain to the divine will, from which all perfection is derived in some kind of likeness. Hence,
12018 if natural things, in so far as they are perfect, communicate their good to others, much more does it appertain to the divine 12018 if natural things, in so far as they are perfect, communicate their good to others, much more does it appertain to the divine
12036 vult et se esse, et alia. Sed se ut finem, alia vero ut ad finem, 12036 vult et se esse, et alia. Sed se ut finem, alia vero ut ad finem,
12037 inquantum condecet divinam bonitatem etiam alia ipsam 12037 inquantum condecet divinam bonitatem etiam alia ipsam
12038 participare.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A2-p8"> 12038 participare.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A2-p8">
12039 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The divine will is God's own existence essentially, yet they differ in aspect, according to the different ways of understanding 12039 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The divine will is God's own existence essentially, yet they differ in aspect, according to the different ways of understanding
12040 them and expressing them, as is clear from what has already been said ( 12040 them and expressing them, as is clear from what has already been said (
12041 <a id="FP_Q19_A2-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q13_A4.html">Q[13], A[4]</a>). For when we say that God exists, no relation to any other object is implied, as we do imply when we say that God wills. 12041 <a href="#FP_Q13_A4" id="FP_Q19_A2-p8.1" shape="rect">Q[13], A[4]</a>). For when we say that God exists, no relation to any other object is implied, as we do imply when we say that God wills.
12042 Therefore, although He is not anything apart from Himself, yet He does will things apart from 12042 Therefore, although He is not anything apart from Himself, yet He does will things apart from
12043 Himself. 12043 Himself.
12044 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="29194" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29194] Iª q. 19 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo 12044 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="29194" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29194] Iª q. 19 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
12045 dicendum quod, licet divinum velle sit eius esse secundum rem, 12045 dicendum quod, licet divinum velle sit eius esse secundum rem,
12046 tamen differt ratione, secundum diversum modum intelligendi et 12046 tamen differt ratione, secundum diversum modum intelligendi et
12094 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="29199" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29199] Iª q. 19 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, Deus 12094 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="29199" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29199] Iª q. 19 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, Deus
12095 vult alia a se, inquantum vult bonitatem suam. Sed Deus bonitatem 12095 vult alia a se, inquantum vult bonitatem suam. Sed Deus bonitatem
12096 suam ex necessitate vult. Ergo alia a se ex necessitate vult.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A3-p4"> 12096 suam ex necessitate vult. Ergo alia a se ex necessitate vult.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A3-p4">
12097 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, whatever belongs to the nature of God is necessary, for God is of Himself necessary being, and the principle of 12097 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, whatever belongs to the nature of God is necessary, for God is of Himself necessary being, and the principle of
12098 all necessity, as above shown ( 12098 all necessity, as above shown (
12099 <a id="FP_Q19_A3-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q2_A3.html">Q[2], A[3]</a>). But it belongs to His nature to will whatever He wills; since in God there can be nothing over and above His nature as 12099 <a href="#FP_Q2_A3" id="FP_Q19_A3-p4.1" shape="rect">Q[2], A[3]</a>). But it belongs to His nature to will whatever He wills; since in God there can be nothing over and above His nature as
12100 stated in Metaph. v, 6. Therefore whatever He wills, He wills necessarily. 12100 stated in Metaph. v, 6. Therefore whatever He wills, He wills necessarily.
12101 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="29200" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29200] Iª q. 19 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, 12101 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="29200" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29200] Iª q. 19 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
12102 quidquid est Deo naturale, est necessarium, quia Deus est per se 12102 quidquid est Deo naturale, est necessarium, quia Deus est per se
12103 necesse esse, et principium omnis necessitatis, ut supra ostensum 12103 necesse esse, et principium omnis necessitatis, ut supra ostensum
12104 est. Sed naturale est ei velle quidquid vult, quia in Deo nihil 12104 est. Sed naturale est ei velle quidquid vult, quia in Deo nihil
12279 quia est calidus; sed artifex est causa domus, quia vult eam 12279 quia est calidus; sed artifex est causa domus, quia vult eam
12280 facere. Sed Augustinus dicit, in I de Doct. Christ., quod <i>quia 12280 facere. Sed Augustinus dicit, in I de Doct. Christ., quod <i>quia
12281 Deus bonus est, sumus</i>. Ergo Deus per suam naturam est causa 12281 Deus bonus est, sumus</i>. Ergo Deus per suam naturam est causa
12282 rerum, et non per voluntatem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A4-p5"> 12282 rerum, et non per voluntatem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A4-p5">
12283 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, Of one thing there is one cause. But the created things is the knowledge of God, as said before ( 12283 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, Of one thing there is one cause. But the created things is the knowledge of God, as said before (
12284 <a id="FP_Q19_A4-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q14_A8.html">Q[14], A[8]</a>). Therefore the will of God cannot be considered the cause of things. 12284 <a href="#FP_Q14_A8" id="FP_Q19_A4-p5.1" shape="rect">Q[14], A[8]</a>). Therefore the will of God cannot be considered the cause of things.
12285 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 4 arg. 4"><a name="29215" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29215] Iª q. 19 a. 4 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, unius 12285 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 4 arg. 4"><a name="29215" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29215] Iª q. 19 a. 4 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, unius
12286 rei una est causa. Sed rerum creatarum est causa scientia Dei, ut 12286 rei una est causa. Sed rerum creatarum est causa scientia Dei, ut
12287 supra dictum est. Ergo voluntas Dei non debet poni causa rerum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A4-p6"> 12287 supra dictum est. Ergo voluntas Dei non debet poni causa rerum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A4-p6">
12288 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is said ( 12288 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is said (
12289 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q19_A4-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.11.26" target="asv">Wis. 11:26</a>), "How could anything endure, if Thou wouldst not?" 12289 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q19_A4-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.11.26" target="asv">Wis. 11:26</a>), "How could anything endure, if Thou wouldst not?"
12301 for nature operates in one and the same way unless it be prevented. This is because the nature of the act is according to 12301 for nature operates in one and the same way unless it be prevented. This is because the nature of the act is according to
12302 the nature of the agent; and hence as long as it has that nature, its acts will be in accordance with that nature; for every 12302 the nature of the agent; and hence as long as it has that nature, its acts will be in accordance with that nature; for every
12303 natural agent has a determinate being. Since, then, the Divine Being is undetermined, and contains in Himself 12303 natural agent has a determinate being. Since, then, the Divine Being is undetermined, and contains in Himself
12304 the full perfection of being, it cannot be that He acts by a necessity of His nature, unless He were to cause something undetermined 12304 the full perfection of being, it cannot be that He acts by a necessity of His nature, unless He were to cause something undetermined
12305 and indefinite in being: and that this is impossible has been already shown ( 12305 and indefinite in being: and that this is impossible has been already shown (
12306 <a id="FP_Q19_A4-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q7_A2.html">Q[7], A[2]</a>). He does not, therefore, act by a necessity of His nature, but determined effects proceed from His own infinite perfection 12306 <a href="#FP_Q7_A2" id="FP_Q19_A4-p9.1" shape="rect">Q[7], A[2]</a>). He does not, therefore, act by a necessity of His nature, but determined effects proceed from His own infinite perfection
12307 according to the determination of His will and intellect. 12307 according to the determination of His will and intellect.
12308 </p><p id="FP_Q19_A4-p10"> Thirdly, it is shown by the relation of effects to their cause. For effects proceed from the agent that causes them, in so 12308 </p><p id="FP_Q19_A4-p10"> Thirdly, it is shown by the relation of effects to their cause. For effects proceed from the agent that causes them, in so
12309 far as they pre-exist in the agent; since every agent produces its like. Now effects pre-exist in their cause after the mode 12309 far as they pre-exist in the agent; since every agent produces its like. Now effects pre-exist in their cause after the mode
12310 of the cause. Wherefore since the Divine Being is His own intellect, effects pre-exist in Him after the mode of intellect, 12310 of the cause. Wherefore since the Divine Being is His own intellect, effects pre-exist in Him after the mode of intellect,
12311 and therefore proceed from Him after the same mode. Consequently, they proceed from Him after the mode of will, 12311 and therefore proceed from Him after the same mode. Consequently, they proceed from Him after the mode of will,
12384 <i>quis audeat dicere Deum irrationabiliter omnia condidisse?</i> 12384 <i>quis audeat dicere Deum irrationabiliter omnia condidisse?</i>
12385 Sed agenti voluntario, quod est ratio operandi, est etiam causa 12385 Sed agenti voluntario, quod est ratio operandi, est etiam causa
12386 volendi. Ergo voluntas Dei habet aliquam causam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A5-p3"> 12386 volendi. Ergo voluntas Dei habet aliquam causam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A5-p3">
12387 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, in things made by one who wills to make them, and whose will is influenced by no cause, there can be no cause assigned 12387 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, in things made by one who wills to make them, and whose will is influenced by no cause, there can be no cause assigned
12388 except by the will of him who wills. But the will of God is the cause of all things, as has been already shown 12388 except by the will of him who wills. But the will of God is the cause of all things, as has been already shown
12389 <a id="FP_Q19_A5-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q19_A4.html">(A[4])</a>. If, then, there is no cause of His will, we cannot seek in any natural things any cause, except the divine will alone. Thus 12389 <a href="#FP_Q19_A4" id="FP_Q19_A5-p3.1" shape="rect">(A[4])</a>. If, then, there is no cause of His will, we cannot seek in any natural things any cause, except the divine will alone. Thus
12390 all science would be in vain, since science seeks to assign causes 12390 all science would be in vain, since science seeks to assign causes
12391 to effects. This seems inadmissible, and therefore we must assign some cause to the divine will. 12391 to effects. This seems inadmissible, and therefore we must assign some cause to the divine will.
12392 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 5 arg. 2"><a name="29223" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29223] Iª q. 19 a. 5 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, in 12392 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 5 arg. 2"><a name="29223" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29223] Iª q. 19 a. 5 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, in
12393 his quae fiunt a volente qui propter nullam causam aliquid vult, 12393 his quae fiunt a volente qui propter nullam causam aliquid vult,
12394 non oportet aliam causam assignare nisi voluntatem volentis. Sed 12394 non oportet aliam causam assignare nisi voluntatem volentis. Sed
12665 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 7 arg. 3"><a name="29240" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29240] Iª q. 19 a. 7 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, 12665 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 7 arg. 3"><a name="29240" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29240] Iª q. 19 a. 7 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
12666 quidquid Deus facit, voluntarie facit. Sed Deus non semper eadem 12666 quidquid Deus facit, voluntarie facit. Sed Deus non semper eadem
12667 facit, nam quandoque praecepit legalia observari, quandoque 12667 facit, nam quandoque praecepit legalia observari, quandoque
12668 prohibuit. Ergo habet mutabilem voluntatem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A7-p5"> 12668 prohibuit. Ergo habet mutabilem voluntatem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A7-p5">
12669 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, God does not will of necessity what He wills, as said before 12669 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, God does not will of necessity what He wills, as said before
12670 <a id="FP_Q19_A7-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q19_A3.html">(A[3])</a>. Therefore He can both will and not will the same thing. But whatever can incline to either of two opposites, is changeable 12670 <a href="#FP_Q19_A3" id="FP_Q19_A7-p5.1" shape="rect">(A[3])</a>. Therefore He can both will and not will the same thing. But whatever can incline to either of two opposites, is changeable
12671 substantially; and that which can exist in a place or not in that place, is changeable locally. Therefore God is changeable 12671 substantially; and that which can exist in a place or not in that place, is changeable locally. Therefore God is changeable
12672 as regards His will. 12672 as regards His will.
12673 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 7 arg. 4"><a name="29241" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29241] Iª q. 19 a. 7 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, Deus 12673 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 7 arg. 4"><a name="29241" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29241] Iª q. 19 a. 7 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, Deus
12674 non ex necessitate vult quod vult, ut supra dictum est. Ergo potest 12674 non ex necessitate vult quod vult, ut supra dictum est. Ergo potest
12675 velle et non velle idem. Sed omne quod habet potentiam ad opposita, 12675 velle et non velle idem. Sed omne quod habet potentiam ad opposita,
12690 good, a man may in two ways begin to will a thing. In one way when that thing begins to be good for him, and this does not 12690 good, a man may in two ways begin to will a thing. In one way when that thing begins to be good for him, and this does not
12691 take place without a change in him. Thus when the cold weather begins, it becomes good to sit by the fire; though it was not 12691 take place without a change in him. Thus when the cold weather begins, it becomes good to sit by the fire; though it was not
12692 so before. In another way when he knows for the first time that a thing is good for him, though he did not know it before; 12692 so before. In another way when he knows for the first time that a thing is good for him, though he did not know it before;
12693 hence we take counsel in order to know what is good for us. Now it has already been shown that both the substance of God and 12693 hence we take counsel in order to know what is good for us. Now it has already been shown that both the substance of God and
12694 His knowledge are entirely unchangeable ( 12694 His knowledge are entirely unchangeable (
12695 <a id="FP_Q19_A7-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q9_A1.html">Q[9], A[1]</a>; 12695 <a href="#FP_Q9_A1" id="FP_Q19_A7-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[9], A[1]</a>;
12696 <a id="FP_Q19_A7-p7.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q14_A15.html">Q[14], A[15]</a>). Therefore His will must be entirely unchangeable. 12696 <a href="#FP_Q14_A15" id="FP_Q19_A7-p7.2" shape="rect">Q[14], A[15]</a>). Therefore His will must be entirely unchangeable.
12697 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 7 co."><a name="29243" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29243] Iª q. 19 a. 7 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum 12697 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 7 co."><a name="29243" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29243] Iª q. 19 a. 7 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
12698 quod voluntas Dei est omnino immutabilis. Sed circa hoc 12698 quod voluntas Dei est omnino immutabilis. Sed circa hoc
12699 considerandum est, quod aliud est mutare voluntatem; et aliud est 12699 considerandum est, quod aliud est mutare voluntatem; et aliud est
12700 velle aliquarum rerum mutationem. Potest enim aliquis, eadem 12700 velle aliquarum rerum mutationem. Potest enim aliquis, eadem
12701 voluntate immobiliter permanente, velle quod nunc fiat hoc, et 12701 voluntate immobiliter permanente, velle quod nunc fiat hoc, et
12767 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 7 ad 3"><a name="29246" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29246] Iª q. 19 a. 7 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium 12767 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 7 ad 3"><a name="29246" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29246] Iª q. 19 a. 7 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
12768 dicendum quod ex ratione illa non potest concludi quod Deus habeat 12768 dicendum quod ex ratione illa non potest concludi quod Deus habeat
12769 mutabilem voluntatem; sed quod mutationem velit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A7-p11"> 12769 mutabilem voluntatem; sed quod mutationem velit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A7-p11">
12770 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Although God's willing a thing is not by absolute necessity, yet it is necessary by supposition, on account of the unchangeableness 12770 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Although God's willing a thing is not by absolute necessity, yet it is necessary by supposition, on account of the unchangeableness
12771 of the divine will, as has been said above 12771 of the divine will, as has been said above
12772 <a id="FP_Q19_A7-p11.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q19_A3.html">(A[3])</a>. 12772 <a href="#FP_Q19_A3" id="FP_Q19_A7-p11.1" shape="rect">(A[3])</a>.
12773 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 7 ad 4"><a name="29247" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29247] Iª q. 19 a. 7 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum 12773 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 7 ad 4"><a name="29247" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29247] Iª q. 19 a. 7 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum
12774 dicendum quod, licet Deum velle aliquid non sit necessarium 12774 dicendum quod, licet Deum velle aliquid non sit necessarium
12775 absolute, tamen necessarium est ex suppositione, propter 12775 absolute, tamen necessarium est ex suppositione, propter
12776 immutabilitatem divinae voluntatis, ut supra dictum est.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q19_A8" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q19_A8-p0.1">Q. 19. A. 8. Whether the will of God imposes necessity on the things willed?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A8-p2"> 12776 immutabilitatem divinae voluntatis, ut supra dictum est.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q19_A8" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q19_A8-p0.1">Q. 19. A. 8. Whether the will of God imposes necessity on the things willed?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A8-p2">
12777 <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the will of God imposes necessity on the things willed. For Augustine says (Enchiridion 103): "No one is saved, 12777 <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the will of God imposes necessity on the things willed. For Augustine says (Enchiridion 103): "No one is saved,
12923 aliquis deterior. Illo autem auctore cum dicitur, illo volente 12923 aliquis deterior. Illo autem auctore cum dicitur, illo volente
12924 dicitur</i>. Non ergo volente Deo, fit homo deterior. Constat autem 12924 dicitur</i>. Non ergo volente Deo, fit homo deterior. Constat autem
12925 quod quolibet malo fit aliquid deterius. Ergo Deus non vult 12925 quod quolibet malo fit aliquid deterius. Ergo Deus non vult
12926 mala.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A9-p6"> 12926 mala.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A9-p6">
12927 <b>I answer that,</b> Since the ratio of good is the ratio of appetibility, as said before ( 12927 <b>I answer that,</b> Since the ratio of good is the ratio of appetibility, as said before (
12928 <a id="FP_Q19_A9-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q5_A1.html">Q[5], A[1]</a>), and since evil is opposed to good, it is impossible that any evil, as such, should be sought for by the appetite, either 12928 <a href="#FP_Q5_A1" id="FP_Q19_A9-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[5], A[1]</a>), and since evil is opposed to good, it is impossible that any evil, as such, should be sought for by the appetite, either
12929 natural, or animal, or by the intellectual appetite which is the will. Nevertheless evil may be sought accidentally, so far 12929 natural, or animal, or by the intellectual appetite which is the will. Nevertheless evil may be sought accidentally, so far
12930 as it accompanies a good, as appears in each of the appetites. For a natural agent intends not privation or 12930 as it accompanies a good, as appears in each of the appetites. For a natural agent intends not privation or
12931 corruption, but the form to which is annexed the privation of some other form, and the generation of one thing, which implies 12931 corruption, but the form to which is annexed the privation of some other form, and the generation of one thing, which implies
12932 the corruption of another. Also when a lion kills a stag, his object is food, to obtain which the killing of the animal is 12932 the corruption of another. Also when a lion kills a stag, his object is food, to obtain which the killing of the animal is
12933 only the means. Similarly the fornicator has merely pleasure for his object, and the deformity of sin is only an accompaniment. 12933 only the means. Similarly the fornicator has merely pleasure for his object, and the deformity of sin is only an accompaniment.
13004 enim Hieronymus, in homilia de filio prodigo, <i>solus Deus est, in 13004 enim Hieronymus, in homilia de filio prodigo, <i>solus Deus est, in
13005 quem peccatum non cadit, nec cadere potest; cetera, cum sint liberi 13005 quem peccatum non cadit, nec cadere potest; cetera, cum sint liberi
13006 arbitrii, in utramque partem flecti possunt</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A10-p3"> 13006 arbitrii, in utramque partem flecti possunt</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A10-p3">
13007 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, free-will is the faculty of the reason and will, by which good and evil are chosen. But God does not will evil, 13007 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, free-will is the faculty of the reason and will, by which good and evil are chosen. But God does not will evil,
13008 as has been said 13008 as has been said
13009 <a id="FP_Q19_A10-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q19_A9.html">(A[9])</a>. Therefore there is not free-will in God. 13009 <a href="#FP_Q19_A9" id="FP_Q19_A10-p3.1" shape="rect">(A[9])</a>. Therefore there is not free-will in God.
13010 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 10 arg. 2"><a name="29265" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29265] Iª q. 19 a. 10 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, 13010 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 10 arg. 2"><a name="29265" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29265] Iª q. 19 a. 10 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
13011 liberum arbitrium est facultas rationis et voluntatis, qua bonum et 13011 liberum arbitrium est facultas rationis et voluntatis, qua bonum et
13012 malum eligitur. Sed Deus non vult malum, ut dictum est. Ergo 13012 malum eligitur. Sed Deus non vult malum, ut dictum est. Ergo
13013 liberum arbitrium non est in Deo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A10-p4"> 13013 liberum arbitrium non est in Deo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A10-p4">
13014 <b>On the contrary,</b> Ambrose says (De Fide ii, 3): "The Holy Spirit divideth unto each one as He will, namely, according to the free choice of 13014 <b>On the contrary,</b> Ambrose says (De Fide ii, 3): "The Holy Spirit divideth unto each one as He will, namely, according to the free choice of
13019 necessitatis obsequio</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A10-p5"> 13019 necessitatis obsequio</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A10-p5">
13020 <b>I answer that,</b> We have free-will with respect to what we will not of necessity, nor be natural instinct. For our will to be happy does not 13020 <b>I answer that,</b> We have free-will with respect to what we will not of necessity, nor be natural instinct. For our will to be happy does not
13021 appertain to free-will, but to natural instinct. Hence other animals, that are moved to act by natural instinct, are not said 13021 appertain to free-will, but to natural instinct. Hence other animals, that are moved to act by natural instinct, are not said
13022 to be moved by free-will. Since then God necessarily wills His own goodness, but other things not necessarily, as shown above 13022 to be moved by free-will. Since then God necessarily wills His own goodness, but other things not necessarily, as shown above
13023 13023
13024 <a id="FP_Q19_A10-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q19_A3.html">(A[3])</a>, He has free will with respect to what He does not 13024 <a href="#FP_Q19_A3" id="FP_Q19_A10-p5.1" shape="rect">(A[3])</a>, He has free will with respect to what He does not
13025 necessarily will. 13025 necessarily will.
13026 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 10 co."><a name="29267" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29267] Iª q. 19 a. 10 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum 13026 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 10 co."><a name="29267" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29267] Iª q. 19 a. 10 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
13027 quod liberum arbitrium habemus respectu eorum quae non necessario 13027 quod liberum arbitrium habemus respectu eorum quae non necessario
13028 volumus, vel naturali instinctu. Non enim ad liberum arbitrium 13028 volumus, vel naturali instinctu. Non enim ad liberum arbitrium
13029 pertinet quod volumus esse felices, sed ad naturalem instinctum. 13029 pertinet quod volumus esse felices, sed ad naturalem instinctum.
13073 quod voluntas Dei est una, cum ipsa sit Dei essentia. Quandoque 13073 quod voluntas Dei est una, cum ipsa sit Dei essentia. Quandoque
13074 autem pluraliter significatur, ut cum dicitur, <i>magna opera 13074 autem pluraliter significatur, ut cum dicitur, <i>magna opera
13075 domini, exquisita in omnes voluntates eius</i>. Ergo oportet quod 13075 domini, exquisita in omnes voluntates eius</i>. Ergo oportet quod
13076 aliquando signum voluntatis pro voluntate accipiatur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A11-p5"> 13076 aliquando signum voluntatis pro voluntate accipiatur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A11-p5">
13077 <b>I answer that,</b> Some things are said of God in their strict sense; others by metaphor, as appears from what has been said before ( 13077 <b>I answer that,</b> Some things are said of God in their strict sense; others by metaphor, as appears from what has been said before (
13078 <a id="FP_Q19_A11-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q13_A3.html">Q[13], A[3]</a>). When certain human passions are predicated of the Godhead metaphorically, this is done because of a likeness in the effect. 13078 <a href="#FP_Q13_A3" id="FP_Q19_A11-p5.1" shape="rect">Q[13], A[3]</a>). When certain human passions are predicated of the Godhead metaphorically, this is done because of a likeness in the effect.
13079 Hence a thing that is in us a sign of some passion, is signified metaphorically in God under the name of that passion. Thus 13079 Hence a thing that is in us a sign of some passion, is signified metaphorically in God under the name of that passion. Thus
13080 with us it is usual for an angry man to punish, so that 13080 with us it is usual for an angry man to punish, so that
13081 punishment becomes an expression of anger. Therefore punishment itself is signified by the word anger, when anger is attributed 13081 punishment becomes an expression of anger. Therefore punishment itself is signified by the word anger, when anger is attributed
13082 to God. In the same way, what is usually with us an expression of will, is sometimes metaphorically called will in God; just 13082 to God. In the same way, what is usually with us an expression of will, is sometimes metaphorically called will in God; just
13083 as when anyone lays down a precept, it is a sign that he wishes that precept obeyed. Hence a divine precept is sometimes called 13083 as when anyone lays down a precept, it is a sign that he wishes that precept obeyed. Hence a divine precept is sometimes called
13302 all the other appetite movements presuppose love, as their root and origin. For nobody desires anything nor rejoices in anything, 13302 all the other appetite movements presuppose love, as their root and origin. For nobody desires anything nor rejoices in anything,
13303 except as a good that is loved: nor is anything an object of hate except as opposed to the object of love. 13303 except as a good that is loved: nor is anything an object of hate except as opposed to the object of love.
13304 Similarly, it is clear that sorrow, and other things like to it, must be referred to love as to their first principle. Hence, 13304 Similarly, it is clear that sorrow, and other things like to it, must be referred to love as to their first principle. Hence,
13305 in whomsoever there is will and appetite, there must also be love: since if the first is wanting, all that follows is also 13305 in whomsoever there is will and appetite, there must also be love: since if the first is wanting, all that follows is also
13306 wanting. Now it has been shown that will is in God ( 13306 wanting. Now it has been shown that will is in God (
13307 <a id="FP_Q20_A1-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q19_A1.html">Q[19], A[1]</a>), and hence we must attribute love to Him. 13307 <a href="#FP_Q19_A1" id="FP_Q20_A1-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[19], A[1]</a>), and hence we must attribute love to Him.
13308 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 20 a. 1 co."><a name="29290" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29290] Iª q. 20 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum 13308 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 20 a. 1 co."><a name="29290" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29290] Iª q. 20 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
13309 quod necesse est ponere amorem in Deo. Primus enim motus 13309 quod necesse est ponere amorem in Deo. Primus enim motus
13310 voluntatis, et cuiuslibet appetitivae virtutis, est amor. Cum enim 13310 voluntatis, et cuiuslibet appetitivae virtutis, est amor. Cum enim
13311 actus voluntatis, et cuiuslibet appetitivae virtutis tendat in 13311 actus voluntatis, et cuiuslibet appetitivae virtutis tendat in
13312 bonum et malum, sicut in propria obiecta; bonum autem principalius 13312 bonum et malum, sicut in propria obiecta; bonum autem principalius
13365 implied, as in desire, which is of the good we have not, and in sorrow, which is about the evil we have. This applies also 13365 implied, as in desire, which is of the good we have not, and in sorrow, which is about the evil we have. This applies also
13366 to anger, which supposes sorrow. Certain other passions, however, as love and joy, imply no imperfection. Since therefore 13366 to anger, which supposes sorrow. Certain other passions, however, as love and joy, imply no imperfection. Since therefore
13367 none of these can be attributed to God on their material side, as has been said (ad 1); neither can those that even on their 13367 none of these can be attributed to God on their material side, as has been said (ad 1); neither can those that even on their
13368 formal side imply imperfection be attributed to Him; except metaphorically, and from likeness of effects, as already show 13368 formal side imply imperfection be attributed to Him; except metaphorically, and from likeness of effects, as already show
13369 ( 13369 (
13370 <a id="FP_Q20_A1-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q3_A2.html">Q[3], A[2]</a> , ad 2; 13370 <a href="#FP_Q3_A2" id="FP_Q20_A1-p8.1" shape="rect">Q[3], A[2]</a> , ad 2;
13371 <a id="FP_Q20_A1-p8.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q19_A11.html">Q[19], A[11]</a>). Whereas, those that do not imply imperfection, such as love and joy, can be properly predicated of God, though without 13371 <a href="#FP_Q19_A11" id="FP_Q20_A1-p8.2" shape="rect">Q[19], A[11]</a>). Whereas, those that do not imply imperfection, such as love and joy, can be properly predicated of God, though without
13372 attributing passion to Him, as said before ( 13372 attributing passion to Him, as said before (
13373 <a id="FP_Q20_A1-p8.3" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q19_A11.html">Q[19], A[11]</a>). 13373 <a href="#FP_Q19_A11" id="FP_Q20_A1-p8.3" shape="rect">Q[19], A[11]</a>).
13374 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 20 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="29292" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29292] Iª q. 20 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum 13374 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 20 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="29292" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29292] Iª q. 20 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
13375 dicendum quod in passionibus sensitivi appetitus, est considerare 13375 dicendum quod in passionibus sensitivi appetitus, est considerare
13376 aliquid quasi materiale, scilicet corporalem transmutationem; et 13376 aliquid quasi materiale, scilicet corporalem transmutationem; et
13377 aliquid quasi formale, quod est ex parte appetitus. Sicut in ira, 13377 aliquid quasi formale, quod est ex parte appetitus. Sicut in ira,
13378 ut dicitur in I de anima, materiale est accensio sanguinis circa 13378 ut dicitur in I de anima, materiale est accensio sanguinis circa
13391 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> An act of love always tends towards two things; to the good that one wills, and to the person for whom one wills it: since 13391 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> An act of love always tends towards two things; to the good that one wills, and to the person for whom one wills it: since
13392 to love a person is to wish that person good. Hence, inasmuch as we love ourselves, we wish ourselves good; and, so far as 13392 to love a person is to wish that person good. Hence, inasmuch as we love ourselves, we wish ourselves good; and, so far as
13393 possible, union with that good. So love is called the unitive force, even in God, yet without implying composition; for the 13393 possible, union with that good. So love is called the unitive force, even in God, yet without implying composition; for the
13394 good that He wills for Himself, is no other than Himself, Who is good by His essence, 13394 good that He wills for Himself, is no other than Himself, Who is good by His essence,
13395 as above shown ( 13395 as above shown (
13396 <a id="FP_Q20_A1-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q6_A1.html">Q[6], AA[1]</a>,3). And by the fact that anyone loves another, he wills good to that other. Thus he puts the other, as it were, in the place 13396 <a href="#FP_Q6_A1" id="FP_Q20_A1-p9.1" shape="rect">Q[6], AA[1]</a>,3). And by the fact that anyone loves another, he wills good to that other. Thus he puts the other, as it were, in the place
13397 of himself; and regards the good done to him as done to himself. So far love is a binding force, since it aggregates another 13397 of himself; and regards the good done to him as done to himself. So far love is a binding force, since it aggregates another
13398 to ourselves, and refers his good to our own. And then again the divine love is a binding force, inasmuch as God wills good 13398 to ourselves, and refers his good to our own. And then again the divine love is a binding force, inasmuch as God wills good
13399 to others; yet it implies no composition in God. 13399 to others; yet it implies no composition in God.
13400 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 20 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="29293" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29293] Iª q. 20 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium 13400 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 20 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="29293" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29293] Iª q. 20 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
13401 dicendum quod actus amoris semper tendit in duo, scilicet in bonum 13401 dicendum quod actus amoris semper tendit in duo, scilicet in bonum
13449 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 20 a. 2 s. c."><a name="29298" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29298] Iª q. 20 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est 13449 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 20 a. 2 s. c."><a name="29298" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29298] Iª q. 20 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
13450 quod dicitur Sap. XI, <i>diligis omnia quae sunt, et nihil odisti 13450 quod dicitur Sap. XI, <i>diligis omnia quae sunt, et nihil odisti
13451 eorum quae fecisti</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q20_A2-p7"> 13451 eorum quae fecisti</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q20_A2-p7">
13452 <b>I answer that,</b> God loves all existing things. For all existing things, in so far as they exist, are good, since the existence of a thing 13452 <b>I answer that,</b> God loves all existing things. For all existing things, in so far as they exist, are good, since the existence of a thing
13453 is itself a good; and likewise, whatever perfection it possesses. Now it has been shown above ( 13453 is itself a good; and likewise, whatever perfection it possesses. Now it has been shown above (
13454 <a id="FP_Q20_A2-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q19_A4.html">Q[19], A[4]</a>) that God's will is the cause of all things. It must needs be, therefore, that a thing has existence, or any kind of good, 13454 <a href="#FP_Q19_A4" id="FP_Q20_A2-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[19], A[4]</a>) that God's will is the cause of all things. It must needs be, therefore, that a thing has existence, or any kind of good,
13455 only inasmuch as it is willed by God. To every existing thing, then, God wills some 13455 only inasmuch as it is willed by God. To every existing thing, then, God wills some
13456 good. Hence, since to love anything is nothing else than to will good to that thing, it is manifest that God loves everything 13456 good. Hence, since to love anything is nothing else than to will good to that thing, it is manifest that God loves everything
13457 that exists. Yet not as we love. Because since our will is not the cause of the goodness of things, but is moved by it as 13457 that exists. Yet not as we love. Because since our will is not the cause of the goodness of things, but is moved by it as
13458 by its object, our love, whereby we will good to anything, is not the cause of its goodness; but conversely its goodness, 13458 by its object, our love, whereby we will good to anything, is not the cause of its goodness; but conversely its goodness,
13459 whether real or imaginary, calls forth our love, by which we will that it should preserve the good it has, and receive besides 13459 whether real or imaginary, calls forth our love, by which we will that it should preserve the good it has, and receive besides
13553 the act of the will itself, which is more or less intense. In this way God does not love some things more than others, because 13553 the act of the will itself, which is more or less intense. In this way God does not love some things more than others, because
13554 He loves all things by an act of the will that is one, simple, and always the same. In another way on the part of the good 13554 He loves all things by an act of the will that is one, simple, and always the same. In another way on the part of the good
13555 itself that a person wills for the beloved. In this way we are said to love that one more 13555 itself that a person wills for the beloved. In this way we are said to love that one more
13556 than another, for whom we will a greater good, though our will is not more intense. In this way we must needs say that God 13556 than another, for whom we will a greater good, though our will is not more intense. In this way we must needs say that God
13557 loves some things more than others. For since God's love is the cause of goodness in things, as has been said 13557 loves some things more than others. For since God's love is the cause of goodness in things, as has been said
13558 <a id="FP_Q20_A3-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q20_A2.html">(A[2])</a>, no one thing would be better than another, if God did not will greater good for one than for another. 13558 <a href="#FP_Q20_A2" id="FP_Q20_A3-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[2])</a>, no one thing would be better than another, if God did not will greater good for one than for another.
13559 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 20 a. 3 co."><a name="29308" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29308] Iª q. 20 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum 13559 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 20 a. 3 co."><a name="29308" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29308] Iª q. 20 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
13560 quod, cum amare sit velle bonum alicui, duplici ratione potest 13560 quod, cum amare sit velle bonum alicui, duplici ratione potest
13561 aliquid magis vel minus amari. Uno modo, ex parte ipsius actus 13561 aliquid magis vel minus amari. Uno modo, ex parte ipsius actus
13562 voluntatis, qui est magis vel minus intensus. Et sic Deus non magis 13562 voluntatis, qui est magis vel minus intensus. Et sic Deus non magis
13563 quaedam aliis amat, quia omnia amat uno et simplici actu 13563 quaedam aliis amat, quia omnia amat uno et simplici actu
13651 unumquodque diligit sibi simile; ut patet per illud quod habetur 13651 unumquodque diligit sibi simile; ut patet per illud quod habetur
13652 Eccli. XIII, <i>omne animal diligit sibi simile</i>. Sed intantum 13652 Eccli. XIII, <i>omne animal diligit sibi simile</i>. Sed intantum
13653 aliquid est melius, inquantum est Deo similius. Ergo meliora magis 13653 aliquid est melius, inquantum est Deo similius. Ergo meliora magis
13654 diliguntur a Deo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q20_A4-p8"> 13654 diliguntur a Deo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q20_A4-p8">
13655 <b>I answer that,</b> It must needs be, according to what has been said before, that God loves more the better things . For it has been shown ( 13655 <b>I answer that,</b> It must needs be, according to what has been said before, that God loves more the better things . For it has been shown (
13656 <a id="FP_Q20_A4-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q20_A2.html">AA[2]</a>,3), that God's loving one thing more than another is nothing else than His willing for that thing a greater good: because 13656 <a href="#FP_Q20_A2" id="FP_Q20_A4-p8.1" shape="rect">AA[2]</a>,3), that God's loving one thing more than another is nothing else than His willing for that thing a greater good: because
13657 God's will is the cause of goodness in things; and the reason why some things are better than others, is that God wills for 13657 God's will is the cause of goodness in things; and the reason why some things are better than others, is that God wills for
13658 them a greater good. Hence it follows that He loves more the 13658 them a greater good. Hence it follows that He loves more the
13659 better things. 13659 better things.
13660 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 20 a. 4 co."><a name="29318" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29318] Iª q. 20 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum 13660 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 20 a. 4 co."><a name="29318" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29318] Iª q. 20 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
13661 quod necesse est dicere, secundum praedicta, quod Deus magis 13661 quod necesse est dicere, secundum praedicta, quod Deus magis
13846 omnibus tribuit propria, secundum uniuscuiusque existentium 13846 omnibus tribuit propria, secundum uniuscuiusque existentium
13847 dignitatem; et uniuscuiusque naturam in proprio salvat ordine et 13847 dignitatem; et uniuscuiusque naturam in proprio salvat ordine et
13848 virtute</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q21_A1-p8"> 13848 virtute</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q21_A1-p8">
13849 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Certain of the moral virtues are concerned with the passions, as temperance with concupiscence, fortitude with fear and daring, 13849 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Certain of the moral virtues are concerned with the passions, as temperance with concupiscence, fortitude with fear and daring,
13850 meekness with anger. Such virtues as these can only metaphorically be attributed to God; since, as stated above ( 13850 meekness with anger. Such virtues as these can only metaphorically be attributed to God; since, as stated above (
13851 <a id="FP_Q21_A1-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q20_A1.html">Q[20], A[1]</a> ), in God there are no passions; nor a sensitive appetite, which is, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 10), the subject 13851 <a href="#FP_Q20_A1" id="FP_Q21_A1-p8.1" shape="rect">Q[20], A[1]</a> ), in God there are no passions; nor a sensitive appetite, which is, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 10), the subject
13852 of those virtues. On the other hand, certain moral 13852 of those virtues. On the other hand, certain moral
13853 virtues are concerned with works of giving and expending; such as justice, liberality, and magnificence; and these reside 13853 virtues are concerned with works of giving and expending; such as justice, liberality, and magnificence; and these reside
13854 not in the sensitive faculty, but in the will. Hence, there is nothing to prevent our attributing these virtues to God; although 13854 not in the sensitive faculty, but in the will. Hence, there is nothing to prevent our attributing these virtues to God; although
13855 not in civil matters, but in such acts as are not unbecoming to Him. For, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. x, 8), it would 13855 not in civil matters, but in such acts as are not unbecoming to Him. For, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. x, 8), it would
13856 be absurd to praise God for His political virtues. 13856 be absurd to praise God for His political virtues.
13954 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q21_A2-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.84.11" target="asv">Ps. 84:11</a>): "Mercy and truth have met each other": where truth stands for justice. 13954 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q21_A2-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.84.11" target="asv">Ps. 84:11</a>): "Mercy and truth have met each other": where truth stands for justice.
13955 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 21 a. 2 s. c."><a name="29337" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29337] Iª q. 21 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est 13955 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 21 a. 2 s. c."><a name="29337" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29337] Iª q. 21 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
13956 quod in Psalmo LXXXIV dicitur, <i>misericordia et veritas 13956 quod in Psalmo LXXXIV dicitur, <i>misericordia et veritas
13957 obviaverunt sibi</i>; et ponitur ibi veritas pro iustitia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q21_A2-p5"> 13957 obviaverunt sibi</i>; et ponitur ibi veritas pro iustitia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q21_A2-p5">
13958 <b>I answer that,</b> Truth consists in the equation of mind and thing, as said above ( 13958 <b>I answer that,</b> Truth consists in the equation of mind and thing, as said above (
13959 <a id="FP_Q21_A2-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q16_A1.html">Q[16], A[1]</a>). Now the mind, that is the cause of the thing, is related to it as its rule and measure; whereas the converse is the case 13959 <a href="#FP_Q16_A1" id="FP_Q21_A2-p5.1" shape="rect">Q[16], A[1]</a>). Now the mind, that is the cause of the thing, is related to it as its rule and measure; whereas the converse is the case
13960 with the mind that receives its knowledge from things. When therefore things are the measure and rule of the mind, truth consists 13960 with the mind that receives its knowledge from things. When therefore things are the measure and rule of the mind, truth consists
13961 in the equation of the mind to the thing, as happens in ourselves. For according as a thing is, or is not, 13961 in the equation of the mind to the thing, as happens in ourselves. For according as a thing is, or is not,
13962 our thoughts or our words about it are true or false. But when the mind is the rule or measure of things, truth consists in 13962 our thoughts or our words about it are true or false. But when the mind is the rule or measure of things, truth consists in
13963 the equation of the thing to the mind; just as the work of an artist is said to be true, when it is in accordance with his 13963 the equation of the thing to the mind; just as the work of an artist is said to be true, when it is in accordance with his
13964 art. 13964 art.
14022 cor]; being affected with sorrow at the misery of another as though it were his own. Hence it follows that he endeavors to 14022 cor]; being affected with sorrow at the misery of another as though it were his own. Hence it follows that he endeavors to
14023 dispel the misery of this other, as if it were his; and this is the effect of mercy. To 14023 dispel the misery of this other, as if it were his; and this is the effect of mercy. To
14024 sorrow, therefore, over the misery of others belongs not to God; but it does most properly belong to Him to dispel that misery, 14024 sorrow, therefore, over the misery of others belongs not to God; but it does most properly belong to Him to dispel that misery,
14025 whatever be the defect we call by that name. Now defects are not removed, except by the perfection of some kind of goodness; 14025 whatever be the defect we call by that name. Now defects are not removed, except by the perfection of some kind of goodness;
14026 and the primary source of goodness is God, as shown above ( 14026 and the primary source of goodness is God, as shown above (
14027 <a id="FP_Q21_A3-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q6_A4.html">Q[6] , A[4]</a>). It must, however, be considered that to bestow perfections appertains not only to the divine goodness, but also to His 14027 <a href="#FP_Q6_A4" id="FP_Q21_A3-p5.1" shape="rect">Q[6] , A[4]</a>). It must, however, be considered that to bestow perfections appertains not only to the divine goodness, but also to His
14028 justice, liberality, and 14028 justice, liberality, and
14029 mercy; yet under different aspects. The communicating of perfections, absolutely considered, appertains to goodness, as shown 14029 mercy; yet under different aspects. The communicating of perfections, absolutely considered, appertains to goodness, as shown
14030 above ( 14030 above (
14031 <a id="FP_Q21_A3-p5.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q6_A1.html">Q[6], AA[1]</a>,4); in so far as perfections are given to things in proportion, the bestowal of them belongs to justice, as has been already 14031 <a href="#FP_Q6_A1" id="FP_Q21_A3-p5.2" shape="rect">Q[6], AA[1]</a>,4); in so far as perfections are given to things in proportion, the bestowal of them belongs to justice, as has been already
14032 said 14032 said
14033 <a id="FP_Q21_A3-p5.3" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q21_A1.html">(A[1])</a>; in so far as God does not bestow them for His own use, but only on account of His goodness, it belongs to liberality; in 14033 <a href="#FP_Q21_A1" id="FP_Q21_A3-p5.3" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>; in so far as God does not bestow them for His own use, but only on account of His goodness, it belongs to liberality; in
14034 so far as perfections given to things by God 14034 so far as perfections given to things by God
14035 expel defects, it belongs to mercy. 14035 expel defects, it belongs to mercy.
14036 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 21 a. 3 co."><a name="29344" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29344] Iª q. 21 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum 14036 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 21 a. 3 co."><a name="29344" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29344] Iª q. 21 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
14037 quod misericordia est Deo maxime attribuenda, tamen secundum 14037 quod misericordia est Deo maxime attribuenda, tamen secundum
14038 effectum, non secundum passionis affectum. Ad cuius evidentiam, 14038 effectum, non secundum passionis affectum. Ad cuius evidentiam,
14255 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 22 a. 1 s. c."><a name="29361" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29361] Iª q. 22 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est 14255 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 22 a. 1 s. c."><a name="29361" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29361] Iª q. 22 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
14256 quod dicitur Sap. XIV, <i>tu autem, pater, gubernas omnia 14256 quod dicitur Sap. XIV, <i>tu autem, pater, gubernas omnia
14257 providentia</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q22_A1-p6"> 14257 providentia</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q22_A1-p6">
14258 <b>I answer that,</b> It is necessary to attribute providence to God. For all the good that is in created things has been created by God, as was 14258 <b>I answer that,</b> It is necessary to attribute providence to God. For all the good that is in created things has been created by God, as was
14259 shown above ( 14259 shown above (
14260 <a id="FP_Q22_A1-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q6_A4.html">Q[6], A[4]</a>). In created things good is found not only as regards their substance, but also as regards their order towards an end and 14260 <a href="#FP_Q6_A4" id="FP_Q22_A1-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[6], A[4]</a>). In created things good is found not only as regards their substance, but also as regards their order towards an end and
14261 especially their last end, which, as was said above, is the divine goodness ( 14261 especially their last end, which, as was said above, is the divine goodness (
14262 <a id="FP_Q22_A1-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q21_A4.html">Q[21], A[4]</a>). This good of order existing in things created, is 14262 <a href="#FP_Q21_A4" id="FP_Q22_A1-p6.2" shape="rect">Q[21], A[4]</a>). This good of order existing in things created, is
14263 itself created by God. Since, however, God is the cause of things by His intellect, and thus it behooves that the type of 14263 itself created by God. Since, however, God is the cause of things by His intellect, and thus it behooves that the type of
14264 every effect should pre-exist in Him, as is clear from what has gone before ( 14264 every effect should pre-exist in Him, as is clear from what has gone before (
14265 <a id="FP_Q22_A1-p6.3" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q19_A4.html">Q[19], A[4]</a>), it is necessary that the type of the order of things towards their end should pre-exist in the divine mind: and the type 14265 <a href="#FP_Q19_A4" id="FP_Q22_A1-p6.3" shape="rect">Q[19], A[4]</a>), it is necessary that the type of the order of things towards their end should pre-exist in the divine mind: and the type
14266 of things ordered towards an end is, properly speaking, providence. For it is the chief part of prudence, to which two other 14266 of things ordered towards an end is, properly speaking, providence. For it is the chief part of prudence, to which two other
14267 parts are 14267 parts are
14268 directed---namely, remembrance of the past, and understanding of the present; inasmuch as from the remembrance of what is 14268 directed---namely, remembrance of the past, and understanding of the present; inasmuch as from the remembrance of what is
14269 past and the understanding of what is present, we gather how to provide for the future. Now it belongs to prudence, according 14269 past and the understanding of what is present, we gather how to provide for the future. Now it belongs to prudence, according
14270 to the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 12), to direct other things towards an end whether in regard to oneself---as for instance, 14270 to the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 12), to direct other things towards an end whether in regard to oneself---as for instance,
14304 est ipsa divina ratio in summo omnium principe constituta, quae 14304 est ipsa divina ratio in summo omnium principe constituta, quae
14305 cuncta disponit</i>. Dispositio autem potest dici tam ratio ordinis 14305 cuncta disponit</i>. Dispositio autem potest dici tam ratio ordinis
14306 rerum in finem, quam ratio ordinis partium in toto.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q22_A1-p7"> 14306 rerum in finem, quam ratio ordinis partium in toto.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q22_A1-p7">
14307 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> According to the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 9,10), "Prudence is what, strictly speaking, commands all that 'ebulia' has rightly 14307 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> According to the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 9,10), "Prudence is what, strictly speaking, commands all that 'ebulia' has rightly
14308 counselled and 'synesis' rightly judged" [*Cf. 14308 counselled and 'synesis' rightly judged" [*Cf.
14309 <a id="FP_Q22_A1-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q57_A6.html">FS, Q[57], A[6]</a>]. Whence, though to take counsel may not be fitting to God, from the fact that counsel is an inquiry into matters that are 14309 <a href="FS_v.html#FS_Q57_A6" id="FP_Q22_A1-p7.1" shape="rect">FS, Q[57], A[6]</a>]. Whence, though to take counsel may not be fitting to God, from the fact that counsel is an inquiry into matters that are
14310 doubtful, nevertheless to give a command as to the ordering of things towards an end, the right reason of which He 14310 doubtful, nevertheless to give a command as to the ordering of things towards an end, the right reason of which He
14311 possesses, does belong to God, according to 14311 possesses, does belong to God, according to
14312 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q22_A1-p7.2" href="./asv.html#Ps.148.6" target="asv"> Ps. 148:6</a>: "He hath made a decree, and it shall not pass away." In this manner both prudence and providence belong to God. Although 14312 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q22_A1-p7.2" href="./asv.html#Ps.148.6" target="asv"> Ps. 148:6</a>: "He hath made a decree, and it shall not pass away." In this manner both prudence and providence belong to God. Although
14313 at the same time it may be said that the very reason of things to be done is called counsel in God; not because of any inquiry 14313 at the same time it may be said that the very reason of things to be done is called counsel in God; not because of any inquiry
14314 necessitated, but from the certitude of the knowledge, to which those who take counsel come by inquiry. Whence it is said: 14314 necessitated, but from the certitude of the knowledge, to which those who take counsel come by inquiry. Whence it is said:
14338 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Providence resides in the intellect; but presupposes the act of willing the end. Nobody gives a precept about things done 14338 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Providence resides in the intellect; but presupposes the act of willing the end. Nobody gives a precept about things done
14339 for an end; unless he will that end. Hence prudence presupposes the moral virtues, by means of which the appetitive faculty 14339 for an end; unless he will that end. Hence prudence presupposes the moral virtues, by means of which the appetitive faculty
14340 is directed towards good, as the Philosopher says. Even if Providence has to do with the divine will and intellect equally, 14340 is directed towards good, as the Philosopher says. Even if Providence has to do with the divine will and intellect equally,
14341 this would not affect the divine simplicity, since in God both the will and intellect 14341 this would not affect the divine simplicity, since in God both the will and intellect
14342 are one and the same thing, as we have said above 14342 are one and the same thing, as we have said above
14343 <a id="FP_Q22_A1-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q19.html">(Q[19])</a>. 14343 <a href="#FP_Q19" id="FP_Q22_A1-p9.1" shape="rect">(Q[19])</a>.
14344 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 22 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="29365" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29365] Iª q. 22 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium 14344 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 22 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="29365" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29365] Iª q. 22 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
14345 dicendum quod providentia est in intellectu, sed praesupponit 14345 dicendum quod providentia est in intellectu, sed praesupponit
14346 voluntatem finis, nullus enim praecipit de agendis propter finem, 14346 voluntatem finis, nullus enim praecipit de agendis propter finem,
14347 nisi velit finem. Unde et prudentia praesupponit virtutes morales, 14347 nisi velit finem. Unde et prudentia praesupponit virtutes morales,
14348 per quas appetitus se habet ad bonum, ut dicitur in VI Ethic. Et 14348 per quas appetitus se habet ad bonum, ut dicitur in VI Ethic. Et
14416 a 14416 a
14417 Deo ordinatae sunt.' St. Thomas often quotes this passage, and invariably reads: 'Quae a Deo sunt, ordinata sunt.']" ( 14417 Deo ordinatae sunt.' St. Thomas often quotes this passage, and invariably reads: 'Quae a Deo sunt, ordinata sunt.']" (
14418 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q22_A2-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.13.1" target="asv">Rom. 13:1</a>). Since, therefore, as the providence of God is nothing less than the type of the order of things towards an end, as we have 14418 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q22_A2-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.13.1" target="asv">Rom. 13:1</a>). Since, therefore, as the providence of God is nothing less than the type of the order of things towards an end, as we have
14419 said; it necessarily follows that all things, inasmuch as they participate in existence, must likewise be subject to divine 14419 said; it necessarily follows that all things, inasmuch as they participate in existence, must likewise be subject to divine
14420 providence. It has also been shown ( 14420 providence. It has also been shown (
14421 <a id="FP_Q22_A2-p9.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q14_A6.html">Q[14], AA[6]</a>,11) that God knows all 14421 <a href="#FP_Q14_A6" id="FP_Q22_A2-p9.2" shape="rect">Q[14], AA[6]</a>,11) that God knows all
14422 things, both universal and particular. And since His knowledge may be compared to the things themselves, as the knowledge 14422 things, both universal and particular. And since His knowledge may be compared to the things themselves, as the knowledge
14423 of art to the objects of art, all things must of necessity come under His ordering; as all things wrought by art are subject 14423 of art to the objects of art, all things must of necessity come under His ordering; as all things wrought by art are subject
14424 to the ordering of that art. 14424 to the ordering of that art.
14425 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 22 a. 2 co."><a name="29372" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29372] Iª q. 22 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum 14425 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 22 a. 2 co."><a name="29372" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29372] Iª q. 22 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
14426 quod quidam totaliter providentiam negaverunt, sicut Democritus et 14426 quod quidam totaliter providentiam negaverunt, sicut Democritus et
14563 providentia excludantur, alioquin in nihilum deciderent, nisi per 14563 providentia excludantur, alioquin in nihilum deciderent, nisi per
14564 eius providentiam conservarentur. Et ex hac ratione videtur motus 14564 eius providentiam conservarentur. Et ex hac ratione videtur motus
14565 fuisse Tullius, qui res humanas, de quibus consiliamur, divinae 14565 fuisse Tullius, qui res humanas, de quibus consiliamur, divinae
14566 providentiae subtraxit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q22_A2-p14"> 14566 providentiae subtraxit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q22_A2-p14">
14567 <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> Since a rational creature has, through its free will, control over its actions, as was said above ( 14567 <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> Since a rational creature has, through its free will, control over its actions, as was said above (
14568 <a id="FP_Q22_A2-p14.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q19_A10.html">Q[19], A[10]</a>), it is subject to divine providence in an especial manner, so that something is imputed to it as a fault, or as a merit; 14568 <a href="#FP_Q19_A10" id="FP_Q22_A2-p14.1" shape="rect">Q[19], A[10]</a>), it is subject to divine providence in an especial manner, so that something is imputed to it as a fault, or as a merit;
14569 and there is given it accordingly something by way of punishment or reward. In this way, the Apostle withdraws oxen from the 14569 and there is given it accordingly something by way of punishment or reward. In this way, the Apostle withdraws oxen from the
14570 care of God: not, however, that individual irrational creatures escape 14570 care of God: not, however, that individual irrational creatures escape
14571 the care of divine providence; as was the opinion of the Rabbi Moses. 14571 the care of divine providence; as was the opinion of the Rabbi Moses.
14572 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 22 a. 2 ad 5"><a name="29377" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29377] Iª q. 22 a. 2 ad 5</span></a> Ad quintum 14572 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 22 a. 2 ad 5"><a name="29377" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29377] Iª q. 22 a. 2 ad 5</span></a> Ad quintum
14573 dicendum quod, quia creatura rationalis habet per liberum arbitrium 14573 dicendum quod, quia creatura rationalis habet per liberum arbitrium
14655 quae per eos agenda sunt, est ex defectu ipsius. Omnis enim 14655 quae per eos agenda sunt, est ex defectu ipsius. Omnis enim
14656 scientia operativa tanto perfectior est, quanto magis particularia 14656 scientia operativa tanto perfectior est, quanto magis particularia
14657 considerat, in quibus est actus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q22_A3-p8"> 14657 considerat, in quibus est actus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q22_A3-p8">
14658 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> God's immediate provision over everything does not exclude the action of secondary causes; which are the executors of His 14658 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> God's immediate provision over everything does not exclude the action of secondary causes; which are the executors of His
14659 order, as was said above ( 14659 order, as was said above (
14660 <a id="FP_Q22_A3-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q19_A5.html">Q[19], AA[5]</a>,8). 14660 <a href="#FP_Q19_A5" id="FP_Q22_A3-p8.1" shape="rect">Q[19], AA[5]</a>,8).
14661 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 22 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="29384" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29384] Iª q. 22 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum 14661 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 22 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="29384" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29384] Iª q. 22 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
14662 dicendum quod per hoc quod Deus habet immediate providentiam de 14662 dicendum quod per hoc quod Deus habet immediate providentiam de
14663 rebus omnibus, non excluduntur causae secundae, quae sunt 14663 rebus omnibus, non excluduntur causae secundae, quae sunt
14664 executrices huius ordinis, ut ex supra dictis patet.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q22_A3-p9"> 14664 executrices huius ordinis, ut ex supra dictis patet.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q22_A3-p9">
14665 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> It is better for us not to know low and vile things, because by them we are impeded in our knowledge of what is better and 14665 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> It is better for us not to know low and vile things, because by them we are impeded in our knowledge of what is better and
14787 ea</i>. Sed merita et demerita humana sunt in nobis, inquantum 14787 ea</i>. Sed merita et demerita humana sunt in nobis, inquantum
14788 sumus nostrorum actuum domini per liberum arbitrium. Ea ergo quae 14788 sumus nostrorum actuum domini per liberum arbitrium. Ea ergo quae
14789 pertinent ad meritum vel demeritum, non praedestinantur a Deo. Et 14789 pertinent ad meritum vel demeritum, non praedestinantur a Deo. Et
14790 sic hominum praedestinatio tollitur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q23_A1-p3"> 14790 sic hominum praedestinatio tollitur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q23_A1-p3">
14791 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, all creatures are directed to their end by divine providence, as was said above ( 14791 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, all creatures are directed to their end by divine providence, as was said above (
14792 <a id="FP_Q23_A1-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q22_A1.html">Q[22], AA[1]</a>,2). But other creatures are not said to be predestined by God. Therefore neither are men. 14792 <a href="#FP_Q22_A1" id="FP_Q23_A1-p3.1" shape="rect">Q[22], AA[1]</a>,2). But other creatures are not said to be predestined by God. Therefore neither are men.
14793 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 23 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="29396" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29396] Iª q. 23 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, omnes 14793 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 23 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="29396" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29396] Iª q. 23 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, omnes
14794 creaturae ordinantur ad suos fines per divinam providentiam, ut 14794 creaturae ordinantur ad suos fines per divinam providentiam, ut
14795 supra dictum est. Sed aliae creaturae non dicuntur praedestinari a 14795 supra dictum est. Sed aliae creaturae non dicuntur praedestinari a
14796 Deo. Ergo nec homines.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q23_A1-p4"> 14796 Deo. Ergo nec homines.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q23_A1-p4">
14797 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the angels are capable of beatitude, as well as men. But predestination is not suitable to angels, since in them 14797 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the angels are capable of beatitude, as well as men. But predestination is not suitable to angels, since in them
14798 there never was any unhappiness (miseria); for predestination, as Augustine says (De praedest. sanct. 17), is the "purpose 14798 there never was any unhappiness (miseria); for predestination, as Augustine says (De praedest. sanct. 17), is the "purpose
14799 to take pity [miserendi]" [*See 14799 to take pity [miserendi]" [*See
14800 <a id="FP_Q23_A1-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q22_A3.html">Q[22], A[3]</a>]. Therefore men are not predestined. 14800 <a href="#FP_Q22_A3" id="FP_Q23_A1-p4.1" shape="rect">Q[22], A[3]</a>]. Therefore men are not predestined.
14801 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 23 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="29397" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29397] Iª q. 23 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, 14801 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 23 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="29397" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29397] Iª q. 23 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
14802 Angeli sunt capaces beatitudinis, sicut et homines. Sed Angelis non 14802 Angeli sunt capaces beatitudinis, sicut et homines. Sed Angelis non
14803 competit praedestinari, ut videtur, cum in eis nunquam fuerit 14803 competit praedestinari, ut videtur, cum in eis nunquam fuerit
14804 miseria; praedestinatio autem est propositum miserendi, ut dicit 14804 miseria; praedestinatio autem est propositum miserendi, ut dicit
14805 Augustinus. Ergo homines non praedestinantur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q23_A1-p5"> 14805 Augustinus. Ergo homines non praedestinantur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q23_A1-p5">
14820 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q23_A1-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.8.30" target="asv">Rom. 8:30</a>): "Whom He predestined, them He also called." 14820 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q23_A1-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.8.30" target="asv">Rom. 8:30</a>): "Whom He predestined, them He also called."
14821 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 23 a. 1 s. c."><a name="29399" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29399] Iª q. 23 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est 14821 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 23 a. 1 s. c."><a name="29399" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29399] Iª q. 23 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
14822 quod dicitur Rom. VIII, <i>quos praedestinavit, hos et 14822 quod dicitur Rom. VIII, <i>quos praedestinavit, hos et
14823 vocavit</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q23_A1-p7"> 14823 vocavit</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q23_A1-p7">
14824 <b>I answer that,</b> It is fitting that God should predestine men. For all things are subject to His providence, as was shown above ( 14824 <b>I answer that,</b> It is fitting that God should predestine men. For all things are subject to His providence, as was shown above (
14825 <a id="FP_Q23_A1-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q22_A2.html">Q[22], A[2]</a>). Now it belongs to providence to direct things towards their end, as was also said ( 14825 <a href="#FP_Q22_A2" id="FP_Q23_A1-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[22], A[2]</a>). Now it belongs to providence to direct things towards their end, as was also said (
14826 <a id="FP_Q23_A1-p7.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q22_A1.html">Q[22], AA[1]</a>,2). The end towards which created things are directed by God is twofold; one which exceeds all proportion and faculty of 14826 <a href="#FP_Q22_A1" id="FP_Q23_A1-p7.2" shape="rect">Q[22], AA[1]</a>,2). The end towards which created things are directed by God is twofold; one which exceeds all proportion and faculty of
14827 created nature; and this end is life eternal, that consists in seeing 14827 created nature; and this end is life eternal, that consists in seeing
14828 God which is above the nature of every creature, as shown above ( 14828 God which is above the nature of every creature, as shown above (
14829 <a id="FP_Q23_A1-p7.3" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q12_A4.html">Q[12], A[4]</a>). The other end, however, is proportionate to created nature, to which end created being can attain according to the power 14829 <a href="#FP_Q12_A4" id="FP_Q23_A1-p7.3" shape="rect">Q[12], A[4]</a>). The other end, however, is proportionate to created nature, to which end created being can attain according to the power
14830 of its nature. Now if a thing cannot attain to something by the power of its nature, it must be directed thereto by another; 14830 of its nature. Now if a thing cannot attain to something by the power of its nature, it must be directed thereto by another;
14831 thus, an arrow is directed by the archer towards a mark. Hence, properly speaking, a rational creature, capable of eternal 14831 thus, an arrow is directed by the archer towards a mark. Hence, properly speaking, a rational creature, capable of eternal
14832 life, is led towards it, 14832 life, is led towards it,
14833 directed, as it were, by God. The reason of that direction pre-exists in God; as in Him is the type of the order of all things 14833 directed, as it were, by God. The reason of that direction pre-exists in God; as in Him is the type of the order of all things
14834 towards an end, which we proved above to be providence. Now the type in the mind of the doer of something to be done, is a 14834 towards an end, which we proved above to be providence. Now the type in the mind of the doer of something to be done, is a
14877 its species from the term "wherefrom" but from the term "whereto." Because it matters nothing, in respect of the notion of 14877 its species from the term "wherefrom" but from the term "whereto." Because it matters nothing, in respect of the notion of
14878 making white, whether he who is made white was before black, yellow or red. Likewise it matters nothing in respect of the 14878 making white, whether he who is made white was before black, yellow or red. Likewise it matters nothing in respect of the
14879 notion of predestination whether one is predestined to life eternal from the state of 14879 notion of predestination whether one is predestined to life eternal from the state of
14880 misery or not. Although it may be said that every conferring of good above that which is due pertains to mercy; as was shown 14880 misery or not. Although it may be said that every conferring of good above that which is due pertains to mercy; as was shown
14881 previously ( 14881 previously (
14882 <a id="FP_Q23_A1-p10.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q21_A3.html">Q[21], AA[3]</a>,4). 14882 <a href="#FP_Q21_A3" id="FP_Q23_A1-p10.1" shape="rect">Q[21], AA[3]</a>,4).
14883 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 23 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="29403" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29403] Iª q. 23 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium 14883 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 23 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="29403" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29403] Iª q. 23 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
14884 dicendum quod praedestinari convenit Angelis, sicut et hominibus, 14884 dicendum quod praedestinari convenit Angelis, sicut et hominibus,
14885 licet nunquam fuerint miseri. Nam motus non accipit speciem a 14885 licet nunquam fuerint miseri. Nam motus non accipit speciem a
14886 termino a quo, sed a termino ad quem, nihil enim refert, quantum ad 14886 termino a quo, sed a termino ad quem, nihil enim refert, quantum ad
14887 rationem dealbationis, utrum ille qui dealbatur, fuerit niger aut 14887 rationem dealbationis, utrum ille qui dealbatur, fuerit niger aut
14942 praesciente. Ergo nec praedestinatio est in praedestinatis, sed in 14942 praesciente. Ergo nec praedestinatio est in praedestinatis, sed in
14943 praedestinante.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q23_A2-p7"> 14943 praedestinante.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q23_A2-p7">
14944 <b>I answer that,</b> Predestination is not anything in the predestined; but only in the person who predestines. We have said above that predestination 14944 <b>I answer that,</b> Predestination is not anything in the predestined; but only in the person who predestines. We have said above that predestination
14945 is a part of providence. Now providence is not anything in the things provided for; but is a type in the mind of the provider, 14945 is a part of providence. Now providence is not anything in the things provided for; but is a type in the mind of the provider,
14946 as was proved above ( 14946 as was proved above (
14947 <a id="FP_Q23_A2-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q22_A1.html">Q[22], A[1]</a>). But the execution of providence which is called government, is in a passive way in the thing governed, and in an active 14947 <a href="#FP_Q22_A1" id="FP_Q23_A2-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[22], A[1]</a>). But the execution of providence which is called government, is in a passive way in the thing governed, and in an active
14948 way in the governor. 14948 way in the governor.
14949 Whence it is clear that predestination is a kind of type of the ordering of some persons towards eternal salvation, existing 14949 Whence it is clear that predestination is a kind of type of the ordering of some persons towards eternal salvation, existing
14950 in the divine mind. The execution, however, of this order is in a passive way in the predestined, but actively in God. The 14950 in the divine mind. The execution, however, of this order is in a passive way in the predestined, but actively in God. The
14951 execution of predestination is the calling and magnification; according to the Apostle ( 14951 execution of predestination is the calling and magnification; according to the Apostle (
14952 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q23_A2-p7.2" href="./asv.html#Rom.8.30" target="asv">Rom. 8:30</a>): "Whom He predestined, them He also called and whom He called, them He also magnified [Vulg. 'justified']." 14952 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q23_A2-p7.2" href="./asv.html#Rom.8.30" target="asv">Rom. 8:30</a>): "Whom He predestined, them He also called and whom He called, them He also magnified [Vulg. 'justified']."
14964 magnificatio, secundum illud apostoli, ad Rom. VIII, <i>quos 14964 magnificatio, secundum illud apostoli, ad Rom. VIII, <i>quos
14965 praedestinavit, hos et vocavit; et quos vocavit, hos et 14965 praedestinavit, hos et vocavit; et quos vocavit, hos et
14966 magnificavit</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q23_A2-p8"> 14966 magnificavit</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q23_A2-p8">
14967 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Actions passing out to external matter imply of themselves passion---for example, the actions of warming and cutting; but 14967 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Actions passing out to external matter imply of themselves passion---for example, the actions of warming and cutting; but
14968 not so actions remaining in the agent, as understanding and willing, as said above ( 14968 not so actions remaining in the agent, as understanding and willing, as said above (
14969 <a id="FP_Q23_A2-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q14_A2.html">Q[14], A[2]</a>; 14969 <a href="#FP_Q14_A2" id="FP_Q23_A2-p8.1" shape="rect">Q[14], A[2]</a>;
14970 <a id="FP_Q23_A2-p8.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q18_A3.html">Q[18], A[3]</a>, ad 1). Predestination is an action of this latter class. Wherefore, it does not put anything in the predestined. But its 14970 <a href="#FP_Q18_A3" id="FP_Q23_A2-p8.2" shape="rect">Q[18], A[3]</a>, ad 1). Predestination is an action of this latter class. Wherefore, it does not put anything in the predestined. But its
14971 execution, which passes out to external things, has 14971 execution, which passes out to external things, has
14972 an effect in them. 14972 an effect in them.
14973 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 23 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="29411" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29411] Iª q. 23 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo 14973 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 23 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="29411" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29411] Iª q. 23 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
14974 dicendum quod actiones in exteriorem materiam transeuntes, inferunt 14974 dicendum quod actiones in exteriorem materiam transeuntes, inferunt
14975 ex se passionem, ut calefactio et secatio, non autem actiones in 14975 ex se passionem, ut calefactio et secatio, non autem actiones in
15050 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q23_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Mal.1.2" target="asv">Malachi 1:2,3</a>): "I have loved Jacob, but have hated Esau." 15050 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q23_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Mal.1.2" target="asv">Malachi 1:2,3</a>): "I have loved Jacob, but have hated Esau."
15051 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 23 a. 3 s. c."><a name="29418" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29418] Iª q. 23 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est 15051 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 23 a. 3 s. c."><a name="29418" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29418] Iª q. 23 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
15052 quod dicitur Malach. I, <i>Iacob dilexi, Esau autem odio 15052 quod dicitur Malach. I, <i>Iacob dilexi, Esau autem odio
15053 habui</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q23_A3-p6"> 15053 habui</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q23_A3-p6">
15054 <b>I answer that,</b> God does reprobate some. For it was said above 15054 <b>I answer that,</b> God does reprobate some. For it was said above
15055 <a id="FP_Q23_A3-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q23_A1.html">(A[1])</a> that predestination is a part of providence. To providence, however, it belongs to permit certain defects in those things 15055 <a href="#FP_Q23_A1" id="FP_Q23_A3-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a> that predestination is a part of providence. To providence, however, it belongs to permit certain defects in those things
15056 which are subject to providence, as was said above ( 15056 which are subject to providence, as was said above (
15057 <a id="FP_Q23_A3-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q22_A2.html">Q[22], A[2]</a>). Thus, as men are ordained to eternal life through the providence of God, it likewise is part of that providence to permit 15057 <a href="#FP_Q22_A2" id="FP_Q23_A3-p6.2" shape="rect">Q[22], A[2]</a>). Thus, as men are ordained to eternal life through the providence of God, it likewise is part of that providence to permit
15058 some to fall away from that end; this is called 15058 some to fall away from that end; this is called
15059 reprobation. Thus, as predestination is a part of providence, in regard to those ordained to eternal salvation, so reprobation 15059 reprobation. Thus, as predestination is a part of providence, in regard to those ordained to eternal salvation, so reprobation
15060 is a part of providence in regard to those who turn aside from that end. Hence reprobation implies not only foreknowledge, 15060 is a part of providence in regard to those who turn aside from that end. Hence reprobation implies not only foreknowledge,
15061 but also something more, as does providence, as was said above ( 15061 but also something more, as does providence, as was said above (
15062 <a id="FP_Q23_A3-p6.3" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q22_A1.html">Q[22], A[1]</a>). Therefore, as predestination includes the will to confer grace and glory; so also reprobation includes the will to permit 15062 <a href="#FP_Q22_A1" id="FP_Q23_A3-p6.3" shape="rect">Q[22], A[1]</a>). Therefore, as predestination includes the will to confer grace and glory; so also reprobation includes the will to permit
15063 a person to fall into 15063 a person to fall into
15064 sin, and to impose the punishment of damnation on account of that sin. 15064 sin, and to impose the punishment of damnation on account of that sin.
15065 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 23 a. 3 co."><a name="29419" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29419] Iª q. 23 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum 15065 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 23 a. 3 co."><a name="29419" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29419] Iª q. 23 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
15066 quod Deus aliquos reprobat. Dictum enim est supra quod 15066 quod Deus aliquos reprobat. Dictum enim est supra quod
15067 praedestinatio est pars providentiae. Ad providentiam autem 15067 praedestinatio est pars providentiae. Ad providentiam autem
15103 verificatur dictum prophetae, scilicet, <i>perditio tua, Israel, ex 15103 verificatur dictum prophetae, scilicet, <i>perditio tua, Israel, ex
15104 te</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q23_A3-p9"> 15104 te</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q23_A3-p9">
15105 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Reprobation by God does not take anything away from the power of the person reprobated. Hence, when it is said that the reprobated 15105 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Reprobation by God does not take anything away from the power of the person reprobated. Hence, when it is said that the reprobated
15106 cannot obtain grace, this must not be understood as implying absolute impossibility: but only conditional impossibility: as 15106 cannot obtain grace, this must not be understood as implying absolute impossibility: but only conditional impossibility: as
15107 was said above ( 15107 was said above (
15108 <a id="FP_Q23_A3-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q19_A3.html">Q[19], A[3]</a>), that the predestined must necessarily be saved; yet a conditional necessity, which does not do away with the liberty of 15108 <a href="#FP_Q19_A3" id="FP_Q23_A3-p9.1" shape="rect">Q[19], A[3]</a>), that the predestined must necessarily be saved; yet a conditional necessity, which does not do away with the liberty of
15109 choice. Whence, although 15109 choice. Whence, although
15110 anyone reprobated by God cannot acquire grace, nevertheless that he falls into this or that particular sin comes from the 15110 anyone reprobated by God cannot acquire grace, nevertheless that he falls into this or that particular sin comes from the
15111 use of his free-will. Hence it is rightly imputed to him as guilt. 15111 use of his free-will. Hence it is rightly imputed to him as guilt.
15112 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 23 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="29422" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29422] Iª q. 23 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium 15112 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 23 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="29422" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29422] Iª q. 23 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
15113 dicendum quod reprobatio Dei non subtrahit aliquid de potentia 15113 dicendum quod reprobatio Dei non subtrahit aliquid de potentia
15149 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 23 a. 4 s. c."><a name="29426" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29426] Iª q. 23 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est 15149 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 23 a. 4 s. c."><a name="29426" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29426] Iª q. 23 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
15150 quod dicitur Ephes. I, <i>elegit nos in ipso ante mundi 15150 quod dicitur Ephes. I, <i>elegit nos in ipso ante mundi
15151 constitutionem</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q23_A4-p6"> 15151 constitutionem</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q23_A4-p6">
15152 <b>I answer that,</b> Predestination presupposes election in the order of reason; and election presupposes love. The reason of this is that predestination, 15152 <b>I answer that,</b> Predestination presupposes election in the order of reason; and election presupposes love. The reason of this is that predestination,
15153 as stated above 15153 as stated above
15154 <a id="FP_Q23_A4-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q23_A1.html">(A[1])</a>, is a part of providence. Now providence, as also prudence, is the plan existing in the intellect directing the ordering 15154 <a href="#FP_Q23_A1" id="FP_Q23_A4-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>, is a part of providence. Now providence, as also prudence, is the plan existing in the intellect directing the ordering
15155 of some things towards an end; as was proved above ( 15155 of some things towards an end; as was proved above (
15156 <a id="FP_Q23_A4-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q22_A2.html">Q[22], A[2]</a>). But nothing is directed towards an end unless the will for that end 15156 <a href="#FP_Q22_A2" id="FP_Q23_A4-p6.2" shape="rect">Q[22], A[2]</a>). But nothing is directed towards an end unless the will for that end
15157 already exists. Whence the predestination of some to eternal salvation presupposes, in the order of reason, that God wills 15157 already exists. Whence the predestination of some to eternal salvation presupposes, in the order of reason, that God wills
15158 their salvation; and to this belong both election and love:---love, inasmuch as He wills them this particular good of eternal 15158 their salvation; and to this belong both election and love:---love, inasmuch as He wills them this particular good of eternal
15159 salvation; since to love is to wish well to anyone, as stated above ( 15159 salvation; since to love is to wish well to anyone, as stated above (
15160 <a id="FP_Q23_A4-p6.3" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q20_A2.html">Q[20], AA[2]</a>,3):---election, inasmuch as He wills this good to some in preference to others; since He reprobates some, as stated above 15160 <a href="#FP_Q20_A2" id="FP_Q23_A4-p6.3" shape="rect">Q[20], AA[2]</a>,3):---election, inasmuch as He wills this good to some in preference to others; since He reprobates some, as stated above
15161 15161
15162 <a id="FP_Q23_A4-p6.4" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q23_A3.html">(A[3])</a>. Election and love, however, are differently ordered in God, and in ourselves: because in us the will in loving does not 15162 <a href="#FP_Q23_A3" id="FP_Q23_A4-p6.4" shape="rect">(A[3])</a>. Election and love, however, are differently ordered in God, and in ourselves: because in us the will in loving does not
15163 cause good, but we are incited to love by the good which already exists; and therefore we choose someone to love, and so election 15163 cause good, but we are incited to love by the good which already exists; and therefore we choose someone to love, and so election
15164 in us precedes love. In God, however, it is the reverse. For His will, by which in loving He wishes good to someone, is the 15164 in us precedes love. In God, however, it is the reverse. For His will, by which in loving He wishes good to someone, is the
15165 cause of that good possessed by some in preference to others. Thus it is clear that love 15165 cause of that good possessed by some in preference to others. Thus it is clear that love
15166 precedes election in the order of reason, and election precedes predestination. Whence all the predestinate are objects of 15166 precedes election in the order of reason, and election precedes predestination. Whence all the predestinate are objects of
15167 election and love. 15167 election and love.
15187 habeatur. Et sic patet quod dilectio praesupponitur electioni, 15187 habeatur. Et sic patet quod dilectio praesupponitur electioni,
15188 secundum rationem; et electio praedestinationi. Unde omnes 15188 secundum rationem; et electio praedestinationi. Unde omnes
15189 praedestinati sunt electi et dilecti.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q23_A4-p7"> 15189 praedestinati sunt electi et dilecti.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q23_A4-p7">
15190 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> If the communication of the divine goodness in general be considered, God communicates His goodness without election; inasmuch 15190 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> If the communication of the divine goodness in general be considered, God communicates His goodness without election; inasmuch
15191 as there is nothing which does not in some way share in His goodness, as we said above ( 15191 as there is nothing which does not in some way share in His goodness, as we said above (
15192 <a id="FP_Q23_A4-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q6_A4.html">Q[6], A[4]</a>). But if we consider the communication of this or that particular good, He does not allot it without election; since He gives 15192 <a href="#FP_Q6_A4" id="FP_Q23_A4-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[6], A[4]</a>). But if we consider the communication of this or that particular good, He does not allot it without election; since He gives
15193 certain goods to some men, which He does not give to others. Thus in the 15193 certain goods to some men, which He does not give to others. Thus in the
15194 conferring of grace and glory election is implied. 15194 conferring of grace and glory election is implied.
15195 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 23 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="29428" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29428] Iª q. 23 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo 15195 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 23 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="29428" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29428] Iª q. 23 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
15196 dicendum quod, si consideretur communicatio bonitatis divinae in 15196 dicendum quod, si consideretur communicatio bonitatis divinae in
15197 communi, absque electione bonitatem suam communicat; inquantum 15197 communi, absque electione bonitatem suam communicat; inquantum
15201 aliquibus, quae non dat aliis. Et sic in collatione gratiae et 15201 aliquibus, quae non dat aliis. Et sic in collatione gratiae et
15202 gloriae attenditur electio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q23_A4-p8"> 15202 gloriae attenditur electio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q23_A4-p8">
15203 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> When the will of the person choosing is incited to make a choice by the good already pre-existing in the object chosen, the 15203 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> When the will of the person choosing is incited to make a choice by the good already pre-existing in the object chosen, the
15204 choice must needs be of those things which already exist, as happens in our choice. In God it is otherwise; as was said above 15204 choice must needs be of those things which already exist, as happens in our choice. In God it is otherwise; as was said above
15205 ( 15205 (
15206 <a id="FP_Q23_A4-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q20_A2.html">Q[20], A[2]</a>). Thus, as Augustine says (De Verb. Ap. Serm. 11): "Those are chosen by God, who do not exist; yet He does not err in His 15206 <a href="#FP_Q20_A2" id="FP_Q23_A4-p8.1" shape="rect">Q[20], A[2]</a>). Thus, as Augustine says (De Verb. Ap. Serm. 11): "Those are chosen by God, who do not exist; yet He does not err in His
15207 choice." 15207 choice."
15208 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 23 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="29429" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29429] Iª q. 23 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum 15208 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 23 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="29429" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29429] Iª q. 23 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
15209 dicendum quod, quando voluntas eligentis provocatur ad eligendum a 15209 dicendum quod, quando voluntas eligentis provocatur ad eligendum a
15210 bono in re praeexistente, tunc oportet quod electio sit eorum quae 15210 bono in re praeexistente, tunc oportet quod electio sit eorum quae
15211 sunt; sicut accidit in electione nostra. Sed in Deo est aliter, ut 15211 sunt; sicut accidit in electione nostra. Sed in Deo est aliter, ut
15259 quae fecimus nos, sed secundum suam misericordiam salvos nos 15259 quae fecimus nos, sed secundum suam misericordiam salvos nos
15260 fecit</i>. Sicut autem salvos nos fecit, ita et praedestinavit nos 15260 fecit</i>. Sicut autem salvos nos fecit, ita et praedestinavit nos
15261 salvos fieri. Non ergo praescientia meritorum est causa vel ratio 15261 salvos fieri. Non ergo praescientia meritorum est causa vel ratio
15262 praedestinationis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q23_A5-p6"> 15262 praedestinationis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q23_A5-p6">
15263 <b>I answer that,</b> Since predestination includes will, as was said above 15263 <b>I answer that,</b> Since predestination includes will, as was said above
15264 <a id="FP_Q23_A5-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q23_A4.html">(A[4])</a>, the reason of predestination must be sought for in the same way as was the reason of the will of God. Now it was shown above 15264 <a href="#FP_Q23_A4" id="FP_Q23_A5-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[4])</a>, the reason of predestination must be sought for in the same way as was the reason of the will of God. Now it was shown above
15265 ( 15265 (
15266 <a id="FP_Q23_A5-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q19_A5.html">Q[19], A[5]</a> ), that we cannot assign any cause of the divine will on the part of the act of willing; but a reason can be found on the 15266 <a href="#FP_Q19_A5" id="FP_Q23_A5-p6.2" shape="rect">Q[19], A[5]</a> ), that we cannot assign any cause of the divine will on the part of the act of willing; but a reason can be found on the
15267 part of the things willed; inasmuch as God wills one thing on account of something else. 15267 part of the things willed; inasmuch as God wills one thing on account of something else.
15268 Wherefore nobody has been so insane as to say that merit is the cause of divine predestination as regards the act of the predestinator. 15268 Wherefore nobody has been so insane as to say that merit is the cause of divine predestination as regards the act of the predestinator.
15269 But this is the question, whether, as regards the effect, predestination has any cause; or what comes to the same thing, whether 15269 But this is the question, whether, as regards the effect, predestination has any cause; or what comes to the same thing, whether
15270 God pre-ordained that He would give the effect of predestination to anyone on account of any merits. 15270 God pre-ordained that He would give the effect of predestination to anyone on account of any merits.
15271 </p><p id="FP_Q23_A5-p7"> Accordingly there were some who held that the effect of predestination was pre-ordained for some on account of pre-existing 15271 </p><p id="FP_Q23_A5-p7"> Accordingly there were some who held that the effect of predestination was pre-ordained for some on account of pre-existing
15290 this cannot be considered as the reason of predestination, since it is contained in the notion of predestination. Therefore, 15290 this cannot be considered as the reason of predestination, since it is contained in the notion of predestination. Therefore,
15291 if anything else in us be the reason of predestination, it will outside the effect of predestination. Now there is no distinction 15291 if anything else in us be the reason of predestination, it will outside the effect of predestination. Now there is no distinction
15292 between what flows from free will, and what is of predestination; as there is not distinction between what flows from a 15292 between what flows from free will, and what is of predestination; as there is not distinction between what flows from a
15293 secondary cause and from a first cause. For the providence of God produces effects through the operation of secondary causes, 15293 secondary cause and from a first cause. For the providence of God produces effects through the operation of secondary causes,
15294 as was above shown ( 15294 as was above shown (
15295 <a id="FP_Q23_A5-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q22_A3.html">Q[22], A[3]</a>). Wherefore, that which flows from free-will is also of predestination. We must say, therefore, that the effect of predestination 15295 <a href="#FP_Q22_A3" id="FP_Q23_A5-p9.1" shape="rect">Q[22], A[3]</a>). Wherefore, that which flows from free-will is also of predestination. We must say, therefore, that the effect of predestination
15296 may be considered in a twofold light---in one way, in particular; and thus there is no reason why one effect of predestination 15296 may be considered in a twofold light---in one way, in particular; and thus there is no reason why one effect of predestination
15297 should not be the reason or cause of another; a subsequent 15297 should not be the reason or cause of another; a subsequent
15298 effect being the reason of a previous effect, as its final cause; and the previous effect being the reason of the subsequent 15298 effect being the reason of a previous effect, as its final cause; and the previous effect being the reason of the subsequent
15299 as its meritorious cause, which is reduced to the disposition of the matter. Thus we might say that God pre-ordained to give 15299 as its meritorious cause, which is reduced to the disposition of the matter. Thus we might say that God pre-ordained to give
15300 glory on account of merit, and that He pre-ordained to give grace to merit glory. In another way, the effect of predestination 15300 glory on account of merit, and that He pre-ordained to give grace to merit glory. In another way, the effect of predestination
15385 necessary that God's goodness, which in itself is one and undivided, should be manifested in many ways in His creation; because 15385 necessary that God's goodness, which in itself is one and undivided, should be manifested in many ways in His creation; because
15386 creatures in themselves cannot attain to the simplicity of God. Thus it is that 15386 creatures in themselves cannot attain to the simplicity of God. Thus it is that
15387 for the completion of the universe there are required different grades of being; some of which hold a high and some a low 15387 for the completion of the universe there are required different grades of being; some of which hold a high and some a low
15388 place in the universe. That this multiformity of grades may be preserved in things, God allows some evils, lest many good 15388 place in the universe. That this multiformity of grades may be preserved in things, God allows some evils, lest many good
15389 things should never happen, as was said above ( 15389 things should never happen, as was said above (
15390 <a id="FP_Q23_A5-p12.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q22_A2.html">Q[22], A[2]</a>). Let us then consider the whole of the human race, as we consider the whole universe. God wills to manifest His goodness 15390 <a href="#FP_Q22_A2" id="FP_Q23_A5-p12.1" shape="rect">Q[22], A[2]</a>). Let us then consider the whole of the human race, as we consider the whole universe. God wills to manifest His goodness
15391 in men; in respect to those whom He predestines, 15391 in men; in respect to those whom He predestines,
15392 by means of His mercy, as sparing them; and in respect of others, whom he reprobates, by means of His justice, in punishing 15392 by means of His mercy, as sparing them; and in respect of others, whom he reprobates, by means of His justice, in punishing
15393 them. This is the reason why God elects some and rejects others. To this the Apostle refers, saying ( 15393 them. This is the reason why God elects some and rejects others. To this the Apostle refers, saying (
15394 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q23_A5-p12.2" href="./asv.html#Rom.9.22" target="asv">Rom. 9:22,23</a>): "What if God, willing to show His wrath [that is, the vengeance of His justice], and to make His power known, endured [that 15394 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q23_A5-p12.2" href="./asv.html#Rom.9.22" target="asv">Rom. 9:22,23</a>): "What if God, willing to show His wrath [that is, the vengeance of His justice], and to make His power known, endured [that
15395 is, permitted] with much patience vessels of wrath, fitted for destruction; that He might show the riches of His 15395 is, permitted] with much patience vessels of wrath, fitted for destruction; that He might show the riches of His
15487 praedestinavit</i> etc., dicit Glossa, <i>praedestinatio est 15487 praedestinavit</i> etc., dicit Glossa, <i>praedestinatio est
15488 praescientia et praeparatio beneficiorum Dei, qua certissime 15488 praescientia et praeparatio beneficiorum Dei, qua certissime
15489 liberantur quicumque liberantur</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q23_A6-p6"> 15489 liberantur quicumque liberantur</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q23_A6-p6">
15490 <b>I answer that,</b> Predestination most certainly and infallibly takes effect; yet it does not impose any necessity, so that, namely, its effect 15490 <b>I answer that,</b> Predestination most certainly and infallibly takes effect; yet it does not impose any necessity, so that, namely, its effect
15491 should take place from necessity. For it was said above 15491 should take place from necessity. For it was said above
15492 <a id="FP_Q23_A6-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q23_A1.html">(A[1])</a>, that predestination is a part of providence. But not all things subject to providence are necessary; some things happening 15492 <a href="#FP_Q23_A1" id="FP_Q23_A6-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>, that predestination is a part of providence. But not all things subject to providence are necessary; some things happening
15493 from contingency, according to the nature of the proximate causes, which divine providence has ordained for such effects. 15493 from contingency, according to the nature of the proximate causes, which divine providence has ordained for such effects.
15494 Yet 15494 Yet
15495 the order of providence is infallible, as was shown above ( 15495 the order of providence is infallible, as was shown above (
15496 <a id="FP_Q23_A6-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q22_A4.html">Q[22], A[4]</a>). So also the order of predestination is certain; yet free-will is not destroyed; whence the effect of predestination has 15496 <a href="#FP_Q22_A4" id="FP_Q23_A6-p6.2" shape="rect">Q[22], A[4]</a>). So also the order of predestination is certain; yet free-will is not destroyed; whence the effect of predestination has
15497 its contingency. Moreover all that has been said about the divine knowledge and will ( 15497 its contingency. Moreover all that has been said about the divine knowledge and will (
15498 <a id="FP_Q23_A6-p6.3" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q14_A13.html">Q[14], A[13]</a>; 15498 <a href="#FP_Q14_A13" id="FP_Q23_A6-p6.3" shape="rect">Q[14], A[13]</a>;
15499 <a id="FP_Q23_A6-p6.4" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q19_A4.html">Q[19], A[4]</a>) must also be taken into consideration; since they do not destroy contingency in things, although they themselves are 15499 <a href="#FP_Q19_A4" id="FP_Q23_A6-p6.4" shape="rect">Q[19], A[4]</a>) must also be taken into consideration; since they do not destroy contingency in things, although they themselves are
15500 most certain and infallible. 15500 most certain and infallible.
15501 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 23 a. 6 co."><a name="29443" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29443] Iª q. 23 a. 6 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum 15501 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 23 a. 6 co."><a name="29443" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29443] Iª q. 23 a. 6 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
15502 quod praedestinatio certissime et infallibiliter consequitur suum 15502 quod praedestinatio certissime et infallibiliter consequitur suum
15503 effectum, nec tamen imponit necessitatem, ut scilicet effectus eius 15503 effectum, nec tamen imponit necessitatem, ut scilicet effectus eius
15504 ex necessitate proveniat. Dictum est enim supra quod praedestinatio 15504 ex necessitate proveniat. Dictum est enim supra quod praedestinatio
15543 in peccato mortali, secundum se consideratum; tamen hoc est 15543 in peccato mortali, secundum se consideratum; tamen hoc est
15544 impossibile, posito (prout scilicet ponitur) eum esse 15544 impossibile, posito (prout scilicet ponitur) eum esse
15545 praedestinatum. Unde non sequitur quod praedestinatio falli 15545 praedestinatum. Unde non sequitur quod praedestinatio falli
15546 possit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q23_A6-p9"> 15546 possit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q23_A6-p9">
15547 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Since predestination includes the divine will as stated above 15547 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Since predestination includes the divine will as stated above
15548 <a id="FP_Q23_A6-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q23_A4.html">(A[4])</a>: and the fact that God wills any created thing is necessary on the supposition that He so wills, on account of the immutability 15548 <a href="#FP_Q23_A4" id="FP_Q23_A6-p9.1" shape="rect">(A[4])</a>: and the fact that God wills any created thing is necessary on the supposition that He so wills, on account of the immutability
15549 of the divine will, but is not necessary absolutely; so the same must be said of predestination. Wherefore one ought not to 15549 of the divine will, but is not necessary absolutely; so the same must be said of predestination. Wherefore one ought not to
15550 say that God is able not to predestinate one whom He has predestinated, taking it in a composite sense, 15550 say that God is able not to predestinate one whom He has predestinated, taking it in a composite sense,
15551 thought, absolutely speaking, God can predestinate or not. But in this way the certainty of predestination is not destroyed. 15551 thought, absolutely speaking, God can predestinate or not. But in this way the certainty of predestination is not destroyed.
15552 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 23 a. 6 ad 3"><a name="29446" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29446] Iª q. 23 a. 6 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium 15552 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 23 a. 6 ad 3"><a name="29446" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29446] Iª q. 23 a. 6 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
15553 dicendum quod, cum praedestinatio includat divinam voluntatem, 15553 dicendum quod, cum praedestinatio includat divinam voluntatem,
15598 est praedestinatorum numerus, qui neque augeri potest, neque 15598 est praedestinatorum numerus, qui neque augeri potest, neque
15599 minui</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q23_A7-p6"> 15599 minui</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q23_A7-p6">
15600 <b>I answer that,</b> The number of the predestined is certain. Some have said that it was formally, but not materially certain; as if we were 15600 <b>I answer that,</b> The number of the predestined is certain. Some have said that it was formally, but not materially certain; as if we were
15601 to say that it was certain that a hundred or a thousand would be saved; not however these or those individuals. But this destroys 15601 to say that it was certain that a hundred or a thousand would be saved; not however these or those individuals. But this destroys
15602 the certainty of predestination; of which we spoke above 15602 the certainty of predestination; of which we spoke above
15603 <a id="FP_Q23_A7-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q23_A6.html">(A[6])</a>. Therefore we must say that to God the number of the predestined is certain, not only formally, but also materially. It 15603 <a href="#FP_Q23_A6" id="FP_Q23_A7-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[6])</a>. Therefore we must say that to God the number of the predestined is certain, not only formally, but also materially. It
15604 must, however, be observed that the number of the predestined is said to be certain to God, not by reason of His knowledge, 15604 must, however, be observed that the number of the predestined is said to be certain to God, not by reason of His knowledge,
15605 because, that is to say, He knows how many will be saved (for in this way the number of drops of rain and the sands of the 15605 because, that is to say, He knows how many will be saved (for in this way the number of drops of rain and the sands of the
15606 sea are certain to God); but by reason of His deliberate choice and determination. For the further evidence of which we must 15606 sea are certain to God); but by reason of His deliberate choice and determination. For the further evidence of which we must
15607 remember that every agent intends to make something finite, as is clear from what has been said above when we treated of the 15607 remember that every agent intends to make something finite, as is clear from what has been said above when we treated of the
15608 infinite ( 15608 infinite (
15609 <a id="FP_Q23_A7-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q7_A2.html">Q[7], AA[2]</a>,3). Now whosoever intends some definite measure in his effect thinks out some definite number in the essential parts, which 15609 <a href="#FP_Q7_A2" id="FP_Q23_A7-p6.2" shape="rect">Q[7], AA[2]</a>,3). Now whosoever intends some definite measure in his effect thinks out some definite number in the essential parts, which
15610 are by their very nature required for the perfection of the whole. For of those things which are required not principally, 15610 are by their very nature required for the perfection of the whole. For of those things which are required not principally,
15611 but only on account of something else, he does not select any definite number "per se"; but he accepts and uses them in such 15611 but only on account of something else, he does not select any definite number "per se"; but he accepts and uses them in such
15612 numbers as are necessary on account of that other thing. For instance, a builder 15612 numbers as are necessary on account of that other thing. For instance, a builder
15613 thinks out the definite measurements of a house, and also the definite number of rooms which he wishes to make in the house; 15613 thinks out the definite measurements of a house, and also the definite number of rooms which he wishes to make in the house;
15614 and definite measurements of the walls and roof; he does not, however, select a definite number of stones, but accepts and 15614 and definite measurements of the walls and roof; he does not, however, select a definite number of stones, but accepts and
15835 adiutores sumus</i>. Neque hoc est propter defectum divinae 15835 adiutores sumus</i>. Neque hoc est propter defectum divinae
15836 virtutis, sed quia utitur causis mediis, ut ordinis pulchritudo 15836 virtutis, sed quia utitur causis mediis, ut ordinis pulchritudo
15837 servetur in rebus, et ut etiam creaturis dignitatem causalitatis 15837 servetur in rebus, et ut etiam creaturis dignitatem causalitatis
15838 communicet.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q23_A8-p11"> 15838 communicet.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q23_A8-p11">
15839 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Secondary causes cannot escape the order of the first universal cause, as has been said above ( 15839 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Secondary causes cannot escape the order of the first universal cause, as has been said above (
15840 <a id="FP_Q23_A8-p11.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q19_A6.html">Q[19], A[6]</a>), indeed, they execute that order. And therefore predestination can be furthered by creatures, but it cannot be impeded by 15840 <a href="#FP_Q19_A6" id="FP_Q23_A8-p11.1" shape="rect">Q[19], A[6]</a>), indeed, they execute that order. And therefore predestination can be furthered by creatures, but it cannot be impeded by
15841 them. 15841 them.
15842 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 23 a. 8 ad 3"><a name="29462" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29462] Iª q. 23 a. 8 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium 15842 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 23 a. 8 ad 3"><a name="29462" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29462] Iª q. 23 a. 8 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
15843 dicendum quod secundae causae non possunt egredi ordinem causae 15843 dicendum quod secundae causae non possunt egredi ordinem causae
15844 primae universalis, ut supra dictum est; sed ipsum exequuntur. Et 15844 primae universalis, ut supra dictum est; sed ipsum exequuntur. Et
15845 ideo praedestinatio per creaturas potest adiuvari, sed non 15845 ideo praedestinatio per creaturas potest adiuvari, sed non
15886 libro viventium, liber iste est notitia Dei, qua praedestinavit ad 15886 libro viventium, liber iste est notitia Dei, qua praedestinavit ad
15887 vitam, quos praescivit</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q24_A1-p6"> 15887 vitam, quos praescivit</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q24_A1-p6">
15888 <b>I answer that,</b> The book of life is in God taken in a metaphorical sense, according to a comparison with human affairs. For it is usual among 15888 <b>I answer that,</b> The book of life is in God taken in a metaphorical sense, according to a comparison with human affairs. For it is usual among
15889 men that they who are chosen for any office should be inscribed in a book; as, for instance, soldiers, or counsellors, who 15889 men that they who are chosen for any office should be inscribed in a book; as, for instance, soldiers, or counsellors, who
15890 formerly were called "conscript" fathers. Now it is clear from the preceding ( 15890 formerly were called "conscript" fathers. Now it is clear from the preceding (
15891 <a id="FP_Q24_A1-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q23_A4.html">Q[23], A[4]</a>) that all the predestined are chosen by God to possess eternal life. This conscription, therefore, 15891 <a href="#FP_Q23_A4" id="FP_Q24_A1-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[23], A[4]</a>) that all the predestined are chosen by God to possess eternal life. This conscription, therefore,
15892 of the predestined is called the book of life. A thing is said metaphorically to be written upon the mind of anyone when it 15892 of the predestined is called the book of life. A thing is said metaphorically to be written upon the mind of anyone when it
15893 is firmly held in the memory, according to 15893 is firmly held in the memory, according to
15894 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q24_A1-p6.2" href="./asv.html#Prov.3.3" target="asv"> Prov. 3:3</a>: "Forget not My Law, and let thy heart keep My commandments," and further on, "Write them in the tables of thy heart." For 15894 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q24_A1-p6.2" href="./asv.html#Prov.3.3" target="asv"> Prov. 3:3</a>: "Forget not My Law, and let thy heart keep My commandments," and further on, "Write them in the tables of thy heart." For
15895 things are written down in material books to help the memory. Whence, the knowledge of God, by which He firmly remembers that 15895 things are written down in material books to help the memory. Whence, the knowledge of God, by which He firmly remembers that
15896 He has predestined some to eternal life, is called 15896 He has predestined some to eternal life, is called
15971 patet per id quod dicitur Ioan. VI, <i>nonne duodecim vos elegi, et 15971 patet per id quod dicitur Ioan. VI, <i>nonne duodecim vos elegi, et
15972 unus ex vobis Diabolus est?</i> Sed liber vitae est conscriptio 15972 unus ex vobis Diabolus est?</i> Sed liber vitae est conscriptio
15973 electionis divinae, ut dictum est. Ergo etiam est respectu vitae 15973 electionis divinae, ut dictum est. Ergo etiam est respectu vitae
15974 gratiae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q24_A2-p5"> 15974 gratiae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q24_A2-p5">
15975 <b>On the contrary,</b> The book of life is the knowledge of predestination, as stated above 15975 <b>On the contrary,</b> The book of life is the knowledge of predestination, as stated above
15976 <a id="FP_Q24_A2-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q24_A1.html">(A[1])</a>. But predestination does not regard the life of grace, except so far as it is directed to glory; for those are not predestined 15976 <a href="#FP_Q24_A1" id="FP_Q24_A2-p5.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>. But predestination does not regard the life of grace, except so far as it is directed to glory; for those are not predestined
15977 who have grace and yet fail to obtain glory. The book of life altogether is only so called in regard to the life of glory. 15977 who have grace and yet fail to obtain glory. The book of life altogether is only so called in regard to the life of glory.
15978 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 24 a. 2 s. c."><a name="29476" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29476] Iª q. 24 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est 15978 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 24 a. 2 s. c."><a name="29476" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29476] Iª q. 24 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
15979 quod liber vitae est notitia praedestinationis, ut dictum est. Sed 15979 quod liber vitae est notitia praedestinationis, ut dictum est. Sed
15980 praedestinatio non respicit vitam gratiae, nisi secundum quod 15980 praedestinatio non respicit vitam gratiae, nisi secundum quod
15981 ordinatur ad gloriam, non enim sunt praedestinati, qui habent 15981 ordinatur ad gloriam, non enim sunt praedestinati, qui habent
15982 gratiam et deficiunt a gloria. Liber igitur vitae non dicitur nisi 15982 gratiam et deficiunt a gloria. Liber igitur vitae non dicitur nisi
15983 respectu gloriae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q24_A2-p6"> 15983 respectu gloriae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q24_A2-p6">
15984 <b>I answer that,</b> The book of life, as stated above 15984 <b>I answer that,</b> The book of life, as stated above
15985 <a id="FP_Q24_A2-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q24_A1.html">(A[1])</a>, implies a conscription or a knowledge of those chosen to life. Now a man is chosen for something which does not belong to 15985 <a href="#FP_Q24_A1" id="FP_Q24_A2-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>, implies a conscription or a knowledge of those chosen to life. Now a man is chosen for something which does not belong to
15986 him by nature; and again that to which a man is chosen has the aspect of an end. For a soldier is not chosen or inscribed 15986 him by nature; and again that to which a man is chosen has the aspect of an end. For a soldier is not chosen or inscribed
15987 merely to put on armor, but to fight; since this is the proper duty to which military service is directed. But the life of 15987 merely to put on armor, but to fight; since this is the proper duty to which military service is directed. But the life of
15988 glory is an end exceeding 15988 glory is an end exceeding
15989 human nature, as said above ( 15989 human nature, as said above (
15990 <a id="FP_Q24_A2-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q23_A1.html">Q[23], A[1]</a>). Wherefore, strictly speaking, the book of life regards the life of glory. 15990 <a href="#FP_Q23_A1" id="FP_Q24_A2-p6.2" shape="rect">Q[23], A[1]</a>). Wherefore, strictly speaking, the book of life regards the life of glory.
15991 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 24 a. 2 co."><a name="29477" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29477] Iª q. 24 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum 15991 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 24 a. 2 co."><a name="29477" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29477] Iª q. 24 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
15992 quod liber vitae, ut dictum est, importat conscriptionem quandam 15992 quod liber vitae, ut dictum est, importat conscriptionem quandam
15993 sive notitiam electorum ad vitam. Eligitur autem aliquis ad id quod 15993 sive notitiam electorum ad vitam. Eligitur autem aliquis ad id quod
15994 non competit sibi secundum suam naturam. Et iterum, id ad quod 15994 non competit sibi secundum suam naturam. Et iterum, id ad quod
15995 eligitur aliquis, habet rationem finis, non enim miles eligitur aut 15995 eligitur aliquis, habet rationem finis, non enim miles eligitur aut
16152 absque omni actu. Ergo agens primum, quod est Deus, est absque 16152 absque omni actu. Ergo agens primum, quod est Deus, est absque
16153 potentia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q25_A1-p3"> 16153 potentia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q25_A1-p3">
16154 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, according to the Philosopher (Metaph. vi, 19), better than every power is its act. For form is better than matter; 16154 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, according to the Philosopher (Metaph. vi, 19), better than every power is its act. For form is better than matter;
16155 and action than active power, since it is its end. But nothing is better than what is in God; because whatsoever is in God, 16155 and action than active power, since it is its end. But nothing is better than what is in God; because whatsoever is in God,
16156 is God, as was shown above ( 16156 is God, as was shown above (
16157 <a id="FP_Q25_A1-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q3_A3.html">Q[3] , A[3]</a>). Therefore, there is no power in God. 16157 <a href="#FP_Q3_A3" id="FP_Q25_A1-p3.1" shape="rect">Q[3] , A[3]</a>). Therefore, there is no power in God.
16158 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 25 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="29491" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29491] Iª q. 25 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, 16158 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 25 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="29491" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29491] Iª q. 25 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
16159 secundum philosophum, in IX Metaphys., qualibet potentia melior est 16159 secundum philosophum, in IX Metaphys., qualibet potentia melior est
16160 eius actus, nam forma est melior quam materia, et actio quam 16160 eius actus, nam forma est melior quam materia, et actio quam
16161 potentia activa; est enim finis eius. Sed nihil est melius eo quod 16161 potentia activa; est enim finis eius. Sed nihil est melius eo quod
16162 est in Deo, quia quidquid est in Deo, est Deus, ut supra ostensum 16162 est in Deo, quia quidquid est in Deo, est Deus, ut supra ostensum
16167 potentia est principium operationis. Sed operatio divina est eius 16167 potentia est principium operationis. Sed operatio divina est eius
16168 essentia, cum in Deo nullum sit accidens. Essentiae autem divinae 16168 essentia, cum in Deo nullum sit accidens. Essentiae autem divinae
16169 non est aliquod principium. Ergo ratio potentiae Deo non 16169 non est aliquod principium. Ergo ratio potentiae Deo non
16170 convenit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q25_A1-p5"> 16170 convenit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q25_A1-p5">
16171 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, it was shown above ( 16171 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, it was shown above (
16172 <a id="FP_Q25_A1-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q14_A8.html">Q[14], A[8]</a>; 16172 <a href="#FP_Q14_A8" id="FP_Q25_A1-p5.1" shape="rect">Q[14], A[8]</a>;
16173 <a id="FP_Q25_A1-p5.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q19_A4.html">Q[19], A[4]</a>) that God's knowledge and will are the cause of things. But the cause and principle of a thing are identical. We ought not, 16173 <a href="#FP_Q19_A4" id="FP_Q25_A1-p5.2" shape="rect">Q[19], A[4]</a>) that God's knowledge and will are the cause of things. But the cause and principle of a thing are identical. We ought not,
16174 therefore, to assign power to God; but only knowledge and will. 16174 therefore, to assign power to God; but only knowledge and will.
16175 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 25 a. 1 arg. 4"><a name="29493" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29493] Iª q. 25 a. 1 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, supra 16175 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 25 a. 1 arg. 4"><a name="29493" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29493] Iª q. 25 a. 1 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, supra
16176 ostensum est quod scientia Dei et voluntas eius sunt causa rerum. 16176 ostensum est quod scientia Dei et voluntas eius sunt causa rerum.
16177 Causa autem et principium idem sunt. Ergo non oportet in Deo 16177 Causa autem et principium idem sunt. Ergo non oportet in Deo
16178 assignare potentiam, sed solum scientiam et voluntatem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q25_A1-p6"> 16178 assignare potentiam, sed solum scientiam et voluntatem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q25_A1-p6">
16182 quod dicitur in Psalmo LXXXVIII, <i>potens es, domine, et veritas 16182 quod dicitur in Psalmo LXXXVIII, <i>potens es, domine, et veritas
16183 tua in circuitu tuo</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q25_A1-p7"> 16183 tua in circuitu tuo</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q25_A1-p7">
16184 <b>I answer that,</b> Power is twofold---namely, passive, which exists not at all in God; and active, which we must assign to Him in the highest 16184 <b>I answer that,</b> Power is twofold---namely, passive, which exists not at all in God; and active, which we must assign to Him in the highest
16185 degree. For it is manifest that everything, according as it is in act and is perfect, is the active principle of something: 16185 degree. For it is manifest that everything, according as it is in act and is perfect, is the active principle of something:
16186 whereas everything is passive according as it is deficient and imperfect. Now it was shown above ( 16186 whereas everything is passive according as it is deficient and imperfect. Now it was shown above (
16187 <a id="FP_Q25_A1-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q3_A2.html">Q[3], A[2]</a>; 16187 <a href="#FP_Q3_A2" id="FP_Q25_A1-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[3], A[2]</a>;
16188 <a id="FP_Q25_A1-p7.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q4_A1.html">Q[4], AA[1]</a>, 2), that God is pure act, simply and in all 16188 <a href="#FP_Q4_A1" id="FP_Q25_A1-p7.2" shape="rect">Q[4], AA[1]</a>, 2), that God is pure act, simply and in all
16189 ways perfect, nor in Him does any imperfection find place. Whence it most fittingly belongs to Him to be an active principle, 16189 ways perfect, nor in Him does any imperfection find place. Whence it most fittingly belongs to Him to be an active principle,
16190 and in no way whatsoever to be passive. On the other hand, the notion of active principle is consistent with active power. 16190 and in no way whatsoever to be passive. On the other hand, the notion of active principle is consistent with active power.
16191 For active power is the principle of acting upon something else; whereas passive power is the principle of being acted upon 16191 For active power is the principle of acting upon something else; whereas passive power is the principle of being acted upon
16192 by something else, as the Philosopher says (Metaph. v, 17). It remains, therefore, that in God there is active power in the 16192 by something else, as the Philosopher says (Metaph. v, 17). It remains, therefore, that in God there is active power in the
16193 highest degree. 16193 highest degree.
16281 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 25 a. 2 s. c."><a name="29503" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29503] Iª q. 25 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est 16281 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 25 a. 2 s. c."><a name="29503" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29503] Iª q. 25 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
16282 quod dicit Hilarius, VIII de Trin., quod Deus est immensae 16282 quod dicit Hilarius, VIII de Trin., quod Deus est immensae
16283 virtutis, vivens, potens. Omne autem immensum est infinitum. Ergo 16283 virtutis, vivens, potens. Omne autem immensum est infinitum. Ergo
16284 virtus divina est infinita.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q25_A2-p6"> 16284 virtus divina est infinita.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q25_A2-p6">
16285 <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above 16285 <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above
16286 <a id="FP_Q25_A2-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q25_A1.html">(A[1])</a>, active power exists in God according to the measure in which He is actual. Now His existence is infinite, inasmuch as it 16286 <a href="#FP_Q25_A1" id="FP_Q25_A2-p6.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>, active power exists in God according to the measure in which He is actual. Now His existence is infinite, inasmuch as it
16287 is not limited by anything that receives it, as is clear from what has been said, when we discussed the infinity of the divine 16287 is not limited by anything that receives it, as is clear from what has been said, when we discussed the infinity of the divine
16288 essence ( 16288 essence (
16289 <a id="FP_Q25_A2-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q7_A1.html">Q[7], A[1]</a>). Wherefore, it is necessary that the active power in God should be infinite. For in every agent is it found that the 16289 <a href="#FP_Q7_A1" id="FP_Q25_A2-p6.2" shape="rect">Q[7], A[1]</a>). Wherefore, it is necessary that the active power in God should be infinite. For in every agent is it found that the
16290 more perfectly an agent has the form by which it acts the greater its power to act. For instance, the hotter a thing is, the 16290 more perfectly an agent has the form by which it acts the greater its power to act. For instance, the hotter a thing is, the
16291 greater the power has it to give heat; and it would have infinite power to give heat, were its own heat infinite. Whence, 16291 greater the power has it to give heat; and it would have infinite power to give heat, were its own heat infinite. Whence,
16292 since the divine essence, through which God acts, is infinite, as was shown above ( 16292 since the divine essence, through which God acts, is infinite, as was shown above (
16293 <a id="FP_Q25_A2-p6.3" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q7_A1.html">Q[7], A[1]</a>) it follows that His power likewise is infinite. 16293 <a href="#FP_Q7_A1" id="FP_Q25_A2-p6.3" shape="rect">Q[7], A[1]</a>) it follows that His power likewise is infinite.
16294 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 25 a. 2 co."><a name="29504" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29504] Iª q. 25 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum 16294 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 25 a. 2 co."><a name="29504" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29504] Iª q. 25 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
16295 quod, sicut iam dictum est, secundum hoc potentia activa invenitur 16295 quod, sicut iam dictum est, secundum hoc potentia activa invenitur
16296 in Deo, secundum quod ipse actu est. Esse autem eius est infinitum, 16296 in Deo, secundum quod ipse actu est. Esse autem eius est infinitum,
16297 inquantum non est limitatum per aliquid recipiens; ut patet per ea 16297 inquantum non est limitatum per aliquid recipiens; ut patet per ea
16298 quae supra dicta sunt, cum de infinitate divinae essentiae 16298 quae supra dicta sunt, cum de infinitate divinae essentiae
16304 ad calefaciendum, si eius calor esset infinitus. Unde, cum ipsa 16304 ad calefaciendum, si eius calor esset infinitus. Unde, cum ipsa
16305 essentia divina, per quam Deus agit, sit infinita, sicut supra 16305 essentia divina, per quam Deus agit, sit infinita, sicut supra
16306 ostensum est, sequitur quod eius potentia sit infinita.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q25_A2-p7"> 16306 ostensum est, sequitur quod eius potentia sit infinita.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q25_A2-p7">
16307 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The Philosopher is here speaking of an infinity in regard to matter not limited by any form; and such infinity belongs to 16307 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The Philosopher is here speaking of an infinity in regard to matter not limited by any form; and such infinity belongs to
16308 quantity. But the divine essence is otherwise, as was shown above ( 16308 quantity. But the divine essence is otherwise, as was shown above (
16309 <a id="FP_Q25_A2-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q7_A1.html">Q[7], A[1]</a>); and consequently so also His power. It does not follow, therefore, that it is imperfect. 16309 <a href="#FP_Q7_A1" id="FP_Q25_A2-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[7], A[1]</a>); and consequently so also His power. It does not follow, therefore, that it is imperfect.
16310 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 25 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="29505" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29505] Iª q. 25 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo 16310 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 25 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="29505" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29505] Iª q. 25 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
16311 dicendum quod philosophus loquitur de infinito quod est ex parte 16311 dicendum quod philosophus loquitur de infinito quod est ex parte
16312 materiae non terminatae per formam; cuiusmodi est infinitum quod 16312 materiae non terminatae per formam; cuiusmodi est infinitum quod
16313 congruit quantitati. Sic autem non est infinita divina essentia, ut 16313 congruit quantitati. Sic autem non est infinita divina essentia, ut
16314 supra ostensum est; et per consequens nec eius potentia. Unde non 16314 supra ostensum est; et per consequens nec eius potentia. Unde non
16316 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The power of a univocal agent is wholly manifested in its effect. The generative power of man, for example, is not able to 16316 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The power of a univocal agent is wholly manifested in its effect. The generative power of man, for example, is not able to
16317 do more than beget man. But the power of a non-univocal agent does not wholly manifest itself in the production of its effect: 16317 do more than beget man. But the power of a non-univocal agent does not wholly manifest itself in the production of its effect:
16318 as, for example, the power of the sun does not wholly manifest itself in the production of an animal generated from putrefaction. 16318 as, for example, the power of the sun does not wholly manifest itself in the production of an animal generated from putrefaction.
16319 Now it is clear that God is not a univocal agent. For nothing agrees with 16319 Now it is clear that God is not a univocal agent. For nothing agrees with
16320 Him either in species or in genus, as was shown above ( 16320 Him either in species or in genus, as was shown above (
16321 <a id="FP_Q25_A2-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q3_A5.html">Q[3], A[5]</a>; 16321 <a href="#FP_Q3_A5" id="FP_Q25_A2-p8.1" shape="rect">Q[3], A[5]</a>;
16322 <a id="FP_Q25_A2-p8.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q4_A3.html">Q[4], A[3]</a>). Whence it follows that His effect is always less than His power. It is not necessary, therefore, that the infinite power 16322 <a href="#FP_Q4_A3" id="FP_Q25_A2-p8.2" shape="rect">Q[4], A[3]</a>). Whence it follows that His effect is always less than His power. It is not necessary, therefore, that the infinite power
16323 of God should be manifested so as to produce an infinite effect. Yet even if it were to produce no effect, the power of God 16323 of God should be manifested so as to produce an infinite effect. Yet even if it were to produce no effect, the power of God
16324 would not be ineffectual; because a thing is ineffectual which is ordained towards an end to which it does not attain. But 16324 would not be ineffectual; because a thing is ineffectual which is ordained towards an end to which it does not attain. But
16325 the 16325 the
16326 power of God is not ordered toward its effect as towards an end; rather, it is the end of the effect produced by it. 16326 power of God is not ordered toward its effect as towards an end; rather, it is the end of the effect produced by it.
16327 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 25 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="29506" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29506] Iª q. 25 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum 16327 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 25 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="29506" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29506] Iª q. 25 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
16364 tota virtus eius manifestetur in motu ita, quod moveat in non 16364 tota virtus eius manifestetur in motu ita, quod moveat in non
16365 tempore. Et praesertim, quia movet secundum dispositionem suae 16365 tempore. Et praesertim, quia movet secundum dispositionem suae
16366 voluntatis.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q25_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q25_A3-p0.1">Q. 25. A. 3. Whether God is omnipotent?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q25_A3-p2"> 16366 voluntatis.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q25_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q25_A3-p0.1">Q. 25. A. 3. Whether God is omnipotent?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q25_A3-p2">
16367 <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God is not omnipotent. For movement and passiveness belong to everything. But this is impossible with God, 16367 <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God is not omnipotent. For movement and passiveness belong to everything. But this is impossible with God,
16368 for He is immovable, as was said above ( 16368 for He is immovable, as was said above (
16369 <a id="FP_Q25_A3-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q2_A3.html">Q[2], A[3]</a>). Therefore He is not omnipotent. 16369 <a href="#FP_Q2_A3" id="FP_Q25_A3-p2.1" shape="rect">Q[2], A[3]</a>). Therefore He is not omnipotent.
16370 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 25 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="29508" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29508] Iª q. 25 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium sic 16370 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 25 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="29508" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29508] Iª q. 25 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium sic
16371 proceditur. Videtur quod Deus non sit omnipotens. Moveri enim et 16371 proceditur. Videtur quod Deus non sit omnipotens. Moveri enim et
16372 pati aliquid omnium est. Sed hoc Deus non potest, est enim 16372 pati aliquid omnium est. Sed hoc Deus non potest, est enim
16373 immobilis, ut supra dictum est. Non igitur est omnipotens.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q25_A3-p3"> 16373 immobilis, ut supra dictum est. Non igitur est omnipotens.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q25_A3-p3">
16374 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, sin is an act of some kind. But God cannot sin, nor "deny Himself" as it is said in 16374 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, sin is an act of some kind. But God cannot sin, nor "deny Himself" as it is said in
16486 potest ea facere. Neque hoc est contra verbum Angeli dicentis, 16486 potest ea facere. Neque hoc est contra verbum Angeli dicentis,
16487 <i>non erit impossibile apud Deum omne verbum</i>. Id enim quod 16487 <i>non erit impossibile apud Deum omne verbum</i>. Id enim quod
16488 contradictionem implicat, verbum esse non potest, quia nullus 16488 contradictionem implicat, verbum esse non potest, quia nullus
16489 intellectus potest illud concipere.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q25_A3-p10"> 16489 intellectus potest illud concipere.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q25_A3-p10">
16490 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> God is said to be omnipotent in respect to His active power, not to passive power, as was shown above 16490 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> God is said to be omnipotent in respect to His active power, not to passive power, as was shown above
16491 <a id="FP_Q25_A3-p10.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q25_A1.html">(A[1])</a>. Whence the fact that He is immovable or impassible is not repugnant to His omnipotence. 16491 <a href="#FP_Q25_A1" id="FP_Q25_A3-p10.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>. Whence the fact that He is immovable or impassible is not repugnant to His omnipotence.
16492 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 25 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="29514" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29514] Iª q. 25 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo 16492 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 25 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="29514" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29514] Iª q. 25 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
16493 dicendum quod Deus dicitur omnipotens secundum potentiam activam, 16493 dicendum quod Deus dicitur omnipotens secundum potentiam activam,
16494 non secundum potentiam passivam, ut dictum est. Unde, quod non 16494 non secundum potentiam passivam, ut dictum est. Unde, quod non
16495 potest moveri et pati, non repugnat omnipotentiae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q25_A3-p11"> 16495 potest moveri et pati, non repugnat omnipotentiae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q25_A3-p11">
16496 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> To sin is to fall short of a perfect action; hence to be able to sin is to be able to fall short in action, which is repugnant 16496 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> To sin is to fall short of a perfect action; hence to be able to sin is to be able to fall short in action, which is repugnant
16517 deos, ut Iovem vel Mercurium.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q25_A3-p12"> 16517 deos, ut Iovem vel Mercurium.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q25_A3-p12">
16518 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> God's omnipotence is particularly shown in sparing and having mercy, because in this is it made manifest that God has supreme 16518 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> God's omnipotence is particularly shown in sparing and having mercy, because in this is it made manifest that God has supreme
16519 power, that He freely forgives sins. For it is not for one who is bound by laws of a superior to forgive sins of his own free 16519 power, that He freely forgives sins. For it is not for one who is bound by laws of a superior to forgive sins of his own free
16520 will. Or, because by sparing and having mercy upon men, He leads them on to the participation of an infinite good; which is 16520 will. Or, because by sparing and having mercy upon men, He leads them on to the participation of an infinite good; which is
16521 the ultimate effect of the divine power. Or because, as was said above ( 16521 the ultimate effect of the divine power. Or because, as was said above (
16522 <a id="FP_Q25_A3-p12.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q21_A4.html">Q[21], 16522 <a href="#FP_Q21_A4" id="FP_Q25_A3-p12.1" shape="rect">Q[21],
16523 A[4] 16523 A[4]
16524 </a>), the effect of the divine mercy is the foundation of all the divine works. For nothing is due to anyone, except on account 16524 </a>), the effect of the divine mercy is the foundation of all the divine works. For nothing is due to anyone, except on account
16525 of something already given him gratuitously by God. In this way the divine omnipotence is particularly made manifest, because 16525 of something already given him gratuitously by God. In this way the divine omnipotence is particularly made manifest, because
16526 to it pertains the first foundation of all good things. 16526 to it pertains the first foundation of all good things.
16527 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 25 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="29516" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29516] Iª q. 25 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium 16527 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 25 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="29516" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29516] Iª q. 25 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
16540 But the possible in reference to some power is named possible in reference to its proximate cause. Hence those things which 16540 But the possible in reference to some power is named possible in reference to its proximate cause. Hence those things which
16541 it belongs to God alone to do immediately---as, for example, to create, to justify, and the like---are said to be possible 16541 it belongs to God alone to do immediately---as, for example, to create, to justify, and the like---are said to be possible
16542 in reference to a higher cause. Those things, however, which are of such kind as 16542 in reference to a higher cause. Those things, however, which are of such kind as
16543 to be done by inferior causes are said to be possible in reference to those inferior causes. For it is according to the condition 16543 to be done by inferior causes are said to be possible in reference to those inferior causes. For it is according to the condition
16544 of the proximate cause that the effect has contingency or necessity, as was shown above ( 16544 of the proximate cause that the effect has contingency or necessity, as was shown above (
16545 <a id="FP_Q25_A3-p13.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q14_A1.html">Q[14], A[1]</a>, ad 2). Thus is it that the wisdom of the world is deemed foolish, because what is impossible to nature, it judges to be 16545 <a href="#FP_Q14_A1" id="FP_Q25_A3-p13.1" shape="rect">Q[14], A[1]</a>, ad 2). Thus is it that the wisdom of the world is deemed foolish, because what is impossible to nature, it judges to be
16546 impossible to God. So it is clear that the omnipotence of God does not take away from things their impossibility and 16546 impossible to God. So it is clear that the omnipotence of God does not take away from things their impossibility and
16547 necessity. 16547 necessity.
16548 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 25 a. 3 ad 4"><a name="29517" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29517] Iª q. 25 a. 3 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum 16548 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 25 a. 3 ad 4"><a name="29517" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29517] Iª q. 25 a. 3 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum
16549 dicendum quod possibile absolutum non dicitur neque secundum causas 16549 dicendum quod possibile absolutum non dicitur neque secundum causas
16550 superiores, neque secundum causas inferiores sed secundum seipsum. 16550 superiores, neque secundum causas inferiores sed secundum seipsum.
16593 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 25 a. 4 s. c."><a name="29521" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29521] Iª q. 25 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est 16593 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 25 a. 4 s. c."><a name="29521" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29521] Iª q. 25 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
16594 quod Hieronymus dicit, <i>cum Deus omnia possit, non potest de 16594 quod Hieronymus dicit, <i>cum Deus omnia possit, non potest de
16595 corrupta facere incorruptam</i>. Ergo eadem ratione non potest 16595 corrupta facere incorruptam</i>. Ergo eadem ratione non potest
16596 facere de quocumque alio praeterito quod non fuerit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q25_A4-p6"> 16596 facere de quocumque alio praeterito quod non fuerit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q25_A4-p6">
16597 <b>I answer that,</b> As was said above ( 16597 <b>I answer that,</b> As was said above (
16598 <a id="FP_Q25_A4-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q7_A2.html">Q[7], A[2]</a>), there does not fall under the scope of God's omnipotence anything that implies a contradiction. Now that the past should 16598 <a href="#FP_Q7_A2" id="FP_Q25_A4-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[7], A[2]</a>), there does not fall under the scope of God's omnipotence anything that implies a contradiction. Now that the past should
16599 not have been implies a contradiction. For as it implies a contradiction to say that Socrates is sitting, and is not sitting, 16599 not have been implies a contradiction. For as it implies a contradiction to say that Socrates is sitting, and is not sitting,
16600 so does it to say that he sat, and did not sit. But to say that he did sit is to say that it happened in the past. To say 16600 so does it to say that he sat, and did not sit. But to say that he did sit is to say that it happened in the past. To say
16601 that he did not sit, is to say that 16601 that he did not sit, is to say that
16602 it did not happen. Whence, that the past should not have been, does not come under the scope of divine power. This is what 16602 it did not happen. Whence, that the past should not have been, does not come under the scope of divine power. This is what
16603 Augustine means when he says (Contra Faust. xxix, 5): "Whosoever says, If God is almighty, let Him make what is done as if 16603 Augustine means when he says (Contra Faust. xxix, 5): "Whosoever says, If God is almighty, let Him make what is done as if
16685 Iudaeis. Ergo Deus potest facere quod non facit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q25_A5-p6"> 16685 Iudaeis. Ergo Deus potest facere quod non facit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q25_A5-p6">
16686 <b>I answer that,</b> In this matter certain persons erred in two ways. Some laid it down that God acts from natural necessity in such way that 16686 <b>I answer that,</b> In this matter certain persons erred in two ways. Some laid it down that God acts from natural necessity in such way that
16687 as from the action of nature nothing else can happen beyond what actually takes place---as, for instance, from the seed of 16687 as from the action of nature nothing else can happen beyond what actually takes place---as, for instance, from the seed of
16688 man, a man must come, and from that of an olive, an olive; so from the divine operation there could not result other things, 16688 man, a man must come, and from that of an olive, an olive; so from the divine operation there could not result other things,
16689 nor another order of things, than that which now is. But we showed above ( 16689 nor another order of things, than that which now is. But we showed above (
16690 <a id="FP_Q25_A5-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q19_A3.html">Q[19], A[3]</a>) that God does not act from natural necessity, but that His will is the cause of all things; nor is that will naturally and 16690 <a href="#FP_Q19_A3" id="FP_Q25_A5-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[19], A[3]</a>) that God does not act from natural necessity, but that His will is the cause of all things; nor is that will naturally and
16691 from any necessity determined to those things. Whence in no way at all is the present course of events produced by God from 16691 from any necessity determined to those things. Whence in no way at all is the present course of events produced by God from
16692 any necessity, so that other things could not happen. Others, however, said that the divine power is restricted to this present 16692 any necessity, so that other things could not happen. Others, however, said that the divine power is restricted to this present
16693 course of events through the order of the divine wisdom and justice without which God 16693 course of events through the order of the divine wisdom and justice without which God
16694 does nothing. But since the power of God, which is His essence, is nothing else but His wisdom, it can indeed be fittingly 16694 does nothing. But since the power of God, which is His essence, is nothing else but His wisdom, it can indeed be fittingly
16695 said that there is nothing in the divine power which is not in the order of the divine wisdom; for the divine wisdom includes 16695 said that there is nothing in the divine power which is not in the order of the divine wisdom; for the divine wisdom includes
16696 the whole potency of the divine power. Yet the order placed in creation by divine wisdom, in which order the notion of His 16696 the whole potency of the divine power. Yet the order placed in creation by divine wisdom, in which order the notion of His
16697 justice consists, as said above ( 16697 justice consists, as said above (
16698 <a id="FP_Q25_A5-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q21_A2.html">Q[21], A[2]</a>), is not so adequate to the divine wisdom that the divine 16698 <a href="#FP_Q21_A2" id="FP_Q25_A5-p6.2" shape="rect">Q[21], A[2]</a>), is not so adequate to the divine wisdom that the divine
16699 wisdom should be restricted to this present order of things. Now it is clear that the whole idea of order which a wise man 16699 wisdom should be restricted to this present order of things. Now it is clear that the whole idea of order which a wise man
16700 puts into things made by him is taken from their end. So, when the end is proportionate to the things made for that end, the 16700 puts into things made by him is taken from their end. So, when the end is proportionate to the things made for that end, the
16701 wisdom of the maker is restricted to some definite order. But the divine goodness is an end exceeding beyond all proportion 16701 wisdom of the maker is restricted to some definite order. But the divine goodness is an end exceeding beyond all proportion
16702 things created. Whence the divine wisdom is not so restricted to any particular order that no other course of events could 16702 things created. Whence the divine wisdom is not so restricted to any particular order that no other course of events could
16703 happen. Wherefore we must simply say that God can do other things than those He has done. 16703 happen. Wherefore we must simply say that God can do other things than those He has done.
16732 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> In ourselves, in whom power and essence are distinct from will and intellect, and again intellect from wisdom, and will from 16732 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> In ourselves, in whom power and essence are distinct from will and intellect, and again intellect from wisdom, and will from
16733 justice, there can be something in the power which is not in the just will nor in the wise intellect. But in God, power and 16733 justice, there can be something in the power which is not in the just will nor in the wise intellect. But in God, power and
16734 essence, will and intellect, wisdom and justice, are one and the same. Whence, there can be nothing in the divine power which 16734 essence, will and intellect, wisdom and justice, are one and the same. Whence, there can be nothing in the divine power which
16735 cannot also be in His just will or in His wise intellect. Nevertheless, because 16735 cannot also be in His just will or in His wise intellect. Nevertheless, because
16736 His will cannot be determined from necessity to this or that order of things, except upon supposition, as was said above ( 16736 His will cannot be determined from necessity to this or that order of things, except upon supposition, as was said above (
16737 <a id="FP_Q25_A5-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q19_A3.html">Q[19], A[3]</a>), neither are the wisdom and justice of God restricted to this present order, as was shown above; so nothing prevents there 16737 <a href="#FP_Q19_A3" id="FP_Q25_A5-p7.1" shape="rect">Q[19], A[3]</a>), neither are the wisdom and justice of God restricted to this present order, as was shown above; so nothing prevents there
16738 being something in the divine power which He does not will, and which is not included in the order which He has place in things. 16738 being something in the divine power which He does not will, and which is not included in the order which He has place in things.
16739 Again, because power is considered as executing, the will as commanding, and the 16739 Again, because power is considered as executing, the will as commanding, and the
16740 intellect and wisdom as directing; what is attributed to His power considered in itself, God is said to be able to do in accordance 16740 intellect and wisdom as directing; what is attributed to His power considered in itself, God is said to be able to do in accordance
16741 with His absolute power. Of such a kind is everything which has the nature of being, as was said above 16741 with His absolute power. Of such a kind is everything which has the nature of being, as was said above
16742 <a id="FP_Q25_A5-p7.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q25_A3.html">(A[3])</a>. What is, however, attributed to the divine power, according as it carries into execution the command of a just will, God 16742 <a href="#FP_Q25_A3" id="FP_Q25_A5-p7.2" shape="rect">(A[3])</a>. What is, however, attributed to the divine power, according as it carries into execution the command of a just will, God
16743 is said to be able to do by His ordinary power. In this manner, we must say that God can do other things by 16743 is said to be able to do by His ordinary power. In this manner, we must say that God can do other things by
16744 His absolute power than those He has foreknown and pre-ordained He would do. But it could not happen that He should do anything 16744 His absolute power than those He has foreknown and pre-ordained He would do. But it could not happen that He should do anything
16745 which He had not foreknown, and had not pre-ordained that He would do, because His actual doing is subject to His foreknowledge 16745 which He had not foreknown, and had not pre-ordained that He would do, because His actual doing is subject to His foreknowledge
16746 and pre-ordination, though His power, which is His nature, is not so. For God does things because He wills so to do; yet the 16746 and pre-ordination, though His power, which is His nature, is not so. For God does things because He wills so to do; yet the
16747 power to do them does not come from His will, but from His nature. 16747 power to do them does not come from His will, but from His nature.
16967 et sit suarum operationum domina. Utrumque autem istorum 16967 et sit suarum operationum domina. Utrumque autem istorum
16968 excellentissime Deo convenit, scilicet perfectum esse, et 16968 excellentissime Deo convenit, scilicet perfectum esse, et
16969 intelligentem. Unde beatitudo maxime convenit Deo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q26_A1-p6"> 16969 intelligentem. Unde beatitudo maxime convenit Deo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q26_A1-p6">
16970 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Aggregation of good is in God, after the manner not of composition, but of simplicity; for those things which in creatures 16970 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Aggregation of good is in God, after the manner not of composition, but of simplicity; for those things which in creatures
16971 is manifold, pre-exist in God, as was said above ( 16971 is manifold, pre-exist in God, as was said above (
16972 <a id="FP_Q26_A1-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q4_A2.html">Q[4], A[2]</a>; 16972 <a href="#FP_Q4_A2" id="FP_Q26_A1-p6.1" shape="rect">Q[4], A[2]</a>;
16973 <a id="FP_Q26_A1-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q13_A4.html">Q[13], A[4]</a>), in simplicity and unity. 16973 <a href="#FP_Q13_A4" id="FP_Q26_A1-p6.2" shape="rect">Q[13], A[4]</a>), in simplicity and unity.
16974 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 26 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="29549" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29549] Iª q. 26 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo 16974 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 26 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="29549" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29549] Iª q. 26 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
16975 dicendum quod aggregatio bonorum est in Deo non per modum 16975 dicendum quod aggregatio bonorum est in Deo non per modum
16976 compositionis, sed per modum simplicitatis, quia quae in creaturis 16976 compositionis, sed per modum simplicitatis, quia quae in creaturis
16977 multiplicia sunt, in Deo praeexistunt simpliciter et unite, ut 16977 multiplicia sunt, in Deo praeexistunt simpliciter et unite, ut
16978 supra dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q26_A1-p7"> 16978 supra dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q26_A1-p7">
17011 autem gloriosum significat esse beatum. Cum igitur Deo fruamur 17011 autem gloriosum significat esse beatum. Cum igitur Deo fruamur
17012 secundum intellectum, quia visio est tota merces, ut dicit 17012 secundum intellectum, quia visio est tota merces, ut dicit
17013 Augustinus, videtur quod beatitudo dicatur in Deo secundum 17013 Augustinus, videtur quod beatitudo dicatur in Deo secundum
17014 intellectum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q26_A2-p5"> 17014 intellectum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q26_A2-p5">
17015 <b>I answer that,</b> Beatitude, as stated above 17015 <b>I answer that,</b> Beatitude, as stated above
17016 <a id="FP_Q26_A2-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q26_A1.html">(A[1])</a>, is the perfect good of an intellectual nature. Thus it is that, as everything desires the perfection of its nature, intellectual 17016 <a href="#FP_Q26_A1" id="FP_Q26_A2-p5.1" shape="rect">(A[1])</a>, is the perfect good of an intellectual nature. Thus it is that, as everything desires the perfection of its nature, intellectual
17017 nature desires naturally to be happy. Now that which is most perfect in any intellectual nature is the intellectual operation, 17017 nature desires naturally to be happy. Now that which is most perfect in any intellectual nature is the intellectual operation,
17018 by which in some sense it grasps everything. Whence the beatitude of every intellectual nature consists in understanding. 17018 by which in some sense it grasps everything. Whence the beatitude of every intellectual nature consists in understanding.
17019 Now in God, to be and to 17019 Now in God, to be and to
17020 understand are one and the same thing; differing only in the manner of our understanding them. Beatitude must therefore be 17020 understand are one and the same thing; differing only in the manner of our understanding them. Beatitude must therefore be
17021 assigned to God in respect of His intellect; as also to the blessed, who are called blesses [beati] by reason of the assimilation 17021 assigned to God in respect of His intellect; as also to the blessed, who are called blesses [beati] by reason of the assimilation
17047 Obiectum autem praeintelligitur actui potentiae. Unde, secundum 17047 Obiectum autem praeintelligitur actui potentiae. Unde, secundum
17048 modum intelligendi, prius est beatitudo divina, quam actus 17048 modum intelligendi, prius est beatitudo divina, quam actus
17049 voluntatis in ea requiescentis. Et hoc non potest esse nisi actus 17049 voluntatis in ea requiescentis. Et hoc non potest esse nisi actus
17050 intellectus. Unde in actu intellectus attenditur beatitudo.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q26_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q26_A3-p0.1">Q. 26. A. 3. Whether God is the beatitude of each of the blessed?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q26_A3-p2"> 17050 intellectus. Unde in actu intellectus attenditur beatitudo.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q26_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q26_A3-p0.1">Q. 26. A. 3. Whether God is the beatitude of each of the blessed?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q26_A3-p2">
17051 <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God is the beatitude of each of the blessed. For God is the supreme good, as was said above ( 17051 <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God is the beatitude of each of the blessed. For God is the supreme good, as was said above (
17052 <a id="FP_Q26_A3-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q6_A2.html">Q[6], AA[2]</a>,4). But it is quite impossible that there should be many supreme goods, as also is clear from what has been said above ( 17052 <a href="#FP_Q6_A2" id="FP_Q26_A3-p2.1" shape="rect">Q[6], AA[2]</a>,4). But it is quite impossible that there should be many supreme goods, as also is clear from what has been said above (
17053 <a id="FP_Q26_A3-p2.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q11_A3.html">Q[11], A[3]</a>). Therefore, since it is of the essence of beatitude that it should be the supreme good, it seems that beatitude is nothing 17053 <a href="#FP_Q11_A3" id="FP_Q26_A3-p2.2" shape="rect">Q[11], A[3]</a>). Therefore, since it is of the essence of beatitude that it should be the supreme good, it seems that beatitude is nothing
17054 else but God Himself. 17054 else but God Himself.
17055 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 26 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="29557" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29557] Iª q. 26 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium sic 17055 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 26 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="29557" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29557] Iª q. 26 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium sic
17056 proceditur. Videtur quod Deus sit beatitudo cuiuslibet beati. Deus 17056 proceditur. Videtur quod Deus sit beatitudo cuiuslibet beati. Deus
17057 enim est summum bonum, ut supra ostensum est. Impossibile est autem 17057 enim est summum bonum, ut supra ostensum est. Impossibile est autem
17058 esse plura summa bona, ut etiam ex superioribus patet. Cum igitur 17058 esse plura summa bona, ut etiam ex superioribus patet. Cum igitur
17115 quaedam beatitudo, secundum quosdam, consistit in rebus 17115 quaedam beatitudo, secundum quosdam, consistit in rebus
17116 corporalibus, sicut in voluptatibus, divitiis, et huiusmodi, quae 17116 corporalibus, sicut in voluptatibus, divitiis, et huiusmodi, quae
17117 quidem Deo convenire non possunt, cum sit incorporeus. Ergo 17117 quidem Deo convenire non possunt, cum sit incorporeus. Ergo
17118 beatitudo eius non complectitur omnem beatitudinem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q26_A4-p4"> 17118 beatitudo eius non complectitur omnem beatitudinem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q26_A4-p4">
17119 <b>On the contrary,</b> Beatitude is a certain perfection. But the divine perfection embraces all other perfection, as was shown above ( 17119 <b>On the contrary,</b> Beatitude is a certain perfection. But the divine perfection embraces all other perfection, as was shown above (
17120 <a id="FP_Q26_A4-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q4_A2.html">Q[4], A[2]</a> ). Therefore the divine beatitude embraces all other beatitudes. 17120 <a href="#FP_Q4_A2" id="FP_Q26_A4-p4.1" shape="rect">Q[4], A[2]</a> ). Therefore the divine beatitude embraces all other beatitudes.
17121 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 26 a. 4 s. c."><a name="29565" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29565] Iª q. 26 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est 17121 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 26 a. 4 s. c."><a name="29565" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29565] Iª q. 26 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
17122 quod beatitudo est perfectio quaedam. Divina autem perfectio 17122 quod beatitudo est perfectio quaedam. Divina autem perfectio
17123 complectitur omnem perfectionem, ut supra ostensum est. Ergo divina 17123 complectitur omnem perfectionem, ut supra ostensum est. Ergo divina
17124 beatitudo complectitur omnem beatitudinem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q26_A4-p5"> 17124 beatitudo complectitur omnem beatitudinem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q26_A4-p5">
17125 <b>I answer that,</b> Whatever is desirable in whatsoever beatitude, whether true or false, pre-exists wholly and in a more eminent degree in the 17125 <b>I answer that,</b> Whatever is desirable in whatsoever beatitude, whether true or false, pre-exists wholly and in a more eminent degree in the
17151 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The good that exists in things corporeal in a corporeal manner, is also in God, but in a spiritual manner. 17151 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The good that exists in things corporeal in a corporeal manner, is also in God, but in a spiritual manner.
17152 </p><p id="FP_Q26_A4-p8"> We have now spoken enough concerning what pertains to the unity of the divine essence.</p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 26 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="29568" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29568] Iª q. 26 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum 17152 </p><p id="FP_Q26_A4-p8"> We have now spoken enough concerning what pertains to the unity of the divine essence.</p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 26 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="29568" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29568] Iª q. 26 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
17153 dicendum quod bona quae sunt in corporalibus corporaliter, in Deo 17153 dicendum quod bona quae sunt in corporalibus corporaliter, in Deo
17154 sunt spiritualiter, secundum modum suum. Et haec dicta sufficiant 17154 sunt spiritualiter, secundum modum suum. Et haec dicta sufficiant
17155 de his quae pertinent ad divinae essentiae unitatem.</p></div></div></div></div> 17155 de his quae pertinent ad divinae essentiae unitatem.</p></div></div></div></div>
17156 <a href="summa.FP_Q1_A10.html"/> 17156
17157 <a href="summa.FP_Q2.html"/> 17157
17158 ` 17158 `
17159 </div> 17159 </div>
17160 </body> 17160 </body>
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