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| date | Sun, 03 Jan 2010 18:47:31 +0000 |
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| 2 <html xmlns:x="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"> | |
| 3 <head> | |
| 4 <title>Bilingual Aquinas</title> | |
| 5 <style> | |
| 6 h2, h3, h4 {margin-bottom: 0px; clear: both} | |
| 7 .bilingual {clear: both; margin-top: .5em} | |
| 8 div.eng {width: 45%; float: left} | |
| 9 div.lat {width: 45%; float: right} | |
| 10 @page { size: A4 portrait; margin: 1cm} | |
| 11 </style> | |
| 12 </head> | |
| 13 <body style="font-family: Bitstream Vera Serif"><div id="FP.ii" class="div2"> | |
| 14 <a href="summa.FP_Q1_A10.html"/> | |
| 15 <a href="summa.FP_Q2.html"/> | |
| 16 <h2 id="FP.ii-p0.1">TREATISE ON THE ONE GOD (QQ[2]-26)</h2> | |
| 17 <div id="FP_Q2" class="div3"> | |
| 18 <h3 id="FP_Q2-p0.1">Q. 2. THE EXISTENCE OF GOD (THREE ARTICLES)</h3> | |
| 19 <div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> | |
| 20 <p id="FP_Q2-p2"> Because the chief aim of sacred doctrine is to teach the knowledge of God, not only as He is in Himself, but also as He is | |
| 21 the beginning of things and their last end, and especially of rational creatures, as is clear from what has been already said, | |
| 22 therefore, in our endeavor to expound this science, we shall treat: (1) Of God; (2) Of the rational creature's advance towards | |
| 23 God; (3) Of Christ, Who as man, is our way to God. | |
| 24 </p><p id="FP_Q2-p3"> In treating of God there will be a threefold division, for we shall consider: (1) Whatever concerns the Divine Essence; (2) | |
| 25 Whatever concerns the distinctions of Persons; (3) Whatever concerns the procession of creatures from Him. | |
| 26 </p><p id="FP_Q2-p4"> Concerning the Divine Essence, we must consider: (1) Whether God exists? (2) The manner of His existence, or, rather, what | |
| 27 is NOT the manner of His existence; (3) Whatever concerns His operations---namely, His knowledge, will, power. | |
| 28 </p><p id="FP_Q2-p5"> Concerning the first, there are three points of inquiry:</p><p id="FP_Q2-p6"> (1) Whether the proposition "God exists" is self-evident?</p><p id="FP_Q2-p7"> (2) Whether it is demonstrable?</p><p id="FP_Q2-p8"> (3) Whether God exists?</p> | |
| 29 </div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 2 pr."><a name="28298" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28298] | |
| 30 Iª q. 2 pr.</span></a> Quia igitur principalis intentio huius | |
| 31 sacrae doctrinae est Dei cognitionem tradere, et non solum secundum | |
| 32 quod in se est, sed etiam secundum quod est principium rerum et | |
| 33 finis earum, et specialiter rationalis creaturae, ut ex dictis est | |
| 34 manifestum; ad huius doctrinae expositionem intendentes, primo | |
| 35 tractabimus de Deo; secundo, de motu rationalis creaturae in Deum; | |
| 36 tertio, de Christo, qui, secundum quod homo, via est nobis tendendi | |
| 37 in Deum. Consideratio autem de Deo tripartita erit. Primo namque | |
| 38 considerabimus ea quae ad essentiam divinam pertinent; secundo, ea | |
| 39 quae pertinent ad distinctionem personarum; tertio, ea quae | |
| 40 pertinent ad processum creaturarum ab ipso. Circa essentiam vero | |
| 41 divinam, primo considerandum est an Deus sit; secundo, quomodo sit, | |
| 42 vel potius quomodo non sit; tertio considerandum erit de his quae | |
| 43 ad operationem ipsius pertinent, scilicet de scientia et de | |
| 44 voluntate et potentia. Circa primum quaeruntur tria. Primo, utrum | |
| 45 Deum esse sit per se notum. Secundo, utrum sit demonstrabile. | |
| 46 Tertio, an Deus sit.</p></div></div></div> | |
| 47 <div id="FP_Q2_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q2_A1-p0.1">Q. 2. A. 1. Whether the existence of God is self-evident?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q2_A1-p2"> | |
| 48 <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the existence of God is self-evident. Now those things are said to be self-evident to us the knowledge of which | |
| 49 is naturally implanted in us, as we can see in regard to first principles. But as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. i, 1,3), "the | |
| 50 knowledge of God is naturally implanted in all." Therefore the existence of God is self-evident. | |
| 51 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 2 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="28299" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28299] Iª q. 2 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum sic | |
| 52 proceditur. Videtur quod Deum esse sit per se notum. Illa enim | |
| 53 nobis dicuntur per se nota, quorum cognitio nobis naturaliter | |
| 54 inest, sicut patet de primis principiis. Sed, sicut dicit | |
| 55 Damascenus in principio libri sui, <i>omnibus cognitio existendi | |
| 56 Deum naturaliter est inserta</i>. Ergo Deum esse est per se | |
| 57 notum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q2_A1-p3"> | |
| 58 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, those things are said to be self-evident which are known as soon as the terms are known, which the Philosopher (1 | |
| 59 Poster. iii) says is true of the first principles of demonstration. Thus, when the nature of a whole and of a part is known, | |
| 60 it is at once recognized that every whole is greater than its part. But as soon as the signification of the word "God" is | |
| 61 understood, it is at once seen that God exists. For by this word is signified that thing than | |
| 62 which nothing greater can be conceived. But that which exists actually and mentally is greater than that which exists only | |
| 63 mentally. Therefore, since as soon as the word "God" is understood it exists mentally, it also follows that it exists actually. | |
| 64 Therefore the proposition "God exists" is self-evident. | |
| 65 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 2 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="28300" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28300] Iª q. 2 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, illa | |
| 66 dicuntur esse per se nota, quae statim, cognitis terminis, | |
| 67 cognoscuntur, quod philosophus attribuit primis demonstrationis | |
| 68 principiis, in I Poster., scito enim quid est totum et quid pars, | |
| 69 statim scitur quod omne totum maius est sua parte. Sed intellecto | |
| 70 quid significet hoc nomen Deus, statim habetur quod Deus est. | |
| 71 Significatur enim hoc nomine id quo maius significari non potest, | |
| 72 maius autem est quod est in re et intellectu, quam quod est in | |
| 73 intellectu tantum, unde cum, intellecto hoc nomine Deus, statim sit | |
| 74 in intellectu, sequitur etiam quod sit in re. Ergo Deum esse est | |
| 75 per se notum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q2_A1-p4"> | |
| 76 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the existence of truth is self-evident. For whoever denies the existence of truth grants that truth does not exist: | |
| 77 and, if truth does not exist, then the proposition "Truth does not exist" is true: and if there is anything true, there must | |
| 78 be truth. But God is truth itself: "I am the way, the truth, and the life" ( | |
| 79 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q2_A1-p4.1" href="./asv.html#John.14.6" target="asv">Jn. 14:6</a>) Therefore "God exists" is self-evident. | |
| 80 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 2 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="28301" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28301] Iª q. 2 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 81 veritatem esse est per se notum, quia qui negat veritatem esse, | |
| 82 concedit veritatem esse, si enim veritas non est, verum est | |
| 83 veritatem non esse. Si autem est aliquid verum, oportet quod | |
| 84 veritas sit. Deus autem est ipsa veritas, Ioann. XIV, <i>ego sum | |
| 85 via, veritas et vita</i>. Ergo Deum esse est per se notum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q2_A1-p5"> | |
| 86 <b>On the contrary,</b> No one can mentally admit the opposite of what is self-evident; as the Philosopher (Metaph. iv, lect. vi) states concerning | |
| 87 the first principles of demonstration. But the opposite of the proposition "God is" can be mentally admitted: "The fool said | |
| 88 in his heart, There is no God" ( | |
| 89 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q2_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.52.1" target="asv">Ps. 52:1</a>). Therefore, that God exists is not self-evident. | |
| 90 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 2 a. 1 s. c."><a name="28302" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28302] Iª q. 2 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra, nullus | |
| 91 potest cogitare oppositum eius quod est per se notum ut patet per | |
| 92 philosophum, in IV Metaphys. et I Poster., circa prima | |
| 93 demonstrationis principia. Cogitari autem potest oppositum eius | |
| 94 quod est Deum esse, secundum illud Psalmi LII, <i>dixit insipiens | |
| 95 in corde suo, non est Deus</i>. Ergo Deum esse non est per se | |
| 96 notum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q2_A1-p6"> | |
| 97 <b>I answer that,</b> A thing can be self-evident in either of two ways: on the one hand, self-evident in itself, though not to us; on the other, | |
| 98 self-evident in itself, and to us. A proposition is self-evident because the predicate is included in the essence of the subject, | |
| 99 as "Man is an animal," for animal is contained in the essence of man. If, therefore the essence of the predicate and subject | |
| 100 be known to all, the proposition will be self-evident to all; as is clear with | |
| 101 regard to the first principles of demonstration, the terms of which are common things that no one is ignorant of, such as | |
| 102 being and non-being, whole and part, and such like. If, however, there are some to whom the essence of the predicate and subject | |
| 103 is unknown, the proposition will be self-evident in itself, but not to those who do not know the meaning of the predicate | |
| 104 and subject of the proposition. Therefore, it happens, as Boethius says (Hebdom., the title of which is: "Whether all that | |
| 105 is, | |
| 106 is good"), "that there are some mental concepts self-evident only to the learned, as that incorporeal substances are not in | |
| 107 space." Therefore I say that this proposition, "God exists," of itself is self-evident, for the predicate is the same as the | |
| 108 subject, because God is His own existence as will be hereafter shown ( | |
| 109 <a id="FP_Q2_A1-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q3_A4.html">Q[3], A[4]</a>). Now because we do not know the essence of God, the proposition is not self-evident to us; but needs to be demonstrated | |
| 110 by things that are more | |
| 111 known to us, though less known in their nature---namely, by effects. | |
| 112 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 2 a. 1 co."><a name="28303" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28303] Iª q. 2 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum | |
| 113 quod contingit aliquid esse per se notum dupliciter, uno modo, | |
| 114 secundum se et non quoad nos; alio modo, secundum se et quoad nos. | |
| 115 Ex hoc enim aliqua propositio est per se nota, quod praedicatum | |
| 116 includitur in ratione subiecti, ut homo est animal, nam animal est | |
| 117 de ratione hominis. Si igitur notum sit omnibus de praedicato et de | |
| 118 subiecto quid sit, propositio illa erit omnibus per se nota, sicut | |
| 119 patet in primis demonstrationum principiis, quorum termini sunt | |
| 120 quaedam communia quae nullus ignorat, ut ens et non ens, totum et | |
| 121 pars, et similia. Si autem apud aliquos notum non sit de praedicato | |
| 122 et subiecto quid sit, propositio quidem quantum in se est, erit per | |
| 123 se nota, non tamen apud illos qui praedicatum et subiectum | |
| 124 propositionis ignorant. Et ideo contingit, ut dicit Boetius in | |
| 125 libro de hebdomadibus, quod quaedam sunt communes animi | |
| 126 conceptiones et per se notae, apud sapientes tantum, ut | |
| 127 incorporalia in loco non esse. Dico ergo quod haec propositio, Deus | |
| 128 est, quantum in se est, per se nota est, quia praedicatum est idem | |
| 129 cum subiecto; Deus enim est suum esse, ut infra patebit. Sed quia | |
| 130 nos non scimus de Deo quid est, non est nobis per se nota, sed | |
| 131 indiget demonstrari per ea quae sunt magis nota quoad nos, et minus | |
| 132 nota quoad naturam, scilicet per effectus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q2_A1-p7"> | |
| 133 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> To know that God exists in a general and confused way is implanted in us by nature, inasmuch as God is man's beatitude. For | |
| 134 man naturally desires happiness, and what is naturally desired by man must be naturally known to him. This, however, is not | |
| 135 to know absolutely that God exists; just as to know that someone is approaching is not the same as to know that Peter is approaching, | |
| 136 even though it is Peter who is approaching; for many there are who | |
| 137 imagine that man's perfect good which is happiness, consists in riches, and others in pleasures, and others in something else. | |
| 138 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 2 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="28304" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28304] Iª q. 2 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo | |
| 139 dicendum quod cognoscere Deum esse in aliquo communi, sub quadam | |
| 140 confusione, est nobis naturaliter insertum, inquantum scilicet Deus | |
| 141 est hominis beatitudo, homo enim naturaliter desiderat | |
| 142 beatitudinem, et quod naturaliter desideratur ab homine, | |
| 143 naturaliter cognoscitur ab eodem. Sed hoc non est simpliciter | |
| 144 cognoscere Deum esse; sicut cognoscere venientem, non est | |
| 145 cognoscere Petrum, quamvis sit Petrus veniens, multi enim perfectum | |
| 146 hominis bonum, quod est beatitudo, existimant divitias; quidam vero | |
| 147 voluptates; quidam autem aliquid aliud.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q2_A1-p8"> | |
| 148 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Perhaps not everyone who hears this word "God" understands it to signify something than which nothing greater can be thought, | |
| 149 seeing that some have believed God to be a body. Yet, granted that everyone understands that by this word "God" is signified | |
| 150 something than which nothing greater can be thought, nevertheless, it does not therefore follow that he understands that what | |
| 151 the word signifies exists actually, but only that it exists mentally. Nor can | |
| 152 it be argued that it actually exists, unless it be admitted that there actually exists something than which nothing greater | |
| 153 can be thought; and this precisely is not admitted by those who hold that God does not exist. | |
| 154 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 2 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="28305" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28305] Iª q. 2 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 155 dicendum quod forte ille qui audit hoc nomen Deus, non intelligit | |
| 156 significari aliquid quo maius cogitari non possit, cum quidam | |
| 157 crediderint Deum esse corpus. Dato etiam quod quilibet intelligat | |
| 158 hoc nomine Deus significari hoc quod dicitur, scilicet illud quo | |
| 159 maius cogitari non potest; non tamen propter hoc sequitur quod | |
| 160 intelligat id quod significatur per nomen, esse in rerum natura; | |
| 161 sed in apprehensione intellectus tantum. Nec potest argui quod sit | |
| 162 in re, nisi daretur quod sit in re aliquid quo maius cogitari non | |
| 163 potest, quod non est datum a ponentibus Deum non esse.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q2_A1-p9"> | |
| 164 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The existence of truth in general is self-evident but the existence of a Primal Truth is not self-evident to us. | |
| 165 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 2 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="28306" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28306] Iª q. 2 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum | |
| 166 quod veritatem esse in communi, est per se notum, sed primam | |
| 167 veritatem esse, hoc non est per se notum quoad nos.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q2_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q2_A2-p0.1">Q. 2. A. 2. Whether it can be demonstrated that God exists?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q2_A2-p2"> | |
| 168 <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the existence of God cannot be demonstrated. For it is an article of faith that God exists. But what is of | |
| 169 faith cannot be demonstrated, because a demonstration produces scientific knowledge; whereas faith is of the unseen ( | |
| 170 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q2_A2-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Heb.11.1" target="asv">Heb. 11:1</a>). Therefore it cannot be demonstrated that God exists. | |
| 171 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 2 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="28307" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28307] Iª q. 2 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum sic | |
| 172 proceditur. Videtur quod Deum esse non sit demonstrabile. Deum enim | |
| 173 esse est articulus fidei. Sed ea quae sunt fidei, non sunt | |
| 174 demonstrabilia, quia demonstratio facit scire, fides autem de non | |
| 175 apparentibus est, ut patet per apostolum, ad Hebr. XI. Ergo Deum | |
| 176 esse non est demonstrabile.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q2_A2-p3"> | |
| 177 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the essence is the middle term of demonstration. But we cannot know in what God's essence consists, but solely in | |
| 178 what it does not consist; as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. i, 4). Therefore we cannot demonstrate that God exists. | |
| 179 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 2 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="28308" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28308] Iª q. 2 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, medium | |
| 180 demonstrationis est quod quid est. Sed de Deo non possumus scire | |
| 181 quid est, sed solum quid non est, ut dicit Damascenus. Ergo non | |
| 182 possumus demonstrare Deum esse.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q2_A2-p4"> | |
| 183 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if the existence of God were demonstrated, this could only be from His effects. But His effects are not proportionate | |
| 184 to Him, since He is infinite and His effects are finite; and between the finite and infinite there is no proportion. Therefore, | |
| 185 since a cause cannot be demonstrated by an effect not proportionate to it, it seems that the existence of God cannot be demonstrated. | |
| 186 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 2 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="28309" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28309] Iª q. 2 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, si | |
| 187 demonstraretur Deum esse, hoc non esset nisi ex effectibus eius. | |
| 188 Sed effectus eius non sunt proportionati ei, cum ipse sit | |
| 189 infinitus, et effectus finiti; finiti autem ad infinitum non est | |
| 190 proportio. Cum ergo causa non possit demonstrari per effectum sibi | |
| 191 non proportionatum, videtur quod Deum esse non possit | |
| 192 demonstrari.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q2_A2-p5"> | |
| 193 <b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle says: "The invisible things of Him are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made" ( | |
| 194 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q2_A2-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.1.20" target="asv">Rom. 1:20</a>). But this would not be unless the existence of God could be demonstrated through the things that are made; for the first | |
| 195 thing we must know of anything is whether it exists. | |
| 196 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 2 a. 2 s. c."><a name="28310" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28310] Iª q. 2 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est | |
| 197 quod apostolus dicit, ad Rom. I, <i>invisibilia Dei per ea quae | |
| 198 facta sunt, intellecta, conspiciuntur</i>. Sed hoc non esset, nisi | |
| 199 per ea quae facta sunt, posset demonstrari Deum esse, primum enim | |
| 200 quod oportet intelligi de aliquo, est an sit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q2_A2-p6"> | |
| 201 <b>I answer that,</b> Demonstration can be made in two ways: One is through the cause, and is called "a priori," and this is to argue from what | |
| 202 is prior absolutely. The other is through the effect, and is called a demonstration "a posteriori"; this is to argue from | |
| 203 what is prior relatively only to us. When an effect is better known to us than its cause, from the effect we proceed to the | |
| 204 knowledge of the cause. And from every effect the existence of its proper cause can be | |
| 205 demonstrated, so long as its effects are better known to us; because since every effect depends upon its cause, if the effect | |
| 206 exists, the cause must pre-exist. Hence the existence of God, in so far as it is not self-evident to us, can be demonstrated | |
| 207 from those of His effects which are known to us. | |
| 208 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 2 a. 2 co."><a name="28311" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28311] Iª q. 2 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum | |
| 209 quod duplex est demonstratio. Una quae est per causam, et dicitur | |
| 210 propter quid, et haec est per priora simpliciter. Alia est per | |
| 211 effectum, et dicitur demonstratio quia, et haec est per ea quae | |
| 212 sunt priora quoad nos, cum enim effectus aliquis nobis est | |
| 213 manifestior quam sua causa, per effectum procedimus ad cognitionem | |
| 214 causae. Ex quolibet autem effectu potest demonstrari propriam | |
| 215 causam eius esse (si tamen eius effectus sint magis noti quoad | |
| 216 nos), quia, cum effectus dependeant a causa, posito effectu necesse | |
| 217 est causam praeexistere. Unde Deum esse, secundum quod non est per | |
| 218 se notum quoad nos, demonstrabile est per effectus nobis notos.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q2_A2-p7"> | |
| 219 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The existence of God and other like truths about God, which can be known by natural reason, are not articles of faith, but | |
| 220 are preambles to the articles; for faith presupposes natural knowledge, even as grace presupposes nature, and perfection supposes | |
| 221 something that can be perfected. Nevertheless, there is nothing to prevent a man, who cannot grasp a proof, accepting, as | |
| 222 a matter of faith, something which in itself is capable of being scientifically | |
| 223 known and demonstrated. | |
| 224 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 2 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="28312" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28312] Iª q. 2 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo | |
| 225 dicendum quod Deum esse, et alia huiusmodi quae per rationem | |
| 226 naturalem nota possunt esse de Deo, ut dicitur Rom. I non sunt | |
| 227 articuli fidei, sed praeambula ad articulos, sic enim fides | |
| 228 praesupponit cognitionem naturalem, sicut gratia naturam, et ut | |
| 229 perfectio perfectibile. Nihil tamen prohibet illud quod secundum se | |
| 230 demonstrabile est et scibile, ab aliquo accipi ut credibile, qui | |
| 231 demonstrationem non capit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q2_A2-p8"> | |
| 232 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> When the existence of a cause is demonstrated from an effect, this effect takes the place of the definition of the cause | |
| 233 in proof of the cause's existence. This is especially the case in regard to God, because, in order to prove the existence | |
| 234 of anything, it is necessary to accept as a middle term the meaning of the word, and not its essence, for the question of | |
| 235 its essence follows on the question of its existence. Now the names given to God are | |
| 236 derived from His effects; consequently, in demonstrating the existence of God from His effects, we may take for the middle | |
| 237 term the meaning of the word "God". | |
| 238 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 2 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="28313" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28313] Iª q. 2 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 239 dicendum quod cum demonstratur causa per effectum, necesse est uti | |
| 240 effectu loco definitionis causae, ad probandum causam esse, et hoc | |
| 241 maxime contingit in Deo. Quia ad probandum aliquid esse, necesse | |
| 242 est accipere pro medio quid significet nomen non autem quod quid | |
| 243 est, quia quaestio quid est, sequitur ad quaestionem an est. Nomina | |
| 244 autem Dei imponuntur ab effectibus, ut postea ostendetur, unde, | |
| 245 demonstrando Deum esse per effectum, accipere possumus pro medio | |
| 246 quid significet hoc nomen Deus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q2_A2-p9"> | |
| 247 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> From effects not proportionate to the cause no perfect knowledge of that cause can be obtained. Yet from every effect the | |
| 248 existence of the cause can be clearly demonstrated, and so we can demonstrate the existence of God from His effects; though | |
| 249 from them we cannot perfectly know God as He is in His essence. | |
| 250 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 2 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="28314" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28314] Iª q. 2 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum | |
| 251 quod per effectus non proportionatos causae, non potest perfecta | |
| 252 cognitio de causa haberi, sed tamen ex quocumque effectu potest | |
| 253 manifeste nobis demonstrari causam esse, ut dictum est. Et sic ex | |
| 254 effectibus Dei potest demonstrari Deum esse, licet per eos non | |
| 255 perfecte possimus eum cognoscere secundum suam essentiam.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q2_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q2_A3-p0.1">Q. 2. A. 3. Whether God exists?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q2_A3-p2"> | |
| 256 <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God does not exist; because if one of two contraries be infinite, the other would be altogether destroyed. | |
| 257 But the word "God" means that He is infinite goodness. If, therefore, God existed, there would be no evil discoverable; but | |
| 258 there is evil in the world. Therefore God does not exist. | |
| 259 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 2 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="28315" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28315] Iª q. 2 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium sic | |
| 260 proceditur. Videtur quod Deus non sit. Quia si unum contrariorum | |
| 261 fuerit infinitum, totaliter destruetur aliud. Sed hoc intelligitur | |
| 262 in hoc nomine Deus, scilicet quod sit quoddam bonum infinitum. Si | |
| 263 ergo Deus esset, nullum malum inveniretur. Invenitur autem malum in | |
| 264 mundo. Ergo Deus non est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q2_A3-p3"> | |
| 265 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it is superfluous to suppose that what can be accounted for by a few principles has been produced by many. But it | |
| 266 seems that everything we see in the world can be accounted for by other principles, supposing God did not exist. For all natural | |
| 267 things can be reduced to one principle which is nature; and all voluntary things can be reduced to one principle which is | |
| 268 human reason, or will. Therefore there is no need to suppose God's existence. | |
| 269 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 2 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="28316" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28316] Iª q. 2 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, quod | |
| 270 potest compleri per pauciora principia, non fit per plura. Sed | |
| 271 videtur quod omnia quae apparent in mundo, possunt compleri per | |
| 272 alia principia, supposito quod Deus non sit, quia ea quae sunt | |
| 273 naturalia, reducuntur in principium quod est natura; ea vero quae | |
| 274 sunt a proposito, reducuntur in principium quod est ratio humana | |
| 275 vel voluntas. Nulla igitur necessitas est ponere Deum esse.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q2_A3-p4"> | |
| 276 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is said in the person of God: "I am Who am." ( | |
| 277 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q2_A3-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Exod.3.14" target="asv">Ex. 3:14</a>) | |
| 278 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 2 a. 3 s. c."><a name="28317" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28317] Iª q. 2 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est | |
| 279 quod dicitur Exodi III, ex persona Dei, <i>ego sum qui sum</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q2_A3-p5"> | |
| 280 <b>I answer that,</b> The existence of God can be proved in five ways. | |
| 281 </p><p id="FP_Q2_A3-p6"> The first and more manifest way is the argument from motion. It is certain, and evident to our senses, that in the world | |
| 282 some things are in motion. Now whatever is in motion is put in motion by another, for nothing can be in motion except it is | |
| 283 in potentiality to that towards which it is in motion; whereas a thing moves inasmuch as it is in act. For motion is nothing | |
| 284 else than the reduction of something from potentiality to actuality. But nothing can be reduced from potentiality | |
| 285 to actuality, except by something in a state of actuality. Thus that which is actually hot, as fire, makes wood, which is | |
| 286 potentially hot, to be actually hot, and thereby moves and changes it. Now it is not possible that the same thing should be | |
| 287 at once in actuality and potentiality in the same respect, but only in different respects. For what is actually hot cannot | |
| 288 simultaneously be potentially hot; but it is simultaneously potentially cold. It is therefore impossible that in the same | |
| 289 respect | |
| 290 and in the same way a thing should be both mover and moved, i.e. that it should move itself. Therefore, whatever is in motion | |
| 291 must be put in motion by another. If that by which it is put in motion be itself put in motion, then this also must needs | |
| 292 be put in motion by another, and that by another again. But this cannot go on to infinity, because then there would be no | |
| 293 first mover, and, consequently, no other mover; seeing that subsequent movers move only inasmuch as they are put in motion | |
| 294 by the | |
| 295 first mover; as the staff moves only because it is put in motion by the hand. Therefore it is necessary to arrive at a first | |
| 296 mover, put in motion by no other; and this everyone understands to be God. | |
| 297 </p><p id="FP_Q2_A3-p7"> The second way is from the nature of the efficient cause. In the world of sense we find there is an order of efficient causes. | |
| 298 There is no case known (neither is it, indeed, possible) in which a thing is found to be the efficient cause of itself; for | |
| 299 so it would be prior to itself, which is impossible. Now in efficient causes it is not possible to go on to infinity, because | |
| 300 in all efficient causes following in order, the first is the cause of the intermediate cause, and the | |
| 301 intermediate is the cause of the ultimate cause, whether the intermediate cause be several, or only one. Now to take away | |
| 302 the cause is to take away the effect. Therefore, if there be no first cause among efficient causes, there will be no ultimate, | |
| 303 nor any intermediate cause. But if in efficient causes it is possible to go on to infinity, there will be no first efficient | |
| 304 cause, neither will there be an ultimate effect, nor any intermediate efficient causes; all of which is plainly false. | |
| 305 Therefore it is necessary to admit a first efficient cause, to which everyone gives the name of God. | |
| 306 </p><p id="FP_Q2_A3-p8"> The third way is taken from possibility and necessity, and runs thus. We find in nature things that are possible to be and | |
| 307 not to be, since they are found to be generated, and to corrupt, and consequently, they are possible to be and not to be. | |
| 308 But it is impossible for these always to exist, for that which is possible not to be at some time is not. Therefore, if everything | |
| 309 is possible not to be, then at one time there could have been nothing in existence. Now if this were true, | |
| 310 even now there would be nothing in existence, because that which does not exist only begins to exist by something already | |
| 311 existing. Therefore, if at one time nothing was in existence, it would have been impossible for anything to have begun to | |
| 312 exist; and thus even now nothing would be in existence---which is absurd. Therefore, not all beings are merely possible, but | |
| 313 there must exist something the existence of which is necessary. But every necessary thing either has its necessity caused | |
| 314 by | |
| 315 another, or not. Now it is impossible to go on to infinity in necessary things which have their necessity caused by another, | |
| 316 as has been already proved in regard to efficient causes. Therefore we cannot but postulate the existence of some being having | |
| 317 of itself its own necessity, and not receiving it from another, but rather causing in others their necessity. This all men | |
| 318 speak of as God. | |
| 319 </p><p id="FP_Q2_A3-p9"> The fourth way is taken from the gradation to be found in things. Among beings there are some more and some less good, true, | |
| 320 noble and the like. But "more" and "less" are predicated of different things, according as they resemble in their different | |
| 321 ways something which is the maximum, as a thing is said to be hotter according as it more nearly resembles that which is hottest; | |
| 322 so that there is something which is truest, something best, something noblest and, consequently, | |
| 323 something which is uttermost being; for those things that are greatest in truth are greatest in being, as it is written in | |
| 324 Metaph. ii. Now the maximum in any genus is the cause of all in that genus; as fire, which is the maximum heat, is the cause | |
| 325 of all hot things. Therefore there must also be something which is to all beings the cause of their being, goodness, and every | |
| 326 other perfection; and this we call God. | |
| 327 </p><p id="FP_Q2_A3-p10"> The fifth way is taken from the governance of the world. We see that things which lack intelligence, such as natural bodies, | |
| 328 act for an end, and this is evident from their acting always, or nearly always, in the same way, so as to obtain the best | |
| 329 result. Hence it is plain that not fortuitously, but designedly, do they achieve their end. Now whatever lacks intelligence | |
| 330 cannot move towards an end, unless it be directed by some being endowed with knowledge and intelligence; as the | |
| 331 arrow is shot to its mark by the archer. Therefore some intelligent being exists by whom all natural things are directed to | |
| 332 their end; and this being we call God. | |
| 333 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 2 a. 3 co."><a name="28318" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28318] Iª q. 2 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum | |
| 334 quod Deum esse quinque viis probari potest. Prima autem et | |
| 335 manifestior via est, quae sumitur ex parte motus. Certum est enim, | |
| 336 et sensu constat, aliqua moveri in hoc mundo. Omne autem quod | |
| 337 movetur, ab alio movetur. Nihil enim movetur, nisi secundum quod | |
| 338 est in potentia ad illud ad quod movetur, movet autem aliquid | |
| 339 secundum quod est actu. Movere enim nihil aliud est quam educere | |
| 340 aliquid de potentia in actum, de potentia autem non potest aliquid | |
| 341 reduci in actum, nisi per aliquod ens in actu, sicut calidum in | |
| 342 actu, ut ignis, facit lignum, quod est calidum in potentia, esse | |
| 343 actu calidum, et per hoc movet et alterat ipsum. Non autem est | |
| 344 possibile ut idem sit simul in actu et potentia secundum idem, sed | |
| 345 solum secundum diversa, quod enim est calidum in actu, non potest | |
| 346 simul esse calidum in potentia, sed est simul frigidum in potentia. | |
| 347 Impossibile est ergo quod, secundum idem et eodem modo, aliquid sit | |
| 348 movens et motum, vel quod moveat seipsum. Omne ergo quod movetur, | |
| 349 oportet ab alio moveri. Si ergo id a quo movetur, moveatur, oportet | |
| 350 et ipsum ab alio moveri et illud ab alio. Hic autem non est | |
| 351 procedere in infinitum, quia sic non esset aliquod primum movens; | |
| 352 et per consequens nec aliquod aliud movens, quia moventia secunda | |
| 353 non movent nisi per hoc quod sunt mota a primo movente, sicut | |
| 354 baculus non movet nisi per hoc quod est motus a manu. Ergo necesse | |
| 355 est devenire ad aliquod primum movens, quod a nullo movetur, et hoc | |
| 356 omnes intelligunt Deum. Secunda via est ex ratione causae | |
| 357 efficientis. Invenimus enim in istis sensibilibus esse ordinem | |
| 358 causarum efficientium, nec tamen invenitur, nec est possibile, quod | |
| 359 aliquid sit causa efficiens sui ipsius; quia sic esset prius | |
| 360 seipso, quod est impossibile. Non autem est possibile quod in | |
| 361 causis efficientibus procedatur in infinitum. Quia in omnibus | |
| 362 causis efficientibus ordinatis, primum est causa medii, et medium | |
| 363 est causa ultimi, sive media sint plura sive unum tantum, remota | |
| 364 autem causa, removetur effectus, ergo, si non fuerit primum in | |
| 365 causis efficientibus, non erit ultimum nec medium. Sed si | |
| 366 procedatur in infinitum in causis efficientibus, non erit prima | |
| 367 causa efficiens, et sic non erit nec effectus ultimus, nec causae | |
| 368 efficientes mediae, quod patet esse falsum. Ergo est necesse ponere | |
| 369 aliquam causam efficientem primam, quam omnes Deum nominant. Tertia | |
| 370 via est sumpta ex possibili et necessario, quae talis est. | |
| 371 Invenimus enim in rebus quaedam quae sunt possibilia esse et non | |
| 372 esse, cum quaedam inveniantur generari et corrumpi, et per | |
| 373 consequens possibilia esse et non esse. Impossibile est autem omnia | |
| 374 quae sunt, talia esse, quia quod possibile est non esse, quandoque | |
| 375 non est. Si igitur omnia sunt possibilia non esse, aliquando nihil | |
| 376 fuit in rebus. Sed si hoc est verum, etiam nunc nihil esset, quia | |
| 377 quod non est, non incipit esse nisi per aliquid quod est; si igitur | |
| 378 nihil fuit ens, impossibile fuit quod aliquid inciperet esse, et | |
| 379 sic modo nihil esset, quod patet esse falsum. Non ergo omnia entia | |
| 380 sunt possibilia, sed oportet aliquid esse necessarium in rebus. | |
| 381 Omne autem necessarium vel habet causam suae necessitatis aliunde, | |
| 382 vel non habet. Non est autem possibile quod procedatur in infinitum | |
| 383 in necessariis quae habent causam suae necessitatis, sicut nec in | |
| 384 causis efficientibus, ut probatum est. Ergo necesse est ponere | |
| 385 aliquid quod sit per se necessarium, non habens causam necessitatis | |
| 386 aliunde, sed quod est causa necessitatis aliis, quod omnes dicunt | |
| 387 Deum. Quarta via sumitur ex gradibus qui in rebus inveniuntur. | |
| 388 Invenitur enim in rebus aliquid magis et minus bonum, et verum, et | |
| 389 nobile, et sic de aliis huiusmodi. Sed magis et minus dicuntur de | |
| 390 diversis secundum quod appropinquant diversimode ad aliquid quod | |
| 391 maxime est, sicut magis calidum est, quod magis appropinquat maxime | |
| 392 calido. Est igitur aliquid quod est verissimum, et optimum, et | |
| 393 nobilissimum, et per consequens maxime ens, nam quae sunt maxime | |
| 394 vera, sunt maxime entia, ut dicitur II Metaphys. Quod autem dicitur | |
| 395 maxime tale in aliquo genere, est causa omnium quae sunt illius | |
| 396 generis, sicut ignis, qui est maxime calidus, est causa omnium | |
| 397 calidorum, ut in eodem libro dicitur. Ergo est aliquid quod omnibus | |
| 398 entibus est causa esse, et bonitatis, et cuiuslibet perfectionis, | |
| 399 et hoc dicimus Deum. Quinta via sumitur ex gubernatione rerum. | |
| 400 Videmus enim quod aliqua quae cognitione carent, scilicet corpora | |
| 401 naturalia, operantur propter finem, quod apparet ex hoc quod semper | |
| 402 aut frequentius eodem modo operantur, ut consequantur id quod est | |
| 403 optimum; unde patet quod non a casu, sed ex intentione perveniunt | |
| 404 ad finem. Ea autem quae non habent cognitionem, non tendunt in | |
| 405 finem nisi directa ab aliquo cognoscente et intelligente, sicut | |
| 406 sagitta a sagittante. Ergo est aliquid intelligens, a quo omnes res | |
| 407 naturales ordinantur ad finem, et hoc dicimus Deum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q2_A3-p11"> | |
| 408 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As Augustine says (Enchiridion xi): "Since God is the highest good, He would not allow any evil to exist in His works, unless | |
| 409 His omnipotence and goodness were such as to bring good even out of evil." This is part of the infinite goodness of God, that | |
| 410 He should allow evil to exist, and out of it produce good. | |
| 411 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 2 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="28319" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28319] Iª q. 2 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo | |
| 412 dicendum quod, sicut dicit Augustinus in Enchiridio, <i>Deus, cum | |
| 413 sit summe bonus, nullo modo sineret aliquid mali esse in operibus | |
| 414 suis, nisi esset adeo omnipotens et bonus, ut bene faceret etiam de | |
| 415 malo</i>. Hoc ergo ad infinitam Dei bonitatem pertinet, ut esse | |
| 416 permittat mala, et ex eis eliciat bona.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q2_A3-p12"> | |
| 417 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Since nature works for a determinate end under the direction of a higher agent, whatever is done by nature must needs be | |
| 418 traced back to God, as to its first cause. So also whatever is done voluntarily must also be traced back to some higher cause | |
| 419 other than human reason or will, since these can change or fail; for all things that are changeable and capable of defect | |
| 420 must be traced back to an immovable and self-necessary first principle, as was shown | |
| 421 in the body of the Article. | |
| 422 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 2 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="28320" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28320] Iª q. 2 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 423 dicendum quod, cum natura propter determinatum finem operetur ex | |
| 424 directione alicuius superioris agentis, necesse est ea quae a | |
| 425 natura fiunt, etiam in Deum reducere, sicut in primam causam. | |
| 426 Similiter etiam quae ex proposito fiunt, oportet reducere in | |
| 427 aliquam altiorem causam, quae non sit ratio et voluntas humana, | |
| 428 quia haec mutabilia sunt et defectibilia; oportet autem omnia | |
| 429 mobilia et deficere possibilia reduci in aliquod primum principium | |
| 430 immobile et per se necessarium, sicut ostensum est.</p></div></div></div></div> | |
| 431 <div id="FP_Q3" class="div3"> | |
| 432 <h3 id="FP_Q3-p0.1">Q. 3. OF THE SIMPLICITY OF GOD (EIGHT ARTICLES)</h3> | |
| 433 <div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> | |
| 434 <p id="FP_Q3-p2"> When the existence of a thing has been ascertained there remains the further question of the manner of its existence, in | |
| 435 order that we may know its essence. Now, because we cannot know what God is, but rather what He is not, we have no means for | |
| 436 considering how God is, but rather how He is not. | |
| 437 </p><p id="FP_Q3-p3"> Therefore, we must consider: (1) How He is not; (2) How He is known by us; (3) How He is named.</p><p id="FP_Q3-p4"> Now it can be shown how God is not, by denying Him whatever is opposed to the idea of Him, viz. composition, motion, and | |
| 438 the like. Therefore (1) we must discuss His simplicity, whereby we deny composition in Him; and because whatever is simple | |
| 439 in material things is imperfect and a part of something else, we shall discuss (2) His perfection; (3) His infinity; (4) His | |
| 440 immutability; (5) His unity. | |
| 441 </p><p id="FP_Q3-p5"> Concerning His simplicity, there are eight points of inquiry:</p><p id="FP_Q3-p6"> (1) Whether God is a body?</p><p id="FP_Q3-p7"> (2) Whether He is composed of matter and form?</p><p id="FP_Q3-p8"> (3) Whether in Him there is composition of quiddity, essence or nature, and subject?</p><p id="FP_Q3-p9"> (4) Whether He is composed of essence and existence?</p><p id="FP_Q3-p10"> (5) Whether He is composed of genus and difference?</p><p id="FP_Q3-p11"> (6) Whether He is composed of subject and accident?</p><p id="FP_Q3-p12"> (7) Whether He is in any way composite, or wholly simple?</p><p id="FP_Q3-p13"> (8) Whether He enters into composition with other things?</p> | |
| 442 </div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 3 pr."><a name="28321" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28321] | |
| 443 Iª q. 3 pr.</span></a> Cognito de aliquo an sit, inquirendum | |
| 444 restat quomodo sit, ut sciatur de eo quid sit. Sed quia de Deo | |
| 445 scire non possumus quid sit, sed quid non sit, non possumus | |
| 446 considerare de Deo quomodo sit, sed potius quomodo non sit. Primo | |
| 447 ergo considerandum est quomodo non sit; secundo, quomodo a nobis | |
| 448 cognoscatur; tertio, quomodo nominetur. Potest autem ostendi de Deo | |
| 449 quomodo non sit, removendo ab eo ea quae ei non conveniunt, utpote | |
| 450 compositionem, motum, et alia huiusmodi. Primo ergo inquiratur de | |
| 451 simplicitate ipsius, per quam removetur ab eo compositio. Et quia | |
| 452 simplicia in rebus corporalibus sunt imperfecta et partes, secundo | |
| 453 inquiretur de perfectione ipsius; tertio, de infinitate eius; | |
| 454 quarto, de immutabilitate; quinto, de unitate. Circa primum | |
| 455 quaeruntur octo. Primo, utrum Deus sit corpus. Secundo, utrum sit | |
| 456 in eo compositio formae et materiae. Tertio, utrum sit in eo | |
| 457 compositio quidditatis, sive essentiae, vel naturae, et subiecti. | |
| 458 Quarto, utrum sit in eo compositio quae est ex essentia et esse. | |
| 459 Quinto, utrum sit in eo compositio generis et differentiae. Sexto, | |
| 460 utrum sit in eo compositio subiecti et accidentis. Septimo, utrum | |
| 461 sit quocumque modo compositus, vel totaliter simplex. Octavo, utrum | |
| 462 veniat in compositionem cum aliis.</p></div></div></div> | |
| 463 <div id="FP_Q3_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q3_A1-p0.1">Q. 3. A. 1. Whether God is a body?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q3_A1-p2"> | |
| 464 <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God is a body. For a body is that which has the three dimensions. But Holy Scripture attributes the three dimensions | |
| 465 to God, for it is written: "He is higher than Heaven, and what wilt thou do? He is deeper than Hell, and how wilt thou know? | |
| 466 The measure of Him is longer than the earth and broader than the sea" ( | |
| 467 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q3_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Job.11.8" target="asv">Job 11:8,9</a>). Therefore God is a body. | |
| 468 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 3 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="28322" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28322] Iª q. 3 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum sic | |
| 469 proceditur. Videtur quod Deus sit corpus. Corpus enim est quod | |
| 470 habet trinam dimensionem. Sed sacra Scriptura attribuit Deo trinam | |
| 471 dimensionem, dicitur enim Iob XI, <i>excelsior caelo est, et quid | |
| 472 facies? Profundior Inferno, et unde cognosces? Longior terra | |
| 473 mensura eius, et latior mari</i>. Ergo Deus est corpus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q3_A1-p3"> | |
| 474 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, everything that has figure is a body, since figure is a quality of quantity. But God seems to have figure, for it | |
| 475 is written: "Let us make man to our image and likeness" ( | |
| 476 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q3_A1-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.1.26" target="asv">Gn. 1:26</a>). Now a figure is called an image, according to the text: "Who being the brightness of His glory and the figure," i.e. the | |
| 477 image, "of His substance" ( | |
| 478 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q3_A1-p3.2" href="./asv.html#Heb.1.3" target="asv">Heb. 1:3</a>). Therefore God is a body. | |
| 479 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 3 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="28323" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28323] Iª q. 3 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, omne | |
| 480 figuratum est corpus, cum figura sit qualitas circa quantitatem. | |
| 481 Sed Deus videtur esse figuratus, cum scriptum sit Gen. I, | |
| 482 <i>faciamus hominem ad imaginem et similitudinem nostram</i>, | |
| 483 figura enim imago dicitur, secundum illud Hebr. I, <i>cum sit | |
| 484 splendor gloriae, et figura substantiae eius</i>, idest imago. Ergo | |
| 485 Deus est corpus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q3_A1-p4"> | |
| 486 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, whatever has corporeal parts is a body. Now Scripture attributes corporeal parts to God. "Hast thou an arm like | |
| 487 God?" ( | |
| 488 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q3_A1-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Job.40.4" target="asv">Job 40:4</a>); and "The eyes of the Lord are upon the just" ( | |
| 489 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q3_A1-p4.2" href="./asv.html#Ps.33.16" target="asv">Ps. 33:16</a>); and "The right hand of the Lord hath wrought strength" ( | |
| 490 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q3_A1-p4.3" href="./asv.html#Ps.117.16" target="asv">Ps. 117:16</a>). Therefore God is a body. | |
| 491 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 3 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="28324" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28324] Iª q. 3 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, omne | |
| 492 quod habet partes corporeas, est corpus. Sed Scriptura attribuit | |
| 493 Deo partes corporeas, dicitur enim Iob XL, <i>si habes brachium ut | |
| 494 Deus</i>; et in Psalmo, <i>oculi domini super iustos; et, dextera | |
| 495 domini fecit virtutem</i>. Ergo Deus est corpus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q3_A1-p5"> | |
| 496 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, posture belongs only to bodies. But something which supposes posture is said of God in the Scriptures: "I saw the | |
| 497 Lord sitting" ( | |
| 498 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q3_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.6.1" target="asv">Is. 6:1</a>), and "He standeth up to judge" ( | |
| 499 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q3_A1-p5.2" href="./asv.html#Isa.3.13" target="asv">Is. 3:13</a>). Therefore God is a body. | |
| 500 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 3 a. 1 arg. 4"><a name="28325" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28325] Iª q. 3 a. 1 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, situs | |
| 501 non convenit nisi corpori. Sed ea quae ad situm pertinent, in | |
| 502 Scripturis dicuntur de Deo, dicitur enim Isaiae VI, <i>vidi dominum | |
| 503 sedentem</i>; et Isaiae III, <i>stat ad iudicandum dominus</i>. | |
| 504 Ergo Deus est corpus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q3_A1-p6"> | |
| 505 <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, only bodies or things corporeal can be a local term "wherefrom" or "whereto." But in the Scriptures God is spoken | |
| 506 of as a local term "whereto," according to the words, "Come ye to Him and be enlightened" ( | |
| 507 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q3_A1-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.33.6" target="asv">Ps. 33:6</a>), and as a term "wherefrom": "All they that depart from Thee shall be written in the earth" ( | |
| 508 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q3_A1-p6.2" href="./asv.html#Jer.17.13" target="asv">Jer. 17:13</a>). Therefore God is a body. | |
| 509 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 3 a. 1 arg. 5"><a name="28326" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28326] Iª q. 3 a. 1 arg. 5</span></a> Praeterea, nihil | |
| 510 potest esse terminus localis a quo vel ad quem, nisi sit corpus vel | |
| 511 aliquod corporeum. Sed Deus in Scriptura dicitur esse terminus | |
| 512 localis ut ad quem, secundum illud Psalmi, <i>accedite ad eum, et | |
| 513 illuminamini</i>; et ut a quo, secundum illud Hierem. XVII, | |
| 514 recedentes a te in terra scribentur. Ergo Deus est corpus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q3_A1-p7"> | |
| 515 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written in the Gospel of St. John ( | |
| 516 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q3_A1-p7.1" href="./asv.html#John.4.24" target="asv">Jn. 4:24</a>): "God is a spirit." | |
| 517 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 3 a. 1 s. c."><a name="28327" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28327] Iª q. 3 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est | |
| 518 quod dicitur Ioan. IV, <i>spiritus est Deus</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q3_A1-p8"> | |
| 519 <b>I answer that,</b> It is absolutely true that God is not a body; and this can be shown in three ways. First, because no body is in motion unless | |
| 520 it be put in motion, as is evident from induction. Now it has been already proved ( | |
| 521 <a id="FP_Q3_A1-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q2_A3.html">Q[2], A[3]</a>), that God is the First Mover, and is Himself unmoved. Therefore it is clear that God is not a body. Secondly, because the | |
| 522 first being must of necessity be in act, and in no way in potentiality. For although in any | |
| 523 single thing that passes from potentiality to actuality, the potentiality is prior in time to the actuality; nevertheless, | |
| 524 absolutely speaking, actuality is prior to potentiality; for whatever is in potentiality can be reduced into actuality only | |
| 525 by some being in actuality. Now it has been already proved that God is the First Being. It is therefore impossible that in | |
| 526 God there should be any potentiality. But every body is in potentiality because the continuous, as such, is divisible to | |
| 527 infinity; it is therefore impossible that God should be a body. Thirdly, because God is the most noble of beings. Now it is | |
| 528 impossible for a body to be the most noble of beings; for a body must be either animate or inanimate; and an animate body | |
| 529 is manifestly nobler than any inanimate body. But an animate body is not animate precisely as body; otherwise all bodies would | |
| 530 be animate. Therefore its animation depends upon some other thing, as our body depends for its animation on the soul. Hence | |
| 531 that by which a body becomes animated must be nobler than the body. Therefore it is impossible that God should be a body. | |
| 532 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 3 a. 1 co."><a name="28328" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28328] Iª q. 3 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum | |
| 533 absolute Deum non esse corpus. Quod tripliciter ostendi potest. | |
| 534 Primo quidem, quia nullum corpus movet non motum, ut patet | |
| 535 inducendo per singula. Ostensum est autem supra quod Deus est | |
| 536 primum movens immobile. Unde manifestum est quod Deus non est | |
| 537 corpus. Secundo, quia necesse est id quod est primum ens, esse in | |
| 538 actu, et nullo modo in potentia. Licet enim in uno et eodem quod | |
| 539 exit de potentia in actum, prius sit potentia quam actus tempore, | |
| 540 simpliciter tamen actus prior est potentia, quia quod est in | |
| 541 potentia, non reducitur in actum nisi per ens actu. Ostensum est | |
| 542 autem supra quod Deus est primum ens. Impossibile est igitur quod | |
| 543 in Deo sit aliquid in potentia. Omne autem corpus est in potentia, | |
| 544 quia continuum, inquantum huiusmodi, divisibile est in infinitum. | |
| 545 Impossibile est igitur Deum esse corpus. Tertio, quia Deus est id | |
| 546 quod est nobilissimum in entibus, ut ex dictis patet. Impossibile | |
| 547 est autem aliquod corpus esse nobilissimum in entibus. Quia corpus | |
| 548 aut est vivum, aut non vivum. Corpus autem vivum, manifestum est | |
| 549 quod est nobilius corpore non vivo. Corpus autem vivum non vivit | |
| 550 inquantum corpus, quia sic omne corpus viveret, oportet igitur quod | |
| 551 vivat per aliquid aliud, sicut corpus nostrum vivit per animam. | |
| 552 Illud autem per quod vivit corpus, est nobilius quam corpus. | |
| 553 Impossibile est igitur Deum esse corpus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q3_A1-p9"> | |
| 554 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As we have said above ( | |
| 555 <a id="FP_Q3_A1-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q1_A9.html">Q[1], A[9]</a>), Holy Writ puts before us spiritual and divine things under the comparison of corporeal things. Hence, when it attributes | |
| 556 to God the three dimensions under the comparison of corporeal quantity, it implies His virtual quantity; thus, by depth, it | |
| 557 signifies His power of knowing hidden things; by height, the transcendence of His excelling power; by length, the duration | |
| 558 of His existence; by | |
| 559 breadth, His act of love for all. Or, as says Dionysius (Div. Nom. ix), by the depth of God is meant the incomprehensibility | |
| 560 of His essence; by length, the procession of His all-pervading power; by breadth, His overspreading all things, inasmuch as | |
| 561 all things lie under His protection. | |
| 562 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 3 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="28329" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28329] Iª q. 3 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo | |
| 563 dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, sacra Scriptura tradit nobis | |
| 564 spiritualia et divina sub similitudinibus corporalium. Unde, cum | |
| 565 trinam dimensionem Deo attribuit, sub similitudine quantitatis | |
| 566 corporeae, quantitatem virtualem ipsius designat, utpote per | |
| 567 profunditatem, virtutem ad cognoscendum occulta; per altitudinem, | |
| 568 excellentiam virtutis super omnia; per longitudinem, durationem sui | |
| 569 esse; per latitudinem, affectum dilectionis ad omnia. Vel, ut dicit | |
| 570 Dionysius, cap. IX de Div. Nom., per profunditatem Dei intelligitur | |
| 571 incomprehensibilitas ipsius essentiae; per longitudinem, processus | |
| 572 virtutis eius, omnia penetrantis; per latitudinem vero, | |
| 573 superextensio eius ad omnia, inquantum scilicet sub eius | |
| 574 protectione omnia continentur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q3_A1-p10"> | |
| 575 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Man is said to be after the image of God, not as regards his body, but as regards that whereby he excels other animals. Hence, | |
| 576 when it is said, "Let us make man to our image and likeness", it is added, "And let him have dominion over the fishes of the | |
| 577 sea" ( | |
| 578 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q3_A1-p10.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.1.26" target="asv">Gn. 1:26</a>). Now man excels all animals by his reason and intelligence; hence it is according to his intelligence and reason, which | |
| 579 are incorporeal, that man is said to be according to the image of | |
| 580 God. | |
| 581 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 3 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="28330" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28330] Iª q. 3 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 582 dicendum quod homo dicitur esse ad imaginem Dei, non secundum | |
| 583 corpus, sed secundum id quo homo excellit alia animalia, unde, Gen. | |
| 584 I, postquam dictum est, <i>faciamus hominem ad imaginem et | |
| 585 similitudinem nostram</i>, subditur, <i>ut praesit piscibus | |
| 586 maris,</i> et cetera. Excellit autem homo omnia animalia quantum ad | |
| 587 rationem et intellectum. Unde secundum intellectum et rationem, | |
| 588 quae sunt incorporea, homo est ad imaginem Dei.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q3_A1-p11"> | |
| 589 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Corporeal parts are attributed to God in Scripture on account of His actions, and this is owing to a certain parallel. For | |
| 590 instance the act of the eye is to see; hence the eye attributed to God signifies His power of seeing intellectually, not sensibly; | |
| 591 and so on with the other parts. | |
| 592 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 3 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="28331" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28331] Iª q. 3 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum | |
| 593 quod partes corporeae attribuuntur Deo in Scripturis ratione suorum | |
| 594 actuum, secundum quandam similitudinem. Sicut actus oculi est | |
| 595 videre, unde oculus de Deo dictus, significat virtutem eius ad | |
| 596 videndum modo intelligibili, non sensibili. Et simile est de aliis | |
| 597 partibus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q3_A1-p12"> | |
| 598 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Whatever pertains to posture, also, is only attributed to God by some sort of parallel. He is spoken of as sitting, on account | |
| 599 of His unchangeableness and dominion; and as standing, on account of His power of overcoming whatever withstands Him. | |
| 600 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 3 a. 1 ad 4"><a name="28332" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28332] Iª q. 3 a. 1 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum dicendum | |
| 601 quod etiam ea quae ad situm pertinent, non attribuuntur Deo nisi | |
| 602 secundum quandam similitudinem, sicut dicitur sedens, propter suam | |
| 603 immobilitatem et auctoritatem; et stans, propter suam fortitudinem | |
| 604 ad debellandum omne quod adversatur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q3_A1-p13"> | |
| 605 <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> We draw near to God by no corporeal steps, since He is everywhere, but by the affections of our soul, and by the actions | |
| 606 of that same soul do we withdraw from Him; thus, to draw near to or to withdraw signifies merely spiritual actions based on | |
| 607 the metaphor of local motion. | |
| 608 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 3 a. 1 ad 5"><a name="28333" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28333] Iª q. 3 a. 1 ad 5</span></a> Ad quintum dicendum | |
| 609 quod ad Deum non acceditur passibus corporalibus, cum ubique sit, | |
| 610 sed affectibus mentis, et eodem modo ab eo receditur. Et sic | |
| 611 accessus et recessus, sub similitudine localis motus, designant | |
| 612 spiritualem affectum.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q3_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q3_A2-p0.1">Q. 3. A. 2. Whether God is composed of matter and form?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q3_A2-p2"> | |
| 613 <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God is composed of matter and form. For whatever has a soul is composed of matter and form; since the soul | |
| 614 is the form of the body. But Scripture attributes a soul to God; for it is mentioned in Hebrews ( | |
| 615 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q3_A2-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Heb.10.38" target="asv">Heb. 10:38</a>), where God says: "But My just man liveth by faith; but if he withdraw himself, he shall not please My soul." Therefore God | |
| 616 is composed of matter and form. | |
| 617 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 3 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="28334" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28334] Iª q. 3 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum sic | |
| 618 proceditur. Videtur quod in Deo sit compositio formae et materiae. | |
| 619 Omne enim quod habet animam, est compositum ex materia et forma, | |
| 620 quia anima est forma corporis. Sed Scriptura attribuit animam Deo, | |
| 621 introducitur enim ad Hebr. X, ex persona Dei, <i>iustus autem meus | |
| 622 ex fide vivit; quod si subtraxerit se, non placebit animae | |
| 623 meae</i>. Ergo Deus est compositus ex materia et forma.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q3_A2-p3"> | |
| 624 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, anger, joy and the like are passions of the composite. But these are attributed to God in Scripture: "The Lord was | |
| 625 exceeding angry with His people" ( | |
| 626 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q3_A2-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.105.40" target="asv">Ps. 105:40</a>). Therefore God is composed of matter and form. | |
| 627 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 3 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="28335" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28335] Iª q. 3 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, ira, | |
| 628 gaudium, et huiusmodi, sunt passiones coniuncti, ut dicitur I de | |
| 629 anima. Sed huiusmodi attribuuntur Deo in Scriptura dicitur enim in | |
| 630 Psalmo, <i>iratus est furore dominus in populum suum</i>. Ergo Deus | |
| 631 ex materia et forma est compositus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q3_A2-p4"> | |
| 632 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, matter is the principle of individualization. But God seems to be individual, for He cannot be predicated of many. | |
| 633 Therefore He is composed of matter and form. | |
| 634 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 3 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="28336" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28336] Iª q. 3 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 635 materia est principium individuationis. Sed Deus videtur esse | |
| 636 individuum, non enim de multis praedicatur. Ergo est compositus ex | |
| 637 materia et forma.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q3_A2-p5"> | |
| 638 <b>On the contrary,</b> Whatever is composed of matter and form is a body; for dimensive quantity is the first property of matter. But God is not | |
| 639 a body as proved in the preceding Article; therefore He is not composed of matter and form. | |
| 640 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 3 a. 2 s. c."><a name="28337" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28337] Iª q. 3 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra, omne | |
| 641 compositum ex materia et forma est corpus, quantitas enim dimensiva | |
| 642 est quae primo inhaeret materiae. Sed Deus non est corpus, ut | |
| 643 ostensum est. Ergo Deus non est compositus ex materia et forma.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q3_A2-p6"> | |
| 644 <b>I answer that,</b> It is impossible that matter should exist in God. First, because matter is in potentiality. But we have shown ( | |
| 645 <a id="FP_Q3_A2-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q2_A3.html">Q[2], A[3]</a>) that God is pure act, without any potentiality. Hence it is impossible that God should be composed of matter and form. Secondly, | |
| 646 because everything composed of matter and form owes its perfection and goodness to its form; therefore its goodness is participated, | |
| 647 inasmuch as matter participates the form. Now the | |
| 648 first good and the best---viz. God---is not a participated good, because the essential good is prior to the participated good. | |
| 649 Hence it is impossible that God should be composed of matter and form. Thirdly, because every agent acts by its form; hence | |
| 650 the manner in which it has its form is the manner in which it is an agent. Therefore whatever is primarily and essentially | |
| 651 an agent must be primarily and essentially form. Now God is the first agent, since He is the first efficient cause. He is | |
| 652 therefore of His essence a form; and not composed of matter and form. | |
| 653 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 3 a. 2 co."><a name="28338" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28338] Iª q. 3 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum | |
| 654 quod impossibile est in Deo esse materiam. Primo quidem, quia | |
| 655 materia est id quod est in potentia. Ostensum est autem quod Deus | |
| 656 est purus actus, non habens aliquid de potentialitate. Unde | |
| 657 impossibile est quod Deus sit compositus ex materia et forma. | |
| 658 Secundo, quia omne compositum ex materia et forma est perfectum et | |
| 659 bonum per suam formam, unde oportet quod sit bonum per | |
| 660 participationem, secundum quod materia participat formam. Primum | |
| 661 autem quod est bonum et optimum, quod Deus est, non est bonum per | |
| 662 participationem, quia bonum per essentiam, prius est bono per | |
| 663 participationem. Unde impossibile est quod Deus sit compositus ex | |
| 664 materia et forma. Tertio, quia unumquodque agens agit per suam | |
| 665 formam, unde secundum quod aliquid se habet ad suam formam, sic se | |
| 666 habet ad hoc quod sit agens. Quod igitur primum est et per se | |
| 667 agens, oportet quod sit primo et per se forma. Deus autem est | |
| 668 primum agens, cum sit prima causa efficiens, ut ostensum est. Est | |
| 669 igitur per essentiam suam forma; et non compositus ex materia et | |
| 670 forma.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q3_A2-p7"> | |
| 671 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> A soul is attributed to God because His acts resemble the acts of a soul; for, that we will anything, is due to our soul. | |
| 672 Hence what is pleasing to His will is said to be pleasing to His soul. | |
| 673 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 3 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="28339" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28339] Iª q. 3 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo | |
| 674 dicendum quod anima attribuitur Deo per similitudinem actus. Quod | |
| 675 enim volumus aliquid nobis, ex anima nostra est, unde illud dicitur | |
| 676 esse placitum animae Dei, quod est placitum voluntati ipsius.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q3_A2-p8"> | |
| 677 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Anger and the like are attributed to God on account of a similitude of effect. Thus, because to punish is properly the act | |
| 678 of an angry man, God's punishment is metaphorically spoken of as His anger. | |
| 679 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 3 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="28340" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28340] Iª q. 3 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 680 dicendum quod ira et huiusmodi attribuuntur Deo secundum | |
| 681 similitudinem effectus, quia enim proprium est irati punire, ira | |
| 682 eius punitio metaphorice vocatur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q3_A2-p9"> | |
| 683 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Forms which can be received in matter are individualized by matter, which cannot be in another as in a subject since it is | |
| 684 the first underlying subject; although form of itself, unless something else prevents it, can be received by many. But that | |
| 685 form which cannot be received in matter, but is self-subsisting, is individualized precisely because it cannot be received | |
| 686 in a subject; and such a form is God. Hence it does not follow that matter exists in | |
| 687 God. | |
| 688 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 3 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="28341" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28341] Iª q. 3 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum | |
| 689 quod formae quae sunt receptibiles in materia individuantur per | |
| 690 materiam, quae non potest esse in alio, cum sit primum subiectum | |
| 691 substans, forma vero, quantum est de se, nisi aliquid aliud | |
| 692 impediat, recipi potest a pluribus. Sed illa forma quae non est | |
| 693 receptibilis in materia, sed est per se subsistens, ex hoc ipso | |
| 694 individuatur, quod non potest recipi in alio, et huiusmodi forma | |
| 695 est Deus. Unde non sequitur quod habeat materiam.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q3_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q3_A3-p0.1">Q. 3. A. 3. Whether God is the same as His essence or nature?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q3_A3-p2"> | |
| 696 <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God is not the same as His essence or nature. For nothing can be in itself. But the substance or nature of | |
| 697 God---i.e. the Godhead---is said to be in God. Therefore it seems that God is not the same as His essence or nature. | |
| 698 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 3 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="28342" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28342] Iª q. 3 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium sic | |
| 699 proceditur. Videtur quod non sit idem Deus quod sua essentia vel | |
| 700 natura. Nihil enim est in seipso. Sed essentia vel natura Dei, quae | |
| 701 est deitas, dicitur esse in Deo. Ergo videtur quod Deus non sit | |
| 702 idem quod sua essentia vel natura.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q3_A3-p3"> | |
| 703 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the effect is assimilated to its cause; for every agent produces its like. But in created things the "suppositum" | |
| 704 is not identical with its nature; for a man is not the same as his humanity. Therefore God is not the same as His Godhead. | |
| 705 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 3 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="28343" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28343] Iª q. 3 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 706 effectus assimilatur suae causae, quia omne agens agit sibi simile. | |
| 707 Sed in rebus creatis non est idem suppositum quod sua natura, non | |
| 708 enim idem est homo quod sua humanitas. Ergo nec Deus est idem quod | |
| 709 sua deitas.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q3_A3-p4"> | |
| 710 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is said of God that He is life itself, and not only that He is a living thing: "I am the way, the truth, and the life" | |
| 711 ( | |
| 712 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q3_A3-p4.1" href="./asv.html#John.14.6" target="asv">Jn. 14:6</a>). Now the relation between Godhead and God is the same as the relation between life and a living thing. Therefore God is | |
| 713 His very Godhead. | |
| 714 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 3 a. 3 s. c."><a name="28344" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28344] Iª q. 3 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Contra, de Deo | |
| 715 dicitur quod est vita, et non solum quod est vivens, ut patet Ioan. | |
| 716 XIV, <i>ego sum via, veritas et vita</i>. Sicut autem se habet vita | |
| 717 ad viventem, ita deitas ad Deum. Ergo Deus est ipsa deitas.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q3_A3-p5"> | |
| 718 <b>I answer that,</b> God is the same as His essence or nature. To understand this, it must be noted that in things composed of matter and form, | |
| 719 the nature or essence must differ from the "suppositum," because the essence or nature connotes only what is included in the | |
| 720 definition of the species; as, humanity connotes all that is included in the definition of man, for it is by this that man | |
| 721 is man, and it is this that humanity signifies, that, namely, whereby man is man. Now | |
| 722 individual matter, with all the individualizing accidents, is not included in the definition of the species. For this particular | |
| 723 flesh, these bones, this blackness or whiteness, etc., are not included in the definition of a man. Therefore this flesh, | |
| 724 these bones, and the accidental qualities distinguishing this particular matter, are not included in humanity; and yet they | |
| 725 are included in the thing which is man. Hence the thing which is a man has something more in it than has humanity. | |
| 726 Consequently humanity and a man are not wholly identical; but humanity is taken to mean the formal part of a man, because | |
| 727 the principles whereby a thing is defined are regarded as the formal constituent in regard to the individualizing matter. | |
| 728 On the other hand, in things not composed of matter and form, in which individualization is not due to individual matter---that | |
| 729 is to say, to "this" matter---the very forms being individualized of themselves---it is necessary the forms themselves should | |
| 730 be subsisting "supposita." Therefore "suppositum" and nature in them are identified. Since God then is not composed of matter | |
| 731 and form, He must be His own Godhead, His own Life, and whatever else is thus predicated of Him. | |
| 732 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 3 a. 3 co."><a name="28345" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28345] Iª q. 3 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum | |
| 733 quod Deus est idem quod sua essentia vel natura. Ad cuius | |
| 734 intellectum sciendum est, quod in rebus compositis ex materia et | |
| 735 forma, necesse est quod differant natura vel essentia et | |
| 736 suppositum. Quia essentia vel natura comprehendit in se illa tantum | |
| 737 quae cadunt in definitione speciei, sicut humanitas comprehendit in | |
| 738 se ea quae cadunt in definitione hominis, his enim homo est homo, | |
| 739 et hoc significat humanitas, hoc scilicet quo homo est homo. Sed | |
| 740 materia individualis, cum accidentibus omnibus individuantibus | |
| 741 ipsam, non cadit in definitione speciei, non enim cadunt in | |
| 742 definitione hominis hae carnes et haec ossa, aut albedo vel | |
| 743 nigredo, vel aliquid huiusmodi. Unde hae carnes et haec ossa, et | |
| 744 accidentia designantia hanc materiam, non concluduntur in | |
| 745 humanitate. Et tamen in eo quod est homo, includuntur, unde id quod | |
| 746 est homo, habet in se aliquid quod non habet humanitas. Et propter | |
| 747 hoc non est totaliter idem homo et humanitas, sed humanitas | |
| 748 significatur ut pars formalis hominis; quia principia definientia | |
| 749 habent se formaliter, respectu materiae individuantis. In his | |
| 750 igitur quae non sunt composita ex materia et forma, in quibus | |
| 751 individuatio non est per materiam individualem, idest per hanc | |
| 752 materiam, sed ipsae formae per se individuantur, oportet quod ipsae | |
| 753 formae sint supposita subsistentia. Unde in eis non differt | |
| 754 suppositum et natura. Et sic, cum Deus non sit compositus ex | |
| 755 materia et forma, ut ostensum est, oportet quod Deus sit sua | |
| 756 deitas, sua vita, et quidquid aliud sic de Deo praedicatur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q3_A3-p6"> | |
| 757 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> We can speak of simple things only as though they were like the composite things from which we derive our knowledge. Therefore | |
| 758 in speaking of God, we use concrete nouns to signify His subsistence, because with us only those things subsist which are | |
| 759 composite; and we use abstract nouns to signify His simplicity. In saying therefore that Godhead, or life, or the like are | |
| 760 in God, we indicate the composite way in which our intellect understands, but not | |
| 761 that there is any composition in God. | |
| 762 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 3 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="28346" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28346] Iª q. 3 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo | |
| 763 dicendum quod de rebus simplicibus loqui non possumus, nisi per | |
| 764 modum compositorum, a quibus cognitionem accipimus. Et ideo, de Deo | |
| 765 loquentes, utimur nominibus concretis, ut significemus eius | |
| 766 subsistentiam, quia apud nos non subsistunt nisi composita, et | |
| 767 utimur nominibus abstractis, ut significemus eius simplicitatem. | |
| 768 Quod ergo dicitur deitas vel vita, vel aliquid huiusmodi, esse in | |
| 769 Deo, referendum est ad diversitatem quae est in acceptione | |
| 770 intellectus nostri; et non ad aliquam diversitatem rei.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q3_A3-p7"> | |
| 771 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The effects of God do not imitate Him perfectly, but only as far as they are able; and the imitation is here defective, precisely | |
| 772 because what is simple and one, can only be represented by divers things; consequently, composition is accidental to them, | |
| 773 and therefore, in them "suppositum" is not the same as nature. | |
| 774 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 3 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="28347" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28347] Iª q. 3 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 775 dicendum quod effectus Dei imitantur ipsum, non perfecte, sed | |
| 776 secundum quod possunt. Et hoc ad defectum imitationis pertinet, | |
| 777 quod id quod est simplex et unum, non potest repraesentari nisi per | |
| 778 multa, et sic accidit in eis compositio, ex qua provenit quod in | |
| 779 eis non est idem suppositum quod natura.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q3_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q3_A4-p0.1">Q. 3. A. 4. Whether essence and existence are the same in God?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q3_A4-p2"> | |
| 780 <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that essence and existence are not the same in God. For if it be so, then the divine being has nothing added to | |
| 781 it. Now being to which no addition is made is universal being which is predicated of all things. Therefore it follows that | |
| 782 God is being in general which can be predicated of everything. But this is false: "For men gave the incommunicable name to | |
| 783 stones and wood" ( | |
| 784 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q3_A4-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.14.21" target="asv">Wis. 14:21</a>). Therefore God's existence is not His | |
| 785 essence. | |
| 786 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 3 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="28348" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28348] Iª q. 3 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum sic | |
| 787 proceditur. Videtur quod in Deo non sit idem essentia et esse. Si | |
| 788 enim hoc sit, tunc ad esse divinum nihil additur. Sed esse cui | |
| 789 nulla fit additio, est esse commune quod de omnibus praedicatur, | |
| 790 sequitur ergo quod Deus sit ens commune praedicabile de omnibus. | |
| 791 Hoc autem est falsum, secundum illud Sap. XIV, <i>incommunicabile | |
| 792 nomen lignis et lapidibus imposuerunt</i>. Ergo esse Dei non est | |
| 793 eius essentia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q3_A4-p3"> | |
| 794 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, we can know "whether" God exists as said above ( | |
| 795 <a id="FP_Q3_A4-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q2_A2.html">Q[2], A[2]</a>); but we cannot know "what" He is. Therefore God's existence is not the same as His essence---that is, as His quiddity or | |
| 796 nature. | |
| 797 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 3 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="28349" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28349] Iª q. 3 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, de Deo | |
| 798 scire possumus an sit, ut supra dictum est. Non autem possumus | |
| 799 scire quid sit. Ergo non est idem esse Dei, et quod quid est eius, | |
| 800 sive quidditas vel natura.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q3_A4-p4"> | |
| 801 <b>On the contrary,</b> Hilary says (Trin. vii): "In God existence is not an accidental quality, but subsisting truth." Therefore what subsists in | |
| 802 God is His existence. | |
| 803 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 3 a. 4 s. c."><a name="28350" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28350] Iª q. 3 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est | |
| 804 quod Hilarius dicit in VII de Trin., <i>esse non est accidens in | |
| 805 Deo, sed subsistens veritas</i>. Id ergo quod subsistit in Deo, est | |
| 806 suum esse.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q3_A4-p5"> | |
| 807 <b>I answer that,</b> God is not only His own essence, as shown in the preceding article, but also His own existence. This may be shown in several | |
| 808 ways. First, whatever a thing has besides its essence must be caused either by the constituent principles of that essence | |
| 809 (like a property that necessarily accompanies the species---as the faculty of laughing is proper to a man---and is caused | |
| 810 by the constituent principles of the species), or by some exterior agent---as heat is caused | |
| 811 in water by fire. Therefore, if the existence of a thing differs from its essence, this existence must be caused either by | |
| 812 some exterior agent or by its essential principles. Now it is impossible for a thing's existence to be caused by its essential | |
| 813 constituent principles, for nothing can be the sufficient cause of its own existence, if its existence is caused. Therefore | |
| 814 that thing, whose existence differs from its essence, must have its existence caused by another. But this cannot be true of | |
| 815 God; because we call God the first efficient cause. Therefore it is impossible that in God His existence should differ from | |
| 816 His essence. Secondly, existence is that which makes every form or nature actual; for goodness and humanity are spoken of | |
| 817 as actual, only because they are spoken of as existing. Therefore existence must be compared to essence, if the latter is | |
| 818 a distinct reality, as actuality to potentiality. Therefore, since in God there is no potentiality, as shown above | |
| 819 | |
| 820 <a id="FP_Q3_A4-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q3_A1.html">(A[1])</a>, it follows that in Him essence does not differ from existence. Therefore His essence is His existence. Thirdly, because, | |
| 821 just as that which has fire, but is not itself fire, is on fire by participation; so that which has existence but is not existence, | |
| 822 is a being by participation. But God is His own essence, as shown above | |
| 823 <a id="FP_Q3_A4-p5.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q3_A3.html">(A[3])</a> if, therefore, He is not His own existence He will be not essential, but participated being. He will not | |
| 824 therefore be the first being---which is absurd. Therefore God is His own existence, and not merely His own essence. | |
| 825 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 3 a. 4 co."><a name="28351" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28351] Iª q. 3 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum | |
| 826 quod Deus non solum est sua essentia, ut ostensum est, sed etiam | |
| 827 suum esse. Quod quidem multipliciter ostendi potest. Primo quidem, | |
| 828 quia quidquid est in aliquo quod est praeter essentiam eius, | |
| 829 oportet esse causatum vel a principiis essentiae, sicut accidentia | |
| 830 propria consequentia speciem, ut risibile consequitur hominem et | |
| 831 causatur ex principiis essentialibus speciei; vel ab aliquo | |
| 832 exteriori, sicut calor in aqua causatur ab igne. Si igitur ipsum | |
| 833 esse rei sit aliud ab eius essentia, necesse est quod esse illius | |
| 834 rei vel sit causatum ab aliquo exteriori, vel a principiis | |
| 835 essentialibus eiusdem rei. Impossibile est autem quod esse sit | |
| 836 causatum tantum ex principiis essentialibus rei, quia nulla res | |
| 837 sufficit quod sit sibi causa essendi, si habeat esse causatum. | |
| 838 Oportet ergo quod illud cuius esse est aliud ab essentia sua, | |
| 839 habeat esse causatum ab alio. Hoc autem non potest dici de Deo, | |
| 840 quia Deum dicimus esse primam causam efficientem. Impossibile est | |
| 841 ergo quod in Deo sit aliud esse, et aliud eius essentia. Secundo, | |
| 842 quia esse est actualitas omnis formae vel naturae, non enim bonitas | |
| 843 vel humanitas significatur in actu, nisi prout significamus eam | |
| 844 esse. Oportet igitur quod ipsum esse comparetur ad essentiam quae | |
| 845 est aliud ab ipso, sicut actus ad potentiam. Cum igitur in Deo | |
| 846 nihil sit potentiale, ut ostensum est supra, sequitur quod non sit | |
| 847 aliud in eo essentia quam suum esse. Sua igitur essentia est suum | |
| 848 esse. Tertio, quia sicut illud quod habet ignem et non est ignis, | |
| 849 est ignitum per participationem, ita illud quod habet esse et non | |
| 850 est esse, est ens per participationem. Deus autem est sua essentia, | |
| 851 ut ostensum est. Si igitur non sit suum esse, erit ens per | |
| 852 participationem, et non per essentiam. Non ergo erit primum ens, | |
| 853 quod absurdum est dicere. Est igitur Deus suum esse, et non solum | |
| 854 sua essentia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q3_A4-p6"> | |
| 855 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> A thing that has nothing added to it can be of two kinds. Either its essence precludes any addition; thus, for example, it | |
| 856 is of the essence of an irrational animal to be without reason. Or we may understand a thing to have nothing added to it, | |
| 857 inasmuch as its essence does not require that anything should be added to it; thus the genus animal is without reason, because | |
| 858 it is not of the essence of animal in general to have reason; but neither is it to | |
| 859 lack reason. And so the divine being has nothing added to it in the first sense; whereas universal being has nothing added | |
| 860 to it in the second sense. | |
| 861 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 3 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="28352" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28352] Iª q. 3 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo | |
| 862 dicendum quod aliquid cui non fit additio potest intelligi | |
| 863 dupliciter. Uno modo, ut de ratione eius sit quod non fiat ei | |
| 864 additio; sicut de ratione animalis irrationalis est, ut sit sine | |
| 865 ratione. Alio modo intelligitur aliquid cui non fit additio, quia | |
| 866 non est de ratione eius quod sibi fiat additio, sicut animal | |
| 867 commune est sine ratione, quia non est de ratione animalis communis | |
| 868 ut habeat rationem; sed nec de ratione eius est ut careat ratione. | |
| 869 Primo igitur modo, esse sine additione, est esse divinum, secundo | |
| 870 modo, esse sine additione, est esse commune.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q3_A4-p7"> | |
| 871 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> "To be" can mean either of two things. It may mean the act of essence, or it may mean the composition of a proposition effected | |
| 872 by the mind in joining a predicate to a subject. Taking "to be" in the first sense, we cannot understand God's existence nor | |
| 873 His essence; but only in the second sense. We know that this proposition which we form about God when we say "God is," is | |
| 874 true; and this we know from His effects ( | |
| 875 <a id="FP_Q3_A4-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q2_A2.html">Q[2], | |
| 876 A[2] | |
| 877 </a>). | |
| 878 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 3 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="28353" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28353] Iª q. 3 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 879 dicendum quod esse dupliciter dicitur, uno modo, significat actum | |
| 880 essendi; alio modo, significat compositionem propositionis, quam | |
| 881 anima adinvenit coniungens praedicatum subiecto. Primo igitur modo | |
| 882 accipiendo esse, non possumus scire esse Dei, sicut nec eius | |
| 883 essentiam, sed solum secundo modo. Scimus enim quod haec propositio | |
| 884 quam formamus de Deo, cum dicimus Deus est, vera est. Et hoc scimus | |
| 885 ex eius effectibus, ut supra dictum est.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q3_A5" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q3_A5-p0.1">Q. 3. A. 5. Whether God is contained in a genus?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q3_A5-p2"> | |
| 886 <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God is contained in a genus. For a substance is a being that subsists of itself. But this is especially true | |
| 887 of God. Therefore God is in a genus of substance. | |
| 888 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 3 a. 5 arg. 1"><a name="28354" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28354] Iª q. 3 a. 5 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quintum sic | |
| 889 proceditur. Videtur quod Deus sit in genere aliquo. Substantia enim | |
| 890 est ens per se subsistens. Hoc autem maxime convenit Deo. Ergo Deus | |
| 891 est in genere substantiae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q3_A5-p3"> | |
| 892 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, nothing can be measured save by something of its own genus; as length is measured by length and numbers by number. | |
| 893 But God is the measure of all substances, as the Commentator shows (Metaph. x). Therefore God is in the genus of substance. | |
| 894 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 3 a. 5 arg. 2"><a name="28355" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28355] Iª q. 3 a. 5 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 895 unumquodque mensuratur per aliquid sui generis; sicut longitudines | |
| 896 per longitudinem, et numeri per numerum. Sed Deus est mensura | |
| 897 omnium substantiarum, ut patet per Commentatorem, X Metaphys. Ergo | |
| 898 Deus est in genere substantiae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q3_A5-p4"> | |
| 899 <b>On the contrary,</b> In the mind, genus is prior to what it contains. But nothing is prior to God either really or mentally. Therefore God is | |
| 900 not in any genus. | |
| 901 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 3 a. 5 s. c."><a name="28356" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28356] Iª q. 3 a. 5 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra, genus | |
| 902 est prius, secundum intellectum, eo quod in genere continetur. Sed | |
| 903 nihil est prius Deo, nec secundum rem, nec secundum intellectum. | |
| 904 Ergo Deus non est in aliquo genere.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q3_A5-p5"> | |
| 905 <b>I answer that,</b> A thing can be in a genus in two ways; either absolutely and properly, as a species contained under a genus; or as being | |
| 906 reducible to it, as principles and privations. For example, a point and unity are reduced to the genus of quantity, as its | |
| 907 principles; while blindness and all other privations are reduced to the genus of habit. But in neither way is God in a genus. | |
| 908 That He cannot be a species of any genus may be shown in three ways. First, because a | |
| 909 species is constituted of genus and difference. Now that from which the difference constituting the species is derived, is | |
| 910 always related to that from which the genus is derived, as actuality is related to potentiality. For animal is derived from | |
| 911 sensitive nature, by concretion as it were, for that is animal, which has a sensitive nature. Rational being, on the other | |
| 912 hand, is derived from intellectual nature, because that is rational, which has an intellectual nature, and intelligence is | |
| 913 compared to sense, as actuality is to potentiality. The same argument holds good in other things. Hence since in God actuality | |
| 914 is not added to potentiality, it is impossible that He should be in any genus as a species. Secondly, since the existence | |
| 915 of God is His essence, if God were in any genus, He would be the genus "being", because, since genus is predicated as an essential | |
| 916 it refers to the essence of a thing. But the Philosopher has shown (Metaph. iii) that being cannot be a genus, for | |
| 917 every genus has differences distinct from its generic essence. Now no difference can exist distinct from being; for non-being | |
| 918 cannot be a difference. It follows then that God is not in a genus. Thirdly, because all in one genus agree in the quiddity | |
| 919 or essence of the genus which is predicated of them as an essential, but they differ in their existence. For the existence | |
| 920 of man and of horse is not the same; as also of this man and that man: thus in every member of a genus, existence and | |
| 921 quiddity---i.e. essence---must differ. But in God they do not differ, as shown in the preceding article. Therefore it is plain | |
| 922 that God is not in a genus as if He were a species. From this it is also plain that He has no genus nor difference, nor can | |
| 923 there be any definition of Him; nor, save through His effects, a demonstration of Him: for a definition is from genus and | |
| 924 difference; and the mean of a demonstration is a definition. That God is not in a genus, as reducible to it as its principle, | |
| 925 is clear from this, that a principle reducible to any genus does not extend beyond that genus; as, a point is the principle | |
| 926 of continuous quantity alone; and unity, of discontinuous quantity. But God is the principle of all being. Therefore He is | |
| 927 not contained in any genus as its principle. | |
| 928 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 3 a. 5 co."><a name="28357" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28357] Iª q. 3 a. 5 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum | |
| 929 quod aliquid est in genere dupliciter. Uno modo simpliciter et | |
| 930 proprie; sicut species, quae sub genere continentur. Alio modo, per | |
| 931 reductionem, sicut principia et privationes, sicut punctus et | |
| 932 unitas reducuntur ad genus quantitatis, sicut principia; caecitas | |
| 933 autem, et omnis privatio, reducitur ad genus sui habitus. Neutro | |
| 934 autem modo Deus est in genere. Quod enim non possit esse species | |
| 935 alicuius generis, tripliciter ostendi potest. Primo quidem, quia | |
| 936 species constituitur ex genere et differentia. Semper autem id a | |
| 937 quo sumitur differentia constituens speciem, se habet ad illud unde | |
| 938 sumitur genus, sicut actus ad potentiam. Animal enim sumitur a | |
| 939 natura sensitiva per modum concretionis; hoc enim dicitur animal, | |
| 940 quod naturam sensitivam habet, rationale vero sumitur a natura | |
| 941 intellectiva, quia rationale est quod naturam intellectivam habet, | |
| 942 intellectivum autem comparatur ad sensitivum, sicut actus ad | |
| 943 potentiam. Et similiter manifestum est in aliis. Unde, cum in Deo | |
| 944 non adiungatur potentia actui, impossibile est quod sit in genere | |
| 945 tanquam species. Secundo, quia, cum esse Dei sit eius essentia, ut | |
| 946 ostensum est, si Deus esset in aliquo genere, oporteret quod genus | |
| 947 eius esset ens, nam genus significat essentiam rei, cum praedicetur | |
| 948 in eo quod quid est. Ostendit autem philosophus in III Metaphys., | |
| 949 quod ens non potest esse genus alicuius, omne enim genus habet | |
| 950 differentias quae sunt extra essentiam generis; nulla autem | |
| 951 differentia posset inveniri, quae esset extra ens; quia non ens non | |
| 952 potest esse differentia. Unde relinquitur quod Deus non sit in | |
| 953 genere. Tertio, quia omnia quae sunt in genere uno, communicant in | |
| 954 quidditate vel essentia generis, quod praedicatur de eis in eo quod | |
| 955 quid est. Differunt autem secundum esse, non enim idem est esse | |
| 956 hominis et equi, nec huius hominis et illius hominis. Et sic | |
| 957 oportet quod quaecumque sunt in genere, differant in eis esse et | |
| 958 quod quid est, idest essentia. In Deo autem non differt, ut | |
| 959 ostensum est. Unde manifestum est quod Deus non est in genere sicut | |
| 960 species. Et ex hoc patet quod non habet genus, neque differentias; | |
| 961 neque est definitio ipsius; neque demonstratio, nisi per effectum, | |
| 962 quia definitio est ex genere et differentia, demonstrationis autem | |
| 963 medium est definitio. Quod autem Deus non sit in genere per | |
| 964 reductionem ut principium, manifestum est ex eo quod principium | |
| 965 quod reducitur in aliquod genus, non se extendit ultra genus illud, | |
| 966 sicut punctum non est principium nisi quantitatis continuae, et | |
| 967 unitas quantitatis discretae. Deus autem est principium totius | |
| 968 esse, ut infra ostendetur. Unde non continetur in aliquo genere | |
| 969 sicut principium.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q3_A5-p6"> | |
| 970 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The word substance signifies not only what exists of itself---for existence cannot of itself be a genus, as shown in the | |
| 971 body of the article; but, it also signifies an essence that has the property of existing in this way---namely, of existing | |
| 972 of itself; this existence, however, is not its essence. Thus it is clear that God is not in the genus of substance. | |
| 973 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 3 a. 5 ad 1"><a name="28358" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28358] Iª q. 3 a. 5 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo | |
| 974 dicendum quod substantiae nomen non significat hoc solum quod est | |
| 975 per se esse, quia hoc quod est esse, non potest per se esse genus, | |
| 976 ut ostensum est. Sed significat essentiam cui competit sic esse, | |
| 977 idest per se esse, quod tamen esse non est ipsa eius essentia. Et | |
| 978 sic patet quod Deus non est in genere substantiae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q3_A5-p7"> | |
| 979 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> This objection turns upon proportionate measure which must be homogeneous with what is measured. Now, God is not a measure | |
| 980 proportionate to anything. Still, He is called the measure of all things, in the sense that everything has being only according | |
| 981 as it resembles Him. | |
| 982 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 3 a. 5 ad 2"><a name="28359" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28359] Iª q. 3 a. 5 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 983 dicendum quod obiectio illa procedit de mensura proportionata, hanc | |
| 984 enim oportet esse homogeneam mensurato. Deus autem non est mensura | |
| 985 proportionata alicui. Dicitur tamen mensura omnium, ex eo quod | |
| 986 unumquodque tantum habet de esse, quantum ei appropinquat.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q3_A6" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q3_A6-p0.1">Q. 3. A. 6. Whether in God there are any accidents?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q3_A6-p2"> | |
| 987 <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that there are accidents in God. For substance cannot be an accident, as Aristotle says (Phys. i). Therefore that | |
| 988 which is an accident in one, cannot, in another, be a substance. Thus it is proved that heat cannot be the substantial form | |
| 989 of fire, because it is an accident in other things. But wisdom, virtue, and the like, which are accidents in us, are attributes | |
| 990 of God. Therefore in God there are accidents. | |
| 991 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 3 a. 6 arg. 1"><a name="28360" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28360] Iª q. 3 a. 6 arg. 1</span></a> Ad sextum sic | |
| 992 proceditur. Videtur quod in Deo sint aliqua accidentia. Substantia | |
| 993 enim nulli est accidens, ut dicitur in I Physic. Quod ergo in uno | |
| 994 est accidens, non potest in alio esse substantia, sicut probatur | |
| 995 quod calor non sit forma substantialis ignis, quia in aliis est | |
| 996 accidens. Sed sapientia, virtus, et huiusmodi, quae in nobis sunt | |
| 997 accidentia, Deo attribuuntur. Ergo et in Deo sunt accidentia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q3_A6-p3"> | |
| 998 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, in every genus there is a first principle. But there are many "genera" of accidents. If, therefore, the primal members | |
| 999 of these genera are not in God, there will be many primal beings other than God---which is absurd. | |
| 1000 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 3 a. 6 arg. 2"><a name="28361" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28361] Iª q. 3 a. 6 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, in | |
| 1001 quolibet genere est unum primum. Multa autem sunt genera | |
| 1002 accidentium. Si igitur prima illorum generum non sunt in Deo, erunt | |
| 1003 multa prima extra Deum, quod est inconveniens.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q3_A6-p4"> | |
| 1004 <b>On the contrary,</b> Every accident is in a subject. But God cannot be a subject, for "no simple form can be a subject", as Boethius says (De | |
| 1005 Trin.). Therefore in God there cannot be any accident. | |
| 1006 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 3 a. 6 s. c."><a name="28362" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28362] Iª q. 3 a. 6 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra, omne | |
| 1007 accidens in subiecto est. Deus autem non potest esse subiectum, | |
| 1008 quia <i>forma simplex non potest esse subiectum</i>, ut dicit | |
| 1009 Boetius in Lib. de Trin. Ergo in Deo non potest esse accidens.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q3_A6-p5"> | |
| 1010 <b>I answer that,</b> From all we have said, it is clear there can be no accident in God. First, because a subject is compared to its accidents | |
| 1011 as potentiality to actuality; for a subject is in some sense made actual by its accidents. But there can be no potentiality | |
| 1012 in God, as was shown ( | |
| 1013 <a id="FP_Q3_A6-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q2_A3.html">Q[2], A[3]</a>). Secondly, because God is His own existence; and as Boethius says (Hebdom.), although every essence may have something superadded | |
| 1014 to it, this cannot apply to | |
| 1015 absolute being: thus a heated substance can have something extraneous to heat added to it, as whiteness, nevertheless absolute | |
| 1016 heat can have nothing else than heat. Thirdly, because what is essential is prior to what is accidental. Whence as God is | |
| 1017 absolute primal being, there can be in Him nothing accidental. Neither can He have any essential accidents (as the capability | |
| 1018 of laughing is an essential accident of man), because such accidents are caused by the constituent principles of the | |
| 1019 subject. Now there can be nothing caused in God, since He is the first cause. Hence it follows that there is no accident in | |
| 1020 God. | |
| 1021 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 3 a. 6 co."><a name="28363" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28363] Iª q. 3 a. 6 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum | |
| 1022 quod, secundum praemissa, manifeste apparet quod in Deo accidens | |
| 1023 esse non potest. Primo quidem, quia subiectum comparatur ad | |
| 1024 accidens, sicut potentia ad actum, subiectum enim secundum accidens | |
| 1025 est aliquo modo in actu. Esse autem in potentia, omnino removetur a | |
| 1026 Deo, ut ex praedictis patet. Secundo, quia Deus est suum esse, et, | |
| 1027 ut Boetius dicit in Lib. de Hebdomad., <i>licet id quod est, | |
| 1028 aliquid aliud possit habere adiunctum, tamen ipsum esse nihil aliud | |
| 1029 adiunctum habere potest</i>, sicut quod est calidum, potest habere | |
| 1030 aliquid extraneum quam calidum, ut albedinem; sed ipse calor nihil | |
| 1031 habet praeter calorem. Tertio, quia omne quod est per se, prius est | |
| 1032 eo quod est per accidens. Unde, cum Deus sit simpliciter primum | |
| 1033 ens, in eo non potest esse aliquid per accidens. Sed nec accidentia | |
| 1034 per se in eo esse possunt, sicut risibile est per se accidens | |
| 1035 hominis. Quia huiusmodi accidentia causantur ex principiis | |
| 1036 subiecti, in Deo autem nihil potest esse causatum, cum sit causa | |
| 1037 prima. Unde relinquitur quod in Deo nullum sit accidens.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q3_A6-p6"> | |
| 1038 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Virtue and wisdom are not predicated of God and of us univocally. Hence it does not follow that there are accidents in God | |
| 1039 as there are in us. | |
| 1040 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 3 a. 6 ad 1"><a name="28364" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28364] Iª q. 3 a. 6 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo | |
| 1041 dicendum quod virtus et sapientia non univoce dicuntur de Deo et de | |
| 1042 nobis, ut infra patebit. Unde non sequitur quod accidentia sint in | |
| 1043 Deo, sicut in nobis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q3_A6-p7"> | |
| 1044 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Since substance is prior to its accidents, the principles of accidents are reducible to the principles of the substance as | |
| 1045 to that which is prior; although God is not first as if contained in the genus of substance; yet He is first in respect to | |
| 1046 all being, outside of every genus. | |
| 1047 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 3 a. 6 ad 2"><a name="28365" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28365] Iª q. 3 a. 6 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 1048 dicendum quod, cum substantia sit prior accidentibus, principia | |
| 1049 accidentium reducuntur in principia substantiae sicut in priora. | |
| 1050 Quamvis Deus non sit primum contentum in genere substantiae, sed | |
| 1051 primum extra omne genus, respectu totius esse.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q3_A7" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q3_A7-p0.1">Q. 3. A. 7. Whether God is altogether simple?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q3_A7-p2"> | |
| 1052 <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God is not altogether simple. For whatever is from God must imitate Him. Thus from the first being are all | |
| 1053 beings; and from the first good is all good. But in the things which God has made, nothing is altogether simple. Therefore | |
| 1054 neither is God altogether simple. | |
| 1055 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 3 a. 7 arg. 1"><a name="28366" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28366] Iª q. 3 a. 7 arg. 1</span></a> Ad septimum sic | |
| 1056 proceditur. Videtur quod Deus non sit omnino simplex. Ea enim quae | |
| 1057 sunt a Deo, imitantur ipsum, unde a primo ente sunt omnia entia, et | |
| 1058 a primo bono sunt omnia bona. Sed in rebus quae sunt a Deo, nihil | |
| 1059 est omnino simplex. Ergo Deus non est omnino simplex.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q3_A7-p3"> | |
| 1060 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, whatever is best must be attributed to God. But with us that which is composite is better than that which is simple; | |
| 1061 thus, chemical compounds are better than simple elements, and animals than the parts that compose them. Therefore it cannot | |
| 1062 be said that God is altogether simple. | |
| 1063 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 3 a. 7 arg. 2"><a name="28367" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28367] Iª q. 3 a. 7 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, omne | |
| 1064 quod est melius, Deo attribuendum est. Sed, apud nos, composita | |
| 1065 sunt meliora simplicibus, sicut corpora mixta elementis, et | |
| 1066 elementa suis partibus. Ergo non est dicendum quod Deus sit omnino | |
| 1067 simplex.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q3_A7-p4"> | |
| 1068 <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Trin. iv, 6,7): "God is truly and absolutely simple." | |
| 1069 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 3 a. 7 s. c."><a name="28368" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28368] Iª q. 3 a. 7 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est | |
| 1070 quod Augustinus dicit, VI de Trin., quod Deus vere et summe simplex | |
| 1071 est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q3_A7-p5"> | |
| 1072 <b>I answer that,</b> The absolute simplicity of God may be shown in many ways. First, from the previous articles of this question. For there is | |
| 1073 neither composition of quantitative parts in God, since He is not a body; nor composition of matter and form; nor does His | |
| 1074 nature differ from His "suppositum"; nor His essence from His existence; neither is there in Him composition of genus and | |
| 1075 difference, nor of subject and accident. Therefore, it is clear that God is nowise composite, | |
| 1076 but is altogether simple. Secondly, because every composite is posterior to its component parts, and is dependent on them; | |
| 1077 but God is the first being, as shown above ( | |
| 1078 <a id="FP_Q3_A7-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q2_A3.html">Q[2], A[3]</a>). Thirdly, because every composite has a cause, for things in themselves different cannot unite unless something causes them | |
| 1079 to unite. But God is uncaused, as shown above ( | |
| 1080 <a id="FP_Q3_A7-p5.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q2_A3.html">Q[2], A[3]</a>), since He is the first efficient cause. Fourthly, because in every composite there must | |
| 1081 be potentiality and actuality; but this does not apply to God; for either one of the parts actuates another, or at least all | |
| 1082 the parts are potential to the whole. Fifthly, because nothing composite can be predicated of any single one of its parts. | |
| 1083 And this is evident in a whole made up of dissimilar parts; for no part of a man is a man, nor any of the parts of the foot, | |
| 1084 a foot. But in wholes made up of similar parts, although something which is predicated of the whole may be predicated of a | |
| 1085 part (as a part of the air is air, and a part of water, water), nevertheless certain things are predicable of the whole which | |
| 1086 cannot be predicated of any of the parts; for instance, if the whole volume of water is two cubits, no part of it can be two | |
| 1087 cubits. Thus in every composite there is something which is not it itself. But, even if this could be said of whatever has | |
| 1088 a form, viz. that it has something which is not it itself, as in a white object there is something which does not belong to | |
| 1089 the essence of white; nevertheless in the form itself, there is nothing besides itself. And so, since God is absolute form, | |
| 1090 or rather absolute being, He can be in no way composite. Hilary implies this argument, when he says (De Trin. vii): "God, | |
| 1091 Who is strength, is not made up of things that are weak; nor is He Who is light, composed of things that are dim." | |
| 1092 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 3 a. 7 co."><a name="28369" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28369] Iª q. 3 a. 7 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum | |
| 1093 quod Deum omnino esse simplicem, multipliciter potest esse | |
| 1094 manifestum. Primo quidem per supradicta. Cum enim in Deo non sit | |
| 1095 compositio, neque quantitativarum partium, quia corpus non est; | |
| 1096 neque compositio formae et materiae, neque in eo sit aliud natura | |
| 1097 et suppositum; neque aliud essentia et esse, neque in eo sit | |
| 1098 compositio generis et differentiae; neque subiecti et accidentis, | |
| 1099 manifestum est quod Deus nullo modo compositus est, sed est omnino | |
| 1100 simplex. Secundo, quia omne compositum est posterius suis | |
| 1101 componentibus, et dependens ex eis. Deus autem est primum ens, ut | |
| 1102 supra ostensum est. Tertio, quia omne compositum causam habet, quae | |
| 1103 enim secundum se diversa sunt, non conveniunt in aliquod unum nisi | |
| 1104 per aliquam causam adunantem ipsa. Deus autem non habet causam, ut | |
| 1105 supra ostensum est, cum sit prima causa efficiens. Quarto, quia in | |
| 1106 omni composito oportet esse potentiam et actum, quod in Deo non | |
| 1107 est, quia vel una partium est actus respectu alterius; vel saltem | |
| 1108 omnes partes sunt sicut in potentia respectu totius. Quinto, quia | |
| 1109 omne compositum est aliquid quod non convenit alicui suarum | |
| 1110 partium. Et quidem in totis dissimilium partium, manifestum est, | |
| 1111 nulla enim partium hominis est homo, neque aliqua partium pedis est | |
| 1112 pes. In totis vero similium partium, licet aliquid quod dicitur de | |
| 1113 toto, dicatur de parte, sicut pars aeris est aer, et aquae aqua; | |
| 1114 aliquid tamen dicitur de toto, quod non convenit alicui partium, | |
| 1115 non enim si tota aqua est bicubita, et pars eius. Sic igitur in | |
| 1116 omni composito est aliquid quod non est ipsum. Hoc autem etsi | |
| 1117 possit dici de habente formam, quod scilicet habeat aliquid quod | |
| 1118 non est ipsum (puta in albo est aliquid quod non pertinet ad | |
| 1119 rationem albi), tamen in ipsa forma nihil est alienum. Unde, cum | |
| 1120 Deus sit ipsa forma, vel potius ipsum esse, nullo modo compositus | |
| 1121 esse potest. Et hanc rationem tangit Hilarius, VII de Trin., | |
| 1122 dicens, <i>Deus, qui virtus est, ex infirmis non continetur, neque | |
| 1123 qui lux est, ex obscuris coaptatur</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q3_A7-p6"> | |
| 1124 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Whatever is from God imitates Him, as caused things imitate the first cause. But it is of the essence of a thing to be in | |
| 1125 some sort composite; because at least its existence differs from its essence, as will be shown hereafter, ( | |
| 1126 <a id="FP_Q3_A7-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q4_A3.html">Q[4], A[3]</a>). | |
| 1127 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 3 a. 7 ad 1"><a name="28370" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28370] Iª q. 3 a. 7 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo | |
| 1128 dicendum quod ea quae sunt a Deo, imitantur Deum sicut causata | |
| 1129 primam causam. Est autem hoc de ratione causati, quod sit aliquo | |
| 1130 modo compositum, quia ad minus esse eius est aliud quam quod quid | |
| 1131 est, ut infra patebit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q3_A7-p7"> | |
| 1132 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> With us composite things are better than simple things, because the perfections of created goodness cannot be found in one | |
| 1133 simple thing, but in many things. But the perfection of divine goodness is found in one simple thing ( | |
| 1134 <a id="FP_Q3_A7-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q4_A1.html">Q[4], A[1]</a> and | |
| 1135 <a id="FP_Q3_A7-p7.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q6_A2.html">Q[6], A[2]</a>). | |
| 1136 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 3 a. 7 ad 2"><a name="28371" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28371] Iª q. 3 a. 7 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 1137 dicendum quod apud nos composita sunt meliora simplicibus, quia | |
| 1138 perfectio bonitatis creaturae non invenitur in uno simplici, sed in | |
| 1139 multis. Sed perfectio divinae bonitatis invenitur in uno simplici, | |
| 1140 ut infra ostendetur.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q3_A8" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q3_A8-p0.1">Q. 3. A. 8. Whether God enters into the composition of other things?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q3_A8-p2"> | |
| 1141 <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God enters into the composition of other things, for Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. iv): "The being of all things | |
| 1142 is that which is above being---the Godhead." But the being of all things enters into the composition of everything. Therefore | |
| 1143 God enters into the composition of other things. | |
| 1144 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 3 a. 8 arg. 1"><a name="28372" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28372] Iª q. 3 a. 8 arg. 1</span></a> Ad octavum sic | |
| 1145 proceditur. Videtur quod Deus in compositionem aliorum veniat. | |
| 1146 Dicit enim Dionysius, IV cap. Cael. Hier., <i>esse omnium est, quae | |
| 1147 super esse est deitas</i>. Sed esse omnium intrat compositionem | |
| 1148 uniuscuiusque. Ergo Deus in compositionem aliorum venit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q3_A8-p3"> | |
| 1149 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, God is a form; for Augustine says (De Verb. Dom., [*Serm. xxxviii]) that, "the word of God, which is God, is an | |
| 1150 uncreated form." But a form is part of a compound. Therefore God is part of some compound. | |
| 1151 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 3 a. 8 arg. 2"><a name="28373" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28373] Iª q. 3 a. 8 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, Deus | |
| 1152 est forma, dicit enim Augustinus, in libro de verbis domini, quod | |
| 1153 verbum Dei (quod est Deus) est forma quaedam non formata. Sed forma | |
| 1154 est pars compositi. Ergo Deus est pars alicuius compositi.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q3_A8-p4"> | |
| 1155 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, whatever things exist, in no way differing from each other, are the same. But God and primary matter exist, and | |
| 1156 in no way differ from each other. Therefore they are absolutely the same. But primary matter enters into the composition things. | |
| 1157 Therefore also does God. Proof of the minor---whatever things differ, they differ by some differences, and therefore must | |
| 1158 be composite. But God and primary matter are altogether simple. Therefore they nowise differ | |
| 1159 from each other. | |
| 1160 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 3 a. 8 arg. 3"><a name="28374" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28374] Iª q. 3 a. 8 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 1161 quaecumque sunt et nullo modo differunt, sunt idem. Sed Deus et | |
| 1162 materia prima sunt, et nullo modo differunt. Ergo penitus sunt | |
| 1163 idem. Sed materia prima intrat compositionem rerum. Ergo et Deus. | |
| 1164 Probatio mediae, quaecumque differunt, aliquibus differentiis | |
| 1165 differunt, et ita oportet ea esse composita; sed Deus et materia | |
| 1166 prima sunt omnino simplicia; ergo nullo modo differunt.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q3_A8-p5"> | |
| 1167 <b>On the contrary,</b> Dionysius says (Div. Nom. ii): "There can be no touching Him," i.e. God, "nor any other union with Him by mingling part with | |
| 1168 part." | |
| 1169 </p><p id="FP_Q3_A8-p6"> Further, the first cause rules all things without commingling with them, as the Philosopher says (De Causis).</p></div></div><div class="lat"><div class="latin"><p title="I q. 3 a. 8 s. c. 1"><a name="28375" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28375] Iª q. 3 a. 8 s. c. 1</span></a> Sed contra est | |
| 1170 quod dicit Dionysius, II cap. de Div. Nom., quod neque tactus est | |
| 1171 eius (scilicet Dei), <i>neque alia quaedam ad partes commiscendi | |
| 1172 communio</i>.</p><p title="I q. 3 a. 8 s. c. 2"><a name="28376" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28376] Iª q. 3 a. 8 s. c. 2</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 1173 dicitur in libro de causis, quod <i>causa prima regit omnes res, | |
| 1174 praeterquam commisceatur eis</i>.</p></div></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q3_A8-p7"> | |
| 1175 <b>I answer that,</b> On this point there have been three errors. Some have affirmed that God is the world-soul, as is clear from Augustine (De | |
| 1176 Civ. Dei vii, 6). This is practically the same as the opinion of those who assert that God is the soul of the highest heaven. | |
| 1177 Again, others have said that God is the formal principle of all things; and this was the theory of the Almaricians. The third | |
| 1178 error is that of David of Dinant, who most absurdly taught that God was primary matter. | |
| 1179 Now all these contain manifest untruth; since it is not possible for God to enter into the composition of anything, either | |
| 1180 as a formal or a material principle. First, because God is the first efficient cause. Now the efficient cause is not identical | |
| 1181 numerically with the form of the thing caused, but only specifically: for man begets man. But primary matter can be neither | |
| 1182 numerically nor specifically identical with an efficient cause; for the former is merely potential, while the latter is | |
| 1183 actual. Secondly, because, since God is the first efficient cause, to act belongs to Him primarily and essentially. But that | |
| 1184 which enters into composition with anything does not act primarily and essentially, but rather the composite so acts; for | |
| 1185 the hand does not act, but the man by his hand; and, fire warms by its heat. Hence God cannot be part of a compound. Thirdly, | |
| 1186 because no part of a compound can be absolutely primal among beings---not even matter, nor form, though they are the primal | |
| 1187 parts of every compound. For matter is merely potential; and potentiality is absolutely posterior to actuality, as is clear | |
| 1188 from the foregoing ( | |
| 1189 <a id="FP_Q3_A8-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q3_A1.html">Q[3], A[1]</a>): while a form which is part of a compound is a participated form; and as that which participates is posterior to that which | |
| 1190 is essential, so likewise is that which is participated; as fire in ignited objects is posterior to fire that is essentially | |
| 1191 such. Now it has been proved that God is absolutely primal being ( | |
| 1192 <a id="FP_Q3_A8-p7.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q2_A3.html">Q[2], A[3]</a>). | |
| 1193 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 3 a. 8 co."><a name="28377" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28377] Iª q. 3 a. 8 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum | |
| 1194 quod circa hoc fuerunt tres errores. Quidam enim posuerunt quod | |
| 1195 Deus esset anima mundi, ut patet per Augustinum in Lib. VII de | |
| 1196 civitate Dei, et ad hoc etiam reducitur, quod quidam dixerunt Deum | |
| 1197 esse animam primi caeli. Alii autem dixerunt Deum esse principium | |
| 1198 formale omnium rerum. Et haec dicitur fuisse opinio Almarianorum. | |
| 1199 Sed tertius error fuit David de Dinando, qui stultissime posuit | |
| 1200 Deum esse materiam primam. Omnia enim haec manifestam continent | |
| 1201 falsitatem, neque est possibile Deum aliquo modo in compositionem | |
| 1202 alicuius venire, nec sicut principium formale, nec sicut principium | |
| 1203 materiale. Primo quidem, quia supra diximus Deum esse primam causam | |
| 1204 efficientem. Causa autem efficiens cum forma rei factae non incidit | |
| 1205 in idem numero, sed solum in idem specie, homo enim generat | |
| 1206 hominem. Materia vero cum causa efficiente non incidit in idem | |
| 1207 numero, nec in idem specie, quia hoc est in potentia, illud vero in | |
| 1208 actu. Secundo, quia cum Deus sit prima causa efficiens, eius est | |
| 1209 primo et per se agere. Quod autem venit in compositionem alicuius, | |
| 1210 non est primo et per se agens, sed magis compositum, non enim manus | |
| 1211 agit, sed homo per manum; et ignis calefacit per calorem. Unde Deus | |
| 1212 non potest esse pars alicuius compositi. Tertio, quia nulla pars | |
| 1213 compositi potest esse simpliciter prima in entibus; neque etiam | |
| 1214 materia et forma, quae sunt primae partes compositorum. Nam materia | |
| 1215 est in potentia, potentia autem est posterior actu simpliciter, ut | |
| 1216 ex dictis patet. Forma autem quae est pars compositi, est forma | |
| 1217 participata, sicut autem participans est posterius eo quod est per | |
| 1218 essentiam, ita et ipsum participatum; sicut ignis in ignitis est | |
| 1219 posterior eo quod est per essentiam. Ostensum est autem quod Deus | |
| 1220 est primum ens simpliciter.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q3_A8-p8"> | |
| 1221 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The Godhead is called the being of all things, as their efficient and exemplar cause, but not as being their essence. | |
| 1222 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 3 a. 8 ad 1"><a name="28378" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28378] Iª q. 3 a. 8 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo | |
| 1223 dicendum quod deitas dicitur esse omnium effective et exemplariter, | |
| 1224 non autem per essentiam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q3_A8-p9"> | |
| 1225 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The Word is an exemplar form; but not a form that is part of a compound. | |
| 1226 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 3 a. 8 ad 2"><a name="28379" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28379] Iª q. 3 a. 8 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 1227 dicendum quod verbum est forma exemplaris, non autem forma quae est | |
| 1228 pars compositi.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q3_A8-p10"> | |
| 1229 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Simple things do not differ by added differences---for this is the property of compounds. Thus man and horse differ by their | |
| 1230 differences, rational and irrational; which differences, however, do not differ from each other by other differences. Hence, | |
| 1231 to be quite accurate, it is better to say that they are, not different, but diverse. Hence, according to the Philosopher (Metaph. | |
| 1232 x), "things which are diverse are absolutely distinct, but things which are | |
| 1233 different differ by something." Therefore, strictly speaking, primary matter and God do not differ, but are by their very | |
| 1234 being, diverse. Hence it does not follow they are the same. | |
| 1235 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 3 a. 8 ad 3"><a name="28380" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28380] Iª q. 3 a. 8 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum | |
| 1236 quod simplicia non differunt aliquibus aliis differentiis, hoc enim | |
| 1237 compositorum est. Homo enim et equus differunt rationali et | |
| 1238 irrationali differentiis, quae quidem differentiae non differunt | |
| 1239 amplius ab invicem aliis differentiis. Unde, si fiat vis in verbo, | |
| 1240 non proprie dicuntur differre, sed diversa esse, nam, secundum | |
| 1241 philosophum X Metaphys., diversum absolute dicitur, sed omne | |
| 1242 differens aliquo differt. Unde, si fiat vis in verbo, materia prima | |
| 1243 et Deus non differunt, sed sunt diversa seipsis. Unde non sequitur | |
| 1244 quod sint idem.</p></div></div></div></div> | |
| 1245 <div id="FP_Q4" class="div3"> | |
| 1246 <h3 id="FP_Q4-p0.1">Q. 4. THE PERFECTION OF GOD (THREE ARTICLES)</h3> | |
| 1247 <div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> | |
| 1248 <p id="FP_Q4-p2"> Having considered the divine simplicity, we treat next of God's perfection. Now because everything in so far as it is perfect | |
| 1249 is called good, we shall speak first of the divine perfection; secondly of the divine goodness. | |
| 1250 </p><p id="FP_Q4-p3"> Concerning the first there are three points of inquiry:</p><p id="FP_Q4-p4"> (1) Whether God is perfect?</p><p id="FP_Q4-p5"> (2) Whether God is perfect universally, as having in Himself the perfections of all things?</p><p id="FP_Q4-p6"> (3) Whether creatures can be said to be like God?</p> | |
| 1251 </div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 4 pr."><a name="28381" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28381] | |
| 1252 Iª q. 4 pr.</span></a> Post considerationem divinae | |
| 1253 simplicitatis, de perfectione ipsius Dei dicendum est. Et quia | |
| 1254 unumquodque, secundum quod perfectum est, sic dicitur bonum, primo | |
| 1255 agendum est de perfectione divina; secundo de eius bonitate. Circa | |
| 1256 primum quaeruntur tria. Primo, utrum Deus sit perfectus. Secundo, | |
| 1257 utrum Deus sit universaliter perfectus omnium in se perfectiones | |
| 1258 habens. Tertio, utrum creaturae similes Deo dici possint.</p></div></div></div> | |
| 1259 <div id="FP_Q4_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q4_A1-p0.1">Q. 4. A. 1. Whether God is perfect?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q4_A1-p2"> | |
| 1260 <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that perfection does not belong to God. For we say a thing is perfect if it is completely made. But it does not | |
| 1261 befit God to be made. Therefore He is not perfect. | |
| 1262 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 4 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="28382" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28382] Iª q. 4 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum sic | |
| 1263 proceditur. Videtur quod esse perfectum non conveniat Deo. | |
| 1264 Perfectum enim dicitur quasi totaliter factum. Sed Deo non convenit | |
| 1265 esse factum. Ergo nec esse perfectum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q4_A1-p3"> | |
| 1266 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, God is the first beginning of things. But the beginnings of things seem to be imperfect, as seed is the beginning | |
| 1267 of animal and vegetable life. Therefore God is imperfect. | |
| 1268 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 4 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="28383" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28383] Iª q. 4 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, Deus | |
| 1269 est primum rerum principium. Sed principia rerum videntur esse | |
| 1270 imperfecta, semen enim est principium animalium et plantarum. Ergo | |
| 1271 Deus est imperfectus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q4_A1-p4"> | |
| 1272 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, as shown above ( | |
| 1273 <a id="FP_Q4_A1-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q3_A4.html">Q[3], A[4]</a>), God's essence is existence. But existence seems most imperfect, since it is most universal and receptive of all modification. | |
| 1274 Therefore God is imperfect. | |
| 1275 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 4 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="28384" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28384] Iª q. 4 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 1276 ostensum est supra quod essentia Dei est ipsum esse. Sed ipsum esse | |
| 1277 videtur esse imperfectissimum, cum sit communissimum, et recipiens | |
| 1278 omnium additiones. Ergo Deus est imperfectus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q4_A1-p5"> | |
| 1279 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written: "Be you perfect as also your heavenly Father is perfect" ( | |
| 1280 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q4_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.5.48" target="asv">Mat. 5:48</a>). | |
| 1281 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 4 a. 1 s. c."><a name="28385" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28385] Iª q. 4 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est | |
| 1282 quod dicitur Matt. V, <i>estote perfecti, sicut et pater vester | |
| 1283 caelestis perfectus est</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q4_A1-p6"> | |
| 1284 <b>I answer that,</b> As the Philosopher relates (Metaph. xii), some ancient philosophers, namely, the Pythagoreans and Leucippus, did not predicate | |
| 1285 "best" and "most perfect" of the first principle. The reason was that the ancient philosophers considered only a material | |
| 1286 principle; and a material principle is most imperfect. For since matter as such is merely potential, the first material principle | |
| 1287 must be simply potential, and thus most imperfect. Now God is the first principle, | |
| 1288 not material, but in the order of efficient cause, which must be most perfect. For just as matter, as such, is merely potential, | |
| 1289 an agent, as such, is in the state of actuality. Hence, the first active principle must needs be most actual, and therefore | |
| 1290 most perfect; for a thing is perfect in proportion to its state of actuality, because we call that perfect which lacks nothing | |
| 1291 of the mode of its perfection. | |
| 1292 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 4 a. 1 co."><a name="28386" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28386] Iª q. 4 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum | |
| 1293 quod, sicut philosophus narrat in XII Metaphys., quidam antiqui | |
| 1294 philosophi, scilicet Pythagorici et Speusippus, non attribuerunt | |
| 1295 optimum et perfectissimum primo principio. Cuius ratio est, quia | |
| 1296 philosophi antiqui consideraverunt principium materiale tantum, | |
| 1297 primum autem principium materiale imperfectissimum est. Cum enim | |
| 1298 materia, inquantum huiusmodi, sit in potentia, oportet quod primum | |
| 1299 principium materiale sit maxime in potentia; et ita maxime | |
| 1300 imperfectum. Deus autem ponitur primum principium, non materiale, | |
| 1301 sed in genere causae efficientis, et hoc oportet esse | |
| 1302 perfectissimum. Sicut enim materia, inquantum huiusmodi, est in | |
| 1303 potentia; ita agens, inquantum huiusmodi, est in actu. Unde primum | |
| 1304 principium activum oportet maxime esse in actu, et per consequens | |
| 1305 maxime esse perfectum. Secundum hoc enim dicitur aliquid esse | |
| 1306 perfectum, secundum quod est actu, nam perfectum dicitur, cui nihil | |
| 1307 deest secundum modum suae perfectionis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q4_A1-p7"> | |
| 1308 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As Gregory says (Moral. v, 26,29): "Though our lips can only stammer, we yet chant the high things of God." For that which | |
| 1309 is not made is improperly called perfect. Nevertheless because created things are then called perfect, when from potentiality | |
| 1310 they are brought into actuality, this word "perfect" signifies whatever is not wanting in actuality, whether this be by way | |
| 1311 of perfection or not. | |
| 1312 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 4 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="28387" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28387] Iª q. 4 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo | |
| 1313 dicendum quod, sicut dicit Gregorius, <i>balbutiendo ut possumus, | |
| 1314 excelsa Dei resonamus, quod enim factum non est, perfectum proprie | |
| 1315 dici non potest</i>. Sed quia in his quae fiunt, tunc dicitur esse | |
| 1316 aliquid perfectum, cum de potentia educitur in actum; transumitur | |
| 1317 hoc nomen perfectum ad significandum omne illud cui non deest esse | |
| 1318 in actu, sive hoc habeat per modum factionis, sive non.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q4_A1-p8"> | |
| 1319 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The material principle which with us is found to be imperfect, cannot be absolutely primal; but must be preceded by something | |
| 1320 perfect. For seed, though it be the principle of animal life reproduced through seed, has previous to it, the animal or plant | |
| 1321 from which is came. Because, previous to that which is potential, must be that which is actual; since a potential being can | |
| 1322 only be reduced into act by some being already actual. | |
| 1323 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 4 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="28388" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28388] Iª q. 4 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 1324 dicendum quod principium materiale, quod apud nos imperfectum | |
| 1325 invenitur, non potest esse simpliciter primum, sed praeceditur ab | |
| 1326 alio perfecto. Nam semen, licet sit principium animalis generati ex | |
| 1327 semine, tamen habet ante se animal vel plantam unde deciditur. | |
| 1328 Oportet enim ante id quod est in potentia, esse aliquid actu, cum | |
| 1329 ens in potentia non reducatur in actum, nisi per aliquod ens in | |
| 1330 actu.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q4_A1-p9"> | |
| 1331 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Existence is the most perfect of all things, for it is compared to all things as that by which they are made actual; for | |
| 1332 nothing has actuality except so far as it exists. Hence existence is that which actuates all things, even their forms. Therefore | |
| 1333 it is not compared to other things as the receiver is to the received; but rather as the received to the receiver. When therefore | |
| 1334 I speak of the existence of man, or horse, or anything else, existence is | |
| 1335 considered a formal principle, and as something received; and not as that which exists. | |
| 1336 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 4 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="28389" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28389] Iª q. 4 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum | |
| 1337 quod ipsum esse est perfectissimum omnium, comparatur enim ad omnia | |
| 1338 ut actus. Nihil enim habet actualitatem, nisi inquantum est, unde | |
| 1339 ipsum esse est actualitas omnium rerum, et etiam ipsarum formarum. | |
| 1340 Unde non comparatur ad alia sicut recipiens ad receptum, sed magis | |
| 1341 sicut receptum ad recipiens. Cum enim dico esse hominis, vel equi, | |
| 1342 vel cuiuscumque alterius, ipsum esse consideratur ut formale et | |
| 1343 receptum, non autem ut illud cui competit esse.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q4_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q4_A2-p0.1">Q. 4. A. 2. Whether the perfections of all things are in God?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q4_A2-p2"> | |
| 1344 <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the perfections of all things are not in God. For God is simple, as shown above ( | |
| 1345 <a id="FP_Q4_A2-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q3_A7.html">Q[3], A[7]</a>); whereas the perfections of things are many and diverse. Therefore the perfections of all things are not in God. | |
| 1346 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 4 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="28390" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28390] Iª q. 4 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum sic | |
| 1347 proceditur. Videtur quod in Deo non sint perfectiones omnium rerum. | |
| 1348 Deus enim simplex est, ut ostensum est. Sed perfectiones rerum sunt | |
| 1349 multae et diversae. Ergo in Deo non sunt omnes perfectiones | |
| 1350 rerum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q4_A2-p3"> | |
| 1351 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, opposites cannot coexist. Now the perfections of things are opposed to each other, for each thing is perfected by | |
| 1352 its specific difference. But the differences by which "genera" are divided, and "species" constituted, are opposed to each | |
| 1353 other. Therefore because opposites cannot coexist in the same subject, it seems that the perfections of all things are not | |
| 1354 in God. | |
| 1355 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 4 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="28391" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28391] Iª q. 4 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 1356 opposita non possunt esse in eodem. Sed perfectiones rerum sunt | |
| 1357 oppositae, unaquaeque enim species perficitur per suam differentiam | |
| 1358 specificam; differentiae autem quibus dividitur genus et | |
| 1359 constituuntur species, sunt oppositae. Cum ergo opposita non | |
| 1360 possint simul esse in eodem, videtur quod non omnes rerum | |
| 1361 perfectiones sint in Deo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q4_A2-p4"> | |
| 1362 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, a living thing is more perfect than what merely exists; and an intelligent thing than what merely lives. Therefore | |
| 1363 life is more perfect than existence; and knowledge than life. But the essence of God is existence itself. Therefore He has | |
| 1364 not the perfections of life, and knowledge, and other similar perfections. | |
| 1365 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 4 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="28392" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28392] Iª q. 4 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, vivens | |
| 1366 est perfectius quam ens, et sapiens quam vivens, ergo et vivere est | |
| 1367 perfectius quam esse, et sapere quam vivere. Sed essentia Dei est | |
| 1368 ipsum esse. Ergo non habet in se perfectionem vitae et sapientiae, | |
| 1369 et alias huiusmodi perfectiones.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q4_A2-p5"> | |
| 1370 <b>On the contrary,</b> Dionysius says (Div. Nom. v) that "God in His one existence prepossesses all things." | |
| 1371 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 4 a. 2 s. c."><a name="28393" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28393] Iª q. 4 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est | |
| 1372 quod dicit Dionysius, cap. V de Div. Nom., quod Deus in uno | |
| 1373 existentia omnia praehabet.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q4_A2-p6"> | |
| 1374 <b>I answer that,</b> All created perfections are in God. Hence He is spoken of as universally perfect, because He lacks not (says the Commentator, | |
| 1375 Metaph. v) any excellence which may be found in any genus. This may be seen from two considerations. First, because whatever | |
| 1376 perfection exists in an effect must be found in the effective cause: either in the same formality, if it is a univocal agent---as | |
| 1377 when man reproduces man; or in a more eminent degree, if it is an equivocal | |
| 1378 agent---thus in the sun is the likeness of whatever is generated by the sun's power. Now it is plain that the effect pre-exists | |
| 1379 virtually in the efficient cause: and although to pre-exist in the potentiality of a material cause is to pre-exist in a more | |
| 1380 imperfect way, since matter as such is imperfect, and an agent as such is perfect; still to pre-exist virtually in the efficient | |
| 1381 cause is to pre-exist not in a more imperfect, but in a more perfect way. Since therefore God is the first effective | |
| 1382 cause of things, the perfections of all things must pre-exist in God in a more eminent way. Dionysius implies the same line | |
| 1383 of argument by saying of God (Div. Nom. v): "It is not that He is this and not that, but that He is all, as the cause of all." | |
| 1384 Secondly, from what has been already proved, God is existence itself, of itself subsistent ( | |
| 1385 <a id="FP_Q4_A2-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q3_A4.html">Q[3], A[4]</a>). Consequently, He must contain within Himself the whole perfection of being. For it is clear that if some hot thing has | |
| 1386 not the whole perfection of heat, this is because heat is not participated in its full perfection; but if this heat were self-subsisting, | |
| 1387 nothing of the virtue of heat would be wanting to it. Since therefore God is subsisting being itself, nothing of the perfection | |
| 1388 of being can be wanting to Him. Now all created perfections are included in the perfection of being; for things are perfect, | |
| 1389 precisely so far as they have being after some fashion. It follows therefore that the perfection of no one | |
| 1390 thing is wanting to God. This line of argument, too, is implied by Dionysius (Div. Nom. v), when he says that, "God exists | |
| 1391 not in any single mode, but embraces all being within Himself, absolutely, without limitation, uniformly;" and afterwards | |
| 1392 he adds that, "He is the very existence to subsisting things." | |
| 1393 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 4 a. 2 co."><a name="28394" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28394] Iª q. 4 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum | |
| 1394 quod in Deo sunt perfectiones omnium rerum. Unde et dicitur | |
| 1395 universaliter perfectus, quia non deest ei aliqua nobilitas quae | |
| 1396 inveniatur in aliquo genere, ut dicit Commentator in V Metaphys. Et | |
| 1397 hoc quidem ex duobus considerari potest. Primo quidem, per hoc quod | |
| 1398 quidquid perfectionis est in effectu, oportet inveniri in causa | |
| 1399 effectiva, vel secundum eandem rationem, si sit agens univocum, ut | |
| 1400 homo generat hominem; vel eminentiori modo, si sit, agens | |
| 1401 aequivocum, sicut in sole est similitudo eorum quae generantur per | |
| 1402 virtutem solis. Manifestum est enim quod effectus praeexistit | |
| 1403 virtute in causa agente, praeexistere autem in virtute causae | |
| 1404 agentis, non est praeexistere imperfectiori modo, sed perfectiori; | |
| 1405 licet praeexistere in potentia causae materialis, sit praeexistere | |
| 1406 imperfectiori modo, eo quod materia, inquantum huiusmodi, est | |
| 1407 imperfecta; agens vero, inquantum huiusmodi, est perfectum. Cum | |
| 1408 ergo Deus sit prima causa effectiva rerum, oportet omnium rerum | |
| 1409 perfectiones praeexistere in Deo secundum eminentiorem modum. Et | |
| 1410 hanc rationem tangit Dionysius, cap. V de Div. Nom., dicens de Deo | |
| 1411 quod <i>non hoc quidem est, hoc autem non est, sed omnia est, ut | |
| 1412 omnium causa</i>. Secundo vero, ex hoc quod supra ostensum est, | |
| 1413 quod Deus est ipsum esse per se subsistens, ex quo oportet quod | |
| 1414 totam perfectionem essendi in se contineat. Manifestum est enim | |
| 1415 quod, si aliquod calidum non habeat totam perfectionem calidi, hoc | |
| 1416 ideo est, quia calor non participatur secundum perfectam rationem, | |
| 1417 sed si calor esset per se subsistens, non posset ei aliquid deesse | |
| 1418 de virtute caloris. Unde, cum Deus sit ipsum esse subsistens, nihil | |
| 1419 de perfectione essendi potest ei deesse. Omnium autem perfectiones | |
| 1420 pertinent ad perfectionem essendi, secundum hoc enim aliqua | |
| 1421 perfecta sunt, quod aliquo modo esse habent. Unde sequitur quod | |
| 1422 nullius rei perfectio Deo desit. Et hanc etiam rationem tangit | |
| 1423 Dionysius, cap. V de Div. Nom., dicens quod <i>Deus non quodammodo | |
| 1424 est existens, sed simpliciter et incircumscripte totum in seipso | |
| 1425 uniformiter esse praeaccipit</i>, et postea subdit quod <i>ipse est | |
| 1426 esse subsistentibus</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q4_A2-p7"> | |
| 1427 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Even as the sun (as Dionysius remarks, (Div. Nom. v)), while remaining one and shining uniformly, contains within itself | |
| 1428 first and uniformly the substances of sensible things, and many and diverse qualities; "a fortiori" should all things in a | |
| 1429 kind of natural unity pre-exist in the cause of all things; and thus things diverse and in themselves opposed to each other, | |
| 1430 pre-exist in God as one, without injury to His simplicity.</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 4 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="28395" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28395] Iª q. 4 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo | |
| 1431 dicendum quod, <i>sicut sol</i>, ut dicit Dionysius, cap. V de Div. | |
| 1432 Nom., <i>sensibilium substantias et qualitates multas et | |
| 1433 differentes, ipse unus existens et uniformiter lucendo, in seipso | |
| 1434 uniformiter praeaccipit; ita multo magis in causa omnium necesse | |
| 1435 est praeexistere omnia secundum naturalem unionem</i>. Et sic, quae | |
| 1436 sunt diversa et opposita in seipsis, in Deo praeexistunt ut unum, | |
| 1437 absque detrimento simplicitatis ipsius.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q4_A2-p7a"> | |
| 1438 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> This suffices for the Reply | |
| 1439 to the Second Objection. | |
| 1440 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 4 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="28396" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28396] Iª q. 4 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Et per hoc patet | |
| 1441 solutio ad secundum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q4_A2-p8"> | |
| 1442 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The same Dionysius says (Div. Nom. v) that, although existence is more perfect than life, and life than wisdom, if they are | |
| 1443 considered as distinguished in idea; nevertheless, a living thing is more perfect than what merely exists, because living | |
| 1444 things also exist and intelligent things both exist and live. Although therefore existence does not include life and wisdom, | |
| 1445 because that which participates in existence need not participate in every mode of | |
| 1446 existence; nevertheless God's existence includes in itself life and wisdom, because nothing of the perfection of being can | |
| 1447 be wanting to Him who is subsisting being itself. | |
| 1448 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 4 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="28397" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28397] Iª q. 4 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum | |
| 1449 quod, sicut in eodem capite idem Dionysius dicit, licet ipsum esse | |
| 1450 sit perfectius quam vita, et ipsa vita quam ipsa sapientia, si | |
| 1451 considerentur secundum quod distinguuntur ratione, tamen vivens est | |
| 1452 perfectius quam ens tantum, quia vivens etiam est ens; et sapiens | |
| 1453 est ens et vivens. Licet igitur ens non includat in se vivens et | |
| 1454 sapiens, quia non oportet quod illud quod participat esse, | |
| 1455 participet ipsum secundum omnem modum essendi, tamen ipsum esse Dei | |
| 1456 includit in se vitam et sapientiam; quia nulla de perfectionibus | |
| 1457 essendi potest deesse ei quod est ipsum esse subsistens.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q4_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q4_A3-p0.1">Q. 4. A. 3. Whether any creature can be like God?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q4_A3-p2"> | |
| 1458 <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that no creature can be like God. For it is written ( | |
| 1459 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q4_A3-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.85.8" target="asv">Ps. 85:8</a>): "There is none among the gods like unto Thee, O Lord." But of all creatures the most excellent are those which are called | |
| 1460 participation gods. Therefore still less can other creatures be said to be like God. | |
| 1461 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 4 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="28398" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28398] Iª q. 4 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium sic | |
| 1462 proceditur. Videtur quod nulla creatura possit esse similis Deo. | |
| 1463 Dicitur enim in Psalmo, <i>non est similis tui in diis, domine</i>. | |
| 1464 Sed inter omnes creaturas, excellentiores sunt quae dicuntur dii | |
| 1465 participative. Multo ergo minus aliae creaturae possunt dici Deo | |
| 1466 similes.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q4_A3-p3"> | |
| 1467 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, likeness implies comparison. But there can be no comparison between things in a different "genus." Therefore neither | |
| 1468 can there be any likeness. Thus we do not say that sweetness is like whiteness. But no creature is in the same "genus" as | |
| 1469 God: since God is no "genus," as shown above ( | |
| 1470 <a id="FP_Q4_A3-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q3_A5.html">Q[3], A[5]</a>). Therefore no creature is like God. | |
| 1471 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 4 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="28399" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28399] Iª q. 4 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 1472 similitudo est comparatio quaedam. Non est autem comparatio eorum | |
| 1473 quae sunt diversorum generum; ergo nec similitudo, non enim dicimus | |
| 1474 quod dulcedo sit similis albedini. Sed nulla creatura est eiusdem | |
| 1475 generis cum Deo, cum Deus non sit in genere, ut supra ostensum est. | |
| 1476 Ergo nulla creatura est similis Deo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q4_A3-p4"> | |
| 1477 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, we speak of those things as like which agree in form. But nothing can agree with God in form; for, save in God alone, | |
| 1478 essence and existence differ. Therefore no creature can be like to God. | |
| 1479 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 4 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="28400" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28400] Iª q. 4 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 1480 similia dicuntur quae conveniunt in forma. Sed nihil convenit cum | |
| 1481 Deo in forma, nullius enim rei essentia est ipsum esse, nisi solius | |
| 1482 Dei. Ergo nulla creatura potest esse similis Deo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q4_A3-p5"> | |
| 1483 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, among like things there is mutual likeness; for like is like to like. If therefore any creature is like God, God | |
| 1484 will be like some creature, which is against what is said by Isaias: "To whom have you likened God?" ( | |
| 1485 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q4_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.40.18" target="asv">Is. 40:18</a>). | |
| 1486 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 4 a. 3 arg. 4"><a name="28401" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28401] Iª q. 4 a. 3 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, in | |
| 1487 similibus est mutua similitudo, nam simile est simili simile. Si | |
| 1488 igitur aliqua creatura est similis Deo, et Deus erit similis alicui | |
| 1489 creaturae. Quod est contra id quod dicitur Isaiae XL, <i>cui | |
| 1490 similem fecistis Deum?</i></p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q4_A3-p6"> | |
| 1491 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written: "Let us make man to our image and likeness" ( | |
| 1492 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q4_A3-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.1.26" target="asv">Gn. 1:26</a>), and: "When He shall appear we shall be like to Him" ( | |
| 1493 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q4_A3-p6.2" href="./asv.html#iJohn.3.2" target="asv">1 Jn. 3:2</a>). | |
| 1494 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 4 a. 3 s. c."><a name="28402" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28402] Iª q. 4 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est | |
| 1495 quod dicitur Gen. I, <i>faciamus hominem ad imaginem et | |
| 1496 similitudinem nostram</i>; et I Ioann. III, <i>cum apparuerit, | |
| 1497 similes ei erimus</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q4_A3-p7"> | |
| 1498 <b>I answer that,</b> Since likeness is based upon agreement or communication in form, it varies according to the many modes of communication in | |
| 1499 form. Some things are said to be like, which communicate in the same form according to the same formality, and according to | |
| 1500 the same mode; and these are said to be not merely like, but equal in their likeness; as two things equally white are said | |
| 1501 to be alike in whiteness; and this is the most perfect likeness. In another way, we speak of | |
| 1502 things as alike which communicate in form according to the same formality, though not according to the same measure, but according | |
| 1503 to more or less, as something less white is said to be like another thing more white; and this is imperfect likeness. In a | |
| 1504 third way some things are said to be alike which communicate in the same form, but not according to the same formality; as | |
| 1505 we see in non-univocal agents. For since every agent reproduces itself so far as it is an agent, and everything acts | |
| 1506 according to the manner of its form, the effect must in some way resemble the form of the agent. If therefore the agent is | |
| 1507 contained in the same species as its effect, there will be a likeness in form between that which makes and that which is made, | |
| 1508 according to the same formality of the species; as man reproduces man. If, however, the agent and its effect are not contained | |
| 1509 in the same species, there will be a likeness, but not according to the formality of the same species; as things generated | |
| 1510 by the sun's heat may be in some sort spoken of as like the sun, not as though they received the form of the sun in its specific | |
| 1511 likeness, but in its generic likeness. Therefore if there is an agent not contained in any "genus," its effect will still | |
| 1512 more distantly reproduce the form of the agent, not, that is, so as to participate in the likeness of the agent's form according | |
| 1513 to the same specific or generic formality, but only according to some sort of analogy; as existence is common to all. | |
| 1514 In this way all created things, so far as they are beings, are like God as the first and universal principle of all being. | |
| 1515 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 4 a. 3 co."><a name="28403" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28403] Iª q. 4 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum | |
| 1516 quod, cum similitudo attendatur secundum convenientiam vel | |
| 1517 communicationem in forma, multiplex est similitudo, secundum multos | |
| 1518 modos communicandi in forma. Quaedam enim dicuntur similia, quae | |
| 1519 communicant in eadem forma secundum eandem rationem, et secundum | |
| 1520 eundem modum, et haec non solum dicuntur similia, sed aequalia in | |
| 1521 sua similitudine; sicut duo aequaliter alba, dicuntur similia in | |
| 1522 albedine. Et haec est perfectissima similitudo. Alio modo dicuntur | |
| 1523 similia, quae communicant in forma secundum eandem rationem, et non | |
| 1524 secundum eundem modum, sed secundum magis et minus; ut minus album | |
| 1525 dicitur simile magis albo. Et haec est similitudo imperfecta. | |
| 1526 Tertio modo dicuntur aliqua similia, quae communicant in eadem | |
| 1527 forma, sed non secundum eandem rationem; ut patet in agentibus non | |
| 1528 univocis. Cum enim omne agens agat sibi simile inquantum est agens, | |
| 1529 agit autem unumquodque secundum suam formam, necesse est quod in | |
| 1530 effectu sit similitudo formae agentis. Si ergo agens sit contentum | |
| 1531 in eadem specie cum suo effectu, erit similitudo inter faciens et | |
| 1532 factum in forma, secundum eandem rationem speciei; sicut homo | |
| 1533 generat hominem. Si autem agens non sit contentum in eadem specie, | |
| 1534 erit similitudo, sed non secundum eandem rationem speciei, sicut ea | |
| 1535 quae generantur ex virtute solis, accedunt quidem ad aliquam | |
| 1536 similitudinem solis, non tamen ut recipiant formam solis secundum | |
| 1537 similitudinem speciei, sed secundum similitudinem generis. Si | |
| 1538 igitur sit aliquod agens, quod non in genere contineatur, effectus | |
| 1539 eius adhuc magis accedent remote ad similitudinem formae agentis, | |
| 1540 non tamen ita quod participent similitudinem formae agentis | |
| 1541 secundum eandem rationem speciei aut generis, sed secundum | |
| 1542 aliqualem analogiam, sicut ipsum esse est commune omnibus. Et hoc | |
| 1543 modo illa quae sunt a Deo, assimilantur ei inquantum sunt entia, ut | |
| 1544 primo et universali principio totius esse.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q4_A3-p8"> | |
| 1545 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As Dionysius says (Div. Nom. ix), when Holy Writ declares that nothing is like God, it does not mean to deny all likeness | |
| 1546 to Him. For, "the same things can be like and unlike to God: like, according as they imitate Him, as far as He, Who is not | |
| 1547 perfectly imitable, can be imitated; unlike according as they fall short of their cause," not merely in intensity and remission, | |
| 1548 as that which is less white falls short of that which is more white; but because | |
| 1549 they are not in agreement, specifically or generically. | |
| 1550 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 4 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="28404" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28404] Iª q. 4 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo | |
| 1551 dicendum quod, sicut dicit Dionysius cap. IX de Div. Nom., cum | |
| 1552 sacra Scriptura dicit aliquid non esse simile Deo, <i>non est | |
| 1553 contrarium assimilationi ad ipsum. Eadem enim sunt similia Deo, et | |
| 1554 dissimilia, similia quidem secundum quod imitantur ipsum, prout | |
| 1555 contingit eum imitari qui non perfecte imitabilis est dissimilia | |
| 1556 vero, secundum quod deficiunt a sua causa</i>; non solum secundum | |
| 1557 intensionem et remissionem, sicut minus album deficit a magis albo; | |
| 1558 sed quia non est convenientia nec secundum speciem nec secundum | |
| 1559 genus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q4_A3-p9"> | |
| 1560 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> God is not related to creatures as though belonging to a different "genus," but as transcending every "genus," and as the | |
| 1561 principle of all "genera." | |
| 1562 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 4 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="28405" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28405] Iª q. 4 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 1563 dicendum quod Deus non se habet ad creaturas sicut res diversorum | |
| 1564 generum, sed sicut id quod est extra omne genus, et principium | |
| 1565 omnium generum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q4_A3-p10"> | |
| 1566 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Likeness of creatures to God is not affirmed on account of agreement in form according to the formality of the same genus | |
| 1567 or species, but solely according to analogy, inasmuch as God is essential being, whereas other things are beings by participation. | |
| 1568 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 4 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="28406" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28406] Iª q. 4 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum | |
| 1569 quod non dicitur esse similitudo creaturae ad Deum propter | |
| 1570 communicantiam in forma secundum eandem rationem generis et | |
| 1571 speciei, sed secundum analogiam tantum; prout scilicet Deus est ens | |
| 1572 per essentiam, et alia per participationem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q4_A3-p11"> | |
| 1573 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Although it may be admitted that creatures are in some sort like God, it must nowise be admitted that God is like creatures; | |
| 1574 because, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. ix): "A mutual likeness may be found between things of the same order, but not between | |
| 1575 a cause and that which is caused." For, we say that a statue is like a man, but not conversely; so also a creature can be | |
| 1576 spoken of as in some sort like God; but not that God is like a creature. | |
| 1577 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 4 a. 3 ad 4"><a name="28407" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28407] Iª q. 4 a. 3 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum dicendum | |
| 1578 quod, licet aliquo modo concedatur quod creatura sit similis Deo, | |
| 1579 nullo tamen modo concedendum est quod Deus sit similis creaturae, | |
| 1580 quia, ut dicit Dionysius cap. IX de Div. Nom., <i>in his quae unius | |
| 1581 ordinis sunt, recipitur mutua similitudo, non autem in causa et | |
| 1582 causato</i>, dicimus enim quod imago sit similis homini, et non e | |
| 1583 converso. Et similiter dici potest aliquo modo quod creatura sit | |
| 1584 similis Deo, non tamen quod Deus sit similis creaturae.</p></div></div></div></div> | |
| 1585 <div id="FP_Q5" class="div3"> | |
| 1586 <h3 id="FP_Q5-p0.1">Q. 5. OF GOODNESS IN GENERAL (SIX ARTICLES)</h3> | |
| 1587 <div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> | |
| 1588 <p id="FP_Q5-p2"> We next consider goodness: First, goodness in general. Secondly, the goodness of God.</p><p id="FP_Q5-p3"> Under the first head there are six points of inquiry:</p><p id="FP_Q5-p4"> (1) Whether goodness and being are the same really?</p><p id="FP_Q5-p5"> (2) Granted that they differ only in idea, which is prior in thought?</p><p id="FP_Q5-p6"> (3) Granted that being is prior, whether every being is good?</p><p id="FP_Q5-p7"> (4) To what cause should goodness be reduced?</p><p id="FP_Q5-p8"> (5) Whether goodness consists in mode, species, and order?</p><p id="FP_Q5-p9"> (6) Whether goodness is divided into the virtuous, the useful, and the pleasant?</p> | |
| 1589 </div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 5 pr."><a name="28408" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28408] | |
| 1590 Iª q. 5 pr.</span></a> Deinde quaeritur de bono, et primo de | |
| 1591 bono in communi; secundo de bonitate Dei. Circa primum quaeruntur | |
| 1592 sex. Primo, utrum bonum et ens sint idem secundum rem. Secundo, | |
| 1593 supposito quod differant ratione tantum, quid sit prius secundum | |
| 1594 rationem, utrum bonum vel ens. Tertio, supposito quod ens sit | |
| 1595 prius, utrum omne ens sit bonum. Quarto, ad quam causam ratio boni | |
| 1596 reducatur. Quinto, utrum ratio boni consistat in modo, specie et | |
| 1597 ordine. Sexto, quomodo dividatur bonum in honestum, utile et | |
| 1598 delectabile.</p></div></div></div> | |
| 1599 <div id="FP_Q5_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q5_A1-p0.1">Q. 5. A. 1. Whether goodness differs really from being?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q5_A1-p2"> | |
| 1600 <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that goodness differs really from being. For Boethius says (De Hebdom.): "I perceive that in nature the fact that | |
| 1601 things are good is one thing: that they are is another." Therefore goodness and being really differ. | |
| 1602 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 5 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="28409" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28409] Iª q. 5 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum sic | |
| 1603 proceditur. Videtur quod bonum differat secundum rem ab ente. Dicit | |
| 1604 enim Boetius, in libro de Hebdom., <i>intueor in rebus aliud esse | |
| 1605 quod sunt bona, et aliud esse quod sunt</i>. Ergo bonum et ens | |
| 1606 differunt secundum rem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q5_A1-p3"> | |
| 1607 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, nothing can be its own form. "But that is called good which has the form of being", according to the commentary | |
| 1608 on De Causis. Therefore goodness differs really from being. | |
| 1609 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 5 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="28410" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28410] Iª q. 5 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, nihil | |
| 1610 informatur seipso. Sed bonum dicitur per informationem entis, ut | |
| 1611 habetur in commento libri de causis. Ergo bonum differt secundum | |
| 1612 rem ab ente.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q5_A1-p4"> | |
| 1613 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, goodness can be more or less. But being cannot be more or less. Therefore goodness differs really from being. | |
| 1614 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 5 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="28411" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28411] Iª q. 5 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, bonum | |
| 1615 suscipit magis et minus. Esse autem non suscipit magis et minus. | |
| 1616 Ergo bonum differt secundum rem ab ente.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q5_A1-p5"> | |
| 1617 <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 42) that, "inasmuch as we exist we are good." | |
| 1618 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 5 a. 1 s. c."><a name="28412" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28412] Iª q. 5 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est | |
| 1619 quod Augustinus dicit, in libro de doctrina Christiana, quod | |
| 1620 <i>inquantum sumus, boni sumus</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q5_A1-p6"> | |
| 1621 <b>I answer that,</b> Goodness and being are really the same, and differ only in idea; which is clear from the following argument. The essence | |
| 1622 of goodness consists in this, that it is in some way desirable. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. i): "Goodness is what all | |
| 1623 desire." Now it is clear that a thing is desirable only in so far as it is perfect; for all desire their own perfection. But | |
| 1624 everything is perfect so far as it is actual. Therefore it is clear that a thing is perfect | |
| 1625 so far as it exists; for it is existence that makes all things actual, as is clear from the foregoing ( | |
| 1626 <a id="FP_Q5_A1-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q3_A4.html">Q[3], A[4]</a>; | |
| 1627 <a id="FP_Q5_A1-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q4_A1.html">Q[4], A[1]</a>). Hence it is clear that goodness and being are the same really. But goodness presents the aspect of desirableness, which | |
| 1628 being does not present. | |
| 1629 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 5 a. 1 co."><a name="28413" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28413] Iª q. 5 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum | |
| 1630 quod bonum et ens sunt idem secundum rem, sed differunt secundum | |
| 1631 rationem tantum. Quod sic patet. Ratio enim boni in hoc consistit, | |
| 1632 quod aliquid sit appetibile, unde philosophus, in I Ethic., dicit | |
| 1633 quod <i>bonum est quod omnia appetunt</i>. Manifestum est autem | |
| 1634 quod unumquodque est appetibile secundum quod est perfectum, nam | |
| 1635 omnia appetunt suam perfectionem. Intantum est autem perfectum | |
| 1636 unumquodque, inquantum est actu, unde manifestum est quod intantum | |
| 1637 est aliquid bonum, inquantum est ens, esse enim est actualitas | |
| 1638 omnis rei, ut ex superioribus patet. Unde manifestum est quod bonum | |
| 1639 et ens sunt idem secundum rem, sed bonum dicit rationem | |
| 1640 appetibilis, quam non dicit ens.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q5_A1-p7"> | |
| 1641 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Although goodness and being are the same really, nevertheless since they differ in thought, they are not predicated of a | |
| 1642 thing absolutely in the same way. Since being properly signifies that something actually is, and actuality properly correlates | |
| 1643 to potentiality; a thing is, in consequence, said simply to have being, accordingly as it is primarily distinguished from | |
| 1644 that which is only in potentiality; and this is precisely each thing's substantial | |
| 1645 being. Hence by its substantial being, everything is said to have being simply; but by any further actuality it is said to | |
| 1646 have being relatively. Thus to be white implies relative being, for to be white does not take a thing out of simply potential | |
| 1647 being; because only a thing that actually has being can receive this mode of being. But goodness signifies perfection which | |
| 1648 is desirable; and consequently of ultimate perfection. Hence that which has ultimate perfection is said to be simply good; | |
| 1649 but | |
| 1650 that which has not the ultimate perfection it ought to have (although, in so far as it is at all actual, it has some perfection), | |
| 1651 is not said to be perfect simply nor good simply, but only relatively. In this way, therefore, viewed in its primal (i.e. | |
| 1652 substantial) being a thing is said to be simply, and to be good relatively (i.e. in so far as it has being) but viewed in | |
| 1653 its complete actuality, a thing is said to be relatively, and to be good simply. Hence the saying of Boethius (De Hebrom.), | |
| 1654 "I perceive that in nature the fact that things are good is one thing; that they are is another," is to be referred to a thing's | |
| 1655 goodness simply, and having being simply. Because, regarded in its primal actuality, a thing simply exists; and regarded in | |
| 1656 its complete actuality, it is good simply---in such sort that even in its primal actuality, it is in some sort good, and even | |
| 1657 in its complete actuality, it in some sort has being. | |
| 1658 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 5 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="28414" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28414] Iª q. 5 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo | |
| 1659 dicendum quod, licet bonum et ens sint idem secundum rem, quia | |
| 1660 tamen differunt secundum rationem, non eodem modo dicitur aliquid | |
| 1661 ens simpliciter, et bonum simpliciter. Nam cum ens dicat aliquid | |
| 1662 proprie esse in actu; actus autem proprie ordinem habeat ad | |
| 1663 potentiam; secundum hoc simpliciter aliquid dicitur ens, secundum | |
| 1664 quod primo discernitur ab eo quod est in potentia tantum. Hoc autem | |
| 1665 est esse substantiale rei uniuscuiusque; unde per suum esse | |
| 1666 substantiale dicitur unumquodque ens simpliciter. Per actus autem | |
| 1667 superadditos, dicitur aliquid esse secundum quid, sicut esse album | |
| 1668 significat esse secundum quid, non enim esse album aufert esse in | |
| 1669 potentia simpliciter, cum adveniat rei iam praeexistenti in actu. | |
| 1670 Sed bonum dicit rationem perfecti, quod est appetibile, et per | |
| 1671 consequens dicit rationem ultimi. Unde id quod est ultimo | |
| 1672 perfectum, dicitur bonum simpliciter. Quod autem non habet ultimam | |
| 1673 perfectionem quam debet habere, quamvis habeat aliquam perfectionem | |
| 1674 inquantum est actu, non tamen dicitur perfectum simpliciter, nec | |
| 1675 bonum simpliciter, sed secundum quid. Sic ergo secundum primum | |
| 1676 esse, quod est substantiale, dicitur aliquid ens simpliciter et | |
| 1677 bonum secundum quid, idest inquantum est ens, secundum vero ultimum | |
| 1678 actum dicitur aliquid ens secundum quid, et bonum simpliciter. Sic | |
| 1679 ergo quod dicit Boetius, quod <i>in rebus aliud est quod sunt bona, | |
| 1680 et aliud quod sunt</i>, referendum est ad esse bonum et ad esse | |
| 1681 simpliciter, quia secundum primum actum est aliquid ens | |
| 1682 simpliciter; et secundum ultimum, bonum simpliciter. Et tamen | |
| 1683 secundum primum actum est quodammodo bonum, et secundum ultimum | |
| 1684 actum est quodammodo ens.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q5_A1-p8"> | |
| 1685 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Goodness is a form so far as absolute goodness signifies complete actuality. | |
| 1686 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 5 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="28415" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28415] Iª q. 5 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 1687 dicendum quod bonum dicitur per informationem, prout accipitur | |
| 1688 bonum simpliciter, secundum ultimum actum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q5_A1-p9"> | |
| 1689 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Again, goodness is spoken of as more or less according to a thing's superadded actuality, for example, as to knowledge or | |
| 1690 virtue. | |
| 1691 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 5 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="28416" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28416] Iª q. 5 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Et similiter | |
| 1692 dicendum ad tertium, quod bonum dicitur secundum magis et minus, | |
| 1693 secundum actum supervenientem; puta secundum scientiam vel | |
| 1694 virtutem.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q5_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q5_A2-p0.1">Q. 5. A. 2. Whether goodness is prior in idea to being?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q5_A2-p2"> | |
| 1695 <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that goodness is prior in idea to being. For names are arranged according to the arrangement of the things signified | |
| 1696 by the names. But Dionysius (Div. Nom. iii) assigned the first place, amongst the other names of God, to His goodness rather | |
| 1697 than to His being. Therefore in idea goodness is prior to being. | |
| 1698 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 5 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="28417" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28417] Iª q. 5 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum sic | |
| 1699 proceditur. Videtur quod bonum secundum rationem sit prius quam | |
| 1700 ens. Ordo enim nominum est secundum ordinem rerum significatarum | |
| 1701 per nomina. Sed Dionysius, inter alia nomina Dei, prius ponit bonum | |
| 1702 quam ens, ut patet, in III cap. de Div. Nom. Ergo bonum secundum | |
| 1703 rationem est prius quam ens.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q5_A2-p3"> | |
| 1704 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, that which is the more extensive is prior in idea. But goodness is more extensive than being, because, as Dionysius | |
| 1705 notes (Div. Nom. v), "goodness extends to things both existing and non-existing; whereas existence extends to existing things | |
| 1706 alone." Therefore goodness is in idea prior to being. | |
| 1707 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 5 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="28418" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28418] Iª q. 5 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, illud | |
| 1708 est prius secundum rationem, quod ad plura se extendit. Sed bonum | |
| 1709 ad plura se extendit quam ens, quia, ut dicit Dionysius, V cap. de | |
| 1710 Div. Nom., <i>bonum se extendit ad existentia et non existentia, | |
| 1711 ens vero ad existentia tantum</i>. Ergo bonum est prius secundum | |
| 1712 rationem quam ens.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q5_A2-p4"> | |
| 1713 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, what is the more universal is prior in idea. But goodness seems to be more universal than being, since goodness | |
| 1714 has the aspect of desirable; whereas to some non-existence is desirable; for it is said of Judas: "It were better for him, | |
| 1715 if that man had not been born" ( | |
| 1716 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q5_A2-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.26.24" target="asv">Mat. 26:24</a>). Therefore in idea goodness is prior to being. | |
| 1717 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 5 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="28419" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28419] Iª q. 5 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, quod | |
| 1718 est universalius, est prius secundum rationem. Sed bonum videtur | |
| 1719 universalius esse quam ens, quia bonum habet rationem appetibilis; | |
| 1720 quibusdam autem appetibile est ipsum non esse; dicitur enim, Matth. | |
| 1721 XXVI, de Iuda, <i>bonum erat ei, si natus non fuisset</i> et | |
| 1722 cetera. Ergo bonum est prius quam ens, secundum rationem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q5_A2-p5"> | |
| 1723 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, not only is existence desirable, but life, knowledge, and many other things besides. Thus it seems that existence | |
| 1724 is a particular appetible, and goodness a universal appetible. Therefore, absolutely, goodness is prior in idea to being. | |
| 1725 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 5 a. 2 arg. 4"><a name="28420" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28420] Iª q. 5 a. 2 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, non | |
| 1726 solum esse est appetibile, sed et vita et sapientia, et multa | |
| 1727 huiusmodi, et sic videtur quod esse sit quoddam particulare | |
| 1728 appetibile, et bonum, universale. Bonum ergo simpliciter est prius | |
| 1729 secundum rationem quam ens.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q5_A2-p6"> | |
| 1730 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is said by Aristotle (De Causis) that "the first of created things is being." | |
| 1731 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 5 a. 2 s. c."><a name="28421" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28421] Iª q. 5 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est | |
| 1732 quod dicitur in libro de causis, quod <i>prima rerum creatarum est | |
| 1733 esse</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q5_A2-p7"> | |
| 1734 <b>I answer that,</b> In idea being is prior to goodness. For the meaning signified by the name of a thing is that which the mind conceives of | |
| 1735 the thing and intends by the word that stands for it. Therefore, that is prior in idea, which is first conceived by the intellect. | |
| 1736 Now the first thing conceived by the intellect is being; because everything is knowable only inasmuch as it is in actuality. | |
| 1737 Hence, being is the proper object of the intellect, and is primarily intelligible; as | |
| 1738 sound is that which is primarily audible. Therefore in idea being is prior to goodness. | |
| 1739 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 5 a. 2 co."><a name="28422" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28422] Iª q. 5 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum | |
| 1740 quod ens secundum rationem est prius quam bonum. Ratio enim | |
| 1741 significata per nomen, est id quod concipit intellectus de re, et | |
| 1742 significat illud per vocem, illud ergo est prius secundum rationem, | |
| 1743 quod prius cadit in conceptione intellectus. Primo autem in | |
| 1744 conceptione intellectus cadit ens, quia secundum hoc unumquodque | |
| 1745 cognoscibile est, inquantum est actu, ut dicitur in IX Metaphys. | |
| 1746 Unde ens est proprium obiectum intellectus, et sic est primum | |
| 1747 intelligibile, sicut sonus est primum audibile. Ita ergo secundum | |
| 1748 rationem prius est ens quam bonum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q5_A2-p8"> | |
| 1749 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Dionysius discusses the Divine Names (Div. Nom. i, iii) as implying some causal relation in God; for we name God, as he says, | |
| 1750 from creatures, as a cause from its effects. But goodness, since it has the aspect of desirable, implies the idea of a final | |
| 1751 cause, the causality of which is first among causes, since an agent does not act except for some end; and by an agent matter | |
| 1752 is moved to its form. Hence the end is called the cause of causes. Thus | |
| 1753 goodness, as a cause, is prior to being, as is the end to the form. Therefore among the names signifying the divine causality, | |
| 1754 goodness precedes being. Again, according to the Platonists, who, through not distinguishing primary matter from privation, | |
| 1755 said that matter was non-being, goodness is more extensively participated than being; for primary matter participates in goodness | |
| 1756 as tending to it, for all seek their like; but it does not participate in being, since it is presumed to be non-being. | |
| 1757 Therefore Dionysius says that "goodness extends to non-existence" (Div. Nom. v). | |
| 1758 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 5 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="28423" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28423] Iª q. 5 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo | |
| 1759 dicendum quod Dionysius determinat de divinis nominibus secundum | |
| 1760 quod important circa Deum habitudinem causae, nominamus enim Deum, | |
| 1761 ut ipse dicit, ex creaturis, sicut causam ex effectibus. Bonum | |
| 1762 autem, cum habeat rationem appetibilis, importat habitudinem causae | |
| 1763 finalis, cuius causalitas prima est, quia agens non agit nisi | |
| 1764 propter finem, et ab agente materia movetur ad formam, unde dicitur | |
| 1765 quod finis est causa causarum. Et sic, in causando, bonum est prius | |
| 1766 quam ens, sicut finis quam forma, et hac ratione, inter nomina | |
| 1767 significantia causalitatem divinam, prius ponitur bonum quam ens. | |
| 1768 Et iterum quia, secundum Platonicos, qui, materiam a privatione non | |
| 1769 distinguentes, dicebant materiam esse non ens, ad plura se extendit | |
| 1770 participatio boni quam participatio entis. Nam materia prima | |
| 1771 participat bonum, cum appetat ipsum (nihil autem appetit nisi | |
| 1772 simile sibi), non autem participat ens, cum ponatur non ens. Et | |
| 1773 ideo dicit Dionysius quod <i>bonum extenditur ad non | |
| 1774 existentia</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q5_A2-p9"> | |
| 1775 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The same solution is applied to this objection. Or it may be said that goodness extends to existing and non-existing things, | |
| 1776 not so far as it can be predicated of them, but so far as it can cause them---if, indeed, by non-existence we understand not | |
| 1777 simply those things which do not exist, but those which are potential, and not actual. For goodness has the aspect of the | |
| 1778 end, in which not only actual things find their completion, but also towards which | |
| 1779 tend even those things which are not actual, but merely potential. Now being implies the habitude of a formal cause only, | |
| 1780 either inherent or exemplar; and its causality does not extend save to those things which are actual. | |
| 1781 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 5 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="28424" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28424] Iª q. 5 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Unde patet solutio | |
| 1782 ad secundum. Vel dicendum quod bonum extenditur ad existentia et | |
| 1783 non existentia, non secundum praedicationem, sed secundum | |
| 1784 causalitatem, ut per non existentia intelligamus, non ea | |
| 1785 simpliciter quae penitus non sunt, sed ea quae sunt in potentia et | |
| 1786 non in actu, quia bonum habet rationem finis, in quo non solum | |
| 1787 quiescunt quae sunt in actu, sed ad ipsum etiam ea moventur quae in | |
| 1788 actu non sunt sed in potentia tantum. Ens autem non importat | |
| 1789 habitudinem causae nisi formalis tantum, vel inhaerentis vel | |
| 1790 exemplaris, cuius causalitas non se extendit nisi ad ea quae sunt | |
| 1791 in actu.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q5_A2-p10"> | |
| 1792 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Non-being is desirable, not of itself, but only relatively---i.e. inasmuch as the removal of an evil, which can only be removed | |
| 1793 by non-being, is desirable. Now the removal of an evil cannot be desirable, except so far as this evil deprives a thing of | |
| 1794 some being. Therefore being is desirable of itself; and non-being only relatively, inasmuch as one seeks some mode of being | |
| 1795 of which one cannot bear to be deprived; thus even non-being can be spoken of as | |
| 1796 relatively good. | |
| 1797 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 5 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="28425" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28425] Iª q. 5 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum | |
| 1798 quod non esse secundum se non est appetibile, sed per accidens, | |
| 1799 inquantum scilicet ablatio alicuius mali est appetibilis, quod | |
| 1800 malum quidem aufertur per non esse. Ablatio vero mali non est | |
| 1801 appetibilis, nisi inquantum per malum privatur quodam esse. Illud | |
| 1802 igitur quod per se est appetibile, est esse, non esse vero per | |
| 1803 accidens tantum, inquantum scilicet quoddam esse appetitur, quo | |
| 1804 homo non sustinet privari. Et sic etiam per accidens non esse | |
| 1805 dicitur bonum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q5_A2-p11"> | |
| 1806 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Life, wisdom, and the like, are desirable only so far as they are actual. Hence, in each one of them some sort of being is | |
| 1807 desired. And thus nothing can be desired except being; and consequently nothing is good except being. | |
| 1808 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 5 a. 2 ad 4"><a name="28426" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28426] Iª q. 5 a. 2 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum dicendum | |
| 1809 quod vita et scientia, et alia huiusmodi, sic appetuntur ut sunt in | |
| 1810 actu, unde in omnibus appetitur quoddam esse. Et sic nihil est | |
| 1811 appetibile nisi ens, et per consequens nihil est bonum nisi | |
| 1812 ens.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q5_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q5_A3-p0.1">Q. 5. A. 3. Whether every being is good?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q5_A3-p2"> | |
| 1813 <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that not every being is good. For goodness is something superadded to being, as is clear from A[1]. But whatever | |
| 1814 is added to being limits it; as substance, quantity, quality, etc. Therefore goodness limits being. Therefore not every being | |
| 1815 is good. | |
| 1816 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 5 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="28427" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28427] Iª q. 5 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium sic | |
| 1817 proceditur. Videtur quod non omne ens sit bonum. Bonum enim addit | |
| 1818 supra ens, ut ex dictis patet. Ea vero quae addunt aliquid supra | |
| 1819 ens, contrahunt ipsum, sicut substantia, quantitas, qualitas, et | |
| 1820 alia huiusmodi. Ergo bonum contrahit ens. Non igitur omne ens est | |
| 1821 bonum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q5_A3-p3"> | |
| 1822 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, no evil is good: "Woe to you that call evil good and good evil" ( | |
| 1823 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q5_A3-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.5.20" target="asv">Is. 5:20</a>). But some things are called evil. Therefore not every being is good. | |
| 1824 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 5 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="28428" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28428] Iª q. 5 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, nullum | |
| 1825 malum est bonum, Isaiae V, <i>vae qui dicitis malum bonum, et bonum | |
| 1826 malum</i>. Sed aliquod ens dicitur malum. Ergo non omne ens est | |
| 1827 bonum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q5_A3-p4"> | |
| 1828 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, goodness implies desirability. Now primary matter does not imply desirability, but rather that which desires. Therefore | |
| 1829 primary matter does not contain the formality of goodness. Therefore not every being is good. | |
| 1830 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 5 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="28429" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28429] Iª q. 5 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, bonum | |
| 1831 habet rationem appetibilis. Sed materia prima non habet rationem | |
| 1832 appetibilis, sed appetentis tantum. Ergo materia prima non habet | |
| 1833 rationem boni. Non igitur omne ens est bonum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q5_A3-p5"> | |
| 1834 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, the Philosopher notes (Metaph. iii) that "in mathematics goodness does not exist." But mathematics are entities; | |
| 1835 otherwise there would be no science of mathematics. Therefore not every being is good. | |
| 1836 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 5 a. 3 arg. 4"><a name="28430" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28430] Iª q. 5 a. 3 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 1837 philosophus dicit, in III Metaphys., quod in mathematicis non est | |
| 1838 bonum. Sed mathematica sunt quaedam entia, alioquin de eis non | |
| 1839 esset scientia. Ergo non omne ens est bonum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q5_A3-p6"> | |
| 1840 <b>On the contrary,</b> Every being that is not God is God's creature. Now every creature of God is good ( | |
| 1841 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q5_A3-p6.1" href="./asv.html#iTim.4.4" target="asv">1 Tim. 4:4</a>): and God is the greatest good. Therefore every being is good. | |
| 1842 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 5 a. 3 s. c."><a name="28431" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28431] Iª q. 5 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra, omne | |
| 1843 ens quod non est Deus, est Dei creatura. Sed omnis creatura Dei est | |
| 1844 bona, ut dicitur I ad Tim., IV cap., Deus vero est maxime bonus. | |
| 1845 Ergo omne ens est bonum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q5_A3-p7"> | |
| 1846 <b>I answer that,</b> Every being, as being, is good. For all being, as being, has actuality and is in some way perfect; since every act implies | |
| 1847 some sort of perfection; and perfection implies desirability and goodness, as is clear from A[1]. Hence it follows that every | |
| 1848 being as such is good. | |
| 1849 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 5 a. 3 co."><a name="28432" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28432] Iª q. 5 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum | |
| 1850 quod omne ens, inquantum est ens, est bonum. Omne enim ens, | |
| 1851 inquantum est ens, est in actu, et quodammodo perfectum, quia omnis | |
| 1852 actus perfectio quaedam est. Perfectum vero habet rationem | |
| 1853 appetibilis et boni, ut ex dictis patet. Unde sequitur omne ens, | |
| 1854 inquantum huiusmodi, bonum esse.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q5_A3-p8"> | |
| 1855 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Substance, quantity, quality, and everything included in them, limit being by applying it to some essence or nature. Now | |
| 1856 in this sense, goodness does not add anything to being beyond the aspect of desirability and perfection, which is also proper | |
| 1857 to being, whatever kind of nature it may be. Hence goodness does not limit being. | |
| 1858 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 5 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="28433" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28433] Iª q. 5 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo | |
| 1859 dicendum quod substantia, quantitas et qualitas, et ea quae sub eis | |
| 1860 continentur, contrahunt ens applicando ens ad aliquam quidditatem | |
| 1861 seu naturam. Sic autem non addit aliquid bonum super ens, sed | |
| 1862 rationem tantum appetibilis et perfectionis, quod convenit ipsi | |
| 1863 esse in quacumque natura sit. Unde bonum non contrahit ens.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q5_A3-p9"> | |
| 1864 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> No being can be spoken of as evil, formally as being, but only so far as it lacks being. Thus a man is said to be evil, because | |
| 1865 he lacks some virtue; and an eye is said to be evil, because it lacks the power to see well. | |
| 1866 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 5 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="28434" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28434] Iª q. 5 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 1867 dicendum quod nullum ens dicitur malum inquantum est ens, sed | |
| 1868 inquantum caret quodam esse, sicut homo dicitur malus inquantum | |
| 1869 caret esse virtutis, et oculus dicitur malus inquantum caret | |
| 1870 acumine visus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q5_A3-p10"> | |
| 1871 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As primary matter has only potential being, so it is only potentially good. Although, according to the Platonists, primary | |
| 1872 matter may be said to be a non-being on account of the privation attaching to it, nevertheless, it does participate to a certain | |
| 1873 extent in goodness, viz. by its relation to, or aptitude for, goodness. Consequently, to be desirable is not its property, | |
| 1874 but to desire. | |
| 1875 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 5 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="28435" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28435] Iª q. 5 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum | |
| 1876 quod materia prima, sicut non est ens nisi in potentia, ita nec | |
| 1877 bonum nisi in potentia. Licet, secundum Platonicos, dici possit | |
| 1878 quod materia prima est non ens, propter privationem adiunctam. Sed | |
| 1879 tamen participat aliquid de bono, scilicet ipsum ordinem vel | |
| 1880 aptitudinem ad bonum. Et ideo non convenit sibi quod sit | |
| 1881 appetibile, sed quod appetat.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q5_A3-p11"> | |
| 1882 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Mathematical entities do not subsist as realities; because they would be in some sort good if they subsisted; but they have | |
| 1883 only logical existence, inasmuch as they are abstracted from motion and matter; thus they cannot have the aspect of an end, | |
| 1884 which itself has the aspect of moving another. Nor is it repugnant that there should be in some logical entity neither goodness | |
| 1885 nor form of goodness; since the idea of being is prior to the idea of goodness, | |
| 1886 as was said in the preceding article. | |
| 1887 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 5 a. 3 ad 4"><a name="28436" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28436] Iª q. 5 a. 3 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum dicendum | |
| 1888 quod mathematica non subsistunt separata secundum esse, quia si | |
| 1889 subsisterent, esset in eis bonum, scilicet ipsum esse ipsorum. Sunt | |
| 1890 autem mathematica separata secundum rationem tantum, prout | |
| 1891 abstrahuntur a motu et a materia, et sic abstrahuntur a ratione | |
| 1892 finis, qui habet rationem moventis. Non est autem inconveniens quod | |
| 1893 in aliquo ente secundum rationem non sit bonum vel ratio boni, cum | |
| 1894 ratio entis sit prior quam ratio boni, sicut supra dictum est.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q5_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q5_A4-p0.1">Q. 5. A. 4. Whether goodness has the aspect of a final cause?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q5_A4-p2"> | |
| 1895 <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that goodness has not the aspect of a final cause, but rather of the other causes. For, as Dionysius says (Div. | |
| 1896 Nom. iv), "Goodness is praised as beauty." But beauty has the aspect of a formal cause. Therefore goodness has the aspect | |
| 1897 of a formal cause. | |
| 1898 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 5 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="28437" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28437] Iª q. 5 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum sic | |
| 1899 proceditur. Videtur quod bonum non habeat rationem causae finalis, | |
| 1900 sed magis aliarum. Ut enim dicit Dionysius, IV cap. de Div. Nom., | |
| 1901 <i>bonum laudatur ut pulchrum</i>. Sed pulchrum importat rationem | |
| 1902 causae formalis. Ergo bonum habet rationem causae formalis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q5_A4-p3"> | |
| 1903 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, goodness is self-diffusive; for Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that goodness is that whereby all things subsist, | |
| 1904 and are. But to be self-giving implies the aspect of an efficient cause. Therefore goodness has the aspect of an efficient | |
| 1905 cause. | |
| 1906 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 5 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="28438" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28438] Iª q. 5 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, bonum | |
| 1907 est diffusivum sui esse, ut ex verbis Dionysii accipitur, quibus | |
| 1908 dicit quod <i>bonum est ex quo omnia subsistunt et sunt</i>. Sed | |
| 1909 esse diffusivum importat rationem causae efficientis. Ergo bonum | |
| 1910 habet rationem causae efficientis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q5_A4-p4"> | |
| 1911 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 31) that "we exist because God is good." But we owe our existence to God as | |
| 1912 the efficient cause. Therefore goodness implies the aspect of an efficient cause. | |
| 1913 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 5 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="28439" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28439] Iª q. 5 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, dicit | |
| 1914 Augustinus in I de Doctr. Christ., quod <i>quia Deus bonus est, nos | |
| 1915 sumus</i>. Sed ex Deo sumus sicut ex causa efficiente. Ergo bonum | |
| 1916 importat rationem causae efficientis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q5_A4-p5"> | |
| 1917 <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Phys. ii) that "that is to be considered as the end and the good of other things, for the sake of which | |
| 1918 something is." Therefore goodness has the aspect of a final cause. | |
| 1919 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 5 a. 4 s. c."><a name="28440" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28440] Iª q. 5 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est | |
| 1920 quod philosophus dicit, in II Physic., quod <i>illud cuius causa | |
| 1921 est, est sicut finis et bonum aliorum</i>. Bonum ergo habet | |
| 1922 rationem causae finalis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q5_A4-p6"> | |
| 1923 <b>I answer that,</b> Since goodness is that which all things desire, and since this has the aspect of an end, it is clear that goodness implies | |
| 1924 the aspect of an end. Nevertheless, the idea of goodness presupposes the idea of an efficient cause, and also of a formal | |
| 1925 cause. For we see that what is first in causing, is last in the thing caused. Fire, e.g. heats first of all before it reproduces | |
| 1926 the form of fire; though the heat in the fire follows from its substantial form. Now in | |
| 1927 causing, goodness and the end come first, both of which move the agent to act; secondly, the action of the agent moving to | |
| 1928 the form; thirdly, comes the form. Hence in that which is caused the converse ought to take place, so that there should be | |
| 1929 first, the form whereby it is a being; secondly, we consider in it its effective power, whereby it is perfect in being, for | |
| 1930 a thing is perfect when it can reproduce its like, as the Philosopher says (Meteor. iv); thirdly, there follows the formality | |
| 1931 of | |
| 1932 goodness which is the basic principle of its perfection. | |
| 1933 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 5 a. 4 co."><a name="28441" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28441] Iª q. 5 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum | |
| 1934 quod, cum bonum sit quod omnia appetunt, hoc autem habet rationem | |
| 1935 finis; manifestum est quod bonum rationem finis importat. Sed tamen | |
| 1936 ratio boni praesupponit rationem causae efficientis, et rationem | |
| 1937 causae formalis. Videmus enim quod id quod est primum in causando, | |
| 1938 ultimum est in causato, ignis enim primo calefacit quam formam | |
| 1939 ignis inducat, cum tamen calor in igne consequatur formam | |
| 1940 substantialem. In causando autem, primum invenitur bonum et finis, | |
| 1941 qui movet efficientem; secundo, actio efficientis, movens ad | |
| 1942 formam; tertio advenit forma. Unde e converso esse oportet in | |
| 1943 causato, quod primum sit ipsa forma, per quam est ens; secundo | |
| 1944 consideratur in ea virtus effectiva, secundum quod est perfectum in | |
| 1945 esse (quia unumquodque tunc perfectum est, quando potest sibi | |
| 1946 simile facere, ut dicit philosophus in IV Meteor.); tertio | |
| 1947 consequitur ratio boni, per quam in ente perfectio fundatur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q5_A4-p7"> | |
| 1948 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Beauty and goodness in a thing are identical fundamentally; for they are based upon the same thing, namely, the form; and | |
| 1949 consequently goodness is praised as beauty. But they differ logically, for goodness properly relates to the appetite (goodness | |
| 1950 being what all things desire); and therefore it has the aspect of an end (the appetite being a kind of movement towards a | |
| 1951 thing). On the other hand, beauty relates to the cognitive faculty; for beautiful | |
| 1952 things are those which please when seen. Hence beauty consists in due proportion; for the senses delight in things duly proportioned, | |
| 1953 as in what is after their own kind---because even sense is a sort of reason, just as is every cognitive faculty. Now since | |
| 1954 knowledge is by assimilation, and similarity relates to form, beauty properly belongs to the nature of a formal cause. | |
| 1955 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 5 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="28442" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28442] Iª q. 5 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo | |
| 1956 dicendum quod pulchrum et bonum in subiecto quidem sunt idem, quia | |
| 1957 super eandem rem fundantur, scilicet super formam, et propter hoc, | |
| 1958 bonum laudatur ut pulchrum. Sed ratione differunt. Nam bonum | |
| 1959 proprie respicit appetitum, est enim bonum quod omnia appetunt. Et | |
| 1960 ideo habet rationem finis, nam appetitus est quasi quidam motus ad | |
| 1961 rem. Pulchrum autem respicit vim cognoscitivam, pulchra enim | |
| 1962 dicuntur quae visa placent. Unde pulchrum in debita proportione | |
| 1963 consistit, quia sensus delectatur in rebus debite proportionatis, | |
| 1964 sicut in sibi similibus; nam et sensus ratio quaedam est, et omnis | |
| 1965 virtus cognoscitiva. Et quia cognitio fit per assimilationem, | |
| 1966 similitudo autem respicit formam, pulchrum proprie pertinet ad | |
| 1967 rationem causae formalis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q5_A4-p8"> | |
| 1968 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Goodness is described as self-diffusive in the sense that an end is said to move. | |
| 1969 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 5 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="28443" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28443] Iª q. 5 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 1970 dicendum quod bonum dicitur diffusivum sui esse, eo modo quo finis | |
| 1971 dicitur movere.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q5_A4-p9"> | |
| 1972 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> He who has a will is said to be good, so far as he has a good will; because it is by our will that we employ whatever powers | |
| 1973 we may have. Hence a man is said to be good, not by his good understanding; but by his good will. Now the will relates to | |
| 1974 the end as to its proper object. Thus the saying, "we exist because God is good" has reference to the final cause. | |
| 1975 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 5 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="28444" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28444] Iª q. 5 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum | |
| 1976 quod quilibet habens voluntatem, dicitur bonus inquantum habet | |
| 1977 bonam voluntatem, quia per voluntatem utimur omnibus quae in nobis | |
| 1978 sunt. Unde non dicitur bonus homo, qui habet bonum intellectum, sed | |
| 1979 qui habet bonam voluntatem. Voluntas autem respicit finem ut | |
| 1980 obiectum proprium, et sic, quod dicitur, quia Deus est bonus, | |
| 1981 sumus, refertur ad causam finalem.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q5_A5" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q5_A5-p0.1">Q. 5. A. 5. Whether the essence of goodness consists in mode, species and order?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q5_A5-p2"> | |
| 1982 <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the essence of goodness does not consist in mode, species and order. For goodness and being differ logically. | |
| 1983 But mode, species and order seem to belong to the nature of being, for it is written: "Thou hast ordered all things in measure, | |
| 1984 and number, and weight" ( | |
| 1985 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q5_A5-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.11.21" target="asv">Wis. 11:21</a>). And to these three can be reduced species, mode and order, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. iv, 3): "Measure fixes the mode | |
| 1986 of everything, number gives it | |
| 1987 its species, and weight gives it rest and stability." Therefore the essence of goodness does not consist in mode, species | |
| 1988 and order. | |
| 1989 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 5 a. 5 arg. 1"><a name="28445" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28445] Iª q. 5 a. 5 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quintum sic | |
| 1990 proceditur. Videtur quod ratio boni non consistat in modo, specie | |
| 1991 et ordine. Bonum enim et ens ratione differunt, ut supra dictum | |
| 1992 est. Sed modus, species et ordo pertinere ad rationem entis | |
| 1993 videntur, quia, sicut dicitur Sap. XI, <i>omnia in numero, pondere | |
| 1994 et mensura disposuisti</i>, ad quae tria reducuntur species, modus | |
| 1995 et ordo, quia, ut dicit Augustinus, IV super Gen. ad litteram, | |
| 1996 <i>mensura omni rei modum praefigit, et numerus omni rei speciem | |
| 1997 praebet, et pondus omnem rem ad quietem et stabilitatem trahit</i>. | |
| 1998 Ergo ratio boni non consistit in modo, specie et ordine.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q5_A5-p3"> | |
| 1999 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, mode, species and order are themselves good. Therefore if the essence of goodness consists in mode, species and | |
| 2000 order, then every mode must have its own mode, species and order. The same would be the case with species and order in endless | |
| 2001 succession. | |
| 2002 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 5 a. 5 arg. 2"><a name="28446" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28446] Iª q. 5 a. 5 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, ipse | |
| 2003 modus, species et ordo bona quaedam sunt. Si ergo ratio boni | |
| 2004 consistit in modo, specie et ordine, oportet etiam quod modus | |
| 2005 habeat modum, speciem et ordinem, et similiter species et ordo. | |
| 2006 Ergo procederetur in infinitum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q5_A5-p4"> | |
| 2007 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, evil is the privation of mode, species and order. But evil is not the total absence of goodness. Therefore the essence | |
| 2008 of goodness does not consist in mode, species and order. | |
| 2009 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 5 a. 5 arg. 3"><a name="28447" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28447] Iª q. 5 a. 5 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, malum | |
| 2010 est privatio modi et speciei et ordinis. Sed malum non tollit | |
| 2011 totaliter bonum. Ergo ratio boni non consistit in modo, specie et | |
| 2012 ordine.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q5_A5-p5"> | |
| 2013 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, that wherein consists the essence of goodness cannot be spoken of as evil. Yet we can speak of an evil mode, species | |
| 2014 and order. Therefore the essence of goodness does not consist in mode, species and order. | |
| 2015 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 5 a. 5 arg. 4"><a name="28448" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28448] Iª q. 5 a. 5 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, illud | |
| 2016 in quo consistit ratio boni, non potest dici malum. Sed dicitur | |
| 2017 malus modus, mala species, malus ordo. Ergo ratio boni non | |
| 2018 consistit in modo, specie et ordine.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q5_A5-p6"> | |
| 2019 <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, mode, species and order are caused by weight, number and measure, as appears from the quotation from Augustine. | |
| 2020 But not every good thing has weight, number and measure; for Ambrose says (Hexam. i, 9): "It is of the nature of light not | |
| 2021 to have been created in number, weight and measure." Therefore the essence of goodness does not consist in mode, species and | |
| 2022 order. | |
| 2023 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 5 a. 5 arg. 5"><a name="28449" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28449] Iª q. 5 a. 5 arg. 5</span></a> Praeterea, modus, | |
| 2024 species et ordo ex pondere, numero et mensura causantur, ut ex | |
| 2025 auctoritate Augustini inducta patet. Non autem omnia bona habent | |
| 2026 pondus, numerum et mensuram, dicit enim Ambrosius, in Hexaemeron, | |
| 2027 quod <i>lucis natura est, ut non in numero, non in pondere, non in | |
| 2028 mensura creata sit</i>. Non ergo ratio boni consistit in modo, | |
| 2029 specie et ordine.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q5_A5-p7"> | |
| 2030 <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Nat. Boni. iii): "These three---mode, species and order---as common good things, are in everything God | |
| 2031 has made; thus, where these three abound the things are very good; where they are less, the things are less good; where they | |
| 2032 do not exist at all, there can be nothing good." But this would not be unless the essence of goodness consisted in them. Therefore | |
| 2033 the essence of goodness consists in mode, species and order. | |
| 2034 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 5 a. 5 s. c."><a name="28450" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28450] Iª q. 5 a. 5 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est | |
| 2035 quod dicit Augustinus, in libro de natura boni, <i>haec tria, | |
| 2036 modus, species et ordo, tanquam generalia bona sunt in rebus a Deo | |
| 2037 factis, et ita, haec tria ubi magna sunt, magna bona sunt; ubi | |
| 2038 parva, parva bona sunt; ubi nulla, nullum bonum est</i>. Quod non | |
| 2039 esset, nisi ratio boni in eis consisteret. Ergo ratio boni | |
| 2040 consistit in modo, specie et ordine.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q5_A5-p8"> | |
| 2041 <b>I answer that,</b> Everything is said to be good so far as it is perfect; for in that way only is it desirable (as shown above | |
| 2042 <a id="FP_Q5_A5-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q5_A1.html">AA[1]</a>,3). Now a thing is said to be perfect if it lacks nothing according to the mode of its perfection. But since everything is | |
| 2043 what it is by its form (and since the form presupposes certain things, and from the form certain things necessarily follow), | |
| 2044 in order for a thing to be perfect and good it must have a form, together | |
| 2045 with all that precedes and follows upon that form. Now the form presupposes determination or commensuration of its principles, | |
| 2046 whether material or efficient, and this is signified by the mode: hence it is said that the measure marks the mode. But the | |
| 2047 form itself is signified by the species; for everything is placed in its species by its form. Hence the number is said to | |
| 2048 give the species, for definitions signifying species are like numbers, according to the Philosopher (Metaph. x); for as a | |
| 2049 unit | |
| 2050 added to, or taken from a number, changes its species, so a difference added to, or taken from a definition, changes its species. | |
| 2051 Further, upon the form follows an inclination to the end, or to an action, or something of the sort; for everything, in so | |
| 2052 far as it is in act, acts and tends towards that which is in accordance with its form; and this belongs to weight and order. | |
| 2053 Hence the essence of goodness, so far as it consists in perfection, consists also in mode, species and order. | |
| 2054 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 5 a. 5 co."><a name="28451" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28451] Iª q. 5 a. 5 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum | |
| 2055 quod unumquodque dicitur bonum, inquantum est perfectum, sic enim | |
| 2056 est appetibile, ut supra dictum est. Perfectum autem dicitur, cui | |
| 2057 nihil deest secundum modum suae perfectionis. Cum autem unumquodque | |
| 2058 sit id quod est, per suam formam; forma autem praesupponit quaedam, | |
| 2059 et quaedam ad ipsam ex necessitate consequuntur; ad hoc quod | |
| 2060 aliquid sit perfectum et bonum, necesse est quod formam habeat, et | |
| 2061 ea quae praeexiguntur ad eam, et ea quae consequuntur ad ipsam. | |
| 2062 Praeexigitur autem ad formam determinatio sive commensuratio | |
| 2063 principiorum, seu materialium, seu efficientium ipsam, et hoc | |
| 2064 significatur per modum, unde dicitur quod mensura modum praefigit. | |
| 2065 Ipsa autem forma significatur per speciem, quia per formam | |
| 2066 unumquodque in specie constituitur. Et propter hoc dicitur quod | |
| 2067 numerus speciem praebet, quia definitiones significantes speciem | |
| 2068 sunt sicut numeri, secundum philosophum in VIII Metaphys.; sicut | |
| 2069 enim unitas addita vel subtracta variat speciem numeri, ita in | |
| 2070 definitionibus differentia apposita vel subtracta. Ad formam autem | |
| 2071 consequitur inclinatio ad finem, aut ad actionem, aut ad aliquid | |
| 2072 huiusmodi, quia unumquodque, inquantum est actu, agit, et tendit in | |
| 2073 id quod sibi convenit secundum suam formam. Et hoc pertinet ad | |
| 2074 pondus et ordinem. Unde ratio boni, secundum quod consistit in | |
| 2075 perfectione, consistit etiam in modo, specie et ordine.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q5_A5-p9"> | |
| 2076 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> These three only follow upon being, so far as it is perfect, and according to this perfection is it good. | |
| 2077 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 5 a. 5 ad 1"><a name="28452" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28452] Iª q. 5 a. 5 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo | |
| 2078 dicendum quod ista tria non consequuntur ens, nisi inquantum est | |
| 2079 perfectum, et secundum hoc est bonum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q5_A5-p10"> | |
| 2080 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Mode, species and order are said to be good, and to be beings, not as though they themselves were subsistences, but because | |
| 2081 it is through them that other things are both beings and good. Hence they have no need of other things whereby they are good: | |
| 2082 for they are spoken of as good, not as though formally constituted so by something else, but as formally constituting others | |
| 2083 good: thus whiteness is not said to be a being as though it were by anything | |
| 2084 else; but because, by it, something else has accidental being, as an object that is white. | |
| 2085 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 5 a. 5 ad 2"><a name="28453" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28453] Iª q. 5 a. 5 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 2086 dicendum quod modus, species et ordo eo modo dicuntur bona, sicut | |
| 2087 et entia, non quia ipsa sint quasi subsistentia, sed quia eis alia | |
| 2088 sunt et entia et bona. Unde non oportet quod ipsa habeant aliqua | |
| 2089 alia, quibus sint bona. Non enim sic dicuntur bona, quasi | |
| 2090 formaliter aliis sint bona; sed quia ipsis formaliter aliqua sunt | |
| 2091 bona; sicut albedo non dicitur ens quia ipsa aliquo sit, sed quia | |
| 2092 ipsa aliquid est secundum quid, scilicet album.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q5_A5-p11"> | |
| 2093 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Every being is due to some form. Hence, according to every being of a thing is its mode, species, order. Thus, a man has | |
| 2094 a mode, species and order as he is white, virtuous, learned and so on; according to everything predicated of him. But evil | |
| 2095 deprives a thing of some sort of being, as blindness deprives us of that being which is sight; yet it does not destroy every | |
| 2096 mode, species and order, but only such as follow upon the being of sight. | |
| 2097 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 5 a. 5 ad 3"><a name="28454" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28454] Iª q. 5 a. 5 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum | |
| 2098 quod quodlibet esse est secundum formam aliquam, unde secundum | |
| 2099 quodlibet esse rei, consequuntur ipsam modus, species et ordo, | |
| 2100 sicut homo habet speciem, modum et ordinem, inquantum est homo; et | |
| 2101 similiter inquantum est albus, habet similiter modum, speciem et | |
| 2102 ordinem; et inquantum est virtuosus, et inquantum est sciens, et | |
| 2103 secundum omnia quae de ipso dicuntur. Malum autem privat quodam | |
| 2104 esse, sicut caecitas privat esse visus, unde non tollit omnem | |
| 2105 modum, speciem et ordinem; sed solum modum, speciem et ordinem quae | |
| 2106 consequuntur esse visus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q5_A5-p12"> | |
| 2107 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Augustine says (De Nat. Boni. xxiii), "Every mode, as mode, is good" (and the same can be said of species and order). "But | |
| 2108 an evil mode, species and order are so called as being less than they ought to be, or as not belonging to that which they | |
| 2109 ought to belong. Therefore they are called evil, because they are out of place and incongruous." | |
| 2110 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 5 a. 5 ad 4"><a name="28455" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28455] Iª q. 5 a. 5 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum dicendum | |
| 2111 quod, sicut dicit Augustinus in libro de natura boni, <i>omnis | |
| 2112 modus, inquantum modus, bonus est</i> (et sic potest dici de specie | |
| 2113 et ordine), <i>sed malus modus, vel mala species, vel malus ordo, | |
| 2114 aut ideo dicuntur quia minora sunt quam esse debuerunt; aut quia | |
| 2115 non his rebus accommodantur, quibus accommodanda sunt; ut ideo | |
| 2116 dicantur mala, quia sunt aliena et incongrua</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q5_A5-p13"> | |
| 2117 <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> The nature of light is spoken of as being without number, weight and measure, not absolutely, but in comparison with corporeal | |
| 2118 things, because the power of light extends to all corporeal things; inasmuch as it is an active quality of the first body | |
| 2119 that causes change, i.e. the heavens. | |
| 2120 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 5 a. 5 ad 5"><a name="28456" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28456] Iª q. 5 a. 5 ad 5</span></a> Ad quintum dicendum | |
| 2121 quod natura lucis dicitur esse sine numero et pondere et mensura, | |
| 2122 non simpliciter, sed per comparationem ad corporalia, quia virtus | |
| 2123 lucis ad omnia corporalia se extendit, inquantum est qualitas | |
| 2124 activa primi corporis alterantis, scilicet caeli.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q5_A6" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q5_A6-p0.1">Q. 5. A. 6. Whether goodness is rightly divided into the virtuous*, the useful and the pleasant? [*"Bonum honestum" is the virtuous good | |
| 2125 considered as fitting. (cf. SS, Q[141], A[3]; SS, Q[145])] | |
| 2126 </h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q5_A6-p2"> | |
| 2127 <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that goodness is not rightly divided into the virtuous, the useful and the pleasant. For goodness is divided by | |
| 2128 the ten predicaments, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. i). But the virtuous, the useful and the pleasant can be found under | |
| 2129 one predicament. Therefore goodness is not rightly divided by them. | |
| 2130 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 5 a. 6 arg. 1"><a name="28457" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28457] Iª q. 5 a. 6 arg. 1</span></a> Ad sextum sic | |
| 2131 proceditur. Videtur quod non convenienter dividatur bonum per | |
| 2132 honestum, utile et delectabile. Bonum enim, sicut dicit philosophus | |
| 2133 in I Ethic., dividitur per decem praedicamenta. Honestum autem, | |
| 2134 utile et delectabile inveniri possunt in uno praedicamento. Ergo | |
| 2135 non convenienter per haec dividitur bonum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q5_A6-p3"> | |
| 2136 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, every division is made by opposites. But these three do not seem to be opposites; for the virtuous is pleasing, | |
| 2137 and no wickedness is useful; whereas this ought to be the case if the division were made by opposites, for then the virtuous | |
| 2138 and the useful would be opposed; and Tully speaks of this (De Offic. ii). Therefore this division is incorrect. | |
| 2139 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 5 a. 6 arg. 2"><a name="28458" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28458] Iª q. 5 a. 6 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, omnis | |
| 2140 divisio fit per opposita. Sed haec tria non videntur esse opposita, | |
| 2141 nam honesta sunt delectabilia, nullumque inhonestum est utile (quod | |
| 2142 tamen oportet, si divisio fieret per opposita, ut opponerentur | |
| 2143 honestum et utile), ut etiam dicit Tullius, in libro de officiis. | |
| 2144 Ergo praedicta divisio non est conveniens.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q5_A6-p4"> | |
| 2145 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, where one thing is on account of another, there is only one thing. But the useful is not goodness, except so far | |
| 2146 as it is pleasing and virtuous. Therefore the useful ought not to divided against the pleasant and the virtuous. | |
| 2147 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 5 a. 6 arg. 3"><a name="28459" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28459] Iª q. 5 a. 6 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, ubi | |
| 2148 unum propter alterum, ibi unum tantum est. Sed utile non est bonum | |
| 2149 nisi propter delectabile vel honestum. Ergo non debet utile dividi | |
| 2150 contra delectabile et honestum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q5_A6-p5"> | |
| 2151 <b>On the contrary,</b> Ambrose makes use of this division of goodness (De Offic. i, 9) | |
| 2152 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 5 a. 6 s. c."><a name="28460" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28460] Iª q. 5 a. 6 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est | |
| 2153 quod Ambrosius, in libro de officiis, utitur ista divisione | |
| 2154 boni.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q5_A6-p6"> | |
| 2155 <b>I answer that,</b> This division properly concerns human goodness. But if we consider the nature of goodness from a higher and more universal | |
| 2156 point of view, we shall find that this division properly concerns goodness as such. For everything is good so far as it is | |
| 2157 desirable, and is a term of the movement of the appetite; the term of whose movement can be seen from a consideration of the | |
| 2158 movement of a natural body. Now the movement of a natural body is terminated by the end | |
| 2159 absolutely; and relatively by the means through which it comes to the end, where the movement ceases; so a thing is called | |
| 2160 a term of movement, so far as it terminates any part of that movement. Now the ultimate term of movement can be taken in two | |
| 2161 ways, either as the thing itself towards which it tends, e.g. a place or form; or a state of rest in that thing. Thus, in | |
| 2162 the movement of the appetite, the thing desired that terminates the movement of the appetite relatively, as a means by which | |
| 2163 something tends towards another, is called the useful; but that sought after as the last thing absolutely terminating the | |
| 2164 movement of the appetite, as a thing towards which for its own sake the appetite tends, is called the virtuous; for the virtuous | |
| 2165 is that which is desired for its own sake; but that which terminates the movement of the appetite in the form of rest in the | |
| 2166 thing desired, is called the pleasant. | |
| 2167 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 5 a. 6 co."><a name="28461" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28461] Iª q. 5 a. 6 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum | |
| 2168 quod haec divisio proprie videtur esse boni humani. Si tamen altius | |
| 2169 et communius rationem boni consideremus, invenitur haec divisio | |
| 2170 proprie competere bono, secundum quod bonum est. Nam bonum est | |
| 2171 aliquid, inquantum est appetibile, et terminus motus appetitus. | |
| 2172 Cuius quidem motus terminatio considerari potest ex consideratione | |
| 2173 motus corporis naturalis. Terminatur autem motus corporis | |
| 2174 naturalis, simpliciter quidem ad ultimum; secundum quid autem etiam | |
| 2175 ad medium, per quod itur ad ultimum quod terminat motum, et dicitur | |
| 2176 aliquis terminus motus, inquantum aliquam partem motus terminat. Id | |
| 2177 autem quod est ultimus terminus motus, potest accipi dupliciter, | |
| 2178 vel ipsa res in quam tenditur, utpote locus vel forma; vel quies in | |
| 2179 re illa. Sic ergo in motu appetitus, id quod est appetibile | |
| 2180 terminans motum appetitus secundum quid, ut medium per quod | |
| 2181 tenditur in aliud, vocatur utile. Id autem quod appetitur ut | |
| 2182 ultimum, terminans totaliter motum appetitus, sicut quaedam res in | |
| 2183 quam per se appetitus tendit, vocatur honestum, quia honestum | |
| 2184 dicitur quod per se desideratur. Id autem quod terminat motum | |
| 2185 appetitus ut quies in re desiderata, est delectatio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q5_A6-p7"> | |
| 2186 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Goodness, so far as it is identical with being, is divided by the ten predicaments. But this division belongs to it according | |
| 2187 to its proper formality. | |
| 2188 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 5 a. 6 ad 1"><a name="28462" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28462] Iª q. 5 a. 6 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo | |
| 2189 dicendum quod bonum, inquantum est idem subiecto cum ente, | |
| 2190 dividitur per decem praedicamenta, sed secundum propriam rationem, | |
| 2191 competit sibi ista divisio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q5_A6-p8"> | |
| 2192 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> This division is not by opposite things; but by opposite aspects. Now those things are called pleasing which have no other | |
| 2193 formality under which they are desirable except the pleasant, being sometimes hurtful and contrary to virtue. Whereas the | |
| 2194 useful applies to such as have nothing desirable in themselves, but are desired only as helpful to something further, as the | |
| 2195 taking of bitter medicine; while the virtuous is predicated of such as are desirable | |
| 2196 in themselves. | |
| 2197 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 5 a. 6 ad 2"><a name="28463" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28463] Iª q. 5 a. 6 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 2198 dicendum quod haec divisio non est per oppositas res, sed per | |
| 2199 oppositas rationes. Dicuntur tamen illa proprie delectabilia, quae | |
| 2200 nullam habent aliam rationem appetibilitatis nisi delectationem, | |
| 2201 cum aliquando sint et noxia et inhonesta. Utilia vero dicuntur, | |
| 2202 quae non habent in se unde desiderentur; sed desiderantur solum ut | |
| 2203 sunt ducentia in alterum, sicut sumptio medicinae amarae. Honesta | |
| 2204 vero dicuntur, quae in seipsis habent unde desiderentur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q5_A6-p9"> | |
| 2205 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Goodness is not divided into these three as something univocal to be predicated equally of them all; but as something analogical | |
| 2206 to be predicated of them according to priority and posteriority. Hence it is predicated chiefly of the virtuous; then of the | |
| 2207 pleasant; and lastly of the useful. | |
| 2208 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 5 a. 6 ad 3"><a name="28464" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28464] Iª q. 5 a. 6 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum | |
| 2209 quod bonum non dividitur in ista tria sicut univocum aequaliter de | |
| 2210 his praedicatum, sed sicut analogum, quod praedicatur secundum | |
| 2211 prius et posterius. Per prius enim praedicatur de honesto; et | |
| 2212 secundario de delectabili; tertio de utili.</p></div></div></div></div> | |
| 2213 <div id="FP_Q6" class="div3"> | |
| 2214 <h3 id="FP_Q6-p0.1">Q. 6. THE GOODNESS OF GOD (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3> | |
| 2215 <div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> | |
| 2216 <p id="FP_Q6-p2"> We next consider the goodness of God; under which head there are four points of inquiry:</p><p id="FP_Q6-p3"> (1) Whether goodness belongs to God?</p><p id="FP_Q6-p4"> (2) Whether God is the supreme good?</p><p id="FP_Q6-p5"> (3) Whether He alone is essentially good?</p><p id="FP_Q6-p6"> (4) Whether all things are good by the divine goodness?</p> | |
| 2217 </div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 6 pr."><a name="28465" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28465] | |
| 2218 Iª q. 6 pr.</span></a> Deinde quaeritur de bonitate Dei. Et | |
| 2219 circa hoc quaeruntur quatuor. Primo, utrum esse bonum conveniat | |
| 2220 Deo. Secundo, utrum Deus sit summum bonum. Tertio, utrum ipse solus | |
| 2221 sit bonus per suam essentiam. Quarto, utrum omnia sint bona | |
| 2222 bonitate divina.</p></div></div></div> | |
| 2223 <div id="FP_Q6_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q6_A1-p0.1">Q. 6. A. 1. Whether God is good?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q6_A1-p2"> | |
| 2224 <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that to be good does not belong to God. For goodness consists in mode, species and order. But these do not seem | |
| 2225 to belong to God; since God is immense and is not ordered to anything else. Therefore to be good does not belong to God. | |
| 2226 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 6 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="28466" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28466] Iª q. 6 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum sic | |
| 2227 proceditur. Videtur quod esse bonum non conveniat Deo. Ratio enim | |
| 2228 boni consistit in modo, specie et ordine. Haec autem non videntur | |
| 2229 Deo convenire, cum Deus immensus sit, et ad aliquid non ordinetur. | |
| 2230 Ergo esse bonum non convenit Deo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q6_A1-p3"> | |
| 2231 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the good is what all things desire. But all things do not desire God, because all things do not know Him; and nothing | |
| 2232 is desired unless it is known. Therefore to be good does not belong to God. | |
| 2233 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 6 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="28467" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28467] Iª q. 6 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, bonum | |
| 2234 est quod omnia appetunt. Sed Deum non omnia appetunt, quia non | |
| 2235 omnia cognoscunt ipsum, nihil autem appetitur nisi notum. Ergo esse | |
| 2236 bonum non convenit Deo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q6_A1-p4"> | |
| 2237 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( | |
| 2238 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q6_A1-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Lam.3.25" target="asv">Lam. 3:25</a>): "The Lord is good to them that hope in Him, to the soul that seeketh Him." | |
| 2239 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 6 a. 1 s. c."><a name="28468" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28468] Iª q. 6 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est | |
| 2240 quod dicitur Thren. III, <i>bonus est dominus sperantibus in eum, | |
| 2241 animae quaerenti illum</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q6_A1-p5"> | |
| 2242 <b>I answer that,</b> To be good belongs pre-eminently to God. For a thing is good according to its desirableness. Now everything seeks after its | |
| 2243 own perfection; and the perfection and form of an effect consist in a certain likeness to the agent, since every agent makes | |
| 2244 its like; and hence the agent itself is desirable and has the nature of good. For the very thing which is desirable in it | |
| 2245 is the participation of its likeness. Therefore, since God is the first effective cause of | |
| 2246 all things, it is manifest that the aspect of good and of desirableness belong to Him; and hence Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv) | |
| 2247 attributes good to God as to the first efficient cause, saying that, God is called good "as by Whom all things subsist." | |
| 2248 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 6 a. 1 co."><a name="28469" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28469] Iª q. 6 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum | |
| 2249 quod bonum esse praecipue Deo convenit. Bonum enim aliquid est, | |
| 2250 secundum quod est appetibile. Unumquodque autem appetit suam | |
| 2251 perfectionem. Perfectio autem et forma effectus est quaedam | |
| 2252 similitudo agentis, cum omne agens agat sibi simile. Unde ipsum | |
| 2253 agens est appetibile, et habet rationem boni, hoc enim est quod de | |
| 2254 ipso appetitur, ut eius similitudo participetur. Cum ergo Deus sit | |
| 2255 prima causa effectiva omnium, manifestum est quod sibi competit | |
| 2256 ratio boni et appetibilis. Unde Dionysius, in libro de Div. Nom., | |
| 2257 attribuit bonum Deo sicut primae causae efficienti, dicens quod | |
| 2258 bonus dicitur Deus, <i>sicut ex quo omnia subsistunt</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q6_A1-p6"> | |
| 2259 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> To have mode, species and order belongs to the essence of caused good; but good is in God as in its cause, and hence it belongs | |
| 2260 to Him to impose mode, species and order on others; wherefore these three things are in God as in their cause. | |
| 2261 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 6 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="28470" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28470] Iª q. 6 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo | |
| 2262 dicendum quod habere modum, speciem et ordinem, pertinet ad | |
| 2263 rationem boni causati. Sed bonum in Deo est sicut in causa, unde ad | |
| 2264 eum pertinet imponere aliis modum, speciem et ordinem. Unde ista | |
| 2265 tria sunt in Deo sicut in causa.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q6_A1-p7"> | |
| 2266 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> All things, by desiring their own perfection, desire God Himself, inasmuch as the perfections of all things are so many similitudes | |
| 2267 of the divine being; as appears from what is said above ( | |
| 2268 <a id="FP_Q6_A1-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q4_A3.html">Q[4] , A[3]</a>). And so of those things which desire God, some know Him as He is Himself, and this is proper to the rational creature; others | |
| 2269 know some participation of His goodness, and this belongs also to sensible knowledge; others have a | |
| 2270 natural desire without knowledge, as being directed to their ends by a higher intelligence. | |
| 2271 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 6 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="28471" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28471] Iª q. 6 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 2272 dicendum quod omnia, appetendo proprias perfectiones, appetunt | |
| 2273 ipsum Deum, inquantum perfectiones omnium rerum sunt quaedam | |
| 2274 similitudines divini esse, ut ex dictis patet. Et sic eorum quae | |
| 2275 Deum appetunt, quaedam cognoscunt ipsum secundum seipsum, quod est | |
| 2276 proprium creaturae rationalis. Quaedam vero cognoscunt aliquas | |
| 2277 participationes suae bonitatis, quod etiam extenditur usque ad | |
| 2278 cognitionem sensibilem. Quaedam vero appetitum naturalem habent | |
| 2279 absque cognitione, utpote inclinata ad suos fines ab alio superiori | |
| 2280 cognoscente.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q6_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q6_A2-p0.1">Q. 6. A. 2. Whether God is the supreme good?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q6_A2-p2"> | |
| 2281 <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God is not the supreme good. For the supreme good adds something to good; otherwise it would belong to every | |
| 2282 good. But everything which is an addition to anything else is a compound thing: therefore the supreme good is a compound. | |
| 2283 But God is supremely simple; as was shown above ( | |
| 2284 <a id="FP_Q6_A2-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q3_A7.html">Q[3], A[7]</a>). Therefore God is not the supreme good. | |
| 2285 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 6 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="28472" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28472] Iª q. 6 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum sic | |
| 2286 proceditur. Videtur quod Deus non sit summum bonum. Summum enim | |
| 2287 bonum addit aliquid supra bonum, alioquin omni bono conveniret. Sed | |
| 2288 omne quod se habet ex additione ad aliquid, est compositum. Ergo | |
| 2289 summum bonum est compositum. Sed Deus est summe simplex, ut supra | |
| 2290 ostensum est. Ergo Deus non est summum bonum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q6_A2-p3"> | |
| 2291 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, "Good is what all desire," as the Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 1). Now what all desire is nothing but God, Who is | |
| 2292 the end of all things: therefore there is no other good but God. This appears also from what is said ( | |
| 2293 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q6_A2-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Luke.18.19" target="asv">Lk. 18:19</a>): "None is good but God alone." But we use the word supreme in comparison with others, as e.g. supreme heat is used in comparison | |
| 2294 with all other heats. Therefore God cannot be called the supreme good. | |
| 2295 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 6 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="28473" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28473] Iª q. 6 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> <i>Praeterea, | |
| 2296 bonum est quod omnia appetunt</i>, ut dicit philosophus. Sed nihil | |
| 2297 aliud est quod omnia appetunt, nisi solus Deus, qui est finis | |
| 2298 omnium. Ergo nihil aliud est bonum nisi Deus. Quod etiam videtur | |
| 2299 per id quod dicitur Matth. XIX, <i>nemo bonus nisi solus Deus</i>. | |
| 2300 Sed summum dicitur in comparatione aliorum; sicut summum calidum in | |
| 2301 comparatione ad omnia calida. Ergo Deus non potest dici summum | |
| 2302 bonum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q6_A2-p4"> | |
| 2303 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, supreme implies comparison. But things not in the same genus are not comparable; as, sweetness is not properly greater | |
| 2304 or less than a line. Therefore, since God is not in the same genus as other good things, as appears above ( | |
| 2305 <a id="FP_Q6_A2-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q3_A5.html">Q[3], A[5]</a>; | |
| 2306 <a id="FP_Q6_A2-p4.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q4_A3.html">Q[4], A[3]</a>) it seems that God cannot be called the supreme good in relation to others. | |
| 2307 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 6 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="28474" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28474] Iª q. 6 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, summum | |
| 2308 comparationem importat. Sed quae non sunt unius generis, non sunt | |
| 2309 comparabilia; sicut dulcedo inconvenienter dicitur maior vel minor | |
| 2310 quam linea. Cum igitur Deus non sit in eodem genere cum aliis | |
| 2311 bonis, ut ex superioribus patet, videtur quod Deus non possit dici | |
| 2312 summum bonum respectu eorum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q6_A2-p5"> | |
| 2313 <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Trin. ii) that, the Trinity of the divine persons is "the supreme good, discerned by purified minds." | |
| 2314 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 6 a. 2 s. c."><a name="28475" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28475] Iª q. 6 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est | |
| 2315 quod dicit Augustinus, I de Trin., quod <i>Trinitas divinarum | |
| 2316 personarum est summum bonum, quod purgatissimis mentibus | |
| 2317 cernitur</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q6_A2-p6"> | |
| 2318 <b>I answer that,</b> God is the supreme good simply, and not only as existing in any genus or order of things. For good is attributed to God, | |
| 2319 as was said in the preceding article, inasmuch as all desired perfections flow from Him as from the first cause. They do not, | |
| 2320 however, flow from Him as from a univocal agent, as shown above ( | |
| 2321 <a id="FP_Q6_A2-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q4_A2.html">Q[4], A[2]</a>); but as from an agent which does not agree with its effects either in species or genus. Now the likeness of an | |
| 2322 effect in the univocal cause is found uniformly; but in the equivocal cause it is found more excellently, as, heat is in the | |
| 2323 sun more excellently than it is in fire. Therefore as good is in God as in the first, but not the univocal, cause of all things, | |
| 2324 it must be in Him in a most excellent way; and therefore He is called the supreme good. | |
| 2325 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 6 a. 2 co."><a name="28476" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28476] Iª q. 6 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum | |
| 2326 quod Deus est summum bonum simpliciter, et non solum in aliquo | |
| 2327 genere vel ordine rerum. Sic enim bonum Deo attribuitur, ut dictum | |
| 2328 est, inquantum omnes perfectiones desideratae effluunt ab eo, sicut | |
| 2329 a prima causa. Non autem effluunt ab eo sicut ab agente univoco, ut | |
| 2330 ex superioribus patet, sed sicut ab agente quod non convenit cum | |
| 2331 suis effectibus, neque in ratione speciei, nec in ratione generis. | |
| 2332 Similitudo autem effectus in causa quidem univoca invenitur | |
| 2333 uniformiter, in causa autem aequivoca invenitur excellentius, sicut | |
| 2334 calor excellentiori modo est in sole quam in igne. Sic ergo oportet | |
| 2335 quod cum bonum sit in Deo sicut in prima causa omnium non univoca, | |
| 2336 quod sit in eo excellentissimo modo. Et propter hoc dicitur summum | |
| 2337 bonum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q6_A2-p7"> | |
| 2338 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The supreme good does not add to good any absolute thing, but only a relation. Now a relation of God to creatures, is not | |
| 2339 a reality in God, but in the creature; for it is in God in our idea only: as, what is knowable is so called with relation | |
| 2340 to knowledge, not that it depends on knowledge, but because knowledge depends on it. Thus it is not necessary that there should | |
| 2341 be composition in the supreme good, but only that other things are deficient in | |
| 2342 comparison with it. | |
| 2343 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 6 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="28477" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28477] Iª q. 6 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo | |
| 2344 dicendum quod summum bonum addit super bonum, non rem aliquam | |
| 2345 absolutam, sed relationem tantum. Relatio autem qua aliquid de Deo | |
| 2346 dicitur relative ad creaturas, non est realiter in Deo, sed in | |
| 2347 creatura; in Deo vero secundum rationem; sicut scibile relative | |
| 2348 dicitur ad scientiam, non quia ad ipsam referatur, sed quia | |
| 2349 scientia refertur ad ipsum. Et sic non oportet quod in summo bono | |
| 2350 sit aliqua compositio, sed solum quod alia deficiant ab ipso.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q6_A2-p8"> | |
| 2351 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> When we say that good is what all desire, it is not to be understood that every kind of good thing is desired by all; but | |
| 2352 that whatever is desired has the nature of good. And when it is said, "None is good but God alone," this is to be understood | |
| 2353 of essential goodness, as will be explained in the next article. | |
| 2354 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 6 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="28478" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28478] Iª q. 6 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 2355 dicendum quod, cum dicitur <i>bonum est quod omnia appetunt</i>, | |
| 2356 non sic intelligitur quasi unumquodque bonum ab omnibus appetatur, | |
| 2357 sed quia quidquid appetitur, rationem boni habet. Quod autem | |
| 2358 dicitur, <i>nemo bonus nisi solus Deus</i>, intelligitur de bono | |
| 2359 per essentiam, ut post dicetur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q6_A2-p9"> | |
| 2360 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Things not of the same genus are in no way comparable to each other if indeed they are in different genera. Now we say that | |
| 2361 God is not in the same genus with other good things; not that He is any other genus, but that He is outside genus, and is | |
| 2362 the principle of every genus; and thus He is compared to others by excess, and it is this kind of comparison the supreme good | |
| 2363 implies. | |
| 2364 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 6 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="28479" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28479] Iª q. 6 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum | |
| 2365 quod ea quae non sunt in eodem genere, si quidem sint in diversis | |
| 2366 generibus contenta, nullo modo comparabilia sunt. De Deo autem | |
| 2367 negatur esse in eodem genere cum aliis bonis, non quod ipse sit in | |
| 2368 quodam alio genere; sed quia ipse est extra genus, et principium | |
| 2369 omnis generis. Et sic comparatur ad alia per excessum. Et huiusmodi | |
| 2370 comparationem importat summum bonum.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q6_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q6_A3-p0.1">Q. 6. A. 3. Whether to be essentially good belongs to God alone?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q6_A3-p2"> | |
| 2371 <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that to be essentially good does not belong to God alone. For as "one" is convertible with "being," so is "good"; | |
| 2372 as we said above ( | |
| 2373 <a id="FP_Q6_A3-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q5_A1.html">Q[5], A[1]</a>). But every being is one essentially, as appears from the Philosopher (Metaph. iv); therefore every being is good essentially. | |
| 2374 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 6 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="28480" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28480] Iª q. 6 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium sic | |
| 2375 proceditur. Videtur quod esse bonum per essentiam non sit proprium | |
| 2376 Dei. Sicut enim unum convertitur cum ente, ita et bonum, ut supra | |
| 2377 habitum est. Sed omne ens est unum per suam essentiam, ut patet per | |
| 2378 philosophum in IV Metaphys. Ergo omne ens est bonum per suam | |
| 2379 essentiam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q6_A3-p3"> | |
| 2380 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, if good is what all things desire, since being itself is desired by all, then the being of each thing is its good. | |
| 2381 But everything is a being essentially; therefore every being is good essentially. | |
| 2382 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 6 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="28481" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28481] Iª q. 6 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, si | |
| 2383 bonum est quod omnia appetunt, cum ipsum esse sit desideratum ab | |
| 2384 omnibus, ipsum esse cuiuslibet rei est eius bonum. Sed quaelibet | |
| 2385 res est ens per suam essentiam. Ergo quaelibet res est bona per | |
| 2386 suam essentiam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q6_A3-p4"> | |
| 2387 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, everything is good by its own goodness. Therefore if there is anything which is not good essentially, it is necessary | |
| 2388 to say that its goodness is not its own essence. Therefore its goodness, since it is a being, must be good; and if it is good | |
| 2389 by some other goodness, the same question applies to that goodness also; therefore we must either proceed to infinity, or | |
| 2390 come to some goodness which is not good by any other goodness. Therefore the first | |
| 2391 supposition holds good. Therefore everything is good essentially. | |
| 2392 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 6 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="28482" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28482] Iª q. 6 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, omnis | |
| 2393 res per suam bonitatem est bona. Si igitur aliqua res est quae non | |
| 2394 sit bona per suam essentiam, oportebit quod eius bonitas non sit | |
| 2395 sua essentia. Illa ergo bonitas, cum sit ens quoddam, oportet quod | |
| 2396 sit bona, et si quidem alia bonitate, iterum de illa bonitate | |
| 2397 quaeretur. Aut ergo erit procedere in infinitum, aut venire ad | |
| 2398 aliquam bonitatem quae non erit bona per aliam bonitatem. Eadem | |
| 2399 ergo ratione standum est in primo. Res igitur quaelibet est bona | |
| 2400 per suam essentiam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q6_A3-p5"> | |
| 2401 <b>On the contrary,</b> Boethius says (De Hebdom.), that "all things but God are good by participation." Therefore they are not good essentially. | |
| 2402 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 6 a. 3 s. c."><a name="28483" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28483] Iª q. 6 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est | |
| 2403 quod dicit Boetius, in libro de Hebdomad., quod alia omnia a Deo | |
| 2404 sunt bona per participationem. Non igitur per essentiam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q6_A3-p6"> | |
| 2405 <b>I answer that,</b> God alone is good essentially. For everything is called good according to its perfection. Now perfection of a thing is threefold: | |
| 2406 first, according to the constitution of its own being; secondly, in respect of any accidents being added as necessary for | |
| 2407 its perfect operation; thirdly, perfection consists in the attaining to something else as the end. Thus, for instance, the | |
| 2408 first perfection of fire consists in its existence, which it has through its own | |
| 2409 substantial form; its secondary perfection consists in heat, lightness and dryness, and the like; its third perfection is | |
| 2410 to rest in its own place. This triple perfection belongs to no creature by its own essence; it belongs to God only, in Whom | |
| 2411 alone essence is existence; in Whom there are no accidents; since whatever belongs to others accidentally belongs to Him essentially; | |
| 2412 as, to be powerful, wise and the like, as appears from what is stated above ( | |
| 2413 <a id="FP_Q6_A3-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q3_A6.html">Q[3], A[6]</a>); and | |
| 2414 He is not directed to anything else as to an end, but is Himself the last end of all things. Hence it is manifest that God | |
| 2415 alone has every kind of perfection by His own essence; therefore He Himself alone is good essentially. | |
| 2416 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 6 a. 3 co."><a name="28484" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28484] Iª q. 6 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum | |
| 2417 quod solus Deus est bonus per suam essentiam. Unumquodque enim | |
| 2418 dicitur bonum, secundum quod est perfectum. Perfectio autem | |
| 2419 alicuius rei triplex est. Prima quidem, secundum quod in suo esse | |
| 2420 constituitur. Secunda vero, prout ei aliqua accidentia | |
| 2421 superadduntur, ad suam perfectam operationem necessaria. Tertia | |
| 2422 vero perfectio alicuius est per hoc, quod aliquid aliud attingit | |
| 2423 sicut finem. Utpote prima perfectio ignis consistit in esse, quod | |
| 2424 habet per suam formam substantialem, secunda vero eius perfectio | |
| 2425 consistit in caliditate, levitate et siccitate, et huiusmodi, | |
| 2426 tertia vero perfectio eius est secundum quod in loco suo quiescit. | |
| 2427 Haec autem triplex perfectio nulli creato competit secundum suam | |
| 2428 essentiam, sed soli Deo, cuius solius essentia est suum esse; et | |
| 2429 cui non adveniunt aliqua accidentia; sed quae de aliis dicuntur | |
| 2430 accidentaliter, sibi conveniunt essentialiter, ut esse potentem, | |
| 2431 sapientem, et huiusmodi, sicut ex dictis patet. Ipse etiam ad nihil | |
| 2432 aliud ordinatur sicut ad finem, sed ipse est ultimus finis omnium | |
| 2433 rerum. Unde manifestum est quod solus Deus habet omnimodam | |
| 2434 perfectionem secundum suam essentiam. Et ideo ipse solus est bonus | |
| 2435 per suam essentiam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q6_A3-p7"> | |
| 2436 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> "One" does not include the idea of perfection, but only of indivision, which belongs to everything according to its own essence. | |
| 2437 Now the essences of simple things are undivided both actually and potentially, but the essences of compounds are undivided | |
| 2438 only actually; and therefore everything must be one essentially, but not good essentially, as was shown above. | |
| 2439 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 6 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="28485" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28485] Iª q. 6 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo | |
| 2440 dicendum quod unum non importat rationem perfectionis, sed | |
| 2441 indivisionis tantum, quae unicuique rei competit secundum suam | |
| 2442 essentiam. Simplicium autem essentiae sunt indivisae et actu et | |
| 2443 potentia, compositorum vero essentiae sunt indivisae secundum actum | |
| 2444 tantum. Et ideo oportet quod quaelibet res sit una per suam | |
| 2445 essentiam, non autem bona, ut ostensum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q6_A3-p8"> | |
| 2446 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Although everything is good in that it has being, yet the essence of a creature is not very being; and therefore it does | |
| 2447 not follow that a creature is good essentially. | |
| 2448 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 6 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="28486" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28486] Iª q. 6 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 2449 dicendum quod, licet unumquodque sit bonum inquantum habet esse, | |
| 2450 tamen essentia rei creatae non est ipsum esse, et ideo non sequitur | |
| 2451 quod res creata sit bona per suam essentiam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q6_A3-p9"> | |
| 2452 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The goodness of a creature is not its very essence, but something superadded; it is either its existence, or some added perfection, | |
| 2453 or the order to its end. Still, the goodness itself thus added is good, just as it is being. But for this reason is it called | |
| 2454 being because by it something has being, not because it itself has being through something else: hence for this reason is | |
| 2455 it called good because by it something is good, and not because it itself | |
| 2456 has some other goodness whereby it is good. | |
| 2457 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 6 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="28487" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28487] Iª q. 6 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum | |
| 2458 quod bonitas rei creatae non est ipsa eius essentia, sed aliquid | |
| 2459 superadditum; vel ipsum esse eius, vel aliqua perfectio | |
| 2460 superaddita, vel ordo ad finem. Ipsa tamen bonitas sic superaddita | |
| 2461 dicitur bona sicut et ens, hac autem ratione dicitur ens, quia ea | |
| 2462 est aliquid, non quia ipsa aliquo alio sit. Unde hac ratione | |
| 2463 dicitur bona, quia ea est aliquid bonum, non quia ipsa habeat | |
| 2464 aliquam aliam bonitatem, qua sit bona.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q6_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q6_A4-p0.1">Q. 6. A. 4. Whether all things are good by the divine goodness?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q6_A4-p2"> | |
| 2465 <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that all things are good by the divine goodness. For Augustine says (De Trin. viii), "This and that are good; take | |
| 2466 away this and that, and see good itself if thou canst; and so thou shalt see God, good not by any other good, but the good | |
| 2467 of every good." But everything is good by its own good; therefore everything is good by that very good which is God. | |
| 2468 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 6 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="28488" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28488] Iª q. 6 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum sic | |
| 2469 proceditur. Videtur quod omnia sint bona bonitate divina. Dicit | |
| 2470 enim Augustinus, VII de Trin., <i>bonum hoc et bonum illud, tolle | |
| 2471 hoc et tolle illud, et vide ipsum bonum, si potes, ita Deum | |
| 2472 videbis, non alio bono bonum, sed bonum omnis boni</i>. Sed | |
| 2473 unumquodque est bonum suo bono. Ergo unumquodque est bonum ipso | |
| 2474 bono quod est Deus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q6_A4-p3"> | |
| 2475 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, as Boethius says (De Hebdom.), all things are called good, accordingly as they are directed to God, and this is | |
| 2476 by reason of the divine goodness; therefore all things are good by the divine goodness. | |
| 2477 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 6 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="28489" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28489] Iª q. 6 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, sicut | |
| 2478 dicit Boetius, in libro de Hebdomad., omnia dicuntur bona inquantum | |
| 2479 ordinantur ad Deum, et hoc ratione bonitatis divinae. Ergo omnia | |
| 2480 sunt bona bonitate divina.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q6_A4-p4"> | |
| 2481 <b>On the contrary,</b> All things are good, inasmuch as they have being. But they are not called beings through the divine being, but through their | |
| 2482 own being; therefore all things are not good by the divine goodness, but by their own goodness. | |
| 2483 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 6 a. 4 s. c."><a name="28490" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28490] Iª q. 6 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est | |
| 2484 quod omnia sunt bona inquantum sunt. Sed non dicuntur omnia entia | |
| 2485 per esse divinum, sed per esse proprium. Ergo non omnia sunt bona | |
| 2486 bonitate divina, sed bonitate propria.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q6_A4-p5"> | |
| 2487 <b>I answer that,</b> As regards relative things, we must admit extrinsic denomination; as, a thing is denominated "placed" from "place," and "measured" | |
| 2488 from "measure." But as regards absolute things opinions differ. Plato held the existence of separate ideas ( | |
| 2489 <a id="FP_Q6_A4-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q84_A4.html">Q[84], A[4]</a>) of all things, and that individuals were denominated by them as participating in the separate ideas; for instance, that | |
| 2490 Socrates is called man according to the separate idea of man. Now | |
| 2491 just as he laid down separate ideas of man and horse which he called absolute man and absolute horse, so likewise he laid | |
| 2492 down separate ideas of "being" and of "one," and these he called absolute being and absolute oneness; and by participation | |
| 2493 of these, everything was called "being" or "one"; and what was thus absolute being and absolute one, he said was the supreme | |
| 2494 good. And because good is convertible with being, as one is also; he called God the absolute good, from whom all things are | |
| 2495 called good by way of participation. | |
| 2496 </p><p id="FP_Q6_A4-p6"> Although this opinion appears to be unreasonable in affirming separate ideas of natural things as subsisting of themselves---as | |
| 2497 Aristotle argues in many ways---still, it is absolutely true that there is first something which is essentially being and | |
| 2498 essentially good, which we call God, as appears from what is shown above ( | |
| 2499 <a id="FP_Q6_A4-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q2_A3.html">Q[2], A[3]</a>), and Aristotle agrees with this. Hence from the first being, essentially such, and good, everything can be called good and | |
| 2500 a being, inasmuch as it participates in it by way of a certain assimilation which is far removed and defective; as appears | |
| 2501 from the above ( | |
| 2502 <a id="FP_Q6_A4-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q4_A3.html">Q[4], A[3]</a>). | |
| 2503 </p><p id="FP_Q6_A4-p7"> Everything is therefore called good from the divine goodness, as from the first exemplary effective and final principle of | |
| 2504 all goodness. Nevertheless, everything is called good by reason of the similitude of the divine goodness belonging to it, | |
| 2505 which is formally its own goodness, whereby it is denominated good. And so of all things there is one goodness, and yet many | |
| 2506 goodnesses. | |
| 2507 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 6 a. 4 co."><a name="28491" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28491] Iª q. 6 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum | |
| 2508 quod nihil prohibet in his quae relationem important, aliquid ab | |
| 2509 extrinseco denominari; sicut aliquid denominatur locatum a loco, et | |
| 2510 mensuratum a mensura. Circa vero ea quae absolute dicuntur, diversa | |
| 2511 fuit opinio. Plato enim posuit omnium rerum species separatas; et | |
| 2512 quod ab eis individua denominantur, quasi species separatas | |
| 2513 participando; ut puta quod Socrates dicitur homo secundum ideam | |
| 2514 hominis separatam. Et sicut ponebat ideam hominis et equi | |
| 2515 separatam, quam vocabat per se hominem et per se equum, ita ponebat | |
| 2516 ideam entis et ideam unius separatam, quam dicebat per se ens et | |
| 2517 per se unum, et eius participatione unumquodque dicitur ens vel | |
| 2518 unum. Hoc autem quod est per se bonum et per se unum, ponebat esse | |
| 2519 summum Deum, a quo omnia dicuntur bona per modum participationis. | |
| 2520 Et quamvis haec opinio irrationabilis videatur quantum ad hoc, quod | |
| 2521 ponebat species rerum naturalium separatas per se subsistentes, ut | |
| 2522 Aristoteles multipliciter probat; tamen hoc absolute verum est, | |
| 2523 quod est aliquod unum per essentiam suam bonum, quod dicimus Deum, | |
| 2524 ut ex superioribus patet. Huic etiam sententiae concordat | |
| 2525 Aristoteles. A primo igitur per suam essentiam ente et bono, | |
| 2526 unumquodque potest dici bonum et ens, inquantum participat ipsum | |
| 2527 per modum cuiusdam assimilationis, licet remote et deficienter, ut | |
| 2528 ex superioribus patet. Sic ergo unumquodque dicitur bonum bonitate | |
| 2529 divina, sicut primo principio exemplari, effectivo et finali totius | |
| 2530 bonitatis. Nihilominus tamen unumquodque dicitur bonum similitudine | |
| 2531 divinae bonitatis sibi inhaerente, quae est formaliter sua bonitas | |
| 2532 denominans ipsum. Et sic est bonitas una omnium; et etiam multae | |
| 2533 bonitates.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q6_A4-p8"><b>Reply to objections.</b> This is a sufficient Reply to the Objections.</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 6 a. 4 ad arg."><a name="28492" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28492] Iª q. 6 a. 4 ad arg.</span></a> Et per hoc patet | |
| 2534 responsio ad obiecta.</p></div></div></div></div> | |
| 2535 <div id="FP_Q7" class="div3"> | |
| 2536 <h3 id="FP_Q7-p0.1">Q. 7. THE INFINITY OF GOD (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3> | |
| 2537 <div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> | |
| 2538 <p id="FP_Q7-p2"> After considering the divine perfection we must consider the divine infinity, and God's existence in things: for God is everywhere, | |
| 2539 and in all things, inasmuch as He is boundless and infinite. | |
| 2540 </p><p id="FP_Q7-p3"> Concerning the first, there are four points of inquiry:</p><p id="FP_Q7-p4"> (1) Whether God is infinite?</p><p id="FP_Q7-p5"> (2) Whether anything besides Him is infinite in essence?</p><p id="FP_Q7-p6"> (3) Whether anything can be infinitude in magnitude?</p><p id="FP_Q7-p7"> (4) Whether an infinite multitude can exist?</p> | |
| 2541 </div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 7 pr."><a name="28493" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28493] | |
| 2542 Iª q. 7 pr.</span></a> Post considerationem divinae | |
| 2543 perfectionis, considerandum est de eius infinitate, et de | |
| 2544 existentia eius in rebus, attribuitur enim Deo quod sit ubique et | |
| 2545 in omnibus rebus, inquantum est incircumscriptibilis et infinitus. | |
| 2546 Circa primum quaeruntur quatuor. Primo, utrum Deus sit infinitus. | |
| 2547 Secundo, utrum aliquid praeter ipsum sit infinitum secundum | |
| 2548 essentiam. Tertio, utrum aliquid possit esse infinitum secundum | |
| 2549 magnitudinem. Quarto, utrum possit esse infinitum in rebus secundum | |
| 2550 multitudinem.</p></div></div></div> | |
| 2551 <div id="FP_Q7_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q7_A1-p0.1">Q. 7. A. 1. Whether God is infinite?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q7_A1-p2"> | |
| 2552 <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God is not infinite. For everything infinite is imperfect, as the Philosopher says; because it has parts and | |
| 2553 matter, as is said in Phys. iii. But God is most perfect; therefore He is not infinite. | |
| 2554 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 7 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="28494" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28494] Iª q. 7 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum sic | |
| 2555 proceditur. Videtur quod Deus non sit infinitus. Omne enim | |
| 2556 infinitum est imperfectum, quia habet rationem partis et materiae, | |
| 2557 ut dicitur in III Physic. Sed Deus est perfectissimus. Ergo non est | |
| 2558 infinitus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q7_A1-p3"> | |
| 2559 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, according to the Philosopher (Phys. i), finite and infinite belong to quantity. But there is no quantity in God, | |
| 2560 for He is not a body, as was shown above ( | |
| 2561 <a id="FP_Q7_A1-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q3_A1.html">Q[3], A[1]</a>). Therefore it does not belong to Him to be infinite. | |
| 2562 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 7 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="28495" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28495] Iª q. 7 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 2563 secundum philosophum in I Physic., finitum et infinitum conveniunt | |
| 2564 quantitati. Sed in Deo non est quantitas, cum non sit corpus, ut | |
| 2565 supra ostensum est. Ergo non competit sibi esse infinitum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q7_A1-p4"> | |
| 2566 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, what is here in such a way as not to be elsewhere, is finite according to place. Therefore that which is a thing | |
| 2567 in such a way as not to be another thing, is finite according to substance. But God is this, and not another; for He is not | |
| 2568 a stone or wood. Therefore God is not infinite in substance. | |
| 2569 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 7 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="28496" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28496] Iª q. 7 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, quod | |
| 2570 ita est hic quod non alibi, est finitum secundum locum, ergo quod | |
| 2571 ita est hoc quod non est aliud, est finitum secundum substantiam. | |
| 2572 Sed Deus est hoc, et non est aliud, non enim est lapis nec lignum. | |
| 2573 Ergo Deus non est infinitus secundum substantiam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q7_A1-p5"> | |
| 2574 <b>On the contrary,</b> Damascene says (De Fide Orth. i, 4) that "God is infinite and eternal, and boundless." | |
| 2575 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 7 a. 1 s. c."><a name="28497" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28497] Iª q. 7 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est | |
| 2576 quod dicit Damascenus, quod <i>Deus est infinitus et aeternus et | |
| 2577 incircumscriptibilis</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q7_A1-p6"> | |
| 2578 <b>I answer that,</b> All the ancient philosophers attribute infinitude to the first principle, as is said (Phys. iii), and with reason; for they | |
| 2579 considered that things flow forth infinitely from the first principle. But because some erred concerning the nature of the | |
| 2580 first principle, as a consequence they erred also concerning its infinity; forasmuch as they asserted that matter was the | |
| 2581 first principle; consequently they attributed to the first principle a material infinity to | |
| 2582 the effect that some infinite body was the first principle of things. | |
| 2583 </p><p id="FP_Q7_A1-p7"> We must consider therefore that a thing is called infinite because it is not finite. Now matter is in a way made finite by | |
| 2584 form, and the form by matter. Matter indeed is made finite by form, inasmuch as matter, before it receives its form, is in | |
| 2585 potentiality to many forms; but on receiving a form, it is terminated by that one. Again, form is made finite by matter, inasmuch | |
| 2586 as form, considered in itself, is common to many; but when received in matter, the form is determined to | |
| 2587 this one particular thing. Now matter is perfected by the form by which it is made finite; therefore infinite as attributed | |
| 2588 to matter, has the nature of something imperfect; for it is as it were formless matter. On the other hand, form is not made | |
| 2589 perfect by matter, but rather is contracted by matter; and hence the infinite, regarded on the part of the form not determined | |
| 2590 by matter, has the nature of something perfect. Now being is the most formal of all things, as appears from what is shown | |
| 2591 above ( | |
| 2592 <a id="FP_Q7_A1-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q4_A1.html">Q[4], A[1]</a>, OBJ[3]). Since therefore the divine being is not a being received in anything, but He is His own subsistent being as was | |
| 2593 shown above ( | |
| 2594 <a id="FP_Q7_A1-p7.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q3_A4.html">Q[3], A[4]</a>), it is clear that God Himself is infinite and perfect. | |
| 2595 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 7 a. 1 co."><a name="28498" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28498] Iª q. 7 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum | |
| 2596 quod omnes antiqui philosophi attribuunt infinitum primo principio, | |
| 2597 ut dicitur in III Physic., et hoc rationabiliter, considerantes res | |
| 2598 effluere a primo principio in infinitum. Sed quia quidam erraverunt | |
| 2599 circa naturam primi principii, consequens fuit ut errarent circa | |
| 2600 infinitatem ipsius. Quia enim ponebant primum principium materiam, | |
| 2601 consequenter attribuerunt primo principio infinitatem materialem; | |
| 2602 dicentes aliquod corpus infinitum esse primum principium rerum. | |
| 2603 Considerandum est igitur quod infinitum dicitur aliquid ex eo quod | |
| 2604 non est finitum. Finitur autem quodammodo et materia per formam, et | |
| 2605 forma per materiam. Materia quidem per formam, inquantum materia, | |
| 2606 antequam recipiat formam, est in potentia ad multas formas, sed cum | |
| 2607 recipit unam, terminatur per illam. Forma vero finitur per | |
| 2608 materiam, inquantum forma, in se considerata, communis est ad | |
| 2609 multa, sed per hoc quod recipitur in materia, fit forma determinate | |
| 2610 huius rei. Materia autem perficitur per formam per quam finitur, et | |
| 2611 ideo infinitum secundum quod attribuitur materiae, habet rationem | |
| 2612 imperfecti; est enim quasi materia non habens formam. Forma autem | |
| 2613 non perficitur per materiam, sed magis per eam eius amplitudo | |
| 2614 contrahitur, unde infinitum secundum quod se tenet ex parte formae | |
| 2615 non determinatae per materiam, habet rationem perfecti. Illud autem | |
| 2616 quod est maxime formale omnium, est ipsum esse, ut ex superioribus | |
| 2617 patet. Cum igitur esse divinum non sit esse receptum in aliquo, sed | |
| 2618 ipse sit suum esse subsistens, ut supra ostensum est; manifestum | |
| 2619 est quod ipse Deus sit infinitus et perfectus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q7_A1-p8"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> From this appears the Reply to the First Objection.</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 7 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="28499" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28499] Iª q. 7 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Et per hoc patet | |
| 2620 responsio ad primum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q7_A1-p9"> | |
| 2621 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Quantity is terminated by its form, which can be seen in the fact that a figure which consists in quantity terminated, is | |
| 2622 a kind of quantitative form. Hence the infinite of quantity is the infinite of matter; such a kind of infinite cannot be attributed | |
| 2623 to God; as was said above, in this article. | |
| 2624 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 7 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="28500" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28500] Iª q. 7 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 2625 dicendum quod terminus quantitatis est sicut forma ipsius, cuius | |
| 2626 signum est, quod figura, quae consistit in terminatione | |
| 2627 quantitatis, est quaedam forma circa quantitatem. Unde infinitum | |
| 2628 quod competit quantitati, est infinitum quod se tenet ex parte | |
| 2629 materiae, et tale infinitum non attribuitur Deo, ut dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q7_A1-p10"> | |
| 2630 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The fact that the being of God is self-subsisting, not received in any other, and is thus called infinite, shows Him to be | |
| 2631 distinguished from all other beings, and all others to be apart from Him. Even so, were there such a thing as a self-subsisting | |
| 2632 whiteness, the very fact that it did not exist in anything else, would make it distinct from every other whiteness existing | |
| 2633 in a subject. | |
| 2634 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 7 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="28501" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28501] Iª q. 7 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum | |
| 2635 quod, ex hoc ipso quod esse Dei est per se subsistens non receptum | |
| 2636 in aliquo, prout dicitur infinitum, distinguitur ab omnibus aliis, | |
| 2637 et alia removentur ab eo, sicut, si esset albedo subsistens, ex hoc | |
| 2638 ipso quod non esset in alio, differret ab omni albedine existente | |
| 2639 in subiecto.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q7_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q7_A2-p0.1">Q. 7. A. 2. Whether anything but God can be essentially infinite?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q7_A2-p2"> | |
| 2640 <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that something else besides God can be essentially infinite. For the power of anything is proportioned to its essence. | |
| 2641 Now if the essence of God is infinite, His power must also be infinite. Therefore He can produce an infinite effect, since | |
| 2642 the extent of a power is known by its effect. | |
| 2643 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 7 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="28502" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28502] Iª q. 7 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum sic | |
| 2644 proceditur. Videtur quod aliquid aliud quam Deus possit esse | |
| 2645 infinitum per essentiam. Virtus enim rei proportionatur essentiae | |
| 2646 eius. Si igitur essentia Dei est infinita, oportet quod eius virtus | |
| 2647 sit infinita. Ergo potest producere effectum infinitum, cum | |
| 2648 quantitas virtutis per effectum cognoscatur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q7_A2-p3"> | |
| 2649 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, whatever has infinite power, has an infinite essence. Now the created intellect has an infinite power; for it apprehends | |
| 2650 the universal, which can extend itself to an infinitude of singular things. Therefore every created intellectual substance | |
| 2651 is infinite. | |
| 2652 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 7 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="28503" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28503] Iª q. 7 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 2653 quidquid habet virtutem infinitam, habet essentiam infinitam. Sed | |
| 2654 intellectus creatus habet virtutem infinitam, apprehendit enim | |
| 2655 universale, quod se potest extendere ad infinita singularia. Ergo | |
| 2656 omnis substantia intellectualis creata est infinita.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q7_A2-p4"> | |
| 2657 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, primary matter is something other than God, as was shown above ( | |
| 2658 <a id="FP_Q7_A2-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q3_A8.html">Q[3], A[8]</a>). But primary matter is infinite. Therefore something besides God can be infinite. | |
| 2659 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 7 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="28504" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28504] Iª q. 7 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 2660 materia prima aliud est a Deo, ut supra ostensum est. Sed materia | |
| 2661 prima est infinita. Ergo aliquid aliud praeter Deum potest esse | |
| 2662 infinitum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q7_A2-p5"> | |
| 2663 <b>On the contrary,</b> The infinite cannot have a beginning, as said in Phys. iii. But everything outside God is from God as from its first principle. | |
| 2664 Therefore besides God nothing can be infinite. | |
| 2665 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 7 a. 2 s. c."><a name="28505" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28505] Iª q. 7 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est | |
| 2666 quod infinitum non potest esse ex principio aliquo, ut dicitur in | |
| 2667 III Physic. Omne autem quod est praeter Deum, est ex Deo sicut ex | |
| 2668 primo principio. Ergo nihil quod est praeter Deum, potest esse | |
| 2669 infinitum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q7_A2-p6"> | |
| 2670 <b>I answer that,</b> Things other than God can be relatively infinite, but not absolutely infinite. For with regard to infinite as applied to | |
| 2671 matter, it is manifest that everything actually existing possesses a form; and thus its matter is determined by form. But | |
| 2672 because matter, considered as existing under some substantial form, remains in potentiality to many accidental forms, which | |
| 2673 is absolutely finite can be relatively infinite; as, for example, wood is finite according to | |
| 2674 its own form, but still it is relatively infinite, inasmuch as it is in potentiality to an infinite number of shapes. But | |
| 2675 if we speak of the infinite in reference to form, it is manifest that those things, the forms of which are in matter, are | |
| 2676 absolutely finite, and in no way infinite. If, however, any created forms are not received into matter, but are self-subsisting, | |
| 2677 as some think is the case with angels, these will be relatively infinite, inasmuch as such kinds of forms are not terminated, | |
| 2678 nor contracted by any matter. But because a created form thus subsisting has being, and yet is not its own being, it follows | |
| 2679 that its being is received and contracted to a determinate nature. Hence it cannot be absolutely infinite. | |
| 2680 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 7 a. 2 co."><a name="28506" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28506] Iª q. 7 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum | |
| 2681 quod aliquid praeter Deum potest esse infinitum secundum quid, sed | |
| 2682 non simpliciter. Si enim loquamur de infinito secundum quod | |
| 2683 competit materiae, manifestum est quod omne existens in actu, habet | |
| 2684 aliquam formam, et sic materia eius est terminata per formam. Sed | |
| 2685 quia materia, secundum quod est sub una forma substantiali, remanet | |
| 2686 in potentia ad multas formas accidentales; quod est finitum | |
| 2687 simpliciter, potest esse infinitum secundum quid, utpote lignum est | |
| 2688 finitum secundum suam formam, sed tamen est infinitum secundum | |
| 2689 quid, inquantum est in potentia ad figuras infinitas. Si autem | |
| 2690 loquamur de infinito secundum quod convenit formae, sic manifestum | |
| 2691 est quod illa quorum formae sunt in materia, sunt simpliciter | |
| 2692 finita, et nullo modo infinita. Si autem sint aliquae formae | |
| 2693 creatae non receptae in materia, sed per se subsistentes, ut quidam | |
| 2694 de Angelis opinantur, erunt quidem infinitae secundum quid, | |
| 2695 inquantum huiusmodi formae non terminantur neque contrahuntur per | |
| 2696 aliquam materiam, sed quia forma creata sic subsistens habet esse, | |
| 2697 et non est suum esse, necesse est quod ipsum eius esse sit receptum | |
| 2698 et contractum ad determinatam naturam. Unde non potest esse | |
| 2699 infinitum simpliciter.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q7_A2-p7"> | |
| 2700 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> It is against the nature of a made thing for its essence to be its existence; because subsisting being is not a created being; | |
| 2701 hence it is against the nature of a made thing to be absolutely infinite. Therefore, as God, although He has infinite power, | |
| 2702 cannot make a thing to be not made (for this would imply that two contradictories are true at the same time), so likewise | |
| 2703 He cannot make anything to be absolutely infinite. | |
| 2704 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 7 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="28507" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28507] Iª q. 7 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo | |
| 2705 dicendum quod hoc est contra rationem facti, quod essentia rei sit | |
| 2706 ipsum esse eius, quia esse subsistens non est esse creatum, unde | |
| 2707 contra rationem facti est, quod sit simpliciter infinitum. Sicut | |
| 2708 ergo Deus, licet habeat potentiam infinitam, non tamen potest | |
| 2709 facere aliquid non factum (hoc enim esset contradictoria esse | |
| 2710 simul); ita non potest facere aliquid infinitum simpliciter.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q7_A2-p8"> | |
| 2711 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The fact that the power of the intellect extends itself in a way to infinite things, is because the intellect is a form not | |
| 2712 in matter, but either wholly separated from matter, as is the angelic substance, or at least an intellectual power, which | |
| 2713 is not the act of any organ, in the intellectual soul joined to a body. | |
| 2714 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 7 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="28508" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28508] Iª q. 7 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 2715 dicendum quod hoc ipsum quod virtus intellectus extendit se | |
| 2716 quodammodo ad infinita, procedit ex hoc quod intellectus est forma | |
| 2717 non in materia; sed vel totaliter separata, sicut sunt substantiae | |
| 2718 Angelorum; vel ad minus potentia intellectiva, quae non est actus | |
| 2719 alicuius organi, in anima intellectiva corpori coniuncta.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q7_A2-p9"> | |
| 2720 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Primary matter does not exist by itself in nature, since it is not actually being, but potentially only; hence it is something | |
| 2721 concreated rather than created. Nevertheless, primary matter even as a potentiality is not absolutely infinite, but relatively, | |
| 2722 because its potentiality extends only to natural forms. | |
| 2723 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 7 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="28509" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28509] Iª q. 7 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum | |
| 2724 quod materia prima non existit in rerum natura per seipsam, cum non | |
| 2725 sit ens in actu, sed potentia tantum, unde magis est aliquid | |
| 2726 concreatum, quam creatum. Nihilominus tamen materia prima, etiam | |
| 2727 secundum potentiam, non est infinita simpliciter, sed secundum | |
| 2728 quid, quia eius potentia non se extendit nisi ad formas | |
| 2729 naturales.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q7_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q7_A3-p0.1">Q. 7. A. 3. Whether an actually infinite magnitude can exist?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q7_A3-p2"> | |
| 2730 <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that there can be something actually infinite in magnitude. For in mathematics there is no error, since "there is | |
| 2731 no lie in things abstract," as the Philosopher says (Phys. ii). But mathematics uses the infinite in magnitude; thus, the | |
| 2732 geometrician in his demonstrations says, "Let this line be infinite." Therefore it is not impossible for a thing to be infinite | |
| 2733 in magnitude. | |
| 2734 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 7 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="28510" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28510] Iª q. 7 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium sic | |
| 2735 proceditur. Videtur quod possit esse aliquid infinitum actu | |
| 2736 secundum magnitudinem. In scientiis enim mathematicis non invenitur | |
| 2737 falsum, <i>quia abstrahentium non est mendacium</i>, ut dicitur in | |
| 2738 II Physic. Sed scientiae mathematicae utuntur infinito secundum | |
| 2739 magnitudinem, dicit enim geometra in suis demonstrationibus, sit | |
| 2740 linea talis infinita. Ergo non est impossibile aliquid esse | |
| 2741 infinitum secundum magnitudinem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q7_A3-p3"> | |
| 2742 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, what is not against the nature of anything, can agree with it. Now to be infinite is not against the nature of magnitude; | |
| 2743 but rather both the finite and the infinite seem to be properties of quantity. Therefore it is not impossible for some magnitude | |
| 2744 to be infinite. | |
| 2745 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 7 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="28511" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28511] Iª q. 7 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, id | |
| 2746 quod non est contra rationem alicuius, non est impossibile | |
| 2747 convenire sibi. Sed esse infinitum non est contra rationem | |
| 2748 magnitudinis, sed magis finitum et infinitum videntur esse | |
| 2749 passiones quantitatis. Ergo non est impossibile aliquam | |
| 2750 magnitudinem esse infinitam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q7_A3-p4"> | |
| 2751 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, magnitude is infinitely divisible, for the continuous is defined that which is infinitely divisible, as is clear | |
| 2752 from Phys. iii. But contraries are concerned about one and the same thing. Since therefore addition is opposed to division, | |
| 2753 and increase opposed to diminution, it appears that magnitude can be increased to infinity. Therefore it is possible for magnitude | |
| 2754 to be infinite. | |
| 2755 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 7 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="28512" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28512] Iª q. 7 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 2756 magnitudo divisibilis est in infinitum, sic enim definitur | |
| 2757 continuum, quod est in infinitum divisibile, ut patet in III | |
| 2758 Physic. Sed contraria nata sunt fieri circa idem. Cum ergo | |
| 2759 divisioni opponatur additio, et diminutioni augmentum, videtur quod | |
| 2760 magnitudo possit crescere in infinitum. Ergo possibile est esse | |
| 2761 magnitudinem infinitam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q7_A3-p5"> | |
| 2762 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, movement and time have quantity and continuity derived from the magnitude over which movement passes, as is said | |
| 2763 in Phys. iv. But it is not against the nature of time and movement to be infinite, since every determinate indivisible in | |
| 2764 time and circular movement is both a beginning and an end. Therefore neither is it against the nature of magnitude to be infinite. | |
| 2765 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 7 a. 3 arg. 4"><a name="28513" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28513] Iª q. 7 a. 3 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, motus | |
| 2766 et tempus habent quantitatem et continuitatem a magnitudine super | |
| 2767 quam transit motus, ut dicitur in IV Physic. Sed non est contra | |
| 2768 rationem temporis et motus quod sint infinita, cum unumquodque | |
| 2769 indivisibile signatum in tempore et motu circulari, sit principium | |
| 2770 et finis. Ergo nec contra rationem magnitudinis erit quod sit | |
| 2771 infinita.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q7_A3-p6"> | |
| 2772 <b>On the contrary,</b> Every body has a surface. But every body which has a surface is finite; because surface is the term of a finite body. Therefore | |
| 2773 all bodies are finite. The same applies both to surface and to a line. Therefore nothing is infinite in magnitude. | |
| 2774 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 7 a. 3 s. c."><a name="28514" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28514] Iª q. 7 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra, omne | |
| 2775 corpus superficiem habet. Sed omne corpus superficiem habens est | |
| 2776 finitum, quia superficies est terminus corporis finiti. Ergo omne | |
| 2777 corpus est finitum. Et similiter potest dici de superficie et | |
| 2778 linea. Nihil est ergo infinitum secundum magnitudinem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q7_A3-p7"> | |
| 2779 <b>I answer that,</b> It is one thing to be infinite in essence, and another to be infinite in magnitude. For granted that a body exists infinite | |
| 2780 in magnitude, as fire or air, yet this could not be infinite in essence, because its essence would be terminated in a species | |
| 2781 by its form, and confined to individuality by matter. And so assuming from these premises that no creature is infinite in | |
| 2782 essence, it still remains to inquire whether any creature can be infinite in | |
| 2783 magnitude. | |
| 2784 </p><p id="FP_Q7_A3-p8"> We must therefore observe that a body, which is a complete magnitude, can be considered in two ways; mathematically, in respect | |
| 2785 to its quantity only; and naturally, as regards its matter and form. | |
| 2786 </p><p id="FP_Q7_A3-p9"> Now it is manifest that a natural body cannot be actually infinite. For every natural body has some determined substantial | |
| 2787 form. Since therefore the accidents follow upon the substantial form, it is necessary that determinate accidents should follow | |
| 2788 upon a determinate form; and among these accidents is quantity. So every natural body has a greater or smaller determinate | |
| 2789 quantity. Hence it is impossible for a natural body to be infinite. The same appears from movement; because | |
| 2790 every natural body has some natural movement; whereas an infinite body could not have any natural movement; neither direct, | |
| 2791 because nothing moves naturally by a direct movement unless it is out of its place; and this could not happen to an infinite | |
| 2792 body, for it would occupy every place, and thus every place would be indifferently its own place. Neither could it move circularly; | |
| 2793 forasmuch as circular motion requires that one part of the body is necessarily transferred to a place occupied by | |
| 2794 another part, and this could not happen as regards an infinite circular body: for if two lines be drawn from the centre, the | |
| 2795 farther they extend from the centre, the farther they are from each other; therefore, if a body were infinite, the lines would | |
| 2796 be infinitely distant from each other; and thus one could never occupy the place belonging to any other. | |
| 2797 </p><p id="FP_Q7_A3-p10"> The same applies to a mathematical body. For if we imagine a mathematical body actually existing, we must imagine it under | |
| 2798 some form, because nothing is actual except by its form; hence, since the form of quantity as such is figure, such a body | |
| 2799 must have some figure, and so would be finite; for figure is confined by a term or boundary. | |
| 2800 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 7 a. 3 co."><a name="28515" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28515] Iª q. 7 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum | |
| 2801 quod aliud est esse infinitum secundum suam essentiam, et secundum | |
| 2802 magnitudinem. Dato enim quod esset aliquod corpus infinitum | |
| 2803 secundum magnitudinem, utpote ignis vel aer, non tamen esset | |
| 2804 infinitum secundum essentiam, quia essentia sua esset terminata ad | |
| 2805 aliquam speciem per formam, et ad aliquod individuum per materiam. | |
| 2806 Et ideo, habito ex praemissis quod nulla creatura est infinita | |
| 2807 secundum essentiam, adhuc restat inquirere utrum aliquid creatum | |
| 2808 sit infinitum secundum magnitudinem. Sciendum est igitur quod | |
| 2809 corpus, quod est magnitudo completa, dupliciter sumitur, scilicet | |
| 2810 mathematice, secundum quod consideratur in eo sola quantitas; et | |
| 2811 naturaliter, secundum quod consideratur in eo materia et forma. Et | |
| 2812 de corpore quidem naturali, quod non possit esse infinitum in actu, | |
| 2813 manifestum est. Nam omne corpus naturale aliquam formam | |
| 2814 substantialem habet determinatam, cum igitur ad formam | |
| 2815 substantialem consequantur accidentia, necesse est quod ad | |
| 2816 determinatam formam consequantur determinata accidentia; inter quae | |
| 2817 est quantitas. Unde omne corpus naturale habet determinatam | |
| 2818 quantitatem et in maius et in minus. Unde impossibile est aliquod | |
| 2819 corpus naturale infinitum esse. Hoc etiam ex motu patet. Quia omne | |
| 2820 corpus naturale habet aliquem motum naturalem. Corpus autem | |
| 2821 infinitum non posset habere aliquem motum naturalem, nec rectum, | |
| 2822 quia nihil movetur naturaliter motu recto, nisi cum est extra suum | |
| 2823 locum, quod corpori infinito accidere non posset; occuparet enim | |
| 2824 omnia loca, et sic indifferenter quilibet locus esset locus eius. | |
| 2825 Et similiter etiam neque secundum motum circularem. Quia in motu | |
| 2826 circulari oportet quod una pars corporis transferatur ad locum in | |
| 2827 quo fuit alia pars; quod in corpore circulari, si ponatur | |
| 2828 infinitum, esse non posset, quia duae lineae protractae a centro, | |
| 2829 quanto longius protrahuntur a centro, tanto longius distant ab | |
| 2830 invicem; si ergo corpus esset infinitum, in infinitum lineae | |
| 2831 distarent ab invicem, et sic una nunquam posset pervenire ad locum | |
| 2832 alterius. De corpore etiam mathematico eadem ratio est. Quia si | |
| 2833 imaginemur corpus mathematicum existens actu, oportet quod | |
| 2834 imaginemur ipsum sub aliqua forma, quia nihil est actu nisi per | |
| 2835 suam formam. Unde, cum forma quanti, inquantum huiusmodi, sit | |
| 2836 figura, oportebit quod habeat aliquam figuram. Et sic erit finitum, | |
| 2837 est enim figura, quae termino vel terminis comprehenditur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q7_A3-p11"> | |
| 2838 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> A geometrician does not need to assume a line actually infinite, but takes some actually finite line, from which he subtracts | |
| 2839 whatever he finds necessary; which line he calls infinite. | |
| 2840 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 7 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="28516" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28516] Iª q. 7 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo | |
| 2841 dicendum quod geometer non indiget sumere aliquam lineam esse | |
| 2842 infinitam actu, sed indiget accipere aliquam lineam finitam actu, a | |
| 2843 qua possit subtrahi quantum necesse est, et hanc nominat lineam | |
| 2844 infinitam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q7_A3-p12"> | |
| 2845 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Although the infinite is not against the nature of magnitude in general, still it is against the nature of any species of | |
| 2846 it; thus, for instance, it is against the nature of a bicubical or tricubical magnitude, whether circular or triangular, and | |
| 2847 so on. Now what is not possible in any species cannot exist in the genus; hence there cannot be any infinite magnitude, since | |
| 2848 no species of magnitude is infinite. | |
| 2849 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 7 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="28517" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28517] Iª q. 7 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 2850 dicendum quod, licet infinitum non sit contra rationem magnitudinis | |
| 2851 in communi, est tamen contra rationem cuiuslibet speciei eius, | |
| 2852 scilicet contra rationem magnitudinis bicubitae vel tricubitae, | |
| 2853 sive circularis vel triangularis, et similium. Non autem est | |
| 2854 possibile in genere esse quod in nulla specie est. Unde non est | |
| 2855 possibile esse aliquam magnitudinem infinitam, cum nulla species | |
| 2856 magnitudinis sit infinita.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q7_A3-p13"> | |
| 2857 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The infinite in quantity, as was shown above, belongs to matter. Now by division of the whole we approach to matter, forasmuch | |
| 2858 as parts have the aspect of matter; but by addition we approach to the whole which has the aspect of a form. Therefore the | |
| 2859 infinite is not in the addition of magnitude, but only in division. | |
| 2860 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 7 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="28518" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28518] Iª q. 7 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum | |
| 2861 quod infinitum quod convenit quantitati, ut dictum est, se tenet ex | |
| 2862 parte materiae. Per divisionem autem totius acceditur ad materiam, | |
| 2863 nam partes se habent in ratione materiae, per additionem autem | |
| 2864 acceditur ad totum, quod se habet in ratione formae. Et ideo non | |
| 2865 invenitur infinitum in additione magnitudinis, sed in divisione | |
| 2866 tantum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q7_A3-p14"> | |
| 2867 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Movement and time are whole, not actually but successively; hence they have potentiality mixed with actuality. But magnitude | |
| 2868 is an actual whole; therefore the infinite in quantity refers to matter, and does not agree with the totality of magnitude; | |
| 2869 yet it agrees with the totality of time and movement: for it is proper to matter to be in potentiality. | |
| 2870 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 7 a. 3 ad 4"><a name="28519" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28519] Iª q. 7 a. 3 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum dicendum | |
| 2871 quod motus et tempus non sunt secundum totum in actu, sed | |
| 2872 successive, unde habent potentiam permixtam actui. Sed magnitudo | |
| 2873 est tota in actu. Et ideo infinitum quod convenit quantitati, et se | |
| 2874 tenet ex parte materiae, repugnat totalitati magnitudinis, non | |
| 2875 autem totalitati temporis vel motus, esse enim in potentia convenit | |
| 2876 materiae.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q7_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q7_A4-p0.1">Q. 7. A. 4. Whether an infinite multitude can exist?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q7_A4-p2"> | |
| 2877 <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that an actually infinite multitude is possible. For it is not impossible for a potentiality to be made actual. | |
| 2878 But number can be multiplied to infinity. Therefore it is possible for an infinite multitude actually to exist. | |
| 2879 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 7 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="28520" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28520] Iª q. 7 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum sic | |
| 2880 proceditur. Videtur quod possibile sit esse multitudinem infinitam | |
| 2881 secundum actum. Non enim est impossibile id quod est in potentia | |
| 2882 reduci ad actum. Sed numerus est in infinitum multiplicabilis. Ergo | |
| 2883 non est impossibile esse multitudinem infinitam in actu.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q7_A4-p3"> | |
| 2884 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it is possible for any individual of any species to be made actual. But the species of figures are infinite. Therefore | |
| 2885 an infinite number of actual figures is possible. | |
| 2886 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 7 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="28521" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28521] Iª q. 7 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 2887 cuiuslibet speciei possibile est esse aliquod individuum in actu. | |
| 2888 Sed species figurae sunt infinitae. Ergo possibile est esse | |
| 2889 infinitas figuras in actu.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q7_A4-p4"> | |
| 2890 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, things not opposed to each other do not obstruct each other. But supposing a multitude of things to exist, there | |
| 2891 can still be many others not opposed to them. Therefore it is not impossible for others also to coexist with them, and so | |
| 2892 on to infinitude; therefore an actual infinite number of things is possible. | |
| 2893 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 7 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="28522" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28522] Iª q. 7 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, ea | |
| 2894 quae non opponuntur ad invicem, non impediunt se invicem. Sed, | |
| 2895 posita aliqua multitudine rerum, adhuc possunt fieri alia multa | |
| 2896 quae eis non opponuntur, ergo non est impossibile aliqua iterum | |
| 2897 simul esse cum eis, et sic in infinitum. Ergo possibile est esse | |
| 2898 infinita in actu.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q7_A4-p5"> | |
| 2899 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written, "Thou hast ordered all things in measure, and number, and weight" ( | |
| 2900 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q7_A4-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.11.21" target="asv">Wis. 11:21</a>). | |
| 2901 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 7 a. 4 s. c."><a name="28523" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28523] Iª q. 7 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est | |
| 2902 quod dicitur Sap. XI, <i>omnia in pondere, numero et mensura | |
| 2903 disposuisti</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q7_A4-p6"> | |
| 2904 <b>I answer that,</b> A twofold opinion exists on this subject. Some, as Avicenna and Algazel, said that it was impossible for an actually infinite | |
| 2905 multitude to exist absolutely; but that an accidentally infinite multitude was not impossible. A multitude is said to be infinite | |
| 2906 absolutely, when an infinite multitude is necessary that something may exist. Now this is impossible; because it would entail | |
| 2907 something dependent on an infinity for its existence; and hence its generation | |
| 2908 could never come to be, because it is impossible to pass through an infinite medium. | |
| 2909 </p><p id="FP_Q7_A4-p7"> A multitude is said to be accidentally infinite when its existence as such is not necessary, but accidental. This can be | |
| 2910 shown, for example, in the work of a carpenter requiring a certain absolute multitude; namely, art in the soul, the movement | |
| 2911 of the hand, and a hammer; and supposing that such things were infinitely multiplied, the carpentering work would never be | |
| 2912 finished, forasmuch as it would depend on an infinite number of causes. But the multitude of hammers, inasmuch as | |
| 2913 one may be broken and another used, is an accidental multitude; for it happens by accident that many hammers are used, and | |
| 2914 it matters little whether one or two, or many are used, or an infinite number, if the work is carried on for an infinite time. | |
| 2915 In this way they said that there can be an accidentally infinite multitude. | |
| 2916 </p><p id="FP_Q7_A4-p8"> This, however, is impossible; since every kind of multitude must belong to a species of multitude. Now the species of multitude | |
| 2917 are to be reckoned by the species of numbers. But no species of number is infinite; for every number is multitude measured | |
| 2918 by one. Hence it is impossible for there to be an actually infinite multitude, either absolute or accidental. Likewise multitude | |
| 2919 in nature is created; and everything created is comprehended under some clear intention of the Creator; | |
| 2920 for no agent acts aimlessly. Hence everything created must be comprehended in a certain number. Therefore it is impossible | |
| 2921 for an actually infinite multitude to exist, even accidentally. But a potentially infinite multitude is possible; because | |
| 2922 the increase of multitude follows upon the division of magnitude; since the more a thing is divided, the greater number of | |
| 2923 things result. Hence, as the infinite is to be found potentially in the division of the continuous, because we thus approach | |
| 2924 matter, as was shown in the preceding article, by the same rule, the infinite can be also found potentially in the addition | |
| 2925 of multitude. | |
| 2926 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 7 a. 4 co."><a name="28524" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28524] Iª q. 7 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum | |
| 2927 quod circa hoc fuit duplex opinio. Quidam enim, sicut Avicenna et | |
| 2928 Algazel, dixerunt quod impossibile est esse multitudinem actu | |
| 2929 infinitam per se, sed infinitam per accidens multitudinem esse, non | |
| 2930 est impossibile. Dicitur enim multitudo esse infinita per se, | |
| 2931 quando requiritur ad aliquid ut multitudo infinita sit. Et hoc est | |
| 2932 impossibile esse, quia sic oporteret quod aliquid dependeret ex | |
| 2933 infinitis; unde eius generatio nunquam compleretur, cum non sit | |
| 2934 infinita pertransire. Per accidens autem dicitur multitudo | |
| 2935 infinita, quando non requiritur ad aliquid infinitas multitudinis, | |
| 2936 sed accidit ita esse. Et hoc sic manifestari potest in operatione | |
| 2937 fabri, ad quam quaedam multitudo requiritur per se, scilicet quod | |
| 2938 sit ars in anima, et manus movens, et martellus. Et si haec in | |
| 2939 infinitum multiplicarentur, nunquam opus fabrile compleretur, quia | |
| 2940 dependeret ex infinitis causis. Sed multitudo martellorum quae | |
| 2941 accidit ex hoc quod unum frangitur et accipitur aliud, est | |
| 2942 multitudo per accidens, accidit enim quod multis martellis | |
| 2943 operetur; et nihil differt utrum uno vel duobus vel pluribus | |
| 2944 operetur, vel infinitis, si infinito tempore operaretur. Per hunc | |
| 2945 igitur modum, posuerunt quod possibile est esse actu multitudinem | |
| 2946 infinitam per accidens. Sed hoc est impossibile. Quia omnem | |
| 2947 multitudinem oportet esse in aliqua specie multitudinis. Species | |
| 2948 autem multitudinis sunt secundum species numerorum. Nulla autem | |
| 2949 species numeri est infinita, quia quilibet numerus est multitudo | |
| 2950 mensurata per unum. Unde impossibile est esse multitudinem | |
| 2951 infinitam actu, sive per se, sive per accidens. Item, multitudo in | |
| 2952 rerum natura existens est creata, et omne creatum sub aliqua certa | |
| 2953 intentione creantis comprehenditur, non enim in vanum agens aliquod | |
| 2954 operatur. Unde necesse est quod sub certo numero omnia creata | |
| 2955 comprehendantur. Impossibile est ergo esse multitudinem infinitam | |
| 2956 in actu, etiam per accidens. Sed esse multitudinem infinitam in | |
| 2957 potentia, possibile est. Quia augmentum multitudinis consequitur | |
| 2958 divisionem magnitudinis, quanto enim aliquid plus dividitur, tanto | |
| 2959 plura secundum numerum resultant. Unde, sicut infinitum invenitur | |
| 2960 in potentia in divisione continui, quia proceditur ad materiam, ut | |
| 2961 supra ostensum est; eadem ratione etiam infinitum invenitur in | |
| 2962 potentia in additione multitudinis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q7_A4-p9"> | |
| 2963 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Every potentiality is made actual according to its mode of being; for instance, a day is reduced to act successively, and | |
| 2964 not all at once. Likewise the infinite in multitude is reduced to act successively, and not all at once; because every multitude | |
| 2965 can be succeeded by another multitude to infinity. | |
| 2966 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 7 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="28525" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28525] Iª q. 7 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo | |
| 2967 dicendum quod unumquodque quod est in potentia, reducitur in actum | |
| 2968 secundum modum sui esse, dies enim non reducitur in actum ut sit | |
| 2969 tota simul, sed successive. Et similiter infinitum multitudinis non | |
| 2970 reducitur in actum ut sit totum simul, sed successive, quia post | |
| 2971 quamlibet multitudinem, potest sumi alia multitudo in | |
| 2972 infinitum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q7_A4-p10"> | |
| 2973 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Species of figures are infinite by infinitude of number. Now there are various species of figures, such as trilateral, quadrilateral | |
| 2974 and so on; and as an infinitely numerable multitude is not all at once reduced to act, so neither is the multitude of figures. | |
| 2975 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 7 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="28526" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28526] Iª q. 7 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 2976 dicendum quod species figurarum habent infinitatem ex infinitate | |
| 2977 numeri, sunt enim species figurarum, trilaterum, quadrilaterum, et | |
| 2978 sic inde. Unde, sicut multitudo infinita numerabilis non reducitur | |
| 2979 in actum quod sit tota simul, ita nec multitudo figurarum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q7_A4-p11"> | |
| 2980 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Although the supposition of some things does not preclude the supposition of others, still the supposition of an infinite | |
| 2981 number is opposed to any single species of multitude. Hence it is not possible for an actually infinite multitude to exist. | |
| 2982 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 7 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="28527" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28527] Iª q. 7 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum | |
| 2983 quod, licet, quibusdam positis, alia poni non sit eis oppositum; | |
| 2984 tamen infinita poni opponitur cuilibet speciei multitudinis. Unde | |
| 2985 non est possibile esse aliquam multitudinem actu infinitam.</p></div></div></div></div> | |
| 2986 <div id="FP_Q8" class="div3"> | |
| 2987 <h3 id="FP_Q8-p0.1">Q. 8. THE EXISTENCE OF GOD IN THINGS (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3> | |
| 2988 <div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> | |
| 2989 <p id="FP_Q8-p2"> Since it evidently belongs to the infinite to be present everywhere, and in all things, we now consider whether this belongs | |
| 2990 to God; and concerning this there arise four points of inquiry: | |
| 2991 </p><p id="FP_Q8-p3"> (1) Whether God is in all things?</p><p id="FP_Q8-p4"> (2) Whether God is everywhere?</p><p id="FP_Q8-p5"> (3) Whether God is everywhere by essence, power, and presence?</p><p id="FP_Q8-p6"> (4) Whether to be everywhere belongs to God alone?</p> | |
| 2992 </div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 8 pr."><a name="28528" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28528] | |
| 2993 Iª q. 8 pr.</span></a> Quia vero infinito convenire videtur | |
| 2994 quod ubique et in omnibus sit, considerandum est utrum hoc Deo | |
| 2995 conveniat. Et circa hoc quaeruntur quatuor. Primo, utrum Deus sit | |
| 2996 in omnibus rebus. Secundo, utrum Deus sit ubique. Tertio, utrum | |
| 2997 Deus sit ubique per essentiam et potentiam et praesentiam. Quarto, | |
| 2998 utrum esse ubique sit proprium Dei.</p></div></div></div> | |
| 2999 <div id="FP_Q8_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q8_A1-p0.1">Q. 8. A. 1. Whether God is in all things?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q8_A1-p2"> | |
| 3000 <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God is not in all things. For what is above all things is not in all things. But God is above all, according | |
| 3001 to the Psalm ( | |
| 3002 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q8_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.112.4" target="asv">Ps. 112:4</a>), "The Lord is high above all nations," etc. Therefore God is not in all things. | |
| 3003 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 8 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="28529" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28529] Iª q. 8 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum sic | |
| 3004 proceditur. Videtur quod Deus non sit in omnibus rebus. Quod enim | |
| 3005 est supra omnia, non est in omnibus rebus. Sed Deus est supra | |
| 3006 omnia, secundum illud Psalmi, <i>excelsus super omnes gentes | |
| 3007 dominus,</i> et cetera. Ergo Deus non est in omnibus rebus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q8_A1-p3"> | |
| 3008 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, what is in anything is thereby contained. Now God is not contained by things, but rather does He contain them. Therefore | |
| 3009 God is not in things but things are rather in Him. Hence Augustine says (Octog. Tri. Quaest. qu. 20), that "in Him things | |
| 3010 are, rather than He is in any place." | |
| 3011 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 8 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="28530" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28530] Iª q. 8 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, quod | |
| 3012 est in aliquo, continetur ab eo. Sed Deus non continetur a rebus, | |
| 3013 sed magis continet res. Ergo Deus non est in rebus, sed magis res | |
| 3014 sunt in eo. Unde Augustinus, in libro octoginta trium quaest., | |
| 3015 dicit quod <i>in ipso potius sunt omnia, quam ipse alicubi</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q8_A1-p4"> | |
| 3016 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the more powerful an agent is, the more extended is its action. But God is the most powerful of all agents. Therefore | |
| 3017 His action can extend to things which are far removed from Him; nor is it necessary that He should be in all things. | |
| 3018 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 8 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="28531" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28531] Iª q. 8 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, quanto | |
| 3019 aliquod agens est virtuosius, tanto ad magis distans eius actio | |
| 3020 procedit. Sed Deus est virtuosissimum agens. Ergo eius actio | |
| 3021 pertingere potest ad ea etiam quae ab ipso distant, nec oportet | |
| 3022 quod sit in omnibus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q8_A1-p5"> | |
| 3023 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, the demons are beings. But God is not in the demons; for there is no fellowship between light and darkness ( | |
| 3024 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q8_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#iiCor.6.14" target="asv">2 Cor. 6:14</a>). Therefore God is not in all things. | |
| 3025 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 8 a. 1 arg. 4"><a name="28532" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28532] Iª q. 8 a. 1 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 3026 Daemones res aliquae sunt. Nec tamen Deus est in Daemonibus, non | |
| 3027 enim est conventio lucis ad tenebras, ut dicitur II ad Cor. VI. | |
| 3028 Ergo Deus non est in omnibus rebus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q8_A1-p6"> | |
| 3029 <b>On the contrary,</b> A thing is wherever it operates. But God operates in all things, according to | |
| 3030 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q8_A1-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.26.12" target="asv"> Is. 26:12, </a> "Lord . . . Thou hast wrought all our works in [Vulg.: 'for'] us." Therefore God is in all things. | |
| 3031 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 8 a. 1 s. c."><a name="28533" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28533] Iª q. 8 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra, | |
| 3032 ubicumque operatur aliquid, ibi est. Sed Deus operatur in omnibus, | |
| 3033 secundum illud Isaiae XXVI, <i>omnia opera nostra operatus es in | |
| 3034 nobis, domine</i>. Ergo Deus est in omnibus rebus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q8_A1-p7"> | |
| 3035 <b>I answer that,</b> God is in all things; not, indeed, as part of their essence, nor as an accident, but as an agent is present to that upon | |
| 3036 which it works. For an agent must be joined to that wherein it acts immediately and touch it by its power; hence it is proved | |
| 3037 in Phys. vii that the thing moved and the mover must be joined together. Now since God is very being by His own essence, created | |
| 3038 being must be His proper effect; as to ignite is the proper effect of fire. Now God | |
| 3039 causes this effect in things not only when they first begin to be, but as long as they are preserved in being; as light is | |
| 3040 caused in the air by the sun as long as the air remains illuminated. Therefore as long as a thing has being, God must be present | |
| 3041 to it, according to its mode of being. But being is innermost in each thing and most fundamentally inherent in all things | |
| 3042 since it is formal in respect of everything found in a thing, as was shown above ( | |
| 3043 <a id="FP_Q8_A1-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q7_A1.html">Q[7], A[1]</a>). Hence | |
| 3044 it must be that God is in all things, and innermostly. | |
| 3045 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 8 a. 1 co."><a name="28534" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28534] Iª q. 8 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum | |
| 3046 quod Deus est in omnibus rebus, non quidem sicut pars essentiae, | |
| 3047 vel sicut accidens, sed sicut agens adest ei in quod agit. Oportet | |
| 3048 enim omne agens coniungi ei in quod immediate agit, et sua virtute | |
| 3049 illud contingere, unde in VII Physic. probatur quod motum et movens | |
| 3050 oportet esse simul. Cum autem Deus sit ipsum esse per suam | |
| 3051 essentiam, oportet quod esse creatum sit proprius effectus eius; | |
| 3052 sicut ignire est proprius effectus ignis. Hunc autem effectum | |
| 3053 causat Deus in rebus, non solum quando primo esse incipiunt, sed | |
| 3054 quandiu in esse conservantur; sicut lumen causatur in aere a sole | |
| 3055 quandiu aer illuminatus manet. Quandiu igitur res habet esse, | |
| 3056 tandiu oportet quod Deus adsit ei, secundum modum quo esse habet. | |
| 3057 Esse autem est illud quod est magis intimum cuilibet, et quod | |
| 3058 profundius omnibus inest, cum sit formale respectu omnium quae in | |
| 3059 re sunt, ut ex supra dictis patet. Unde oportet quod Deus sit in | |
| 3060 omnibus rebus, et intime.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q8_A1-p8"> | |
| 3061 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> God is above all things by the excellence of His nature; nevertheless, He is in all things as the cause of the being of all | |
| 3062 things; as was shown above in this article. | |
| 3063 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 8 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="28535" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28535] Iª q. 8 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo | |
| 3064 dicendum quod Deus est supra omnia per excellentiam suae naturae, | |
| 3065 et tamen est in omnibus rebus, ut causans omnium esse, ut supra | |
| 3066 dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q8_A1-p9"> | |
| 3067 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Although corporeal things are said to be in another as in that which contains them, nevertheless, spiritual things contain | |
| 3068 those things in which they are; as the soul contains the body. Hence also God is in things containing them; nevertheless, | |
| 3069 by a certain similitude to corporeal things, it is said that all things are in God; inasmuch as they are contained by Him. | |
| 3070 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 8 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="28536" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28536] Iª q. 8 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 3071 dicendum quod, licet corporalia dicantur esse in aliquo sicut in | |
| 3072 continente, tamen spiritualia continent ea in quibus sunt, sicut | |
| 3073 anima continet corpus. Unde et Deus est in rebus sicut continens | |
| 3074 res. Tamen, per quandam similitudinem corporalium, dicuntur omnia | |
| 3075 esse in Deo, inquantum continentur ab ipso.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q8_A1-p10"> | |
| 3076 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> No action of an agent, however powerful it may be, acts at a distance, except through a medium. But it belongs to the great | |
| 3077 power of God that He acts immediately in all things. Hence nothing is distant from Him, as if it could be without God in itself. | |
| 3078 But things are said to be distant from God by the unlikeness to Him in nature or grace; as also He is above all by the excellence | |
| 3079 of His own nature. | |
| 3080 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 8 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="28537" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28537] Iª q. 8 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum | |
| 3081 quod nullius agentis, quantumcumque virtuosi, actio procedit ad | |
| 3082 aliquid distans, nisi inquantum in illud per media agit. Hoc autem | |
| 3083 ad maximam virtutem Dei pertinet, quod immediate in omnibus agit. | |
| 3084 Unde nihil est distans ab eo, quasi in se illud Deum non habeat. | |
| 3085 Dicuntur tamen res distare a Deo per dissimilitudinem naturae vel | |
| 3086 gratiae, sicut et ipse est super omnia per excellentiam suae | |
| 3087 naturae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q8_A1-p11"> | |
| 3088 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> In the demons there is their nature which is from God, and also the deformity of sin which is not from Him; therefore, it | |
| 3089 is not to be absolutely conceded that God is in the demons, except with the addition, "inasmuch as they are beings." But in | |
| 3090 things not deformed in their nature, we must say absolutely that God is. | |
| 3091 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 8 a. 1 ad 4"><a name="28538" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28538] Iª q. 8 a. 1 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum dicendum | |
| 3092 quod in Daemonibus intelligitur et natura, quae est a Deo, et | |
| 3093 deformitas culpae, quae non est ab ipso. Et ideo non est absolute | |
| 3094 concedendum quod Deus sit in Daemonibus, sed cum hac additione, | |
| 3095 inquantum sunt res quaedam. In rebus autem quae nominant naturam | |
| 3096 non deformatam, absolute dicendum est Deum esse.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q8_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q8_A2-p0.1">Q. 8. A. 2. Whether God is everywhere?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q8_A2-p2"> | |
| 3097 <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God is not everywhere. For to be everywhere means to be in every place. But to be in every place does not belong | |
| 3098 to God, to Whom it does not belong to be in place at all; for "incorporeal things," as Boethius says (De Hebdom.), "are not | |
| 3099 in a place." Therefore God is not everywhere. | |
| 3100 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 8 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="28539" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28539] Iª q. 8 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum sic | |
| 3101 proceditur. Videtur quod Deus non sit ubique. Esse enim ubique | |
| 3102 significat esse in omni loco. Sed esse in omni loco non convenit | |
| 3103 Deo, cui non convenit esse in loco, nam incorporalia, ut dicit | |
| 3104 Boetius, in libro de Hebdomad., non sunt in loco. Ergo Deus non est | |
| 3105 ubique.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q8_A2-p3"> | |
| 3106 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the relation of time to succession is the same as the relation of place to permanence. But one indivisible part | |
| 3107 of action or movement cannot exist in different times; therefore neither can one indivisible part in the genus of permanent | |
| 3108 things be in every place. Now the divine being is not successive but permanent. Therefore God is not in many places; and thus | |
| 3109 He is not everywhere. | |
| 3110 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 8 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="28540" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28540] Iª q. 8 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, sicut | |
| 3111 se habet tempus ad successiva, ita se habet locus ad permanentia. | |
| 3112 Sed unum indivisibile actionis vel motus, non potest esse in | |
| 3113 diversis temporibus. Ergo nec unum indivisibile in genere rerum | |
| 3114 permanentium, potest esse in omnibus locis. Esse autem divinum non | |
| 3115 est successivum, sed permanens. Ergo Deus non est in pluribus | |
| 3116 locis. Et ita non est ubique.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q8_A2-p4"> | |
| 3117 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, what is wholly in any one place is not in part elsewhere. But if God is in any one place He is all there; for He | |
| 3118 has no parts. No part of Him then is elsewhere; and therefore God is not everywhere. | |
| 3119 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 8 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="28541" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28541] Iª q. 8 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, quod | |
| 3120 est totum alicubi, nihil eius est extra locum illum. Sed Deus, si | |
| 3121 est in aliquo loco, totus est ibi, non enim habet partes. Ergo | |
| 3122 nihil eius est extra locum illum. Ergo Deus non est ubique.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q8_A2-p5"> | |
| 3123 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written, "I fill heaven and earth." ( | |
| 3124 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q8_A2-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Jer.23.24" target="asv">Jer. 23:24</a>). | |
| 3125 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 8 a. 2 s. c."><a name="28542" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28542] Iª q. 8 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est | |
| 3126 quod dicitur Ierem. XXIII, <i>caelum et terram ego impleo</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q8_A2-p6"> | |
| 3127 <b>I answer that,</b> Since place is a thing, to be in place can be understood in a twofold sense; either by way of other things---i.e. as one | |
| 3128 thing is said to be in another no matter how; and thus the accidents of a place are in place; or by a way proper to place; | |
| 3129 and thus things placed are in a place. Now in both these senses, in some way God is in every place; and this is to be everywhere. | |
| 3130 First, as He is in all things giving them being, power and operation; so He is in every | |
| 3131 place as giving it existence and locative power. Again, things placed are in place, inasmuch as they fill place; and God fills | |
| 3132 every place; not, indeed, like a body, for a body is said to fill place inasmuch as it excludes the co-presence of another | |
| 3133 body; whereas by God being in a place, others are not thereby excluded from it; indeed, by the very fact that He gives being | |
| 3134 to the things that fill every place, He Himself fills every place. | |
| 3135 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 8 a. 2 co."><a name="28543" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28543] Iª q. 8 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum | |
| 3136 quod, cum locus sit res quaedam, esse aliquid in loco potest | |
| 3137 intelligi dupliciter, vel per modum aliarum rerum, idest sicut | |
| 3138 dicitur aliquid esse in aliis rebus quocumque modo, sicut | |
| 3139 accidentia loci sunt in loco; vel per modum proprium loci, sicut | |
| 3140 locata sunt in loco. Utroque autem modo, secundum aliquid, Deus est | |
| 3141 in omni loco, quod est esse ubique. Primo quidem, sicut est in | |
| 3142 omnibus rebus, ut dans eis esse et virtutem et operationem, sic | |
| 3143 enim est in omni loco, ut dans ei esse et virtutem locativam. Item, | |
| 3144 locata sunt in loco inquantum replent locum, et Deus omnem locum | |
| 3145 replet. Non sicut corpus, corpus enim dicitur replere locum, | |
| 3146 inquantum non compatitur secum aliud corpus; sed per hoc quod Deus | |
| 3147 est in aliquo loco, non excluditur quin alia sint ibi, imo per hoc | |
| 3148 replet omnia loca, quod dat esse omnibus locatis, quae replent | |
| 3149 omnia loca.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q8_A2-p7"> | |
| 3150 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Incorporeal things are in place not by contact of dimensive quantity, as bodies are but by contact of power. | |
| 3151 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 8 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="28544" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28544] Iª q. 8 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo | |
| 3152 dicendum quod incorporalia non sunt in loco per contactum | |
| 3153 quantitatis dimensivae, sicut corpora, sed per contactum | |
| 3154 virtutis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q8_A2-p8"> | |
| 3155 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The indivisible is twofold. One is the term of the continuous; as a point in permanent things, and as a moment in succession; | |
| 3156 and this kind of the indivisible in permanent things, forasmuch as it has a determinate site, cannot be in many parts of place, | |
| 3157 or in many places; likewise the indivisible of action or movement, forasmuch as it has a determinate order in movement or | |
| 3158 action, cannot be in many parts of time. Another kind of the indivisible is | |
| 3159 outside of the whole genus of the continuous; and in this way incorporeal substances, like God, angel and soul, are called | |
| 3160 indivisible. Such a kind of indivisible does not belong to the continuous, as a part of it, but as touching it by its power; | |
| 3161 hence, according as its power can extend itself to one or to many, to a small thing, or to a great one, in this way it is | |
| 3162 in one or in many places, and in a small or large place. | |
| 3163 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 8 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="28545" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28545] Iª q. 8 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 3164 dicendum quod indivisibile est duplex. Unum quod est terminus | |
| 3165 continui, ut punctus in permanentibus, et momentum in successivis. | |
| 3166 Et huiusmodi indivisibile, in permanentibus, quia habet | |
| 3167 determinatum situm, non potest esse in pluribus partibus loci, vel | |
| 3168 in pluribus locis, et similiter indivisibile actionis vel motus, | |
| 3169 quia habet determinatum ordinem in motu vel actione, non potest | |
| 3170 esse in pluribus partibus temporis. Aliud autem indivisibile est, | |
| 3171 quod est extra totum genus continui, et hoc modo substantiae | |
| 3172 incorporeae, ut Deus, Angelus et anima, dicuntur esse | |
| 3173 indivisibiles. Tale igitur indivisibile non applicatur ad continuum | |
| 3174 sicut aliquid eius, sed inquantum contingit illud sua virtute. Unde | |
| 3175 secundum quod virtus sua se potest extendere ad unum vel multa, ad | |
| 3176 parvum vel magnum, secundum hoc est in uno vel pluribus locis, et | |
| 3177 in loco parvo vel magno.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q8_A2-p9"> | |
| 3178 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> A whole is so called with reference to its parts. Now part is twofold: viz. a part of the essence, as the form and the matter | |
| 3179 are called parts of the composite, while genus and difference are called parts of species. There is also part of quantity | |
| 3180 into which any quantity is divided. What therefore is whole in any place by totality of quantity, cannot be outside of that | |
| 3181 place, because the quantity of anything placed is commensurate to the quantity of | |
| 3182 the place; and hence there is no totality of quantity without totality of place. But totality of essence is not commensurate | |
| 3183 to the totality of place. Hence it is not necessary for that which is whole by totality of essence in a thing, not to be at | |
| 3184 all outside of it. This appears also in accidental forms which have accidental quantity; as an example, whiteness is whole | |
| 3185 in each part of the surface if we speak of its totality of essence; because according to the perfect idea of its species it | |
| 3186 is | |
| 3187 found to exist in every part of the surface. But if its totality be considered according to quantity which it has accidentally, | |
| 3188 then it is not whole in every part of the surface. On the other hand, incorporeal substances have no totality either of themselves | |
| 3189 or accidentally, except in reference to the perfect idea of their essence. Hence, as the soul is whole in every part of the | |
| 3190 body, so is God whole in all things and in each one. | |
| 3191 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 8 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="28546" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28546] Iª q. 8 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum | |
| 3192 quod totum dicitur respectu partium. Est autem duplex pars, | |
| 3193 scilicet pars essentiae, ut forma et materia dicuntur partes | |
| 3194 compositi, et genus et differentia partes speciei; et etiam pars | |
| 3195 quantitatis, in quam scilicet dividitur aliqua quantitas. Quod ergo | |
| 3196 est totum in aliquo loco totalitate quantitatis, non potest esse | |
| 3197 extra locum illum, quia quantitas locati commensuratur quantitati | |
| 3198 loci, unde non est totalitas quantitatis, si non sit totalitas | |
| 3199 loci. Sed totalitas essentiae non commensuratur totalitati loci. | |
| 3200 Unde non oportet quod illud quod est totum totalitate essentiae in | |
| 3201 aliquo, nullo modo sit extra illud. Sicut apparet etiam in formis | |
| 3202 accidentalibus, quae secundum accidens quantitatem habent, albedo | |
| 3203 enim est tota in qualibet parte superficiei, si accipiatur | |
| 3204 totalitas essentiae, quia secundum perfectam rationem suae speciei | |
| 3205 invenitur in qualibet parte superficiei, si autem accipiatur | |
| 3206 totalitas secundum quantitatem, quam habet per accidens, sic non | |
| 3207 est tota in qualibet parte superficiei. In substantiis autem | |
| 3208 incorporeis non est totalitas, nec per se nec per accidens, nisi | |
| 3209 secundum perfectam rationem essentiae. Et ideo, sicut anima est | |
| 3210 tota in qualibet parte corporis, ita Deus totus est in omnibus et | |
| 3211 singulis.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q8_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q8_A3-p0.1">Q. 8. A. 3. Whether God is everywhere by essence, presence and power?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q8_A3-p2"> | |
| 3212 <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the mode of God's existence in all things is not properly described by way of essence, presence and power. | |
| 3213 For what is by essence in anything, is in it essentially. But God is not essentially in things; for He does not belong to | |
| 3214 the essence of anything. Therefore it ought not to be said that God is in things by essence, presence and power. | |
| 3215 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 8 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="28547" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28547] Iª q. 8 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium sic | |
| 3216 proceditur. Videtur quod male assignentur modi existendi Deum in | |
| 3217 rebus, cum dicitur quod Deus est in omnibus rebus per essentiam, | |
| 3218 potentiam et praesentiam. Id enim per essentiam est in aliquo, quod | |
| 3219 essentialiter est in eo. Deus autem non est essentialiter in rebus, | |
| 3220 non enim est de essentia alicuius rei. Ergo non debet dici quod | |
| 3221 Deus sit in rebus per essentiam, praesentiam et potentiam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q8_A3-p3"> | |
| 3222 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, to be present in anything means not to be absent from it. Now this is the meaning of God being in things by His | |
| 3223 essence, that He is not absent from anything. Therefore the presence of God in all things by essence and presence means the | |
| 3224 same thing. Therefore it is superfluous to say that God is present in things by His essence, presence and power. | |
| 3225 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 8 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="28548" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28548] Iª q. 8 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, hoc | |
| 3226 est esse praesentem alicui rei, scilicet non deesse illi. Sed hoc | |
| 3227 est Deum esse per essentiam in rebus, scilicet non deesse alicui | |
| 3228 rei. Ergo idem est esse Deum in omnibus per essentiam et | |
| 3229 praesentiam. Superfluum ergo fuit dicere quod Deus sit in rebus per | |
| 3230 essentiam, praesentiam et potentiam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q8_A3-p4"> | |
| 3231 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, as God by His power is the principle of all things, so He is the same likewise by His knowledge and will. But it | |
| 3232 is not said that He is in things by knowledge and will. Therefore neither is He present by His power. | |
| 3233 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 8 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="28549" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28549] Iª q. 8 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, sicut | |
| 3234 Deus est principium omnium rerum per suam potentiam, ita per | |
| 3235 scientiam et voluntatem. Sed non dicitur Deus esse in rebus per | |
| 3236 scientiam et voluntatem. Ergo nec per potentiam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q8_A3-p5"> | |
| 3237 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, as grace is a perfection added to the substance of a thing, so many other perfections are likewise added. Therefore | |
| 3238 if God is said to be in certain persons in a special way by grace, it seems that according to every perfection there ought | |
| 3239 to be a special mode of God's existence in things. | |
| 3240 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 8 a. 3 arg. 4"><a name="28550" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28550] Iª q. 8 a. 3 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, sicut | |
| 3241 gratia est quaedam perfectio superaddita substantiae rei, ita | |
| 3242 multae sunt aliae perfectiones superadditae. Si ergo Deus dicitur | |
| 3243 esse speciali modo in quibusdam per gratiam, videtur quod secundum | |
| 3244 quamlibet perfectionem debeat accipi specialis modus essendi Deum | |
| 3245 in rebus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q8_A3-p6"> | |
| 3246 <b>On the contrary,</b> A gloss on the Canticle of Canticles (5) says that, "God by a common mode is in all things by His presence, power and substance; | |
| 3247 still He is said to be present more familiarly in some by grace" [*The quotation is from St. Gregory, (Hom. viii in Ezech.)]. | |
| 3248 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 8 a. 3 s. c."><a name="28551" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28551] Iª q. 8 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est | |
| 3249 quod Gregorius dicit, super Cant. Cantic., quod <i>Deus communi | |
| 3250 modo est in omnibus rebus praesentia, potentia et substantia, tamen | |
| 3251 familiari modo dicitur esse in aliquibus per gratiam</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q8_A3-p7"> | |
| 3252 <b>I answer that,</b> God is said to be in a thing in two ways; in one way after the manner of an efficient cause; and thus He is in all things | |
| 3253 created by Him; in another way he is in things as the object of operation is in the operator; and this is proper to the operations | |
| 3254 of the soul, according as the thing known is in the one who knows; and the thing desired in the one desiring. In this second | |
| 3255 way God is especially in the rational creature which knows and loves Him actually or | |
| 3256 habitually. And because the rational creature possesses this prerogative by grace, as will be shown later | |
| 3257 <a id="FP_Q8_A3-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q12.html">(Q[12])</a>. He is said to be thus in the saints by grace. | |
| 3258 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 8 a. 3 co."><a name="28552" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28552] Iª q. 8 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum | |
| 3259 quod Deus dicitur esse in re aliqua dupliciter. Uno modo, per modum | |
| 3260 causae agentis, et sic est in omnibus rebus creatis ab ipso. Alio | |
| 3261 modo, sicut obiectum operationis est in operante, quod proprium est | |
| 3262 in operationibus animae, secundum quod cognitum est in cognoscente, | |
| 3263 et desideratum in desiderante. Hoc igitur secundo modo, Deus | |
| 3264 specialiter est in rationali creatura, quae cognoscit et diligit | |
| 3265 illum actu vel habitu. Et quia hoc habet rationalis creatura per | |
| 3266 gratiam, ut infra patebit, dicitur esse hoc modo in sanctis per | |
| 3267 gratiam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q8_A3-p8"> But how He is in other things created by Him, may be considered from human affairs. A king, for example, is said to be in | |
| 3268 the whole kingdom by his power, although he is not everywhere present. Again a thing is said to be by its presence in other | |
| 3269 things which are subject to its inspection; as things in a house are said to be present to anyone, who nevertheless may not | |
| 3270 be in substance in every part of the house. Lastly, a thing is said to be by way of substance or essence in that | |
| 3271 place in which its substance may be. Now there were some (the Manichees) who said that spiritual and incorporeal things were | |
| 3272 subject to the divine power; but that visible and corporeal things were subject to the power of a contrary principle. Therefore | |
| 3273 against these it is necessary to say that God is in all things by His power. | |
| 3274 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin">In rebus vero aliis ab ipso creatis quomodo sit, | |
| 3275 considerandum est ex his quae in rebus humanis esse dicuntur. Rex | |
| 3276 enim dicitur esse in toto regno suo per suam potentiam, licet non | |
| 3277 sit ubique praesens. Per praesentiam vero suam, dicitur aliquid | |
| 3278 esse in omnibus quae in prospectu ipsius sunt; sicut omnia quae | |
| 3279 sunt in aliqua domo, dicuntur esse praesentia alicui, qui tamen non | |
| 3280 est secundum substantiam suam in qualibet parte domus. Secundum | |
| 3281 vero substantiam vel essentiam, dicitur aliquid esse in loco in quo | |
| 3282 eius substantia habetur. Fuerunt ergo aliqui, scilicet Manichaei, | |
| 3283 qui dixerunt divinae potestati subiecta spiritualia esse et | |
| 3284 incorporalia, visibilia vero et corporalia subiecta esse dicebant | |
| 3285 potestati principii contrarii. Contra hos ergo oportet dicere quod | |
| 3286 Deus sit in omnibus per potentiam suam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q8_A3-p9"> But others, though they believed that all things were subject to the divine power, still did not allow that divine providence | |
| 3287 extended to these inferior bodies, and in the person of these it is said, "He walketh about the poles of the heavens; and | |
| 3288 He doth not consider our things [*Vulg.: 'He doth not consider . . . and He walketh,' etc.]" ( | |
| 3289 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q8_A3-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Job.22.14" target="asv">Job 22:14</a>). Against these it is necessary to say that God is in all things by His presence. | |
| 3290 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin">Fuerunt vero alii, qui | |
| 3291 licet crederent omnia esse subiecta divinae potentiae, tamen | |
| 3292 providentiam divinam usque ad haec inferiora corpora non | |
| 3293 extendebant, ex quorum persona dicitur Iob XXII, <i>circa cardines | |
| 3294 caeli perambulat, nec nostra considerat</i>. Et contra hos oportuit | |
| 3295 dicere quod sit in omnibus per suam praesentiam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q8_A3-p10"> Further, others said that, although all things are subject to God's providence, still all things are not immediately created | |
| 3296 by God; but that He immediately created the first creatures, and these created the others. Against these it is necessary to | |
| 3297 say that He is in all things by His essence. | |
| 3298 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin">Fuerunt vero alii, | |
| 3299 qui licet dicerent omnia ad Dei providentiam pertinere, tamen | |
| 3300 posuerunt omnia non immediate esse a Deo creata, sed quod immediate | |
| 3301 creavit primas creaturas, et illae creaverunt alias. Et contra hos | |
| 3302 oportet dicere quod sit in omnibus per essentiam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q8_A3-p11"> Therefore, God is in all things by His power, inasmuch as all things are subject to His power; He is by His presence in all | |
| 3303 things, as all things are bare and open to His eyes; He is in all things by His essence, inasmuch as He is present to all | |
| 3304 as the cause of their being. | |
| 3305 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin">Sic ergo est in | |
| 3306 omnibus per potentiam, inquantum omnia eius potestati subduntur. | |
| 3307 Est per praesentiam in omnibus, inquantum omnia nuda sunt et aperta | |
| 3308 oculis eius. Est in omnibus per essentiam, inquantum adest omnibus | |
| 3309 ut causa essendi, sicut dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q8_A3-p12"> | |
| 3310 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> God is said to be in all things by essence, not indeed by the essence of the things themselves, as if He were of their essence; | |
| 3311 but by His own essence; because His substance is present to all things as the cause of their being. | |
| 3312 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 8 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="28553" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28553] Iª q. 8 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo | |
| 3313 dicendum quod Deus dicitur esse in omnibus per essentiam, non | |
| 3314 quidem rerum, quasi sit de essentia earum, sed per essentiam suam, | |
| 3315 quia substantia sua adest omnibus ut causa essendi, sicut dictum | |
| 3316 est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q8_A3-p13"> | |
| 3317 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> A thing can be said to be present to another, when in its sight, though the thing may be distant in substance, as was shown | |
| 3318 in this article; and therefore two modes of presence are necessary; viz. by essence and by presence. | |
| 3319 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 8 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="28554" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28554] Iª q. 8 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 3320 dicendum quod aliquid potest dici praesens alicui, inquantum | |
| 3321 subiacet eius conspectui, quod tamen distat ab eo secundum suam | |
| 3322 substantiam, ut dictum est. Et ideo oportuit duos modos poni, | |
| 3323 scilicet per essentiam, et praesentiam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q8_A3-p14"> | |
| 3324 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Knowledge and will require that the thing known should be in the one who knows, and the thing willed in the one who wills. | |
| 3325 Hence by knowledge and will things are more truly in God than God in things. But power is the principle of acting on another; | |
| 3326 hence by power the agent is related and applied to an external thing; thus by power an agent may be said to be present to | |
| 3327 another. | |
| 3328 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 8 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="28555" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28555] Iª q. 8 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum | |
| 3329 quod de ratione scientiae et voluntatis est, quod scitum sit in | |
| 3330 sciente, et volitum in volente, unde secundum scientiam et | |
| 3331 voluntatem, magis res sunt in Deo, quam Deus in rebus. Sed de | |
| 3332 ratione potentiae est, quod sit principium agendi in aliud, unde | |
| 3333 secundum potentiam agens comparatur et applicatur rei exteriori. Et | |
| 3334 sic per potentiam potest dici agens esse in altero.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q8_A3-p15"> | |
| 3335 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> No other perfection, except grace, added to substance, renders God present in anything as the object known and loved; therefore | |
| 3336 only grace constitutes a special mode of God's existence in things. There is, however, another special mode of God's existence | |
| 3337 in man by union, which will be treated of in its own place (TP). | |
| 3338 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 8 a. 3 ad 4"><a name="28556" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28556] Iª q. 8 a. 3 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum dicendum | |
| 3339 quod nulla alia perfectio superaddita substantiae, facit Deum esse | |
| 3340 in aliquo sicut obiectum cognitum et amatum, nisi gratia, et ideo | |
| 3341 sola gratia facit singularem modum essendi Deum in rebus. Est autem | |
| 3342 alius singularis modus essendi Deum in homine per unionem, de quo | |
| 3343 modo suo loco agetur.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q8_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q8_A4-p0.1">Q. 8. A. 4. Whether to be everywhere belongs to God alone?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q8_A4-p2"> | |
| 3344 <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that to be everywhere does not belong to God alone. For the universal, according to the Philosopher (Poster. i), | |
| 3345 is everywhere, and always; primary matter also, since it is in all bodies, is everywhere. But neither of these is God, as | |
| 3346 appears from what is said above | |
| 3347 <a id="FP_Q8_A4-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q3.html">(Q[3])</a>. Therefore to be everywhere does not belong to God alone. | |
| 3348 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 8 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="28557" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28557] Iª q. 8 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum sic | |
| 3349 proceditur. Videtur quod esse ubique non sit proprium Dei. | |
| 3350 Universale enim, secundum philosophum, est ubique et semper, | |
| 3351 materia etiam prima, cum sit in omnibus corporibus, est ubique. | |
| 3352 Neutrum autem horum est Deus, ut ex praemissis patet. Ergo esse | |
| 3353 ubique non est proprium Dei.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q8_A4-p3"> | |
| 3354 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, number is in things numbered. But the whole universe is constituted in number, as appears from the Book of Wisdom | |
| 3355 ( | |
| 3356 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q8_A4-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.11.21" target="asv">Wis. 11:21</a>). Therefore there is some number which is in the whole universe, and is thus everywhere. | |
| 3357 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 8 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="28558" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28558] Iª q. 8 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 3358 numerus est in numeratis. Sed totum universum est constitutum in | |
| 3359 numero, ut patet Sap. XI. Ergo aliquis numerus est, qui est in toto | |
| 3360 universo, et ita ubique.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q8_A4-p4"> | |
| 3361 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the universe is a kind of "whole perfect body" (Coel. et Mund. i). But the whole universe is everywhere, because | |
| 3362 there is no place outside it. Therefore to be everywhere does not belong to God alone. | |
| 3363 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 8 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="28559" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28559] Iª q. 8 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, totum | |
| 3364 universum est quoddam totum corpus perfectum, ut dicitur in I caeli | |
| 3365 et mundi. Sed totum universum est ubique, quia extra ipsum nullus | |
| 3366 locus est. Non ergo solus Deus est ubique.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q8_A4-p5"> | |
| 3367 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, if any body were infinite, no place would exist outside of it, and so it would be everywhere. Therefore to be everywhere | |
| 3368 does not appear to belong to God alone. | |
| 3369 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 8 a. 4 arg. 4"><a name="28560" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28560] Iª q. 8 a. 4 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, si | |
| 3370 aliquod corpus esset infinitum, nullus locus esset extra ipsum. | |
| 3371 Ergo esset ubique. Et sic, esse ubique non videtur proprium | |
| 3372 Dei.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q8_A4-p6"> | |
| 3373 <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, the soul, as Augustine says (De Trin. vi, 6), is "whole in the whole body, and whole in every one of its parts." | |
| 3374 Therefore if there was only one animal in the world, its soul would be everywhere; and thus to be everywhere does not belong | |
| 3375 to God alone. | |
| 3376 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 8 a. 4 arg. 5"><a name="28561" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28561] Iª q. 8 a. 4 arg. 5</span></a> <i>Praeterea, | |
| 3377 anima</i>, ut dicit Augustinus, in VI de Trin., <i>est tota in toto | |
| 3378 corpore, et tota in qualibet eius parte</i>. Si ergo non esset in | |
| 3379 mundo nisi unum solum animal, anima eius esset ubique. Et sic, esse | |
| 3380 ubique non est proprium Dei.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q8_A4-p7"> | |
| 3381 <b>Objection 6:</b> Further, as Augustine says ( | |
| 3382 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q8_A4-p7.1" href="./asv.html#." target="asv">Ep. 137</a>), "The soul feels where it sees, and lives where it feels, and is where it lives." But the soul sees as it were everywhere: | |
| 3383 for in a succession of glances it comprehends the entire space of the heavens in its sight. Therefore the soul is everywhere. | |
| 3384 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 8 a. 4 arg. 6"><a name="28562" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28562] Iª q. 8 a. 4 arg. 6</span></a> Praeterea, ut | |
| 3385 Augustinus dicit in epistola ad Volusianum, <i>anima ubi videt, ibi | |
| 3386 sentit; et ubi sentit, ibi vivit; et ubi vivit, ibi est</i>. Sed | |
| 3387 anima videt quasi ubique, quia successive videt etiam totum caelum. | |
| 3388 Ergo anima est ubique.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q8_A4-p8"> | |
| 3389 <b>On the contrary,</b> Ambrose says (De Spir. Sanct. i, 7): "Who dares to call the Holy Ghost a creature, Who in all things, and everywhere, and | |
| 3390 always is, which assuredly belongs to the divinity alone?" | |
| 3391 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 8 a. 4 s. c."><a name="28563" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28563] Iª q. 8 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est | |
| 3392 quod Ambrosius dicit, in libro de spiritu sancto, <i>quis audeat | |
| 3393 creaturam dicere spiritum sanctum, qui in omnibus et ubique et | |
| 3394 semper est; quod utique divinitatis est proprium?</i></p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q8_A4-p9"> | |
| 3395 <b>I answer that,</b> To be everywhere primarily and absolutely, is proper to God. Now to be everywhere primarily is said of that which in its | |
| 3396 whole self is everywhere; for if a thing were everywhere according to its parts in different places, it would not be primarily | |
| 3397 everywhere, forasmuch as what belongs to anything according to part does not belong to it primarily; thus if a man has white | |
| 3398 teeth, whiteness belongs primarily not to the man but to his teeth. But a thing is | |
| 3399 everywhere absolutely when it does not belong to it to be everywhere accidentally, that is, merely on some supposition; as | |
| 3400 a grain of millet would be everywhere, supposing that no other body existed. It belongs therefore to a thing to be everywhere | |
| 3401 absolutely when, on any supposition, it must be everywhere; and this properly belongs to God alone. For whatever number of | |
| 3402 places be supposed, even if an infinite number be supposed besides what already exist, it would be necessary that God should | |
| 3403 be | |
| 3404 in all of them; for nothing can exist except by Him. Therefore to be everywhere primarily and absolutely belongs to God and | |
| 3405 is proper to Him: because whatever number of places be supposed to exist, God must be in all of them, not as to a part of | |
| 3406 Him, but as to His very self. | |
| 3407 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 8 a. 4 co."><a name="28564" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28564] Iª q. 8 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum | |
| 3408 quod esse ubique primo et per se, est proprium Dei. Dico autem esse | |
| 3409 ubique primo, quod secundum se totum est ubique. Si quid enim esset | |
| 3410 ubique, secundum diversas partes in diversis locis existens, non | |
| 3411 esset primo ubique, quia quod convenit alicui ratione partis suae, | |
| 3412 non convenit ei primo; sicut si homo est albus dente, albedo non | |
| 3413 convenit primo homini, sed denti. Esse autem ubique per se dico id | |
| 3414 cui non convenit esse ubique per accidens, propter aliquam | |
| 3415 suppositionem factam, quia sic granum milii esset ubique, supposito | |
| 3416 quod nullum aliud corpus esset. Per se igitur convenit esse ubique | |
| 3417 alicui, quando tale est quod, qualibet positione facta, sequitur | |
| 3418 illud esse ubique. Et hoc proprie convenit Deo. Quia quotcumque | |
| 3419 loca ponantur, etiam si ponerentur infinita praeter ista quae sunt, | |
| 3420 oporteret in omnibus esse Deum, quia nihil potest esse nisi per | |
| 3421 ipsum. Sic igitur esse ubique primo et per se convenit Deo, et est | |
| 3422 proprium eius, quia quotcumque loca ponantur, oportet quod in | |
| 3423 quolibet sit Deus, non secundum partem, sed secundum seipsum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q8_A4-p10"> | |
| 3424 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The universal, and also primary matter are indeed everywhere; but not according to the same mode of existence. | |
| 3425 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 8 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="28565" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28565] Iª q. 8 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo | |
| 3426 dicendum quod universale et materia prima sunt quidem ubique, sed | |
| 3427 non secundum idem esse.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q8_A4-p11"> | |
| 3428 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Number, since it is an accident, does not, of itself, exist in place, but accidentally; neither is the whole but only part | |
| 3429 of it in each of the things numbered; hence it does not follow that it is primarily and absolutely everywhere. | |
| 3430 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 8 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="28566" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28566] Iª q. 8 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 3431 dicendum quod numerus, cum sit accidens, non est per se sed per | |
| 3432 accidens, in loco. Nec est totus in quolibet numeratorum, sed | |
| 3433 secundum partem. Et sic non sequitur quod sit primo et per se | |
| 3434 ubique.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q8_A4-p12"> | |
| 3435 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The whole body of the universe is everywhere, but not primarily; forasmuch as it is not wholly in each place, but according | |
| 3436 to its parts; nor again is it everywhere absolutely, because, supposing that other places existed besides itself, it would | |
| 3437 not be in them. | |
| 3438 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 8 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="28567" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28567] Iª q. 8 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum | |
| 3439 quod totum corpus universi est ubique, sed non primo, quia non | |
| 3440 totum est in quolibet loco, sed secundum suas partes. Nec iterum | |
| 3441 per se, quia si ponerentur aliqua alia loca, non esset in eis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q8_A4-p13"> | |
| 3442 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> If an infinite body existed, it would be everywhere; but according to its parts. | |
| 3443 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 8 a. 4 ad 4"><a name="28568" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28568] Iª q. 8 a. 4 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum dicendum | |
| 3444 quod, si esset corpus infinitum, esset ubique; sed secundum suas | |
| 3445 partes.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q8_A4-p14"> | |
| 3446 <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> Were there one animal only, its soul would be everywhere primarily indeed, but only accidentally. | |
| 3447 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 8 a. 4 ad 5"><a name="28569" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28569] Iª q. 8 a. 4 ad 5</span></a> Ad quintum dicendum | |
| 3448 quod, si esset unum solum animal, anima eius esset ubique primo | |
| 3449 quidem, sed per accidens.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q8_A4-p15"> | |
| 3450 <b>Reply to Objection 6:</b> When it is said that the soul sees anywhere, this can be taken in two senses. In one sense the adverb "anywhere" determines | |
| 3451 the act of seeing on the part of the object; and in this sense it is true that while it sees the heavens, it sees in the heavens; | |
| 3452 and in the same way it feels in the heavens; but it does not follow that it lives or exists in the heavens, because to live | |
| 3453 and to exist do not import an act passing to an exterior object. In another | |
| 3454 sense it can be understood according as the adverb determines the act of the seer, as proceeding from the seer; and thus it | |
| 3455 is true that where the soul feels and sees, there it is, and there it lives according to this mode of speaking; and thus it | |
| 3456 does not follow that it is everywhere. | |
| 3457 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 8 a. 4 ad 6"><a name="28570" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28570] Iª q. 8 a. 4 ad 6</span></a> Ad sextum dicendum | |
| 3458 quod, cum dicitur anima alicubi videre, potest intelligi | |
| 3459 dupliciter. Uno modo, secundum quod hoc adverbium alicubi | |
| 3460 determinat actum videndi ex parte obiecti. Et sic verum est quod, | |
| 3461 dum caelum videt, in caelo videt, et eadem ratione in caelo sentit. | |
| 3462 Non tamen sequitur quod in caelo vivat vel sit, quia vivere et esse | |
| 3463 non important actum transeuntem in exterius obiectum. Alio modo | |
| 3464 potest intelligi secundum quod adverbium determinat actum videntis, | |
| 3465 secundum quod exit a vidente. Et sic verum est quod anima ubi | |
| 3466 sentit et videt, ibi est et vivit, secundum istum modum loquendi. | |
| 3467 Et ita non sequitur quod sit ubique.</p></div></div></div></div> | |
| 3468 <div id="FP_Q9" class="div3"> | |
| 3469 <h3 id="FP_Q9-p0.1">Q. 9. THE IMMUTABILITY OF GOD (TWO ARTICLES)</h3> | |
| 3470 <div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> | |
| 3471 <p id="FP_Q9-p2"> We next consider God's immutability, and His eternity following on His immutability. On the immutability of God there are | |
| 3472 two points of inquiry: | |
| 3473 </p><p id="FP_Q9-p3"> (1) Whether God is altogether immutable?</p><p id="FP_Q9-p4"> (2) Whether to be immutable belongs to God alone?</p> | |
| 3474 </div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 9 pr."><a name="28571" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28571] | |
| 3475 Iª q. 9 pr.</span></a> Consequenter considerandum est de | |
| 3476 immutabilitate et aeternitate divina, quae immutabilitatem | |
| 3477 consequitur. Circa immutabilitatem vero quaeruntur duo. Primo, | |
| 3478 utrum Deus sit omnino immutabilis. Secundo, utrum esse immutabile | |
| 3479 sit proprium Dei.</p></div></div></div> | |
| 3480 <div id="FP_Q9_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q9_A1-p0.1">Q. 9. A. 1. Whether God is altogether immutable?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q9_A1-p2"> | |
| 3481 <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God is not altogether immutable. For whatever moves itself is in some way mutable. But, as Augustine says (Gen. | |
| 3482 ad lit viii, 20), "The Creator Spirit moves Himself neither by time, nor by place." Therefore God is in some way mutable. | |
| 3483 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 9 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="28572" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28572] Iª q. 9 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum sic | |
| 3484 proceditur. Videtur quod Deus non sit omnino immutabilis. Quidquid | |
| 3485 enim movet seipsum, est aliquo modo mutabile. Sed, sicut dicit | |
| 3486 Augustinus, VIII super Genesim ad litteram, <i>spiritus creator | |
| 3487 movet se nec per tempus nec per locum</i>. Ergo Deus est aliquo | |
| 3488 modo mutabilis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q9_A1-p3"> | |
| 3489 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it is said of Wisdom, that "it is more mobile than all things active [Vulg.'mobilior']" ( | |
| 3490 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q9_A1-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.7.24" target="asv">Wis. 7:24</a>). But God is wisdom itself; therefore God is movable. | |
| 3491 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 9 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="28573" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28573] Iª q. 9 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, Sap. | |
| 3492 VII dicitur de sapientia quod est <i>mobilior omnibus | |
| 3493 mobilibus</i>. Sed Deus est ipsa sapientia. Ergo Deus est | |
| 3494 mobilis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q9_A1-p4"> | |
| 3495 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, to approach and to recede signify movement. But these are said of God in Scripture, "Draw nigh to God and He will | |
| 3496 draw nigh to you" ( | |
| 3497 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q9_A1-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Jas.4.8" target="asv">James 4:8</a>). Therefore God is mutable. | |
| 3498 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 9 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="28574" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28574] Iª q. 9 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 3499 appropinquari et elongari motum significant. Huiusmodi autem | |
| 3500 dicuntur de Deo in Scriptura, Iac. IV, <i>appropinquate Deo, et | |
| 3501 appropinquabit vobis</i>. Ergo Deus est mutabilis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q9_A1-p5"> | |
| 3502 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written, "I am the Lord, and I change not" ( | |
| 3503 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q9_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Mal.3.6" target="asv">Malachi 3:6</a>). | |
| 3504 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 9 a. 1 s. c."><a name="28575" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28575] Iª q. 9 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est | |
| 3505 quod dicitur Malach. III, <i>ego Deus, et non mutor</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q9_A1-p6"> | |
| 3506 <b>I answer that,</b> From what precedes, it is shown that God is altogether immutable. First, because it was shown above that there is some first | |
| 3507 being, whom we call God; and that this first being must be pure act, without the admixture of any potentiality, for the reason | |
| 3508 that, absolutely, potentiality is posterior to act. Now everything which is in any way changed, is in some way in potentiality. | |
| 3509 Hence it is evident that it is impossible for God to be in any way changeable. | |
| 3510 Secondly, because everything which is moved, remains as it was in part, and passes away in part; as what is moved from whiteness | |
| 3511 to blackness, remains the same as to substance; thus in everything which is moved, there is some kind of composition to be | |
| 3512 found. But it has been shown above ( | |
| 3513 <a id="FP_Q9_A1-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q3_A7.html">Q[3], A[7]</a>) that in God there is no composition, for He is altogether simple. Hence it is manifest that God cannot be moved. Thirdly, | |
| 3514 because everything which is moved acquires something | |
| 3515 by its movement, and attains to what it had not attained previously. But since God is infinite, comprehending in Himself all | |
| 3516 the plenitude of perfection of all being, He cannot acquire anything new, nor extend Himself to anything whereto He was not | |
| 3517 extended previously. Hence movement in no way belongs to Him. So, some of the ancients, constrained, as it were, by the truth, | |
| 3518 decided that the first principle was immovable. | |
| 3519 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 9 a. 1 co."><a name="28576" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28576] Iª q. 9 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum | |
| 3520 quod ex praemissis ostenditur Deum esse omnino immutabilem. Primo | |
| 3521 quidem, quia supra ostensum est esse aliquod primum ens, quod Deum | |
| 3522 dicimus, et quod huiusmodi primum ens oportet esse purum actum | |
| 3523 absque permixtione alicuius potentiae, eo quod potentia simpliciter | |
| 3524 est posterior actu. Omne autem quod quocumque modo mutatur, est | |
| 3525 aliquo modo in potentia. Ex quo patet quod impossibile est Deum | |
| 3526 aliquo modo mutari. Secundo, quia omne quod movetur, quantum ad | |
| 3527 aliquid manet, et quantum ad aliquid transit, sicut quod movetur de | |
| 3528 albedine in nigredinem, manet secundum substantiam. Et sic in omni | |
| 3529 eo quod movetur, attenditur aliqua compositio. Ostensum est autem | |
| 3530 supra quod in Deo nulla est compositio, sed est omnino simplex. | |
| 3531 Unde manifestum est quod Deus moveri non potest. Tertio, quia omne | |
| 3532 quod movetur, motu suo aliquid acquirit, et pertingit ad illud ad | |
| 3533 quod prius non pertingebat. Deus autem, cum sit infinitus, | |
| 3534 comprehendens in se omnem plenitudinem perfectionis totius esse, | |
| 3535 non potest aliquid acquirere, nec extendere se in aliquid ad quod | |
| 3536 prius non pertingebat. Unde nullo modo sibi competit motus. Et inde | |
| 3537 est quod quidam antiquorum, quasi ab ipsa veritate coacti, | |
| 3538 posuerunt primum principium esse immobile.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q9_A1-p7"> | |
| 3539 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Augustine there speaks in a similar way to Plato, who said that the first mover moves Himself; calling every operation a | |
| 3540 movement, even as the acts of understanding, and willing, and loving, are called movements. Therefore because God understands | |
| 3541 and loves Himself, in that respect they said that God moves Himself, not, however, as movement and change belong to a thing | |
| 3542 existing in potentiality, as we now speak of change and movement. | |
| 3543 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 9 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="28577" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28577] Iª q. 9 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo | |
| 3544 dicendum quod Augustinus ibi loquitur secundum modum quo Plato | |
| 3545 dicebat primum movens movere seipsum, omnem operationem nominans | |
| 3546 motum; secundum quod etiam ipsum intelligere et velle et amare | |
| 3547 motus quidam dicuntur. Quia ergo Deus intelligit et amat seipsum, | |
| 3548 secundum hoc dixerunt quod Deus movet seipsum, non autem secundum | |
| 3549 quod motus et mutatio est existentis in potentia, ut nunc loquimur | |
| 3550 de mutatione et motu.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q9_A1-p8"> | |
| 3551 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Wisdom is called mobile by way of similitude, according as it diffuses its likeness even to the outermost of things; for | |
| 3552 nothing can exist which does not proceed from the divine wisdom by way of some kind of imitation, as from the first effective | |
| 3553 and formal principle; as also works of art proceed from the wisdom of the artist. And so in the same way, inasmuch as the | |
| 3554 similitude of the divine wisdom proceeds in degrees from the highest things, which | |
| 3555 participate more fully of its likeness, to the lowest things which participate of it in a lesser degree, there is said to | |
| 3556 be a kind of procession and movement of the divine wisdom to things; as when we say that the sun proceeds to the earth, inasmuch | |
| 3557 as the ray of light touches the earth. In this way Dionysius (Coel. Hier. i) expounds the matter, that every procession of | |
| 3558 the divine manifestation comes to us from the movement of the Father of light. | |
| 3559 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 9 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="28578" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28578] Iª q. 9 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 3560 dicendum quod sapientia dicitur mobilis esse similitudinarie, | |
| 3561 secundum quod suam similitudinem diffundit usque ad ultima rerum. | |
| 3562 Nihil enim esse potest, quod non procedat a divina sapientia per | |
| 3563 quandam imitationem, sicut a primo principio effectivo et formali; | |
| 3564 prout etiam artificiata procedunt a sapientia artificis. Sic igitur | |
| 3565 inquantum similitudo divinae sapientiae gradatim procedit a | |
| 3566 supremis, quae magis participant de eius similitudine, usque ad | |
| 3567 infima rerum, quae minus participant dicitur esse quidam processus | |
| 3568 et motus divinae sapientiae in res, sicut si dicamus solem | |
| 3569 procedere usque ad terram, inquantum radius luminis eius usque ad | |
| 3570 terram pertingit. Et hoc modo exponit Dionysius, cap. I Cael. | |
| 3571 Hier., dicens quod <i>omnis processus divinae manifestationis venit | |
| 3572 ad nos a patre luminum moto</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q9_A1-p9"> | |
| 3573 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> These things are said of God in Scripture metaphorically. For as the sun is said to enter a house, or to go out, according | |
| 3574 as its rays reach the house, so God is said to approach to us, or to recede from us, when we receive the influx of His goodness, | |
| 3575 or decline from Him. | |
| 3576 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 9 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="28579" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28579] Iª q. 9 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum | |
| 3577 quod huiusmodi dicuntur de Deo in Scripturis metaphorice. Sicut | |
| 3578 enim dicitur sol intrare domum vel exire, inquantum radius eius | |
| 3579 pertingit ad domum; sic dicitur Deus appropinquare ad nos vel | |
| 3580 recedere a nobis, inquantum percipimus influentiam bonitatis | |
| 3581 ipsius, vel ab eo deficimus.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q9_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q9_A2-p0.1">Q. 9. A. 2. Whether to be immutable belongs to God alone?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q9_A2-p2"> | |
| 3582 <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that to be immutable does not belong to God alone. For the Philosopher says (Metaph. ii) that "matter is in everything | |
| 3583 which is moved." But, according to some, certain created substances, as angels and souls, have not matter. Therefore to be | |
| 3584 immutable does not belong to God alone. | |
| 3585 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 9 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="28580" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28580] Iª q. 9 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum sic | |
| 3586 proceditur. Videtur quod esse immutabile non sit proprium Dei. | |
| 3587 Dicit enim philosophus, in II Metaphys., quod materia est in omni | |
| 3588 eo quod movetur. Sed substantiae quaedam creatae, sicut Angeli et | |
| 3589 animae, non habent materiam, ut quibusdam videtur. Ergo esse | |
| 3590 immutabile non est proprium Dei.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q9_A2-p3"> | |
| 3591 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, everything in motion moves to some end. What therefore has already attained its ultimate end, is not in motion. | |
| 3592 But some creatures have already attained to their ultimate end; as all the blessed in heaven. Therefore some creatures are | |
| 3593 immovable. | |
| 3594 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 9 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="28581" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28581] Iª q. 9 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, omne | |
| 3595 quod movetur, movetur propter aliquem finem, quod ergo iam pervenit | |
| 3596 ad ultimum finem, non movetur. Sed quaedam creaturae iam | |
| 3597 pervenerunt ad ultimum finem, sicut omnes beati. Ergo aliquae | |
| 3598 creaturae sunt immobiles.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q9_A2-p4"> | |
| 3599 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, everything which is mutable is variable. But forms are invariable; for it is said (Sex Princip. i) that "form is | |
| 3600 essence consisting of the simple and invariable." Therefore it does not belong to God alone to be immutable. | |
| 3601 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 9 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="28582" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28582] Iª q. 9 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, omne | |
| 3602 quod est mutabile, est variabile. Sed formae sunt invariabiles, | |
| 3603 dicitur enim in libro sex principiorum, quod <i>forma est simplici | |
| 3604 et invariabili essentia consistens</i>. Ergo non est solius Dei | |
| 3605 proprium esse immutabile.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q9_A2-p5"> | |
| 3606 <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Nat. Boni. i), "God alone is immutable; and whatever things He has made, being from nothing, are mutable." | |
| 3607 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 9 a. 2 s. c."><a name="28583" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28583] Iª q. 9 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est | |
| 3608 quod dicit Augustinus, in libro de natura boni, <i>solus Deus | |
| 3609 immutabilis est; quae autem fecit, quia ex nihilo sunt, mutabilia | |
| 3610 sunt</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q9_A2-p6"> | |
| 3611 <b>I answer that,</b> God alone is altogether immutable; whereas every creature is in some way mutable. Be it known therefore that a mutable thing | |
| 3612 can be called so in two ways: by a power in itself; and by a power possessed by another. For all creatures before they existed, | |
| 3613 were possible, not by any created power, since no creature is eternal, but by the divine power alone, inasmuch as God could | |
| 3614 produce them into existence. Thus, as the production of a thing into existence | |
| 3615 depends on the will of God, so likewise it depends on His will that things should be preserved; for He does not preserve them | |
| 3616 otherwise than by ever giving them existence; hence if He took away His action from them, all things would be reduced to nothing, | |
| 3617 as appears from Augustine (Gen. ad lit. iv, 12). Therefore as it was in the Creator's power to produce them before they existed | |
| 3618 in themselves, so likewise it is in the Creator's power when they exist in themselves to bring them to nothing. In | |
| 3619 this way therefore, by the power of another---namely, of God---they are mutable, inasmuch as they are producible from nothing | |
| 3620 by Him, and are by Him reducible from existence to non-existence. | |
| 3621 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 9 a. 2 co."><a name="28584" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28584] Iª q. 9 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum | |
| 3622 quod solus Deus est omnino immutabilis, omnis autem creatura aliquo | |
| 3623 modo est mutabilis. Sciendum est enim quod mutabile potest aliquid | |
| 3624 dici dupliciter, uno modo, per potentiam quae in ipso est; alio | |
| 3625 modo, per potentiam quae in altero est. Omnes enim creaturae, | |
| 3626 antequam essent, non erant possibiles esse per aliquam potentiam | |
| 3627 creatam, cum nullum creatum sit aeternum, sed per solam potentiam | |
| 3628 divinam, inquantum Deus poterat eas in esse producere. Sicut autem | |
| 3629 ex voluntate Dei dependet quod res in esse producit, ita ex | |
| 3630 voluntate eius dependet quod res in esse conservat, non enim aliter | |
| 3631 eas in esse conservat, quam semper eis esse dando; unde si suam | |
| 3632 actionem eis subtraheret, omnia in nihilum redigerentur, ut patet | |
| 3633 per Augustinum, IV super Gen. ad Litt. Sicut igitur in potentia | |
| 3634 creatoris fuit ut res essent, antequam essent in seipsis, ita in | |
| 3635 potentia creatoris est, postquam sunt in seipsis, ut non sint. Sic | |
| 3636 igitur per potentiam quae est in altero, scilicet in Deo, sunt | |
| 3637 mutabiles, inquantum ab ipso ex nihilo potuerunt produci in esse, | |
| 3638 et de esse possunt reduci in non esse.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q9_A2-p7"> If, however, a thing is called mutable by a power in itself, thus also in some manner every creature is mutable. For every | |
| 3639 creature has a twofold power, active and passive; and I call that power passive which enables anything to attain its perfection | |
| 3640 either in being, or in attaining to its end. Now if the mutability of a thing be considered according to its power for being, | |
| 3641 in that way all creatures are not mutable, but those only in which what is potential in them is consistent | |
| 3642 with non-being. Hence, in the inferior bodies there is mutability both as regards substantial being, inasmuch as their matter | |
| 3643 can exist with privation of their substantial form, and also as regards their accidental being, supposing the subject to coexist | |
| 3644 with privation of accident; as, for example, this subject "man" can exist with "not-whiteness" and can therefore be changed | |
| 3645 from white to not-white. But supposing the accident to be such as to follow on the essential principles of the subject, | |
| 3646 then the privation of such an accident cannot coexist with the subject. Hence the subject cannot be changed as regards that | |
| 3647 kind of accident; as, for example, snow cannot be made black. Now in the celestial bodies matter is not consistent with privation | |
| 3648 of form, because the form perfects the whole potentiality of the matter; therefore these bodies are not mutable as to substantial | |
| 3649 being, but only as to locality, because the subject is consistent with privation of this or that place. On the | |
| 3650 other hand incorporeal substances, being subsistent forms which, although with respect to their own existence are as potentiality | |
| 3651 to act, are not consistent with the privation of this act; forasmuch as existence is consequent upon form, and nothing corrupts | |
| 3652 except it lose its form. Hence in the form itself there is no power to non-existence; and so these kinds of substances are | |
| 3653 immutable and invariable as regards their existence. Wherefore Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that "intellectual | |
| 3654 created substances are pure from generation and from every variation, as also are incorporeal and immaterial substances." | |
| 3655 Still, there remains in them a twofold mutability: one as regards their potentiality to their end; and in that way there is | |
| 3656 in them a mutability according to choice from good to evil, as Damascene says (De Fide ii, 3,4); the other as regards place, | |
| 3657 inasmuch as by their finite power they attain to certain fresh places---which cannot be said of God, who by His infinity fills | |
| 3658 all places, as was shown above ( | |
| 3659 <a id="FP_Q9_A2-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q8_A2.html">Q[8], A[2]</a>). | |
| 3660 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin">Si autem dicatur aliquid | |
| 3661 mutabile per potentiam in ipso existentem, sic etiam aliquo modo | |
| 3662 omnis creatura est mutabilis. Est enim in creatura duplex potentia, | |
| 3663 scilicet activa et passiva. Dico autem potentiam passivam, secundum | |
| 3664 quam aliquid assequi potest suam perfectionem, vel in essendo vel | |
| 3665 in consequendo finem. Si igitur attendatur mutabilitas rei secundum | |
| 3666 potentiam ad esse, sic non in omnibus creaturis est mutabilitas, | |
| 3667 sed in illis solum in quibus illud quod est possibile in eis, | |
| 3668 potest stare cum non esse. Unde in corporibus inferioribus est | |
| 3669 mutabilitas et secundum esse substantiale, quia materia eorum | |
| 3670 potest esse cum privatione formae substantialis ipsorum, et quantum | |
| 3671 ad esse accidentale, si subiectum compatiatur secum privationem | |
| 3672 accidentis; sicut hoc subiectum, homo, compatitur secum non album, | |
| 3673 et ideo potest mutari de albo in non album. Si vero sit tale | |
| 3674 accidens quod consequatur principia essentialia subiecti, privatio | |
| 3675 illius accidentis non potest stare cum subiecto, unde subiectum non | |
| 3676 potest mutari secundum illud accidens, sicut nix non potest fieri | |
| 3677 nigra. In corporibus vero caelestibus, materia non compatitur secum | |
| 3678 privationem formae, quia forma perficit totam potentialitatem | |
| 3679 materiae, et ideo non sunt mutabilia secundum esse substantiale; | |
| 3680 sed secundum esse locale, quia subiectum compatitur secum | |
| 3681 privationem huius loci vel illius. Substantiae vero incorporeae, | |
| 3682 quia sunt ipsae formae subsistentes, quae tamen se habent ad esse | |
| 3683 ipsarum sicut potentia ad actum, non compatiuntur secum privationem | |
| 3684 huius actus, quia esse consequitur formam, et nihil corrumpitur | |
| 3685 nisi per hoc quod amittit formam. Unde in ipsa forma non est | |
| 3686 potentia ad non esse, et ideo huiusmodi substantiae sunt | |
| 3687 immutabiles et invariabiles secundum esse. Et hoc est quod dicit | |
| 3688 Dionysius, IV cap. de Div. Nom., quod <i>substantiae intellectuales | |
| 3689 creatae mundae sunt a generatione et ab omni variatione, sicut | |
| 3690 incorporales et immateriales</i>. Sed tamen remanet in eis duplex | |
| 3691 mutabilitas. Una secundum quod sunt in potentia ad finem, et sic | |
| 3692 est in eis mutabilitas secundum electionem de bono in malum, ut | |
| 3693 Damascenus dicit. Alia secundum locum, inquantum virtute sua finita | |
| 3694 possunt attingere quaedam loca quae prius non attingebant, quod de | |
| 3695 Deo dici non potest, qui sua infinitate omnia loca replet, ut supra | |
| 3696 dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q9_A2-p8"> Thus in every creature there is a potentiality to change either as regards substantial being as in the case of things corruptible; | |
| 3697 or as regards locality only, as in the case of the celestial bodies; or as regards the order to their end, and the application | |
| 3698 of their powers to divers objects, as in the case with the angels; and universally all creatures generally are mutable by | |
| 3699 the power of the Creator, in Whose power is their existence and non-existence. Hence since God is in | |
| 3700 none of these ways mutable, it belongs to Him alone to be altogether immutable. | |
| 3701 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin">Sic igitur in omni creatura est potentia ad mutationem, | |
| 3702 vel secundum esse substantiale, sicut corpora corruptibilia; vel | |
| 3703 secundum esse locale tantum, sicut corpora caelestia, vel secundum | |
| 3704 ordinem ad finem et applicationem virtutis ad diversa, sicut in | |
| 3705 Angelis. Et universaliter omnes creaturae communiter sunt mutabiles | |
| 3706 secundum potentiam creantis, in cuius potestate est esse et non | |
| 3707 esse earum. Unde, cum Deus nullo istorum modorum sit mutabilis, | |
| 3708 proprium eius est omnino immutabilem esse.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q9_A2-p9"> | |
| 3709 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This objection proceeds from mutability as regards substantial or accidental being; for philosophers treated of such movement. | |
| 3710 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 9 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="28585" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28585] Iª q. 9 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo | |
| 3711 dicendum quod obiectio illa procedit de eo quod est mutabile | |
| 3712 secundum esse substantiale vel accidentale, de tali enim motu | |
| 3713 philosophi tractaverunt.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q9_A2-p10"> | |
| 3714 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The good angels, besides their natural endowment of immutability of being, have also immutability of election by divine power; | |
| 3715 nevertheless there remains in them mutability as regards place. | |
| 3716 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 9 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="28586" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28586] Iª q. 9 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 3717 dicendum quod Angeli boni, supra immutabilitatem essendi, quae | |
| 3718 competit eis secundum naturam, habent immutabilitatem electionis ex | |
| 3719 divina virtute, tamen remanet in eis mutabilitas secundum | |
| 3720 locum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q9_A2-p11"> | |
| 3721 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Forms are called invariable, forasmuch as they cannot be subjects of variation; but they are subject to variation because | |
| 3722 by them their subject is variable. Hence it is clear that they vary in so far as they are; for they are not called beings | |
| 3723 as though they were the subject of being, but because through them something has being. | |
| 3724 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 9 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="28587" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28587] Iª q. 9 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium dicendum | |
| 3725 quod formae dicuntur invariabiles, quia non possunt esse subiectum | |
| 3726 variationis, subiiciuntur tamen variationi, inquantum subiectum | |
| 3727 secundum eas variatur. Unde patet quod secundum quod sunt, sic | |
| 3728 variantur, non enim dicuntur entia quasi sint subiectum essendi, | |
| 3729 sed quia eis aliquid est.</p></div></div></div></div> | |
| 3730 <div id="FP_Q10" class="div3"> | |
| 3731 <h3 id="FP_Q10-p0.1">Q. 10. THE ETERNITY OF GOD (SIX ARTICLES)</h3> | |
| 3732 <div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> | |
| 3733 <p id="FP_Q10-p2"> We must now consider the eternity of God, concerning which arise six points of inquiry:</p><p id="FP_Q10-p3"> (1) What is eternity?</p><p id="FP_Q10-p4"> (2) Whether God is eternal?</p><p id="FP_Q10-p5"> (3) Whether to be eternal belongs to God alone?</p><p id="FP_Q10-p6"> (4) Whether eternity differs from time?</p><p id="FP_Q10-p7"> (5) The difference of aeviternity, as there is one time, and one eternity?</p><p id="FP_Q10-p8"> (6) Whether there is only one aeviternity?</p> | |
| 3734 </div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 10 pr."><a name="28588" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28588] | |
| 3735 Iª q. 10 pr.</span></a> Deinde quaeritur de aeternitate. Et | |
| 3736 circa hoc quaeruntur sex. Primo, quid sit aeternitas. Secundo, | |
| 3737 utrum Deus sit aeternus. Tertio, utrum esse aeternum sit proprium | |
| 3738 Dei. Quarto, utrum aeternitas differat a tempore. Quinto, de | |
| 3739 differentia aevi et temporis. Sexto, utrum sit unum aevum tantum, | |
| 3740 sicut est unum tempus et una aeternitas.</p></div></div></div> | |
| 3741 <div id="FP_Q10_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q10_A1-p0.1">Q. 10. A. 1. Whether this is a good definition of eternity, "The simultaneously-whole and perfect possession of interminable life"?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q10_A1-p2"> | |
| 3742 <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the definition of eternity given by Boethius (De Consol. v) is not a good one: "Eternity is the simultaneously-whole | |
| 3743 and perfect possession of interminable life." For the word "interminable" is a negative one. But negation only belongs to | |
| 3744 what is defective, and this does not belong to eternity. Therefore in the definition of eternity the word "interminable" ought | |
| 3745 not to be found. | |
| 3746 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 10 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="28589" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28589] Iª q. 10 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum sic | |
| 3747 proceditur. Videtur quod non sit conveniens definitio aeternitatis, | |
| 3748 quam Boetius ponit V de consolatione, dicens quod <i>aeternitas est | |
| 3749 interminabilis vitae tota simul et perfecta possessio</i>. | |
| 3750 Interminabile enim negative dicitur. Sed negatio non est de ratione | |
| 3751 nisi eorum quae sunt deficientia, quod aeternitati non competit. | |
| 3752 Ergo in definitione aeternitatis non debet poni interminabile.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q10_A1-p3"> | |
| 3753 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, eternity signifies a certain kind of duration. But duration regards existence rather than life. Therefore the word | |
| 3754 "life" ought not to come into the definition of eternity; but rather the word "existence." | |
| 3755 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 10 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="28590" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28590] Iª q. 10 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 3756 aeternitas durationem quandam significat. Duratio autem magis | |
| 3757 respicit esse quam vitam. Ergo non debuit poni in definitione | |
| 3758 aeternitatis vita, sed magis esse.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q10_A1-p4"> | |
| 3759 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, a whole is what has parts. But this is alien to eternity which is simple. Therefore it is improperly said to be | |
| 3760 "whole." | |
| 3761 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 10 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="28591" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28591] Iª q. 10 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, totum | |
| 3762 dicitur quod habet partes. Hoc autem aeternitati non convenit, cum | |
| 3763 sit simplex. Ergo inconvenienter dicitur tota.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q10_A1-p5"> | |
| 3764 <b>Objection 4:</b> Many days cannot occur together, nor can many times exist all at once. But in eternity, days and times are in the plural, | |
| 3765 for it is said, "His going forth is from the beginning, from the days of eternity" ( | |
| 3766 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q10_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Mic.5.2" target="asv">Micah 5:2</a>); and also it is said, "According to the revelation of the mystery hidden from eternity" ( | |
| 3767 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q10_A1-p5.2" href="./asv.html#Rom.16.25" target="asv">Rom. 16:25</a>). Therefore eternity is not omni-simultaneous. | |
| 3768 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 10 a. 1 arg. 4"><a name="28592" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28592] Iª q. 10 a. 1 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 3769 plures dies non possunt esse simul, nec plura tempora. Sed in | |
| 3770 aeternitate pluraliter dicuntur dies et tempora, dicitur enim | |
| 3771 Micheae V, <i>egressus eius ab initio, a diebus aeternitatis</i>; | |
| 3772 et ad Rom., XVI cap., <i>secundum revelationem mysterii temporibus | |
| 3773 aeternis taciti</i>. Ergo aeternitas non est tota simul.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q10_A1-p6"> | |
| 3774 <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, the whole and the perfect are the same thing. Supposing, therefore, that it is "whole," it is superfluously described | |
| 3775 as "perfect." | |
| 3776 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 10 a. 1 arg. 5"><a name="28593" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28593] Iª q. 10 a. 1 arg. 5</span></a> Praeterea, totum | |
| 3777 et perfectum sunt idem. Posito igitur quod sit tota, superflue | |
| 3778 additur quod sit perfecta.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q10_A1-p7"> | |
| 3779 <b>Objection 6:</b> Further, duration does not imply "possession." But eternity is a kind of duration. Therefore eternity is not possession. | |
| 3780 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 10 a. 1 arg. 6"><a name="28594" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28594] Iª q. 10 a. 1 arg. 6</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 3781 possessio ad durationem non pertinet. Aeternitas autem quaedam | |
| 3782 duratio est. Ergo aeternitas non est possessio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q10_A1-p8"> | |
| 3783 <b>I answer that,</b> As we attain to the knowledge of simple things by way of compound things, so must we reach to the knowledge of eternity by | |
| 3784 means of time, which is nothing but the numbering of movement by "before" and "after." For since succession occurs in every | |
| 3785 movement, and one part comes after another, the fact that we reckon before and after in movement, makes us apprehend time, | |
| 3786 which is nothing else but the measure of before and after in movement. Now in a thing bereft | |
| 3787 of movement, which is always the same, there is no before or after. As therefore the idea of time consists in the numbering | |
| 3788 of before and after in movement; so likewise in the apprehension of the uniformity of what is outside of movement, consists | |
| 3789 the idea of eternity. | |
| 3790 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 10 a. 1 co."><a name="28595" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28595] Iª q. 10 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum | |
| 3791 quod, sicut in cognitionem simplicium oportet nos venire per | |
| 3792 composita, ita in cognitionem aeternitatis oportet nos venire per | |
| 3793 tempus; quod nihil aliud est quam numerus motus secundum prius et | |
| 3794 posterius. Cum enim in quolibet motu sit successio, et una pars | |
| 3795 post alteram, ex hoc quod numeramus prius et posterius in motu, | |
| 3796 apprehendimus tempus; quod nihil aliud est quam numerus prioris et | |
| 3797 posterioris in motu. In eo autem quod caret motu, et semper eodem | |
| 3798 modo se habet, non est accipere prius et posterius. Sicut igitur | |
| 3799 ratio temporis consistit in numeratione prioris et posterioris in | |
| 3800 motu, ita in apprehensione uniformitatis eius quod est omnino extra | |
| 3801 motum, consistit ratio aeternitatis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q10_A1-p9"> Further, those things are said to be measured by time which have a beginning and an end in time, because in everything which | |
| 3802 is moved there is a beginning, and there is an end. But as whatever is wholly immutable can have no succession, so it has | |
| 3803 no beginning, and no end. | |
| 3804 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin">Item, ea dicuntur tempore | |
| 3805 mensurari, quae principium et finem habent in tempore, ut dicitur | |
| 3806 in IV Physic., et hoc ideo, quia in omni eo quod movetur est | |
| 3807 accipere aliquod principium et aliquem finem. Quod vero est omnino | |
| 3808 immutabile, sicut nec successionem, ita nec principium aut finem | |
| 3809 habere potest.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q10_A1-p10"> Thus eternity is known from two sources: first, because what is eternal is interminable---that is, has no beginning nor end | |
| 3810 (that is, no term either way); secondly, because eternity has no succession, being simultaneously whole. | |
| 3811 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin">Sic ergo ex duobus notificatur aeternitas. Primo, ex | |
| 3812 hoc quod id quod est in aeternitate, est interminabile, idest | |
| 3813 principio et fine carens (ut terminus ad utrumque referatur). | |
| 3814 Secundo, per hoc quod ipsa aeternitas successione caret, tota simul | |
| 3815 existens.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q10_A1-p11"> | |
| 3816 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Simple things are usually defined by way of negation; as "a point is that which has no parts." Yet this is not to be taken | |
| 3817 as if the negation belonged to their essence, but because our intellect which first apprehends compound things, cannot attain | |
| 3818 to the knowledge of simple things except by removing the opposite. | |
| 3819 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 10 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="28596" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28596] Iª q. 10 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo | |
| 3820 dicendum quod simplicia consueverunt per negationem definiri, sicut | |
| 3821 punctus est cuius pars non est. Quod non ideo est, quod negatio sit | |
| 3822 de essentia eorum, sed quia intellectus noster, qui primo | |
| 3823 apprehendit composita, in cognitionem simplicium pervenire non | |
| 3824 potest, nisi per remotionem compositionis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q10_A1-p12"> | |
| 3825 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> What is truly eternal, is not only being, but also living; and life extends to operation, which is not true of being. Now | |
| 3826 the protraction of duration seems to belong to operation rather than to being; hence time is the numbering of movement. | |
| 3827 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 10 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="28597" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28597] Iª q. 10 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 3828 dicendum quod illud quod est vere aeternum, non solum est ens, sed | |
| 3829 vivens, et ipsum vivere se extendit quodammodo ad operationem, non | |
| 3830 autem esse. Protensio autem durationis videtur attendi secundum | |
| 3831 operationem, magis quam secundum esse, unde et tempus est numerus | |
| 3832 motus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q10_A1-p13"> | |
| 3833 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Eternity is called whole, not because it has parts, but because it is wanting in nothing. | |
| 3834 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 10 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="28598" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28598] Iª q. 10 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 3835 dicendum quod aeternitas dicitur tota, non quia habet partes, sed | |
| 3836 inquantum nihil ei deest.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q10_A1-p14"> | |
| 3837 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> As God, although incorporeal, is named in Scripture metaphorically by corporeal names, so eternity though simultaneously | |
| 3838 whole, is called by names implying time and succession. | |
| 3839 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 10 a. 1 ad 4"><a name="28599" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28599] Iª q. 10 a. 1 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum | |
| 3840 dicendum quod, sicut Deus, cum sit incorporeus, nominibus rerum | |
| 3841 corporalium metaphorice in Scripturis nominatur, sic aeternitas, | |
| 3842 tota simul existens, nominibus temporalibus successivis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q10_A1-p15"> | |
| 3843 <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> Two things are to be considered in time: time itself, which is successive; and the "now" of time, which is imperfect. Hence | |
| 3844 the expression "simultaneously-whole" is used to remove the idea of time, and the word "perfect" is used to exclude the "now" | |
| 3845 of time. | |
| 3846 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 10 a. 1 ad 5"><a name="28600" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28600] Iª q. 10 a. 1 ad 5</span></a> Ad quintum | |
| 3847 dicendum quod in tempore est duo considerare, scilicet ipsum | |
| 3848 tempus, quod est successivum; et nunc temporis, quod est | |
| 3849 imperfectum. Dicit ergo tota simul, ad removendum tempus, et | |
| 3850 perfecta, ad excludendum nunc temporis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q10_A1-p16"> | |
| 3851 <b>Reply to Objection 6:</b> Whatever is possessed, is held firmly and quietly; therefore to designate the immutability and permanence of eternity, we | |
| 3852 use the word "possession." | |
| 3853 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 10 a. 1 ad 6"><a name="28601" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28601] Iª q. 10 a. 1 ad 6</span></a> Ad sextum dicendum | |
| 3854 quod illud quod possidetur, firmiter et quiete habetur. Ad | |
| 3855 designandam ergo immutabilitatem et indeficientiam aeternitatis, | |
| 3856 usus est nomine possessionis.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q10_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q10_A2-p0.1">Q. 10. A. 2. Whether God is eternal?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q10_A2-p2"> | |
| 3857 <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God is not eternal. For nothing made can be predicated of God; for Boethius says (De Trin. iv) that, "The now | |
| 3858 that flows away makes time, the now that stands still makes eternity;" and Augustine says (Octog. Tri. Quaest. qu. 28) "that | |
| 3859 God is the author of eternity." Therefore God is not eternal. | |
| 3860 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 10 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="28602" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28602] Iª q. 10 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum sic | |
| 3861 proceditur. Videtur quod Deus non sit aeternus. Nihil enim factum | |
| 3862 potest dici de Deo. Sed aeternitas est aliquid factum, dicit enim | |
| 3863 Boetius quod <i>nunc fluens facit tempus, nunc stans facit | |
| 3864 aeternitatem</i>; et Augustinus dicit, in libro octoginta trium | |
| 3865 quaest., quod Deus est auctor aeternitatis. Ergo Deus non est | |
| 3866 aeternus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q10_A2-p3"> | |
| 3867 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, what is before eternity, and after eternity, is not measured by eternity. But, as Aristotle says (De Causis), "God | |
| 3868 is before eternity and He is after eternity": for it is written that "the Lord shall reign for eternity, and beyond [*Douay: | |
| 3869 'for ever and ever']" ( | |
| 3870 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q10_A2-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Exod.15.18" target="asv">Ex. 15:18</a>). Therefore to be eternal does not belong to God. | |
| 3871 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 10 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="28603" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28603] Iª q. 10 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, quod | |
| 3872 est ante aeternitatem et post aeternitatem, non mensuratur | |
| 3873 aeternitate. Sed Deus est ante aeternitatem, ut dicitur in libro de | |
| 3874 causis, et post aeternitatem; dicitur enim Exod. XV, quod | |
| 3875 <i>dominus regnabit in aeternum et ultra</i>. Ergo esse aeternum | |
| 3876 non convenit Deo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q10_A2-p4"> | |
| 3877 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, eternity is a kind of measure. But to be measured belongs not to God. Therefore it does not belong to Him to be | |
| 3878 eternal. | |
| 3879 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 10 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="28604" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28604] Iª q. 10 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 3880 aeternitas mensura quaedam est. Sed Deo non convenit esse | |
| 3881 mensuratum. Ergo non competit ei esse aeternum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q10_A2-p5"> | |
| 3882 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, in eternity, there is no present, past or future, since it is simultaneously whole; as was said in the preceding | |
| 3883 article. But words denoting present, past and future time are applied to God in Scripture. Therefore God is not eternal. | |
| 3884 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 10 a. 2 arg. 4"><a name="28605" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28605] Iª q. 10 a. 2 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, in | |
| 3885 aeternitate non est praesens, praeteritum vel futurum cum sit tota | |
| 3886 simul, ut dictum est. Sed de Deo dicuntur in Scripturis verba | |
| 3887 praesentis temporis, praeteriti vel futuri. Ergo Deus non est | |
| 3888 aeternus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q10_A2-p6"> | |
| 3889 <b>On the contrary,</b> Athanasius says in his Creed: "The Father is eternal, the Son is eternal, the Holy Ghost is eternal." | |
| 3890 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 10 a. 2 s. c."><a name="28606" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28606] Iª q. 10 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est | |
| 3891 quod dicit Athanasius, <i>aeternus pater, aeternus filius, aeternus | |
| 3892 spiritus sanctus</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q10_A2-p7"> | |
| 3893 <b>I answer that,</b> The idea of eternity follows immutability, as the idea of time follows movement, as appears from the preceding article. Hence, | |
| 3894 as God is supremely immutable, it supremely belongs to Him to be eternal. Nor is He eternal only; but He is His own eternity; | |
| 3895 whereas, no other being is its own duration, as no other is its own being. Now God is His own uniform being; and hence as | |
| 3896 He is His own essence, so He is His own eternity. | |
| 3897 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 10 a. 2 co."><a name="28607" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28607] Iª q. 10 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum | |
| 3898 quod ratio aeternitatis consequitur immutabilitatem, sicut ratio | |
| 3899 temporis consequitur motum, ut ex dictis patet. Unde, cum Deus sit | |
| 3900 maxime immutabilis, sibi maxime competit esse aeternum. Nec solum | |
| 3901 est aeternus, sed est sua aeternitas, cum tamen nulla alia res sit | |
| 3902 sua duratio, quia non est suum esse. Deus autem est suum esse | |
| 3903 uniforme, unde, sicut est sua essentia, ita est sua aeternitas.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q10_A2-p8"> | |
| 3904 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The "now" that stands still, is said to make eternity according to our apprehension. As the apprehension of time is caused | |
| 3905 in us by the fact that we apprehend the flow of the "now," so the apprehension of eternity is caused in us by our apprehending | |
| 3906 the "now" standing still. When Augustine says that "God is the author of eternity," this is to be understood of participated | |
| 3907 eternity. For God communicates His eternity to some in the same way as He | |
| 3908 communicates His immutability. | |
| 3909 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 10 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="28608" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28608] Iª q. 10 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo | |
| 3910 dicendum quod nunc stans dicitur facere aeternitatem, secundum | |
| 3911 nostram apprehensionem. Sicut enim causatur in nobis apprehensio | |
| 3912 temporis, eo quod apprehendimus fluxum ipsius nunc, ita causatur in | |
| 3913 nobis apprehensio aeternitatis, inquantum apprehendimus nunc stans. | |
| 3914 Quod autem dicit Augustinus, quod <i>Deus est auctor | |
| 3915 aeternitatis</i>, intelligitur de aeternitate participata, eo enim | |
| 3916 modo communicat Deus suam aeternitatem aliquibus, quo et suam | |
| 3917 immutabilitatem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q10_A2-p9"> | |
| 3918 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> From this appears the answer to the Second Objection. For God is said to be before eternity, according as it is shared by | |
| 3919 immaterial substances. Hence, also, in the same book, it is said that "intelligence is equal to eternity." In the words of | |
| 3920 Exodus, "The Lord shall reign for eternity, and beyond," eternity stands for age, as another rendering has it. Thus it is | |
| 3921 said that the Lord will reign beyond eternity, inasmuch as He endures beyond every age, | |
| 3922 i.e. beyond every kind of duration. For age is nothing more than the period of each thing, as is said in the book De Coelo | |
| 3923 i. Or to reign beyond eternity can be taken to mean that if any other thing were conceived to exist for ever, as the movement | |
| 3924 of the heavens according to some philosophers, then God would still reign beyond, inasmuch as His reign is simultaneously | |
| 3925 whole. | |
| 3926 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 10 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="28609" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28609] Iª q. 10 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Et per hoc patet | |
| 3927 solutio ad secundum. Nam Deus dicitur esse ante aeternitatem, prout | |
| 3928 participatur a substantiis immaterialibus. Unde et ibidem dicitur, | |
| 3929 quod <i>intelligentia parificatur aeternitati</i>. Quod autem | |
| 3930 dicitur in Exodo, <i>dominus regnabit in aeternum et ultra</i> | |
| 3931 sciendum quod aeternum accipitur ibi pro saeculo, sicut habet alia | |
| 3932 translatio. Sic igitur dicitur quod regnabit ultra aeternum, quia | |
| 3933 durat ultra quodcumque saeculum, idest ultra quamcumque durationem | |
| 3934 datam, nihil est enim aliud saeculum quam periodus cuiuslibet rei, | |
| 3935 ut dicitur in libro I de caelo. Vel dicitur etiam ultra aeternum | |
| 3936 regnare, quia, si etiam aliquid aliud semper esset (ut motus caeli | |
| 3937 secundum quosdam philosophos), tamen Deus ultra regnat, inquantum | |
| 3938 eius regnum est totum simul.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q10_A2-p10"> | |
| 3939 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Eternity is nothing else but God Himself. Hence God is not called eternal, as if He were in any way measured; but the idea | |
| 3940 of measurement is there taken according to the apprehension of our mind alone. | |
| 3941 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 10 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="28610" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28610] Iª q. 10 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 3942 dicendum quod aeternitas non est aliud quam ipse Deus. Unde non | |
| 3943 dicitur Deus aeternus, quasi sit aliquo modo mensuratus, sed | |
| 3944 accipitur ibi ratio mensurae secundum apprehensionem nostram | |
| 3945 tantum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q10_A2-p11"> | |
| 3946 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Words denoting different times are applied to God, because His eternity includes all times; not as if He Himself were altered | |
| 3947 through present, past and future. | |
| 3948 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 10 a. 2 ad 4"><a name="28611" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28611] Iª q. 10 a. 2 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum | |
| 3949 dicendum quod verba diversorum temporum attribuuntur Deo, inquantum | |
| 3950 eius aeternitas omnia tempora includit, non quod ipse varietur per | |
| 3951 praesens, praeteritum et futurum.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q10_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q10_A3-p0.1">Q. 10. A. 3. Whether to be eternal belongs to God alone?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q10_A3-p2"> | |
| 3952 <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that it does not belong to God alone to be eternal. For it is written that "those who instruct many to justice," | |
| 3953 shall be "as stars unto perpetual eternities [*Douay: 'for all eternity']" ( | |
| 3954 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q10_A3-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Dan.12.3" target="asv">Dan. 12:3</a>). Now if God alone were eternal, there could not be many eternities. Therefore God alone is not the only eternal. | |
| 3955 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 10 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="28612" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28612] Iª q. 10 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium sic | |
| 3956 proceditur. Videtur quod esse aeternum non sit soli Deo proprium. | |
| 3957 Dicitur enim Danielis XII, quod <i>qui ad iustitiam erudiunt | |
| 3958 plurimos, erunt quasi stellae in perpetuas aeternitates</i>. Non | |
| 3959 autem essent plures aeternitates, si solus Deus esset aeternus. Non | |
| 3960 igitur solus Deus est aeternus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q10_A3-p3"> | |
| 3961 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it is written "Depart, ye cursed into eternal [Douay: 'everlasting'] fire" ( | |
| 3962 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q10_A3-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.25.41" target="asv">Mat. 25:41</a>). Therefore God is not the only eternal. | |
| 3963 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 10 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="28613" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28613] Iª q. 10 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 3964 Matth. XXV dicitur, <i>ite, maledicti, in ignem aeternum</i>. Non | |
| 3965 igitur solus Deus est aeternus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q10_A3-p4"> | |
| 3966 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, every necessary thing is eternal. But there are many necessary things; as, for instance, all principles of demonstration | |
| 3967 and all demonstrative propositions. Therefore God is not the only eternal. | |
| 3968 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 10 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="28614" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28614] Iª q. 10 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, omne | |
| 3969 necessarium est aeternum. Sed multa sunt necessaria; sicut omnia | |
| 3970 principia demonstrationis, et omnes propositiones demonstrativae. | |
| 3971 Ergo non solus Deus est aeternus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q10_A3-p5"> | |
| 3972 <b>On the contrary,</b> Jerome says (Ep. ad Damasum. xv) that "God is the only one who has no beginning." Now whatever has a beginning, is not eternal. | |
| 3973 Therefore God is the only one eternal. | |
| 3974 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 10 a. 3 s. c."><a name="28615" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28615] Iª q. 10 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est | |
| 3975 quod dicit Hieronymus, ad Marcellam, <i>Deus solus est qui exordium | |
| 3976 non habet</i>. Quidquid autem exordium habet, non est aeternum. | |
| 3977 Solus ergo Deus est aeternus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q10_A3-p6"> | |
| 3978 <b>I answer that,</b> Eternity truly and properly so called is in God alone, because eternity follows on immutability; as appears from the first | |
| 3979 article. But God alone is altogether immutable, as was shown above ( | |
| 3980 <a id="FP_Q10_A3-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q9_A1.html">Q[9], A[1]</a>). Accordingly, however, as some receive immutability from Him, they share in His eternity. Thus some receive immutability | |
| 3981 from God in the way of never ceasing to exist; in that sense it is said of the earth, "it standeth for ever" | |
| 3982 ( | |
| 3983 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q10_A3-p6.2" href="./asv.html#Eccl.1.4" target="asv">Eccles. 1:4</a>). Again, some things are called eternal in Scripture because of the length of their duration, although they are in nature | |
| 3984 corruptible; thus ( | |
| 3985 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q10_A3-p6.3" href="./asv.html#Ps.75.5" target="asv">Ps. 75:5</a>) the hills are called "eternal" and we read "of the fruits of the eternal hills." ( | |
| 3986 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q10_A3-p6.4" href="./asv.html#Deut.33.15" target="asv">Dt. 33:15</a>). Some again, share more fully than others in the nature of eternity, inasmuch as they possess unchangeableness either in | |
| 3987 being or further still in operation; like the angels, and | |
| 3988 the blessed, who enjoy the Word, because "as regards that vision of the Word, no changing thoughts exist in the Saints," as | |
| 3989 Augustine says (De Trin. xv). Hence those who see God are said to have eternal life; according to that text, "This is eternal | |
| 3990 life, that they may know Thee the only true God," etc. ( | |
| 3991 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q10_A3-p6.5" href="./asv.html#John.17.3" target="asv">Jn. 17:3</a>). | |
| 3992 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 10 a. 3 co."><a name="28616" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28616] Iª q. 10 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum | |
| 3993 quod aeternitas vere et proprie in solo Deo est. Quia aeternitas | |
| 3994 immutabilitatem consequitur, ut ex dictis patet. Solus autem Deus | |
| 3995 est omnino immutabilis, ut est superius ostensum. Secundum tamen | |
| 3996 quod aliqua ab ipso immutabilitatem percipiunt, secundum hoc aliqua | |
| 3997 eius aeternitatem participant. Quaedam ergo quantum ad hoc | |
| 3998 immutabilitatem sortiuntur a Deo, quod nunquam esse desinunt, et | |
| 3999 secundum hoc dicitur Eccle. I de terra, quod in aeternum stat. | |
| 4000 Quaedam etiam aeterna in Scripturis dicuntur propter diuturnitatem | |
| 4001 durationis, licet corruptibilia sint, sicut in Psalmo dicuntur | |
| 4002 montes aeterni; et Deuter. XXXIII etiam dicitur, de pomis collium | |
| 4003 aeternorum. Quaedam autem amplius participant de ratione | |
| 4004 aeternitatis, inquantum habent intransmutabilitatem vel secundum | |
| 4005 esse, vel ulterius secundum operationem, sicut Angeli et beati, qui | |
| 4006 verbo fruuntur, quia quantum ad illam visionem verbi, non sunt in | |
| 4007 sanctis volubiles cogitationes, ut dicit Augustinus, XV de Trin. | |
| 4008 Unde et videntes Deum dicuntur habere vitam aeternam, secundum | |
| 4009 illud Ioann. XVII, <i>haec est vita aeterna, ut cognoscant</i> et | |
| 4010 cetera.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q10_A3-p7"> | |
| 4011 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> There are said to be many eternities, accordingly as many share in eternity, by the contemplation of God. | |
| 4012 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 10 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="28617" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28617] Iª q. 10 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo | |
| 4013 dicendum quod dicuntur multae aeternitates, secundum quod sunt | |
| 4014 multi participantes aeternitatem ex ipsa Dei contemplatione.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q10_A3-p8"> | |
| 4015 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The fire of hell is called eternal, only because it never ends. Still, there is change in the pains of the lost, according | |
| 4016 to the words "To extreme heat they will pass from snowy waters" ( | |
| 4017 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q10_A3-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Job.24.19" target="asv">Job 24:19</a>). Hence in hell true eternity does not exist, but rather time; according to the text of the Psalm "Their time will be for | |
| 4018 ever" ( | |
| 4019 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q10_A3-p8.2" href="./asv.html#Ps.80.16" target="asv">Ps. 80:16</a>). | |
| 4020 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 10 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="28618" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28618] Iª q. 10 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 4021 dicendum quod ignis Inferni dicitur aeternus propter | |
| 4022 interminabilitatem tantum. Est tamen in poenis eorum transmutatio, | |
| 4023 secundum illud Iob XXIV, <i>ad nimium calorem transibunt ab aquis | |
| 4024 nivium</i>. Unde in Inferno non est vera aeternitas, sed magis | |
| 4025 tempus; secundum illud Psalmi, <i>erit tempus eorum in | |
| 4026 saecula</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q10_A3-p9"> | |
| 4027 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Necessary means a certain mode of truth; and truth, according to the Philosopher (Metaph. vi), is in the mind. Therefore | |
| 4028 in this sense the true and necessary are eternal, because they are in the eternal mind, which is the divine intellect alone; | |
| 4029 hence it does not follow that anything beside God is eternal. | |
| 4030 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 10 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="28619" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28619] Iª q. 10 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 4031 dicendum quod necessarium significat quendam modum veritatis. Verum | |
| 4032 autem, secundum philosophum, VI Metaphys., est in intellectu. | |
| 4033 Secundum hoc igitur vera et necessaria sunt aeterna, quia sunt in | |
| 4034 intellectu aeterno, qui est intellectus divinus solus. Unde non | |
| 4035 sequitur quod aliquid extra Deum sit aeternum.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q10_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q10_A4-p0.1">Q. 10. A. 4. Whether eternity differs from time?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q10_A4-p2"> | |
| 4036 <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that eternity does not differ from time. For two measures of duration cannot exist together, unless one is part | |
| 4037 of the other; for instance two days or two hours cannot be together; nevertheless, we may say that a day or an hour are together, | |
| 4038 considering hour as part of a day. But eternity and time occur together, each of which imports a certain measure of duration. | |
| 4039 Since therefore eternity is not a part of time, forasmuch as eternity exceeds time, and | |
| 4040 includes it, it seems that time is a part of eternity, and is not a different thing from eternity. | |
| 4041 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 10 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="28620" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28620] Iª q. 10 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum sic | |
| 4042 proceditur. Videtur quod aeternitas non sit aliud a tempore. | |
| 4043 Impossibile est enim duas esse mensuras durationis simul, nisi una | |
| 4044 sit pars alterius, non enim sunt simul duo dies vel duae horae; sed | |
| 4045 dies et hora sunt simul, quia hora est pars diei. Sed aeternitas et | |
| 4046 tempus sunt simul, quorum utrumque mensuram quandam durationis | |
| 4047 importat. Cum igitur aeternitas non sit pars temporis, quia | |
| 4048 aeternitas excedit tempus et includit ipsum; videtur quod tempus | |
| 4049 sit pars aeternitatis, et non aliud ab aeternitate.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q10_A4-p3"> | |
| 4050 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, according to the Philosopher (Phys. iv), the "now" of time remains the same in the whole of time. But the nature | |
| 4051 of eternity seems to be that it is the same indivisible thing in the whole space of time. Therefore eternity is the "now" | |
| 4052 of time. But the "now" of time is not substantially different from time. Therefore eternity is not substantially different | |
| 4053 from time. | |
| 4054 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 10 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="28621" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28621] Iª q. 10 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 4055 secundum philosophum in IV Physic., nunc temporis manet idem in | |
| 4056 toto tempore. Sed hoc videtur constituere rationem aeternitatis, | |
| 4057 quod sit idem indivisibiliter se habens in toto decursu temporis. | |
| 4058 Ergo aeternitas est nunc temporis. Sed nunc temporis non est aliud | |
| 4059 secundum substantiam a tempore. Ergo aeternitas non est aliud | |
| 4060 secundum substantiam a tempore.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q10_A4-p4"> | |
| 4061 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, as the measure of the first movement is the measure of every movement, as said in Phys. iv, it thus appears that | |
| 4062 the measure of the first being is that of every being. But eternity is the measure of the first being---that is, of the divine | |
| 4063 being. Therefore eternity is the measure of every being. But the being of things corruptible is measured by time. Time therefore | |
| 4064 is either eternity or is a part of eternity. | |
| 4065 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 10 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="28622" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28622] Iª q. 10 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, sicut | |
| 4066 mensura primi motus est mensura omnium motuum, ut dicitur in IV | |
| 4067 Physic., ita videtur quod mensura primi esse sit mensura omnis | |
| 4068 esse. Sed aeternitas est mensura primi esse, quod est esse divinum. | |
| 4069 Ergo aeternitas est mensura omnis esse. Sed esse rerum | |
| 4070 corruptibilium mensuratur tempore. Ergo tempus vel est aeternitas, | |
| 4071 vel aliquid aeternitatis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q10_A4-p5"> | |
| 4072 <b>On the contrary,</b> Eternity is simultaneously whole. But time has a "before" and an "after." Therefore time and eternity are not the same thing. | |
| 4073 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 10 a. 4 s. c."><a name="28623" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28623] Iª q. 10 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est | |
| 4074 quod aeternitas est tota simul, in tempore autem est prius et | |
| 4075 posterius. Ergo tempus et aeternitas non sunt idem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q10_A4-p6"> | |
| 4076 <b>I answer that,</b> It is manifest that time and eternity are not the same. Some have founded this difference on the fact that eternity has neither | |
| 4077 beginning nor an end; whereas time has a beginning and an end. This, however, makes a merely accidental, and not an absolute | |
| 4078 difference because, granted that time always was and always will be, according to the idea of those who think the movement | |
| 4079 of the heavens goes on for ever, there would yet remain a difference between eternity | |
| 4080 and time, as Boethius says (De Consol. v), arising from the fact that eternity is simultaneously whole; which cannot be applied | |
| 4081 to time: for eternity is the measure of a permanent being; while time is a measure of movement. Supposing, however, that the | |
| 4082 aforesaid difference be considered on the part of the things measured, and not as regards the measures, then there is some | |
| 4083 reason for it, inasmuch as that alone is measured by time which has beginning and end in time. Hence, if the movement of | |
| 4084 the heavens lasted always, time would not be of its measure as regards the whole of its duration, since the infinite is not | |
| 4085 measurable; but it would be the measure of that part of its revolution which has beginning and end in time. | |
| 4086 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 10 a. 4 co."><a name="28624" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28624] Iª q. 10 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum | |
| 4087 quod manifestum est tempus et aeternitatem non esse idem. Sed huius | |
| 4088 diversitatis rationem quidam assignaverunt ex hoc quod aeternitas | |
| 4089 caret principio et fine, tempus autem habet principium et finem. | |
| 4090 Sed haec est differentia per accidens, et non per se. Quia dato | |
| 4091 quod tempus semper fuerit et semper futurum sit, secundum | |
| 4092 positionem eorum qui motum caeli ponunt sempiternum, adhuc | |
| 4093 remanebit differentia inter aeternitatem et tempus, ut dicit | |
| 4094 Boetius in libro de Consolat., ex hoc quod aeternitas est tota | |
| 4095 simul, quod tempori non convenit, quia aeternitas est mensura esse | |
| 4096 permanentis, tempus vero est mensura motus. Si tamen praedicta | |
| 4097 differentia attendatur quantum ad mensurata, et non quantum ad | |
| 4098 mensuras, sic habet aliquam rationem, quia solum illud mensuratur | |
| 4099 tempore, quod habet principium et finem in tempore, ut dicitur in | |
| 4100 IV Physic. Unde si motus caeli semper duraret, tempus non | |
| 4101 mensuraret ipsum secundum suam totam durationem, cum infinitum non | |
| 4102 sit mensurabile; sed mensuraret quamlibet circulationem, quae habet | |
| 4103 principium et finem in tempore.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q10_A4-p7"> Another reason for the same can be taken from these measures in themselves, if we consider the end and the beginning as potentialities; | |
| 4104 because, granted also that time always goes on, yet it is possible to note in time both the beginning and the end, by considering | |
| 4105 its parts: thus we speak of the beginning and the end of a day or of a year; which cannot be applied to eternity. Still these | |
| 4106 differences follow upon the essential and primary differences, that eternity is | |
| 4107 simultaneously whole, but that time is not so. | |
| 4108 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin">Potest tamen et aliam rationem | |
| 4109 habere ex parte istarum mensurarum, si accipiatur finis et | |
| 4110 principium in potentia. Quia etiam dato quod tempus semper duret, | |
| 4111 tamen possibile est signare in tempore et principium et finem, | |
| 4112 accipiendo aliquas partes ipsius, sicut dicimus principium et finem | |
| 4113 diei vel anni, quod non contingit in aeternitate. Sed tamen istae | |
| 4114 differentiae consequuntur eam quae est per se et primo, | |
| 4115 differentiam, per hoc quod aeternitas est tota simul, non autem | |
| 4116 tempus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q10_A4-p8"> | |
| 4117 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Such a reason would be a valid one if time and eternity were the same kind of measure; but this is seen not to be the case | |
| 4118 when we consider those things of which the respective measures are time and eternity. | |
| 4119 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 10 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="28625" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28625] Iª q. 10 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo | |
| 4120 dicendum quod ratio illa procederet, si tempus et aeternitas essent | |
| 4121 mensurae unius generis, quod patet esse falsum, ex his quorum est | |
| 4122 tempus et aeternitas mensura.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q10_A4-p9"> | |
| 4123 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The "now" of time is the same as regards its subject in the whole course of time, but it differs in aspect; for inasmuch | |
| 4124 as time corresponds to movement, its "now" corresponds to what is movable; and the thing movable has the same one subject | |
| 4125 in all time, but differs in aspect a being here and there; and such alteration is movement. Likewise the flow of the "now" | |
| 4126 as alternating in aspect is time. But eternity remains the same according to both subject | |
| 4127 and aspect; and hence eternity is not the same as the "now" of time. | |
| 4128 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 10 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="28626" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28626] Iª q. 10 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 4129 dicendum quod nunc temporis est idem subiecto in toto tempore, sed | |
| 4130 differens ratione, eo quod, sicut tempus respondet motui, ita nunc | |
| 4131 temporis respondet mobili; mobile autem est idem subiecto in toto | |
| 4132 decursu temporis, sed differens ratione, inquantum est hic et ibi. | |
| 4133 Et ista alternatio est motus. Similiter fluxus ipsius nunc, | |
| 4134 secundum quod alternatur ratione, est tempus. Aeternitas autem | |
| 4135 manet eadem et subiecto et ratione. Unde aeternitas non est idem | |
| 4136 quod nunc temporis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q10_A4-p10"> | |
| 4137 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As eternity is the proper measure of permanent being, so time is the proper measure of movement; and hence, according as | |
| 4138 any being recedes from permanence of being, and is subject to change, it recedes from eternity, and is subject to time. Therefore | |
| 4139 the being of things corruptible, because it is changeable, is not measured by eternity, but by time; for time measures not | |
| 4140 only things actually changed, but also things changeable; hence it not only | |
| 4141 measures movement but it also measures repose, which belongs to whatever is naturally movable, but is not actually in motion. | |
| 4142 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 10 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="28627" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28627] Iª q. 10 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 4143 dicendum quod, sicut aeternitas est propria mensura ipsius esse, | |
| 4144 ita tempus est propria mensura motus. Unde secundum quod aliquod | |
| 4145 esse recedit a permanentia essendi et subditur transmutationi, | |
| 4146 secundum hoc recedit ab aeternitate et subditur tempori. Esse ergo | |
| 4147 rerum corruptibilium, quia est transmutabile, non mensuratur | |
| 4148 aeternitate, sed tempore. Tempus enim mensurat non solum quae | |
| 4149 transmutantur in actu, sed quae sunt transmutabilia. Unde non solum | |
| 4150 mensurat motum, sed etiam quietem; quae est eius quod natum est | |
| 4151 moveri, et non movetur.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q10_A5" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q10_A5-p0.1">Q. 10. A. 5. The difference of aeviternity and time</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q10_A5-p2"> | |
| 4152 <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that aeviternity is the same as time. For Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. viii, 20,22,23), that "God moves the spiritual | |
| 4153 through time." But aeviternity is said to be the measure of spiritual substances. Therefore time is the same as aeviternity. | |
| 4154 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 10 a. 5 arg. 1"><a name="28628" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28628] Iª q. 10 a. 5 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quintum sic | |
| 4155 proceditur. Videtur quod aevum non sit aliud a tempore. Dicit enim | |
| 4156 Augustinus, VIII super Gen. ad Litt., quod <i>Deus movet creaturam | |
| 4157 spiritualem per tempus</i>. Sed aevum dicitur esse mensura | |
| 4158 spiritualium substantiarum. Ergo tempus non differt ab aevo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q10_A5-p3"> | |
| 4159 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it is essential to time to have "before" and "after"; but it is essential to eternity to be simultaneously whole, | |
| 4160 as was shown above in the first article. Now aeviternity is not eternity; for it is written ( | |
| 4161 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q10_A5-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.1.1" target="asv">Ecclus. 1:1</a>) that eternal "Wisdom is before age." Therefore it is not simultaneously whole but has "before" and "after"; and thus it | |
| 4162 is the same as time. | |
| 4163 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 10 a. 5 arg. 2"><a name="28629" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28629] Iª q. 10 a. 5 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, de | |
| 4164 ratione temporis est quod habeat prius et posterius, de ratione | |
| 4165 vero aeternitatis est quod sit tota simul, ut dictum est. Sed aevum | |
| 4166 non est aeternitas, dicitur enim Eccli. I, quod sapientia aeterna | |
| 4167 est ante aevum. Ergo non est totum simul, sed habet prius et | |
| 4168 posterius, et ita est tempus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q10_A5-p4"> | |
| 4169 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if there is no "before" and "after" in aeviternity, it follows that in aeviternal things there is no difference | |
| 4170 between being, having been, or going to be. Since then it is impossible for aeviternal things not to have been, it follows | |
| 4171 that it is impossible for them not to be in the future; which is false, since God can reduce them to nothing. | |
| 4172 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 10 a. 5 arg. 3"><a name="28630" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28630] Iª q. 10 a. 5 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, si in | |
| 4173 aevo non est prius et posterius, sequitur quod in aeviternis non | |
| 4174 differat esse vel fuisse vel futurum esse. Cum igitur sit | |
| 4175 impossibile aeviterna non fuisse, sequitur quod impossibile sit ea | |
| 4176 non futura esse. Quod falsum est, cum Deus possit ea reducere in | |
| 4177 nihilum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q10_A5-p5"> | |
| 4178 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, since the duration of aeviternal things is infinite as to subsequent duration, if aeviternity is simultaneously | |
| 4179 whole, it follows that some creature is actually infinite; which is impossible. Therefore aeviternity does not differ from | |
| 4180 time. | |
| 4181 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 10 a. 5 arg. 4"><a name="28631" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28631] Iª q. 10 a. 5 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, cum | |
| 4182 duratio aeviternorum sit infinita ex parte post, si aevum sit totum | |
| 4183 simul, sequitur quod aliquod creatum sit infinitum in actu, quod | |
| 4184 est impossibile. Non igitur aevum differt a tempore.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q10_A5-p6"> | |
| 4185 <b>On the contrary,</b> Boethius says (De Consol. iii) "Who commandest time to be separate from aeviternity." | |
| 4186 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 10 a. 5 s. c."><a name="28632" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28632] Iª q. 10 a. 5 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est | |
| 4187 quod dicit Boetius, <i>qui tempus ab aevo ire iubes</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q10_A5-p7"> | |
| 4188 <b>I answer that,</b> Aeviternity differs from time, and from eternity, as the mean between them both. This difference is explained by some to | |
| 4189 consist in the fact that eternity has neither beginning nor end, aeviternity, a beginning but no end, and time both beginning | |
| 4190 and end. This difference, however, is but an accidental one, as was shown above, in the preceding article; because even if | |
| 4191 aeviternal things had always been, and would always be, as some think, and even if they | |
| 4192 might sometimes fail to be, which is possible to God to allow; even granted this, aeviternity would still be distinguished | |
| 4193 from eternity, and from time. | |
| 4194 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 10 a. 5 co."><a name="28633" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28633] Iª q. 10 a. 5 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum | |
| 4195 quod aevum differt a tempore et ab aeternitate, sicut medium | |
| 4196 existens inter illa. Sed horum differentiam aliqui sic assignant, | |
| 4197 dicentes quod aeternitas principio et fine caret; aevum habet | |
| 4198 principium, sed non finem; tempus autem habet principium et finem. | |
| 4199 Sed haec differentia est per accidens, sicut supra dictum est, quia | |
| 4200 si etiam semper aeviterna fuissent et semper futura essent, ut | |
| 4201 aliqui ponunt; vel etiam si quandoque deficerent, quod Deo | |
| 4202 possibile esset, adhuc aevum distingueretur ab aeternitate et | |
| 4203 tempore.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q10_A5-p8"> Others assign the difference between these three to consist in the fact that eternity has no "before" and "after"; but that | |
| 4204 time has both, together with innovation and veteration; and that aeviternity has "before" and "after" without innovation and | |
| 4205 veteration. This theory, however, involves a contradiction; which manifestly appears if innovation and veteration be referred | |
| 4206 to the measure itself. For since "before" and "after" of duration cannot exist together, if aeviternity has | |
| 4207 "before" and "after," it must follow that with the receding of the first part of aeviternity, the after part of aeviternity | |
| 4208 must newly appear; and thus innovation would occur in aeviternity itself, as it does in time. And if they be referred to the | |
| 4209 things measured, even then an incongruity would follow. For a thing which exists in time grows old with time, because it has | |
| 4210 a changeable existence, and from the changeableness of a thing measured, there follows "before" and "after" in the measure, | |
| 4211 as is clear from Phys. iv. Therefore the fact that an aeviternal thing is neither inveterate, nor subject to innovation, comes | |
| 4212 from its changelessness; and consequently its measure does not contain "before" and "after." We say then that since eternity | |
| 4213 is the measure of a permanent being, in so far as anything recedes from permanence of being, it recedes from eternity. Now | |
| 4214 some things recede from permanence of being, so that their being is subject to change, or consists in change; and these | |
| 4215 things are measured by time, as are all movements, and also the being of all things corruptible. But others recede less from | |
| 4216 permanence of being, forasmuch as their being neither consists in change, nor is the subject of change; nevertheless they | |
| 4217 have change annexed to them either actually or potentially. This appears in the heavenly bodies, the substantial being of | |
| 4218 which is unchangeable; and yet with unchangeable being they have changeableness of place. The same applies to the angels, | |
| 4219 who have | |
| 4220 an unchangeable being as regards their nature with changeableness as regards choice; moreover they have changeableness of | |
| 4221 intelligence, of affections and of places in their own degree. Therefore these are measured by aeviternity which is a mean | |
| 4222 between eternity and time. But the being that is measured by eternity is not changeable, nor is it annexed to change. In this | |
| 4223 way time has "before" and "after"; aeviternity in itself has no "before" and "after," which can, however, be annexed to it; | |
| 4224 while eternity has neither "before" nor "after," nor is it compatible with such at all. | |
| 4225 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin">Alii vero assignant differentiam inter haec tria, per hoc | |
| 4226 quod aeternitas non habet prius et posterius; tempus autem habet | |
| 4227 prius et posterius cum innovatione et veteratione; aevum habet | |
| 4228 prius et posterius sine innovatione et veteratione. Sed haec | |
| 4229 positio implicat contradictoria. Quod quidem manifeste apparet, si | |
| 4230 innovatio et veteratio referantur ad ipsam mensuram. Cum enim prius | |
| 4231 et posterius durationis non possint esse simul, si aevum habet | |
| 4232 prius et posterius, oportet quod, priore parte aevi recedente, | |
| 4233 posterior de novo adveniat, et sic erit innovatio in ipso aevo, | |
| 4234 sicut in tempore. Si vero referantur ad mensurata, adhuc sequitur | |
| 4235 inconveniens. Ex hoc enim res temporalis inveteratur tempore, quod | |
| 4236 habet esse transmutabile, et ex transmutabilitate mensurati, est | |
| 4237 prius et posterius in mensura, ut patet ex IV Physic. Si igitur | |
| 4238 ipsum aeviternum non sit inveterabile nec innovabile, hoc erit quia | |
| 4239 esse eius est intransmutabile. Mensura ergo eius non habebit prius | |
| 4240 et posterius. Est ergo dicendum quod, cum aeternitas sit mensura | |
| 4241 esse permanentis, secundum quod aliquid recedit a permanentia | |
| 4242 essendi, secundum hoc recedit ab aeternitate. Quaedam autem sic | |
| 4243 recedunt a permanentia essendi, quod esse eorum est subiectum | |
| 4244 transmutationis, vel in transmutatione consistit, et huiusmodi | |
| 4245 mensurantur tempore; sicut omnis motus, et etiam esse omnium | |
| 4246 corruptibilium. Quaedam vero recedunt minus a permanentia essendi, | |
| 4247 quia esse eorum nec in transmutatione consistit, nec est subiectum | |
| 4248 transmutationis, tamen habent transmutationem adiunctam, vel in | |
| 4249 actu vel in potentia. Sicut patet in corporibus caelestibus, quorum | |
| 4250 esse substantiale est intransmutabile; tamen esse intransmutabile | |
| 4251 habent cum transmutabilitate secundum locum. Et similiter patet de | |
| 4252 Angelis, quod habent esse intransmutabile cum transmutabilitate | |
| 4253 secundum electionem, quantum ad eorum naturam pertinet; et cum | |
| 4254 transmutabilitate intelligentiarum et affectionum, et locorum suo | |
| 4255 modo. Et ideo huiusmodi mensurantur aevo, quod est medium inter | |
| 4256 aeternitatem et tempus. Esse autem quod mensurat aeternitas, nec | |
| 4257 est mutabile, nec mutabilitati adiunctum. Sic ergo tempus habet | |
| 4258 prius et posterius, aevum autem non habet in se prius et posterius, | |
| 4259 sed ei coniungi possunt, aeternitas autem non habet prius neque | |
| 4260 posterius, neque ea compatitur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q10_A5-p9"> | |
| 4261 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Spiritual creatures as regards successive affections and intelligences are measured by time. Hence also Augustine says (Gen. | |
| 4262 ad lit. viii, 20,22,23) that to be moved through time, is to be moved by affections. But as regards their nature they are | |
| 4263 measured by aeviternity; whereas as regards the vision of glory, they have a share of eternity. | |
| 4264 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 10 a. 5 ad 1"><a name="28634" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28634] Iª q. 10 a. 5 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo | |
| 4265 dicendum quod creaturae spirituales, quantum ad affectiones et | |
| 4266 intelligentias, in quibus est successio, mensurantur tempore. Unde | |
| 4267 et Augustinus ibidem dicit quod per tempus moveri, est per | |
| 4268 affectiones moveri. Quantum vero ad eorum esse naturale, | |
| 4269 mensurantur aevo. Sed quantum ad visionem gloriae, participant | |
| 4270 aeternitatem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q10_A5-p10"> | |
| 4271 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Aeviternity is simultaneously whole; yet it is not eternity, because "before" and "after" are compatible with it. | |
| 4272 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 10 a. 5 ad 2"><a name="28635" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28635] Iª q. 10 a. 5 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 4273 dicendum quod aevum est totum simul, non tamen est aeternitas, quia | |
| 4274 compatitur secum prius et posterius.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q10_A5-p11"> | |
| 4275 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> In the very being of an angel considered absolutely, there is no difference of past and future, but only as regards accidental | |
| 4276 change. Now to say that an angel was, or is, or will be, is to be taken in a different sense according to the acceptation | |
| 4277 of our intellect, which apprehends the angelic existence by comparison with different parts of time. But when we say that | |
| 4278 an angel is, or was, we suppose something, which being supposed, its opposite is not | |
| 4279 subject to the divine power. Whereas when we say he will be, we do not as yet suppose anything. Hence, since the existence | |
| 4280 and non-existence of an angel considered absolutely is subject to the divine power, God can make the existence of an angel | |
| 4281 not future; but He cannot cause him not to be while he is, or not to have been, after he has been. | |
| 4282 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 10 a. 5 ad 3"><a name="28636" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28636] Iª q. 10 a. 5 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 4283 dicendum quod in ipso esse Angeli in se considerato, non est | |
| 4284 differentia praeteriti et futuri, sed solum secundum adiunctas | |
| 4285 mutationes. Sed quod dicimus Angelum esse vel fuisse vel futurum | |
| 4286 esse, differt secundum acceptionem intellectus nostri, qui accipit | |
| 4287 esse Angeli per comparationem ad diversas partes temporis. Et cum | |
| 4288 dicit Angelum esse vel fuisse, supponit aliquid cum quo eius | |
| 4289 oppositum non subditur divinae potentiae, cum vero dicit futurum | |
| 4290 esse, nondum supponit aliquid. Unde, cum esse et non esse Angeli | |
| 4291 subsit divinae potentiae, absolute considerando, potest Deus facere | |
| 4292 quod esse Angeli non sit futurum, tamen non potest facere quod non | |
| 4293 sit dum est, vel quod non fuerit postquam fuit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q10_A5-p12"> | |
| 4294 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> The duration of aeviternity is infinite, forasmuch as it is not finished by time. Hence, there is no incongruity in saying | |
| 4295 that a creature is infinite, inasmuch as it is not ended by any other creature. | |
| 4296 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 10 a. 5 ad 4"><a name="28637" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28637] Iª q. 10 a. 5 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum | |
| 4297 dicendum quod duratio aevi est infinita, quia non finitur tempore. | |
| 4298 Sic autem esse aliquod creatum infinitum, quod non finiatur quodam | |
| 4299 alio, non est inconveniens.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q10_A6" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q10_A6-p0.1">Q. 10. A. 6. Whether there is only one aeviternity?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q10_A6-p2"> | |
| 4300 <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that there is not only one aeviternity; for it is written in the apocryphal books of Esdras: "Majesty and power | |
| 4301 of ages are with Thee, O Lord." | |
| 4302 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 10 a. 6 arg. 1"><a name="28638" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28638] Iª q. 10 a. 6 arg. 1</span></a> Ad sextum sic | |
| 4303 proceditur. Videtur quod non sit tantum unum aevum. Dicitur enim in | |
| 4304 apocryphis Esdrae, <i>maiestas et potestas aevorum est apud te, | |
| 4305 domine</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q10_A6-p3"> | |
| 4306 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, different genera have different measures. But some aeviternal things belong to the corporeal genus, as the heavenly | |
| 4307 bodies; and others are spiritual substances, as are the angels. Therefore there is not only one aeviternity. | |
| 4308 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 10 a. 6 arg. 2"><a name="28639" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28639] Iª q. 10 a. 6 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 4309 diversorum generum diversae sunt mensurae. Sed quaedam aeviterna | |
| 4310 sunt in genere corporalium, scilicet corpora caelestia, quaedam | |
| 4311 vero sunt spirituales substantiae, scilicet Angeli. Non ergo est | |
| 4312 unum aevum tantum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q10_A6-p4"> | |
| 4313 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, since aeviternity is a term of duration, where there is one aeviternity, there is also one duration. But not all | |
| 4314 aeviternal things have one duration, for some begin to exist after others; as appears in the case especially of human souls. | |
| 4315 Therefore there is not only one aeviternity. | |
| 4316 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 10 a. 6 arg. 3"><a name="28640" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28640] Iª q. 10 a. 6 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, cum | |
| 4317 aevum sit nomen durationis, quorum est unum aevum, est una duratio. | |
| 4318 Sed non omnium aeviternorum est una duratio, quia quaedam post alia | |
| 4319 esse incipiunt, ut maxime patet in animabus humanis. Non est ergo | |
| 4320 unum aevum tantum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q10_A6-p5"> | |
| 4321 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, things not dependent on each other do not seem to have one measure of duration; for there appears to be one time | |
| 4322 for all temporal things; since the first movement, measured by time, is in some way the cause of all movement. But aeviternal | |
| 4323 things do not depend on each other, for one angel is not the cause of another angel. Therefore there is not only one aeviternity. | |
| 4324 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 10 a. 6 arg. 4"><a name="28641" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28641] Iª q. 10 a. 6 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, ea | |
| 4325 quae non dependent ab invicem, non videntur habere unam mensuram | |
| 4326 durationis, propter hoc enim omnium temporalium videtur esse unum | |
| 4327 tempus, quia omnium motuum quodammodo causa est primus motus, qui | |
| 4328 prius tempore mensuratur. Sed aeviterna non dependent ab invicem, | |
| 4329 quia unus Angelus non est causa alterius. Non ergo est unum aevum | |
| 4330 tantum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q10_A6-p6"> | |
| 4331 <b>On the contrary,</b> Aeviternity is a more simple thing than time, and is nearer to eternity. But time is one only. Therefore much more is aeviternity | |
| 4332 one only. | |
| 4333 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 10 a. 6 s. c."><a name="28642" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28642] Iª q. 10 a. 6 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra, aevum | |
| 4334 est simplicius tempore, et propinquius se habens ad aeternitatem. | |
| 4335 Sed tempus est unum tantum. Ergo multo magis aevum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q10_A6-p7"> | |
| 4336 <b>I answer that,</b> A twofold opinion exists on this subject. Some say there is only one aeviternity; others that there are many aeviternities. | |
| 4337 Which of these is true, may be considered from the cause why time is one; for we can rise from corporeal things to the knowledge | |
| 4338 of spiritual things. | |
| 4339 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 10 a. 6 co."><a name="28643" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28643] Iª q. 10 a. 6 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum | |
| 4340 quod circa hoc est duplex opinio, quidam enim dicunt quod est unum | |
| 4341 aevum tantum; quidam quod multa. Quid autem horum verius sit, | |
| 4342 oportet considerare ex causa unitatis temporis, in cognitionem enim | |
| 4343 spiritualium per corporalia devenimus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q10_A6-p8"> Now some say that there is only one time for temporal things, forasmuch as one number exists for all things numbered; as | |
| 4344 time is a number, according to the Philosopher (Phys. iv). This, however, is not a sufficient reason; because time is not | |
| 4345 a number abstracted from the thing numbered, but existing in the thing numbered; otherwise it would not be continuous; for | |
| 4346 ten ells of cloth are continuous not by reason of the number, but by reason of the thing numbered. Now number as it | |
| 4347 exists in the thing numbered, is not the same for all; but it is different for different things. Hence, others assert that | |
| 4348 the unity of eternity as the principle of all duration is the cause of the unity of time. Thus all durations are one in that | |
| 4349 view, in the light of their principle, but are many in the light of the diversity of things receiving duration from the influx | |
| 4350 of the first principle. On the other hand others assign primary matter as the cause why time is one; as it is the first | |
| 4351 subject of movement, the measure of which is time. Neither of these reasons, however, is sufficient; forasmuch as things which | |
| 4352 are one in principle, or in subject, especially if distant, are not one absolutely, but accidentally. Therefore the true reason | |
| 4353 why time is one, is to be found in the oneness of the first movement by which, since it is most simple, all other movements | |
| 4354 are measured. Therefore time is referred to that movement, not only as a measure is to the thing measured, but also as | |
| 4355 accident is to subject; and thus receives unity from it. Whereas to other movements it is compared only as the measure is | |
| 4356 to the thing measured. Hence it is not multiplied by their multitude, because by one separate measure many things can be measured. | |
| 4357 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin">Dicunt autem quidam esse | |
| 4358 unum tempus omnium temporalium, propter hoc quod est unus numerus | |
| 4359 omnium numeratorum, cum tempus sit numerus, secundum philosophum. | |
| 4360 Sed hoc non sufficit, quia tempus non est numerus ut abstractus | |
| 4361 extra numeratum, sed ut in numerato existens, alioquin non esset | |
| 4362 continuus; quia decem ulnae panni continuitatem habent, non ex | |
| 4363 numero, sed ex numerato. Numerus autem in numerato existens non est | |
| 4364 idem omnium, sed diversus diversorum. Unde alii assignant causam | |
| 4365 unitatis temporis ex unitate aeternitatis, quae est principium | |
| 4366 omnis durationis. Et sic, omnes durationes sunt unum, si | |
| 4367 consideretur earum principium, sunt vero multae, si consideretur | |
| 4368 diversitas eorum quae recipiunt durationem ex influxu primi | |
| 4369 principii. Alii vero assignant causam unitatis temporis ex parte | |
| 4370 materiae primae, quae est primum subiectum motus, cuius mensura est | |
| 4371 tempus. Sed neutra assignatio sufficiens videtur, quia ea quae sunt | |
| 4372 unum principio vel subiecto, et maxime remoto, non sunt unum | |
| 4373 simpliciter sed secundum quid. Est ergo ratio unitatis temporis, | |
| 4374 unitas primi motus, secundum quem, cum sit simplicissimus, omnes | |
| 4375 alii mensurantur, ut dicitur in X Metaphys. Sic ergo tempus ad | |
| 4376 illum motum comparatur non solum ut mensura ad mensuratum, sed | |
| 4377 etiam ut accidens ad subiectum; et sic ab eo recipit unitatem. Ad | |
| 4378 alios autem motus comparatur solum ut mensura ad mensuratum. Unde | |
| 4379 secundum eorum multitudinem non multiplicatur, quia una mensura | |
| 4380 separata multa mensurari possunt.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q10_A6-p9"> This being established, we must observe that a twofold opinion existed concerning spiritual substances. Some said that all | |
| 4381 proceeded from God in a certain equality, as Origen said (Peri Archon. i); or at least many of them, as some others thought. | |
| 4382 Others said that all spiritual substances proceeded from God in a certain degree and order; and Dionysius (Coel. Hier. x) | |
| 4383 seems to have thought so, when he said that among spiritual substances there are the first, the middle and the | |
| 4384 last; even in one order of angels. Now according to the first opinion, it must be said that there are many aeviternities as | |
| 4385 there are many aeviternal things of first degree. But according to the second opinion, it would be necessary to say that there | |
| 4386 is one aeviternity only; because since each thing is measured by the most simple element of its genus, it must be that the | |
| 4387 existence of all aeviternal things should be measured by the existence of the first aeviternal thing, which is all the more | |
| 4388 simple the nearer it is to the first. Wherefore because the second opinion is truer, as will be shown later ( | |
| 4389 <a id="FP_Q10_A6-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q47_A2.html">Q[47], A[2]</a>); we concede at present that there is only one aeviternity. | |
| 4390 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin">Hoc igitur habito, sciendum quod | |
| 4391 de substantiis spiritualibus duplex fuit opinio. Quidam enim | |
| 4392 dixerunt quod omnes processerunt a Deo in quadam aequalitate, ut | |
| 4393 Origenes dixit; vel etiam multae earum, ut quidam posuerunt. Alii | |
| 4394 vero dixerunt quod omnes substantiae spirituales processerunt a Deo | |
| 4395 quodam gradu et ordine et hoc videtur sentire Dionysius, qui dicit, | |
| 4396 cap. X Cael. Hier., quod inter substantias spirituales sunt primae, | |
| 4397 mediae et ultimae, etiam in uno ordine Angelorum. Secundum igitur | |
| 4398 primam opinionem, necesse est dicere quod sunt plura aeva, secundum | |
| 4399 quod sunt plura aeviterna prima aequalia. Secundum autem secundam | |
| 4400 opinionem, oportet dicere quod sit unum aevum tantum, quia, cum | |
| 4401 unumquodque mensuretur simplicissimo sui generis, ut dicitur in X | |
| 4402 Metaphys., oportet quod esse omnium aeviternorum mensuretur esse | |
| 4403 primi aeviterni, quod tanto est simplicius, quanto prius. Et quia | |
| 4404 secunda opinio verior est, ut infra ostendetur, concedimus ad | |
| 4405 praesens unum esse aevum tantum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q10_A6-p10"> | |
| 4406 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Aeviternity is sometimes taken for age, that is, a space of a thing's duration; and thus we say many aeviternities when we | |
| 4407 mean ages. | |
| 4408 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 10 a. 6 ad 1"><a name="28644" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28644] Iª q. 10 a. 6 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo | |
| 4409 dicendum quod aevum aliquando accipitur pro saeculo, quod est | |
| 4410 periodus durationis alicuius rei, et sic dicuntur multa aeva, sicut | |
| 4411 multa saecula.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q10_A6-p11"> | |
| 4412 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Although the heavenly bodies and spiritual things differ in the genus of their nature, still they agree in having a changeless | |
| 4413 being, and are thus measured by aeviternity. | |
| 4414 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 10 a. 6 ad 2"><a name="28645" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28645] Iª q. 10 a. 6 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 4415 dicendum quod, licet corpora caelestia et spiritualia differant in | |
| 4416 genere naturae, tamen conveniunt in hoc, quod habent esse | |
| 4417 intransmutabile. Et sic mensurantur aevo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q10_A6-p12"> | |
| 4418 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> All temporal things did not begin together; nevertheless there is one time for all of them, by reason of the first measured | |
| 4419 by time; and thus all aeviternal things have one aeviternity by reason of the first, though all did not begin together. | |
| 4420 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 10 a. 6 ad 3"><a name="28646" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28646] Iª q. 10 a. 6 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 4421 dicendum quod nec omnia temporalia simul incipiunt, et tamen omnium | |
| 4422 est unum tempus, propter primum quod mensuratur tempore. Et sic | |
| 4423 omnia aeviterna habent unum aevum propter primum, etiam si non | |
| 4424 omnia simul incipiant.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q10_A6-p13"> | |
| 4425 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> For things to be measured by one, it is not necessary that the one should be the cause of all, but that it be more simple | |
| 4426 than the rest. | |
| 4427 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 10 a. 6 ad 4"><a name="28647" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28647] Iª q. 10 a. 6 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum | |
| 4428 dicendum quod ad hoc quod aliqua mensurentur per aliquod unum, non | |
| 4429 requiritur quod illud unum sit causa omnium eorum; sed quod sit | |
| 4430 simplicius.</p></div></div></div></div> | |
| 4431 <div id="FP_Q11" class="div3"> | |
| 4432 <h3 id="FP_Q11-p0.1">Q. 11. THE UNITY OF GOD (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3> | |
| 4433 <div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> | |
| 4434 <p id="FP_Q11-p2"> After the foregoing, we consider the divine unity; concerning which there are four points of inquiry:</p><p id="FP_Q11-p3"> (1) Whether "one" adds anything to "being"?</p><p id="FP_Q11-p4"> (2) Whether "one" and "many" are opposed to each other?</p><p id="FP_Q11-p5"> (3) Whether God is one?</p><p id="FP_Q11-p6"> (4) Whether He is in the highest degree one?</p> | |
| 4435 </div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 11 pr."><a name="28648" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28648] | |
| 4436 Iª q. 11 pr.</span></a> Post praemissa, considerandum est de | |
| 4437 divina unitate. Et circa hoc quaeruntur quatuor. Primo, utrum unum | |
| 4438 addat aliquid supra ens. Secundo, utrum opponantur unum et multa. | |
| 4439 Tertio, utrum Deus sit unus. Quarto, utrum sit maxime unus.</p></div></div></div> | |
| 4440 <div id="FP_Q11_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q11_A1-p0.1">Q. 11. A. 1. Whether "one" adds anything to "being"?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q11_A1-p2"> | |
| 4441 <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that "one" adds something to "being." For everything is in a determinate genus by addition to being, which penetrates | |
| 4442 all "genera." But "one" is a determinate genus, for it is the principle of number, which is a species of quantity. Therefore | |
| 4443 "one" adds something to "being." | |
| 4444 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 11 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="28649" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28649] Iª q. 11 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum sic | |
| 4445 proceditur. Videtur quod unum addat aliquid supra ens. Omne enim | |
| 4446 quod est in aliquo genere determinato, se habet ex additione ad | |
| 4447 ens, quod circuit omnia genera. Sed unum est in genere determinato, | |
| 4448 est enim principium numeri, qui est species quantitatis. Ergo unum | |
| 4449 addit aliquid supra ens.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q11_A1-p3"> | |
| 4450 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, what divides a thing common to all, is an addition to it. But "being" is divided by "one" and by "many." Therefore | |
| 4451 "one" is an addition to "being." | |
| 4452 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 11 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="28650" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28650] Iª q. 11 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, quod | |
| 4453 dividit aliquod commune, se habet ex additione ad illud. Sed ens | |
| 4454 dividitur per unum et multa. Ergo unum addit aliquid supra ens.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q11_A1-p4"> | |
| 4455 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if "one" is not an addition to "being," "one" and "being" must have the same meaning. But it would be nugatory to | |
| 4456 call "being" by the name of "being"; therefore it would be equally so to call being "one." Now this is false. Therefore "one" | |
| 4457 is an addition to "being." | |
| 4458 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 11 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="28651" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28651] Iª q. 11 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, si | |
| 4459 unum non addit supra ens, idem esset dicere unum et ens. Sed | |
| 4460 nugatorie dicitur ens ens. Ergo nugatio esset dicere ens unum, quod | |
| 4461 falsum est. Addit igitur unum supra ens.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q11_A1-p5"> | |
| 4462 <b>On the contrary,</b> Dionysius says (Div. Nom. 5, ult.): "Nothing which exists is not in some way one," which would be false if "one" were an | |
| 4463 addition to "being," in the sense of limiting it. Therefore "one" is not an addition to "being." | |
| 4464 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 11 a. 1 s. c."><a name="28652" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28652] Iª q. 11 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est | |
| 4465 quod dicit Dionysius, ult. cap. de Div. Nom., <i>nihil est | |
| 4466 existentium non participans uno</i>, quod non esset, si unum | |
| 4467 adderet supra ens quod contraheret ipsum. Ergo unum non habet se ex | |
| 4468 additione ad ens.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q11_A1-p6"> | |
| 4469 <b>I answer that,</b> "One" does not add any reality to "being"; but is only a negation of division; for "one" means undivided "being." This is | |
| 4470 the very reason why "one" is the same as "being." Now every being is either simple or compound. But what is simple is undivided, | |
| 4471 both actually and potentially. Whereas what is compound, has not being whilst its parts are divided, but after they make up | |
| 4472 and compose it. Hence it is manifest that the being of anything consists in undivision; | |
| 4473 and hence it is that everything guards its unity as it guards its being. | |
| 4474 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 11 a. 1 co."><a name="28653" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28653] Iª q. 11 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum | |
| 4475 quod unum non addit supra ens rem aliquam, sed tantum negationem | |
| 4476 divisionis, unum enim nihil aliud significat quam ens indivisum. Et | |
| 4477 ex hoc ipso apparet quod unum convertitur cum ente. Nam omne ens | |
| 4478 aut est simplex, aut compositum. Quod autem est simplex, est | |
| 4479 indivisum et actu et potentia. Quod autem est compositum, non habet | |
| 4480 esse quandiu partes eius sunt divisae, sed postquam constituunt et | |
| 4481 componunt ipsum compositum. Unde manifestum est quod esse | |
| 4482 cuiuslibet rei consistit in indivisione. Et inde est quod | |
| 4483 unumquodque, sicut custodit suum esse, ita custodit suam | |
| 4484 unitatem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q11_A1-p7"> | |
| 4485 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Some, thinking that the "one" convertible with "being" is the same as the "one" which is the principle of number, were divided | |
| 4486 into contrary opinions. Pythagoras and Plato, seeing that the "one" convertible with "being" did not add any reality to "being," | |
| 4487 but signified the substance of "being" as undivided, thought that the same applied to the "one" which is the principle of | |
| 4488 number. And because number is composed of unities, they thought that numbers | |
| 4489 were the substances of all things. Avicenna, however, on the contrary, considering that "one" which is the principle of number, | |
| 4490 added a reality to the substance of "being" (otherwise number made of unities would not be a species of quantity), thought | |
| 4491 that the "one" convertible with "being" added a reality to the substance of beings; as "white" to "man." This, however, is | |
| 4492 manifestly false, inasmuch as each thing is "one" by its substance. For if a thing were "one" by anything else but by its | |
| 4493 substance, since this again would be "one," supposing it were again "one" by another thing, we should be driven on to infinity. | |
| 4494 Hence we must adhere to the former statement; therefore we must say that the "one" which is convertible with "being," does | |
| 4495 not add a reality to being; but that the "one" which is the principle of number, does add a reality to "being," belonging | |
| 4496 to the genus of quantity. | |
| 4497 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 11 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="28654" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28654] Iª q. 11 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum igitur | |
| 4498 dicendum quod quidam, putantes idem esse unum quod convertitur cum | |
| 4499 ente, et quod est principium numeri, divisi sunt in contrarias | |
| 4500 positiones. Pythagoras enim et Plato, videntes quod unum quod | |
| 4501 convertitur cum ente, non addit aliquam rem supra ens, sed | |
| 4502 significat substantiam entis prout est indivisa, existimaverunt sic | |
| 4503 se habere de uno quod est principium numeri. Et quia numerus | |
| 4504 componitur ex unitatibus, crediderunt quod numeri essent | |
| 4505 substantiae omnium rerum. E contrario autem Avicenna, considerans | |
| 4506 quod unum quod est principium numeri, addit aliquam rem supra | |
| 4507 substantiam entis (alias numerus ex unitatibus compositus non esset | |
| 4508 species quantitatis), credidit quod unum quod convertitur cum ente, | |
| 4509 addat rem aliquam supra substantiam entis, sicut album supra | |
| 4510 hominem. Sed hoc manifeste falsum est, quia quaelibet res est una | |
| 4511 per suam substantiam. Si enim per aliquid aliud esset una quaelibet | |
| 4512 res, cum illud iterum sit unum, si esset iterum unum per aliquid | |
| 4513 aliud, esset abire in infinitum. Unde standum est in primo. Sic | |
| 4514 igitur dicendum est quod unum quod convertitur cum ente, non addit | |
| 4515 aliquam rem supra ens, sed unum quod est principium numeri, addit | |
| 4516 aliquid supra ens, ad genus quantitatis pertinens.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q11_A1-p8"> | |
| 4517 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> There is nothing to prevent a thing which in one way is divided, from being another way undivided; as what is divided in | |
| 4518 number, may be undivided in species; thus it may be that a thing is in one way "one," and in another way "many." Still, if | |
| 4519 it is absolutely undivided, either because it is so according to what belongs to its essence, though it may be divided as | |
| 4520 regards what is outside its essence, as what is one in subject may have many accidents; | |
| 4521 or because it is undivided actually, and divided potentially, as what is "one" in the whole, and is "many" in parts; in such | |
| 4522 a case a thing will be "one" absolutely and "many" accidentally. On the other hand, if it be undivided accidentally, and divided | |
| 4523 absolutely, as if it were divided in essence and undivided in idea or in principle or cause, it will be "many" absolutely | |
| 4524 and "one" accidentally; as what are "many" in number and "one" in species or "one" in principle. Hence in that way, being | |
| 4525 is divided by "one" and by "many"; as it were by "one" absolutely and by "many" accidentally. For multitude itself would not | |
| 4526 be contained under "being," unless it were in some way contained under "one." Thus Dionysius says (Div. Nom. cap. ult.) that | |
| 4527 "there is no kind of multitude that is not in a way one. But what are many in their parts, are one in their whole; and what | |
| 4528 are many in accidents, are one in subject; and what are many in number, are one in species; and what are many in species, | |
| 4529 are | |
| 4530 one in genus; and what are many in processions, are one in principle." | |
| 4531 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 11 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="28655" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28655] Iª q. 11 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 4532 dicendum quod nihil prohibet id quod est uno modo divisum, esse | |
| 4533 alio modo indivisum; sicut quod est divisum numero, est indivisum | |
| 4534 secundum speciem, et sic contingit aliquid esse uno modo unum, alio | |
| 4535 modo multa. Sed tamen si sit indivisum simpliciter; vel quia est | |
| 4536 indivisum secundum id quod pertinet ad essentiam rei, licet sit | |
| 4537 divisum quantum ad ea quae sunt extra essentiam rei, sicut quod est | |
| 4538 unum subiecto et multa secundum accidentia; vel quia est indivisum | |
| 4539 in actu, et divisum in potentia, sicut quod est unum toto et multa | |
| 4540 secundum partes, huiusmodi erit unum simpliciter, et multa secundum | |
| 4541 quid. Si vero aliquid e converso sit indivisum secundum quid, et | |
| 4542 divisum simpliciter; utpote quia est divisum secundum essentiam, et | |
| 4543 indivisum secundum rationem, vel secundum principium sive causam, | |
| 4544 erit multa simpliciter, et unum secundum quid; ut quae sunt multa | |
| 4545 numero et unum specie, vel unum principio. Sic igitur ens dividitur | |
| 4546 per unum et multa, quasi per unum simpliciter, et multa secundum | |
| 4547 quid. Nam et ipsa multitudo non contineretur sub ente, nisi | |
| 4548 contineretur aliquo modo sub uno. Dicit enim Dionysius, ult. cap. | |
| 4549 de Div. Nom., quod <i>non est multitudo non participans uno, sed | |
| 4550 quae sunt multa partibus, sunt unum toto; et quae sunt multa | |
| 4551 accidentibus, sunt unum subiecto; et quae sunt multa numero, sunt | |
| 4552 unum specie; et quae sunt speciebus multa, sunt unum genere; et | |
| 4553 quae sunt multa processibus, sunt unum principio</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q11_A1-p9"> | |
| 4554 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> It does not follow that it is nugatory to say "being" is "one"; forasmuch as "one" adds an idea to "being." | |
| 4555 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 11 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="28656" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28656] Iª q. 11 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 4556 dicendum quod ideo non est nugatio cum dicitur ens unum, quia unum | |
| 4557 addit aliquid secundum rationem supra ens.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q11_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q11_A2-p0.1">Q. 11. A. 2. Whether "one" and "many" are opposed to each other?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q11_A2-p2"> | |
| 4558 <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that "one" and "many" are not mutually opposed. For no opposite thing is predicated of its opposite. But every "multitude" | |
| 4559 is in a certain way "one," as appears from the preceding article. Therefore "one" is not opposed to "multitude." | |
| 4560 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 11 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="28657" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28657] Iª q. 11 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum sic | |
| 4561 proceditur. Videtur quod unum et multa non opponantur. Nullum enim | |
| 4562 oppositum praedicatur de suo opposito. Sed omnis multitudo est | |
| 4563 quodammodo unum, ut ex praedictis patet. Ergo unum non opponitur | |
| 4564 multitudini.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q11_A2-p3"> | |
| 4565 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, no opposite thing is constituted by its opposite. But "multitude" is constituted by "one." Therefore it is not opposed | |
| 4566 to "multitude." | |
| 4567 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 11 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="28658" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28658] Iª q. 11 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 4568 nullum oppositum constituitur ex suo opposito. Sed unum constituit | |
| 4569 multitudinem. Ergo non opponitur multitudini.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q11_A2-p4"> | |
| 4570 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, "one" is opposed to "one." But the idea of "few" is opposed to "many." Therefore "one" is not opposed to "many." | |
| 4571 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 11 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="28659" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28659] Iª q. 11 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, unum | |
| 4572 uni est oppositum. Sed multo opponitur paucum. Ergo non opponitur | |
| 4573 ei unum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q11_A2-p5"> | |
| 4574 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, if "one" is opposed to "multitude," it is opposed as the undivided is to the divided; and is thus opposed to it | |
| 4575 as privation is to habit. But this appears to be incongruous; because it would follow that "one" comes after "multitude," | |
| 4576 and is defined by it; whereas, on the contrary, "multitude" is defined by "one." Hence there would be a vicious circle in | |
| 4577 the definition; which is inadmissible. Therefore "one" and "many" are not opposed. | |
| 4578 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 11 a. 2 arg. 4"><a name="28660" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28660] Iª q. 11 a. 2 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, si | |
| 4579 unum opponitur multitudini, opponitur ei sicut indivisum diviso, et | |
| 4580 sic opponetur ei ut privatio habitui. Hoc autem videtur | |
| 4581 inconveniens, quia sequeretur quod unum sit posterius multitudine, | |
| 4582 et definiatur per eam; cum tamen multitudo definiatur per unum. | |
| 4583 Unde erit circulus in definitione, quod est inconveniens. Non ergo | |
| 4584 unum et multa sunt opposita.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q11_A2-p6"> | |
| 4585 <b>On the contrary,</b> Things which are opposed in idea, are themselves opposed to each other. But the idea of "one" consists in indivisibility; | |
| 4586 and the idea of "multitude" contains division. Therefore "one" and "many" are opposed to each other. | |
| 4587 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 11 a. 2 s. c."><a name="28661" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28661] Iª q. 11 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra, | |
| 4588 quorum rationes sunt oppositae, ipsa sunt opposita. Sed ratio unius | |
| 4589 consistit in indivisibilitate, ratio vero multitudinis divisionem | |
| 4590 continet. Ergo unum et multa sunt opposita.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q11_A2-p7"> | |
| 4591 <b>I answer that,</b> "One" is opposed to "many," but in various ways. The "one" which is the principle of number is opposed to "multitude" which | |
| 4592 is number, as the measure is to the thing measured. For "one" implies the idea of a primary measure; and number is "multitude" | |
| 4593 measured by "one," as is clear from Metaph. x. But the "one" which convertible with "being" is opposed to "multitude" by way | |
| 4594 of privation; as the undivided is to the thing divided. | |
| 4595 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 11 a. 2 co."><a name="28662" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28662] Iª q. 11 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum | |
| 4596 quod unum opponitur multis, sed diversimode. Nam unum quod est | |
| 4597 principium numeri, opponitur multitudini quae est numerus, ut | |
| 4598 mensura mensurato, unum enim habet rationem primae mensurae, et | |
| 4599 numerus est multitudo mensurata per unum, ut patet ex X Metaphys. | |
| 4600 Unum vero quod convertitur cum ente, opponitur multitudini per | |
| 4601 modum privationis, ut indivisum diviso.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q11_A2-p8"> | |
| 4602 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> No privation entirely takes away the being of a thing, inasmuch as privation means "negation in the subject," according to | |
| 4603 the Philosopher (Categor. viii). Nevertheless every privation takes away some being; and so in being, by reason of its universality, | |
| 4604 the privation of being has its foundation in being; which is not the case in privations of special forms, as of sight, or | |
| 4605 of whiteness and the like. And what applies to being applies also to one and | |
| 4606 to good, which are convertible with being, for the privation of good is founded in some good; likewise the removal of unity | |
| 4607 is founded in some one thing. Hence it happens that multitude is some one thing; and evil is some good thing, and non-being | |
| 4608 is some kind of being. Nevertheless, opposite is not predicated of opposite; forasmuch as one is absolute, and the other is | |
| 4609 relative; for what is relative being (as a potentiality) is non-being absolutely, i.e. actually; or what is absolute being | |
| 4610 in | |
| 4611 the genus of substance is non-being relatively as regards some accidental being. In the same way, what is relatively good | |
| 4612 is absolutely bad, or vice versa; likewise what is absolutely "one" is relatively "many," and vice versa. | |
| 4613 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 11 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="28663" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28663] Iª q. 11 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo | |
| 4614 dicendum quod nulla privatio tollit totaliter esse, quia privatio | |
| 4615 est negatio in subiecto, secundum philosophum. Sed tamen omnis | |
| 4616 privatio tollit aliquod esse. Et ideo in ente, ratione suae | |
| 4617 communitatis, accidit quod privatio entis fundatur in ente, quod | |
| 4618 non accidit in privationibus formarum specialium, ut visus vel | |
| 4619 albedinis, vel alicuius huiusmodi. Et sicut est de ente, ita est de | |
| 4620 uno et bono, quae convertuntur cum ente, nam privatio boni fundatur | |
| 4621 in aliquo bono, et similiter remotio unitatis fundatur in aliquo | |
| 4622 uno. Et exinde contingit quod multitudo est quoddam unum, et malum | |
| 4623 est quoddam bonum, et non ens est quoddam ens. Non tamen oppositum | |
| 4624 praedicatur de opposito, quia alterum horum est simpliciter, et | |
| 4625 alterum secundum quid. Quod enim secundum quid est ens, ut in | |
| 4626 potentia, est non ens simpliciter, idest actu, vel quod est ens | |
| 4627 simpliciter in genere substantiae, est non ens secundum quid, | |
| 4628 quantum ad aliquod esse accidentale. Similiter ergo quod est bonum | |
| 4629 secundum quid, est malum simpliciter; vel e converso. Et similiter | |
| 4630 quod est unum simpliciter, est multa secundum quid; et e | |
| 4631 converso.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q11_A2-p9"> | |
| 4632 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> A "whole" is twofold. In one sense it is homogeneous, composed of like parts; in another sense it is heterogeneous, composed | |
| 4633 of dissimilar parts. Now in every homogeneous whole, the whole is made up of parts having the form of the whole; as, for instance, | |
| 4634 every part of water is water; and such is the constitution of a continuous thing made up of its parts. In every heterogeneous | |
| 4635 whole, however, every part is wanting in the form belonging to the whole; | |
| 4636 as, for instance, no part of a house is a house, nor is any part of a man a man. Now multitude is such a kind of a whole. | |
| 4637 Therefore inasmuch as its part has not the form of the multitude, the latter is composed of unities, as a house is composed | |
| 4638 of not houses; not, indeed, as if unities constituted multitude so far as they are undivided, in which way they are opposed | |
| 4639 to multitude; but so far as they have being, as also the parts of a house make up the house by the fact that they are beings, | |
| 4640 not | |
| 4641 by the fact that they are not houses. | |
| 4642 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 11 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="28664" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28664] Iª q. 11 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 4643 dicendum quod duplex est totum, quoddam homogeneum, quod componitur | |
| 4644 ex similibus partibus; quoddam vero heterogeneum, quod componitur | |
| 4645 ex dissimilibus partibus. In quolibet autem toto homogeneo, totum | |
| 4646 constituitur ex partibus habentibus formam totius, sicut quaelibet | |
| 4647 pars aquae est aqua, et talis est constitutio continui ex suis | |
| 4648 partibus. In quolibet autem toto heterogeneo, quaelibet pars caret | |
| 4649 forma totius, nulla enim pars domus est domus, nec aliqua pars | |
| 4650 hominis est homo. Et tale totum est multitudo. Inquantum ergo pars | |
| 4651 eius non habet formam multitudinis, componitur multitudo ex | |
| 4652 unitatibus, sicut domus ex non domibus, non quod unitates | |
| 4653 constituant multitudinem secundum id quod habent de ratione | |
| 4654 indivisionis, prout opponuntur multitudini; sed secundum hoc quod | |
| 4655 habent de entitate, sicut et partes domus constituunt domum per hoc | |
| 4656 quod sunt quaedam corpora, non per hoc quod sunt non domus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q11_A2-p10"> | |
| 4657 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> "Many" is taken in two ways: absolutely, and in that sense it is opposed to "one"; in another way as importing some kind | |
| 4658 of excess, in which sense it is opposed to "few"; hence in the first sense two are many but not in the second sense. | |
| 4659 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 11 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="28665" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28665] Iª q. 11 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 4660 dicendum quod multum accipitur dupliciter. Uno modo, absolute, et | |
| 4661 sic opponitur uni. Alio modo, secundum quod importat excessum | |
| 4662 quendam, et sic opponitur pauco. Unde primo modo duo sunt multa; | |
| 4663 non autem secundo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q11_A2-p11"> | |
| 4664 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> "One" is opposed to "many" privatively, inasmuch as the idea of "many" involves division. Hence division must be prior to | |
| 4665 unity, not absolutely in itself, but according to our way of apprehension. For we apprehend simple things by compound things; | |
| 4666 and hence we define a point to be, "what has no part," or "the beginning of a line." "Multitude" also, in idea, follows on | |
| 4667 "one"; because we do not understand divided things to convey the idea of multitude | |
| 4668 except by the fact that we attribute unity to every part. Hence "one" is placed in the definition of "multitude"; but "multitude" | |
| 4669 is not placed in the definition of "one." But division comes to be understood from the very negation of being: so what first | |
| 4670 comes to mind is being; secondly, that this being is not that being, and thus we apprehend division as a consequence; thirdly, | |
| 4671 comes the notion of one; fourthly, the notion of multitude. | |
| 4672 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 11 a. 2 ad 4"><a name="28666" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28666] Iª q. 11 a. 2 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum | |
| 4673 dicendum quod unum opponitur privative multis, inquantum in ratione | |
| 4674 multorum est quod sint divisa. Unde oportet quod divisio sit prius | |
| 4675 unitate, non simpliciter, sed secundum rationem nostrae | |
| 4676 apprehensionis. Apprehendimus enim simplicia per composita, unde | |
| 4677 definimus punctum, cuius pars non est, vel principium lineae. Sed | |
| 4678 multitudo, etiam secundum rationem, consequenter se habet ad unum, | |
| 4679 quia divisa non intelligimus habere rationem multitudinis, nisi per | |
| 4680 hoc quod utrique divisorum attribuimus unitatem. Unde unum ponitur | |
| 4681 in definitione multitudinis, non autem multitudo in definitione | |
| 4682 unius. Sed divisio cadit in intellectu ex ipsa negatione entis. Ita | |
| 4683 quod primo cadit in intellectu ens; secundo, quod hoc ens non est | |
| 4684 illud ens, et sic secundo apprehendimus divisionem; tertio, unum; | |
| 4685 quarto, multitudinem.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q11_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q11_A3-p0.1">Q. 11. A. 3. Whether God is one?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q11_A3-p2"> | |
| 4686 <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God is not one. For it is written "For there be many gods and many lords" ( | |
| 4687 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q11_A3-p2.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.8.5" target="asv">1 Cor. 8:5</a>). | |
| 4688 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 11 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="28667" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28667] Iª q. 11 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium sic | |
| 4689 proceditur. Videtur quod Deus non sit unus. Dicitur enim I ad Cor. | |
| 4690 VIII, <i>siquidem sunt dii multi et domini multi</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q11_A3-p3"> | |
| 4691 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, "One," as the principle of number, cannot be predicated of God, since quantity is not predicated of God; likewise, | |
| 4692 neither can "one" which is convertible with "being" be predicated of God, because it imports privation, and every privation | |
| 4693 is an imperfection, which cannot apply to God. Therefore God is not one. | |
| 4694 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 11 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="28668" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28668] Iª q. 11 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, unum | |
| 4695 quod est principium numeri, non potest praedicari de Deo, cum nulla | |
| 4696 quantitas de Deo praedicetur. Similiter nec unum quod convertitur | |
| 4697 cum ente, quia importat privationem, et omnis privatio imperfectio | |
| 4698 est, quae Deo non competit. Non est igitur dicendum quod Deus sit | |
| 4699 unus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q11_A3-p4"> | |
| 4700 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written "Hear, O Israel, the Lord our God is one Lord" ( | |
| 4701 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q11_A3-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Deut.6.4" target="asv">Dt. 6:4</a>). | |
| 4702 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 11 a. 3 s. c."><a name="28669" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28669] Iª q. 11 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est | |
| 4703 quod dicitur Deut. VI, <i>audi, Israel, dominus Deus tuus unus | |
| 4704 est</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q11_A3-p5"> | |
| 4705 <b>I answer that,</b> It can be shown from these three sources that God is one. First from His simplicity. For it is manifest that the reason why | |
| 4706 any singular thing is "this particular thing" is because it cannot be communicated to many: since that whereby Socrates is | |
| 4707 a man, can be communicated to many; whereas, what makes him this particular man, is only communicable to one. Therefore, if | |
| 4708 Socrates were a man by what makes him to be this particular man, as there cannot be many | |
| 4709 Socrates, so there could not in that way be many men. Now this belongs to God alone; for God Himself is His own nature, as | |
| 4710 was shown above ( | |
| 4711 <a id="FP_Q11_A3-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q3_A3.html">Q[3], A[3]</a>). Therefore, in the very same way God is God, and He is this God. Impossible is it therefore that many Gods should exist. | |
| 4712 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 11 a. 3 co."><a name="28670" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28670] Iª q. 11 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum | |
| 4713 quod Deum esse unum, ex tribus demonstratur. Primo quidem ex eius | |
| 4714 simplicitate. Manifestum est enim quod illud unde aliquod singulare | |
| 4715 est hoc aliquid, nullo modo est multis communicabile. Illud enim | |
| 4716 unde Socrates est homo, multis communicari potest, sed id unde est | |
| 4717 hic homo, non potest communicari nisi uni tantum. Si ergo Socrates | |
| 4718 per id esset homo, per quod est hic homo, sicut non possunt esse | |
| 4719 plures Socrates, ita non possent esse plures homines. Hoc autem | |
| 4720 convenit Deo, nam ipse Deus est sua natura, ut supra ostensum est. | |
| 4721 Secundum igitur idem est Deus, et hic Deus. Impossibile est igitur | |
| 4722 esse plures deos.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q11_A3-p6"> Secondly, this is proved from the infinity of His perfection. For it was shown above ( | |
| 4723 <a id="FP_Q11_A3-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q4_A2.html">Q[4], A[2]</a>) that God comprehends in Himself the whole perfection of being. If then many gods existed, they would necessarily differ | |
| 4724 from each other. Something therefore would belong to one which did not belong to another. And if this were a privation, one | |
| 4725 of them would not be absolutely perfect; but if a perfection, one of them would be without it. So it is impossible | |
| 4726 for many gods to exist. Hence also the ancient philosophers, constrained as it were by truth, when they asserted an infinite | |
| 4727 principle, asserted likewise that there was only one such principle. | |
| 4728 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin">Secundo vero, ex infinitate eius perfectionis. | |
| 4729 Ostensum est enim supra quod Deus comprehendit in se totam | |
| 4730 perfectionem essendi. Si ergo essent plures dii, oporteret eos | |
| 4731 differre. Aliquid ergo conveniret uni, quod non alteri. Et si hoc | |
| 4732 esset privatio, non esset simpliciter perfectus, si autem hoc esset | |
| 4733 perfectio, alteri eorum deesset. Impossibile est ergo esse plures | |
| 4734 deos. Unde et antiqui philosophi, quasi ab ipsa coacti veritate, | |
| 4735 ponentes principium infinitum, posuerunt unum tantum principium.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q11_A3-p7"> Thirdly, this is shown from the unity of the world. For all things that exist are seen to be ordered to each other since | |
| 4736 some serve others. But things that are diverse do not harmonize in the same order, unless they are ordered thereto by one. | |
| 4737 For many are reduced into one order by one better than by many: because one is the "per se" cause of one, and many are only | |
| 4738 the accidental cause of one, inasmuch as they are in some way one. Since therefore what is first is most perfect, | |
| 4739 and is so "per se" and not accidentally, it must be that the first which reduces all into one order should be only one. And | |
| 4740 this one is God. | |
| 4741 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin">Tertio, ab unitate mundi. Omnia enim quae sunt, inveniuntur esse | |
| 4742 ordinata ad invicem, dum quaedam quibusdam deserviunt. Quae autem | |
| 4743 diversa sunt, in unum ordinem non convenirent, nisi ab aliquo uno | |
| 4744 ordinarentur. Melius enim multa reducuntur in unum ordinem per | |
| 4745 unum, quam per multa, quia per se unius unum est causa, et multa | |
| 4746 non sunt causa unius nisi per accidens, inquantum scilicet sunt | |
| 4747 aliquo modo unum. Cum igitur illud quod est primum, sit | |
| 4748 perfectissimum et per se, non per accidens, oportet quod primum | |
| 4749 reducens omnia in unum ordinem, sit unum tantum. Et hoc est | |
| 4750 Deus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q11_A3-p8"> | |
| 4751 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Gods are called many by the error of some who worshipped many deities, thinking as they did that the planets and other stars | |
| 4752 were gods, and also the separate parts of the world. Hence the Apostle adds: "Our God is one," etc. | |
| 4753 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 11 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="28671" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28671] Iª q. 11 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo | |
| 4754 dicendum quod dicuntur dii multi secundum errorem quorundam qui | |
| 4755 multos deos colebant, existimantes planetas et alias stellas esse | |
| 4756 deos, vel etiam singulas partes mundi. Unde subdit, <i>nobis autem | |
| 4757 unus Deus,</i> et cetera.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q11_A3-p9"> | |
| 4758 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> "One" which is the principle of number is not predicated of God, but only of material things. For "one" the principle of | |
| 4759 number belongs to the "genus" of mathematics, which are material in being, and abstracted from matter only in idea. But "one" | |
| 4760 which is convertible with being is a metaphysical entity and does not depend on matter in its being. And although in God there | |
| 4761 is no privation, still, according to the mode of our apprehension, He is known to | |
| 4762 us by way only of privation and remotion. Thus there is no reason why a certain kind of privation should not be predicated | |
| 4763 of God; for instance, that He is incorporeal and infinite; and in the same way it is said of God that He is one. | |
| 4764 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 11 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="28672" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28672] Iª q. 11 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 4765 dicendum quod unum secundum quod est principium numeri, non | |
| 4766 praedicatur de Deo; sed solum de his quae habent esse in materia. | |
| 4767 Unum enim quod est principium numeri, est de genere mathematicorum; | |
| 4768 quae habent esse in materia, sed sunt secundum rationem a materia | |
| 4769 abstracta. Unum vero quod convertitur cum ente, est quoddam | |
| 4770 metaphysicum, quod secundum esse non dependet a materia. Et licet | |
| 4771 in Deo non sit aliqua privatio, tamen, secundum modum | |
| 4772 apprehensionis nostrae, non cognoscitur a nobis nisi per modum | |
| 4773 privationis et remotionis. Et sic nihil prohibet aliqua privative | |
| 4774 dicta de Deo praedicari; sicut quod est incorporeus, infinitus. Et | |
| 4775 similiter de Deo dicitur quod sit unus.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q11_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q11_A4-p0.1">Q. 11. A. 4. Whether God is supremely one?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q11_A4-p2"> | |
| 4776 <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God is not supremely "one." For "one" is so called from the privation of division. But privation cannot be | |
| 4777 greater or less. Therefore God is not more "one" than other things which are called "one." | |
| 4778 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 11 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="28673" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28673] Iª q. 11 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum sic | |
| 4779 proceditur. Videtur quod Deus non sit maxime unus. Unum enim | |
| 4780 dicitur secundum privationem divisionis. Sed privatio non recipit | |
| 4781 magis et minus. Ergo Deus non dicitur magis unus quam alia quae | |
| 4782 sunt unum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q11_A4-p3"> | |
| 4783 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, nothing seems to be more indivisible than what is actually and potentially indivisible; such as a point and unity. | |
| 4784 But a thing is said to be more "one" according as it is indivisible. Therefore God is not more "one" than unity is "one" and | |
| 4785 a point is "one." | |
| 4786 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 11 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="28674" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28674] Iª q. 11 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, nihil | |
| 4787 videtur esse magis indivisibile quam id quod est indivisibile actu | |
| 4788 et potentia, cuiusmodi est punctus et unitas. Sed intantum dicitur | |
| 4789 aliquid magis unum, inquantum est indivisibile. Ergo Deus non est | |
| 4790 magis unum quam unitas et punctus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q11_A4-p4"> | |
| 4791 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, what is essentially good is supremely good. Therefore what is essentially "one" is supremely "one." But every being | |
| 4792 is essentially "one," as the Philosopher says (Metaph. iv). Therefore every being is supremely "one"; and therefore God is | |
| 4793 not "one" more than any other being is "one." | |
| 4794 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 11 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="28675" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28675] Iª q. 11 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, quod | |
| 4795 est per essentiam bonum, est maxime bonum, ergo quod est per | |
| 4796 essentiam suam unum, est maxime unum. Sed omne ens est unum per | |
| 4797 suam essentiam, ut patet per philosophum in IV Metaphys. Ergo omne | |
| 4798 ens est maxime unum. Deus igitur non est magis unum quam alia | |
| 4799 entia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q11_A4-p5"> | |
| 4800 <b>On the contrary,</b> Bernard says (De Consid. v): "Among all things called one, the unity of the Divine Trinity holds the first place." | |
| 4801 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 11 a. 4 s. c."><a name="28676" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28676] Iª q. 11 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est | |
| 4802 quod dicit Bernardus, quod <i>inter omnia quae unum dicuntur, arcem | |
| 4803 tenet unitas divinae Trinitatis</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q11_A4-p6"> | |
| 4804 <b>I answer that,</b> Since "one" is an undivided being, if anything is supremely "one" it must be supremely being, and supremely undivided. Now | |
| 4805 both of these belong to God. For He is supremely being, inasmuch as His being is not determined by any nature to which it | |
| 4806 is adjoined; since He is being itself, subsistent, absolutely undetermined. But He is supremely undivided inasmuch as He is | |
| 4807 divided neither actually nor potentially, by any mode of division; since He is altogether | |
| 4808 simple, as was shown above ( | |
| 4809 <a id="FP_Q11_A4-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q3_A7.html">Q[3], A[7]</a>). Hence it is manifest that God is "one" in the supreme degree. | |
| 4810 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 11 a. 4 co."><a name="28677" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28677] Iª q. 11 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum | |
| 4811 quod, cum unum sit ens indivisum, ad hoc quod aliquid sit maxime | |
| 4812 unum, oportet quod sit et maxime ens et maxime indivisum. Utrumque | |
| 4813 autem competit Deo. Est enim maxime ens, inquantum est non habens | |
| 4814 aliquod esse determinatum per aliquam naturam cui adveniat, sed est | |
| 4815 ipsum esse subsistens, omnibus modis indeterminatum. Est autem | |
| 4816 maxime indivisum, inquantum neque dividitur actu neque potentia, | |
| 4817 secundum quemcunque modum divisionis, cum sit omnibus modis | |
| 4818 simplex, ut supra ostensum est. Unde manifestum est quod Deus est | |
| 4819 maxime unus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q11_A4-p7"> | |
| 4820 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Although privation considered in itself is not susceptive of more or less, still according as its opposite is subject to | |
| 4821 more or less, privation also can be considered itself in the light of more and less. Therefore according as a thing is more | |
| 4822 divided, or is divisible, either less or not at all, in the degree it is called more, or less, or supremely, "one." | |
| 4823 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 11 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="28678" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28678] Iª q. 11 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo | |
| 4824 dicendum quod, licet privatio secundum se non recipiat magis et | |
| 4825 minus, tamen secundum quod eius oppositum recipit magis et minus, | |
| 4826 etiam ipsa privativa dicuntur secundum magis et minus. Secundum | |
| 4827 igitur quod aliquid est magis divisum vel divisibile, vel minus, | |
| 4828 vel nullo modo, secundum hoc aliquid dicitur magis et minus vel | |
| 4829 maxime unum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q11_A4-p8"> | |
| 4830 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> A point and unity which is the principle of number, are not supremely being, inasmuch as they have being only in some subject. | |
| 4831 Hence neither of them can be supremely "one." For as a subject cannot be supremely "one," because of the difference within | |
| 4832 it of accident and subject, so neither can an accident. | |
| 4833 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 11 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="28679" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28679] Iª q. 11 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 4834 dicendum quod punctus et unitas quae est principium numeri, non | |
| 4835 sunt maxime entia, cum non habeant esse nisi in subiecto aliquo. | |
| 4836 Unde neutrum eorum est maxime unum. Sicut enim subiectum non est | |
| 4837 maxime unum, propter diversitatem accidentis et subiecti, ita nec | |
| 4838 accidens.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q11_A4-p9"> | |
| 4839 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Although every being is "one" by its substance, still every such substance is not equally the cause of unity; for the substance | |
| 4840 of some things is compound and of others simple. | |
| 4841 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 11 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="28680" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28680] Iª q. 11 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 4842 dicendum quod, licet omne ens sit unum per suam substantiam, non | |
| 4843 tamen se habet aequaliter substantia cuiuslibet ad causandam | |
| 4844 unitatem, quia substantia quorundam est ex multis composita, | |
| 4845 quorundam vero non.</p></div></div></div></div> | |
| 4846 <div id="FP_Q12" class="div3"> | |
| 4847 <h3 id="FP_Q12-p0.1">Q. 12. HOW GOD IS KNOWN BY US (THIRTEEN ARTICLES)</h3> | |
| 4848 <div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> | |
| 4849 <p id="FP_Q12-p2"> As hitherto we have considered God as He is in Himself, we now go on to consider in what manner He is in the knowledge of | |
| 4850 creatures; concerning which there are thirteen points of inquiry: | |
| 4851 </p><p id="FP_Q12-p3"> (1) Whether any created intellect can see the essence of God?</p><p id="FP_Q12-p4"> (2) Whether the essence of God is seen by the intellect through any created image?</p><p id="FP_Q12-p5"> (3) Whether the essence of God can be seen by the corporeal eye?</p><p id="FP_Q12-p6"> (4) Whether any created intellectual substance is sufficient by its own natural powers to see the essence of God?</p><p id="FP_Q12-p7"> (5) Whether the created intellect needs any created light in order to see the essence of God?</p><p id="FP_Q12-p8"> (6) Whether of those who see God, one sees Him more perfectly than another?</p><p id="FP_Q12-p9"> (7) Whether any created intellect can comprehend the essence of God?</p><p id="FP_Q12-p10"> (8) Whether the created intellect seeing the essence of God, knows all things in it?</p><p id="FP_Q12-p11"> (9) Whether what is there known is known by any similitudes?</p><p id="FP_Q12-p12"> (10) Whether the created intellect knows at once what it sees in God?</p><p id="FP_Q12-p13"> (11) Whether in the state of this life any man can see the essence of God?</p><p id="FP_Q12-p14"> (12) Whether by natural reason we can know God in this life?</p><p id="FP_Q12-p15"> (13) Whether there is in this life any knowledge of God through grace above the knowledge of natural reason?</p> | |
| 4852 </div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 pr."><a name="28681" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28681] | |
| 4853 Iª q. 12 pr.</span></a> Quia in superioribus consideravimus | |
| 4854 qualiter Deus sit secundum seipsum, restat considerandum qualiter | |
| 4855 sit in cognitione nostra, idest quomodo cognoscatur a creaturis. Et | |
| 4856 circa hoc quaeruntur tredecim. Primo, utrum aliquis intellectus | |
| 4857 creatus possit videre essentiam Dei. Secundo, utrum Dei essentia | |
| 4858 videatur ab intellectu per aliquam speciem creatam. Tertio, utrum | |
| 4859 oculo corporeo Dei essentia possit videri. Quarto, utrum aliqua | |
| 4860 substantia intellectualis creata ex suis naturalibus sufficiens sit | |
| 4861 videre Dei essentiam. Quinto, utrum intellectus creatus ad videndam | |
| 4862 Dei essentiam indigeat aliquo lumine creato. Sexto, utrum videntium | |
| 4863 essentiam Dei unus alio perfectius videat. Septimo, utrum aliquis | |
| 4864 intellectus creatus possit comprehendere Dei essentiam. Octavo, | |
| 4865 utrum intellectus creatus videns Dei essentiam, omnia in ipsa | |
| 4866 cognoscat. Nono, utrum ea quae ibi cognoscit, per aliquas | |
| 4867 similitudines cognoscat. Decimo, utrum simul cognoscat omnia quae | |
| 4868 in Deo videt. Undecimo, utrum in statu huius vitae possit aliquis | |
| 4869 homo essentiam Dei videre. Duodecimo, utrum per rationem naturalem | |
| 4870 Deum in hac vita possimus cognoscere. Tertiodecimo, utrum, supra | |
| 4871 cognitionem naturalis rationis, sit in praesenti vita aliqua | |
| 4872 cognitio Dei per gratiam.</p></div></div></div> | |
| 4873 <div id="FP_Q12_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q12_A1-p0.1">Q. 12. A. 1. Whether any created intellect can see the essence of God?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q12_A1-p2"> | |
| 4874 <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that no created intellect can see the essence of God. For Chrysostom (Hom. xiv. in Joan.) commenting on | |
| 4875 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q12_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#John.1.18" target="asv"> Jn. 1:18, </a> "No man hath seen God at any time," says: "Not prophets only, but neither angels nor archangels have seen God. For how can | |
| 4876 a creature see what is increatable?" Dionysius also says (Div. Nom. i), speaking of God: "Neither is there sense, nor image, | |
| 4877 nor opinion, nor reason, nor knowledge of Him." | |
| 4878 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="28682" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28682] Iª q. 12 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum sic | |
| 4879 proceditur. Videtur quod nullus intellectus creatus possit Deum per | |
| 4880 essentiam videre. Chrysostomus enim, super Ioannem, exponens illud | |
| 4881 quod dicitur Ioan. I, <i>Deum nemo vidit unquam</i>, sic dicit, | |
| 4882 <i>ipsum quod est Deus, non solum prophetae, sed nec Angeli | |
| 4883 viderunt nec Archangeli, quod enim creabilis est naturae, qualiter | |
| 4884 videre poterit quod increabile est?</i> Dionysius etiam, I cap. de | |
| 4885 Div. Nom., loquens de Deo, dicit, <i>neque sensus est eius, neque | |
| 4886 phantasia, neque opinio, nec ratio, nec scientia</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q12_A1-p3"> | |
| 4887 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, everything infinite, as such, is unknown. But God is infinite, as was shown above ( | |
| 4888 <a id="FP_Q12_A1-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q7_A1.html">Q[7], A[1]</a>). Therefore in Himself He is unknown. | |
| 4889 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="28683" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28683] Iª q. 12 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, omne | |
| 4890 infinitum, inquantum huiusmodi, est ignotum. Sed Deus est | |
| 4891 infinitus, ut supra ostensum est. Ergo secundum se est ignotus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q12_A1-p4"> | |
| 4892 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the created intellect knows only existing things. For what falls first under the apprehension of the intellect is | |
| 4893 being. Now God is not something existing; but He is rather super-existence, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv). Therefore God | |
| 4894 is not intelligible; but above all intellect. | |
| 4895 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="28684" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28684] Iª q. 12 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 4896 intellectus creatus non est cognoscitivus nisi existentium, primum | |
| 4897 enim quod cadit in apprehensione intellectus, est ens. Sed Deus non | |
| 4898 est existens, sed supra existentia. Ut dicit Dionysius. Ergo non | |
| 4899 est intelligibilis; sed est supra omnem intellectum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q12_A1-p5"> | |
| 4900 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, there must be some proportion between the knower and the known, since the known is the perfection of the knower. | |
| 4901 But no proportion exists between the created intellect and God; for there is an infinite distance between them. Therefore | |
| 4902 the created intellect cannot see the essence of God. | |
| 4903 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 1 arg. 4"><a name="28685" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28685] Iª q. 12 a. 1 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 4904 cognoscentis ad cognitum oportet esse aliquam proportionem, cum | |
| 4905 cognitum sit perfectio cognoscentis. Sed nulla est proportio | |
| 4906 intellectus creati ad Deum, quia in infinitum distant. Ergo | |
| 4907 intellectus creatus non potest videre essentiam Dei.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q12_A1-p6"> | |
| 4908 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written: "We shall see Him as He is" ( | |
| 4909 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q12_A1-p6.1" href="./asv.html#iJohn.2.2" target="asv">1 Jn. 2:2</a>). | |
| 4910 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 1 s. c."><a name="28686" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28686] Iª q. 12 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est | |
| 4911 quod dicitur I Ioan. III, <i>videbimus eum sicuti est</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q12_A1-p7"> | |
| 4912 <b>I answer that,</b> Since everything is knowable according as it is actual, God, Who is pure act without any admixture of potentiality, is in | |
| 4913 Himself supremely knowable. But what is supremely knowable in itself, may not be knowable to a particular intellect, on account | |
| 4914 of the excess of the intelligible object above the intellect; as, for example, the sun, which is supremely visible, cannot | |
| 4915 be seen by the bat by reason of its excess of light. | |
| 4916 </p><p id="FP_Q12_A1-p8"> Therefore some who considered this, held that no created intellect can see the essence of God. This opinion, however, is | |
| 4917 not tenable. For as the ultimate beatitude of man consists in the use of his highest function, which is the operation of his | |
| 4918 intellect; if we suppose that the created intellect could never see God, it would either never attain to beatitude, or its | |
| 4919 beatitude would consist in something else beside God; which is opposed to faith. For the ultimate perfection of | |
| 4920 the rational creature is to be found in that which is the principle of its being; since a thing is perfect so far as it attains | |
| 4921 to its principle. Further the same opinion is also against reason. For there resides in every man a natural desire to know | |
| 4922 the cause of any effect which he sees; and thence arises wonder in men. But if the intellect of the rational creature could | |
| 4923 not reach so far as to the first cause of things, the natural desire would remain void. | |
| 4924 </p><p id="FP_Q12_A1-p9"> Hence it must be absolutely granted that the blessed see the essence of God.</p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 1 co."><a name="28687" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28687] Iª q. 12 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum | |
| 4925 quod, cum unumquodque sit cognoscibile secundum quod est in actu, | |
| 4926 Deus, qui est actus purus absque omni permixtione potentiae, | |
| 4927 quantum in se est, maxime cognoscibilis est. Sed quod est maxime | |
| 4928 cognoscibile in se, alicui intellectui cognoscibile non est, | |
| 4929 propter excessum intelligibilis supra intellectum, sicut sol, qui | |
| 4930 est maxime visibilis, videri non potest a vespertilione, propter | |
| 4931 excessum luminis. Hoc igitur attendentes, quidam posuerunt quod | |
| 4932 nullus intellectus creatus essentiam Dei videre potest. Sed hoc | |
| 4933 inconvenienter dicitur. Cum enim ultima hominis beatitudo in | |
| 4934 altissima eius operatione consistat, quae est operatio intellectus, | |
| 4935 si nunquam essentiam Dei videre potest intellectus creatus, vel | |
| 4936 nunquam beatitudinem obtinebit, vel in alio eius beatitudo | |
| 4937 consistet quam in Deo. Quod est alienum a fide. In ipso enim est | |
| 4938 ultima perfectio rationalis creaturae, quia est ei principium | |
| 4939 essendi, intantum enim unumquodque perfectum est, inquantum ad suum | |
| 4940 principium attingit. Similiter etiam est praeter rationem. Inest | |
| 4941 enim homini naturale desiderium cognoscendi causam, cum intuetur | |
| 4942 effectum; et ex hoc admiratio in hominibus consurgit. Si igitur | |
| 4943 intellectus rationalis creaturae pertingere non possit ad primam | |
| 4944 causam rerum, remanebit inane desiderium naturae. Unde simpliciter | |
| 4945 concedendum est quod beati Dei essentiam videant.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q12_A1-p10"> | |
| 4946 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Both of these authorities speak of the vision of comprehension. Hence Dionysius premises immediately before the words cited, | |
| 4947 "He is universally to all incomprehensible," etc. Chrysostom likewise after the words quoted says: "He says this of the most | |
| 4948 certain vision of the Father, which is such a perfect consideration and comprehension as the Father has of the Son." | |
| 4949 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="28688" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28688] Iª q. 12 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo | |
| 4950 dicendum quod utraque auctoritas loquitur de visione | |
| 4951 comprehensionis. Unde praemittit Dionysius immediate ante verba | |
| 4952 proposita, dicens, <i>omnibus ipse est universaliter | |
| 4953 incomprehensibilis, et nec sensus est</i>, et cetera. Et | |
| 4954 Chrysostomus parum post verba praedicta subdit, <i>visionem hic | |
| 4955 dicit certissimam patris considerationem et comprehensionem, tantam | |
| 4956 quantam pater habet de filio</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q12_A1-p11"> | |
| 4957 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The infinity of matter not made perfect by form, is unknown in itself, because all knowledge comes by the form; whereas the | |
| 4958 infinity of the form not limited by matter, is in itself supremely known. God is Infinite in this way, and not in the first | |
| 4959 way: as appears from what was said above ( | |
| 4960 <a id="FP_Q12_A1-p11.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q7_A1.html">Q[7], A[1]</a>). | |
| 4961 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="28689" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28689] Iª q. 12 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 4962 dicendum quod infinitum quod se tenet ex parte materiae non | |
| 4963 perfectae per formam, ignotum est secundum se, quia omnis cognitio | |
| 4964 est per formam. Sed infinitum quod se tenet ex parte formae non | |
| 4965 limitatae per materiam, est secundum se maxime notum. Sic autem | |
| 4966 Deus est infinitus, et non primo modo, ut ex superioribus | |
| 4967 patet.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q12_A1-p12"> | |
| 4968 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> God is not said to be not existing as if He did not exist at all, but because He exists above all that exists; inasmuch as | |
| 4969 He is His own existence. Hence it does not follow that He cannot be known at all, but that He exceeds every kind of knowledge; | |
| 4970 which means that He is not comprehended. | |
| 4971 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="28690" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28690] Iª q. 12 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 4972 dicendum quod Deus non sic dicitur non existens, quasi nullo modo | |
| 4973 sit existens, sed quia est supra omne existens, inquantum est suum | |
| 4974 esse. Unde ex hoc non sequitur quod nullo modo possit cognosci, sed | |
| 4975 quod omnem cognitionem excedat, quod est ipsum non comprehendi.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q12_A1-p13"> | |
| 4976 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Proportion is twofold. In one sense it means a certain relation of one quantity to another, according as double, treble and | |
| 4977 equal are species of proportion. In another sense every relation of one thing to another is called proportion. And in this | |
| 4978 sense there can be a proportion of the creature to God, inasmuch as it is related to Him as the effect of its cause, and as | |
| 4979 potentiality to its act; and in this way the created intellect can be proportioned | |
| 4980 to know God. | |
| 4981 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 1 ad 4"><a name="28691" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28691] Iª q. 12 a. 1 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum | |
| 4982 dicendum quod proportio dicitur dupliciter. Uno modo, certa | |
| 4983 habitudo unius quantitatis ad alteram; secundum quod duplum, | |
| 4984 triplum et aequale sunt species proportionis. Alio modo, quaelibet | |
| 4985 habitudo unius ad alterum proportio dicitur. Et sic potest esse | |
| 4986 proportio creaturae ad Deum, inquantum se habet ad ipsum ut | |
| 4987 effectus ad causam, et ut potentia ad actum. Et secundum hoc, | |
| 4988 intellectus creatus proportionatus esse potest ad cognoscendum | |
| 4989 Deum.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q12_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q12_A2-p0.1">Q. 12. A. 2. Whether the essence of God is seen by the created intellect through an image?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q12_A2-p2"> | |
| 4990 <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the essence of God is seen through an image by the created intellect. For it is written: "We know that when | |
| 4991 He shall appear, we shall be like to Him, and [Vulg.: 'because'] we shall see Him as He is" ( | |
| 4992 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q12_A2-p2.1" href="./asv.html#iJohn.3.2" target="asv">1 Jn. 3:2</a>). | |
| 4993 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="28692" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28692] Iª q. 12 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum sic | |
| 4994 proceditur. Videtur quod essentia Dei ab intellectu creato per | |
| 4995 aliquam similitudinem videatur. Dicitur enim I Ioan. III, <i>scimus | |
| 4996 quoniam, cum apparuerit, similes ei erimus, et videbimus eum sicuti | |
| 4997 est</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q12_A2-p3"> | |
| 4998 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Augustine says (De Trin. v): "When we know God, some likeness of God is made in us." | |
| 4999 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="28693" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28693] Iª q. 12 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 5000 Augustinus dicit, IX de Trin., <i>cum Deum novimus, fit aliqua Dei | |
| 5001 similitudo in nobis</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q12_A2-p4"> | |
| 5002 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the intellect in act is the actual intelligible; as sense in act is the actual sensible. But this comes about inasmuch | |
| 5003 as sense is informed with the likeness of the sensible object, and the intellect with the likeness of the thing understood. | |
| 5004 Therefore, if God is seen by the created intellect in act, it must be that He is seen by some similitude. | |
| 5005 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="28694" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28694] Iª q. 12 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 5006 intellectus in actu est intelligibile in actu, sicut sensus in actu | |
| 5007 est sensibile in actu. Hoc autem non est nisi inquantum informatur | |
| 5008 sensus similitudine rei sensibilis, et intellectus similitudine rei | |
| 5009 intellectae. Ergo, si Deus ab intellectu creato videtur in actu, | |
| 5010 oportet quod per aliquam similitudinem videatur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q12_A2-p5"> | |
| 5011 <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Trin. xv) that when the Apostle says, "We see through a glass and in an enigma [*Douay: 'in a dark manner']," | |
| 5012 "by the terms 'glass' and 'enigma' certain similitudes are signified by him, which are accommodated to the vision of God." | |
| 5013 But to see the essence of God is not an enigmatic nor a speculative vision, but is, on the contrary, of an opposite kind. | |
| 5014 Therefore the divine essence is not seen through a similitude. | |
| 5015 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 2 s. c."><a name="28695" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28695] Iª q. 12 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est | |
| 5016 quod dicit Augustinus, XV de Trin., quod cum apostolus dicit | |
| 5017 <i>videmus nunc per speculum et in aenigmate, speculi et aenigmatis | |
| 5018 nomine, quaecumque similitudines ab ipso significatae intelligi | |
| 5019 possunt, quae accommodatae sunt ad intelligendum Deum</i>. Sed | |
| 5020 videre Deum per essentiam non est visio aenigmatica vel specularis, | |
| 5021 sed contra eam dividitur. Ergo divina essentia non videtur per | |
| 5022 similitudines.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q12_A2-p6"> | |
| 5023 <b>I answer that,</b> Two things are required both for sensible and for intellectual vision---viz. power of sight, and union of the thing seen | |
| 5024 with the sight. For vision is made actual only when the thing seen is in a certain way in the seer. Now in corporeal things | |
| 5025 it is clear that the thing seen cannot be by its essence in the seer, but only by its likeness; as the similitude of a stone | |
| 5026 is in the eye, whereby the vision is made actual; whereas the substance of the stone is not | |
| 5027 there. But if the principle of the visual power and the thing seen were one and the same thing, it would necessarily follow | |
| 5028 that the seer would receive both the visual power and the form whereby it sees, from that one same thing. | |
| 5029 </p><p id="FP_Q12_A2-p7"> Now it is manifest both that God is the author of the intellect power, and that He can be seen by the intellect. And since | |
| 5030 the intellective power of the creature is not the essence of God, it follows that it is some kind of participated likeness | |
| 5031 of Him who is the first intellect. Hence also the intellectual power of the creature is called an intelligible light, as it | |
| 5032 were, derived from the first light, whether this be understood of the natural power, or of some perfection | |
| 5033 superadded of grace or of glory. Therefore, in order to see God, there must be some similitude of God on the part of the visual | |
| 5034 faculty, whereby the intellect is made capable of seeing God. But on the part of the object seen, which must necessarily be | |
| 5035 united to the seer, the essence of God cannot be seen by any created similitude. First, because as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. | |
| 5036 i), "by the similitudes of the inferior order of things, the superior can in no way be known;" as by the likeness of a | |
| 5037 body the essence of an incorporeal thing cannot be known. Much less therefore can the essence of God be seen by any created | |
| 5038 likeness whatever. Secondly, because the essence of God is His own very existence, as was shown above ( | |
| 5039 <a id="FP_Q12_A2-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q3_A4.html">Q[3], A[4]</a>), which cannot be said of any created form; and so no created form can be the similitude representing the essence of God | |
| 5040 to the seer. Thirdly, because the divine essence is uncircumscribed, and contains in itself super-eminently whatever | |
| 5041 can be signified or understood by the created intellect. Now this cannot in any way be represented by any created likeness; | |
| 5042 for every created form is determined according to some aspect of wisdom, or of power, or of being itself, or of some like | |
| 5043 thing. Hence to say that God is seen by some similitude, is to say that the divine essence is not seen at all; which is false. | |
| 5044 </p><p id="FP_Q12_A2-p8"> Therefore it must be said that to see the essence of God, there is required some similitude in the visual faculty, namely, | |
| 5045 the light of glory strengthening the intellect to see God, which is spoken of in the | |
| 5046 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q12_A2-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.35.10" target="asv"> Ps. 35:10, </a> "In Thy light we shall see light." The essence of God, however, cannot be seen by any created similitude representing the | |
| 5047 divine essence itself as it really is. | |
| 5048 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 2 co."><a name="28696" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28696] Iª q. 12 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum | |
| 5049 quod ad visionem, tam sensibilem quam intellectualem, duo | |
| 5050 requiruntur, scilicet virtus visiva, et unio rei visae cum visu, | |
| 5051 non enim fit visio in actu, nisi per hoc quod res visa quodammodo | |
| 5052 est in vidente. Et in rebus quidem corporalibus, apparet quod res | |
| 5053 visa non potest esse in vidente per suam essentiam, sed solum per | |
| 5054 suam similitudinem, sicut similitudo lapidis est in oculo, per quam | |
| 5055 fit visio in actu, non autem ipsa substantia lapidis. Si autem | |
| 5056 esset una et eadem res, quae esset principium visivae virtutis, et | |
| 5057 quae esset res visa, oporteret videntem ab illa re et virtutem | |
| 5058 visivam habere, et formam per quam videret. Manifestum est autem | |
| 5059 quod Deus et est auctor intellectivae virtutis, et ab intellectu | |
| 5060 videri potest. Et cum ipsa intellectiva virtus creaturae non sit | |
| 5061 Dei essentia, relinquitur quod sit aliqua participata similitudo | |
| 5062 ipsius, qui est primus intellectus. Unde et virtus intellectualis | |
| 5063 creaturae lumen quoddam intelligibile dicitur, quasi a prima luce | |
| 5064 derivatum, sive hoc intelligatur de virtute naturali, sive de | |
| 5065 aliqua perfectione superaddita gratiae vel gloriae. Requiritur ergo | |
| 5066 ad videndum Deum aliqua Dei similitudo ex parte visivae potentiae, | |
| 5067 qua scilicet intellectus sit efficax ad videndum Deum. Sed ex parte | |
| 5068 visae rei, quam necesse est aliquo modo uniri videnti per nullam | |
| 5069 similitudinem creatam Dei essentia videri potest. Primo quidem, | |
| 5070 quia, sicut dicit Dionysius, I cap. de Div. Nom., per similitudines | |
| 5071 inferioris ordinis rerum nullo modo superiora possunt cognosci, | |
| 5072 sicut per speciem corporis non potest cognosci essentia rei | |
| 5073 incorporeae. Multo igitur minus per speciem creatam quamcumque | |
| 5074 potest essentia Dei videri. Secundo, quia essentia Dei est ipsum | |
| 5075 esse eius, ut supra ostensum est, quod nulli formae creatae | |
| 5076 competere potest. Non potest igitur aliqua forma creata esse | |
| 5077 similitudo repraesentans videnti Dei essentiam. Tertio, quia divina | |
| 5078 essentia est aliquod incircumscriptum, continens in se | |
| 5079 supereminenter quidquid potest significari vel intelligi ab | |
| 5080 intellectu creato. Et hoc nullo modo per aliquam speciem creatam | |
| 5081 repraesentari potest, quia omnis forma creata est determinata | |
| 5082 secundum aliquam rationem vel sapientiae, vel virtutis, vel ipsius | |
| 5083 esse, vel alicuius huiusmodi. Unde dicere Deum per similitudinem | |
| 5084 videri, est dicere divinam essentiam non videri, quod est erroneum. | |
| 5085 Dicendum ergo quod ad videndum Dei essentiam requiritur aliqua | |
| 5086 similitudo ex parte visivae potentiae, scilicet lumen gloriae, | |
| 5087 confortans intellectum ad videndum Deum, de quo dicitur in Psalmo, | |
| 5088 <i>in lumine tuo videbimus lumen</i>. Non autem per aliquam | |
| 5089 similitudinem creatam Dei essentia videri potest, quae ipsam | |
| 5090 divinam essentiam repraesentet ut in se est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q12_A2-p9"> | |
| 5091 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> That authority speaks of the similitude which is caused by participation of the light of glory. | |
| 5092 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="28697" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28697] Iª q. 12 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo | |
| 5093 dicendum quod auctoritas illa loquitur de similitudine quae est per | |
| 5094 participationem luminis gloriae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q12_A2-p10"> | |
| 5095 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Augustine speaks of the knowledge of God here on earth. | |
| 5096 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="28698" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28698] Iª q. 12 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 5097 dicendum quod Augustinus ibi loquitur de cognitione Dei quae | |
| 5098 habetur in via.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q12_A2-p11"> | |
| 5099 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The divine essence is existence itself. Hence as other intelligible forms which are not their own existence are united to | |
| 5100 the intellect by means of some entity, whereby the intellect itself is informed, and made in act; so the divine essence is | |
| 5101 united to the created intellect, as the object actually understood, making the intellect in act by and of itself. | |
| 5102 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="28699" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28699] Iª q. 12 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 5103 dicendum quod divina essentia est ipsum esse. Unde, sicut aliae | |
| 5104 formae intelligibiles quae non sunt suum esse, uniuntur intellectui | |
| 5105 secundum aliquod esse quo informant ipsum intellectum et faciunt | |
| 5106 ipsum in actu; ita divina essentia unitur intellectui creato ut | |
| 5107 intellectum in actu, per seipsam faciens intellectum in actu.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q12_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q12_A3-p0.1">Q. 12. A. 3. Whether the essence of God can be seen with the bodily eye?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q12_A3-p2"> | |
| 5108 <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the essence of God can be seen by the corporeal eye. For it is written ( | |
| 5109 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q12_A3-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Job.19.26" target="asv">Job 19:26</a>): "In my flesh I shall see . . . God," and ( | |
| 5110 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q12_A3-p2.2" href="./asv.html#Job.42.5" target="asv">Job 42:5</a>), "With the hearing of the ear I have heard Thee, but now my eye seeth Thee." | |
| 5111 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="28700" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28700] Iª q. 12 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium sic | |
| 5112 proceditur. Videtur quod essentia Dei videri possit oculo | |
| 5113 corporali. Dicitur enim Iob XIX, <i>in carne mea videbo Deum,</i> | |
| 5114 etc.; et XLII, <i>auditu auris audivi te, nunc autem oculus meus | |
| 5115 videt te</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q12_A3-p3"> | |
| 5116 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xxix, 29): "Those eyes" (namely the glorified) "will therefore have a greater power | |
| 5117 of sight, not so much to see more keenly, as some report of the sight of serpents or of eagles (for whatever acuteness of | |
| 5118 vision is possessed by these creatures, they can see only corporeal things) but to see even incorporeal things." Now whoever | |
| 5119 can see incorporeal things, can be raised up to see God. Therefore the glorified eye can see | |
| 5120 God. | |
| 5121 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="28701" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28701] Iª q. 12 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 5122 Augustinus dicit, ultimo de civitate Dei, cap. XXIX, <i>vis itaque | |
| 5123 praepollentior oculorum erit illorum</i> (scilicet glorificatorum), | |
| 5124 <i>non ut acutius videant quam quidam perhibentur videre serpentes | |
| 5125 vel aquilae (quantalibet enim acrimonia cernendi eadem animalia | |
| 5126 vigeant, nihil aliud possunt videre quam corpora), sed ut videant | |
| 5127 et incorporalia</i>. Quicumque autem potest videre incorporalia, | |
| 5128 potest elevari ad videndum Deum. Ergo oculus glorificatus potest | |
| 5129 videre Deum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q12_A3-p4"> | |
| 5130 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, God can be seen by man through a vision of the imagination. For it is written: "I saw the Lord sitting upon a throne," | |
| 5131 etc. ( | |
| 5132 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q12_A3-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.6.1" target="asv">Is. 6:1</a>). But an imaginary vision originates from sense; for the imagination is moved by sense to act. Therefore God can be seen | |
| 5133 by a vision of sense. | |
| 5134 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="28702" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28702] Iª q. 12 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, Deus | |
| 5135 potest videri ab homine visione imaginaria, dicitur enim Isaiae VI, | |
| 5136 <i>vidi dominum sedentem super solium,</i> et cetera. Sed visio | |
| 5137 imaginaria a sensu originem habet, <i>phantasia enim est motus | |
| 5138 factus a sensu secundum actum</i>, ut dicitur in III de anima. Ergo | |
| 5139 Deus sensibili visione videri potest.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q12_A3-p5"> | |
| 5140 <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Vid. Deum, Ep. cxlvii): "No one has ever seen God either in this life, as He is, nor in the angelic life, | |
| 5141 as visible things are seen by corporeal vision." | |
| 5142 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 3 s. c."><a name="28703" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28703] Iª q. 12 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est | |
| 5143 quod dicit Augustinus, in libro de videndo Deum ad Paulinam, | |
| 5144 <i>Deum nemo vidit unquam, vel in hac vita, sicut ipse est; vel in | |
| 5145 Angelorum vita, sicut visibilia ista quae corporali visione | |
| 5146 cernuntur</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q12_A3-p6"> | |
| 5147 <b>I answer that,</b> It is impossible for God to be seen by the sense of sight, or by any other sense, or faculty of the sensitive power. For | |
| 5148 every such kind of power is the act of a corporeal organ, as will be shown later | |
| 5149 <a id="FP_Q12_A3-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q78.html">(Q[78])</a>. Now act is proportional to the nature which possesses it. Hence no power of that kind can go beyond corporeal things. For | |
| 5150 God is incorporeal, as was shown above ( | |
| 5151 <a id="FP_Q12_A3-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q3_A1.html">Q[3], A[1]</a>). Hence He cannot be seen by the | |
| 5152 sense or the imagination, but only by the intellect. | |
| 5153 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 3 co."><a name="28704" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28704] Iª q. 12 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum | |
| 5154 quod impossibile est Deum videri sensu visus, vel quocumque alio | |
| 5155 sensu aut potentia sensitivae partis. Omnis enim potentia huiusmodi | |
| 5156 est actus corporalis organi, ut infra dicetur. Actus autem | |
| 5157 proportionatur ei cuius est actus. Unde nulla huiusmodi potentia | |
| 5158 potest se extendere ultra corporalia. Deus autem incorporeus est, | |
| 5159 ut supra ostensum est. Unde nec sensu nec imaginatione videri | |
| 5160 potest, sed solo intellectu.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q12_A3-p7"> | |
| 5161 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The words, "In my flesh I shall see God my Saviour," do not mean that God will be seen with the eye of the flesh, but that | |
| 5162 man existing in the flesh after the resurrection will see God. Likewise the words, "Now my eye seeth Thee," are to be understood | |
| 5163 of the mind's eye, as the Apostle says: "May He give unto you the spirit of wisdom . . . in the knowledge of Him, that the | |
| 5164 eyes of your heart" may be "enlightened" ( | |
| 5165 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q12_A3-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Eph.1.17" target="asv">Eph. | |
| 5166 1:17,18 | |
| 5167 </a>). | |
| 5168 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="28705" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28705] Iª q. 12 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo | |
| 5169 dicendum quod, cum dicitur <i>in carne mea videbo Deum, salvatorem | |
| 5170 meum</i>, non intelligitur quod oculo carnis sit Deum visurus, sed | |
| 5171 quod in carne existens, post resurrectionem, visurus sit Deum. | |
| 5172 Similiter quod dicitur, <i>nunc oculus meus videt te</i>, | |
| 5173 intelligitur de oculo mentis, sicut Ephes. I dicit apostolus, | |
| 5174 <i>det vobis spiritum sapientiae in agnitione eius, illuminatos | |
| 5175 oculos cordis vestri</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q12_A3-p8"> | |
| 5176 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Augustine speaks as one inquiring, and conditionally. This appears from what he says previously: "Therefore they will have | |
| 5177 an altogether different power (viz. the glorified eyes), if they shall see that incorporeal nature;" and afterwards he explains | |
| 5178 this, saying: "It is very credible, that we shall so see the mundane bodies of the new heaven and the new earth, as to see | |
| 5179 most clearly God everywhere present, governing all corporeal things, not as we | |
| 5180 now see the invisible things of God as understood by what is made; but as when we see men among whom we live, living and exercising | |
| 5181 the functions of human life, we do not believe they live, but see it." Hence it is evident how the glorified eyes will see | |
| 5182 God, as now our eyes see the life of another. But life is not seen with the corporeal eye, as a thing in itself visible, but | |
| 5183 as the indirect object of the sense; which indeed is not known by sense, but at once, together with sense, by some | |
| 5184 other cognitive power. But that the divine presence is known by the intellect immediately on the sight of, and through, corporeal | |
| 5185 things, happens from two causes---viz. from the perspicuity of the intellect, and from the refulgence of the divine glory | |
| 5186 infused into the body after its renovation. | |
| 5187 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="28706" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28706] Iª q. 12 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 5188 dicendum quod Augustinus loquitur inquirendo in verbis illis, et | |
| 5189 sub conditione. Quod patet ex hoc quod praemittitur, longe itaque | |
| 5190 potentiae alterius erunt (scilicet oculi glorificati), si per eos | |
| 5191 videbitur incorporea illa natura. Sed postmodum hoc determinat, | |
| 5192 dicens, <i>valde credibile est sic nos visuros mundana tunc corpora | |
| 5193 caeli novi et terrae novae, ut Deum ubique praesentem, et universa | |
| 5194 etiam corporalia gubernantem, clarissima perspicuitate videamus; | |
| 5195 non sicut nunc invisibilia Dei per ea quae facta sunt intellecta | |
| 5196 conspiciuntur; sed sicut homines, inter quos viventes motusque | |
| 5197 vitales exerentes vivimus, mox ut aspicimus, non credimus vivere, | |
| 5198 sed videmus</i>. Ex quo patet quod hoc modo intelligit oculos | |
| 5199 glorificatos Deum visuros, sicut nunc oculi nostri vident alicuius | |
| 5200 vitam. Vita autem non videtur oculo corporali, sicut per se | |
| 5201 visibile, sed sicut sensibile per accidens, quod quidem a sensu non | |
| 5202 cognoscitur, sed statim cum sensu ab aliqua alia virtute | |
| 5203 cognoscitiva. Quod autem statim, visis corporibus, divina | |
| 5204 praesentia ex eis cognoscatur per intellectum, ex duobus contingit, | |
| 5205 scilicet ex perspicacitate intellectus; et ex refulgentia divinae | |
| 5206 claritatis in corporibus innovatis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q12_A3-p9"> | |
| 5207 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The essence of God is not seen in a vision of the imagination; but the imagination receives some form representing God according | |
| 5208 to some mode of similitude; as in the divine Scripture divine things are metaphorically described by means of sensible things. | |
| 5209 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="28707" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28707] Iª q. 12 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 5210 dicendum quod in visione imaginaria non videtur Dei essentia, sed | |
| 5211 aliqua forma in imaginatione formatur, repraesentans Deum secundum | |
| 5212 aliquem modum similitudinis, prout in Scripturis divinis divina per | |
| 5213 res sensibiles metaphorice describuntur.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q12_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q12_A4-p0.1">Q. 12. A. 4. Whether any created intellect by its natural powers can see the Divine essence?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q12_A4-p2"> | |
| 5214 <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that a created intellect can see the Divine essence by its own natural power. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv): | |
| 5215 "An angel is a pure mirror, most clear, receiving, if it is right to say so, the whole beauty of God." But if a reflection | |
| 5216 is seen, the original thing is seen. Therefore since an angel by his natural power understands himself, it seems that by his | |
| 5217 own natural power he understands the Divine essence. | |
| 5218 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="28708" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28708] Iª q. 12 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum sic | |
| 5219 proceditur. Videtur quod aliquis intellectus creatus per sua | |
| 5220 naturalia divinam essentiam videre possit. Dicit enim Dionysius, | |
| 5221 cap. IV de Div. Nom., quod Angelus est speculum purum, clarissimum, | |
| 5222 <i>suscipiens totam, si fas est dicere, pulchritudinem Dei</i>. Sed | |
| 5223 unumquodque videtur dum videtur eius speculum. Cum igitur Angelus | |
| 5224 per sua naturalia intelligat seipsum, videtur quod etiam per sua | |
| 5225 naturalia intelligat divinam essentiam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q12_A4-p3"> | |
| 5226 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, what is supremely visible, is made less visible to us by reason of our defective corporeal or intellectual sight. | |
| 5227 But the angelic intellect has no such defect. Therefore, since God is supremely intelligible in Himself, it seems that in | |
| 5228 like manner He is supremely so to an angel. Therefore, if he can understand other intelligible things by his own natural power, | |
| 5229 much more can he understand God. | |
| 5230 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="28709" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28709] Iª q. 12 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, illud | |
| 5231 quod est maxime visibile, fit minus visibile nobis propter defectum | |
| 5232 nostri visus, vel corporalis vel intellectualis. Sed intellectus | |
| 5233 Angeli non patitur aliquem defectum. Cum ergo Deus secundum se sit | |
| 5234 maxime intelligibilis, videtur quod ab Angelo sit maxime | |
| 5235 intelligibilis. Si igitur alia intelligibilia per sua naturalia | |
| 5236 intelligere potest, multo magis Deum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q12_A4-p4"> | |
| 5237 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, corporeal sense cannot be raised up to understand incorporeal substance, which is above its nature. Therefore if | |
| 5238 to see the essence of God is above the nature of every created intellect, it follows that no created intellect can reach up | |
| 5239 to see the essence of God at all. But this is false, as appears from what is said above | |
| 5240 <a id="FP_Q12_A4-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q12_A1.html">(A[1])</a>. Therefore it seems that it is natural for a created intellect to see the Divine essence. | |
| 5241 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="28710" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28710] Iª q. 12 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 5242 sensus corporeus non potest elevari ad intelligendam substantiam | |
| 5243 incorpoream, quia est supra eius naturam. Si igitur videre Deum per | |
| 5244 essentiam sit supra naturam cuiuslibet intellectus creati, videtur | |
| 5245 quod nullus intellectus creatus ad videndum Dei essentiam | |
| 5246 pertingere possit, quod est erroneum, ut ex supradictis patet. | |
| 5247 Videtur ergo quod intellectui creato sit naturale divinam essentiam | |
| 5248 videre.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q12_A4-p5"> | |
| 5249 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written: "The grace of God is life everlasting" ( | |
| 5250 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q12_A4-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.6.23" target="asv">Rom. 6:23</a>). But life everlasting consists in the vision of the Divine essence, according to the words: "This is eternal life, that | |
| 5251 they may know Thee the only true God," etc. ( | |
| 5252 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q12_A4-p5.2" href="./asv.html#John.17.3" target="asv">Jn. 17:3</a>). Therefore to see the essence of God is possible to the created intellect by grace, and not by nature. | |
| 5253 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 4 s. c."><a name="28711" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28711] Iª q. 12 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est | |
| 5254 quod dicitur Rom. VI, <i>gratia Dei vita aeterna</i>. Sed vita | |
| 5255 aeterna consistit in visione divinae essentiae, secundum illud | |
| 5256 Ioan. XVII, <i>haec est vita aeterna, ut cognoscant te solum verum | |
| 5257 Deum,</i> et cetera. Ergo videre Dei essentiam convenit intellectui | |
| 5258 creato per gratiam, et non per naturam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q12_A4-p6"> | |
| 5259 <b>I answer that,</b> It is impossible for any created intellect to see the essence of God by its own natural power. For knowledge is regulated | |
| 5260 according as the thing known is in the knower. But the thing known is in the knower according to the mode of the knower. Hence | |
| 5261 the knowledge of every knower is ruled according to its own nature. If therefore the mode of anything's being exceeds the | |
| 5262 mode of the knower, it must result that the knowledge of the object is above the nature of | |
| 5263 the knower. Now the mode of being of things is manifold. For some things have being only in this one individual matter; as | |
| 5264 all bodies. But others are subsisting natures, not residing in matter at all, which, however, are not their own existence, | |
| 5265 but receive it; and these are the incorporeal beings, called angels. But to God alone does it belong to be His own subsistent | |
| 5266 being. Therefore what exists only in individual matter we know naturally, forasmuch as our soul, whereby we know, is the form | |
| 5267 of certain matter. Now our soul possesses two cognitive powers; one is the act of a corporeal organ, which naturally knows | |
| 5268 things existing in individual matter; hence sense knows only the singular. But there is another kind of cognitive power in | |
| 5269 the soul, called the intellect; and this is not the act of any corporeal organ. Wherefore the intellect naturally knows natures | |
| 5270 which exist only in individual matter; not as they are in such individual matter, but according as they are abstracted | |
| 5271 therefrom by the considering act of the intellect; hence it follows that through the intellect we can understand these objects | |
| 5272 as universal; and this is beyond the power of the sense. Now the angelic intellect naturally knows natures that are not in | |
| 5273 matter; but this is beyond the power of the intellect of our soul in the state of its present life, united as it is to the | |
| 5274 body. It follows therefore that to know self-subsistent being is natural to the divine intellect alone; and this is beyond | |
| 5275 the | |
| 5276 natural power of any created intellect; for no creature is its own existence, forasmuch as its existence is participated. | |
| 5277 Therefore the created intellect cannot see the essence of God, unless God by His grace unites Himself to the created intellect, | |
| 5278 as an object made intelligible to it. | |
| 5279 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 4 co."><a name="28712" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28712] Iª q. 12 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum | |
| 5280 quod impossibile est quod aliquis intellectus creatus per sua | |
| 5281 naturalia essentiam Dei videat. Cognitio enim contingit secundum | |
| 5282 quod cognitum est in cognoscente. Cognitum autem est in cognoscente | |
| 5283 secundum modum cognoscentis. Unde cuiuslibet cognoscentis cognitio | |
| 5284 est secundum modum suae naturae. Si igitur modus essendi alicuius | |
| 5285 rei cognitae excedat modum naturae cognoscentis, oportet quod | |
| 5286 cognitio illius rei sit supra naturam illius cognoscentis. Est | |
| 5287 autem multiplex modus essendi rerum. Quaedam enim sunt, quorum | |
| 5288 natura non habet esse nisi in hac materia individuali, et huiusmodi | |
| 5289 sunt omnia corporalia. Quaedam vero sunt, quorum naturae sunt per | |
| 5290 se subsistentes, non in materia aliqua, quae tamen non sunt suum | |
| 5291 esse, sed sunt esse habentes, et huiusmodi sunt substantiae | |
| 5292 incorporeae, quas Angelos dicimus. Solius autem Dei proprius modus | |
| 5293 essendi est, ut sit suum esse subsistens. Ea igitur quae non habent | |
| 5294 esse nisi in materia individuali, cognoscere est nobis connaturale, | |
| 5295 eo quod anima nostra, per quam cognoscimus, est forma alicuius | |
| 5296 materiae. Quae tamen habet duas virtutes cognoscitivas. Unam, quae | |
| 5297 est actus alicuius corporei organi. Et huic connaturale est | |
| 5298 cognoscere res secundum quod sunt in materia individuali, unde | |
| 5299 sensus non cognoscit nisi singularia. Alia vero virtus cognoscitiva | |
| 5300 eius est intellectus, qui non est actus alicuius organi corporalis. | |
| 5301 Unde per intellectum connaturale est nobis cognoscere naturas, quae | |
| 5302 quidem non habent esse nisi in materia individuali; non tamen | |
| 5303 secundum quod sunt in materia individuali, sed secundum quod | |
| 5304 abstrahuntur ab ea per considerationem intellectus. Unde secundum | |
| 5305 intellectum possumus cognoscere huiusmodi res in universali, quod | |
| 5306 est supra facultatem sensus. Intellectui autem angelico connaturale | |
| 5307 est cognoscere naturas non in materia existentes. Quod est supra | |
| 5308 naturalem facultatem intellectus animae humanae, secundum statum | |
| 5309 praesentis vitae, quo corpori unitur. Relinquitur ergo quod | |
| 5310 cognoscere ipsum esse subsistens, sit connaturale soli intellectui | |
| 5311 divino, et quod sit supra facultatem naturalem cuiuslibet | |
| 5312 intellectus creati, quia nulla creatura est suum esse, sed habet | |
| 5313 esse participatum. Non igitur potest intellectus creatus Deum per | |
| 5314 essentiam videre, nisi inquantum Deus per suam gratiam se | |
| 5315 intellectui creato coniungit, ut intelligibile ab ipso.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q12_A4-p7"> | |
| 5316 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This mode of knowing God is natural to an angel---namely, to know Him by His own likeness refulgent in the angel himself. | |
| 5317 But to know God by any created similitude is not to know the essence of God, as was shown above | |
| 5318 <a id="FP_Q12_A4-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q12_A2.html">(A[2])</a>. Hence it does not follow that an angel can know the essence of God by his own power. | |
| 5319 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="28713" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28713] Iª q. 12 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo | |
| 5320 dicendum quod iste modus cognoscendi Deum, est Angelo connaturalis, | |
| 5321 ut scilicet cognoscat eum per similitudinem eius in ipso Angelo | |
| 5322 refulgentem. Sed cognoscere Deum per aliquam similitudinem creatam, | |
| 5323 non est cognoscere essentiam Dei, ut supra ostensum est. Unde non | |
| 5324 sequitur quod Angelus per sua naturalia possit cognoscere essentiam | |
| 5325 Dei.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q12_A4-p8"> | |
| 5326 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The angelic intellect is not defective, if defect be taken to mean privation, as if it were without anything which it ought | |
| 5327 to have. But if the defect be taken negatively, in that sense every creature is defective, when compared with God; forasmuch | |
| 5328 as it does not possess the excellence which is in God. | |
| 5329 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="28714" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28714] Iª q. 12 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 5330 dicendum quod intellectus Angeli non habet defectum, si defectus | |
| 5331 accipiatur privative, ut scilicet careat eo quod habere debet. Si | |
| 5332 vero accipiatur negative, sic quaelibet creatura invenitur | |
| 5333 deficiens, Deo comparata, dum non habet illam excellentiam quae | |
| 5334 invenitur in Deo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q12_A4-p9"> | |
| 5335 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The sense of sight, as being altogether material, cannot be raised up to immateriality. But our intellect, or the angelic | |
| 5336 intellect, inasmuch as it is elevated above matter in its own nature, can be raised up above its own nature to a higher level | |
| 5337 by grace. The proof is, that sight cannot in any way know abstractedly what it knows concretely; for in no way can it perceive | |
| 5338 a nature except as this one particular nature; whereas our intellect is able to | |
| 5339 consider abstractedly what it knows concretely. Now although it knows things which have a form residing in matter, still it | |
| 5340 resolves the composite into both of these elements; and it considers the form separately by itself. Likewise, also, the intellect | |
| 5341 of an angel, although it naturally knows the concrete in any nature, still it is able to separate that existence by its intellect; | |
| 5342 since it knows that the thing itself is one thing, and its existence is another. Since therefore the created | |
| 5343 intellect is naturally capable of apprehending the concrete form, and the concrete being abstractedly, by way of a kind of | |
| 5344 resolution of parts; it can by grace be raised up to know separate subsisting substance, and separate subsisting existence. | |
| 5345 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="28715" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28715] Iª q. 12 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 5346 dicendum quod sensus visus, quia omnino materialis est, nullo modo | |
| 5347 elevari potest ad aliquid immateriale. Sed intellectus noster vel | |
| 5348 angelicus, quia secundum naturam a materia aliqualiter elevatus | |
| 5349 est, potest ultra suam naturam per gratiam ad aliquid altius | |
| 5350 elevari. Et huius signum est, quia visus nullo modo potest in | |
| 5351 abstractione cognoscere id quod in concretione cognoscit, nullo | |
| 5352 enim modo potest percipere naturam, nisi ut hanc. Sed intellectus | |
| 5353 noster potest in abstractione considerare quod in concretione | |
| 5354 cognoscit. Etsi enim cognoscat res habentes formam in materia, | |
| 5355 tamen resolvit compositum in utrumque, et considerat ipsam formam | |
| 5356 per se. Et similiter intellectus Angeli, licet connaturale sit ei | |
| 5357 cognoscere esse concretum in aliqua natura, tamen potest ipsum esse | |
| 5358 secernere per intellectum, dum cognoscit quod aliud est ipse, et | |
| 5359 aliud est suum esse. Et ideo, cum intellectus creatus per suam | |
| 5360 naturam natus sit apprehendere formam concretam et esse concretum | |
| 5361 in abstractione, per modum resolutionis cuiusdam, potest per | |
| 5362 gratiam elevari ut cognoscat substantiam separatam subsistentem, et | |
| 5363 esse separatum subsistens.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q12_A5" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q12_A5-p0.1">Q. 12. A. 5. Whether the created intellect needs any created light in order to see the essence of God?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q12_A5-p2"> | |
| 5364 <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the created intellect does not need any created light in order to see the essence of God. For what is of itself | |
| 5365 lucid in sensible things does not require any other light in order to be seen. Therefore the same applies to intelligible | |
| 5366 things. Now God is intelligible light. Therefore He is not seen by means of any created light. | |
| 5367 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 5 arg. 1"><a name="28716" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28716] Iª q. 12 a. 5 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quintum sic | |
| 5368 proceditur. Videtur quod intellectus creatus ad videndum essentiam | |
| 5369 Dei aliquo lumine creato non indigeat. Illud enim quod est per se | |
| 5370 lucidum in rebus sensibilibus, alio lumine non indiget ut videatur, | |
| 5371 ergo nec in intelligibilibus. Sed Deus est lux intelligibilis. Ergo | |
| 5372 non videtur per aliquod lumen creatum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q12_A5-p3"> | |
| 5373 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, if God is seen through a medium, He is not seen in His essence. But if seen by any created light, He is seen through | |
| 5374 a medium. Therefore He is not seen in His essence. | |
| 5375 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 5 arg. 2"><a name="28717" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28717] Iª q. 12 a. 5 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, cum | |
| 5376 Deus videtur per medium, non videtur per suam essentiam. Sed cum | |
| 5377 videtur per aliquod lumen creatum, videtur per medium. Ergo non | |
| 5378 videtur per suam essentiam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q12_A5-p4"> | |
| 5379 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, what is created can be natural to some creature. Therefore if the essence of God is seen through any created light, | |
| 5380 such a light can be made natural to some other creature; and thus, that creature would not need any other light to see God; | |
| 5381 which is impossible. Therefore it is not necessary that every creature should require a superadded light in order to see the | |
| 5382 essence of God. | |
| 5383 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 5 arg. 3"><a name="28718" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28718] Iª q. 12 a. 5 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, illud | |
| 5384 quod est creatum, nihil prohibet alicui creaturae esse naturale. Si | |
| 5385 ergo per aliquod lumen creatum Dei essentia videtur, poterit illud | |
| 5386 lumen esse naturale alicui creaturae. Et ita illa creatura non | |
| 5387 indigebit aliquo alio lumine ad videndum Deum, quod est | |
| 5388 impossibile. Non est ergo necessarium quod omnis creatura ad | |
| 5389 videndum Dei essentiam lumen superadditum requirat.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q12_A5-p5"> | |
| 5390 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written: "In Thy light we shall see light" ( | |
| 5391 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q12_A5-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.35.10" target="asv">Ps. 35:10</a>). | |
| 5392 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 5 s. c."><a name="28719" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28719] Iª q. 12 a. 5 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est | |
| 5393 quod dicitur in Psalmo, <i>in lumine tuo videbimus lumen</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q12_A5-p6"> | |
| 5394 <b>I answer that,</b> Everything which is raised up to what exceeds its nature, must be prepared by some disposition above its nature; as, for | |
| 5395 example, if air is to receive the form of fire, it must be prepared by some disposition for such a form. But when any created | |
| 5396 intellect sees the essence of God, the essence of God itself becomes the intelligible form of the intellect. Hence it is necessary | |
| 5397 that some supernatural disposition should be added to the intellect in order that it | |
| 5398 may be raised up to such a great and sublime height. Now since the natural power of the created intellect does not avail to | |
| 5399 enable it to see the essence of God, as was shown in the preceding article, it is necessary that the power of understanding | |
| 5400 should be added by divine grace. Now this increase of the intellectual powers is called the illumination of the intellect, | |
| 5401 as we also call the intelligible object itself by the name of light of illumination. And this is the light spoken of in the | |
| 5402 Apocalypse ( | |
| 5403 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q12_A5-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Rev.21.23" target="asv">Apoc. 21:23</a>): "The glory of God hath enlightened it"---viz. the society of the blessed who see God. By this light the blessed are made | |
| 5404 "deiform"---i.e. like to God, according to the saying: "When He shall appear we shall be like to Him, and [Vulg.: 'because'] | |
| 5405 we shall see Him as He is" ( | |
| 5406 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q12_A5-p6.2" href="./asv.html#iJohn.2.2" target="asv">1 Jn. 2:2</a>). | |
| 5407 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 5 co."><a name="28720" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28720] Iª q. 12 a. 5 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum | |
| 5408 quod omne quod elevatur ad aliquid quod excedit suam naturam, | |
| 5409 oportet quod disponatur aliqua dispositione quae sit supra suam | |
| 5410 naturam, sicut, si aer debeat accipere formam ignis, oportet quod | |
| 5411 disponatur aliqua dispositione ad talem formam. Cum autem aliquis | |
| 5412 intellectus creatus videt Deum per essentiam, ipsa essentia Dei fit | |
| 5413 forma intelligibilis intellectus. Unde oportet quod aliqua | |
| 5414 dispositio supernaturalis ei superaddatur, ad hoc quod elevetur in | |
| 5415 tantam sublimitatem. Cum igitur virtus naturalis intellectus creati | |
| 5416 non sufficiat ad Dei essentiam videndam, ut ostensum est, oportet | |
| 5417 quod ex divina gratia superaccrescat ei virtus intelligendi. Et hoc | |
| 5418 augmentum virtutis intellectivae illuminationem intellectus | |
| 5419 vocamus; sicut et ipsum intelligibile vocatur lumen vel lux. Et | |
| 5420 istud est lumen de quo dicitur Apoc. XXI, <i>quod claritas Dei | |
| 5421 illuminabit eam</i>, scilicet societatem beatorum Deum videntium. | |
| 5422 Et secundum hoc lumen efficiuntur deiformes, idest Deo similes; | |
| 5423 secundum illud I Ioan. III, <i>cum apparuerit, similes ei erimus, | |
| 5424 et videbimus eum sicuti est</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q12_A5-p7"> | |
| 5425 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The created light is necessary to see the essence of God, not in order to make the essence of God intelligible, which is | |
| 5426 of itself intelligible, but in order to enable the intellect to understand in the same way as a habit makes a power abler | |
| 5427 to act. Even so corporeal light is necessary as regards external sight, inasmuch as it makes the medium actually transparent, | |
| 5428 and susceptible of color. | |
| 5429 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 5 ad 1"><a name="28721" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28721] Iª q. 12 a. 5 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo | |
| 5430 dicendum quod lumen creatum est necessarium ad videndum Dei | |
| 5431 essentiam, non quod per hoc lumen Dei essentia intelligibilis fiat, | |
| 5432 quae secundum se intelligibilis est, sed ad hoc quod intellectus | |
| 5433 fiat potens ad intelligendum, per modum quo potentia fit potentior | |
| 5434 ad operandum per habitum, sicut etiam et lumen corporale | |
| 5435 necessarium est in visu exteriori, inquantum facit medium | |
| 5436 transparens in actu, ut possit moveri a colore.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q12_A5-p8"> | |
| 5437 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> This light is required to see the divine essence, not as a similitude in which God is seen, but as a perfection of the intellect, | |
| 5438 strengthening it to see God. Therefore it may be said that this light is to be described not as a medium in which God is seen, | |
| 5439 but as one by which He is seen; and such a medium does not take away the immediate vision of God. | |
| 5440 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 5 ad 2"><a name="28722" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28722] Iª q. 12 a. 5 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 5441 dicendum quod lumen istud non requiritur ad videndum Dei essentiam | |
| 5442 quasi similitudo in qua Deus videatur, sed quasi perfectio quaedam | |
| 5443 intellectus, confortans ipsum ad videndum Deum. Et ideo potest dici | |
| 5444 quod non est medium in quo Deus videatur, sed sub quo videtur. Et | |
| 5445 hoc non tollit immediatam visionem Dei.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q12_A5-p9"> | |
| 5446 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The disposition to the form of fire can be natural only to the subject of that form. Hence the light of glory cannot be natural | |
| 5447 to a creature unless the creature has a divine nature; which is impossible. But by this light the rational creature is made | |
| 5448 deiform, as is said in this article. | |
| 5449 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 5 ad 3"><a name="28723" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28723] Iª q. 12 a. 5 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 5450 dicendum quod dispositio ad formam ignis non potest esse naturalis | |
| 5451 nisi habenti formam ignis. Unde lumen gloriae non potest esse | |
| 5452 naturale creaturae, nisi creatura esset naturae divinae, quod est | |
| 5453 impossibile. Per hoc enim lumen fit creatura rationalis deiformis, | |
| 5454 ut dictum est.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q12_A6" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q12_A6-p0.1">Q. 12. A. 6. Whether of those who see the essence of God, one sees more perfectly than another?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q12_A6-p2"> | |
| 5455 <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that of those who see the essence of God, one does not see more perfectly than another. For it is written ( | |
| 5456 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q12_A6-p2.1" href="./asv.html#iJohn.3.2" target="asv">1 Jn. 3:2</a>): "We shall see Him as He is." But He is only in one way. Therefore He will be seen by all in one way only; and therefore | |
| 5457 He will not be seen more perfectly by one and less perfectly by another. | |
| 5458 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 6 arg. 1"><a name="28724" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28724] Iª q. 12 a. 6 arg. 1</span></a> Ad sextum sic | |
| 5459 proceditur. Videtur quod videntium essentiam Dei unus alio | |
| 5460 perfectius non videat. Dicitur enim I Ioan. III, <i>videbimus eum | |
| 5461 sicuti est</i>. Sed ipse uno modo est. Ergo uno modo videbitur ab | |
| 5462 omnibus. Non ergo perfectius et minus perfecte.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q12_A6-p3"> | |
| 5463 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Augustine says (Octog. Tri. Quaest. qu. xxxii): "One person cannot see one and the same thing more perfectly than | |
| 5464 another." But all who see the essence of God, understand the Divine essence, for God is seen by the intellect and not by sense, | |
| 5465 as was shown above (A[3] ). Therefore of those who see the divine essence, one does not see more clearly than another. | |
| 5466 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 6 arg. 2"><a name="28725" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28725] Iª q. 12 a. 6 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 5467 Augustinus dicit, in libro octoginta trium qq., quod unam rem non | |
| 5468 potest unus alio plus intelligere. Sed omnes videntes Deum per | |
| 5469 essentiam, intelligunt Dei essentiam, intellectu enim videtur Deus, | |
| 5470 non sensu, ut supra habitum est. Ergo videntium divinam essentiam | |
| 5471 unus alio non clarius videt.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q12_A6-p4"> | |
| 5472 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, That anything be seen more perfectly than another can happen in two ways: either on the part of the visible object, | |
| 5473 or on the part of the visual power of the seer. On the part of the object, it may so happen because the object is received | |
| 5474 more perfectly in the seer, that is, according to the greater perfection of the similitude; but this does not apply to the | |
| 5475 present question, for God is present to the intellect seeing Him not by way of similitude, | |
| 5476 but by His essence. It follows then that if one sees Him more perfectly than another, this happens according to the difference | |
| 5477 of the intellectual power; thus it follows too that the one whose intellectual power is higher, will see Him the more clearly; | |
| 5478 and this is incongruous; since equality with angels is promised to men as their beatitude. | |
| 5479 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 6 arg. 3"><a name="28726" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28726] Iª q. 12 a. 6 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, quod | |
| 5480 aliquid altero perfectius videatur, ex duobus contingere potest, | |
| 5481 vel ex parte obiecti visibilis; vel ex parte potentiae visivae | |
| 5482 videntis. Ex parte autem obiecti, per hoc quod obiectum perfectius | |
| 5483 in vidente recipitur, scilicet secundum perfectiorem similitudinem. | |
| 5484 Quod in proposito locum non habet, Deus enim non per aliquam | |
| 5485 similitudinem, sed per eius essentiam praesens est intellectui | |
| 5486 essentiam eius videnti. Relinquitur ergo quod, si unus alio | |
| 5487 perfectius eum videat, quod hoc sit secundum differentiam potentiae | |
| 5488 intellectivae. Et ita sequitur quod cuius potentia intellectiva | |
| 5489 naturaliter est sublimior, clarius eum videat. Quod est | |
| 5490 inconveniens, cum hominibus promittatur in beatitudine aequalitas | |
| 5491 Angelorum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q12_A6-p5"> | |
| 5492 <b>On the contrary,</b> Eternal life consists in the vision of God, according to | |
| 5493 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q12_A6-p5.1" href="./asv.html#John.17.3" target="asv"> Jn. 17:3</a>: "This is eternal life, that they may know Thee the only true God," etc. Therefore if all saw the essence of God equally | |
| 5494 in eternal life, all would be equal; the contrary to which is declared by the Apostle: "Star differs from star in glory" ( | |
| 5495 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q12_A6-p5.2" href="./asv.html#iCor.15.41" target="asv">1 Cor. 15:41</a>). | |
| 5496 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 6 s. c."><a name="28727" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28727] Iª q. 12 a. 6 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est | |
| 5497 quod vita aeterna in visione Dei consistit, secundum illud Ioan. | |
| 5498 XVII, <i>haec est vita aeterna,</i> et cetera. Ergo, si omnes | |
| 5499 aequaliter Dei essentiam vident, in vita aeterna omnes erunt | |
| 5500 aequales. Cuius contrarium dicit apostolus, I Cor. XV, <i>stella | |
| 5501 differt a stella in claritate</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q12_A6-p6"> | |
| 5502 <b>I answer that,</b> Of those who see the essence of God, one sees Him more perfectly than another. This, indeed, does not take place as if one | |
| 5503 had a more perfect similitude of God than another, since that vision will not spring from any similitude; but it will take | |
| 5504 place because one intellect will have a greater power or faculty to see God than another. The faculty of seeing God, however, | |
| 5505 does not belong to the created intellect naturally, but is given to it by the light of | |
| 5506 glory, which establishes the intellect in a kind of "deiformity," as appears from what is said above, in the preceding article. | |
| 5507 </p><p id="FP_Q12_A6-p7"> Hence the intellect which has more of the light of glory will see God the more perfectly; and he will have a fuller participation | |
| 5508 of the light of glory who has more charity; because where there is the greater charity, there is the more desire; and desire | |
| 5509 in a certain degree makes the one desiring apt and prepared to receive the object desired. Hence he who possesses the more | |
| 5510 charity, will see God the more perfectly, and will be the more beatified. | |
| 5511 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 6 co."><a name="28728" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28728] Iª q. 12 a. 6 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum | |
| 5512 quod videntium Deum per essentiam unus alio perfectius eum videbit. | |
| 5513 Quod quidem non erit per aliquam Dei similitudinem perfectiorem in | |
| 5514 uno quam in alio, cum illa visio non sit futura per aliquam | |
| 5515 similitudinem, ut ostensum est. Sed hoc erit per hoc, quod | |
| 5516 intellectus unius habebit maiorem virtutem seu facultatem ad | |
| 5517 videndum Deum, quam alterius. Facultas autem videndi Deum non | |
| 5518 competit intellectui creato secundum suam naturam, sed per lumen | |
| 5519 gloriae, quod intellectum in quadam deiformitate constituit, ut ex | |
| 5520 superioribus patet. Unde intellectus plus participans de lumine | |
| 5521 gloriae, perfectius Deum videbit. Plus autem participabit de lumine | |
| 5522 gloriae, qui plus habet de caritate, quia ubi est maior caritas, | |
| 5523 ibi est maius desiderium; et desiderium quodammodo facit | |
| 5524 desiderantem aptum et paratum ad susceptionem desiderati. Unde qui | |
| 5525 plus habebit de caritate, perfectius Deum videbit, et beatior | |
| 5526 erit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q12_A6-p8"> | |
| 5527 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> In the words,"We shall see Him as He is," the conjunction "as" determines the mode of vision on the part of the object seen, | |
| 5528 so that the meaning is, we shall see Him to be as He is, because we shall see His existence, which is His essence. But it | |
| 5529 does not determine the mode of vision on the part of the one seeing; as if the meaning was that the mode of seeing God will | |
| 5530 be as perfect as is the perfect mode of God's existence. | |
| 5531 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 6 ad 1"><a name="28729" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28729] Iª q. 12 a. 6 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo | |
| 5532 dicendum quod, cum dicitur videbimus eum sicuti est, hoc adverbium | |
| 5533 sicuti determinat modum visionis ex parte rei visae ut sit sensus, | |
| 5534 videbimus eum ita esse sicuti est, quia ipsum esse eius videbimus, | |
| 5535 quod est eius essentia. Non autem determinat modum visionis ex | |
| 5536 parte videntis, ut sit sensus, quod ita erit perfectus modus | |
| 5537 videndi, sicut est in Deo perfectus modus essendi.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q12_A6-p9"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Thus appears the answer to the Second Objection. For when it is said that one intellect does not understand one and the same | |
| 5538 thing better than another, this would be true if referred to the mode of the thing understood, for whoever understands it | |
| 5539 otherwise than it really is, does not truly understand it, but not if referred to the mode of understanding, for the understanding | |
| 5540 of one is more perfect than the understanding of another. | |
| 5541 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 6 ad 2"><a name="28730" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28730] Iª q. 12 a. 6 ad 2</span></a> Et per hoc etiam | |
| 5542 patet solutio ad secundum. Cum enim dicitur quod rem unam unus alio | |
| 5543 melius non intelligit, hoc habet veritatem si referatur ad modum | |
| 5544 rei intellectae, quia quicumque intelligit rem esse aliter quam | |
| 5545 sit, non vere intelligit. Non autem si referatur ad modum | |
| 5546 intelligendi, quia intelligere unius est perfectius quam | |
| 5547 intelligere alterius.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q12_A6-p10"> | |
| 5548 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The diversity of seeing will not arise on the part of the object seen, for the same object will be presented to all---viz. | |
| 5549 the essence of God; nor will it arise from the diverse participation of the object seen by different similitudes; but it will | |
| 5550 arise on the part of the diverse faculty of the intellect, not, indeed, the natural faculty, but the glorified faculty. | |
| 5551 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 6 ad 3"><a name="28731" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28731] Iª q. 12 a. 6 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 5552 dicendum quod diversitas videndi non erit ex parte obiecti, quia | |
| 5553 idem obiectum omnibus praesentabitur, scilicet Dei essentia, nec ex | |
| 5554 diversa participatione obiecti per differentes similitudines, sed | |
| 5555 erit per diversam facultatem intellectus, non quidem naturalem, sed | |
| 5556 gloriosam, ut dictum est.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q12_A7" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q12_A7-p0.1">Q. 12. A. 7. Whether those who see the essence of God comprehend Him?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q12_A7-p2"> | |
| 5557 <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that those who see the divine essence, comprehend God. For the Apostle says ( | |
| 5558 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q12_A7-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Phil.3.12" target="asv">Phil. 3:12</a>): "But I follow after, if I may by any means comprehend [Douay: 'apprehend']." But the Apostle did not follow in vain; for | |
| 5559 he said ( | |
| 5560 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q12_A7-p2.2" href="./asv.html#iCor.9.26" target="asv">1 Cor. 9:26</a>): "I . . . so run, not as at an uncertainty." Therefore he comprehended; and in the same way, others also, whom he invites | |
| 5561 to do the same, saying: "So run that you may | |
| 5562 comprehend." | |
| 5563 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 7 arg. 1"><a name="28732" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28732] Iª q. 12 a. 7 arg. 1</span></a> Ad septimum sic | |
| 5564 proceditur. Videtur quod videntes Deum per essentiam ipsum | |
| 5565 comprehendant. Dicit enim apostolus, Philipp. III, <i>sequor autem | |
| 5566 si quo modo comprehendam</i>. Non autem frustra sequebatur, dicit | |
| 5567 enim ipse, I Cor. IX, <i>sic curro, non quasi in incertum</i>. Ergo | |
| 5568 ipse comprehendit, et eadem ratione alii, quos ad hoc invitat, | |
| 5569 dicens, <i>sic currite, ut comprehendatis</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q12_A7-p3"> | |
| 5570 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Augustine says (De Vid. Deum, Ep. cxlvii): "That is comprehended which is so seen as a whole, that nothing of it | |
| 5571 is hidden from the seer." But if God is seen in His essence, He is seen whole, and nothing of Him is hidden from the seer, | |
| 5572 since God is simple. Therefore whoever sees His essence, comprehends Him. | |
| 5573 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 7 arg. 2"><a name="28733" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28733] Iª q. 12 a. 7 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, ut | |
| 5574 dicit Augustinus in libro de videndo Deum ad Paulinam, <i>illud | |
| 5575 comprehenditur, quod ita totum videtur, ut nihil eius lateat | |
| 5576 videntem</i>. Sed si Deus per essentiam videtur, totus videtur, et | |
| 5577 nihil eius latet videntem; cum Deus sit simplex. Ergo a quocumque | |
| 5578 videtur per essentiam, comprehenditur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q12_A7-p4"> | |
| 5579 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if we say that He is seen as a "whole," but not "wholly," it may be contrarily urged that "wholly" refers either | |
| 5580 to the mode of the seer, or to the mode of the thing seen. But he who sees the essence of God, sees Him wholly, if the mode | |
| 5581 of the thing seen is considered; forasmuch as he sees Him as He is; also, likewise, he sees Him wholly if the mode of the | |
| 5582 seer is meant, forasmuch as the intellect will with its full power see the Divine essence. | |
| 5583 Therefore all who see the essence of God see Him wholly; therefore they comprehend Him. | |
| 5584 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 7 arg. 3"><a name="28734" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28734] Iª q. 12 a. 7 arg. 3</span></a> Si dicatur quod | |
| 5585 videtur totus, sed non totaliter, contra, totaliter vel dicit modum | |
| 5586 videntis, vel modum rei visae. Sed ille qui videt Deum per | |
| 5587 essentiam, videt eum totaliter, si significetur modus rei visae, | |
| 5588 quia videt eum sicuti est, ut dictum est. Similiter videt eum | |
| 5589 totaliter, si significetur modus videntis, quia tota virtute sua | |
| 5590 intellectus Dei essentiam videbit. Quilibet ergo videns Deum per | |
| 5591 essentiam, totaliter eum videbit. Ergo eum comprehendet.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q12_A7-p5"> | |
| 5592 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written: "O most mighty, great, and powerful, the Lord of hosts is Thy Name. Great in counsel, and incomprehensible | |
| 5593 in thought" ( | |
| 5594 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q12_A7-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Jer.32.18" target="asv">Jer. 32:18,19</a>). Therefore He cannot be comprehended. | |
| 5595 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 7 s. c."><a name="28735" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28735] Iª q. 12 a. 7 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est | |
| 5596 quod dicitur Ierem. XXXII, <i>fortissime, magne, potens, dominus | |
| 5597 exercituum nomen tibi; magnus consilio, et incomprehensibilis | |
| 5598 cogitatu</i>. Ergo comprehendi non potest.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q12_A7-p6"> | |
| 5599 <b>I answer that,</b> It is impossible for any created intellect to comprehend God; yet "for the mind to attain to God in some degree is great | |
| 5600 beatitude," as Augustine says (De Verb. Dim., Serm. xxxvii). | |
| 5601 </p><p id="FP_Q12_A7-p7"> In proof of this we must consider that what is comprehended is perfectly known; and that is perfectly known which is known | |
| 5602 so far as it can be known. Thus, if anything which is capable of scientific demonstration is held only by an opinion resting | |
| 5603 on a probably proof, it is not comprehended; as, for instance, if anyone knows by scientific demonstration that a triangle | |
| 5604 has three angles equal to two right angles, he comprehends that truth; whereas if anyone accepts it as a | |
| 5605 probable opinion because wise men or most men teach it, he cannot be said to comprehend the thing itself, because he does | |
| 5606 not attain to that perfect mode of knowledge of which it is intrinsically capable. But no created intellect can attain to | |
| 5607 that perfect mode of the knowledge of the Divine intellect whereof it is intrinsically capable. Which thus appears---Everything | |
| 5608 is knowable according to its actuality. But God, whose being is infinite, as was shown above | |
| 5609 <a id="FP_Q12_A7-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q7.html">(Q[7])</a> is | |
| 5610 infinitely knowable. Now no created intellect can know God infinitely. For the created intellect knows the Divine essence | |
| 5611 more or less perfectly in proportion as it receives a greater or lesser light of glory. Since therefore the created light | |
| 5612 of glory received into any created intellect cannot be infinite, it is clearly impossible for any created intellect to know | |
| 5613 God in an infinite degree. Hence it is impossible that it should comprehend God. | |
| 5614 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 7 co."><a name="28736" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28736] Iª q. 12 a. 7 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum | |
| 5615 quod comprehendere Deum impossibile est cuicumque intellectui | |
| 5616 creato, <i>attingere vero mente Deum qualitercumque, magna est | |
| 5617 beatitudo</i>, ut dicit Augustinus. Ad cuius evidentiam, sciendum | |
| 5618 est quod illud comprehenditur, quod perfecte cognoscitur. Perfecte | |
| 5619 autem cognoscitur, quod tantum cognoscitur, quantum est | |
| 5620 cognoscibile. Unde si id quod est cognoscibile per scientiam | |
| 5621 demonstrativam, opinione teneatur ex aliqua ratione probabili | |
| 5622 concepta, non comprehenditur. Puta, si hoc quod est triangulum | |
| 5623 habere tres angulos aequales duobus rectis, aliquis sciat per | |
| 5624 demonstrationem, comprehendit illud, si vero aliquis eius opinionem | |
| 5625 accipiat probabiliter, per hoc quod a sapientibus vel pluribus ita | |
| 5626 dicitur, non comprehendet ipsum, quia non pertingit ad illum | |
| 5627 perfectum modum cognitionis, quo cognoscibilis est. Nullus autem | |
| 5628 intellectus creatus pertingere potest ad illum perfectum modum | |
| 5629 cognitionis divinae essentiae, quo cognoscibilis est. Quod sic | |
| 5630 patet. Unumquodque enim sic cognoscibile est, secundum quod est ens | |
| 5631 actu. Deus igitur, cuius esse est infinitum, ut supra ostensum est, | |
| 5632 infinite cognoscibilis est. Nullus autem intellectus creatus potest | |
| 5633 Deum infinite cognoscere. Intantum enim intellectus creatus divinam | |
| 5634 essentiam perfectius vel minus perfecte cognoscit, inquantum maiori | |
| 5635 vel minori lumine gloriae perfunditur. Cum igitur lumen gloriae | |
| 5636 creatum, in quocumque intellectu creato receptum, non possit esse | |
| 5637 infinitum, impossibile est quod aliquis intellectus creatus Deum | |
| 5638 infinite cognoscat. Unde impossibile est quod Deum | |
| 5639 comprehendat.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q12_A7-p8"> | |
| 5640 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> "Comprehension" is twofold: in one sense it is taken strictly and properly, according as something is included in the one | |
| 5641 comprehending; and thus in no way is God comprehended either by intellect, or in any other way; forasmuch as He is infinite | |
| 5642 and cannot be included in any finite being; so that no finite being can contain Him infinitely, in the degree of His own infinity. | |
| 5643 In this sense we now take comprehension. But in another sense "comprehension" | |
| 5644 is taken more largely as opposed to "non-attainment"; for he who attains to anyone is said to comprehend him when he attains | |
| 5645 to him. And in this sense God is comprehended by the blessed, according to the words, "I held him, and I will not let him | |
| 5646 go" ( | |
| 5647 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q12_A7-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Song.3.4" target="asv">Cant 3:4</a>); in this sense also are to be understood the words quoted from the Apostle concerning comprehension. And in this way "comprehension" | |
| 5648 is one of the three prerogatives of the soul, responding to hope, as vision | |
| 5649 responds to faith, and fruition responds to charity. For even among ourselves not everything seen is held or possessed, forasmuch | |
| 5650 as things either appear sometimes afar off, or they are not in our power of attainment. Neither, again, do we always enjoy | |
| 5651 what we possess; either because we find no pleasure in them, or because such things are not the ultimate end of our desire, | |
| 5652 so as to satisfy and quell it. But the blessed possess these three things in God; because they see Him, and in seeing Him, | |
| 5653 possess Him as present, having the power to see Him always; and possessing Him, they enjoy Him as the ultimate fulfilment | |
| 5654 of desire. | |
| 5655 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 7 ad 1"><a name="28737" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28737] Iª q. 12 a. 7 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo | |
| 5656 dicendum quod comprehensio dicitur dupliciter. Uno modo, stricte et | |
| 5657 proprie, secundum quod aliquid includitur in comprehendente. Et sic | |
| 5658 nullo modo Deus comprehenditur, nec intellectu nec aliquo alio, | |
| 5659 quia, cum sit infinitus, nullo finito includi potest, ut aliquid | |
| 5660 finitum eum infinite capiat, sicut ipse infinite est. Et sic de | |
| 5661 comprehensione nunc quaeritur. Alio modo comprehensio largius | |
| 5662 sumitur, secundum quod comprehensio insecutioni opponitur. Qui enim | |
| 5663 attingit aliquem, quando iam tenet ipsum, comprehendere eum | |
| 5664 dicitur. Et sic Deus comprehenditur a beatis, secundum illud Cant. | |
| 5665 III, <i>tenui eum, nec dimittam</i>. Et sic intelliguntur | |
| 5666 auctoritates apostoli de comprehensione. Et hoc modo comprehensio | |
| 5667 est una de tribus dotibus animae, quae respondet spei; sicut visio | |
| 5668 fidei, et fruitio caritati. Non enim, apud nos, omne quod videtur, | |
| 5669 iam tenetur vel habetur, quia videntur interdum distantia, vel quae | |
| 5670 non sunt in potestate nostra. Neque iterum omnibus quae habemus, | |
| 5671 fruimur, vel quia non delectamur in eis; vel quia non sunt ultimus | |
| 5672 finis desiderii nostri, ut desiderium nostrum impleant et quietent. | |
| 5673 Sed haec tria habent beati in Deo, quia et vident ipsum; et | |
| 5674 videndo, tenent sibi praesentem, in potestate habentes semper eum | |
| 5675 videre; et tenentes, fruuntur sicut ultimo fine desiderium | |
| 5676 implente.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q12_A7-p9"> | |
| 5677 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> God is called incomprehensible not because anything of Him is not seen; but because He is not seen as perfectly as He is | |
| 5678 capable of being seen; thus when any demonstrable proposition is known by probable reason only, it does not follow that any | |
| 5679 part of it is unknown, either the subject, or the predicate, or the composition; but that it is not as perfectly known as | |
| 5680 it is capable of being known. Hence Augustine, in his definition of comprehension, says | |
| 5681 the whole is comprehended when it is seen in such a way that nothing of it is hidden from the seer, or when its boundaries | |
| 5682 can be completely viewed or traced; for the boundaries of a thing are said to be completely surveyed when the end of the knowledge | |
| 5683 of it is attained. | |
| 5684 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 7 ad 2"><a name="28738" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28738] Iª q. 12 a. 7 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 5685 dicendum quod non propter hoc Deus incomprehensibilis dicitur, | |
| 5686 quasi aliquid eius sit quod non videatur, sed quia non ita perfecte | |
| 5687 videtur, sicut visibilis est. Sicut cum aliqua demonstrabilis | |
| 5688 propositio per aliquam probabilem rationem cognoscitur, non est | |
| 5689 aliquid eius quod non cognoscatur, nec subiectum, nec praedicatum, | |
| 5690 nec compositio, sed tota non ita perfecte cognoscitur, sicut | |
| 5691 cognoscibilis est. Unde Augustinus, definiendo comprehensionem, | |
| 5692 dicit quod <i>totum comprehenditur videndo, quod ita videtur, ut | |
| 5693 nihil eius lateat videntem; aut cuius fines circumspici | |
| 5694 possunt</i>, tunc enim fines alicuius circumspiciuntur, quando ad | |
| 5695 finem in modo cognoscendi illam rem pervenitur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q12_A7-p10"> | |
| 5696 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The word "wholly" denotes a mode of the object; not that the whole object does not come under knowledge, but that the mode | |
| 5697 of the object is not the mode of the one who knows. Therefore he who sees God's essence, sees in Him that He exists infinitely, | |
| 5698 and is infinitely knowable; nevertheless, this infinite mode does not extend to enable the knower to know infinitely; thus, | |
| 5699 for instance, a person can have a probable opinion that a proposition is | |
| 5700 demonstrable, although he himself does not know it as demonstrated. | |
| 5701 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 7 ad 3"><a name="28739" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28739] Iª q. 12 a. 7 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 5702 dicendum quod totaliter dicit modum obiecti, non quidem ita quod | |
| 5703 totus modus obiecti non cadat sub cognitione; sed quia modus | |
| 5704 obiecti non est modus cognoscentis. Qui igitur videt Deum per | |
| 5705 essentiam, videt hoc in eo, quod infinite existit, et infinite | |
| 5706 cognoscibilis est, sed hic infinitus modus non competit ei, ut | |
| 5707 scilicet ipse infinite cognoscat, sicut aliquis probabiliter scire | |
| 5708 potest aliquam propositionem esse demonstrabilem, licet ipse eam | |
| 5709 demonstrative non cognoscat.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q12_A8" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q12_A8-p0.1">Q. 12. A. 8. Whether those who see the essence of God see all in God?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q12_A8-p2"> | |
| 5710 <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that those who see the essence of God see all things in God. For Gregory says (Dialog. iv): "What do they not see, | |
| 5711 who see Him Who sees all things?" But God sees all things. Therefore those who see God see all things. | |
| 5712 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 8 arg. 1"><a name="28740" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28740] Iª q. 12 a. 8 arg. 1</span></a> Ad octavum sic | |
| 5713 proceditur. Videtur quod videntes Deum per essentiam omnia in Deo | |
| 5714 videant. Dicit enim Gregorius, in IV Dialog. <i>quid est quod non | |
| 5715 videant, qui videntem omnia vident?</i> Sed Deus est videns omnia. | |
| 5716 Ergo qui vident Deum, omnia vident.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q12_A8-p3"> | |
| 5717 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, whoever sees a mirror, sees what is reflected in the mirror. But all actual or possible things shine forth in God | |
| 5718 as in a mirror; for He knows all things in Himself. Therefore whoever sees God, sees all actual things in Him, and also all | |
| 5719 possible things. | |
| 5720 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 8 arg. 2"><a name="28741" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28741] Iª q. 12 a. 8 arg. 2</span></a> Item, quicumque | |
| 5721 videt speculum, videt ea quae in speculo resplendent. Sed omnia | |
| 5722 quaecumque fiunt vel fieri possunt, in Deo resplendent sicut in | |
| 5723 quodam speculo, ipse enim omnia in seipso cognoscit. Ergo quicumque | |
| 5724 videt Deum, videt omnia quae sunt et quae fieri possunt.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q12_A8-p4"> | |
| 5725 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, whoever understands the greater, can understand the least, as is said in De Anima iii. But all that God does, or | |
| 5726 can do, are less than His essence. Therefore whoever understands God, can understand all that God does, or can do. | |
| 5727 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 8 arg. 3"><a name="28742" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28742] Iª q. 12 a. 8 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, qui | |
| 5728 intelligit id quod est maius, potest intelligere minima, ut dicitur | |
| 5729 III de anima. Sed omnia quae Deus facit vel facere potest, sunt | |
| 5730 minus quam eius essentia. Ergo quicumque intelligit Deum, potest | |
| 5731 intelligere omnia quae Deus facit vel facere potest.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q12_A8-p5"> | |
| 5732 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, the rational creature naturally desires to know all things. Therefore if in seeing God it does not know all things, | |
| 5733 its natural desire will not rest satisfied; thus, in seeing God it will not be fully happy; which is incongruous. Therefore | |
| 5734 he who sees God knows all things. | |
| 5735 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 8 arg. 4"><a name="28743" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28743] Iª q. 12 a. 8 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 5736 rationalis creatura omnia naturaliter scire desiderat. Si igitur | |
| 5737 videndo Deum non omnia sciat, non quietatur eius naturale | |
| 5738 desiderium, et ita, videndo Deum non erit beata. Quod est | |
| 5739 inconveniens. Videndo igitur Deum, omnia scit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q12_A8-p6"> | |
| 5740 <b>On the contrary,</b> The angels see the essence of God; and yet do not know all things. For as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. vii), "the inferior | |
| 5741 angels are cleansed from ignorance by the superior angels." Also they are ignorant of future contingent things, and of secret | |
| 5742 thoughts; for this knowledge belongs to God alone. Therefore whosoever sees the essence of God, does not know all things. | |
| 5743 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 8 s. c."><a name="28744" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28744] Iª q. 12 a. 8 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est | |
| 5744 quod Angeli vident Deum per essentiam, et tamen non omnia sciunt. | |
| 5745 Inferiores enim Angeli purgantur a superioribus a nescientia, ut | |
| 5746 dicit Dionysius, VII cap. Cael. Hier. Ipsi etiam nesciunt futura | |
| 5747 contingentia et cogitationes cordium, hoc enim solius Dei est. Non | |
| 5748 ergo quicumque vident Dei essentiam, vident omnia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q12_A8-p7"> | |
| 5749 <b>I answer that,</b> The created intellect, in seeing the divine essence, does not see in it all that God does or can do. For it is manifest that | |
| 5750 things are seen in God as they are in Him. But all other things are in God as effects are in the power of their cause. Therefore | |
| 5751 all things are seen in God as an effect is seen in its cause. Now it is clear that the more perfectly a cause is seen, the | |
| 5752 more of its effects can be seen in it. For whoever has a lofty understanding, as soon | |
| 5753 as one demonstrative principle is put before him can gather the knowledge of many conclusions; but this is beyond one of a | |
| 5754 weaker intellect, for he needs things to be explained to him separately. And so an intellect can know all the effects of a | |
| 5755 cause and the reasons for those effects in the cause itself, if it comprehends the cause wholly. Now no created intellect | |
| 5756 can comprehend God wholly, as shown above | |
| 5757 <a id="FP_Q12_A8-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q12_A7.html">(A[7])</a>. Therefore no created intellect in seeing God can know | |
| 5758 all that God does or can do, for this would be to comprehend His power; but of what God does or can do any intellect can know | |
| 5759 the more, the more perfectly it sees God. | |
| 5760 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 8 co."><a name="28745" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28745] Iª q. 12 a. 8 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum | |
| 5761 quod intellectus creatus, videndo divinam essentiam, non videt in | |
| 5762 ipsa omnia quae facit Deus vel facere potest. Manifestum est enim | |
| 5763 quod sic aliqua videntur in Deo, secundum quod sunt in ipso. Omnia | |
| 5764 autem alia sunt in Deo, sicut effectus sunt virtute in sua causa. | |
| 5765 Sic igitur videntur alia in Deo, sicut effectus in sua causa. Sed | |
| 5766 manifestum est quod quanto aliqua causa perfectius videtur, tanto | |
| 5767 plures eius effectus in ipsa videri possunt. Qui enim habet | |
| 5768 intellectum elevatum, statim uno principio demonstrativo proposito, | |
| 5769 ex ipso multarum conclusionum cognitionem accipit, quod non | |
| 5770 convenit ei qui debilioris intellectus est, sed oportet quod ei | |
| 5771 singula explanentur. Ille igitur intellectus potest in causa | |
| 5772 cognoscere omnes causae effectus, et omnes rationes effectuum, qui | |
| 5773 causam totaliter comprehendit. Nullus autem intellectus creatus | |
| 5774 totaliter Deum comprehendere potest, ut ostensum est. Nullus igitur | |
| 5775 intellectus creatus, videndo Deum, potest cognoscere omnia quae | |
| 5776 Deus facit vel potest facere, hoc enim esset comprehendere eius | |
| 5777 virtutem. Sed horum quae Deus facit vel facere potest, tanto | |
| 5778 aliquis intellectus plura cognoscit, quanto perfectius Deum | |
| 5779 videt.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q12_A8-p8"> | |
| 5780 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Gregory speaks as regards the object being sufficient, namely, God, who in Himself sufficiently contains and shows forth | |
| 5781 all things; but it does not follow that whoever sees God knows all things, for he does not perfectly comprehend Him. | |
| 5782 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 8 ad 1"><a name="28746" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28746] Iª q. 12 a. 8 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo | |
| 5783 dicendum quod Gregorius loquitur quantum ad sufficientiam obiecti, | |
| 5784 scilicet Dei, quod, quantum in se est, sufficienter continet omnia | |
| 5785 et demonstrat. Non tamen sequitur quod unusquisque videns Deum | |
| 5786 omnia cognoscat, quia non perfecte comprehendit ipsum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q12_A8-p9"> | |
| 5787 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> It is not necessary that whoever sees a mirror should see all that is in the mirror, unless his glance comprehends the mirror | |
| 5788 itself. | |
| 5789 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 8 ad 2"><a name="28747" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28747] Iª q. 12 a. 8 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 5790 dicendum quod videns speculum, non est necessarium quod omnia in | |
| 5791 speculo videat, nisi speculum visu suo comprehendat.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q12_A8-p10"> | |
| 5792 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Although it is more to see God than to see all things else, still it is a greater thing to see Him so that all things are | |
| 5793 known in Him, than to see Him in such a way that not all things, but the fewer or the more, are known in Him. For it has been | |
| 5794 shown in this article that the more things are known in God according as He is seen more or less perfectly. | |
| 5795 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 8 ad 3"><a name="28748" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28748] Iª q. 12 a. 8 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 5796 dicendum quod, licet maius sit videre Deum quam omnia alia, tamen | |
| 5797 maius est videre sic Deum quod omnia in eo cognoscantur, quam | |
| 5798 videre sic ipsum quod non omnia, sed pauciora vel plura | |
| 5799 cognoscantur in eo. Iam enim ostensum est quod multitudo cognitorum | |
| 5800 in Deo, consequitur modum videndi ipsum vel magis perfectum vel | |
| 5801 minus perfectum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q12_A8-p11"> | |
| 5802 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> The natural desire of the rational creature is to know everything that belongs to the perfection of the intellect, namely, | |
| 5803 the species and the genera of things and their types, and these everyone who sees the Divine essence will see in God. But | |
| 5804 to know other singulars, their thoughts and their deeds does not belong to the perfection of the created intellect nor does | |
| 5805 its natural desire go out to these things; neither, again, does it desire to know | |
| 5806 things that exist not as yet, but which God can call into being. Yet if God alone were seen, Who is the fount and principle | |
| 5807 of all being and of all truth, He would so fill the natural desire of knowledge that nothing else would be desired, and the | |
| 5808 seer would be completely beatified. Hence Augustine says (Confess. v): "Unhappy the man who knoweth all these" (i.e. all creatures) | |
| 5809 "and knoweth not Thee! but happy whoso knoweth Thee although he know not these. And whoso knoweth both Thee and them is | |
| 5810 not the happier for them, but for Thee alone." | |
| 5811 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 8 ad 4"><a name="28749" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28749] Iª q. 12 a. 8 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum | |
| 5812 dicendum quod naturale desiderium rationalis creaturae est ad | |
| 5813 sciendum omnia illa quae pertinent ad perfectionem intellectus; et | |
| 5814 haec sunt species et genera rerum, et rationes earum, quae in Deo | |
| 5815 videbit quilibet videns essentiam divinam. Cognoscere autem alia | |
| 5816 singularia, et cogitata et facta eorum, non est de perfectione | |
| 5817 intellectus creati, nec ad hoc eius naturale desiderium tendit, nec | |
| 5818 iterum cognoscere illa quae nondum sunt, sed fieri a Deo possunt. | |
| 5819 Si tamen solus Deus videretur, qui est fons et principium totius | |
| 5820 esse et veritatis, ita repleret naturale desiderium sciendi, quod | |
| 5821 nihil aliud quaereretur, et beatus esset. Unde dicit Augustinus, V | |
| 5822 Confess., infelix homo qui scit omnia illa (scilicet creaturas), | |
| 5823 <i>te autem nescit, beatus autem qui te scit, etiam si illa | |
| 5824 nesciat. Qui vero te et illa novit, non propter illa beatior est, | |
| 5825 sed propter te solum beatus</i>.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q12_A9" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q12_A9-p0.1">Q. 12. A. 9. Whether what is seen in God by those who see the Divine essence, is seen through any similitude?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q12_A9-p2"> | |
| 5826 <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that what is seen in God by those who see the Divine essence, is seen by means of some similitude. For every kind | |
| 5827 of knowledge comes about by the knower being assimilated to the object known. For thus the intellect in act becomes the actual | |
| 5828 intelligible, and the sense in act becomes the actual sensible, inasmuch as it is informed by a similitude of the object, | |
| 5829 as the eye by the similitude of color. Therefore if the intellect of one who sees the Divine | |
| 5830 essence understands any creatures in God, it must be informed by their similitudes. | |
| 5831 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 9 arg. 1"><a name="28750" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28750] Iª q. 12 a. 9 arg. 1</span></a> Ad nonum sic | |
| 5832 proceditur. Videtur quod ea quae videntur in Deo, a videntibus | |
| 5833 divinam essentiam per aliquas similitudines videantur. Omnis enim | |
| 5834 cognitio est per assimilationem cognoscentis ad cognitum, sic enim | |
| 5835 intellectus in actu fit intellectum in actu, et sensus in actu | |
| 5836 sensibile in actu, inquantum eius similitudine informatur, ut | |
| 5837 pupilla similitudine coloris. Si igitur intellectus videntis Deum | |
| 5838 per essentiam intelligat in Deo aliquas creaturas, oportet quod | |
| 5839 earum similitudinibus informetur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q12_A9-p3"> | |
| 5840 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, what we have seen, we keep in memory. But Paul, seeing the essence of God whilst in ecstasy, when he had ceased | |
| 5841 to see the Divine essence, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. ii, 28,34), remembered many of the things he had seen in the rapture; | |
| 5842 hence he said: "I have heard secret words which it is not granted to man to utter" ( | |
| 5843 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q12_A9-p3.1" href="./asv.html#iiCor.12.4" target="asv">2 Cor. 12:4</a>). Therefore it must be said that certain similitudes of what he remembered, remained in his mind; and in the same way, | |
| 5844 when he actually saw the essence of God, he had certain similitudes or ideas of what he actually saw in it. | |
| 5845 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 9 arg. 2"><a name="28751" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28751] Iª q. 12 a. 9 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, ea | |
| 5846 quae prius vidimus, memoriter tenemus. Sed Paulus, videns in raptu | |
| 5847 essentiam Dei, ut dicit Augustinus XII super Gen. ad litteram, | |
| 5848 postquam desiit essentiam Dei videre, recordatus est multorum quae | |
| 5849 in illo raptu viderat, unde ipse dicit quod <i>audivit arcana | |
| 5850 verba, quae non licet homini loqui</i>, II Cor. XII. Ergo oportet | |
| 5851 dicere quod aliquae similitudines eorum quae recordatus est, in | |
| 5852 eius intellectu remanserint. Et eadem ratione, quando | |
| 5853 praesentialiter videbat Dei essentiam, eorum quae in ipsa videbat, | |
| 5854 aliquas similitudines vel species habebat.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q12_A9-p4"> | |
| 5855 <b>On the contrary,</b> A mirror and what is in it are seen by means of one likeness. But all things are seen in God as in an intelligible mirror. | |
| 5856 Therefore if God Himself is not seen by any similitude but by His own essence, neither are the things seen in Him seen by | |
| 5857 any similitudes or ideas. | |
| 5858 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 9 s. c."><a name="28752" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28752] Iª q. 12 a. 9 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est | |
| 5859 quod per unam speciem videtur speculum, et ea quae in speculo | |
| 5860 apparent. Sed omnia sic videntur in Deo sicut in quodam speculo | |
| 5861 intelligibili. Ergo, si ipse Deus non videtur per aliquam | |
| 5862 similitudinem, sed per suam essentiam; nec ea quae in ipso | |
| 5863 videntur, per aliquas similitudines sive species videntur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q12_A9-p5"> | |
| 5864 <b>I answer that,</b> Those who see the divine essence see what they see in God not by any likeness, but by the divine essence itself united to | |
| 5865 their intellect. For each thing is known in so far as its likeness is in the one who knows. Now this takes place in two ways. | |
| 5866 For as things which are like one and the same thing are like to each other, the cognitive faculty can be assimilated to any | |
| 5867 knowable object in two ways. In one way it is assimilated by the object itself, when it is | |
| 5868 directly informed by a similitude, and then the object is known in itself. In another way when informed by a similitude which | |
| 5869 resembles the object; and in this way, the knowledge is not of the thing in itself, but of the thing in its likeness. For | |
| 5870 the knowledge of a man in himself differs from the knowledge of him in his image. Hence to know things thus by their likeness | |
| 5871 in the one who knows, is to know them in themselves or in their own nature; whereas to know them by their similitudes | |
| 5872 pre-existing in God, is to see them in God. Now there is a difference between these two kinds of knowledge. Hence, according | |
| 5873 to the knowledge whereby things are known by those who see the essence of God, they are seen in God Himself not by any other | |
| 5874 similitudes but by the Divine essence alone present to the intellect; by which also God Himself is seen. | |
| 5875 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 9 co."><a name="28753" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28753] Iª q. 12 a. 9 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum | |
| 5876 quod videntes Deum per essentiam, ea quae in ipsa essentia Dei | |
| 5877 vident, non vident per aliquas species, sed per ipsam essentiam | |
| 5878 divinam intellectui eorum unitam. Sic enim cognoscitur unumquodque, | |
| 5879 secundum quod similitudo eius est in cognoscente. Sed hoc contingit | |
| 5880 dupliciter. Cum enim quaecumque uni et eidem sunt similia, sibi | |
| 5881 invicem sint similia, virtus cognoscitiva dupliciter assimilari | |
| 5882 potest alicui cognoscibili. Uno modo, secundum se, quando directe | |
| 5883 eius similitudine informatur, et tunc cognoscitur illud secundum | |
| 5884 se. Alio modo, secundum quod informatur specie alicuius quod est ei | |
| 5885 simile, et tunc non dicitur res cognosci in seipsa, sed in suo | |
| 5886 simili. Alia enim est cognitio qua cognoscitur aliquis homo in | |
| 5887 seipso, et alia qua cognoscitur in sua imagine. Sic ergo, | |
| 5888 cognoscere res per earum similitudines in cognoscente existentes, | |
| 5889 est cognoscere eas in seipsis, seu in propriis naturis, sed | |
| 5890 cognoscere eas prout earum similitudines praeexistunt in Deo, est | |
| 5891 videre eas in Deo. Et hae duae cognitiones differunt. Unde secundum | |
| 5892 illam cognitionem qua res cognoscuntur a videntibus Deum per | |
| 5893 essentiam in ipso Deo, non videntur per aliquas similitudines | |
| 5894 alias; sed per solam essentiam divinam intellectui praesentem, per | |
| 5895 quam et Deus videtur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q12_A9-p6"> | |
| 5896 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The created intellect of one who sees God is assimilated to what is seen in God, inasmuch as it is united to the Divine essence, | |
| 5897 in which the similitudes of all things pre-exist. | |
| 5898 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 9 ad 1"><a name="28754" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28754] Iª q. 12 a. 9 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo | |
| 5899 dicendum quod intellectus videntis Deum assimilatur rebus quae | |
| 5900 videntur in Deo, inquantum unitur essentiae divinae, in qua rerum | |
| 5901 omnium similitudines praeexistunt.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q12_A9-p7"> | |
| 5902 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Some of the cognitive faculties form other images from those first conceived; thus the imagination from the preconceived | |
| 5903 images of a mountain and of gold can form the likeness of a golden mountain; and the intellect, from the preconceived ideas | |
| 5904 of genus and difference, forms the idea of species; in like manner from the similitude of an image we can form in our minds | |
| 5905 the similitude of the original of the image. Thus Paul, or any other person who sees | |
| 5906 God, by the very vision of the divine essence, can form in himself the similitudes of what is seen in the divine essence, | |
| 5907 which remained in Paul even when he had ceased to see the essence of God. Still this kind of vision whereby things are seen | |
| 5908 by this likeness thus conceived, is not the same as that whereby things are seen in God. | |
| 5909 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 9 ad 2"><a name="28755" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28755] Iª q. 12 a. 9 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 5910 dicendum quod aliquae potentiae cognoscitivae sunt, quae ex | |
| 5911 speciebus primo conceptis alias formare possunt. Sicut imaginatio | |
| 5912 ex praeconceptis speciebus montis et auri, format speciem montis | |
| 5913 aurei, et intellectus ex praeconceptis speciebus generis et | |
| 5914 differentiae, format rationem speciei. Et similiter ex similitudine | |
| 5915 imaginis formare possumus in nobis similitudinem eius cuius est | |
| 5916 imago. Et sic Paulus, vel quicumque alius videns Deum, ex ipsa | |
| 5917 visione essentiae divinae potest formare in se similitudines rerum | |
| 5918 quae in essentia divina videntur, quae remanserunt in Paulo etiam | |
| 5919 postquam desiit Dei essentiam videre. Ista tamen visio, qua | |
| 5920 videntur res per huiusmodi species sic conceptas, est alia a | |
| 5921 visione qua videntur res in Deo.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q12_A10" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q12_A10-p0.1">Q. 12. A. 10. Whether those who see the essence of God see all they see in it at the same time?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q12_A10-p2"> | |
| 5922 <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that those who see the essence of God do not see all they see in Him at one and the same time. For according to | |
| 5923 the Philosopher (Topic. ii): "It may happen that many things are known, but only one is understood." But what is seen in God, | |
| 5924 is understood; for God is seen by the intellect. Therefore those who see God do not see all in Him at the same time. | |
| 5925 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 10 arg. 1"><a name="28756" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28756] Iª q. 12 a. 10 arg. 1</span></a> Ad decimum sic | |
| 5926 proceditur. Videtur quod videntes Deum per essentiam non simul | |
| 5927 videant omnia quae in ipso vident. Quia, secundum philosophum, | |
| 5928 contingit multa scire, intelligere vero unum. Sed ea quae videntur | |
| 5929 in Deo, intelliguntur, intellectu enim videtur Deus. Ergo non | |
| 5930 contingit a videntibus Deum simul multa videri in Deo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q12_A10-p3"> | |
| 5931 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. viii, 22,23), "God moves the spiritual creature according to time"---i.e. by intelligence | |
| 5932 and affection. But the spiritual creature is the angel who sees God. Therefore those who see God understand and are affected | |
| 5933 successively; for time means succession. | |
| 5934 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 10 arg. 2"><a name="28757" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28757] Iª q. 12 a. 10 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 5935 Augustinus dicit, VIII super Gen. ad litteram, quod <i>Deus movet | |
| 5936 creaturam spiritualem per tempus</i>, hoc est per intelligentiam et | |
| 5937 affectionem. Sed creatura spiritualis est Angelus, qui Deum videt. | |
| 5938 Ergo videntes Deum, successive intelligunt et afficiuntur, tempus | |
| 5939 enim successionem importat.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q12_A10-p4"> | |
| 5940 <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Trin. xvi): "Our thoughts will not be unstable, going to and fro from one thing to another; but we shall | |
| 5941 see all we know at one glance." | |
| 5942 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 10 s. c."><a name="28758" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28758] Iª q. 12 a. 10 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est | |
| 5943 quod Augustinus dicit, ultimo de Trin., <i>non erunt volubiles | |
| 5944 nostrae cogitationes, ab aliis in alia euntes atque redeuntes; sed | |
| 5945 omnem scientiam nostram uno simul conspectu videbimus</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q12_A10-p5"> | |
| 5946 <b>I answer that,</b> What is seen in the Word is seen not successively, but at the same time. In proof whereof, we ourselves cannot know many | |
| 5947 things all at once, forasmuch as understand many things by means of many ideas. But our intellect cannot be actually informed | |
| 5948 by many diverse ideas at the same time, so as to understand by them; as one body cannot bear different shapes simultaneously. | |
| 5949 Hence, when many things can be understood by one idea, they are understood at the same | |
| 5950 time; as the parts of a whole are understood successively, and not all at the same time, if each one is understood by its | |
| 5951 own idea; whereas if all are understood under the one idea of the whole, they are understood simultaneously. Now it was shown | |
| 5952 above that things seen in God, are not seen singly by their own similitude; but all are seen by the one essence of God. Hence | |
| 5953 they are seen simultaneously, and not successively. | |
| 5954 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 10 co."><a name="28759" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28759] Iª q. 12 a. 10 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum | |
| 5955 quod ea quae videntur in verbo, non successive, sed simul videntur. | |
| 5956 Ad cuius evidentiam considerandum est, quod ideo nos simul non | |
| 5957 possumus multa intelligere, quia multa per diversas species | |
| 5958 intelligimus; diversis autem speciebus non potest intellectus unus | |
| 5959 simul actu informari ad intelligendum per eas, sicut nec unum | |
| 5960 corpus potest simul diversis figuris figurari. Unde contingit quod, | |
| 5961 quando aliqua multa una specie intelligi possunt, simul | |
| 5962 intelliguntur, sicut diversae partes alicuius totius, si singulae | |
| 5963 propriis speciebus intelligantur, successive intelliguntur, et non | |
| 5964 simul; si autem omnes intelligantur una specie totius, simul | |
| 5965 intelliguntur. Ostensum est autem quod ea quae videntur in Deo, non | |
| 5966 videntur singula per suas similitudines, sed omnia per unam | |
| 5967 essentiam Dei. Unde simul, et non successive videntur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q12_A10-p6"> | |
| 5968 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> We understand one thing only when we understand by one idea; but many things understood by one idea are understood simultaneously, | |
| 5969 as in the idea of a man we understand "animal" and "rational"; and in the idea of a house we understand the wall and the roof. | |
| 5970 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 10 ad 1"><a name="28760" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28760] Iª q. 12 a. 10 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo | |
| 5971 dicendum quod sic unum tantum intelligimus, inquantum una specie | |
| 5972 intelligimus. Sed multa una specie intellecta simul intelliguntur, | |
| 5973 sicut in specie hominis intelligimus animal et rationale, et in | |
| 5974 specie domus parietem et tectum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q12_A10-p7"> | |
| 5975 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As regards their natural knowledge, whereby they know things by diverse ideas given them, the angels do not know all things | |
| 5976 simultaneously, and thus they are moved in the act of understanding according to time; but as regards what they see in God, | |
| 5977 they see all at the same time. | |
| 5978 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 10 ad 2"><a name="28761" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28761] Iª q. 12 a. 10 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 5979 dicendum quod Angeli, quantum ad cognitionem naturalem qua | |
| 5980 cognoscunt res per species diversas eis inditas, non simul omnia | |
| 5981 cognoscunt, et sic moventur, secundum intelligentiam, per tempus. | |
| 5982 Sed secundum quod vident res in Deo, simul eas vident.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q12_A11" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q12_A11-p0.1">Q. 12. A. 11. Whether anyone in this life can see the essence of God?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q12_A11-p2"> | |
| 5983 <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that one can in this life see the Divine essence. For Jacob said: "I have seen God face to face" ( | |
| 5984 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q12_A11-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.32.30" target="asv">Gn. 32:30</a>). But to see Him face to face is to see His essence, as appears from the words: "We see now in a glass and in a dark manner, | |
| 5985 but then face to face" ( | |
| 5986 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q12_A11-p2.2" href="./asv.html#iCor.13.12" target="asv">1 Cor. 13:12</a>). | |
| 5987 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 11 arg. 1"><a name="28762" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28762] Iª q. 12 a. 11 arg. 1</span></a> Ad undecimum | |
| 5988 sic proceditur. Videtur quod aliquis in hac vita possit Deum per | |
| 5989 essentiam videre. Dicit enim Iacob, Gen. XXXII, <i>vidi Deum facie | |
| 5990 ad faciem</i>. Sed videre facie ad faciem, est videre per | |
| 5991 essentiam, ut patet per illud quod dicitur I Cor. XIII, <i>videmus | |
| 5992 nunc per speculum et in aenigmate, tunc autem facie ad faciem</i>. | |
| 5993 Ergo Deus in hac vita per essentiam videri potest.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q12_A11-p3"> | |
| 5994 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the Lord said to Moses: "I speak to him mouth to mouth, and plainly, and not by riddles and figures doth he see | |
| 5995 the Lord" ( | |
| 5996 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q12_A11-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Num.12.8" target="asv">Num. 12:8</a>); but this is to see God in His essence. Therefore it is possible to see the essence of God in this life. | |
| 5997 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 11 arg. 2"><a name="28763" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28763] Iª q. 12 a. 11 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, Num. | |
| 5998 XII dicit dominus de Moyse, <i>ore ad os loquor ei, et palam, et | |
| 5999 non per aenigmata et figuras, videt Deum</i>. Sed hoc est videre | |
| 6000 Deum per essentiam. Ergo aliquis in statu huius vitae potest Deum | |
| 6001 per essentiam videre.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q12_A11-p4"> | |
| 6002 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, that wherein we know all other things, and whereby we judge of other things, is known in itself to us. But even | |
| 6003 now we know all things in God; for Augustine says (Confess. viii): "If we both see that what you say is true, and we both | |
| 6004 see that what I say is true; where, I ask, do we see this? neither I in thee, nor thou in me; but both of us in the very incommutable | |
| 6005 truth itself above our minds." He also says (De Vera Relig. xxx) that, "We judge of all | |
| 6006 things according to the divine truth"; and (De Trin. xii) that, "it is the duty of reason to judge of these corporeal things | |
| 6007 according to the incorporeal and eternal ideas; which unless they were above the mind could not be incommutable." Therefore | |
| 6008 even in this life we see God Himself. | |
| 6009 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 11 arg. 3"><a name="28764" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28764] Iª q. 12 a. 11 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 6010 illud in quo alia omnia cognoscimus, et per quod de aliis | |
| 6011 iudicamus, est nobis secundum se notum. Sed omnia etiam nunc in Deo | |
| 6012 cognoscimus. Dicit enim Augustinus, XII Conf., <i>si ambo videmus | |
| 6013 verum esse quod dicis, et ambo videmus verum esse quod dico, ubi | |
| 6014 quaeso illud videmus? Nec ego in te, nec tu in me, sed ambo in ipsa | |
| 6015 quae supra mentes nostras est, incommutabili veritate</i>. Idem | |
| 6016 etiam, in libro de vera religione, dicit quod secundum veritatem | |
| 6017 divinam de omnibus iudicamus. Et XII de Trin. dicit quod | |
| 6018 <i>rationis est iudicare de istis corporalibus secundum rationes | |
| 6019 incorporales et sempiternas, quae nisi supra mentem essent, | |
| 6020 incommutabiles profecto non essent</i>. Ergo et in hac vita ipsum | |
| 6021 Deum videmus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q12_A11-p5"> | |
| 6022 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, according to Augustine (Gen. ad lit. xii, 24, 25), those things that are in the soul by their essence are seen by | |
| 6023 intellectual vision. But intellectual vision is of intelligible things, not by similitudes, but by their very essences, as | |
| 6024 he also says (Gen. ad lit. xiii, 24,25). Therefore since God is in our soul by His essence, it follows that He is seen by | |
| 6025 us in His essence. | |
| 6026 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 11 arg. 4"><a name="28765" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28765] Iª q. 12 a. 11 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 6027 secundum Augustinum, XII super Gen. ad Litt., visione intellectuali | |
| 6028 videntur ea quae sunt in anima per suam essentiam. Sed visio | |
| 6029 intellectualis est de rebus intelligibilibus, non per aliquas | |
| 6030 similitudines, sed per suas essentias, ut ipse ibidem dicit. Ergo, | |
| 6031 cum Deus sit per essentiam suam in anima nostra, per essentiam suam | |
| 6032 videtur a nobis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q12_A11-p6"> | |
| 6033 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written, "Man shall not see Me, and live" ( | |
| 6034 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q12_A11-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Exod.32.20" target="asv">Ex. 32:20</a>), and a gloss upon this says, "In this mortal life God can be seen by certain images, but not by the likeness itself of His | |
| 6035 own nature." | |
| 6036 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 11 s. c."><a name="28766" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28766] Iª q. 12 a. 11 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est | |
| 6037 quod dicitur Exod. XXXIII, <i>non videbit me homo et vivet</i>. | |
| 6038 Glossa, <i>quandiu hic mortaliter vivitur, videri per quasdam | |
| 6039 imagines Deus potest; sed per ipsam naturae suae speciem non | |
| 6040 potest</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q12_A11-p7"> | |
| 6041 <b>I answer that,</b> God cannot be seen in His essence by a mere human being, except he be separated from this mortal life. The reason is because, | |
| 6042 as was said above | |
| 6043 <a id="FP_Q12_A11-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q12_A4.html">(A[4])</a>, the mode of knowledge follows the mode of the nature of the knower. But our soul, as long as we live in this life, has its | |
| 6044 being in corporeal matter; hence naturally it knows only what has a form in matter, or what can be known by such a form. Now | |
| 6045 it is evident that the Divine essence | |
| 6046 cannot be known through the nature of material things. For it was shown above ( | |
| 6047 <a id="FP_Q12_A11-p7.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q12_A2.html">AA[2]</a>,9) that the knowledge of God by means of any created similitude is not the vision of His essence. Hence it is impossible | |
| 6048 for the soul of man in this life to see the essence of God. This can be seen in the fact that the more our soul is abstracted | |
| 6049 from corporeal things, the more it is capable of receiving abstract intelligible things. Hence in dreams and alienations of | |
| 6050 the bodily senses | |
| 6051 divine revelations and foresight of future events are perceived the more clearly. It is not possible, therefore, that the | |
| 6052 soul in this mortal life should be raised up to the supreme of intelligible objects, i.e. to the divine essence. | |
| 6053 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 11 co."><a name="28767" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28767] Iª q. 12 a. 11 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum | |
| 6054 quod ab homine puro Deus videri per essentiam non potest, nisi ab | |
| 6055 hac vita mortali separetur. Cuius ratio est quia, sicut supra | |
| 6056 dictum est, modus cognitionis sequitur modum naturae rei | |
| 6057 cognoscentis. Anima autem nostra, quandiu in hac vita vivimus, | |
| 6058 habet esse in materia corporali, unde naturaliter non cognoscit | |
| 6059 aliqua nisi quae habent formam in materia, vel quae per huiusmodi | |
| 6060 cognosci possunt. Manifestum est autem quod per naturas rerum | |
| 6061 materialium divina essentia cognosci non potest. Ostensum est enim | |
| 6062 supra quod cognitio Dei per quamcumque similitudinem creatam, non | |
| 6063 est visio essentiae ipsius. Unde impossibile est animae hominis | |
| 6064 secundum hanc vitam viventis, essentiam Dei videre. Et huius signum | |
| 6065 est, quod anima nostra, quanto magis a corporalibus abstrahitur, | |
| 6066 tanto intelligibilium abstractorum fit capacior. Unde in somniis et | |
| 6067 alienationibus a sensibus corporis, magis divinae revelationes | |
| 6068 percipiuntur, et praevisiones futurorum. Quod ergo anima elevetur | |
| 6069 usque ad supremum intelligibilium, quod est essentia divina, esse | |
| 6070 non potest quandiu hac mortali vita utitur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q12_A11-p8"> | |
| 6071 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> According to Dionysius (Coel. Hier. iv) a man is said in the Scriptures to see God in the sense that certain figures are | |
| 6072 formed in the senses or imagination, according to some similitude representing in part the divinity. So when Jacob says, "I | |
| 6073 have seen God face to face," this does not mean the Divine essence, but some figure representing God. And this is to be referred | |
| 6074 to some high mode of prophecy, so that God seems to speak, though in an imaginary | |
| 6075 vision; as will later be explained (SS, | |
| 6076 <a id="FP_Q12_A11-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q174.html">Q[174])</a> in treating of the degrees of prophecy. We may also say that Jacob spoke thus to designate some exalted intellectual contemplation, | |
| 6077 above the ordinary state. | |
| 6078 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 11 ad 1"><a name="28768" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28768] Iª q. 12 a. 11 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo | |
| 6079 dicendum quod, secundum Dionysium, IV cap. Cael. Hier., sic in | |
| 6080 Scripturis dicitur aliquis Deum vidisse, inquantum formatae sunt | |
| 6081 aliquae figurae, vel sensibiles vel imaginariae, secundum aliquam | |
| 6082 similitudinem aliquod divinum repraesentantes. Quod ergo dicit | |
| 6083 Iacob, vidi Deum facie ad faciem, referendum est, non ad ipsam | |
| 6084 divinam essentiam, sed ad figuram in qua repraesentabatur Deus. Et | |
| 6085 hoc ipsum ad quandam prophetiae eminentiam pertinet, ut videatur | |
| 6086 persona Dei loquentis, licet imaginaria visione, ut infra patebit, | |
| 6087 cum de gradibus prophetiae loquemur. Vel hoc dicit Iacob ad | |
| 6088 designandam quandam eminentiam intelligibilis contemplationis, | |
| 6089 supra communem statum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q12_A11-p9"> | |
| 6090 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As God works miracles in corporeal things, so also He does supernatural wonders above the common order, raising the minds | |
| 6091 of some living in the flesh beyond the use of sense, even up to the vision of His own essence; as Augustine says (Gen. ad | |
| 6092 lit. xii, 26,27,28) of Moses, the teacher of the Jews; and of Paul, the teacher of the Gentiles. This will be treated more | |
| 6093 fully in the question of rapture (SS, | |
| 6094 <a id="FP_Q12_A11-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q175.html">Q[175])</a>. | |
| 6095 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 11 ad 2"><a name="28769" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28769] Iª q. 12 a. 11 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 6096 dicendum quod, sicut Deus miraculose aliquid supernaturaliter in | |
| 6097 rebus corporeis operatur, ita etiam et supernaturaliter, et praeter | |
| 6098 communem ordinem, mentes aliquorum in hac carne viventium, sed non | |
| 6099 sensibus carnis utentium, usque ad visionem suae essentiae | |
| 6100 elevavit; ut dicit Augustinus, XII super Genes. ad Litt., et in | |
| 6101 libro de videndo Deum de Moyse, qui fuit magister Iudaeorum, et | |
| 6102 Paulo, qui fuit magister gentium. Et de hoc plenius tractabitur, | |
| 6103 cum de raptu agemus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q12_A11-p10"> | |
| 6104 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> All things are said to be seen in God and all things are judged in Him, because by the participation of His light, we know | |
| 6105 and judge all things; for the light of natural reason itself is a participation of the divine light; as likewise we are said | |
| 6106 to see and judge of sensible things in the sun, i.e., by the sun's light. Hence Augustine says (Soliloq. i, 8), "The lessons | |
| 6107 of instruction can only be seen as it were by their own sun," namely God. As | |
| 6108 therefore in order to see a sensible object, it is not necessary to see the substance of the sun, so in like manner to see | |
| 6109 any intelligible object, it is not necessary to see the essence of God. | |
| 6110 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 11 ad 3"><a name="28770" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28770] Iª q. 12 a. 11 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 6111 dicendum quod omnia dicimur in Deo videre, et secundum ipsum de | |
| 6112 omnibus iudicare, inquantum per participationem sui luminis omnia | |
| 6113 cognoscimus et diiudicamus, nam et ipsum lumen naturale rationis | |
| 6114 participatio quaedam est divini luminis; sicut etiam omnia | |
| 6115 sensibilia dicimus videre et iudicare in sole, idest per lumen | |
| 6116 solis. Unde dicit Augustinus, I Soliloquiorum, <i>disciplinarum | |
| 6117 spectamina videri non possunt, nisi aliquo velut suo sole | |
| 6118 illustrentur, videlicet Deo</i>. Sicut ergo ad videndum aliquid | |
| 6119 sensibiliter, non est necesse quod videatur substantia solis, ita | |
| 6120 ad videndum aliquid intelligibiliter, non est necessarium quod | |
| 6121 videatur essentia Dei.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q12_A11-p11"> | |
| 6122 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Intellectual vision is of the things which are in the soul by their essence, as intelligible things are in the intellect. | |
| 6123 And thus God is in the souls of the blessed; not thus is He in our soul, but by presence, essence and power. | |
| 6124 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 11 ad 4"><a name="28771" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28771] Iª q. 12 a. 11 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum | |
| 6125 dicendum quod visio intellectualis est eorum quae sunt in anima per | |
| 6126 suam essentiam sicut intelligibilia in intellectu. Sic autem Deus | |
| 6127 est in anima beatorum, non autem in anima nostra; sed per | |
| 6128 praesentiam, essentiam, et potentiam.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q12_A12" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q12_A12-p0.1">Q. 12. A. 12. Whether God can be known in this life by natural reason?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q12_A12-p2"> | |
| 6129 <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that by natural reason we cannot know God in this life. For Boethius says (De Consol. v) that "reason does not grasp | |
| 6130 simple form." But God is a supremely simple form, as was shown above ( | |
| 6131 <a id="FP_Q12_A12-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q3_A7.html">Q[3], A[7]</a> ). Therefore natural reason cannot attain to know Him. | |
| 6132 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 12 arg. 1"><a name="28772" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28772] Iª q. 12 a. 12 arg. 1</span></a> Ad duodecimum | |
| 6133 sic proceditur. Videtur quod per naturalem rationem Deum in hac | |
| 6134 vita cognoscere non possimus. Dicit enim Boetius, in libro de | |
| 6135 Consol., quod <i>ratio non capit simplicem formam</i>. Deus autem | |
| 6136 maxime est simplex forma, ut supra ostensum est. Ergo ad eius | |
| 6137 cognitionem ratio naturalis pervenire non potest.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q12_A12-p3"> | |
| 6138 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the soul understands nothing by natural reason without the use of the imagination. But we cannot have an imagination | |
| 6139 of God, Who is incorporeal. Therefore we cannot know God by natural knowledge. | |
| 6140 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 12 arg. 2"><a name="28773" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28773] Iª q. 12 a. 12 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 6141 ratione naturali sine phantasmate nihil intelligit anima, ut | |
| 6142 dicitur in III de anima. Sed Dei, cum sit incorporeus, phantasma in | |
| 6143 nobis esse non potest. Ergo cognosci non potest a nobis cognitione | |
| 6144 naturali.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q12_A12-p4"> | |
| 6145 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the knowledge of natural reason belongs to both good and evil, inasmuch as they have a common nature. But the knowledge | |
| 6146 of God belongs only to the good; for Augustine says (De Trin. i): "The weak eye of the human mind is not fixed on that excellent | |
| 6147 light unless purified by the justice of faith." Therefore God cannot be known by natural reason. | |
| 6148 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 12 arg. 3"><a name="28774" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28774] Iª q. 12 a. 12 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 6149 cognitio quae est per rationem naturalem, communis est bonis et | |
| 6150 malis, sicut natura eis communis est. Sed cognitio Dei competit | |
| 6151 tantum bonis, dicit enim Augustinus, I de Trin., quod <i>mentis | |
| 6152 humanae acies in tam excellenti luce non figitur, nisi per | |
| 6153 iustitiam fidei emundetur</i>. Ergo Deus per rationem naturalem | |
| 6154 cognosci non potest.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q12_A12-p5"> | |
| 6155 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( | |
| 6156 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q12_A12-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.1.19" target="asv">Rom. 1:19</a>), "That which is known of God," namely, what can be known of God by natural reason, "is manifest in them." | |
| 6157 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 12 s. c."><a name="28775" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28775] Iª q. 12 a. 12 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est | |
| 6158 quod dicitur Rom. I, <i>quod notum est Dei, manifestum est in | |
| 6159 illis</i>, idest, quod cognoscibile est de Deo per rationem | |
| 6160 naturalem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q12_A12-p6"> | |
| 6161 <b>I answer that,</b> Our natural knowledge begins from sense. Hence our natural knowledge can go as far as it can be led by sensible things. But | |
| 6162 our mind cannot be led by sense so far as to see the essence of God; because the sensible effects of God do not equal the | |
| 6163 power of God as their cause. Hence from the knowledge of sensible things the whole power of God cannot be known; nor therefore | |
| 6164 can His essence be seen. But because they are His effects and depend on their cause, we | |
| 6165 can be led from them so far as to know of God "whether He exists," and to know of Him what must necessarily belong to Him, | |
| 6166 as the first cause of all things, exceeding all things caused by Him. | |
| 6167 </p><p id="FP_Q12_A12-p7"> Hence we know that His relationship with creatures so far as to be the cause of them all; also that creatures differ from | |
| 6168 Him, inasmuch as He is not in any way part of what is caused by Him; and that creatures are not removed from Him by reason | |
| 6169 of any defect on His part, but because He superexceeds them all. | |
| 6170 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 12 co."><a name="28776" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28776] Iª q. 12 a. 12 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum | |
| 6171 quod naturalis nostra cognitio a sensu principium sumit, unde | |
| 6172 tantum se nostra naturalis cognitio extendere potest, inquantum | |
| 6173 manuduci potest per sensibilia. Ex sensibilibus autem non potest | |
| 6174 usque ad hoc intellectus noster pertingere, quod divinam essentiam | |
| 6175 videat, quia creaturae sensibiles sunt effectus Dei virtutem causae | |
| 6176 non adaequantes. Unde ex sensibilium cognitione non potest tota Dei | |
| 6177 virtus cognosci, et per consequens nec eius essentia videri. Sed | |
| 6178 quia sunt eius effectus a causa dependentes, ex eis in hoc perduci | |
| 6179 possumus, ut cognoscamus de Deo an est; et ut cognoscamus de ipso | |
| 6180 ea quae necesse est ei convenire secundum quod est prima omnium | |
| 6181 causa, excedens omnia sua causata. Unde cognoscimus de ipso | |
| 6182 habitudinem ipsius ad creaturas, quod scilicet omnium est causa; et | |
| 6183 differentiam creaturarum ab ipso, quod scilicet ipse non est | |
| 6184 aliquid eorum quae ab eo causantur; et quod haec non removentur ab | |
| 6185 eo propter eius defectum, sed quia superexcedit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q12_A12-p8"> | |
| 6186 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Reason cannot reach up to simple form, so as to know "what it is"; but it can know "whether it is." | |
| 6187 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 12 ad 1"><a name="28777" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28777] Iª q. 12 a. 12 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo | |
| 6188 dicendum quod ratio ad formam simplicem pertingere non potest, ut | |
| 6189 sciat de ea quid est, potest tamen de ea cognoscere, ut sciat an | |
| 6190 est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q12_A12-p9"> | |
| 6191 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> God is known by natural knowledge through the images of His effects. | |
| 6192 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 12 ad 2"><a name="28778" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28778] Iª q. 12 a. 12 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 6193 dicendum quod Deus naturali cognitione cognoscitur per phantasmata | |
| 6194 effectus sui.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q12_A12-p10"> | |
| 6195 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> As the knowledge of God's essence is by grace, it belongs only to the good; but the knowledge of Him by natural reason can | |
| 6196 belong to both good and bad; and hence Augustine says (Retract. i), retracting what he had said before: "I do not approve | |
| 6197 what I said in prayer, 'God who willest that only the pure should know truth.' For it can be answered that many who are not | |
| 6198 pure can know many truths," i.e. by natural reason. | |
| 6199 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 12 ad 3"><a name="28779" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28779] Iª q. 12 a. 12 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 6200 dicendum quod cognitio Dei per essentiam, cum sit per gratiam, non | |
| 6201 competit nisi bonis, sed cognitio eius quae est per rationem | |
| 6202 naturalem, potest competere bonis et malis. Unde dicit Augustinus, | |
| 6203 in libro Retractationum, <i>non approbo quod in oratione dixi, | |
| 6204 Deus, qui non nisi mundos verum scire voluisti, responderi enim | |
| 6205 potest, multos etiam non mundos multa scire vera</i>, scilicet per | |
| 6206 rationem naturalem.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q12_A13" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q12_A13-p0.1">Q. 12. A. 13. Whether by grace a higher knowledge of God can be obtained than by natural reason?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q12_A13-p2"> | |
| 6207 <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that by grace a higher knowledge of God is not obtained than by natural reason. For Dionysius says (De Mystica Theol. | |
| 6208 i) that whoever is the more united to God in this life, is united to Him as to one entirely unknown. He says the same of Moses, | |
| 6209 who nevertheless obtained a certain excellence by the knowledge conferred by grace. But to be united to God while ignoring | |
| 6210 of Him "what He is," comes about also by natural reason. Therefore God is not more | |
| 6211 known to us by grace than by natural reason. | |
| 6212 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 13 arg. 1"><a name="28780" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28780] Iª q. 12 a. 13 arg. 1</span></a> Ad | |
| 6213 decimumtertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod per gratiam non | |
| 6214 habeatur altior cognitio Dei, quam ea quae habetur per naturalem | |
| 6215 rationem. Dicit enim Dionysius, in libro de mystica theologia, quod | |
| 6216 ille qui melius unitur Deo in hac vita, unitur ei sicut omnino | |
| 6217 ignoto, quod etiam de Moyse dicit, qui tamen excellentiam quandam | |
| 6218 obtinuit in gratiae cognitione. Sed coniungi Deo ignorando de eo | |
| 6219 quid est, hoc contingit etiam per rationem naturalem. Ergo per | |
| 6220 gratiam non plenius cognoscitur a nobis Deus, quam per rationem | |
| 6221 naturalem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q12_A13-p3"> | |
| 6222 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, we can acquire the knowledge of divine things by natural reason only through the imagination; and the same applies | |
| 6223 to the knowledge given by grace. For Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. i) that "it is impossible for the divine ray to shine upon | |
| 6224 us except as screened round about by the many colored sacred veils." Therefore we cannot know God more fully by grace than | |
| 6225 by natural reason. | |
| 6226 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 13 arg. 2"><a name="28781" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28781] Iª q. 12 a. 13 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, per | |
| 6227 rationem naturalem in cognitionem divinorum pervenire non possumus, | |
| 6228 nisi per phantasmata, sic etiam nec secundum cognitionem gratiae. | |
| 6229 Dicit enim Dionysius, I cap. de Cael. Hier., quod <i>impossibile | |
| 6230 est nobis aliter lucere divinum radium, nisi varietate sacrorum | |
| 6231 velaminum circumvelatum</i>. Ergo per gratiam non plenius | |
| 6232 cognoscimus Deum, quam per rationem naturalem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q12_A13-p4"> | |
| 6233 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, our intellect adheres to God by grace of faith. But faith does not seem to be knowledge; for Gregory says (Hom. | |
| 6234 xxvi in Ev.) that "things not seen are the objects of faith, and not of knowledge." Therefore there is not given to us a more | |
| 6235 excellent knowledge of God by grace. | |
| 6236 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 13 arg. 3"><a name="28782" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28782] Iª q. 12 a. 13 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 6237 intellectus noster per gratiam fidei Deo adhaeret. Fides autem non | |
| 6238 videtur esse cognitio, dicit enim Gregorius, in Homil., quod ea | |
| 6239 quae non videntur fidem habent, et non agnitionem. Ergo per gratiam | |
| 6240 non additur nobis aliqua excellentior cognitio de Deo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q12_A13-p5"> | |
| 6241 <b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle says that "God hath revealed to us His spirit," what "none of the princes of this world knew" ( | |
| 6242 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q12_A13-p5.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.2.10" target="asv">1 Cor. 2:10</a>), namely, the philosophers, as the gloss expounds. | |
| 6243 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 13 s. c."><a name="28783" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28783] Iª q. 12 a. 13 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est | |
| 6244 quod dicit apostolus, I Cor. II, <i>nobis revelavit Deus per | |
| 6245 spiritum suum</i>, illa scilicet quae nemo principum huius saeculi | |
| 6246 novit, idest philosophorum, ut exponit Glossa.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q12_A13-p6"> | |
| 6247 <b>I answer that,</b> We have a more perfect knowledge of God by grace than by natural reason. Which is proved thus. The knowledge which we have | |
| 6248 by natural reason contains two things: images derived from the sensible objects; and the natural intelligible light, enabling | |
| 6249 us to abstract from them intelligible conceptions. | |
| 6250 </p><p id="FP_Q12_A13-p7"> Now in both of these, human knowledge is assisted by the revelation of grace. For the intellect's natural light is strengthened | |
| 6251 by the infusion of gratuitous light; and sometimes also the images in the human imagination are divinely formed, so as to | |
| 6252 express divine things better than those do which we receive from sensible objects, as appears in prophetic visions; while | |
| 6253 sometimes sensible things, or even voices, are divinely formed to express some divine meaning; as in the | |
| 6254 Baptism, the Holy Ghost was seen in the shape of a dove, and the voice of the Father was heard, "This is My beloved Son" ( | |
| 6255 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q12_A13-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.3.17" target="asv">Mat. 3:17</a>). | |
| 6256 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 13 co."><a name="28784" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28784] Iª q. 12 a. 13 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum | |
| 6257 quod per gratiam perfectior cognitio de Deo habetur a nobis, quam | |
| 6258 per rationem naturalem. Quod sic patet. Cognitio enim quam per | |
| 6259 naturalem rationem habemus, duo requirit, scilicet, phantasmata ex | |
| 6260 sensibilibus accepta, et lumen naturale intelligibile, cuius | |
| 6261 virtute intelligibiles conceptiones ab eis abstrahimus. Et quantum | |
| 6262 ad utrumque, iuvatur humana cognitio per revelationem gratiae. Nam | |
| 6263 et lumen naturale intellectus confortatur per infusionem luminis | |
| 6264 gratuiti. Et interdum etiam phantasmata in imaginatione hominis | |
| 6265 formantur divinitus, magis exprimentia res divinas, quam ea quae | |
| 6266 naturaliter a sensibilibus accipimus; sicut apparet in visionibus | |
| 6267 prophetalibus. Et interdum etiam aliquae res sensibiles formantur | |
| 6268 divinitus, aut etiam voces, ad aliquid divinum exprimendum; sicut | |
| 6269 in Baptismo visus est spiritus sanctus in specie columbae, et vox | |
| 6270 patris audita est, <i>hic est filius meus dilectus</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q12_A13-p8"> | |
| 6271 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Although by the revelation of grace in this life we cannot know of God "what He is," and thus are united to Him as to one | |
| 6272 unknown; still we know Him more fully according as many and more excellent of His effects are demonstrated to us, and according | |
| 6273 as we attribute to Him some things known by divine revelation, to which natural reason cannot reach, as, for instance, that | |
| 6274 God is Three and One. | |
| 6275 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 13 ad 1"><a name="28785" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28785] Iª q. 12 a. 13 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo | |
| 6276 dicendum quod, licet per revelationem gratiae in hac vita non | |
| 6277 cognoscamus de Deo quid est, et sic ei quasi ignoto coniungamur; | |
| 6278 tamen plenius ipsum cognoscimus, inquantum plures et excellentiores | |
| 6279 effectus eius nobis demonstrantur; et inquantum ei aliqua | |
| 6280 attribuimus ex revelatione divina, ad quae ratio naturalis non | |
| 6281 pertingit, ut Deum esse trinum et unum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q12_A13-p9"> | |
| 6282 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> From the images either received from sense in the natural order, or divinely formed in the imagination, we have so much the | |
| 6283 more excellent intellectual knowledge, the stronger the intelligible light is in man; and thus through the revelation given | |
| 6284 by the images a fuller knowledge is received by the infusion of the divine light. | |
| 6285 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 13 ad 2"><a name="28786" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28786] Iª q. 12 a. 13 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 6286 dicendum quod ex phantasmatibus, vel a sensu acceptis secundum | |
| 6287 naturalem ordinem, vel divinitus in imaginatione formatis, tanto | |
| 6288 excellentior cognitio intellectualis habetur, quanto lumen | |
| 6289 intelligibile in homine fortius fuerit. Et sic per revelationem ex | |
| 6290 phantasmatibus plenior cognitio accipitur, ex infusione divini | |
| 6291 luminis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q12_A13-p10"> | |
| 6292 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Faith is a kind of knowledge, inasmuch as the intellect is determined by faith to some knowable object. But this determination | |
| 6293 to one object does not proceed from the vision of the believer, but from the vision of Him who is believed. Thus as far as | |
| 6294 faith falls short of vision, it falls short of the knowledge which belongs to science, for science determines the intellect | |
| 6295 to one object by the vision and understanding of first principles. | |
| 6296 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 12 a. 13 ad 3"><a name="28787" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28787] Iª q. 12 a. 13 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 6297 dicendum quod fides cognitio quaedam est, inquantum intellectus | |
| 6298 determinatur per fidem ad aliquod cognoscibile. Sed haec | |
| 6299 determinatio ad unum non procedit ex visione credentis, sed a | |
| 6300 visione eius cui creditur. Et sic, inquantum deest visio, deficit a | |
| 6301 ratione cognitionis quae est in scientia, nam scientia determinat | |
| 6302 intellectum ad unum per visionem et intellectum primorum | |
| 6303 principiorum.</p></div></div></div></div> | |
| 6304 <div id="FP_Q13" class="div3"> | |
| 6305 <h3 id="FP_Q13-p0.1">Q. 13. THE NAMES OF GOD (TWELVE ARTICLES)</h3> | |
| 6306 <div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> | |
| 6307 <p id="FP_Q13-p2"> After the consideration of those things which belong to the divine knowledge, we now proceed to the consideration of the | |
| 6308 divine names. For everything is named by us according to our knowledge of it. | |
| 6309 </p><p id="FP_Q13-p3"> Under this head, there are twelve points for inquiry:</p><p id="FP_Q13-p4"> (1) Whether God can be named by us?</p><p id="FP_Q13-p5"> (2) Whether any names applied to God are predicated of Him substantially?</p><p id="FP_Q13-p6"> (3) Whether any names applied to God are said of Him literally, or are all to be taken metaphorically?</p><p id="FP_Q13-p7"> (4) Whether any names applied to God are synonymous?</p><p id="FP_Q13-p8"> (5) Whether some names are applied to God and to creatures univocally or equivocally?</p><p id="FP_Q13-p9"> (6) Whether, supposing they are applied analogically, they are applied first to God or to creatures?</p><p id="FP_Q13-p10"> (7) Whether any names are applicable to God from time?</p><p id="FP_Q13-p11"> (8) Whether this name "God" is a name of nature, or of the operation?</p><p id="FP_Q13-p12"> (9) Whether this name "God" is a communicable name?</p><p id="FP_Q13-p13"> (10) Whether it is taken univocally or equivocally as signifying God, by nature, by participation, and by opinion?</p><p id="FP_Q13-p14"> (11) Whether this name, "Who is," is the supremely appropriate name of God?</p><p id="FP_Q13-p15"> (12) Whether affirmative propositions can be formed about God?</p> | |
| 6310 </div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 13 pr."><a name="28788" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28788] | |
| 6311 Iª q. 13 pr.</span></a> Consideratis his quae ad divinam | |
| 6312 cognitionem pertinent, procedendum est ad considerationem divinorum | |
| 6313 nominum, unumquodque enim nominatur a nobis, secundum quod ipsum | |
| 6314 cognoscimus. Circa hoc ergo quaeruntur duodecim. Primo, utrum Deus | |
| 6315 sit nominabilis a nobis. Secundo, utrum aliqua nomina dicta de Deo, | |
| 6316 praedicentur de ipso substantialiter. Tertio, utrum aliqua nomina | |
| 6317 dicta de Deo, proprie dicantur de ipso; an omnia attribuantur ei | |
| 6318 metaphorice. Quarto, utrum multa nomina dicta de Deo, sint | |
| 6319 synonyma. Quinto, utrum nomina aliqua dicantur de Deo et creaturis | |
| 6320 univoce, vel aequivoce. Sexto, supposito quod dicantur analogice, | |
| 6321 utrum dicantur de Deo per prius, vel de creaturis. Septimo, utrum | |
| 6322 aliqua nomina dicantur de Deo ex tempore. Octavo, utrum hoc nomen | |
| 6323 Deus sit nomen naturae, vel operationis. Nono, utrum hoc nomen Deus | |
| 6324 sit nomen communicabile. Decimo, utrum accipiatur univoce vel | |
| 6325 aequivoce, secundum quod significat Deum per naturam, et per | |
| 6326 participationem, et secundum opinionem. Undecimo, utrum hoc nomen | |
| 6327 qui est sit maxime proprium nomen Dei. Duodecimo, utrum | |
| 6328 propositiones affirmativae possint formari de Deo.</p></div></div></div> | |
| 6329 <div id="FP_Q13_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q13_A1-p0.1">Q. 13. A. 1. Whether a name can be given to God?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q13_A1-p2"> | |
| 6330 <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that no name can be given to God. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. i) that, "Of Him there is neither name, nor can | |
| 6331 one be found of Him;" and it is written: "What is His name, and what is the name of His Son, if thou knowest?" ( | |
| 6332 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q13_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Prov.30.4" target="asv">Prov. 30:4</a>). | |
| 6333 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 13 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="28789" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28789] Iª q. 13 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum sic | |
| 6334 proceditur. Videtur quod nullum nomen Deo conveniat. Dicit enim | |
| 6335 Dionysius, I cap. de Div. Nom., quod neque nomen eius est, neque | |
| 6336 opinio. Et Prov. XXX dicitur, <i>quod nomen eius, et quod nomen | |
| 6337 filii eius, si nosti?</i></p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q13_A1-p3"> | |
| 6338 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, every name is either abstract or concrete. But concrete names do not belong to God, since He is simple, nor do abstract | |
| 6339 names belong to Him, forasmuch as they do not signify any perfect subsisting thing. Therefore no name can be said of God. | |
| 6340 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 13 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="28790" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28790] Iª q. 13 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, omne | |
| 6341 nomen aut dicitur in abstracto, aut in concreto. Sed nomina | |
| 6342 significantia in concreto, non competunt Deo, cum simplex sit, | |
| 6343 neque nomina significantia in abstracto, quia non significant | |
| 6344 aliquid perfectum subsistens. Ergo nullum nomen potest dici de | |
| 6345 Deo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q13_A1-p4"> | |
| 6346 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, nouns are taken to signify substance with quality; verbs and participles signify substance with time; pronouns the | |
| 6347 same with demonstration or relation. But none of these can be applied to God, for He has no quality, nor accident, nor time; | |
| 6348 moreover, He cannot be felt, so as to be pointed out; nor can He be described by relation, inasmuch as relations serve to | |
| 6349 recall a thing mentioned before by nouns, participles, or demonstrative pronouns. Therefore | |
| 6350 God cannot in any way be named by us. | |
| 6351 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 13 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="28791" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28791] Iª q. 13 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 6352 nomina significant substantiam cum qualitate; verba autem et | |
| 6353 participia significant cum tempore; pronomina autem cum | |
| 6354 demonstratione vel relatione. Quorum nihil competit Deo, quia sine | |
| 6355 qualitate est et sine omni accidente, et sine tempore; et sentiri | |
| 6356 non potest, ut demonstrari possit; nec relative significari, cum | |
| 6357 relativa sint aliquorum antedictorum recordativa, vel nominum, vel | |
| 6358 participiorum, vel pronominum demonstrativorum. Ergo Deus nullo | |
| 6359 modo potest nominari a nobis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q13_A1-p5"> | |
| 6360 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( | |
| 6361 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q13_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Exod.15.3" target="asv">Ex. 15:3</a>): "The Lord is a man of war, Almighty is His name." | |
| 6362 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 13 a. 1 s. c."><a name="28792" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28792] Iª q. 13 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est | |
| 6363 quod dicitur Exod. XV, <i>dominus quasi vir pugnator, omnipotens | |
| 6364 nomen eius</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q13_A1-p6"> | |
| 6365 <b>I answer that,</b> Since according to the Philosopher (Peri Herm. i), words are signs of ideas, and ideas the similitude of things, it is evident | |
| 6366 that words relate to the meaning of things signified through the medium of the intellectual conception. It follows therefore | |
| 6367 that we can give a name to anything in as far as we can understand it. Now it was shown above ( | |
| 6368 <a id="FP_Q13_A1-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q12_A11.html">Q[12], AA[11]</a>,12) that in this life we cannot see the essence of God; but we know God | |
| 6369 from creatures as their principle, and also by way of excellence and remotion. In this way therefore He can be named by us | |
| 6370 from creatures, yet not so that the name which signifies Him expresses the divine essence in itself. Thus the name "man" expresses | |
| 6371 the essence of man in himself, since it signifies the definition of man by manifesting his essence; for the idea expressed | |
| 6372 by the name is the definition. | |
| 6373 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 13 a. 1 co."><a name="28793" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28793] Iª q. 13 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum | |
| 6374 quod, secundum philosophum, voces sunt signa intellectuum, et | |
| 6375 intellectus sunt rerum similitudines. Et sic patet quod voces | |
| 6376 referuntur ad res significandas, mediante conceptione intellectus. | |
| 6377 Secundum igitur quod aliquid a nobis intellectu cognosci potest, | |
| 6378 sic a nobis potest nominari. Ostensum est autem supra quod Deus in | |
| 6379 hac vita non potest a nobis videri per suam essentiam; sed | |
| 6380 cognoscitur a nobis ex creaturis, secundum habitudinem principii, | |
| 6381 et per modum excellentiae et remotionis. Sic igitur potest nominari | |
| 6382 a nobis ex creaturis, non tamen ita quod nomen significans ipsum, | |
| 6383 exprimat divinam essentiam secundum quod est, sicut hoc nomen homo | |
| 6384 exprimit sua significatione essentiam hominis secundum quod est, | |
| 6385 significat enim eius definitionem, declarantem eius essentiam; | |
| 6386 ratio enim quam significat nomen, est definitio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q13_A1-p7"> | |
| 6387 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The reason why God has no name, or is said to be above being named, is because His essence is above all that we understand | |
| 6388 about God, and signify in word. | |
| 6389 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 13 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="28794" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28794] Iª q. 13 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo | |
| 6390 dicendum quod ea ratione dicitur Deus non habere nomen, vel esse | |
| 6391 supra nominationem, quia essentia eius est supra id quod de Deo | |
| 6392 intelligimus et voce significamus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q13_A1-p8"> | |
| 6393 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Because we know and name God from creatures, the names we attribute to God signify what belongs to material creatures, of | |
| 6394 which the knowledge is natural to us. And because in creatures of this kind what is perfect and subsistent is compound; whereas | |
| 6395 their form is not a complete subsisting thing, but rather is that whereby a thing is; hence it follows that all names used | |
| 6396 by us to signify a complete subsisting thing must have a concrete meaning as | |
| 6397 applicable to compound things; whereas names given to signify simple forms, signify a thing not as subsisting, but as that | |
| 6398 whereby a thing is; as, for instance, whiteness signifies that whereby a thing is white. And as God is simple, and subsisting, | |
| 6399 we attribute to Him abstract names to signify His simplicity, and concrete names to signify His substance and perfection, | |
| 6400 although both these kinds of names fail to express His mode of being, forasmuch as our intellect does not know Him in this | |
| 6401 life | |
| 6402 as He is. | |
| 6403 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 13 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="28795" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28795] Iª q. 13 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 6404 dicendum quod, quia ex creaturis in Dei cognitionem venimus, et ex | |
| 6405 ipsis eum nominamus, nomina quae Deo attribuimus, hoc modo | |
| 6406 significant, secundum quod competit creaturis materialibus, quarum | |
| 6407 cognitio est nobis connaturalis, ut supra dictum est. Et quia in | |
| 6408 huiusmodi creaturis, ea quae sunt perfecta et subsistentia sunt | |
| 6409 composita; forma autem in eis non est aliquid completum subsistens, | |
| 6410 sed magis quo aliquid est, inde est quod omnia nomina a nobis | |
| 6411 imposita ad significandum aliquid completum subsistens, significant | |
| 6412 in concretione, prout competit compositis; quae autem imponuntur ad | |
| 6413 significandas formas simplices, significant aliquid non ut | |
| 6414 subsistens, sed ut quo aliquid est, sicut albedo significat ut quo | |
| 6415 aliquid est album. Quia igitur et Deus simplex est, et subsistens | |
| 6416 est, attribuimus ei et nomina abstracta, ad significandam | |
| 6417 simplicitatem eius; et nomina concreta, ad significandum | |
| 6418 subsistentiam et perfectionem ipsius, quamvis utraque nomina | |
| 6419 deficiant a modo ipsius, sicut intellectus noster non cognoscit eum | |
| 6420 ut est, secundum hanc vitam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q13_A1-p9"> | |
| 6421 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> To signify substance with quality is to signify the "suppositum" with a nature or determined form in which it subsists. Hence, | |
| 6422 as some things are said of God in a concrete sense, to signify His subsistence and perfection, so likewise nouns are applied | |
| 6423 to God signifying substance with quality. Further, verbs and participles which signify time, are applied to Him because His | |
| 6424 eternity includes all time. For as we can apprehend and signify simple | |
| 6425 subsistences only by way of compound things, so we can understand and express simple eternity only by way of temporal things, | |
| 6426 because our intellect has a natural affinity to compound and temporal things. But demonstrative pronouns are applied to God | |
| 6427 as describing what is understood, not what is sensed. For we can only describe Him as far as we understand Him. Thus, according | |
| 6428 as nouns, participles and demonstrative pronouns are applicable to God, so far can He be signified by relative | |
| 6429 pronouns. | |
| 6430 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 13 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="28796" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28796] Iª q. 13 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 6431 dicendum quod significare substantiam cum qualitate, est | |
| 6432 significare suppositum cum natura vel forma determinata in qua | |
| 6433 subsistit. Unde, sicut de Deo dicuntur aliqua in concretione, ad | |
| 6434 significandum subsistentiam et perfectionem ipsius, sicut iam | |
| 6435 dictum est, ita dicuntur de Deo nomina significantia substantiam | |
| 6436 cum qualitate. Verba vero et participia consignificantia tempus | |
| 6437 dicuntur de ipso, ex eo quod aeternitas includit omne tempus, sicut | |
| 6438 enim simplicia subsistentia non possumus apprehendere et | |
| 6439 significare nisi per modum compositorum, ita simplicem aeternitatem | |
| 6440 non possumus intelligere vel voce exprimere, nisi per modum | |
| 6441 temporalium rerum; et hoc propter connaturalitatem intellectus | |
| 6442 nostri ad res compositas et temporales. Pronomina vero | |
| 6443 demonstrativa dicuntur de Deo, secundum quod faciunt | |
| 6444 demonstrationem ad id quod intelligitur, non ad id quod sentitur, | |
| 6445 secundum enim quod a nobis intelligitur, secundum hoc sub | |
| 6446 demonstratione cadit. Et sic, secundum illum modum quo nomina et | |
| 6447 participia et pronomina demonstrativa de Deo dicuntur, secundum hoc | |
| 6448 et pronominibus relativis significari potest.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q13_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q13_A2-p0.1">Q. 13. A. 2. Whether any name can be applied to God substantially?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q13_A2-p2"> | |
| 6449 <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that no name can be applied to God substantially. For Damascene says (De Fide Orth. i, 9): "Everything said of God | |
| 6450 signifies not His substance, but rather shows forth what He is not; or expresses some relation, or something following from | |
| 6451 His nature or operation." | |
| 6452 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 13 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="28797" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28797] Iª q. 13 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum sic | |
| 6453 proceditur. Videtur quod nullum nomen dicatur de Deo | |
| 6454 substantialiter. Dicit enim Damascenus, <i>oportet singulum eorum | |
| 6455 quae de Deo dicuntur, non quid est secundum substantiam | |
| 6456 significare, sed quid non est ostendere, aut habitudinem quandam, | |
| 6457 aut aliquid eorum quae assequuntur naturam vel operationem</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q13_A2-p3"> | |
| 6458 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. i): "You will find a chorus of holy doctors addressed to the end of distinguishing clearly | |
| 6459 and praiseworthily the divine processions in the denomination of God." Thus the names applied by the holy doctors in praising | |
| 6460 God are distinguished according to the divine processions themselves. But what expresses the procession of anything, does | |
| 6461 not signify its essence. Therefore the names applied to God are not said of Him | |
| 6462 substantially. | |
| 6463 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 13 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="28798" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28798] Iª q. 13 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, dicit | |
| 6464 Dionysius, I cap. de Div. Nom., <i>omnem sanctorum theologorum | |
| 6465 hymnum invenies, ad bonos thearchiae processus, manifestative et | |
| 6466 laudative Dei nominationes dividentem</i>, et est sensus, quod | |
| 6467 nomina quae in divinam laudem sancti doctores assumunt, secundum | |
| 6468 processus ipsius Dei distinguuntur. Sed quod significat processum | |
| 6469 alicuius rei, nihil significat ad eius essentiam pertinens. Ergo | |
| 6470 nomina dicta de Deo, non dicuntur de ipso substantialiter.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q13_A2-p4"> | |
| 6471 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, a thing is named by us according as we understand it. But God is not understood by us in this life in His substance. | |
| 6472 Therefore neither is any name we can use applied substantially to God. | |
| 6473 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 13 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="28799" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28799] Iª q. 13 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 6474 secundum hoc nominatur aliquid a nobis, secundum quod intelligitur. | |
| 6475 Sed non intelligitur Deus a nobis in hac vita secundum suam | |
| 6476 substantiam. Ergo nec aliquod nomen impositum a nobis, dicitur de | |
| 6477 Deo secundum suam substantiam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q13_A2-p5"> | |
| 6478 <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Trin. vi): "The being of God is the being strong, or the being wise, or whatever else we may say of that | |
| 6479 simplicity whereby His substance is signified." Therefore all names of this kind signify the divine substance. | |
| 6480 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 13 a. 2 s. c."><a name="28800" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28800] Iª q. 13 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est | |
| 6481 quod dicit Augustinus, VI de Trin., <i>Deo hoc est esse, quod | |
| 6482 fortem esse vel sapientem esse, et si quid de illa simplicitate | |
| 6483 dixeris, quo eius substantia significatur</i>. Ergo omnia nomina | |
| 6484 huiusmodi significant divinam substantiam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q13_A2-p6"> | |
| 6485 <b>I answer that,</b> Negative names applied to God, or signifying His relation to creatures manifestly do not at all signify His substance, but | |
| 6486 rather express the distance of the creature from Him, or His relation to something else, or rather, the relation of creatures | |
| 6487 to Himself. | |
| 6488 </p><p id="FP_Q13_A2-p7"> But as regards absolute and affirmative names of God, as "good," "wise," and the like, various and many opinions have been | |
| 6489 given. For some have said that all such names, although they are applied to God affirmatively, nevertheless have been brought | |
| 6490 into use more to express some remotion from God, rather than to express anything that exists positively in Him. Hence they | |
| 6491 assert that when we say that God lives, we mean that God is not like an inanimate thing; and the same in like | |
| 6492 manner applies to other names; and this was taught by Rabbi Moses. Others say that these names applied to God signify His | |
| 6493 relationship towards creatures: thus in the words, "God is good," we mean, God is the cause of goodness in things; and the | |
| 6494 same rule applies to other names. | |
| 6495 </p><p id="FP_Q13_A2-p8"> Both of these opinions, however, seem to be untrue for three reasons. First because in neither of them can a reason be assigned | |
| 6496 why some names more than others are applied to God. For He is assuredly the cause of bodies in the same way as He is the cause | |
| 6497 of good things; therefore if the words "God is good," signified no more than, "God is the cause of good things," it might | |
| 6498 in like manner be said that God is a body, inasmuch as He is the cause of bodies. So also to say that He | |
| 6499 is a body implies that He is not a mere potentiality, as is primary matter. Secondly, because it would follow that all names | |
| 6500 applied to God would be said of Him by way of being taken in a secondary sense, as healthy is secondarily said of medicine, | |
| 6501 forasmuch as it signifies only the cause of the health in the animal which primarily is called healthy. Thirdly, because this | |
| 6502 is against the intention of those who speak of God. For in saying that God lives, they assuredly mean more than to say the | |
| 6503 He is the cause of our life, or that He differs from inanimate bodies. | |
| 6504 </p><p id="FP_Q13_A2-p9"> Therefore we must hold a different doctrine---viz. that these names signify the divine substance, and are predicated substantially | |
| 6505 of God, although they fall short of a full representation of Him. Which is proved thus. For these names express God, so far | |
| 6506 as our intellects know Him. Now since our intellect knows God from creatures, it knows Him as far as creatures represent Him. | |
| 6507 Now it is shown above ( | |
| 6508 <a id="FP_Q13_A2-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q4_A2.html">Q[4], A[2]</a>) that God prepossesses in Himself all the | |
| 6509 perfections of creatures, being Himself simply and universally perfect. Hence every creature represents Him, and is like Him | |
| 6510 so far as it possesses some perfection; yet it represents Him not as something of the same species or genus, but as the excelling | |
| 6511 principle of whose form the effects fall short, although they derive some kind of likeness thereto, even as the forms of inferior | |
| 6512 bodies represent the power of the sun. This was explained above ( | |
| 6513 <a id="FP_Q13_A2-p9.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q4_A3.html">Q[4], A[3]</a>), in treating | |
| 6514 of the divine perfection. Therefore the aforesaid names signify the divine substance, but in an imperfect manner, even as | |
| 6515 creatures represent it imperfectly. So when we say, "God is good," the meaning is not, "God is the cause of goodness," or | |
| 6516 "God is not evil"; but the meaning is, "Whatever good we attribute to creatures, pre-exists in God," and in a more excellent | |
| 6517 and higher way. Hence it does not follow that God is good, because He causes goodness; but rather, on the contrary, He causes | |
| 6518 goodness in things because He is good; according to what Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 32), "Because He is good, we | |
| 6519 are." | |
| 6520 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 13 a. 2 co."><a name="28801" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28801] Iª q. 13 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum | |
| 6521 quod de nominibus quae de Deo dicuntur negative, vel quae | |
| 6522 relationem ipsius ad creaturam significant, manifestum est quod | |
| 6523 substantiam eius nullo modo significant; sed remotionem alicuius ab | |
| 6524 ipso, vel relationem eius ad alium, vel potius alicuius ad ipsum. | |
| 6525 Sed de nominibus quae absolute et affirmative de Deo dicuntur, | |
| 6526 sicut bonus, sapiens, et huiusmodi, multipliciter aliqui sunt | |
| 6527 opinati. Quidam enim dixerunt quod haec omnia nomina, licet | |
| 6528 affirmative de Deo dicantur, tamen magis inventa sunt ad aliquid | |
| 6529 removendum a Deo, quam ad aliquid ponendum in ipso. Unde dicunt | |
| 6530 quod, cum dicimus Deum esse viventem, significamus quod Deus non | |
| 6531 hoc modo est, sicut res inanimatae, et similiter accipiendum est in | |
| 6532 aliis. Et hoc posuit Rabbi Moyses. Alii vero dicunt quod haec | |
| 6533 nomina imposita sunt ad significandum habitudinem eius ad creata, | |
| 6534 ut, cum dicimus Deus est bonus, sit sensus, Deus est causa | |
| 6535 bonitatis in rebus. Et eadem ratio est in aliis. Sed utrumque | |
| 6536 istorum videtur esse inconveniens, propter tria. Primo quidem, quia | |
| 6537 secundum neutram harum positionum posset assignari ratio quare | |
| 6538 quaedam nomina magis de Deo dicerentur quam alia. Sic enim est | |
| 6539 causa corporum, sicut est causa bonorum, unde, si nihil aliud | |
| 6540 significatur, cum dicitur Deus est bonus, nisi Deus est causa | |
| 6541 bonorum, poterit similiter dici quod Deus est corpus, quia est | |
| 6542 causa corporum. Item, per hoc quod dicitur quod est corpus, | |
| 6543 removetur quod non sit ens in potentia tantum, sicut materia prima. | |
| 6544 Secundo, quia sequeretur quod omnia nomina dicta de Deo, per | |
| 6545 posterius dicerentur de ipso, sicut sanum per posterius dicitur de | |
| 6546 medicina, eo quod significat hoc tantum quod sit causa sanitatis in | |
| 6547 animali, quod per prius dicitur sanum. Tertio, quia hoc est contra | |
| 6548 intentionem loquentium de Deo. Aliud enim intendunt dicere, cum | |
| 6549 dicunt Deum viventem, quam quod sit causa vitae nostrae, vel quod | |
| 6550 differat a corporibus inanimatis. Et ideo aliter dicendum est, quod | |
| 6551 huiusmodi quidem nomina significant substantiam divinam, et | |
| 6552 praedicantur de Deo substantialiter, sed deficiunt a | |
| 6553 repraesentatione ipsius. Quod sic patet. Significant enim sic | |
| 6554 nomina Deum, secundum quod intellectus noster cognoscit ipsum. | |
| 6555 Intellectus autem noster, cum cognoscat Deum ex creaturis, sic | |
| 6556 cognoscit ipsum, secundum quod creaturae ipsum repraesentant. | |
| 6557 Ostensum est autem supra quod Deus in se praehabet omnes | |
| 6558 perfectiones creaturarum, quasi simpliciter et universaliter | |
| 6559 perfectus. Unde quaelibet creatura intantum eum repraesentat, et | |
| 6560 est ei similis, inquantum perfectionem aliquam habet, non tamen ita | |
| 6561 quod repraesentet eum sicut aliquid eiusdem speciei vel generis, | |
| 6562 sed sicut excellens principium, a cuius forma effectus deficiunt, | |
| 6563 cuius tamen aliqualem similitudinem effectus consequuntur; sicut | |
| 6564 formae corporum inferiorum repraesentant virtutem solarem. Et hoc | |
| 6565 supra expositum est, cum de perfectione divina agebatur. Sic igitur | |
| 6566 praedicta nomina divinam substantiam significant, imperfecte tamen, | |
| 6567 sicut et creaturae imperfecte eam repraesentant. Cum igitur dicitur | |
| 6568 Deus est bonus, non est sensus, Deus est causa bonitatis, vel Deus | |
| 6569 non est malus, sed est sensus, id quod bonitatem dicimus in | |
| 6570 creaturis, praeexistit in Deo, et hoc quidem secundum modum | |
| 6571 altiorem. Unde ex hoc non sequitur quod Deo competat esse bonum | |
| 6572 inquantum causat bonitatem, sed potius e converso, quia est bonus, | |
| 6573 bonitatem rebus diffundit, secundum illud Augustini, de Doct. | |
| 6574 Christ., <i>inquantum bonus est, sumus</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q13_A2-p10"> | |
| 6575 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Damascene says that these names do not signify what God is, forasmuch as by none of these names is perfectly expressed what | |
| 6576 He is; but each one signifies Him in an imperfect manner, even as creatures represent Him imperfectly. | |
| 6577 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 13 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="28802" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28802] Iª q. 13 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo | |
| 6578 dicendum quod Damascenus ideo dicit quod haec nomina non | |
| 6579 significant quid est Deus, quia a nullo istorum nominum exprimitur | |
| 6580 quid est Deus perfecte, sed unumquodque imperfecte eum significat, | |
| 6581 sicut et creaturae imperfecte eum repraesentant.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q13_A2-p11"> | |
| 6582 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> In the significance of names, that from which the name is derived is different sometimes from what it is intended to signify, | |
| 6583 as for instance, this name "stone" [lapis] is imposed from the fact that it hurts the foot [loedit pedem], but it is not imposed | |
| 6584 to signify that which hurts the foot, but rather to signify a certain kind of body; otherwise everything that hurts the foot | |
| 6585 would be a stone [*This refers to the Latin etymology of the word "lapis" | |
| 6586 which has no place in English]. So we must say that these kinds of divine names are imposed from the divine processions; for | |
| 6587 as according to the diverse processions of their perfections, creatures are the representations of God, although in an imperfect | |
| 6588 manner; so likewise our intellect knows and names God according to each kind of procession; but nevertheless these names are | |
| 6589 not imposed to signify the procession themselves, as if when we say "God lives," the sense were, "life proceeds from | |
| 6590 Him"; but to signify the principle itself of things, in so far as life pre-exists in Him, although it pre-exists in Him in | |
| 6591 a more eminent way than can be understood or signified. | |
| 6592 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 13 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="28803" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28803] Iª q. 13 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 6593 dicendum quod in significatione nominum, aliud est quandoque a quo | |
| 6594 imponitur nomen ad significandum, et id ad quod significandum nomen | |
| 6595 imponitur, sicut hoc nomen lapis imponitur ab eo quod laedit pedem, | |
| 6596 non tamen imponitur ad hoc significandum quod significet laedens | |
| 6597 pedem, sed ad significandam quandam speciem corporum; alioquin omne | |
| 6598 laedens pedem esset lapis. Sic igitur dicendum est quod huiusmodi | |
| 6599 divina nomina imponuntur quidem a processibus deitatis, sicut enim | |
| 6600 secundum diversos processus perfectionum, creaturae Deum | |
| 6601 repraesentant, licet imperfecte; ita intellectus noster, secundum | |
| 6602 unumquemque processum, Deum cognoscit et nominat. Sed tamen haec | |
| 6603 nomina non imponit ad significandum ipsos processus, ut, cum | |
| 6604 dicitur Deus est vivens, sit sensus, ab eo procedit vita, sed ad | |
| 6605 significandum ipsum rerum principium, prout in eo praeexistit vita, | |
| 6606 licet eminentiori modo quam intelligatur vel significetur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q13_A2-p12"> | |
| 6607 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> We cannot know the essence of God in this life, as He really is in Himself; but we know Him accordingly as He is represented | |
| 6608 in the perfections of creatures; and thus the names imposed by us signify Him in that manner only. | |
| 6609 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 13 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="28804" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28804] Iª q. 13 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 6610 dicendum quod essentiam Dei in hac vita cognoscere non possumus | |
| 6611 secundum quod in se est, sed cognoscimus eam secundum quod | |
| 6612 repraesentatur in perfectionibus creaturarum. Et sic nomina a nobis | |
| 6613 imposita eam significant.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q13_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q13_A3-p0.1">Q. 13. A. 3. Whether any name can be applied to God in its literal sense?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q13_A3-p2"> | |
| 6614 <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that no name is applied literally to God. For all names which we apply to God are taken from creatures; as was explained | |
| 6615 above | |
| 6616 <a id="FP_Q13_A3-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q13_A1.html">(A[1])</a>. But the names of creatures are applied to God metaphorically, as when we say, God is a stone, or a lion, or the like. Therefore | |
| 6617 names are applied to God in a metaphorical sense. | |
| 6618 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 13 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="28805" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28805] Iª q. 13 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium sic | |
| 6619 proceditur. Videtur quod nullum nomen dicatur de Deo proprie. Omnia | |
| 6620 enim nomina quae de Deo dicimus, sunt a creaturis accepta, ut | |
| 6621 dictum est. Sed nomina creaturarum metaphorice dicuntur de Deo, | |
| 6622 sicut cum dicitur Deus est lapis, vel leo, vel aliquid huiusmodi. | |
| 6623 Ergo omnia nomina dicta de Deo, dicuntur metaphorice.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q13_A3-p3"> | |
| 6624 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, no name can be applied literally to anything if it should be withheld from it rather than given to it. But all such | |
| 6625 names as "good," "wise," and the like are more truly withheld from God than given to Him; as appears from Dionysius says (Coel. | |
| 6626 Hier. ii). Therefore none of these names belong to God in their literal sense. | |
| 6627 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 13 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="28806" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28806] Iª q. 13 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 6628 nullum nomen proprie dicitur de aliquo, a quo verius removetur quam | |
| 6629 de eo praedicetur. Sed omnia huiusmodi nomina, bonus sapiens, et | |
| 6630 similia, verius removentur a Deo quam de eo praedicentur, ut patet | |
| 6631 per Dionysium, II cap. Cael. Hier. Ergo nullum istorum nominum | |
| 6632 proprie dicitur de Deo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q13_A3-p4"> | |
| 6633 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, corporeal names are applied to God in a metaphorical sense only; since He is incorporeal. But all such names imply | |
| 6634 some kind of corporeal condition; for their meaning is bound up with time and composition and like corporeal conditions. Therefore | |
| 6635 all these names are applied to God in a metaphorical sense. | |
| 6636 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 13 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="28807" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28807] Iª q. 13 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 6637 nomina corporum non dicuntur de Deo nisi metaphorice, cum sit | |
| 6638 incorporeus. Sed omnia huiusmodi nomina implicant quasdam | |
| 6639 corporales conditiones, significant enim cum tempore, et cum | |
| 6640 compositione, et cum aliis huiusmodi, quae sunt conditiones | |
| 6641 corporum. Ergo omnia huiusmodi nomina dicuntur de Deo | |
| 6642 metaphorice.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q13_A3-p5"> | |
| 6643 <b>On the contrary,</b> Ambrose says (De Fide ii), "Some names there are which express evidently the property of the divinity, and some which express | |
| 6644 the clear truth of the divine majesty, but others there are which are applied to God metaphorically by way of similitude." | |
| 6645 Therefore not all names are applied to God in a metaphorical sense, but there are some which are said of Him in their literal | |
| 6646 sense. | |
| 6647 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 13 a. 3 s. c."><a name="28808" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28808] Iª q. 13 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est | |
| 6648 quod dicit Ambrosius, in Lib. II de fide, <i>sunt quaedam nomina, | |
| 6649 quae evidenter proprietatem divinitatis ostendunt; et quaedam quae | |
| 6650 perspicuam divinae maiestatis exprimunt veritatem; alia vero sunt, | |
| 6651 quae translative per similitudinem de Deo dicuntur</i>. Non igitur | |
| 6652 omnia nomina dicuntur de Deo metaphorice, sed aliqua dicuntur | |
| 6653 proprie.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q13_A3-p6"> | |
| 6654 <b>I answer that,</b> According to the preceding article, our knowledge of God is derived from the perfections which flow from Him to creatures, | |
| 6655 which perfections are in God in a more eminent way than in creatures. Now our intellect apprehends them as they are in creatures, | |
| 6656 and as it apprehends them it signifies them by names. Therefore as to the names applied to God---viz. the perfections which | |
| 6657 they signify, such as goodness, life and the like, and their mode of signification. | |
| 6658 As regards what is signified by these names, they belong properly to God, and more properly than they belong to creatures, | |
| 6659 and are applied primarily to Him. But as regards their mode of signification, they do not properly and strictly apply to God; | |
| 6660 for their mode of signification applies to creatures. | |
| 6661 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 13 a. 3 co."><a name="28809" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28809] Iª q. 13 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum | |
| 6662 quod, sicut dictum est, Deum cognoscimus ex perfectionibus | |
| 6663 procedentibus in creaturas ab ipso; quae quidem perfectiones in Deo | |
| 6664 sunt secundum eminentiorem modum quam in creaturis. Intellectus | |
| 6665 autem noster eo modo apprehendit eas, secundum quod sunt in | |
| 6666 creaturis, et secundum quod apprehendit, ita significat per nomina. | |
| 6667 In nominibus igitur quae Deo attribuimus, est duo considerare, | |
| 6668 scilicet, perfectiones ipsas significatas, ut bonitatem, vitam, et | |
| 6669 huiusmodi; et modum significandi. Quantum igitur ad id quod | |
| 6670 significant huiusmodi nomina, proprie competunt Deo, et magis | |
| 6671 proprie quam ipsis creaturis, et per prius dicuntur de eo. Quantum | |
| 6672 vero ad modum significandi, non proprie dicuntur de Deo, habent | |
| 6673 enim modum significandi qui creaturis competit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q13_A3-p7"> | |
| 6674 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> There are some names which signify these perfections flowing from God to creatures in such a way that the imperfect way in | |
| 6675 which creatures receive the divine perfection is part of the very signification of the name itself as "stone" signifies a | |
| 6676 material being, and names of this kind can be applied to God only in a metaphorical sense. Other names, however, express these | |
| 6677 perfections absolutely, without any such mode of participation being part of their | |
| 6678 signification as the words "being," "good," "living," and the like, and such names can be literally applied to God. | |
| 6679 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 13 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="28810" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28810] Iª q. 13 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo | |
| 6680 dicendum quod quaedam nomina significant huiusmodi perfectiones a | |
| 6681 Deo procedentes in res creatas, hoc modo quod ipse modus | |
| 6682 imperfectus quo a creatura participatur divina perfectio, in ipso | |
| 6683 nominis significato includitur, sicut lapis significat aliquid | |
| 6684 materialiter ens, et huiusmodi nomina non possunt attribui Deo nisi | |
| 6685 metaphorice. Quaedam vero nomina significant ipsas perfectiones | |
| 6686 absolute, absque hoc quod aliquis modus participandi claudatur in | |
| 6687 eorum significatione, ut ens, bonum vivens, et huiusmodi, et talia | |
| 6688 proprie dicuntur de Deo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q13_A3-p8"> | |
| 6689 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Such names as these, as Dionysius shows, are denied of God for the reason that what the name signifies does not belong to | |
| 6690 Him in the ordinary sense of its signification, but in a more eminent way. Hence Dionysius says also that God is above all | |
| 6691 substance and all life. | |
| 6692 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 13 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="28811" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28811] Iª q. 13 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 6693 dicendum quod ideo huiusmodi nomina dicit Dionysius negari a Deo, | |
| 6694 quia id quod significatur per nomen, non convenit eo modo ei, quo | |
| 6695 nomen significat, sed excellentiori modo. Unde ibidem dicit | |
| 6696 Dionysius quod Deus est super omnem substantiam et vitam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q13_A3-p9"> | |
| 6697 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> These names which are applied to God literally imply corporeal conditions not in the thing signified, but as regards their | |
| 6698 mode of signification; whereas those which are applied to God metaphorically imply and mean a corporeal condition in the thing | |
| 6699 signified. | |
| 6700 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 13 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="28812" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28812] Iª q. 13 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 6701 dicendum quod ista nomina quae proprie dicuntur de Deo important | |
| 6702 conditiones corporales, non in ipso significato nominis, sed | |
| 6703 quantum ad modum significandi. Ea vero quae metaphorice de Deo | |
| 6704 dicuntur, important conditionem corporalem in ipso suo | |
| 6705 significato.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q13_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q13_A4-p0.1">Q. 13. A. 4. Whether names applied to God are synonymous?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q13_A4-p2"> | |
| 6706 <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that these names applied to God are synonymous names. For synonymous names are those which mean exactly the same. | |
| 6707 But these names applied to God mean entirely the same thing in God; for the goodness of God is His essence, and likewise it | |
| 6708 is His wisdom. Therefore these names are entirely synonymous. | |
| 6709 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 13 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="28813" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28813] Iª q. 13 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum sic | |
| 6710 proceditur. Videtur quod ista nomina dicta de Deo, sint nomina | |
| 6711 synonyma. Synonyma enim nomina dicuntur, quae omnino idem | |
| 6712 significant. Sed ista nomina dicta de Deo, omnino idem significant | |
| 6713 in Deo, quia bonitas Dei est eius essentia, et similiter sapientia. | |
| 6714 Ergo ista nomina sunt omnino synonyma.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q13_A4-p3"> | |
| 6715 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, if it be said these names signify one and the same thing in reality, but differ in idea, it can be objected that | |
| 6716 an idea to which no reality corresponds is a vain notion. Therefore if these ideas are many, and the thing is one, it seems | |
| 6717 also that all these ideas are vain notions. | |
| 6718 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 13 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="28814" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28814] Iª q. 13 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Si dicatur quod | |
| 6719 ista nomina significant idem secundum rem, sed secundum rationes | |
| 6720 diversas, contra, ratio cui non respondet aliquid in re, est vana; | |
| 6721 si ergo istae rationes sunt multae, et res est una, videtur quod | |
| 6722 rationes istae sint vanae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q13_A4-p4"> | |
| 6723 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, a thing which is one in reality and in idea, is more one than what is one in reality and many in idea. But God is | |
| 6724 supremely one. Therefore it seems that He is not one in reality and many in idea; and thus the names applied to God do not | |
| 6725 signify different ideas; and thus they are synonymous. | |
| 6726 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 13 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="28815" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28815] Iª q. 13 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, magis | |
| 6727 est unum quod est unum re et ratione, quam quod est unum re et | |
| 6728 multiplex ratione. Sed Deus est maxime unus. Ergo videtur quod non | |
| 6729 sit unus re et multiplex ratione. Et sic nomina dicta de Deo non | |
| 6730 significant rationes diversas, et ita sunt synonyma.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q13_A4-p5"> | |
| 6731 <b>On the contrary,</b> All synonyms united with each other are redundant, as when we say, "vesture clothing." Therefore if all names applied to | |
| 6732 God are synonymous, we cannot properly say "good God" or the like, and yet it is written, "O most mighty, great and powerful, | |
| 6733 the Lord of hosts is Thy name" ( | |
| 6734 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q13_A4-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Jer.32.18" target="asv">Jer. 32:18</a>). | |
| 6735 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 13 a. 4 s. c."><a name="28816" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28816] Iª q. 13 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra, omnia | |
| 6736 synonyma, sibi invicem adiuncta, nugationem adducunt, sicut si | |
| 6737 dicatur vestis indumentum. Si igitur omnia nomina dicta de Deo sunt | |
| 6738 synonyma, non posset convenienter dici Deus bonus, vel aliquid | |
| 6739 huiusmodi; cum tamen scriptum sit Ierem. XXXII, <i>fortissime, | |
| 6740 magne, potens, dominus exercituum nomen tibi</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q13_A4-p6"> | |
| 6741 <b>I answer that,</b> These names spoken of God are not synonymous. This would be easy to understand, if we said that these names are used to remove, | |
| 6742 or to express the relation of cause to creatures; for thus it would follow that there are different ideas as regards the diverse | |
| 6743 things denied of God, or as regards diverse effects connoted. But even according to what was said above | |
| 6744 <a id="FP_Q13_A4-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q13_A2.html">(A[2])</a>, that these names signify the divine substance, although in an | |
| 6745 imperfect manner, it is also clear from what has been said (AA 1,2) that they have diverse meanings. For the idea signified | |
| 6746 by the name is the conception in the intellect of the thing signified by the name. But our intellect, since it knows God from | |
| 6747 creatures, in order to understand God, forms conceptions proportional to the perfections flowing from God to creatures, which | |
| 6748 perfections pre-exist in God unitedly and simply, whereas in creatures they are received and divided and multiplied. As | |
| 6749 therefore, to the different perfections of creatures, there corresponds one simple principle represented by different perfections | |
| 6750 of creatures in a various and manifold manner, so also to the various and multiplied conceptions of our intellect, there corresponds | |
| 6751 one altogether simple principle, according to these conceptions, imperfectly understood. Therefore although the names applied | |
| 6752 to God signify one thing, still because they signify that under many and different aspects, they are not | |
| 6753 synonymous. | |
| 6754 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 13 a. 4 co."><a name="28817" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28817] Iª q. 13 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum | |
| 6755 quod huiusmodi nomina dicta de Deo, non sunt synonyma. Quod quidem | |
| 6756 facile esset videre, si diceremus quod huiusmodi nomina sunt | |
| 6757 inducta ad removendum, vel ad designandum habitudinem causae | |
| 6758 respectu creaturarum, sic enim essent diversae rationes horum | |
| 6759 nominum secundum diversa negata, vel secundum diversos effectus | |
| 6760 connotatos. Sed secundum quod dictum est huiusmodi nomina | |
| 6761 substantiam divinam significare, licet imperfecte, etiam plane | |
| 6762 apparet, secundum praemissa, quod habent rationes diversas. Ratio | |
| 6763 enim quam significat nomen, est conceptio intellectus de re | |
| 6764 significata per nomen. Intellectus autem noster, cum cognoscat Deum | |
| 6765 ex creaturis, format ad intelligendum Deum conceptiones | |
| 6766 proportionatas perfectionibus procedentibus a Deo in creaturas. | |
| 6767 Quae quidem perfectiones in Deo praeexistunt unite et simpliciter, | |
| 6768 in creaturis vero recipiuntur divise et multipliciter. Sicut igitur | |
| 6769 diversis perfectionibus creaturarum respondet unum simplex | |
| 6770 principium, repraesentatum per diversas perfectiones creaturarum | |
| 6771 varie et multipliciter; ita variis et multiplicibus conceptibus | |
| 6772 intellectus nostri respondet unum omnino simplex, secundum | |
| 6773 huiusmodi conceptiones imperfecte intellectum. Et ideo nomina Deo | |
| 6774 attributa, licet significent unam rem, tamen, quia significant eam | |
| 6775 sub rationibus multis et diversis, non sunt synonyma.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q13_A4-p7"> Thus appears the solution of the First Objection, since synonymous terms signify one thing under one aspect; for words which | |
| 6776 signify different aspects of one things, do not signify primarily and absolutely one thing; because the term only signifies | |
| 6777 the thing through the medium of the intellectual conception, as was said above. | |
| 6778 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 13 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="28818" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28818] Iª q. 13 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Et sic patet | |
| 6779 solutio ad primum, quia nomina synonyma dicuntur, quae significant | |
| 6780 unum secundum unam rationem. Quae enim significant rationes | |
| 6781 diversas unius rei, non primo et per se unum significant, quia | |
| 6782 nomen non significat rem, nisi mediante conceptione intellectus, ut | |
| 6783 dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q13_A4-p8"> | |
| 6784 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The many aspects of these names are not empty and vain, for there corresponds to all of them one simple reality represented | |
| 6785 by them in a manifold and imperfect manner. | |
| 6786 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 13 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="28819" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28819] Iª q. 13 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 6787 dicendum quod rationes plures horum nominum non sunt cassae et | |
| 6788 vanae, quia omnibus eis respondet unum quid simplex, per omnia | |
| 6789 huiusmodi multipliciter et imperfecte repraesentatum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q13_A4-p9"> | |
| 6790 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The perfect unity of God requires that what are manifold and divided in others should exist in Him simply and unitedly. Thus | |
| 6791 it comes about that He is one in reality, and yet multiple in idea, because our intellect apprehends Him in a manifold manner, | |
| 6792 as things represent Him. | |
| 6793 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 13 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="28820" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28820] Iª q. 13 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 6794 dicendum quod hoc ipsum ad perfectam Dei unitatem pertinet, quod ea | |
| 6795 quae sunt multipliciter et divisim in aliis, in ipso sunt | |
| 6796 simpliciter et unite. Et ex hoc contingit quod est unus re et | |
| 6797 plures secundum rationem, quia intellectus noster ita multipliciter | |
| 6798 apprehendit eum, sicut res multipliciter ipsum repraesentant.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q13_A5" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q13_A5-p0.1">Q. 13. A. 5. Whether what is said of God and of creatures is univocally predicated of them?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q13_A5-p2"> | |
| 6799 <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the things attributed to God and creatures are univocal. For every equivocal term is reduced to the univocal, | |
| 6800 as many are reduced to one; for if the name "dog" be said equivocally of the barking dog, and of the dogfish, it must be said | |
| 6801 of some univocally---viz. of all barking dogs; otherwise we proceed to infinitude. Now there are some univocal agents which | |
| 6802 agree with their effects in name and definition, as man generates man; and there are some | |
| 6803 agents which are equivocal, as the sun which causes heat, although the sun is hot only in an equivocal sense. Therefore it | |
| 6804 seems that the first agent to which all other agents are reduced, is an univocal agent: and thus what is said of God and creatures, | |
| 6805 is predicated univocally. | |
| 6806 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 13 a. 5 arg. 1"><a name="28821" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28821] Iª q. 13 a. 5 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quintum sic | |
| 6807 proceditur. Videtur quod ea quae dicuntur de Deo et creaturis, | |
| 6808 univoce de ipsis dicantur. Omne enim aequivocum reducitur ad | |
| 6809 univocum, sicut multa ad unum. Nam si hoc nomen canis aequivoce | |
| 6810 dicitur de latrabili et marino, oportet quod de aliquibus univoce | |
| 6811 dicatur, scilicet de omnibus latrabilibus, aliter enim esset | |
| 6812 procedere in infinitum. Inveniuntur autem quaedam agentia univoca, | |
| 6813 quae conveniunt cum suis effectibus in nomine et definitione, ut | |
| 6814 homo generat hominem; quaedam vero agentia aequivoca, sicut sol | |
| 6815 causat calidum, cum tamen ipse non sit calidus nisi aequivoce. | |
| 6816 Videtur igitur quod primum agens, ad quod omnia agentia reducuntur, | |
| 6817 sit agens univocum. Et ita, quae de Deo et creaturis dicuntur, | |
| 6818 univoce praedicantur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q13_A5-p3"> | |
| 6819 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, there is no similitude among equivocal things. Therefore as creatures have a certain likeness to God, according | |
| 6820 to the word of Genesis ( | |
| 6821 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q13_A5-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.1.26" target="asv">Gn. 1:26</a>), "Let us make man to our image and likeness," it seems that something can be said of God and creatures univocally. | |
| 6822 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 13 a. 5 arg. 2"><a name="28822" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28822] Iª q. 13 a. 5 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 6823 secundum aequivoca non attenditur aliqua similitudo. Cum igitur | |
| 6824 creaturae ad Deum sit aliqua similitudo, secundum illud Genes. I, | |
| 6825 <i>faciamus hominem ad imaginem et similitudinem nostram</i>, | |
| 6826 videtur quod aliquid univoce de Deo et creaturis dicatur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q13_A5-p4"> | |
| 6827 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, measure is homogeneous with the thing measured. But God is the first measure of all beings. Therefore God is homogeneous | |
| 6828 with creatures; and thus a word may be applied univocally to God and to creatures. | |
| 6829 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 13 a. 5 arg. 3"><a name="28823" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28823] Iª q. 13 a. 5 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 6830 mensura est homogenea mensurato, ut dicitur in X Metaphys. Sed Deus | |
| 6831 est prima mensura omnium entium, ut ibidem dicitur. Ergo Deus est | |
| 6832 homogeneus creaturis. Et ita aliquid univoce de Deo et creaturis | |
| 6833 dici potest.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q13_A5-p5"> | |
| 6834 <b>On the contrary,</b> whatever is predicated of various things under the same name but not in the same sense, is predicated equivocally. But no | |
| 6835 name belongs to God in the same sense that it belongs to creatures; for instance, wisdom in creatures is a quality, but not | |
| 6836 in God. Now a different genus changes an essence, since the genus is part of the definition; and the same applies to other | |
| 6837 things. Therefore whatever is said of God and of creatures is predicated equivocally. | |
| 6838 </p><p id="FP_Q13_A5-p6"> Further, God is more distant from creatures than any creatures are from each other. But the distance of some creatures makes | |
| 6839 any univocal predication of them impossible, as in the case of those things which are not in the same genus. Therefore much | |
| 6840 less can anything be predicated univocally of God and creatures; and so only equivocal predication can be applied to them. | |
| 6841 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><div class="latin"><p title="I q. 13 a. 5 s. c. 1"><a name="28824" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28824] Iª q. 13 a. 5 s. c. 1</span></a> Sed contra, | |
| 6842 quidquid praedicatur de aliquibus secundum idem nomen et non | |
| 6843 secundum eandem rationem, praedicatur de eis aequivoce. Sed nullum | |
| 6844 nomen convenit Deo secundum illam rationem, secundum quam dicitur | |
| 6845 de creatura, nam sapientia in creaturis est qualitas, non autem in | |
| 6846 Deo; genus autem variatum mutat rationem, cum sit pars | |
| 6847 definitionis. Et eadem ratio est in aliis. Quidquid ergo de Deo et | |
| 6848 creaturis dicitur, aequivoce dicitur.</p><p title="I q. 13 a. 5 s. c. 2"><a name="28825" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28825] Iª q. 13 a. 5 s. c. 2</span></a> Praeterea, Deus | |
| 6849 plus distat a creaturis, quam quaecumque creaturae ab invicem. Sed | |
| 6850 propter distantiam quarundam creaturarum, contingit quod nihil | |
| 6851 univoce de eis praedicari potest; sicut de his quae non conveniunt | |
| 6852 in aliquo genere. Ergo multo minus de Deo et creaturis aliquid | |
| 6853 univoce praedicatur, sed omnia praedicantur aequivoce.</p></div></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q13_A5-p7"> | |
| 6854 <b>I answer that,</b> Univocal predication is impossible between God and creatures. The reason of this is that every effect which is not an adequate | |
| 6855 result of the power of the efficient cause, receives the similitude of the agent not in its full degree, but in a measure | |
| 6856 that falls short, so that what is divided and multiplied in the effects resides in the agent simply, and in the same manner; | |
| 6857 as for example the sun by exercise of its one power produces manifold and various forms | |
| 6858 in all inferior things. In the same way, as said in the preceding article, all perfections existing in creatures divided and | |
| 6859 multiplied, pre-exist in God unitedly. Thus when any term expressing perfection is applied to a creature, it signifies that | |
| 6860 perfection distinct in idea from other perfections; as, for instance, by the term "wise" applied to man, we signify some perfection | |
| 6861 distinct from a man's essence, and distinct from his power and existence, and from all similar things; whereas when we | |
| 6862 apply to it God, we do not mean to signify anything distinct from His essence, or power, or existence. Thus also this term | |
| 6863 "wise" applied to man in some degree circumscribes and comprehends the thing signified; whereas this is not the case when | |
| 6864 it is applied to God; but it leaves the thing signified as incomprehended, and as exceeding the signification of the name. | |
| 6865 Hence it is evident that this term "wise" is not applied in the same way to God and to man. The same rule applies to other | |
| 6866 terms. | |
| 6867 Hence no name is predicated univocally of God and of creatures. | |
| 6868 </p><p id="FP_Q13_A5-p8"> Neither, on the other hand, are names applied to God and creatures in a purely equivocal sense, as some have said. Because | |
| 6869 if that were so, it follows that from creatures nothing could be known or demonstrated about God at all; for the reasoning | |
| 6870 would always be exposed to the fallacy of equivocation. Such a view is against the philosophers, who proved many things about | |
| 6871 God, and also against what the Apostle says: "The invisible things of God are clearly seen being understood by | |
| 6872 the things that are made" ( | |
| 6873 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q13_A5-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.1.20" target="asv">Rom. 1:20</a>). Therefore it must be said that these names are said of God and creatures in an analogous sense, i.e. according to proportion. | |
| 6874 </p><p id="FP_Q13_A5-p9"> Now names are thus used in two ways: either according as many things are proportionate to one, thus for example "healthy" | |
| 6875 predicated of medicine and urine in relation and in proportion to health of a body, of which the former is the sign and the | |
| 6876 latter the cause: or according as one thing is proportionate to another, thus "healthy" is said of medicine and animal, since | |
| 6877 medicine is the cause of health in the animal body. And in this way some things are said of God and creatures | |
| 6878 analogically, and not in a purely equivocal nor in a purely univocal sense. For we can name God only from creatures | |
| 6879 <a id="FP_Q13_A5-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q13_A1.html">(A[1])</a>. Thus whatever is said of God and creatures, is said according to the relation of a creature to God as its principle and | |
| 6880 cause, wherein all perfections of things pre-exist excellently. Now this mode of community of idea is a mean between pure | |
| 6881 equivocation and simple univocation. For in analogies the idea is not, as it is in univocals, one and the | |
| 6882 same, yet it is not totally diverse as in equivocals; but a term which is thus used in a multiple sense signifies various | |
| 6883 proportions to some one thing; thus "healthy" applied to urine signifies the sign of animal health, and applied to medicine | |
| 6884 signifies the cause of the same health. | |
| 6885 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 13 a. 5 co."><a name="28826" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28826] Iª q. 13 a. 5 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum | |
| 6886 quod impossibile est aliquid praedicari de Deo et creaturis | |
| 6887 univoce. Quia omnis effectus non adaequans virtutem causae agentis, | |
| 6888 recipit similitudinem agentis non secundum eandem rationem, sed | |
| 6889 deficienter, ita ut quod divisim et multipliciter est in | |
| 6890 effectibus, in causa est simpliciter et eodem modo; sicut sol | |
| 6891 secundum unam virtutem, multiformes et varias formas in istis | |
| 6892 inferioribus producit. Eodem modo, ut supra dictum est, omnes rerum | |
| 6893 perfectiones, quae sunt in rebus creatis divisim et multipliciter, | |
| 6894 in Deo praeexistunt unite. Sic igitur, cum aliquod nomen ad | |
| 6895 perfectionem pertinens de creatura dicitur, significat illam | |
| 6896 perfectionem ut distinctam secundum rationem definitionis ab aliis, | |
| 6897 puta cum hoc nomen sapiens de homine dicitur, significamus aliquam | |
| 6898 perfectionem distinctam ab essentia hominis, et a potentia et ab | |
| 6899 esse ipsius, et ab omnibus huiusmodi. Sed cum hoc nomen de Deo | |
| 6900 dicimus, non intendimus significare aliquid distinctum ab essentia | |
| 6901 vel potentia vel esse ipsius. Et sic, cum hoc nomen sapiens de | |
| 6902 homine dicitur, quodammodo circumscribit et comprehendit rem | |
| 6903 significatam, non autem cum dicitur de Deo, sed relinquit rem | |
| 6904 significatam ut incomprehensam, et excedentem nominis | |
| 6905 significationem. Unde patet quod non secundum eandem rationem hoc | |
| 6906 nomen sapiens de Deo et de homine dicitur. Et eadem ratio est de | |
| 6907 aliis. Unde nullum nomen univoce de Deo et creaturis praedicatur. | |
| 6908 Sed nec etiam pure aequivoce, ut aliqui dixerunt. Quia secundum | |
| 6909 hoc, ex creaturis nihil posset cognosci de Deo, nec demonstrari; | |
| 6910 sed semper incideret fallacia aequivocationis. Et hoc est tam | |
| 6911 contra philosophos, qui multa demonstrative de Deo probant, quam | |
| 6912 etiam contra apostolum dicentem, Rom. I, <i>invisibilia Dei per ea | |
| 6913 quae facta sunt, intellecta, conspiciuntur</i>. Dicendum est igitur | |
| 6914 quod huiusmodi nomina dicuntur de Deo et creaturis secundum | |
| 6915 analogiam, idest proportionem. Quod quidem dupliciter contingit in | |
| 6916 nominibus, vel quia multa habent proportionem ad unum, sicut sanum | |
| 6917 dicitur de medicina et urina, inquantum utrumque habet ordinem et | |
| 6918 proportionem ad sanitatem animalis, cuius hoc quidem signum est, | |
| 6919 illud vero causa; vel ex eo quod unum habet proportionem ad | |
| 6920 alterum, sicut sanum dicitur de medicina et animali, inquantum | |
| 6921 medicina est causa sanitatis quae est in animali. Et hoc modo | |
| 6922 aliqua dicuntur de Deo et creaturis analogice, et non aequivoce | |
| 6923 pure, neque univoce. Non enim possumus nominare Deum nisi ex | |
| 6924 creaturis, ut supra dictum est. Et sic, quidquid dicitur de Deo et | |
| 6925 creaturis, dicitur secundum quod est aliquis ordo creaturae ad | |
| 6926 Deum, ut ad principium et causam, in qua praeexistunt excellenter | |
| 6927 omnes rerum perfectiones. Et iste modus communitatis medius est | |
| 6928 inter puram aequivocationem et simplicem univocationem. Neque enim | |
| 6929 in his quae analogice dicuntur, est una ratio, sicut est in | |
| 6930 univocis; nec totaliter diversa, sicut in aequivocis; sed nomen | |
| 6931 quod sic multipliciter dicitur, significat diversas proportiones ad | |
| 6932 aliquid unum; sicut sanum, de urina dictum, significat signum | |
| 6933 sanitatis animalis, de medicina vero dictum, significat causam | |
| 6934 eiusdem sanitatis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q13_A5-p10"> | |
| 6935 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Although equivocal predications must be reduced to univocal, still in actions, the non-univocal agent must precede the univocal | |
| 6936 agent. For the non-univocal agent is the universal cause of the whole species, as for instance the sun is the cause of the | |
| 6937 generation of all men; whereas the univocal agent is not the universal efficient cause of the whole species (otherwise it | |
| 6938 would be the cause of itself, since it is contained in the species), but is a | |
| 6939 particular cause of this individual which it places under the species by way of participation. Therefore the universal cause | |
| 6940 of the whole species is not an univocal agent; and the universal cause comes before the particular cause. But this universal | |
| 6941 agent, whilst it is not univocal, nevertheless is not altogether equivocal, otherwise it could not produce its own likeness, | |
| 6942 but rather it is to be called an analogical agent, as all univocal predications are reduced to one first non-univocal | |
| 6943 analogical predication, which is being. | |
| 6944 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 13 a. 5 ad 1"><a name="28827" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28827] Iª q. 13 a. 5 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo | |
| 6945 dicendum quod, licet in praedicationibus oporteat aequivoca ad | |
| 6946 univoca reduci, tamen in actionibus agens non univocum ex | |
| 6947 necessitate praecedit agens univocum. Agens enim non univocum est | |
| 6948 causa universalis totius speciei, ut sol est causa generationis | |
| 6949 omnium hominum. Agens vero univocum non est causa agens universalis | |
| 6950 totius speciei (alioquin esset causa sui ipsius, cum sub specie | |
| 6951 contineatur), sed est causa particularis respectu huius individui, | |
| 6952 quod in participatione speciei constituit. Causa igitur universalis | |
| 6953 totius speciei non est agens univocum. Causa autem universalis est | |
| 6954 prior particulari. Hoc autem agens universale, licet non sit | |
| 6955 univocum, non tamen est omnino aequivocum, quia sic non faceret | |
| 6956 sibi simile; sed potest dici agens analogicum, sicut in | |
| 6957 praedicationibus omnia univoca reducuntur ad unum primum, non | |
| 6958 univocum, sed analogicum, quod est ens.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q13_A5-p11"> | |
| 6959 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The likeness of the creature to God is imperfect, for it does not represent one and the same generic thing ( | |
| 6960 <a id="FP_Q13_A5-p11.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q4_A3.html">Q[4], A[3]</a>). | |
| 6961 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 13 a. 5 ad 2"><a name="28828" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28828] Iª q. 13 a. 5 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 6962 dicendum quod similitudo creaturae ad Deum est imperfecta, quia | |
| 6963 etiam nec idem secundum genus repraesentat, ut supra dictum | |
| 6964 est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q13_A5-p12"> | |
| 6965 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> God is not the measure proportioned to things measured; hence it is not necessary that God and creatures should be in the | |
| 6966 same genus. | |
| 6967 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 13 a. 5 ad 3"><a name="28829" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28829] Iª q. 13 a. 5 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 6968 dicendum quod Deus non est mensura proportionata mensuratis. Unde | |
| 6969 non oportet quod Deus et creaturae sub uno genere contineantur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q13_A5-p13"><b>Reply to Objections:</b> The arguments adduced in the contrary sense prove indeed that these names are not predicated univocally of God and creatures; | |
| 6970 yet they do not prove that they are predicated equivocally. | |
| 6971 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 13 a. 5 ad 4"><a name="28830" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28830] Iª q. 13 a. 5 ad 4</span></a> Ea vero quae sunt | |
| 6972 in contrarium, concludunt quod non univoce huiusmodi nomina de Deo | |
| 6973 et creaturis praedicentur, non autem quod aequivoce.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q13_A6" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q13_A6-p0.1">Q. 13. A. 6. Whether names predicated of God are predicated primarily of creatures?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q13_A6-p2"> | |
| 6974 <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that names are predicated primarily of creatures rather than of God. For we name anything accordingly as we know | |
| 6975 it, since "names", as the Philosopher says, "are signs of ideas." But we know creatures before we know God. Therefore the | |
| 6976 names imposed by us are predicated primarily of creatures rather than of God. | |
| 6977 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 13 a. 6 arg. 1"><a name="28831" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28831] Iª q. 13 a. 6 arg. 1</span></a> Ad sextum sic | |
| 6978 proceditur. Videtur quod nomina per prius dicantur de creaturis | |
| 6979 quam de Deo. Secundum enim quod cognoscimus aliquid, secundum hoc | |
| 6980 illud nominamus; cum nomina, secundum philosophum, sint signa | |
| 6981 intellectuum. Sed per prius cognoscimus creaturam quam Deum. Ergo | |
| 6982 nomina a nobis imposita, per prius conveniunt creaturis quam | |
| 6983 Deo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q13_A6-p3"> | |
| 6984 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. i): "We name God from creatures." But names transferred from creatures to God, are said | |
| 6985 primarily of creatures rather than of God, as "lion," "stone," and the like. Therefore all names applied to God and creatures | |
| 6986 are applied primarily to creatures rather than to God. | |
| 6987 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 13 a. 6 arg. 2"><a name="28832" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28832] Iª q. 13 a. 6 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 6988 secundum Dionysium, in libro de Div. Nom., Deum ex creaturis | |
| 6989 nominamus. Sed nomina a creaturis translata in Deum, per prius | |
| 6990 dicuntur de creaturis quam de Deo; sicut leo, lapis, et huiusmodi. | |
| 6991 Ergo omnia nomina quae de Deo et de creaturis dicuntur, per prius | |
| 6992 de creaturis quam de Deo dicuntur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q13_A6-p4"> | |
| 6993 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, all names equally applied to God and creatures, are applied to God as the cause of all creatures, as Dionysius says | |
| 6994 (De Mystica Theol.). But what is applied to anything through its cause, is applied to it secondarily, for "healthy" is primarily | |
| 6995 predicated of animal rather than of medicine, which is the cause of health. Therefore these names are said primarily of creatures | |
| 6996 rather than of God. | |
| 6997 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 13 a. 6 arg. 3"><a name="28833" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28833] Iª q. 13 a. 6 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, omnia | |
| 6998 nomina quae communiter de Deo et creaturis dicuntur, dicuntur de | |
| 6999 Deo sicut de causa omnium, ut dicit Dionysius. Sed quod dicitur de | |
| 7000 aliquo per causam, per posterius de illo dicitur, per prius enim | |
| 7001 dicitur animal sanum quam medicina, quae est causa sanitatis. Ergo | |
| 7002 huiusmodi nomina per prius dicuntur de creaturis quam de Deo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q13_A6-p5"> | |
| 7003 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written, "I bow my knees to the Father, of our Lord Jesus Christ, of Whom all paternity in heaven and earth is named" | |
| 7004 ( | |
| 7005 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q13_A6-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Eph.3.14" target="asv">Eph. 3:14,15</a>); and the same applies to the other names applied to God and creatures. Therefore these names are applied primarily to God | |
| 7006 rather than to creatures. | |
| 7007 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 13 a. 6 s. c."><a name="28834" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28834] Iª q. 13 a. 6 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est | |
| 7008 quod dicitur Ephes. III, <i>flecto genua mea ad patrem domini | |
| 7009 nostri Iesu, ex quo omnis paternitas in caelo et in terra | |
| 7010 nominatur</i>. Et eadem ratio videtur de nominibus aliis quae de | |
| 7011 Deo et creaturis dicuntur. Ergo huiusmodi nomina per prius de Deo | |
| 7012 quam de creaturis dicuntur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q13_A6-p6"> | |
| 7013 <b>I answer that,</b> In names predicated of many in an analogical sense, all are predicated because they have reference to some one thing; and | |
| 7014 this one thing must be placed in the definition of them all. And since that expressed by the name is the definition, as the | |
| 7015 Philosopher says (Metaph. iv), such a name must be applied primarily to that which is put in the definition of such other | |
| 7016 things, and secondarily to these others according as they approach more or less to that first. | |
| 7017 Thus, for instance, "healthy" applied to animals comes into the definition of "healthy" applied to medicine, which is called | |
| 7018 healthy as being the cause of health in the animal; and also into the definition of "healthy" which is applied to urine, which | |
| 7019 is called healthy in so far as it is the sign of the animal's health. Thus all names applied metaphorically to God, are applied | |
| 7020 to creatures primarily rather than to God, because when said of God they mean only similitudes to such creatures. For | |
| 7021 as "smiling" applied to a field means only that the field in the beauty of its flowering is like the beauty of the human smile | |
| 7022 by proportionate likeness, so the name of "lion" applied to God means only that God manifests strength in His works, as a | |
| 7023 lion in his. Thus it is clear that applied to God the signification of names can be defined only from what is said of creatures. | |
| 7024 But to other names not applied to God in a metaphorical sense, the same rule would apply if they were spoken of God as | |
| 7025 the cause only, as some have supposed. For when it is said, "God is good," it would then only mean "God is the cause of the | |
| 7026 creature's goodness"; thus the term good applied to God would included in its meaning the creature's goodness. Hence "good" | |
| 7027 would apply primarily to creatures rather than to God. But as was shown above | |
| 7028 <a id="FP_Q13_A6-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q13_A2.html">(A[2])</a>, these names are applied to God not as the cause only, but also essentially. For the words, "God is good," or "wise," signify | |
| 7029 not only that | |
| 7030 He is the cause of wisdom or goodness, but that these exist in Him in a more excellent way. Hence as regards what the name | |
| 7031 signifies, these names are applied primarily to God rather than to creatures, because these perfections flow from God to creatures; | |
| 7032 but as regards the imposition of the names, they are primarily applied by us to creatures which we know first. Hence they | |
| 7033 have a mode of signification which belongs to creatures, as said above | |
| 7034 <a id="FP_Q13_A6-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q13_A3.html">(A[3])</a>. | |
| 7035 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 13 a. 6 co."><a name="28835" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28835] Iª q. 13 a. 6 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum | |
| 7036 quod in omnibus nominibus quae de pluribus analogice dicuntur, | |
| 7037 necesse est quod omnia dicantur per respectum ad unum, et ideo | |
| 7038 illud unum oportet quod ponatur in definitione omnium. Et quia | |
| 7039 ratio quam significat nomen, est definitio, ut dicitur in IV | |
| 7040 Metaphys., necesse est quod illud nomen per prius dicatur de eo | |
| 7041 quod ponitur in definitione aliorum, et per posterius de aliis, | |
| 7042 secundum ordinem quo appropinquant ad illud primum vel magis vel | |
| 7043 minus, sicut sanum quod dicitur de animali, cadit in definitione | |
| 7044 sani quod dicitur de medicina, quae dicitur sana inquantum causat | |
| 7045 sanitatem in animali; et in definitione sani quod dicitur de urina, | |
| 7046 quae dicitur sana inquantum est signum sanitatis animalis. Sic ergo | |
| 7047 omnia nomina quae metaphorice de Deo dicuntur, per prius de | |
| 7048 creaturis dicuntur quam de Deo, quia dicta de Deo, nihil aliud | |
| 7049 significant quam similitudines ad tales creaturas. Sicut enim | |
| 7050 ridere, dictum de prato, nihil aliud significat quam quod pratum | |
| 7051 similiter se habet in decore cum floret, sicut homo cum ridet, | |
| 7052 secundum similitudinem proportionis; sic nomen leonis, dictum de | |
| 7053 Deo, nihil aliud significat quam quod Deus similiter se habet ut | |
| 7054 fortiter operetur in suis operibus, sicut leo in suis. Et sic patet | |
| 7055 quod, secundum quod dicuntur de Deo, eorum significatio definiri | |
| 7056 non potest, nisi per illud quod de creaturis dicitur. De aliis | |
| 7057 autem nominibus, quae non metaphorice dicuntur de Deo, esset etiam | |
| 7058 eadem ratio, si dicerentur de Deo causaliter tantum, ut quidam | |
| 7059 posuerunt. Sic enim. Cum dicitur Deus est bonus, nihil aliud esset | |
| 7060 quam Deus est causa bonitatis creaturae, et sic hoc nomen bonum, | |
| 7061 dictum de Deo, clauderet in suo intellectu bonitatem creaturae. | |
| 7062 Unde bonum per prius diceretur de creatura quam de Deo. Sed supra | |
| 7063 ostensum est quod huiusmodi nomina non solum dicuntur de Deo | |
| 7064 causaliter, sed etiam essentialiter. Cum enim dicitur Deus est | |
| 7065 bonus, vel sapiens, non solum significatur quod ipse sit causa | |
| 7066 sapientiae vel bonitatis, sed quod haec in eo eminentius | |
| 7067 praeexistunt. Unde, secundum hoc, dicendum est quod, quantum ad rem | |
| 7068 significatam per nomen, per prius dicuntur de Deo quam de | |
| 7069 creaturis, quia a Deo huiusmodi perfectiones in creaturas manant. | |
| 7070 Sed quantum ad impositionem nominis, per prius a nobis imponuntur | |
| 7071 creaturis, quas prius cognoscimus. Unde et modum significandi | |
| 7072 habent qui competit creaturis, ut supra dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q13_A6-p7"> | |
| 7073 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This objection refers to the imposition of the name. | |
| 7074 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 13 a. 6 ad 1"><a name="28836" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28836] Iª q. 13 a. 6 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo | |
| 7075 dicendum quod obiectio illa procedit quantum ad impositionem | |
| 7076 nominis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q13_A6-p8"> | |
| 7077 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The same rule does not apply to metaphorical and to other names, as said above. | |
| 7078 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 13 a. 6 ad 2"><a name="28837" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28837] Iª q. 13 a. 6 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 7079 dicendum quod non est eadem ratio de nominibus quae metaphorice de | |
| 7080 Deo dicuntur, et de aliis, ut dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q13_A6-p9"> | |
| 7081 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This objection would be valid if these names were applied to God only as cause, and not also essentially, for instance as | |
| 7082 "healthy" is applied to medicine. | |
| 7083 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 13 a. 6 ad 3"><a name="28838" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28838] Iª q. 13 a. 6 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 7084 dicendum quod obiectio illa procederet, si huiusmodi nomina solum | |
| 7085 de Deo causaliter dicerentur et non essentialiter, sicut sanum de | |
| 7086 medicina.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q13_A7" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q13_A7-p0.1">Q. 13. A. 7. Whether names which imply relation to creatures are predicated of God temporally?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q13_A7-p2"> | |
| 7087 <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that names which imply relation to creatures are not predicated of God temporally. For all such names signify the | |
| 7088 divine substance, as is universally held. Hence also Ambrose (De Fide i) that this name "Lord" is the name of power, which | |
| 7089 is the divine substance; and "Creator" signifies the action of God, which is His essence. Now the divine substance is not | |
| 7090 temporal, but eternal. Therefore these names are not applied to God temporally, but | |
| 7091 eternally. | |
| 7092 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 13 a. 7 arg. 1"><a name="28839" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28839] Iª q. 13 a. 7 arg. 1</span></a> Ad septimum sic | |
| 7093 proceditur. Videtur quod nomina quae important relationem ad | |
| 7094 creaturas, non dicantur de Deo ex tempore. Omnia enim huiusmodi | |
| 7095 nomina significant divinam substantiam, ut communiter dicitur. Unde | |
| 7096 et Ambrosius dicit quod hoc nomen dominus est nomen potestatis, | |
| 7097 quae est divina substantia, et creator significat Dei actionem, | |
| 7098 quae est eius essentia. Sed divina substantia non est temporalis, | |
| 7099 sed aeterna. Ergo huiusmodi nomina non dicuntur de Deo ex tempore, | |
| 7100 sed ab aeterno.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q13_A7-p3"> | |
| 7101 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, that to which something applies temporally can be described as made; for what is white temporally is made white. | |
| 7102 But to make does no apply to God. Therefore nothing can be predicated of God temporally. | |
| 7103 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 13 a. 7 arg. 2"><a name="28840" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28840] Iª q. 13 a. 7 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 7104 cuicumque convenit aliquid ex tempore, potest dici factum, quod | |
| 7105 enim ex tempore est album, fit album. Sed Deo non convenit esse | |
| 7106 factum. Ergo de Deo nihil praedicatur ex tempore.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q13_A7-p4"> | |
| 7107 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if any names are applied to God temporally as implying relation to creatures, the same rule holds good of all things | |
| 7108 that imply relation to creatures. But some names are spoken of God implying relation of God to creatures from eternity; for | |
| 7109 from eternity He knew and loved the creature, according to the word: "I have loved thee with an everlasting love" ( | |
| 7110 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q13_A7-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Jer.31.3" target="asv">Jer. 31:3</a>). Therefore also other names implying relation to creatures, as | |
| 7111 "Lord" and "Creator," are applied to God from eternity. | |
| 7112 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 13 a. 7 arg. 3"><a name="28841" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28841] Iª q. 13 a. 7 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, si | |
| 7113 aliqua nomina dicuntur de Deo ex tempore propter hoc quod important | |
| 7114 relationem ad creaturas, eadem ratio videtur de omnibus quae | |
| 7115 relationem ad creaturas important. Sed quaedam nomina importantia | |
| 7116 relationem ad creaturas, dicuntur de Deo ab aeterno, ab aeterno | |
| 7117 enim scivit creaturam et dilexit, secundum illud Ierem. XXXI, <i>in | |
| 7118 caritate perpetua dilexi te</i>. Ergo et alia nomina quae important | |
| 7119 relationem ad creaturas, ut dominus et creator, dicuntur de Deo ab | |
| 7120 aeterno.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q13_A7-p5"> | |
| 7121 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, names of this kind signify relation. Therefore that relation must be something in God, or in the creature only. | |
| 7122 But it cannot be that it is something in the creature only, for in that case God would be called "Lord" from the opposite | |
| 7123 relation which is in creatures; and nothing is named from its opposite. Therefore the relation must be something in God also. | |
| 7124 But nothing temporal can be in God, for He is above time. Therefore these names are not applied | |
| 7125 to God temporally. | |
| 7126 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 13 a. 7 arg. 4"><a name="28842" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28842] Iª q. 13 a. 7 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 7127 huiusmodi nomina relationem significant. Oportet igitur quod | |
| 7128 relatio illa vel sit aliquid in Deo, vel in creatura tantum. Sed | |
| 7129 non potest esse quod sit in creatura tantum, quia sic Deus | |
| 7130 denominaretur dominus a relatione opposita, quae est in creaturis; | |
| 7131 nihil autem denominatur a suo opposito. Relinquitur ergo quod | |
| 7132 relatio est etiam aliquid in Deo. Sed in Deo nihil potest esse ex | |
| 7133 tempore, cum ipse sit supra tempus. Ergo videtur quod huiusmodi | |
| 7134 nomina non dicantur de Deo ex tempore.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q13_A7-p6"> | |
| 7135 <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, a thing is called relative from relation; for instance lord from lordship, as white from whiteness. Therefore if | |
| 7136 the relation of lordship is not really in God, but only in idea, it follows that God is not really Lord, which is plainly | |
| 7137 false. | |
| 7138 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 13 a. 7 arg. 5"><a name="28843" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28843] Iª q. 13 a. 7 arg. 5</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 7139 secundum relationem dicitur aliquid relative, puta secundum | |
| 7140 dominium dominus, sicut secundum albedinem albus. Si igitur relatio | |
| 7141 dominii non est in Deo secundum rem, sed solum secundum rationem, | |
| 7142 sequitur quod Deus non sit realiter dominus, quod patet esse | |
| 7143 falsum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q13_A7-p7"> | |
| 7144 <b>Objection 6:</b> Further, in relative things which are not simultaneous in nature, one can exist without the other; as a thing knowable can | |
| 7145 exist without the knowledge of it, as the Philosopher says (Praedic. v). But relative things which are said of God and creatures | |
| 7146 are not simultaneous in nature. Therefore a relation can be predicated of God to the creature even without the existence of | |
| 7147 the creature; and thus these names "Lord" and "Creator" are predicated of God from | |
| 7148 eternity, and not temporally. | |
| 7149 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 13 a. 7 arg. 6"><a name="28844" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28844] Iª q. 13 a. 7 arg. 6</span></a> Praeterea, in | |
| 7150 relativis quae non sunt simul natura, unum potest esse, altero non | |
| 7151 existente, sicut scibile existit, non existente scientia, ut | |
| 7152 dicitur in praedicamentis. Sed relativa quae dicuntur de Deo et | |
| 7153 creaturis, non sunt simul natura. Ergo potest aliquid dici relative | |
| 7154 de Deo ad creaturam, etiam creatura non existente. Et sic huiusmodi | |
| 7155 nomina, dominus et creator, dicuntur de Deo ab aeterno, et non ex | |
| 7156 tempore.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q13_A7-p8"> | |
| 7157 <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Trin. v) that this relative appellation "Lord" is applied to God temporally. | |
| 7158 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 13 a. 7 s. c."><a name="28845" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28845] Iª q. 13 a. 7 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est | |
| 7159 quod dicit Augustinus, V de Trin., quod haec relativa appellatio | |
| 7160 dominus Deo convenit ex tempore.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q13_A7-p9"> | |
| 7161 <b>I answer that,</b> The names which import relation to creatures are applied to God temporally, and not from eternity. | |
| 7162 </p><p id="FP_Q13_A7-p10"> To see this we must learn that some have said that relation is not a reality, but only an idea. But this is plainly seen | |
| 7163 to be false from the very fact that things themselves have a mutual natural order and habitude. Nevertheless it is necessary | |
| 7164 to know that since relation has two extremes, it happens in three ways that a relation is real or logical. Sometimes from | |
| 7165 both extremes it is an idea only, as when mutual order or habitude can only go between things in the apprehension | |
| 7166 of reason; as when we say a thing "the same as itself." For reason apprehending one thing twice regards it as two; thus it | |
| 7167 apprehends a certain habitude of a thing to itself. And the same applies to relations between "being" and "non-being" formed | |
| 7168 by reason, apprehending "non-being" as an extreme. The same is true of relations that follow upon an act of reason, as genus | |
| 7169 and species, and the like. | |
| 7170 </p><p id="FP_Q13_A7-p11"> Now there are other relations which are realities as regards both extremes, as when for instance a habitude exists between | |
| 7171 two things according to some reality that belongs to both; as is clear of all relations, consequent upon quantity; as great | |
| 7172 and small, double and half, and the like; for quantity exists in both extremes: and the same applies to relations consequent | |
| 7173 upon action and passion, as motive power and the movable thing, father and son, and the like. | |
| 7174 </p><p id="FP_Q13_A7-p12"> Again, sometimes a relation in one extreme may be a reality, while in the other extreme it is an idea only; and this happens | |
| 7175 whenever two extremes are not of one order; as sense and science refer respectively to sensible things and to intellectual | |
| 7176 things; which, inasmuch as they are realities existing in nature, are outside the order of sensible and intellectual existence. | |
| 7177 Therefore in science and in sense a real relation exists, because they are ordered either to the knowledge | |
| 7178 or to the sensible perception of things; whereas the things looked at in themselves are outside this order, and hence in them | |
| 7179 there is no real relation to science and sense, but only in idea, inasmuch as the intellect apprehends them as terms of the | |
| 7180 relations of science and sense. Hence the Philosopher says (Metaph. v) that they are called relative, not forasmuch as they | |
| 7181 are related to other things, but as others are related to them. Likewise for instance, "on the right" is not applied to a | |
| 7182 column, unless it stands as regards an animal on the right side; which relation is not really in the column, but in the animal. | |
| 7183 </p><p id="FP_Q13_A7-p13"> Since therefore God is outside the whole order of creation, and all creatures are ordered to Him, and not conversely, it | |
| 7184 is manifest that creatures are really related to God Himself; whereas in God there is no real relation to creatures, but a | |
| 7185 relation only in idea, inasmuch as creatures are referred to Him. Thus there is nothing to prevent these names which import | |
| 7186 relation to the creature from being predicated of God temporally, not by reason of any change in Him, but by reason | |
| 7187 of the change of the creature; as a column is on the right of an animal, without change in itself, but by change in the animal. | |
| 7188 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 13 a. 7 co."><a name="28846" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28846] Iª q. 13 a. 7 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum | |
| 7189 quod quaedam nomina importantia relationem ad creaturam, ex tempore | |
| 7190 de Deo dicuntur, et non ab aeterno. Ad cuius evidentiam, sciendum | |
| 7191 est quod quidam posuerunt relationem non esse rem naturae, sed | |
| 7192 rationis tantum. Quod quidem apparet esse falsum, ex hoc quod ipsae | |
| 7193 res naturalem ordinem et habitudinem habent ad invicem. Veruntamen | |
| 7194 sciendum est quod, cum relatio requirat duo extrema, tripliciter se | |
| 7195 habere potest ad hoc quod sit res naturae et rationis. Quandoque | |
| 7196 enim ex utraque parte est res rationis tantum, quando scilicet ordo | |
| 7197 vel habitudo non potest esse inter aliqua, nisi secundum | |
| 7198 apprehensionem rationis tantum, utpote cum dicimus idem eidem idem. | |
| 7199 Nam secundum quod ratio apprehendit bis aliquod unum, statuit illud | |
| 7200 ut duo; et sic apprehendit quandam habitudinem ipsius ad seipsum. | |
| 7201 Et similiter est de omnibus relationibus quae sunt inter ens et non | |
| 7202 ens; quas format ratio, inquantum apprehendit non ens ut quoddam | |
| 7203 extremum. Et idem est de omnibus relationibus quae consequuntur | |
| 7204 actum rationis, ut genus et species, et huiusmodi. Quaedam vero | |
| 7205 relationes sunt, quantum ad utrumque extremum, res naturae, quando | |
| 7206 scilicet est habitudo inter aliqua duo secundum aliquid realiter | |
| 7207 conveniens utrique. Sicut patet de omnibus relationibus quae | |
| 7208 consequuntur quantitatem, ut magnum et parvum, duplum et dimidium, | |
| 7209 et huiusmodi, nam quantitas est in utroque extremorum. Et simile | |
| 7210 est de relationibus quae consequuntur actionem et passionem, ut | |
| 7211 motivum et mobile, pater et filius, et similia. Quandoque vero | |
| 7212 relatio in uno extremorum est res naturae, et in altero est res | |
| 7213 rationis tantum. Et hoc contingit quandocumque duo extrema non sunt | |
| 7214 unius ordinis. Sicut sensus et scientia referuntur ad sensibile et | |
| 7215 scibile, quae quidem, inquantum sunt res quaedam in esse naturali | |
| 7216 existentes, sunt extra ordinem esse sensibilis et intelligibilis, | |
| 7217 et ideo in scientia quidem et sensu est relatio realis, secundum | |
| 7218 quod ordinantur ad sciendum vel sentiendum res; sed res ipsae in se | |
| 7219 consideratae, sunt extra ordinem huiusmodi. Unde in eis non est | |
| 7220 aliqua relatio realiter ad scientiam et sensum; sed secundum | |
| 7221 rationem tantum, inquantum intellectus apprehendit ea ut terminos | |
| 7222 relationum scientiae et sensus. Unde philosophus dicit, in V | |
| 7223 Metaphys., quod non dicuntur relative eo quod ipsa referantur ad | |
| 7224 alia, sed quia alia referuntur ad ipsa. Et similiter dextrum non | |
| 7225 dicitur de columna, nisi inquantum ponitur animali ad dextram, unde | |
| 7226 huiusmodi relatio non est realiter in columna, sed in animali. Cum | |
| 7227 igitur Deus sit extra totum ordinem creaturae, et omnes creaturae | |
| 7228 ordinentur ad ipsum, et non e converso, manifestum est quod | |
| 7229 creaturae realiter referuntur ad ipsum Deum; sed in Deo non est | |
| 7230 aliqua realis relatio eius ad creaturas, sed secundum rationem | |
| 7231 tantum, inquantum creaturae referuntur ad ipsum. Et sic nihil | |
| 7232 prohibet huiusmodi nomina importantia relationem ad creaturam, | |
| 7233 praedicari de Deo ex tempore, non propter aliquam mutationem | |
| 7234 ipsius, sed propter creaturae mutationem; sicut columna fit dextera | |
| 7235 animali, nulla mutatione circa ipsam existente, sed animali | |
| 7236 translato.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q13_A7-p14"> | |
| 7237 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Some relative names are imposed to signify the relative habitudes themselves, as "master" and "servant," "father," and "son," | |
| 7238 and the like, and these relatives are called predicamental [secundum esse]. But others are imposed to signify the things from | |
| 7239 which ensue certain habitudes, as the mover and the thing moved, the head and the thing that has a head, and the like: and | |
| 7240 these relatives are called transcendental [secundum dici]. Thus, there is the | |
| 7241 same two-fold difference in divine names. For some signify the habitude itself to the creature, as "Lord," and these do not | |
| 7242 signify the divine substance directly, but indirectly, in so far as they presuppose the divine substance; as dominion presupposes | |
| 7243 power, which is the divine substance. Others signify the divine essence directly, and consequently the corresponding habitudes, | |
| 7244 as "Saviour," "Creator," and suchlike; and these signify the action of God, which is His essence. Yet both names are | |
| 7245 said of God temporarily so far as they imply a habitude either principally or consequently, but not as signifying the essence, | |
| 7246 either directly or indirectly. | |
| 7247 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 13 a. 7 ad 1"><a name="28847" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28847] Iª q. 13 a. 7 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo | |
| 7248 dicendum quod relativa quaedam sunt imposita ad significandum ipsas | |
| 7249 habitudines relativas, ut dominus, servus, pater et filius, et | |
| 7250 huiusmodi, et haec dicuntur relativa secundum esse. Quaedam vero | |
| 7251 sunt imposita ad significandas res quas consequuntur quaedam | |
| 7252 habitudines, sicut movens et motum, caput et capitatum, et alia | |
| 7253 huiusmodi, quae dicuntur relativa secundum dici. Sic igitur et | |
| 7254 circa nomina divina haec differentia est consideranda. Nam quaedam | |
| 7255 significant ipsam habitudinem ad creaturam, ut dominus. Et | |
| 7256 huiusmodi non significant substantiam divinam directe, sed | |
| 7257 indirecte, inquantum praesupponunt ipsam, sicut dominium | |
| 7258 praesupponit potestatem, quae est divina substantia. Quaedam vero | |
| 7259 significant directe essentiam divinam, et ex consequenti important | |
| 7260 habitudinem; sicut salvator, creator, et huiusmodi, significant | |
| 7261 actionem Dei, quae est eius essentia. Utraque tamen nomina ex | |
| 7262 tempore de Deo dicuntur quantum ad habitudinem quam important, vel | |
| 7263 principaliter vel consequenter, non autem quantum ad hoc quod | |
| 7264 significant essentiam, vel directe vel indirecte.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q13_A7-p15"> | |
| 7265 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As relations applied to God temporally are only in God in our idea, so, "to become" or "to be made" are applied to God only | |
| 7266 in idea, with no change in Him, as for instance when we say, "Lord, Thou art become [Douay: 'hast been'] our refuge" ( | |
| 7267 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q13_A7-p15.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.89.1" target="asv">Ps. 89:1</a>). | |
| 7268 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 13 a. 7 ad 2"><a name="28848" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28848] Iª q. 13 a. 7 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 7269 dicendum quod, sicut relationes quae de Deo dicuntur ex tempore, | |
| 7270 non sunt in Deo nisi secundum rationem, ita nec fieri nec factum | |
| 7271 esse dicitur de Deo, nisi secundum rationem, nulla mutatione circa | |
| 7272 ipsum existente, sicut est id, <i>domine refugium factus es | |
| 7273 nobis</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q13_A7-p16"> | |
| 7274 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The operation of the intellect and the will is in the operator, therefore names signifying relations following upon the action | |
| 7275 of the intellect or will, are applied to God from eternity; whereas those following upon the actions proceeding according | |
| 7276 to our mode of thinking to external effects are applied to God temporally, as "Saviour," "Creator," and the like. | |
| 7277 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 13 a. 7 ad 3"><a name="28849" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28849] Iª q. 13 a. 7 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 7278 dicendum quod operatio intellectus et voluntatis est in operante, | |
| 7279 et ideo nomina quae significant relationes consequentes actionem | |
| 7280 intellectus vel voluntatis, dicuntur de Deo ab aeterno. Quae vero | |
| 7281 consequuntur actiones procedentes, secundum modum intelligendi, ad | |
| 7282 exteriores effectus, dicuntur de Deo ex tempore, ut salvator, | |
| 7283 creator, et huiusmodi.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q13_A7-p17"> | |
| 7284 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Relations signified by these names which are applied to God temporally, are in God only in idea; but the opposite relations | |
| 7285 in creatures are real. Nor is it incongruous that God should be denominated from relations really existing in the thing, yet | |
| 7286 so that the opposite relations in God should also be understood by us at the same time; in the sense that God is spoken of | |
| 7287 relatively to the creature, inasmuch as the creature is related to Him: thus the | |
| 7288 Philosopher says (Metaph. v) that the object is said to be knowable relatively because knowledge relates to it. | |
| 7289 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 13 a. 7 ad 4"><a name="28850" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28850] Iª q. 13 a. 7 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum | |
| 7290 dicendum quod relationes significatae per huiusmodi nomina quae | |
| 7291 dicuntur de Deo ex tempore, sunt in Deo secundum rationem tantum, | |
| 7292 oppositae autem relationes in creaturis sunt secundum rem. Nec est | |
| 7293 inconveniens quod a relationibus realiter existentibus in re, Deus | |
| 7294 denominetur, tamen secundum quod cointelliguntur per intellectum | |
| 7295 nostrum oppositae relationes in Deo. Ut sic Deus dicatur relative | |
| 7296 ad creaturam, quia creatura refertur ad ipsum, sicut philosophus | |
| 7297 dicit, in V Metaphys., quod scibile dicitur relative, quia scientia | |
| 7298 refertur ad ipsum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q13_A7-p18"> | |
| 7299 <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> Since God is related to the creature for the reason that the creature is related to Him: and since the relation of subjection | |
| 7300 is real in the creature, it follows that God is Lord not in idea only, but in reality; for He is called Lord according to | |
| 7301 the manner in which the creature is subject to Him. | |
| 7302 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 13 a. 7 ad 5"><a name="28851" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28851] Iª q. 13 a. 7 ad 5</span></a> Ad quintum | |
| 7303 dicendum quod, cum ea ratione referatur Deus ad creaturam, qua | |
| 7304 creatura refertur ad ipsum; cum relatio subiectionis realiter sit | |
| 7305 in creatura, sequitur quod Deus non secundum rationem tantum, sed | |
| 7306 realiter sit dominus. Eo enim modo dicitur dominus, quo creatura ei | |
| 7307 subiecta est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q13_A7-p19"> | |
| 7308 <b>Reply to Objection 6:</b> To know whether relations are simultaneous by nature or otherwise, it is not necessary by nature or otherwise of things to | |
| 7309 which they belong but the meaning of the relations themselves. For if one in its idea includes another, and vice versa, then | |
| 7310 they are simultaneous by nature: as double and half, father and son, and the like. But if one in its idea includes another, | |
| 7311 and not vice versa, they are not simultaneous by nature. This applies to science | |
| 7312 and its object; for the object knowable is considered as a potentiality, and the science as a habit, or as an act. Hence the | |
| 7313 knowable object in its mode of signification exists before science, but if the same object is considered in act, then it is | |
| 7314 simultaneous with science in act; for the object known is nothing as such unless it is known. Thus, though God is prior to | |
| 7315 the creature, still because the signification of Lord includes the idea of a servant and vice versa, these two relative terms, | |
| 7316 "Lord" and "servant," are simultaneous by nature. Hence, God was not "Lord" until He had a creature subject to Himself. | |
| 7317 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 13 a. 7 ad 6"><a name="28852" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28852] Iª q. 13 a. 7 ad 6</span></a> Ad sextum dicendum | |
| 7318 quod, ad cognoscendum utrum relativa sint simul natura vel non, non | |
| 7319 oportet considerare ordinem rerum de quibus relativa dicuntur, sed | |
| 7320 significationes ipsorum relativorum. Si enim unum in sui intellectu | |
| 7321 claudat aliud et e converso, tunc sunt simul natura, sicut duplum | |
| 7322 et dimidium, pater et filius, et similia. Si autem unum in sui | |
| 7323 intellectu claudat aliud, et non e converso, tunc non sunt simul | |
| 7324 natura. Et hoc modo se habent scientia et scibile. Nam scibile | |
| 7325 dicitur secundum potentiam, scientia autem secundum habitum, vel | |
| 7326 secundum actum. Unde scibile, secundum modum suae significationis, | |
| 7327 praeexistit scientiae. Sed si accipiatur scibile secundum actum, | |
| 7328 tunc est simul cum scientia secundum actum, nam scitum non est | |
| 7329 aliquid nisi sit eius scientia. Licet igitur Deus sit prior | |
| 7330 creaturis, quia tamen in significatione domini clauditur quod | |
| 7331 habeat servum, et e converso, ista duo relativa, dominus et servus, | |
| 7332 sunt simul natura. Unde Deus non fuit dominus, antequam haberet | |
| 7333 creaturam sibi subiectam.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q13_A8" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q13_A8-p0.1">Q. 13. A. 8. Whether this name "God" is a name of the nature?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q13_A8-p2"> | |
| 7334 <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that this name, "God," is not a name of the nature. For Damascene says (De Fide Orth. 1) that "God {Theos} is so | |
| 7335 called from the {theein} [which means to care of] and to cherish all things; or from the {aithein}, that is to burn, for our | |
| 7336 God is a fire consuming all malice; or from {theasthai}, which means to consider all things." But all these names belong to | |
| 7337 operation. Therefore this name "God" signifies His operation and not His nature. | |
| 7338 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 13 a. 8 arg. 1"><a name="28853" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28853] Iª q. 13 a. 8 arg. 1</span></a> Ad octavum sic | |
| 7339 proceditur. Videtur quod hoc nomen Deus non sit nomen naturae. | |
| 7340 Dicit enim Damascenus, in I libro, quod <i>Deus dicitur a | |
| 7341 theein</i>, quod est currere, et fovere universa; <i>vel ab | |
| 7342 aethein, idest ardere (Deus enim noster ignis consumens est omnem | |
| 7343 malitiam); vel a theasthai</i>, quod est considerare, omnia. Haec | |
| 7344 autem omnia ad operationem pertinent. Ergo hoc nomen Deus | |
| 7345 operationem significat, et non naturam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q13_A8-p3"> | |
| 7346 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, a thing is named by us as we know it. But the divine nature is unknown to us. Therefore this name "God" does not | |
| 7347 signify the divine nature. | |
| 7348 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 13 a. 8 arg. 2"><a name="28854" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28854] Iª q. 13 a. 8 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 7349 secundum hoc aliquid nominatur a nobis, secundum quod cognoscitur. | |
| 7350 Sed divina natura est nobis ignota. Ergo hoc nomen Deus non | |
| 7351 significat naturam divinam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q13_A8-p4"> | |
| 7352 <b>On the contrary,</b> Ambrose says (De Fide i) that "God" is a name of the nature. | |
| 7353 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 13 a. 8 s. c."><a name="28855" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28855] Iª q. 13 a. 8 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est | |
| 7354 quod dicit Ambrosius, in libro I de fide, quod Deus est nomen | |
| 7355 naturae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q13_A8-p5"> | |
| 7356 <b>I answer that,</b> Whence a name is imposed, and what the name signifies are not always the same thing. For as we know substance from its properties | |
| 7357 and operations, so we name substance sometimes for its operation, or its property; e.g. we name the substance of a stone from | |
| 7358 its act, as for instance that it hurts the foot [loedit pedem]; but still this name is not meant to signify the particular | |
| 7359 action, but the stone's substance. The things, on the other hand, known to us in | |
| 7360 themselves, such as heat, cold, whiteness and the like, are not named from other things. Hence as regards such things the | |
| 7361 meaning of the name and its source are the same. | |
| 7362 </p><p id="FP_Q13_A8-p6"> Because therefore God is not known to us in His nature, but is made known to us from His operations or effects, we name Him | |
| 7363 from these, as said in A[1]; hence this name "God" is a name of operation so far as relates to the source of its meaning. | |
| 7364 For this name is imposed from His universal providence over all things; since all who speak of God intend to name God as exercising | |
| 7365 providence over all; hence Dionysius says (Div. Nom. ii), "The Deity watches over all with perfect | |
| 7366 providence and goodness." But taken from this operation, this name "God" is imposed to signify the divine nature. | |
| 7367 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 13 a. 8 co."><a name="28856" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28856] Iª q. 13 a. 8 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum | |
| 7368 quod non est semper idem id a quo imponitur nomen ad significandum, | |
| 7369 et id ad quod significandum nomen imponitur. Sicut enim substantiam | |
| 7370 rei ex proprietatibus vel operationibus eius cognoscimus, ita | |
| 7371 substantiam rei denominamus quandoque ab aliqua eius operatione vel | |
| 7372 proprietate, sicut substantiam lapidis denominamus ab aliqua | |
| 7373 actione eius, quia laedit pedem; non tamen hoc nomen impositum est | |
| 7374 ad significandum hanc actionem, sed substantiam lapidis. Si qua | |
| 7375 vero sunt quae secundum se sunt nota nobis, ut calor, frigus, | |
| 7376 albedo, et huiusmodi, non ab aliis denominantur. Unde in talibus | |
| 7377 idem est quod nomen significat, et id a quo imponitur nomen ad | |
| 7378 significandum. Quia igitur Deus non est notus nobis in sui natura, | |
| 7379 sed innotescit nobis ex operationibus vel effectibus eius, ex his | |
| 7380 possumus eum nominare, ut supra dictum est. Unde hoc nomen Deus est | |
| 7381 nomen operationis, quantum ad id a quo imponitur ad significandum. | |
| 7382 Imponitur enim hoc nomen ab universali rerum providentia, omnes | |
| 7383 enim loquentes de Deo, hoc intendunt nominare Deum, quod habet | |
| 7384 providentiam universalem de rebus. Unde dicit Dionysius, XII cap. | |
| 7385 de Div. Nom., quod <i>deitas est quae omnia videt providentia et | |
| 7386 bonitate perfecta</i>. Ex hac autem operatione hoc nomen Deus | |
| 7387 assumptum, impositum est ad significandum divinam naturam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q13_A8-p7"> | |
| 7388 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> All that Damascene says refers to providence; which is the source of the signification of the name "God." | |
| 7389 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 13 a. 8 ad 1"><a name="28857" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28857] Iª q. 13 a. 8 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo | |
| 7390 dicendum quod omnia quae posuit Damascenus, pertinent ad | |
| 7391 providentiam, a qua imponitur hoc nomen Deus ad significandum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q13_A8-p8"> | |
| 7392 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> We can name a thing according to the knowledge we have of its nature from its properties and effects. Hence because we can | |
| 7393 know what stone is in itself from its property, this name "stone" signifies the nature of the stone itself; for it signifies | |
| 7394 the definition of stone, by which we know what it is, for the idea which the name signifies is the definition, as is said | |
| 7395 in Metaph. iv. Now from the divine effects we cannot know the divine nature in | |
| 7396 itself, so as to know what it is; but only by way of eminence, and by way of causality, and of negation as stated above ( | |
| 7397 <a id="FP_Q13_A8-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q12_A12.html">Q[12], A[12]</a>). Thus the name "God" signifies the divine nature, for this name was imposed to signify something existing above all things, | |
| 7398 the principle of all things and removed from all things; for those who name God intend to signify all this. | |
| 7399 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 13 a. 8 ad 2"><a name="28858" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28858] Iª q. 13 a. 8 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 7400 dicendum quod, secundum quod naturam alicuius rei ex eius | |
| 7401 proprietatibus et effectibus cognoscere possumus, sic eam nomine | |
| 7402 possumus significare. Unde, quia substantiam lapidis ex eius | |
| 7403 proprietate possumus cognoscere secundum seipsam, sciendo quid est | |
| 7404 lapis, hoc nomen lapis ipsam lapidis naturam, secundum quod in se | |
| 7405 est, significat, significat enim definitionem lapidis, per quam | |
| 7406 scimus quid est lapis. Ratio enim quam significat nomen, est | |
| 7407 definitio, ut dicitur in IV Metaphys. Sed ex effectibus divinis | |
| 7408 divinam naturam non possumus cognoscere secundum quod in se est, ut | |
| 7409 sciamus de ea quid est; sed per modum eminentiae et causalitatis et | |
| 7410 negationis, ut supra dictum est. Et sic hoc nomen Deus significat | |
| 7411 naturam divinam. Impositum est enim nomen hoc ad aliquid | |
| 7412 significandum supra omnia existens, quod est principium omnium, et | |
| 7413 remotum ab omnibus. Hoc enim intendunt significare nominantes | |
| 7414 Deum.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q13_A9" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q13_A9-p0.1">Q. 13. A. 9. Whether this name "God" is communicable?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q13_A9-p2"> | |
| 7415 <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that this name "God" is communicable. For whosoever shares in the thing signified by a name shares in the name itself. | |
| 7416 But this name "God" signifies the divine nature, which is communicable to others, according to the words, "He hath given us | |
| 7417 great [Vulg.: 'most great'] and precious promises, that by these we [Vulg.: 'ye'] may be made partakers of the divine nature" | |
| 7418 ( | |
| 7419 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q13_A9-p2.1" href="./asv.html#iiPet.1.4" target="asv">2 Pet. 1:4</a>). Therefore this name "God" can be communicated to | |
| 7420 others. | |
| 7421 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 13 a. 9 arg. 1"><a name="28859" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28859] Iª q. 13 a. 9 arg. 1</span></a> Ad nonum sic | |
| 7422 proceditur. Videtur quod hoc nomen Deus sit communicabile. | |
| 7423 Cuicumque enim communicatur res significata per nomen, communicatur | |
| 7424 et nomen ipsum. Sed hoc nomen Deus, ut dictum est, significat | |
| 7425 divinam naturam, quae est communicabilis aliis, secundum illud II | |
| 7426 Pet. I, <i>magna et pretiosa promissa nobis donavit, ut per hoc | |
| 7427 efficiamur divinae consortes naturae</i>. Ergo hoc nomen Deus est | |
| 7428 communicabile.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q13_A9-p3"> | |
| 7429 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, only proper names are not communicable. Now this name "God" is not a proper, but an appellative noun; which appears | |
| 7430 from the fact that it has a plural, according to the text, "I have said, You are gods" ( | |
| 7431 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q13_A9-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.81.6" target="asv">Ps. 81:6</a>). Therefore this name "God" is communicable. | |
| 7432 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 13 a. 9 arg. 2"><a name="28860" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28860] Iª q. 13 a. 9 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, sola | |
| 7433 nomina propria non sunt communicabilia. Sed hoc nomen Deus non est | |
| 7434 nomen proprium, sed appellativum, quod patet ex hoc quod habet | |
| 7435 plurale, secundum illud Psalmi LXXXI, <i>ego dixi, dii estis</i>. | |
| 7436 Ergo hoc nomen Deus est communicabile.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q13_A9-p4"> | |
| 7437 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, this name "God" comes from operation, as explained. But other names given to God from His operations or effects | |
| 7438 are communicable; as "good," "wise," and the like. Therefore this name "God" is communicable. | |
| 7439 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 13 a. 9 arg. 3"><a name="28861" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28861] Iª q. 13 a. 9 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, hoc | |
| 7440 nomen Deus imponitur ab operatione, ut dictum est. Sed alia nomina | |
| 7441 quae imponuntur Deo ab operationibus, sive ab effectibus, sunt | |
| 7442 communicabilia, ut bonus, sapiens et huiusmodi. Ergo et hoc nomen | |
| 7443 Deus est communicabile.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q13_A9-p5"> | |
| 7444 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written: "They gave the incommunicable name to wood and stones" ( | |
| 7445 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q13_A9-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.14.21" target="asv">Wis. 14:21</a>), in reference to the divine name. Therefore this name "God" is incommunicable. | |
| 7446 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 13 a. 9 s. c."><a name="28862" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28862] Iª q. 13 a. 9 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est | |
| 7447 quod dicitur Sap. XIV, <i>incommunicabile nomen lignis et lapidibus | |
| 7448 imposuerunt</i>; et loquitur de nomine deitatis. Ergo hoc nomen | |
| 7449 Deus est nomen incommunicabile.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q13_A9-p6"> | |
| 7450 <b>I answer that,</b> A name is communicable in two ways: properly, and by similitude. It is properly communicable in the sense that its whole | |
| 7451 signification can be given to many; by similitude it is communicable according to some part of the signification of the name. | |
| 7452 For instance this name "lion" is properly communicable to all things of the same nature as "lion"; by similitude it is communicable | |
| 7453 to those who participate in the nature of a lion, as for instance by courage, or | |
| 7454 strength, and those who thus participate are called lions metaphorically. To know, however, what names are properly communicable, | |
| 7455 we must consider that every form existing in the singular subject, by which it is individualized, is common to many either | |
| 7456 in reality, or in idea; as human nature is common to many in reality, and in idea; whereas the nature of the sun is not common | |
| 7457 to many in reality, but only in idea; for the nature of the sun can be understood as existing in many subjects; and the | |
| 7458 reason is because the mind understands the nature of every species by abstraction from the singular. Hence to be in one singular | |
| 7459 subject or in many is outside the idea of the nature of the species. So, given the idea of a species, it can be understood | |
| 7460 as existing in many. But the singular, from the fact that it is singular, is divided off from all others. Hence every name | |
| 7461 imposed to signify any singular thing is incommunicable both in reality and idea; for the plurality of this individual thing | |
| 7462 cannot be; nor can it be conceived in idea. Hence no name signifying any individual thing is properly communicable to many, | |
| 7463 but only by way of similitude; as for instance a person can be called "Achilles" metaphorically, forasmuch as he may possess | |
| 7464 something of the properties of Achilles, such as strength. On the other hand, forms which are individualized not by any "suppositum," | |
| 7465 but by and of themselves, as being subsisting forms, if understood as they are in themselves, could not be | |
| 7466 communicable either in reality or in idea; but only perhaps by way of similitude, as was said of individuals. Forasmuch as | |
| 7467 we are unable to understand simple self-subsisting forms as they really are, we understand them as compound things having | |
| 7468 forms in matter; therefore, as was said in the first article, we give them concrete names signifying a nature existing in | |
| 7469 some "suppositum." Hence, so far as concerns images, the same rules apply to names we impose to signify the nature of compound | |
| 7470 things as to names given to us to signify simple subsisting natures. | |
| 7471 </p><p id="FP_Q13_A9-p7"> Since, then, this name "God" is given to signify the divine nature as stated above | |
| 7472 <a id="FP_Q13_A9-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q13_A8.html">(A[8])</a>, and since the divine nature cannot be multiplied as shown above ( | |
| 7473 <a id="FP_Q13_A9-p7.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q11_A3.html">Q[11], A[3]</a>), it follows that this name "God" is incommunicable in reality, but communicable in opinion; just in the same way as this | |
| 7474 name "sun" would be communicable according to the opinion of those who say there are many suns. Therefore, it is written: | |
| 7475 "You served them who | |
| 7476 by nature are not gods," ( | |
| 7477 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q13_A9-p7.3" href="./asv.html#Gal.4.8" target="asv">Gal. 4:8</a>), and a gloss adds, "Gods not in nature, but in human opinion." Nevertheless this name "God" is communicable, not in its | |
| 7478 whole signification, but in some part of it by way of similitude; so that those are called gods who share in divinity by likeness, | |
| 7479 according to the text, "I have said, You are gods" ( | |
| 7480 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q13_A9-p7.4" href="./asv.html#Ps.81.6" target="asv">Ps. 81:6</a>). | |
| 7481 </p><p id="FP_Q13_A9-p8"> But if any name were given to signify God not as to His nature but as to His "suppositum," accordingly as He is considered | |
| 7482 as "this something," that name would be absolutely incommunicable; as, for instance, perhaps the Tetragrammaton among the | |
| 7483 Hebrew; and this is like giving a name to the sun as signifying this individual thing. | |
| 7484 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 13 a. 9 co."><a name="28863" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28863] Iª q. 13 a. 9 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum | |
| 7485 quod aliquod nomen potest esse communicabile dupliciter, uno modo, | |
| 7486 proprie; alio modo, per similitudinem. Proprie quidem communicabile | |
| 7487 est, quod secundum totam significationem nominis, est communicabile | |
| 7488 multis. Per similitudinem autem communicabile est, quod est | |
| 7489 communicabile secundum aliquid eorum quae includuntur in nominis | |
| 7490 significatione. Hoc enim nomen leo proprie communicatur omnibus | |
| 7491 illis in quibus invenitur natura quam significat hoc nomen leo, per | |
| 7492 similitudinem vero communicabile est illis qui participant aliquid | |
| 7493 leoninum, ut puta audaciam vel fortitudinem, qui metaphorice leones | |
| 7494 dicuntur. Ad sciendum autem quae nomina proprie sunt | |
| 7495 communicabilia, considerandum est quod omnis forma in supposito | |
| 7496 singulari existens, per quod individuatur, communis est multis, vel | |
| 7497 secundum rem vel secundum rationem saltem, sicut natura humana | |
| 7498 communis est multis secundum rem et rationem, natura autem solis | |
| 7499 non est communis multis secundum rem, sed secundum rationem tantum; | |
| 7500 potest enim natura solis intelligi ut in pluribus suppositis | |
| 7501 existens. Et hoc ideo, quia intellectus intelligit naturam | |
| 7502 cuiuslibet speciei per abstractionem a singulari, unde esse in uno | |
| 7503 supposito singulari vel in pluribus, est praeter intellectum | |
| 7504 naturae speciei, unde, servato intellectu naturae speciei, potest | |
| 7505 intelligi ut in pluribus existens. Sed singulare, ex hoc ipso quod | |
| 7506 est singulare, est divisum ab omnibus aliis. Unde omne nomen | |
| 7507 impositum ad significandum aliquod singulare, est incommunicabile | |
| 7508 et re et ratione, non enim potest nec in apprehensione cadere | |
| 7509 pluralitas huius individui. Unde nullum nomen significans aliquod | |
| 7510 individuum, est communicabile multis proprie, sed solum secundum | |
| 7511 similitudinem; sicut aliquis metaphorice potest dici Achilles, | |
| 7512 inquantum habet aliquid de proprietatibus Achillis, scilicet | |
| 7513 fortitudinem. Formae vero quae non individuantur per aliquod | |
| 7514 suppositum, sed per seipsas (quia scilicet sunt formae | |
| 7515 subsistentes), si intelligerentur secundum quod sunt in seipsis, | |
| 7516 non possent communicari nec re neque ratione; sed forte per | |
| 7517 similitudinem, sicut dictum est de individuis. Sed quia formas | |
| 7518 simplices per se subsistentes non possumus intelligere secundum | |
| 7519 quod sunt, sed intelligimus eas ad modum rerum compositarum | |
| 7520 habentium formas in materia; ideo, ut dictum est, imponimus eis | |
| 7521 nomina concreta significantia naturam in aliquo supposito. Unde, | |
| 7522 quantum pertinet ad rationem nominum, eadem ratio est de nominibus | |
| 7523 quae a nobis imponuntur ad significandum naturas rerum | |
| 7524 compositarum, et de nominibus quae a nobis imponuntur ad | |
| 7525 significandum naturas simplices subsistentes. Unde, cum hoc nomen | |
| 7526 Deus impositum sit ad significandum naturam divinam, ut dictum est; | |
| 7527 natura autem divina multiplicabilis non est, ut supra ostensum est, | |
| 7528 sequitur quod hoc nomen Deus incommunicabile quidem sit secundum | |
| 7529 rem, sed communicabile sit secundum opinionem, quemadmodum hoc | |
| 7530 nomen sol esset communicabile secundum opinionem ponentium multos | |
| 7531 soles. Et secundum hoc dicitur Gal. IV, <i>his qui natura non sunt | |
| 7532 dii, serviebatis</i>; Glossa, <i>non sunt dii natura, sed opinione | |
| 7533 hominum</i>. Est nihilominus communicabile hoc nomen Deus, non | |
| 7534 secundum suam totam significationem, sed secundum aliquid eius, per | |
| 7535 quandam similitudinem, ut dii dicantur, qui participant aliquid | |
| 7536 divinum per similitudinem, secundum illud, <i>ego dixi, dii | |
| 7537 estis</i>. Si vero esset aliquod nomen impositum ad significandum | |
| 7538 Deum non ex parte naturae, sed ex parte suppositi, secundum quod | |
| 7539 consideratur ut hoc aliquid, illud nomen esset omnibus modis | |
| 7540 incommunicabile, sicut forte est nomen tetragrammaton apud | |
| 7541 Hebraeos. Et est simile si quis imponeret nomen soli designans hoc | |
| 7542 individuum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q13_A9-p9"> | |
| 7543 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The divine nature is only communicable according to the participation of some similitude. | |
| 7544 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 13 a. 9 ad 1"><a name="28864" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28864] Iª q. 13 a. 9 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo | |
| 7545 dicendum quod natura divina non est communicabilis nisi secundum | |
| 7546 similitudinis participationem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q13_A9-p10"> | |
| 7547 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> This name "God" is an appellative name, and not a proper name, for it signifies the divine nature in the possessor; although | |
| 7548 God Himself in reality is neither universal nor particular. For names do not follow upon the mode of being in things, but | |
| 7549 upon the mode of being as it is in our mind. And yet it is incommunicable according to the truth of the thing, as was said | |
| 7550 above concerning the name "sun." | |
| 7551 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 13 a. 9 ad 2"><a name="28865" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28865] Iª q. 13 a. 9 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 7552 dicendum quod hoc nomen Deus est nomen appellativum, et non | |
| 7553 proprium, quia significat naturam divinam ut in habente; licet ipse | |
| 7554 Deus, secundum rem, non sit nec universalis nec particularis. | |
| 7555 Nomina enim non sequuntur modum essendi qui est in rebus, sed modum | |
| 7556 essendi secundum quod in cognitione nostra est. Et tamen, secundum | |
| 7557 rei veritatem, est incommunicabile, secundum quod dictum est de hoc | |
| 7558 nomine sol.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q13_A9-p11"> | |
| 7559 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> These names "good," "wise," and the like, are imposed from the perfections proceeding from God to creatures; but they do | |
| 7560 not signify the divine nature, but rather signify the perfections themselves absolutely; and therefore they are in truth communicable | |
| 7561 to many. But this name "God" is given to God from His own proper operation, which we experience continually, to signify the | |
| 7562 divine nature. | |
| 7563 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 13 a. 9 ad 3"><a name="28866" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28866] Iª q. 13 a. 9 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 7564 dicendum quod haec nomina bonus, sapiens, et similia, imposita | |
| 7565 quidem sunt a perfectionibus procedentibus a Deo in creaturas, non | |
| 7566 tamen sunt imposita ad significandum divinam naturam, sed ad | |
| 7567 significandum ipsas perfectiones absolute. Et ideo etiam secundum | |
| 7568 rei veritatem sunt communicabilia multis. Sed hoc nomen Deus | |
| 7569 impositum est ab operatione propria Deo, quam experimur continue, | |
| 7570 ad significandum divinam naturam.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q13_A10" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q13_A10-p0.1">Q. 13. A. 10. Whether this name "God" is applied to God univocally by nature, by participation, and according to opinion?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q13_A10-p2"> | |
| 7571 <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that this name "God" is applied to God univocally by nature, by participation, and according to opinion. For where | |
| 7572 a diverse signification exists, there is no contradiction of affirmation and negation; for equivocation prevents contradiction. | |
| 7573 But a Catholic who says: "An idol is not God," contradicts a pagan who says: "An idol is God." Therefore GOD in both senses | |
| 7574 is spoken of univocally. | |
| 7575 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 13 a. 10 arg. 1"><a name="28867" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28867] Iª q. 13 a. 10 arg. 1</span></a> Ad decimum sic | |
| 7576 proceditur. Videtur quod hoc nomen Deus univoce dicatur de Deo per | |
| 7577 naturam, et per participationem, et secundum opinionem. Ubi enim | |
| 7578 est diversa significatio, non est contradictio affirmantis et | |
| 7579 negantis, aequivocatio enim impedit contradictionem sed Catholicus | |
| 7580 dicens idolum non est Deus, contradicit Pagano dicenti idolum est | |
| 7581 Deus. Ergo Deus utrobique sumptum univoce dicitur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q13_A10-p3"> | |
| 7582 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, as an idol is God in opinion, and not in truth, so the enjoyment of carnal pleasures is called happiness in opinion, | |
| 7583 and not in truth. But this name "beatitude" is applied univocally to this supposed happiness, and also to true happiness. | |
| 7584 Therefore also this name "God" is applied univocally to the true God, and to God also in opinion. | |
| 7585 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 13 a. 10 arg. 2"><a name="28868" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28868] Iª q. 13 a. 10 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 7586 sicut idolum est Deus secundum opinionem et non secundum veritatem, | |
| 7587 ita fruitio carnalium delectationum dicitur felicitas secundum | |
| 7588 opinionem, et non secundum veritatem. Sed hoc nomen beatitudo | |
| 7589 univoce dicitur de hac beatitudine opinata, et de hac beatitudine | |
| 7590 vera. Ergo et hoc nomen Deus univoce dicitur de Deo secundum | |
| 7591 veritatem, et de Deo secundum opinionem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q13_A10-p4"> | |
| 7592 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, names are called univocal because they contain one idea. Now when a Catholic says: "There is one God," he understands | |
| 7593 by the name God an omnipotent being, and one venerated above all; while the heathen understands the same when he says: "An | |
| 7594 idol is God." Therefore this name "God" is applied univocally to both. | |
| 7595 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 13 a. 10 arg. 3"><a name="28869" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28869] Iª q. 13 a. 10 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 7596 univoca dicuntur quorum est ratio una. Sed Catholicus, cum dicit | |
| 7597 unum esse Deum, intelligit nomine Dei rem omnipotentem, et super | |
| 7598 omnia venerandam, et hoc idem intelligit gentilis, cum dicit idolum | |
| 7599 esse Deum. Ergo hoc nomen Deus univoce dicitur utrobique.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q13_A10-p5"> | |
| 7600 <b>On the contrary,</b> The idea in the intellect is the likeness of what is in the thing as is said in Peri Herm. i. But the word "animal" applied | |
| 7601 to a true animal, and to a picture of one, is equivocal. Therefore this name "God" applied to the true God and to God in opinion | |
| 7602 is applied equivocally. | |
| 7603 </p><p id="FP_Q13_A10-p6"> Further, No one can signify what he does not know. But the heathen does not know the divine nature. So when he says an idol | |
| 7604 is God, he does not signify the true Deity. On the other hand, A Catholic signifies the true Deity when he says that there | |
| 7605 is one God. Therefore this name "God" is not applied univocally, but equivocally to the true God, and to God according to | |
| 7606 opinion. | |
| 7607 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><div class="latin"><p title="I q. 13 a. 10 s. c. 1"><a name="28870" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28870] Iª q. 13 a. 10 s. c. 1</span></a> Sed contra, | |
| 7608 illud quod est in intellectu, est similitudo eius quod est in re, | |
| 7609 ut dicitur in I Periherm. Sed animal, dictum de animali vero et de | |
| 7610 animali picto, aequivoce dicitur. Ergo hoc nomen Deus, dictum de | |
| 7611 Deo vero et de Deo secundum opinionem, aequivoce dicitur.</p><p title="I q. 13 a. 10 s. c. 2"><a name="28871" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28871] Iª q. 13 a. 10 s. c. 2</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 7612 nullus potest significare id quod non cognoscit, sed gentilis non | |
| 7613 cognoscit naturam divinam, ergo, cum dicit idolum est Deus, non | |
| 7614 significat veram deitatem. Hanc autem significat Catholicus dicens | |
| 7615 unum esse Deum. Ergo hoc nomen Deus non dicitur univoce, sed | |
| 7616 aequivoce, de Deo vero, et de Deo secundum opinionem.</p></div></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q13_A10-p7"> | |
| 7617 <b>I answer that,</b> This name "God" in the three aforesaid significations is taken neither univocally nor equivocally, but analogically. This | |
| 7618 is apparent from this reason: Univocal terms mean absolutely the same thing, but equivocal terms absolutely different; whereas | |
| 7619 in analogical terms a word taken in one signification must be placed in the definition of the same word taken in other senses; | |
| 7620 as, for instance, "being" which is applied to "substance" is placed in the definition | |
| 7621 of being as applied to "accident"; and "healthy" applied to animal is placed in the definition of healthy as applied to urine | |
| 7622 and medicine. For urine is the sign of health in the animal, and medicine is the cause of health. | |
| 7623 </p><p id="FP_Q13_A10-p8"> The same applies to the question at issue. For this name "God," as signifying the true God, includes the idea of God when | |
| 7624 it is used to denote God in opinion, or participation. For when we name anyone god by participation, we understand by the | |
| 7625 name of god some likeness of the true God. Likewise, when we call an idol god, by this name god we understand and signify | |
| 7626 something which men think is God; thus it is manifest that the name has different meanings, but that one of them is | |
| 7627 comprised in the other significations. Hence it is manifestly said analogically. | |
| 7628 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 13 a. 10 co."><a name="28872" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28872] Iª q. 13 a. 10 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum | |
| 7629 quod hoc nomen Deus, in praemissis tribus significationibus, non | |
| 7630 accipitur neque univoce neque aequivoce, sed analogice. Quod ex hoc | |
| 7631 patet. Quia univocorum est omnino eadem ratio, aequivocorum est | |
| 7632 omnino ratio diversa, in analogicis vero, oportet quod nomen | |
| 7633 secundum unam significationem acceptum, ponatur in definitione | |
| 7634 eiusdem nominis secundum alias significationes accepti. Sicut ens | |
| 7635 de substantia dictum, ponitur in definitione entis secundum quod de | |
| 7636 accidente dicitur; et sanum dictum de animali, ponitur in | |
| 7637 definitione sani secundum quod dicitur de urina et de medicina; | |
| 7638 huius enim sani quod est in animali, urina est significativa, et | |
| 7639 medicina factiva. Sic accidit in proposito. Nam hoc nomen Deus, | |
| 7640 secundum quod pro Deo vero sumitur, in ratione Dei sumitur secundum | |
| 7641 quod dicitur Deus secundum opinionem vel participationem. Cum enim | |
| 7642 aliquem nominamus Deum secundum participationem, intelligimus | |
| 7643 nomine Dei aliquid habens similitudinem veri Dei. Similiter cum | |
| 7644 idolum nominamus Deum, hoc nomine Deus intelligimus significari | |
| 7645 aliquid, de quo homines opinantur quod sit Deus. Et sic manifestum | |
| 7646 est quod alia et alia est significatio nominis, sed una illarum | |
| 7647 significationum clauditur in significationibus aliis. Unde | |
| 7648 manifestum est quod analogice dicitur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q13_A10-p9"> | |
| 7649 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The multiplication of names does not depend on the predication of the name, but on the signification: for this name "man," | |
| 7650 of whomsoever it is predicated, whether truly or falsely, is predicated in one sense. But it would be multiplied if by the | |
| 7651 name "man" we meant to signify different things; for instance, if one meant to signify by this name "man" what man really | |
| 7652 is, and another meant to signify by the same name a stone, or something else. Hence it | |
| 7653 is evident that a Catholic saying that an idol is not God contradicts the pagan asserting that it is God; because each of | |
| 7654 them uses this name GOD to signify the true God. For when the pagan says an idol is God, he does not use this name as meaning | |
| 7655 God in opinion, for he would then speak the truth, as also Catholics sometimes use the name in the sense, as in the Psalm, | |
| 7656 "All the gods of the Gentiles are demons" ( | |
| 7657 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q13_A10-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.95.5" target="asv">Ps. 95:5</a>). | |
| 7658 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 13 a. 10 ad 1"><a name="28873" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28873] Iª q. 13 a. 10 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo | |
| 7659 dicendum quod nominum multiplicitas non attenditur secundum nominis | |
| 7660 praedicationem, sed secundum significationem, hoc enim nomen homo, | |
| 7661 de quocumque praedicetur, sive vere sive false, dicitur uno modo. | |
| 7662 Sed tunc multipliciter diceretur, si per hoc nomen homo | |
| 7663 intenderemus significare diversa, puta, si unus intenderet | |
| 7664 significare per hoc nomen homo id quod vere est homo, et alius | |
| 7665 intenderet significare eodem nomine lapidem, vel aliquid aliud. | |
| 7666 Unde patet quod Catholicus dicens idolum non esse Deum, contradicit | |
| 7667 Pagano hoc asserenti, quia uterque utitur hoc nomine Deus ad | |
| 7668 significandum verum Deum. Cum enim Paganus dicit idolum esse Deum, | |
| 7669 non utitur hoc nomine secundum quod significat Deum opinabilem, sic | |
| 7670 enim verum diceret, cum etiam Catholici interdum in tali | |
| 7671 significatione hoc nomine utantur, ut cum dicitur, <i>omnes dii | |
| 7672 gentium Daemonia</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q13_A10-p10"><b>Reply to Objections 2 and 3:</b> The same remark applies to the Second and Third Objections. For these reasons proceed from the different predication of the | |
| 7673 name, and not from its various significations. | |
| 7674 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 13 a. 10 ad 2"><a name="28874" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28874] Iª q. 13 a. 10 ad 2</span></a> Et similiter | |
| 7675 dicendum ad secundum et tertium. Nam illae rationes procedunt | |
| 7676 secundum diversitatem praedicationis nominis, et non secundum | |
| 7677 diversam significationem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q13_A10-p11"> | |
| 7678 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> The term "animal" applied to a true and a pictured animal is not purely equivocal; for the Philosopher takes equivocal names | |
| 7679 in a large sense, including analogous names; because also being, which is predicated analogically, is sometimes said to be | |
| 7680 predicated equivocally of different predicaments. | |
| 7681 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 13 a. 10 ad 4"><a name="28875" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28875] Iª q. 13 a. 10 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum | |
| 7682 dicendum quod animal dictum de animali vero et de picto, non | |
| 7683 dicitur pure aequivoce; sed philosophus largo modo accipit | |
| 7684 aequivoca, secundum quod includunt in se analoga. Quia et ens, quod | |
| 7685 analogice dicitur, aliquando dicitur aequivoce praedicari de | |
| 7686 diversis praedicamentis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q13_A10-p12"> | |
| 7687 <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> Neither a Catholic nor a pagan knows the very nature of God as it is in itself; but each one knows it according to some idea | |
| 7688 of causality, or excellence, or remotion ( | |
| 7689 <a id="FP_Q13_A10-p12.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q12_A12.html">Q[12], A[12]</a>). So a pagan can take this name "God" in the same way when he says an idol is God, as the Catholic does in saying an idol | |
| 7690 is not God. But if anyone should be quite ignorant of God altogether, he could not even name Him, unless, perhaps, as we use | |
| 7691 names the meaning of which we know not. | |
| 7692 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 13 a. 10 ad 5"><a name="28876" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28876] Iª q. 13 a. 10 ad 5</span></a> Ad quintum | |
| 7693 dicendum quod ipsam naturam Dei prout in se est, neque Catholicus | |
| 7694 neque Paganus cognoscit, sed uterque cognoscit eam secundum aliquam | |
| 7695 rationem causalitatis vel excellentiae vel remotionis, ut supra | |
| 7696 dictum est. Et secundum hoc, in eadem significatione accipere | |
| 7697 potest gentilis hoc nomen Deus, cum dicit idolum est Deus, in qua | |
| 7698 accipit ipsum Catholicus dicens idolum non est Deus. Si vero | |
| 7699 aliquis esset qui secundum nullam rationem Deum cognosceret, nec | |
| 7700 ipsum nominaret, nisi forte sicut proferimus nomina quorum | |
| 7701 significationem ignoramus.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q13_A11" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q13_A11-p0.1">Q. 13. A. 11. Whether this name, HE WHO IS, is the most proper name of God?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q13_A11-p2"> | |
| 7702 <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that this name HE WHO IS is not the most proper name of God. For this name "God" is an incommunicable name. But | |
| 7703 this name HE WHO IS, is not an incommunicable name. Therefore this name HE WHO IS is not the most proper name of God. | |
| 7704 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 13 a. 11 arg. 1"><a name="28877" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28877] Iª q. 13 a. 11 arg. 1</span></a> Ad undecimum | |
| 7705 sic proceditur. Videtur quod hoc nomen qui est non sit maxime | |
| 7706 proprium nomen Dei. Hoc enim nomen Deus est nomen incommunicabile, | |
| 7707 ut dictum est. Sed hoc nomen qui est non est nomen incommunicabile. | |
| 7708 Ergo hoc nomen qui est non est maxime proprium nomen Dei.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q13_A11-p3"> | |
| 7709 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iii) that "the name of good excellently manifests all the processions of God." But it | |
| 7710 especially belongs to God to be the universal principle of all things. Therefore this name "good" is supremely proper to God, | |
| 7711 and not this name HE WHO IS. | |
| 7712 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 13 a. 11 arg. 2"><a name="28878" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28878] Iª q. 13 a. 11 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 7713 Dionysius dicit, III cap. de Div. Nom., quod <i>boni nominatio est | |
| 7714 manifestativa omnium Dei processionum</i>. Sed hoc maxime Deo | |
| 7715 convenit, quod sit universale rerum principium. Ergo hoc nomen | |
| 7716 bonum est maxime proprium Dei, et non hoc nomen qui est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q13_A11-p4"> | |
| 7717 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, every divine name seems to imply relation to creatures, for God is known to us only through creatures. But this | |
| 7718 name HE WHO IS imports no relation to creatures. Therefore this name HE WHO IS is not the most applicable to God. | |
| 7719 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 13 a. 11 arg. 3"><a name="28879" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28879] Iª q. 13 a. 11 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, omne | |
| 7720 nomen divinum videtur importare relationem ad creaturas, cum Deus | |
| 7721 non cognoscatur a nobis nisi per creaturas. Sed hoc nomen qui est | |
| 7722 nullam importat habitudinem ad creaturas. Ergo hoc nomen qui est | |
| 7723 non est maxime proprium nomen Dei.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q13_A11-p5"> | |
| 7724 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written that when Moses asked, "If they should say to me, What is His name? what shall I say to them?" The Lord answered | |
| 7725 him, "Thus shalt thou say to them, HE WHO IS hath sent me to you" ( | |
| 7726 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q13_A11-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Exod.3.13" target="asv">Ex. 3:13,14</a>). Therefor this name HE WHO IS most properly belongs to God. | |
| 7727 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 13 a. 11 s. c."><a name="28880" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28880] Iª q. 13 a. 11 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est | |
| 7728 quod dicitur Exod. III, quod Moysi quaerenti, <i>si dixerint mihi, | |
| 7729 quod est nomen eius? Quid dicam eis?</i> Et respondit ei dominus, | |
| 7730 <i>sic dices eis, qui est misit me ad vos</i>. Ergo hoc nomen qui | |
| 7731 est est maxime proprium nomen Dei.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q13_A11-p6"> | |
| 7732 <b>I answer that,</b> This name HE WHO IS is most properly applied to God, for three reasons: | |
| 7733 </p><p id="FP_Q13_A11-p7"> First, because of its signification. For it does not signify form, but simply existence itself. Hence since the existence | |
| 7734 of God is His essence itself, which can be said of no other ( | |
| 7735 <a id="FP_Q13_A11-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q3_A4.html">Q[3], A[4]</a>), it is clear that among other names this one specially denominates God, for everything is denominated by its form. | |
| 7736 </p><p id="FP_Q13_A11-p8"> Secondly, on account of its universality. For all other names are either less universal, or, if convertible with it, add | |
| 7737 something above it at least in idea; hence in a certain way they inform and determine it. Now our intellect cannot know the | |
| 7738 essence of God itself in this life, as it is in itself, but whatever mode it applies in determining what it understands about | |
| 7739 God, it falls short of the mode of what God is in Himself. Therefore the less determinate the names are, and the | |
| 7740 more universal and absolute they are, the more properly they are applied to God. Hence Damascene says (De Fide Orth. i) that, | |
| 7741 "HE WHO IS, is the principal of all names applied to God; for comprehending all in itself, it contains existence itself as | |
| 7742 an infinite and indeterminate sea of substance." Now by any other name some mode of substance is determined, whereas this | |
| 7743 name HE WHO IS, determines no mode of being, but is indeterminate to all; and therefore it denominates the "infinite ocean | |
| 7744 of | |
| 7745 substance." | |
| 7746 </p><p id="FP_Q13_A11-p9"> Thirdly, from its consignification, for it signifies present existence; and this above all properly applies to God, whose | |
| 7747 existence knows not past or future, as Augustine says (De Trin. v). | |
| 7748 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 13 a. 11 co."><a name="28881" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28881] Iª q. 13 a. 11 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum | |
| 7749 quod hoc nomen qui est triplici ratione est maxime proprium nomen | |
| 7750 Dei. Primo quidem, propter sui significationem. Non enim significat | |
| 7751 formam aliquam, sed ipsum esse. Unde, cum esse Dei sit ipsa eius | |
| 7752 essentia, et hoc nulli alii conveniat, ut supra ostensum est, | |
| 7753 manifestum est quod inter alia nomina hoc maxime proprie nominat | |
| 7754 Deum, unumquodque enim denominatur a sua forma. Secundo, propter | |
| 7755 eius universalitatem. Omnia enim alia nomina vel sunt minus | |
| 7756 communia; vel, si convertantur cum ipso, tamen addunt aliqua supra | |
| 7757 ipsum secundum rationem; unde quodammodo informant et determinant | |
| 7758 ipsum. Intellectus autem noster non potest ipsam Dei essentiam | |
| 7759 cognoscere in statu viae, secundum quod in se est, sed quemcumque | |
| 7760 modum determinet circa id quod de Deo intelligit, deficit a modo | |
| 7761 quo Deus in se est. Et ideo, quanto aliqua nomina sunt minus | |
| 7762 determinata, et magis communia et absoluta, tanto magis proprie | |
| 7763 dicuntur de Deo a nobis. Unde et Damascenus dicit quod | |
| 7764 <i>principalius omnibus quae de Deo dicuntur nominibus, est qui | |
| 7765 est, totum enim in seipso comprehendens, habet ipsum esse velut | |
| 7766 quoddam pelagus substantiae infinitum et indeterminatum</i>. | |
| 7767 Quolibet enim alio nomine determinatur aliquis modus substantiae | |
| 7768 rei, sed hoc nomen qui est nullum modum essendi determinat, sed se | |
| 7769 habet indeterminate ad omnes; et ideo nominat ipsum <i>pelagus | |
| 7770 substantiae infinitum</i>. Tertio vero, ex eius consignificatione. | |
| 7771 Significat enim esse in praesenti, et hoc maxime proprie de Deo | |
| 7772 dicitur, cuius esse non novit praeteritum vel futurum, ut dicit | |
| 7773 Augustinus in V de Trin.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q13_A11-p10"> | |
| 7774 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This name HE WHO IS is the name of God more properly than this name "God," as regards its source, namely, existence; and | |
| 7775 as regards the mode of signification and consignification, as said above. But as regards the object intended by the name, | |
| 7776 this name "God" is more proper, as it is imposed to signify the divine nature; and still more proper is the Tetragrammaton, | |
| 7777 imposed to signify the substance of God itself, incommunicable and, if one may so speak, | |
| 7778 singular. | |
| 7779 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 13 a. 11 ad 1"><a name="28882" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28882] Iª q. 13 a. 11 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo | |
| 7780 dicendum quod hoc nomen qui est est magis proprium nomen Dei quam | |
| 7781 hoc nomen Deus, quantum ad id a quo imponitur, scilicet ab esse, et | |
| 7782 quantum ad modum significandi et consignificandi, ut dictum est. | |
| 7783 Sed quantum ad id ad quod imponitur nomen ad significandum, est | |
| 7784 magis proprium hoc nomen Deus, quod imponitur ad significandum | |
| 7785 naturam divinam. Et adhuc magis proprium nomen est tetragrammaton, | |
| 7786 quod est impositum ad significandam ipsam Dei substantiam | |
| 7787 incommunicabilem, et, ut sic liceat loqui, singularem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q13_A11-p11"> | |
| 7788 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> This name "good" is the principal name of God in so far as He is a cause, but not absolutely; for existence considered absolutely | |
| 7789 comes before the idea of cause. | |
| 7790 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 13 a. 11 ad 2"><a name="28883" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28883] Iª q. 13 a. 11 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 7791 dicendum quod hoc nomen bonum est principale nomen Dei inquantum | |
| 7792 est causa, non tamen simpliciter, nam esse absolute | |
| 7793 praeintelligitur causae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q13_A11-p12"> | |
| 7794 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> It is not necessary that all the divine names should import relation to creatures, but it suffices that they be imposed from | |
| 7795 some perfections flowing from God to creatures. Among these the first is existence, from which comes this name, HE WHO IS. | |
| 7796 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 13 a. 11 ad 3"><a name="28884" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28884] Iª q. 13 a. 11 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 7797 dicendum quod non est necessarium quod omnia nomina divina | |
| 7798 importent habitudinem ad creaturas; sed sufficit quod imponantur ab | |
| 7799 aliquibus perfectionibus procedentibus a Deo in creaturas. Inter | |
| 7800 quas prima est ipsum esse, a qua sumitur hoc nomen qui est.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q13_A12" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q13_A12-p0.1">Q. 13. A. 12. Whether affirmative propositions can be formed about God?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q13_A12-p2"> | |
| 7801 <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that affirmative propositions cannot be formed about God. For Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. ii) that "negations about | |
| 7802 God are true; but affirmations are vague." | |
| 7803 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 13 a. 12 arg. 1"><a name="28885" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28885] Iª q. 13 a. 12 arg. 1</span></a> Ad duodecimum | |
| 7804 sic proceditur. Videtur quod propositiones affirmativae non possunt | |
| 7805 formari de Deo. Dicit enim Dionysius, II cap. Cael. Hier., quod | |
| 7806 <i>negationes de Deo sunt verae, affirmationes autem | |
| 7807 incompactae</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q13_A12-p3"> | |
| 7808 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Boethius says (De Trin. ii) that "a simple form cannot be a subject." But God is the most absolutely simple form, | |
| 7809 as shown (Q[3] ): therefore He cannot be a subject. But everything about which an affirmative proposition is made is taken | |
| 7810 as a subject. Therefore an affirmative proposition cannot be formed about God. | |
| 7811 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 13 a. 12 arg. 2"><a name="28886" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28886] Iª q. 13 a. 12 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 7812 Boetius dicit, in libro de Trin., quod <i>forma simplex subiectum | |
| 7813 esse non potest</i>. Sed Deus maxime est forma simplex, ut supra | |
| 7814 ostensum est. Ergo non potest esse subiectum. Sed omne illud de quo | |
| 7815 propositio affirmativa formatur, accipitur ut subiectum. Ergo de | |
| 7816 Deo propositio affirmativa formari non potest.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q13_A12-p4"> | |
| 7817 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, every intellect is false which understands a thing otherwise than as it is. But God has existence without any composition | |
| 7818 as shown above ( | |
| 7819 <a id="FP_Q13_A12-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q3_A7.html">Q[3], A[7]</a>). Therefore since every affirmative intellect understands something as compound, it follows that a true affirmative proposition | |
| 7820 about God cannot be made. | |
| 7821 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 13 a. 12 arg. 3"><a name="28887" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28887] Iª q. 13 a. 12 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 7822 omnis intellectus intelligens rem aliter quam sit, est falsus. Sed | |
| 7823 Deus habet esse absque omni compositione, ut supra probatum est. | |
| 7824 Cum igitur omnis intellectus affirmativus intelligat aliquid cum | |
| 7825 compositione, videtur quod propositio affirmativa vere de Deo | |
| 7826 formari non possit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q13_A12-p5"> | |
| 7827 <b>On the contrary,</b> What is of faith cannot be false. But some affirmative propositions are of faith; as that God is Three and One; and that | |
| 7828 He is omnipotent. Therefore true affirmative propositions can be formed about God. | |
| 7829 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 13 a. 12 s. c."><a name="28888" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28888] Iª q. 13 a. 12 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est | |
| 7830 quod fidei non subest falsum. Sed propositiones quaedam | |
| 7831 affirmativae subduntur fidei, utpote quod Deus est trinus et unus, | |
| 7832 et quod est omnipotens. Ergo propositiones affirmativae possunt | |
| 7833 vere formari de Deo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q13_A12-p6"> | |
| 7834 <b>I answer that,</b> True affirmative propositions can be formed about God. To prove this we must know that in every true affirmative proposition | |
| 7835 the predicate and the subject signify in some way the same thing in reality, and different things in idea. And this appears | |
| 7836 to be the case both in propositions which have an accidental predicate, and in those which have an essential predicate. For | |
| 7837 it is manifest that "man" and "white" are the same in subject, and different in idea; for | |
| 7838 the idea of man is one thing, and that of whiteness is another. The same applies when I say, "man is an animal"; since the | |
| 7839 same thing which is man is truly animal; for in the same "suppositum" there is sensible nature by reason of which he is called | |
| 7840 animal, and the rational nature by reason of which he is called man; hence here again predicate and subject are the same as | |
| 7841 to "suppositum," but different as to idea. But in propositions where one same thing is predicated of itself, the same rule | |
| 7842 in | |
| 7843 some way applies, inasmuch as the intellect draws to the "suppositum" what it places in the subject; and what it places in | |
| 7844 the predicate it draws to the nature of the form existing in the "suppositum"; according to the saying that "predicates are | |
| 7845 to be taken formally, and subjects materially." To this diversity in idea corresponds the plurality of predicate and subject, | |
| 7846 while the intellect signifies the identity of the thing by the composition itself. | |
| 7847 </p><p id="FP_Q13_A12-p7"> God, however, as considered in Himself, is altogether one and simple, yet our intellect knows Him by different conceptions | |
| 7848 because it cannot see Him as He is in Himself. Nevertheless, although it understands Him under different conceptions, it knows | |
| 7849 that one and the same simple object corresponds to its conceptions. Therefore the plurality of predicate and subject represents | |
| 7850 the plurality of idea; and the intellect represents the unity by composition. | |
| 7851 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 13 a. 12 co."><a name="28889" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28889] Iª q. 13 a. 12 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum | |
| 7852 quod propositiones affirmativae possunt vere formari de Deo. Ad | |
| 7853 cuius evidentiam, sciendum est quod in qualibet propositione | |
| 7854 affirmativa vera, oportet quod praedicatum et subiectum significent | |
| 7855 idem secundum rem aliquo modo, et diversum secundum rationem. Et | |
| 7856 hoc patet tam in propositionibus quae sunt de praedicato | |
| 7857 accidentali, quam in illis quae sunt de praedicato substantiali. | |
| 7858 Manifestum est enim quod homo et albus sunt idem subiecto, et | |
| 7859 differunt ratione, alia enim est ratio hominis, et alia ratio albi. | |
| 7860 Et similiter cum dico homo est animal, illud enim ipsum quod est | |
| 7861 homo, vere animal est; in eodem enim supposito est et natura | |
| 7862 sensibilis, a qua dicitur animal, et rationalis, a qua dicitur | |
| 7863 homo. Unde hic etiam praedicatum et subiectum sunt idem supposito, | |
| 7864 sed diversa ratione. Sed et in propositionibus in quibus idem | |
| 7865 praedicatur de seipso, hoc aliquo modo invenitur; inquantum | |
| 7866 intellectus id quod ponit ex parte subiecti, trahit ad partem | |
| 7867 suppositi, quod vero ponit ex parte praedicati, trahit ad naturam | |
| 7868 formae in supposito existentis, secundum quod dicitur quod | |
| 7869 praedicata tenentur formaliter, et subiecta materialiter. Huic vero | |
| 7870 diversitati quae est secundum rationem, respondet pluralitas | |
| 7871 praedicati et subiecti, identitatem vero rei significat intellectus | |
| 7872 per ipsam compositionem. Deus autem, in se consideratus, est omnino | |
| 7873 unus et simplex, sed tamen intellectus noster secundum diversas | |
| 7874 conceptiones ipsum cognoscit, eo quod non potest ipsum ut in seipso | |
| 7875 est, videre. Sed tamen, quamvis intelligat ipsum sub diversis | |
| 7876 conceptionibus, cognoscit tamen quod omnibus suis conceptionibus | |
| 7877 respondet una et eadem res simpliciter. Hanc ergo pluralitatem quae | |
| 7878 est secundum rationem, repraesentat per pluralitatem praedicati et | |
| 7879 subiecti, unitatem vero repraesentat intellectus per | |
| 7880 compositionem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q13_A12-p8"> | |
| 7881 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Dionysius says that the affirmations about God are vague or, according to another translation, "incongruous," inasmuch as | |
| 7882 no name can be applied to God according to its mode of signification. | |
| 7883 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 13 a. 12 ad 1"><a name="28890" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28890] Iª q. 13 a. 12 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo | |
| 7884 dicendum quod Dionysius dicit affirmationes de Deo esse | |
| 7885 incompactas, vel inconvenientes secundum aliam translationem, | |
| 7886 inquantum nullum nomen Deo competit secundum modum significandi, ut | |
| 7887 supra dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q13_A12-p9"> | |
| 7888 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Our intellect cannot comprehend simple subsisting forms, as they really are in themselves; but it apprehends them as compound | |
| 7889 things in which there is something taken as subject and something that is inherent. Therefore it apprehends the simple form | |
| 7890 as a subject, and attributes something else to it. | |
| 7891 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 13 a. 12 ad 2"><a name="28891" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28891] Iª q. 13 a. 12 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 7892 dicendum quod intellectus noster non potest formas simplices | |
| 7893 subsistentes secundum quod in seipsis sunt, apprehendere, sed | |
| 7894 apprehendit eas secundum modum compositorum, in quibus est aliquid | |
| 7895 quod subiicitur, et est aliquid quod inest. Et ideo apprehendit | |
| 7896 formam simplicem in ratione subiecti, et attribuit ei aliquid.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q13_A12-p10"> | |
| 7897 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This proposition, "The intellect understanding anything otherwise than it is, is false," can be taken in two senses, accordingly | |
| 7898 as this adverb "otherwise" determines the word "understanding" on the part of the thing understood, or on the part of the | |
| 7899 one who understands. Taken as referring to the thing understood, the proposition is true, and the meaning is: Any intellect | |
| 7900 which understands that the thing is otherwise than it is, is false. But this | |
| 7901 does not hold in the present case; because our intellect, when forming a proposition about God, does not affirm that He is | |
| 7902 composite, but that He is simple. But taken as referring to the one who understands, the proposition is false. For the mode | |
| 7903 of the intellect in understanding is different from the mode of the thing in its essence. Since it is clear that our intellect | |
| 7904 understands material things below itself in an immaterial manner; not that it understands them to be immaterial things; but | |
| 7905 its manner of understanding is immaterial. Likewise, when it understands simple things above itself, it understands them according | |
| 7906 to its own mode, which is in a composite manner; yet not so as to understand them to be composite things. And thus our intellect | |
| 7907 is not false in forming composition in its ideas concerning God. | |
| 7908 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 13 a. 12 ad 3"><a name="28892" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28892] Iª q. 13 a. 12 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 7909 dicendum quod haec propositio, intellectus intelligens rem aliter | |
| 7910 quam sit, est falsus, est duplex, ex eo quod hoc adverbium aliter | |
| 7911 potest determinare hoc verbum intelligit ex parte intellecti, vel | |
| 7912 ex parte intelligentis. Si ex parte intellecti, sic propositio vera | |
| 7913 est, et est sensus, quicumque intellectus intelligit rem esse | |
| 7914 aliter quam sit, falsus est. Sed hoc non habet locum in proposito, | |
| 7915 quia intellectus noster, formans propositionem de Deo, non dicit | |
| 7916 eum esse compositum, sed simplicem. Si vero ex parte intelligentis, | |
| 7917 sic propositio falsa est. Alius est enim modus intellectus in | |
| 7918 intelligendo, quam rei in essendo. Manifestum est enim quod | |
| 7919 intellectus noster res materiales infra se existentes intelligit | |
| 7920 immaterialiter; non quod intelligat eas esse immateriales, sed | |
| 7921 habet modum immaterialem in intelligendo. Et similiter, cum | |
| 7922 intelligit simplicia quae sunt supra se, intelligit ea secundum | |
| 7923 modum suum, scilicet composite, non tamen ita quod intelligat ea | |
| 7924 esse composita. Et sic intellectus noster non est falsus, formans | |
| 7925 compositionem de Deo.</p></div></div></div></div> | |
| 7926 <div id="FP_Q14" class="div3"> | |
| 7927 <h3 id="FP_Q14-p0.1">Q. 14. OF GOD'S KNOWLEDGE (SIXTEEN ARTICLES)</h3> | |
| 7928 <div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> | |
| 7929 <p id="FP_Q14-p2"> Having considered what belongs to the divine substance, we have now to treat of God's operation. And since one kind of operation | |
| 7930 is immanent, and another kind of operation proceeds to the exterior effect, we treat first of knowledge and of will (for understanding | |
| 7931 abides in the intelligent agent, and will is in the one who wills); and afterwards of the power of God, the principle of the | |
| 7932 divine operation as proceeding to the exterior effect. Now because to understand is a kind of | |
| 7933 life, after treating of the divine knowledge, we consider truth and falsehood. Further, as everything known is in the knower, | |
| 7934 and the types of things as existing in the knowledge of God are called ideas, to the consideration of knowledge will be added | |
| 7935 the treatment of ideas. | |
| 7936 </p><p id="FP_Q14-p3"> Concerning knowledge, there are sixteen points for inquiry:</p><p id="FP_Q14-p4"> (1) Whether there is knowledge in God?</p><p id="FP_Q14-p5"> (2) Whether God understands Himself?</p><p id="FP_Q14-p6"> (3) Whether He comprehends Himself?</p><p id="FP_Q14-p7"> (4) Whether His understanding is His substance?</p><p id="FP_Q14-p8"> (5) Whether He understands other things besides Himself?</p><p id="FP_Q14-p9"> (6) Whether He has a proper knowledge of them?</p><p id="FP_Q14-p10"> (7) Whether the knowledge of God is discursive?</p><p id="FP_Q14-p11"> (8) Whether the knowledge of God is the cause of things?</p><p id="FP_Q14-p12"> (9) Whether God has knowledge of non-existing things?</p><p id="FP_Q14-p13"> (10) Whether He has knowledge of evil?</p><p id="FP_Q14-p14"> (11) Whether He has knowledge of individual things?</p><p id="FP_Q14-p15"> (12) Whether He knows the infinite?</p><p id="FP_Q14-p16"> (13) Whether He knows future contingent things?</p><p id="FP_Q14-p17"> (14) Whether He knows enunciable things?</p><p id="FP_Q14-p18"> (15) Whether the knowledge of God is variable?</p><p id="FP_Q14-p19"> (16) Whether God has speculative or practical knowledge of things?</p> | |
| 7937 </div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 pr."><a name="28893" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28893] | |
| 7938 Iª q. 14 pr.</span></a> Post considerationem eorum quae ad | |
| 7939 divinam substantiam pertinent, restat considerandum de his quae | |
| 7940 pertinent ad operationem ipsius. Et quia operatio quaedam est quae | |
| 7941 manet in operante, quaedam vero quae procedit in exteriorem | |
| 7942 effectum, primo agemus de scientia et voluntate (nam intelligere in | |
| 7943 intelligente est, et velle in volente); et postmodum de potentia | |
| 7944 Dei, quae consideratur ut principium operationis divinae in | |
| 7945 effectum exteriorem procedentis. Quia vero intelligere quoddam | |
| 7946 vivere est, post considerationem divinae scientiae, considerandum | |
| 7947 erit de vita divina. Et quia scientia verorum est, erit etiam | |
| 7948 considerandum de veritate et falsitate. Rursum, quia omne cognitum | |
| 7949 in cognoscente est, rationes autem rerum secundum quod sunt in Deo | |
| 7950 cognoscente, ideae vocantur, cum consideratione scientiae erit | |
| 7951 etiam adiungenda consideratio de ideis. Circa scientiam vero | |
| 7952 quaeruntur sexdecim. Primo, utrum in Deo sit scientia. Secundo, | |
| 7953 utrum Deus intelligat seipsum. Tertio, utrum comprehendat se. | |
| 7954 Quarto, utrum suum intelligere sit sua substantia. Quinto, utrum | |
| 7955 intelligat alia a se. Sexto, utrum habeat de eis propriam | |
| 7956 cognitionem. Septimo, utrum scientia Dei sit discursiva. Octavo, | |
| 7957 utrum scientia Dei sit causa rerum. Nono, utrum scientia Dei sit | |
| 7958 eorum quae non sunt. Decimo, utrum sit malorum. Undecimo, utrum sit | |
| 7959 singularium. Duodecimo, utrum sit infinitorum. Decimotertio, utrum | |
| 7960 sit contingentium futurorum. Decimoquarto, utrum sit enuntiabilium. | |
| 7961 Decimoquinto, utrum scientia Dei sit variabilis. Decimosexto, utrum | |
| 7962 Deus de rebus habeat speculativam scientiam vel practicam.</p></div></div></div> | |
| 7963 <div id="FP_Q14_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q14_A1-p0.1">Q. 14. A. 1. Whether there is knowledge [*Scientia]?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A1-p2"> | |
| 7964 <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that in God there is not knowledge. For knowledge is a habit; and habit does not belong to God, since it is the | |
| 7965 mean between potentiality and act. Therefore knowledge is not in God. | |
| 7966 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="28894" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28894] Iª q. 14 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum sic | |
| 7967 proceditur. Videtur quod in Deo non sit scientia. Scientia enim | |
| 7968 habitus est, qui Deo non competit, cum sit medius inter potentiam | |
| 7969 et actum. Ergo scientia non est in Deo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A1-p3"> | |
| 7970 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, since science is about conclusions, it is a kind of knowledge caused by something else which is the knowledge of | |
| 7971 principles. But nothing is caused in God; therefore science is not in God. | |
| 7972 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="28895" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28895] Iª q. 14 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 7973 scientia, cum sit conclusionum, est quaedam cognitio ab alio | |
| 7974 causata, scilicet ex cognitione principiorum. Sed nihil causatum | |
| 7975 est in Deo. Ergo scientia non est in Deo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A1-p4"> | |
| 7976 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, all knowledge is universal, or particular. But in God there is no universal or particular ( | |
| 7977 <a id="FP_Q14_A1-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q3_A5.html">Q[3], A[5]</a>). Therefore in God there is not knowledge. | |
| 7978 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="28896" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28896] Iª q. 14 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, omnis | |
| 7979 scientia vel universalis vel particularis est. Sed in Deo non est | |
| 7980 universale et particulare, ut ex superioribus patet; ergo in Deo | |
| 7981 non est scientia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A1-p5"> | |
| 7982 <b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle says, "O the depth of the riches of the wisdom and of the knowledge of God" ( | |
| 7983 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q14_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.11.33" target="asv">Rom. 11:33</a>). | |
| 7984 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 1 s. c."><a name="28897" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28897] Iª q. 14 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est | |
| 7985 quod apostolus dicit Rom. XI, <i>o altitudo divitiarum sapientiae | |
| 7986 et scientiae Dei</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A1-p6"> | |
| 7987 <b>I answer that,</b> In God there exists the most perfect knowledge. To prove this, we must note that intelligent beings are distinguished from | |
| 7988 non-intelligent beings in that the latter possess only their own form; whereas the intelligent being is naturally adapted | |
| 7989 to have also the form of some other thing; for the idea of the thing known is in the knower. Hence it is manifest that the | |
| 7990 nature of a non-intelligent being is more contracted and limited; whereas the nature of | |
| 7991 intelligent beings has a greater amplitude and extension; therefore the Philosopher says (De Anima iii) that "the soul is | |
| 7992 in a sense all things." Now the contraction of the form comes from the matter. Hence, as we have said above ( | |
| 7993 <a id="FP_Q14_A1-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q7_A1.html">Q[7], A[1]</a>) forms according as they are the more immaterial, approach more nearly to a kind of infinity. Therefore it is clear that | |
| 7994 the immateriality of a thing is the reason why it is cognitive; and according to the mode of immateriality is | |
| 7995 the mode of knowledge. Hence it is said in De Anima ii that plants do not know, because they are wholly material. But sense | |
| 7996 is cognitive because it can receive images free from matter, and the intellect is still further cognitive, because it is more | |
| 7997 separated from matter and unmixed, as said in De Anima iii. Since therefore God is in the highest degree of immateriality | |
| 7998 as stated above ( | |
| 7999 <a id="FP_Q14_A1-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q7_A1.html">Q[7], A[1]</a>), it follows that He occupies the highest place in knowledge. | |
| 8000 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 1 co."><a name="28898" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28898] Iª q. 14 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum | |
| 8001 quod in Deo perfectissime est scientia. Ad cuius evidentiam, | |
| 8002 considerandum est quod cognoscentia a non cognoscentibus in hoc | |
| 8003 distinguuntur, quia non cognoscentia nihil habent nisi formam suam | |
| 8004 tantum; sed cognoscens natum est habere formam etiam rei alterius, | |
| 8005 nam species cogniti est in cognoscente. Unde manifestum est quod | |
| 8006 natura rei non cognoscentis est magis coarctata et limitata, natura | |
| 8007 autem rerum cognoscentium habet maiorem amplitudinem et | |
| 8008 extensionem. Propter quod dicit philosophus, III de anima, quod | |
| 8009 <i>anima est quodammodo omnia</i>. Coarctatio autem formae est per | |
| 8010 materiam. Unde et supra diximus quod formae, secundum quod sunt | |
| 8011 magis immateriales, secundum hoc magis accedunt ad quandam | |
| 8012 infinitatem. Patet igitur quod immaterialitas alicuius rei est | |
| 8013 ratio quod sit cognoscitiva; et secundum modum immaterialitatis est | |
| 8014 modus cognitionis. Unde in II de anima dicitur quod plantae non | |
| 8015 cognoscunt, propter suam materialitatem. Sensus autem cognoscitivus | |
| 8016 est, quia receptivus est specierum sine materia, et intellectus | |
| 8017 adhuc magis cognoscitivus, quia magis separatus est a materia et | |
| 8018 immixtus, ut dicitur in III de anima. Unde, cum Deus sit in summo | |
| 8019 immaterialitatis, ut ex superioribus patet, sequitur quod ipse sit | |
| 8020 in summo cognitionis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A1-p7"> | |
| 8021 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Because perfections flowing from God to creatures exist in a higher state in God Himself ( | |
| 8022 <a id="FP_Q14_A1-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q4_A2.html">Q[4], A[2]</a>), whenever a name taken from any created perfection is attributed to God, it must be separated in its signification from | |
| 8023 anything that belongs to that imperfect mode proper to creatures. Hence knowledge is not a quality of God, nor a habit; but | |
| 8024 substance and pure act. | |
| 8025 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="28899" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28899] Iª q. 14 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo | |
| 8026 dicendum quod, quia perfectiones procedentes a Deo in creaturas, | |
| 8027 altiori modo sunt in Deo, ut supra dictum est, oportet quod, | |
| 8028 quandocumque aliquod nomen sumptum a quacumque perfectione | |
| 8029 creaturae Deo attribuitur, secludatur ab eius significatione omne | |
| 8030 illud quod pertinet ad imperfectum modum qui competit creaturae. | |
| 8031 Unde scientia non est qualitas in Deo vel habitus, sed substantia | |
| 8032 et actus purus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A1-p8"> | |
| 8033 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Whatever is divided and multiplied in creatures exists in God simply and unitedly ( | |
| 8034 <a id="FP_Q14_A1-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q13_A4.html">Q[13], A[4]</a>). Now man has different kinds of knowledge, according to the different objects of His knowledge. He has "intelligence" as | |
| 8035 regards the knowledge of principles; he has "science" as regards knowledge of conclusions; he has "wisdom," according as he | |
| 8036 knows the highest cause; he has "counsel" or "prudence," according as he knows what is to | |
| 8037 be done. But God knows all these by one simple act of knowledge, as will be shown | |
| 8038 <a id="FP_Q14_A1-p8.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q14_A7.html">(A[7])</a>. Hence the simple knowledge of God can be named by all these names; in such a way, however, that there must be removed from | |
| 8039 each of them, so far as they enter into divine predication, everything that savors of imperfection; and everything that expresses | |
| 8040 perfection is to be retained in them. Hence it is said, "With Him is wisdom and strength, He hath counsel and understanding" | |
| 8041 ( | |
| 8042 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q14_A1-p8.3" href="./asv.html#Job.12.13" target="asv">Job 12:13</a>). | |
| 8043 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="28900" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28900] Iª q. 14 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 8044 dicendum quod ea quae sunt divisim et multipliciter in creaturis, | |
| 8045 in Deo sunt simpliciter et unite, ut supra dictum est. Homo autem, | |
| 8046 secundum diversa cognita, habet diversas cognitiones, nam secundum | |
| 8047 quod cognoscit principia, dicitur habere intelligentiam; scientiam | |
| 8048 vero, secundum quod cognoscit conclusiones; sapientiam, secundum | |
| 8049 quod cognoscit causam altissimam; consilium vel prudentiam, | |
| 8050 secundum quod cognoscit agibilia. Sed haec omnia Deus una et | |
| 8051 simplici cognitione cognoscit, ut infra patebit. Unde simplex Dei | |
| 8052 cognitio omnibus istis nominibus nominari potest, ita tamen quod ab | |
| 8053 unoquoque eorum, secundum quod in divinam praedicationem venit, | |
| 8054 secludatur quidquid imperfectionis est, et retineatur quidquid | |
| 8055 perfectionis est. Et secundum hoc dicitur Iob XII, <i>apud ipsum | |
| 8056 est sapientia et fortitudo; ipse habet consilium et | |
| 8057 intelligentiam</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A1-p9"> | |
| 8058 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Knowledge is according to the mode of the one who knows; for the thing known is in the knower according to the mode of the | |
| 8059 knower. Now since the mode of the divine essence is higher than that of creatures, divine knowledge does not exist in God | |
| 8060 after the mode of created knowledge, so as to be universal or particular, or habitual, or potential, or existing according | |
| 8061 to any such mode. | |
| 8062 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="28901" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28901] Iª q. 14 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 8063 dicendum quod scientia est secundum modum cognoscentis, scitum enim | |
| 8064 est in sciente secundum modum scientis. Et ideo, cum modus divinae | |
| 8065 essentiae sit altior quam modus quo creaturae sunt, scientia divina | |
| 8066 non habet modum creatae scientiae, ut scilicet sit universalis vel | |
| 8067 particularis, vel in habitu vel in potentia, vel secundum aliquem | |
| 8068 talem modum disposita.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q14_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q14_A2-p0.1">Q. 14. A. 2. Whether God understands Himself?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A2-p2"> | |
| 8069 <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God does not understand Himself. For it is said by the Philosopher (De Causis), "Every knower who knows his | |
| 8070 own essence, returns completely to his own essence." But God does not go out from His own essence, nor is He moved at all; | |
| 8071 thus He cannot return to His own essence. Therefore He does not know His own essence. | |
| 8072 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="28902" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28902] Iª q. 14 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum sic | |
| 8073 proceditur. Videtur quod Deus non intelligat se. Dicitur enim in | |
| 8074 libro de causis, quod <i>omnis sciens qui scit suam essentiam, est | |
| 8075 rediens ad essentiam suam reditione completa</i>. Sed Deus non exit | |
| 8076 extra essentiam suam, nec aliquo modo movetur, et sic non competit | |
| 8077 sibi redire ad essentiam suam. Ergo ipse non est sciens essentiam | |
| 8078 suam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A2-p3"> | |
| 8079 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, to understand is a kind of passion and movement, as the Philosopher says (De Anima iii); and knowledge also is a | |
| 8080 kind of assimilation to the object known; and the thing known is the perfection of the knower. But nothing is moved, or suffers, | |
| 8081 or is made perfect by itself, "nor," as Hilary says (De Trin. iii), "is a thing its own likeness." Therefore God does not | |
| 8082 understand Himself. | |
| 8083 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="28903" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28903] Iª q. 14 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 8084 intelligere est quoddam pati et moveri, ut dicitur in III de anima, | |
| 8085 scientia etiam est assimilatio ad rem scitam, et scitum etiam est | |
| 8086 perfectio scientis. Sed nihil movetur, vel patitur, vel perficitur | |
| 8087 a seipso; neque similitudo sibi est, ut Hilarius dicit. Ergo Deus | |
| 8088 non est sciens seipsum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A2-p4"> | |
| 8089 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, we are like to God chiefly in our intellect, because we are the image of God in our mind, as Augustine says (Gen. | |
| 8090 ad lit. vi). But our intellect understands itself, only as it understands other things, as is said in De Anima iii. Therefore | |
| 8091 God understands Himself only so far perchance as He understands other things. | |
| 8092 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="28904" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28904] Iª q. 14 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 8093 praecipue Deo sumus similes secundum intellectum, quia secundum | |
| 8094 mentem sumus ad imaginem Dei, ut dicit Augustinus. Sed intellectus | |
| 8095 noster non intelligit se, nisi sicut intelligit alia, ut dicitur in | |
| 8096 III de anima. Ergo nec Deus intelligit se, nisi forte intelligendo | |
| 8097 alia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A2-p5"> | |
| 8098 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written: "The things that are of God no man knoweth, but the Spirit of God" ( | |
| 8099 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q14_A2-p5.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.2.11" target="asv">1 Cor. 2:11</a>). | |
| 8100 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 2 s. c."><a name="28905" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28905] Iª q. 14 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est | |
| 8101 quod dicitur I ad Cor. II, <i>quae sunt Dei, nemo novit nisi | |
| 8102 spiritus Dei</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q14_A2-p6"> | |
| 8103 <b>I answer that,</b> God understands Himself through Himself. In proof whereof it must be known that although in operations which pass to an external | |
| 8104 effect, the object of the operation, which is taken as the term, exists outside the operator; nevertheless in operations that | |
| 8105 remain in the operator, the object signified as the term of operation, resides in the operator; and accordingly as it is in | |
| 8106 the operator, the operation is actual. Hence the Philosopher says (De Anima iii) | |
| 8107 that "the sensible in act is sense in act, and the intelligible in act is intellect in act." For the reason why we actually | |
| 8108 feel or know a thing is because our intellect or sense is actually informed by the sensible or intelligible species. And because | |
| 8109 of this only, it follows that sense or intellect is distinct from the sensible or intelligible object, since both are in potentiality. | |
| 8110 </p><p id="FP_Q14_A2-p7"> Since therefore God has nothing in Him of potentiality, but is pure act, His intellect and its object are altogether the | |
| 8111 same; so that He neither is without the intelligible species, as is the case with our intellect when it understands potentially; | |
| 8112 nor does the intelligible species differ from the substance of the divine intellect, as it differs in our intellect when it | |
| 8113 understands actually; but the intelligible species itself is the divine intellect itself, and thus God | |
| 8114 understands Himself through Himself. | |
| 8115 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 2 co."><a name="28906" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28906] Iª q. 14 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum | |
| 8116 quod Deus se per seipsum intelligit. Ad cuius evidentiam, sciendum | |
| 8117 est quod, licet in operationibus quae transeunt in exteriorem | |
| 8118 effectum, obiectum operationis, quod significatur ut terminus, sit | |
| 8119 aliquid extra operantem; tamen in operationibus quae sunt in | |
| 8120 operante, obiectum quod significatur ut terminus operationis, est | |
| 8121 in ipso operante; et secundum quod est in eo, sic est operatio in | |
| 8122 actu. Unde dicitur in libro de anima, quod sensibile in actu est | |
| 8123 sensus in actu, et intelligibile in actu est intellectus in actu. | |
| 8124 Ex hoc enim aliquid in actu sentimus vel intelligimus, quod | |
| 8125 intellectus noster vel sensus informatur in actu per speciem | |
| 8126 sensibilis vel intelligibilis. Et secundum hoc tantum sensus vel | |
| 8127 intellectus aliud est a sensibili vel intelligibili, quia utrumque | |
| 8128 est in potentia. Cum igitur Deus nihil potentialitatis habeat, sed | |
| 8129 sit actus purus, oportet quod in eo intellectus et intellectum sint | |
| 8130 idem omnibus modis, ita scilicet, ut neque careat specie | |
| 8131 intelligibili, sicut intellectus noster cum intelligit in potentia; | |
| 8132 neque species intelligibilis sit aliud a substantia intellectus | |
| 8133 divini, sicut accidit in intellectu nostro, cum est actu | |
| 8134 intelligens; sed ipsa species intelligibilis est ipse intellectus | |
| 8135 divinus. Et sic seipsum per seipsum intelligit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A2-p8"> | |
| 8136 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Return to its own essence means only that a thing subsists in itself. Inasmuch as the form perfects the matter by giving | |
| 8137 it existence, it is in a certain way diffused in it; and it returns to itself inasmuch as it has existence in itself. Therefore | |
| 8138 those cognitive faculties which are not subsisting, but are the acts of organs, do not know themselves, as in the case of | |
| 8139 each of the senses; whereas those cognitive faculties which are subsisting, know | |
| 8140 themselves; hence it is said in De Causis that, "whoever knows his essence returns to it." Now it supremely belongs to God | |
| 8141 to be self-subsisting. Hence according to this mode of speaking, He supremely returns to His own essence, and knows Himself. | |
| 8142 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="28907" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28907] Iª q. 14 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo | |
| 8143 dicendum quod redire ad essentiam suam nihil aliud est quam rem | |
| 8144 subsistere in seipsa. Forma enim, inquantum perficit materiam dando | |
| 8145 ei esse, quodammodo supra ipsam effunditur, inquantum vero in | |
| 8146 seipsa habet esse, in seipsam redit. Virtutes igitur cognoscitivae | |
| 8147 quae non sunt subsistentes, sed actus aliquorum organorum, non | |
| 8148 cognoscunt seipsas; sicut patet in singulis sensibus. Sed virtutes | |
| 8149 cognoscitivae per se subsistentes, cognoscunt seipsas. Et propter | |
| 8150 hoc dicitur in libro de causis, quod <i>sciens essentiam suam, | |
| 8151 redit ad essentiam suam</i>. Per se autem subsistere maxime | |
| 8152 convenit Deo. Unde secundum hunc modum loquendi, ipse est maxime | |
| 8153 rediens ad essentiam suam, et cognoscens seipsum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A2-p9"> | |
| 8154 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Movement and passion are taken equivocally, according as to understand is described as a kind of movement or passion, as | |
| 8155 stated in De Anima iii. For to understand is not a movement that is an act of something imperfect passing from one to another, | |
| 8156 but it is an act, existing in the agent itself, of something perfect. Likewise that the intellect is perfected by the intelligible | |
| 8157 object, i.e. is assimilated to it, this belongs to an intellect which is | |
| 8158 sometimes in potentiality; because the fact of its being in a state of potentiality makes it differ from the intelligible | |
| 8159 object and assimilates it thereto through the intelligible species, which is the likeness of the thing understood, and makes | |
| 8160 it to be perfected thereby, as potentiality is perfected by act. On the other hand, the divine intellect, which is no way | |
| 8161 in potentiality, is not perfected by the intelligible object, nor is it assimilated thereto, but is its own perfection, and | |
| 8162 its | |
| 8163 own intelligible object. | |
| 8164 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="28908" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28908] Iª q. 14 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 8165 dicendum quod moveri et pati sumuntur aequivoce secundum quod | |
| 8166 intelligere dicitur esse quoddam moveri vel pati, ut dicitur in III | |
| 8167 de anima. Non enim intelligere est motus qui est actus imperfecti, | |
| 8168 qui est ab alio in aliud, sed actus perfecti, existens in ipso | |
| 8169 agente. Similiter etiam quod intellectus perficiatur ab | |
| 8170 intelligibili vel assimiletur ei, hoc convenit intellectui qui | |
| 8171 quandoque est in potentia, quia per hoc quod est in potentia, | |
| 8172 differt ab intelligibili, et assimilatur ei per speciem | |
| 8173 intelligibilem, quae est similitudo rei intellectae; et perficitur | |
| 8174 per ipsam, sicut potentia per actum. Sed intellectus divinus, qui | |
| 8175 nullo modo est in potentia, non perficitur per intelligibile, neque | |
| 8176 assimilatur ei, sed est sua perfectio et suum intelligibile.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A2-p10"> | |
| 8177 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Existence in nature does not belong to primary matter, which is a potentiality, unless it is reduced to act by a form. Now | |
| 8178 our passive intellect has the same relation to intelligible objects as primary matter has to natural things; for it is in | |
| 8179 potentiality as regards intelligible objects, just as primary matter is to natural things. Hence our passive intellect can | |
| 8180 be exercised concerning intelligible objects only so far as it is perfected by the | |
| 8181 intelligible species of something; and in that way it understands itself by an intelligible species, as it understands other | |
| 8182 things: for it is manifest that by knowing the intelligible object it understands also its own act of understanding, and by | |
| 8183 this act knows the intellectual faculty. But God is a pure act in the order of existence, as also in the order of intelligible | |
| 8184 objects; therefore He understands Himself through Himself. | |
| 8185 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="28909" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28909] Iª q. 14 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 8186 dicendum quod esse naturale non est materiae primae, quae est in | |
| 8187 potentia, nisi secundum quod est reducta in actum per formam. | |
| 8188 Intellectus autem noster possibilis se habet in ordine | |
| 8189 intelligibilium, sicut materia prima in ordine rerum naturalium, eo | |
| 8190 quod est in potentia ad intelligibilia, sicut materia prima ad | |
| 8191 naturalia. Unde intellectus noster possibilis non potest habere | |
| 8192 intelligibilem operationem, nisi inquantum perficitur per speciem | |
| 8193 intelligibilem alicuius. Et sic intelligit seipsum per speciem | |
| 8194 intelligibilem, sicut et alia, manifestum est enim quod ex eo quod | |
| 8195 cognoscit intelligibile, intelligit ipsum suum intelligere, et per | |
| 8196 actum cognoscit potentiam intellectivam. Deus autem est sicut actus | |
| 8197 purus tam in ordine existentium, quam in ordine intelligibilium, et | |
| 8198 ideo per seipsum, seipsum intelligit.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q14_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q14_A3-p0.1">Q. 14. A. 3. Whether God comprehends Himself?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A3-p2"> | |
| 8199 <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God does not comprehend Himself. For Augustine says (Octog. Tri. Quaest. xv), that "whatever comprehends itself | |
| 8200 is finite as regards itself." But God is in all ways infinite. Therefore He does not comprehend Himself. | |
| 8201 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="28910" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28910] Iª q. 14 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium sic | |
| 8202 proceditur. Videtur quod Deus non comprehendat seipsum. Dicit enim | |
| 8203 Augustinus, in libro octoginta trium quaest., quod id quod | |
| 8204 comprehendit se, finitum est sibi. Sed Deus est omnibus modis | |
| 8205 infinitus. Ergo non comprehendit se.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A3-p3"> | |
| 8206 <b>Objection 2:</b> If it is said that God is infinite to us, and finite to Himself, it can be urged to the contrary, that everything in God | |
| 8207 is truer than it is in us. If therefore God is finite to Himself, but infinite to us, then God is more truly finite than infinite; | |
| 8208 which is against what was laid down above ( | |
| 8209 <a id="FP_Q14_A3-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q7_A1.html">Q[7], A[1]</a>). Therefore God does not comprehend Himself. | |
| 8210 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="28911" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28911] Iª q. 14 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Si dicatur quod | |
| 8211 Deus infinitus est nobis, sed sibi finitus, contra, verius est | |
| 8212 unumquodque secundum quod est apud Deum, quam secundum quod est | |
| 8213 apud nos. Si igitur Deus sibi ipsi est finitus, nobis autem | |
| 8214 infinitus, verius est Deum esse finitum, quam infinitum. Quod est | |
| 8215 contra prius determinata. Non ergo Deus comprehendit seipsum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A3-p4"> | |
| 8216 <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (Octog. Tri. Quaest. xv), that "Everything that understands itself, comprehends itself." But God understands | |
| 8217 Himself. Therefore He comprehends Himself. | |
| 8218 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 3 s. c."><a name="28912" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28912] Iª q. 14 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est | |
| 8219 quod Augustinus dicit ibidem, <i>omne quod intelligit se, | |
| 8220 comprehendit se</i>. Sed Deus intelligit se. Ergo comprehendit | |
| 8221 se.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A3-p5"> | |
| 8222 <b>I answer that,</b> God perfectly comprehends Himself, as can be thus proved. A thing is said to be comprehended when the end of the knowledge | |
| 8223 of it is attained, and this is accomplished when it is known as perfectly as it is knowable; as, for instance, a demonstrable | |
| 8224 proposition is comprehended when known by demonstration, not, however, when it is known by some probable reason. Now it is | |
| 8225 manifest that God knows Himself as perfectly as He is perfectly knowable. For everything | |
| 8226 is knowable according to the mode of its own actuality; since a thing is not known according as it is in potentiality, but | |
| 8227 in so far as it is in actuality, as said in Metaph. ix. Now the power of God in knowing is as great as His actuality in existing; | |
| 8228 because it is from the fact that He is in act and free from all matter and potentiality, that God is cognitive, as shown above | |
| 8229 ( | |
| 8230 <a id="FP_Q14_A3-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q14_A1.html">AA[1]</a>,2). Whence it is manifest that He knows Himself as much as He is knowable; and for that | |
| 8231 reason He perfectly comprehends Himself. | |
| 8232 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 3 co."><a name="28913" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28913] Iª q. 14 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum | |
| 8233 quod Deus perfecte comprehendit seipsum. Quod sic patet. Tunc enim | |
| 8234 dicitur aliquid comprehendi, quando pervenitur ad finem cognitionis | |
| 8235 ipsius, et hoc est quando res cognoscitur ita perfecte, sicut | |
| 8236 cognoscibilis est. Sicut propositio demonstrabilis comprehenditur, | |
| 8237 quando scitur per demonstrationem, non autem quando cognoscitur per | |
| 8238 aliquam rationem probabilem. Manifestum est autem quod Deus ita | |
| 8239 perfecte cognoscit seipsum, sicut perfecte cognoscibilis est. Est | |
| 8240 enim unumquodque cognoscibile secundum modum sui actus, non enim | |
| 8241 cognoscitur aliquid secundum quod in potentia est, sed secundum | |
| 8242 quod est in actu, ut dicitur in IX Metaphys. Tanta est autem virtus | |
| 8243 Dei in cognoscendo, quanta est actualitas eius in existendo, quia | |
| 8244 per hoc quod actu est, et ab omni materia et potentia separatus, | |
| 8245 Deus cognoscitivus est, ut ostensum est. Unde manifestum est quod | |
| 8246 tantum seipsum cognoscit, quantum cognoscibilis est. Et propter hoc | |
| 8247 seipsum perfecte comprehendit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A3-p6"> | |
| 8248 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The strict meaning of "comprehension" signifies that one thing holds and includes another; and in this sense everything comprehended | |
| 8249 is finite, as also is everything included in another. But God is not said to be comprehended by Himself in this sense, as | |
| 8250 if His intellect were a faculty apart from Himself, and as if it held and included Himself; for these modes of speaking are | |
| 8251 to be taken by way of negation. But as God is said to be in Himself, | |
| 8252 forasmuch as He is not contained by anything outside of Himself; so He is said to be comprehended by Himself, forasmuch as | |
| 8253 nothing in Himself is hidden from Himself. For Augustine says (De Vid. Deum. ep. cxii), "The whole is comprehended when seen, | |
| 8254 if it is seen in such a way that nothing of it is hidden from the seer." | |
| 8255 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="28914" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28914] Iª q. 14 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo | |
| 8256 dicendum quod comprehendere, si proprie accipiatur, significat | |
| 8257 aliquid habens et includens alterum. Et sic oportet quod omne | |
| 8258 comprehensum sit finitum, sicut omne inclusum. Non sic autem | |
| 8259 comprehendi dicitur Deus a seipso, ut intellectus suus sit aliud | |
| 8260 quam ipse, et capiat ipsum et includat. Sed huiusmodi locutiones | |
| 8261 per negationem sunt exponendae. Sicut enim Deus dicitur esse in | |
| 8262 seipso, quia a nullo exteriori continetur; ita dicitur comprehendi | |
| 8263 a seipso, quia nihil est sui quod lateat ipsum dicit enim | |
| 8264 Augustinus, in libro de videndo Deum, quod <i>totum comprehenditur | |
| 8265 videndo, quod ita videtur, ut nihil eius lateat videntem</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A3-p7"> | |
| 8266 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> When it is said, "God is finite to Himself," this is to be understood according to a certain similitude of proportion, because | |
| 8267 He has the same relation in not exceeding His intellect, as anything finite has in not exceeding finite intellect. But God | |
| 8268 is not to be called finite to Himself in this sense, as if He understood Himself to be something finite. | |
| 8269 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="28915" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28915] Iª q. 14 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 8270 dicendum quod, cum dicitur Deus finitus est sibi, intelligendum est | |
| 8271 secundum quandam similitudinem proportionis; quia sic se habet in | |
| 8272 non excedendo intellectum suum, sicut se habet aliquod finitum in | |
| 8273 non excedendo intellectum finitum. Non autem sic dicitur Deus sibi | |
| 8274 finitus, quod ipse intelligat se esse aliquid finitum.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q14_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q14_A4-p0.1">Q. 14. A. 4. Whether the act of God's intellect is His substance?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A4-p2"> | |
| 8275 <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the act of God's intellect is not His substance. For to understand is an operation. But an operation signifies | |
| 8276 something proceeding from the operator. Therefore the act of God's intellect is not His substance. | |
| 8277 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="28916" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28916] Iª q. 14 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum sic | |
| 8278 proceditur. Videtur quod ipsum intelligere Dei non sit eius | |
| 8279 substantia. Intelligere enim est quaedam operatio. Operatio autem | |
| 8280 aliquid significat procedens ab operante. Ergo ipsum intelligere | |
| 8281 Dei non est ipsa Dei substantia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A4-p3"> | |
| 8282 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, to understand one's act of understanding, is to understand something that is neither great nor chiefly understood, | |
| 8283 and but secondary and accessory. If therefore God be his own act of understanding, His act of understanding will be as when | |
| 8284 we understand our act of understanding: and thus God's act of understanding will not be something great. | |
| 8285 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="28917" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28917] Iª q. 14 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, cum | |
| 8286 aliquis intelligit se intelligere, hoc non est intelligere aliquid | |
| 8287 magnum vel principale intellectum, sed intelligere quoddam | |
| 8288 secundarium et accessorium. Si igitur Deus sit ipsum intelligere, | |
| 8289 intelligere Deum erit sicut cum intelligimus intelligere. Et sic | |
| 8290 non erit aliquid magnum intelligere Deum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A4-p4"> | |
| 8291 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, every act of understanding means understanding something. When therefore God understands Himself, if He Himself | |
| 8292 is not distinct from this act of understanding, He understands that He understands Himself; and so on to infinity. Therefore | |
| 8293 the act of God's intellect is not His substance. | |
| 8294 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="28918" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28918] Iª q. 14 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, omne | |
| 8295 intelligere est aliquid intelligere. Cum ergo Deus intelligit se, | |
| 8296 si ipsemet non est aliud quam suum intelligere, intelligit se | |
| 8297 intelligere, et intelligere se intelligere se, et sic in infinitum. | |
| 8298 Non ergo ipsum intelligere Dei est eius substantia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A4-p5"> | |
| 8299 <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Trin. vii), "In God to be is the same as to be wise." But to be wise is the same thing as to understand. | |
| 8300 Therefore in God to be is the same thing as to understand. But God's existence is His substance, as shown above ( | |
| 8301 <a id="FP_Q14_A4-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q3_A4.html">Q[3], A[4]</a>). Therefore the act of God's intellect is His substance. | |
| 8302 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 4 s. c."><a name="28919" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28919] Iª q. 14 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est | |
| 8303 quod dicit Augustinus, Lib. VII de Trin., <i>Deo hoc est esse, quod | |
| 8304 sapientem esse</i>. Hoc autem est sapientem esse, quod intelligere. | |
| 8305 Ergo Deo hoc est esse, quod intelligere. Sed esse Dei est eius | |
| 8306 substantia, ut supra ostensum est. Ergo intelligere Dei est eius | |
| 8307 substantia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q14_A4-p6"> | |
| 8308 <b>I answer that,</b> It must be said that the act of God's intellect is His substance. For if His act of understanding were other than His substance, | |
| 8309 then something else, as the Philosopher says (Metaph. xii), would be the act and perfection of the divine substance, to which | |
| 8310 the divine substance would be related, as potentiality is to act, which is altogether impossible; because the act of understanding | |
| 8311 is the perfection and act of the one understanding. Let us now consider how | |
| 8312 this is. As was laid down above | |
| 8313 <a id="FP_Q14_A4-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q14_A2.html">(A[2])</a>, to understand is not an act passing to anything extrinsic; for it remains in the operator as his own act and perfection; | |
| 8314 as existence is the perfection of the one existing: just as existence follows on the form, so in like manner to understand | |
| 8315 follows on the intelligible species. Now in God there is no form which is something other than His existence, as shown above | |
| 8316 | |
| 8317 <a id="FP_Q14_A4-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q3.html">(Q[3])</a>. Hence as His essence itself is also | |
| 8318 His intelligible species, it necessarily follows that His act of understanding must be His essence and His existence. | |
| 8319 </p><p id="FP_Q14_A4-p7"> Thus it follows from all the foregoing that in God, intellect, and the object understood, and the intelligible species, and | |
| 8320 His act of understanding are entirely one and the same. Hence when God is said to be understanding, no kind of multiplicity | |
| 8321 is attached to His substance. | |
| 8322 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 4 co."><a name="28920" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28920] Iª q. 14 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum | |
| 8323 quod est necesse dicere quod intelligere Dei est eius substantia. | |
| 8324 Nam si intelligere Dei sit aliud quam eius substantia, oporteret, | |
| 8325 ut dicit philosophus in XII Metaphys., quod aliquid aliud esset | |
| 8326 actus et perfectio substantiae divinae, ad quod se haberet | |
| 8327 substantia divina sicut potentia ad actum (quod est omnino | |
| 8328 impossibile), nam intelligere est perfectio et actus intelligentis. | |
| 8329 Hoc autem qualiter sit, considerandum est. Sicut enim supra dictum | |
| 8330 est, intelligere non est actio progrediens ad aliquid extrinsecum, | |
| 8331 sed manet in operante sicut actus et perfectio eius, prout esse est | |
| 8332 perfectio existentis, sicut enim esse consequitur formam, ita | |
| 8333 intelligere sequitur speciem intelligibilem. In Deo autem non est | |
| 8334 forma quae sit aliud quam suum esse, ut supra ostensum est. Unde, | |
| 8335 cum ipsa sua essentia sit etiam species intelligibilis, ut dictum | |
| 8336 est, ex necessitate sequitur quod ipsum eius intelligere sit eius | |
| 8337 essentia et eius esse. Et sic patet ex omnibus praemissis quod in | |
| 8338 Deo intellectus, et id quod intelligitur, et species | |
| 8339 intelligibilis, et ipsum intelligere, sunt omnino unum et idem. | |
| 8340 Unde patet quod per hoc quod Deus dicitur intelligens, nulla | |
| 8341 multiplicitas ponitur in eius substantia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A4-p8"> | |
| 8342 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> To understand is not an operation proceeding out of the operator, but remaining in him. | |
| 8343 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="28921" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28921] Iª q. 14 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo | |
| 8344 dicendum quod intelligere non est operatio exiens ab ipso operante, | |
| 8345 sed manens in ipso.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A4-p9"> | |
| 8346 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> When that act of understanding which is not subsistent is understood, something not great is understood; as when we understand | |
| 8347 our act of understanding; and so this cannot be likened to the act of the divine understanding which is subsistent. | |
| 8348 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="28922" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28922] Iª q. 14 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 8349 dicendum quod, cum intelligitur illud intelligere quod non est | |
| 8350 subsistens, non intelligitur aliquid magnum; sicut cum intelligimus | |
| 8351 intelligere nostrum. Et ideo non est simile de ipso intelligere | |
| 8352 divino, quod est subsistens.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A4-p10"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Thus appears the Reply to the Third Objection. For the act of divine understanding subsists in itself, and belongs to its | |
| 8353 very self and is not another's; hence it need not proceed to infinity. | |
| 8354 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="28923" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28923] Iª q. 14 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Et per hoc patet | |
| 8355 responsio ad tertium. Nam intelligere divinum, quod est in seipso | |
| 8356 subsistens, est sui ipsius; et non alicuius alterius, ut sic | |
| 8357 oporteat procedere in infinitum.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q14_A5" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q14_A5-p0.1">Q. 14. A. 5. Whether God knows things other than Himself?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A5-p2"> | |
| 8358 <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God does not know things besides Himself. For all other things but God are outside of God. But Augustine says | |
| 8359 (Octog. Tri. Quaest. qu. xlvi) that "God does not behold anything out of Himself." Therefore He does not know things other | |
| 8360 than Himself. | |
| 8361 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 5 arg. 1"><a name="28924" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28924] Iª q. 14 a. 5 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quintum sic | |
| 8362 proceditur. Videtur quod Deus non cognoscat alia a se. Quaecumque | |
| 8363 enim sunt alia a Deo, sunt extra ipsum. Sed Augustinus dicit, in | |
| 8364 libro octoginta trium qu., quod <i>neque quidquam Deus extra | |
| 8365 seipsum intuetur</i>. Ergo non cognoscit alia a se.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A5-p3"> | |
| 8366 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the object understood is the perfection of the one who understands. If therefore God understands other things besides | |
| 8367 Himself, something else will be the perfection of God, and will be nobler than He; which is impossible. | |
| 8368 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 5 arg. 2"><a name="28925" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28925] Iª q. 14 a. 5 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 8369 intellectum est perfectio intelligentis. Si ergo Deus intelligat | |
| 8370 alia a se, aliquid aliud erit perfectio Dei, et nobilius ipso. Quod | |
| 8371 est impossibile.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A5-p4"> | |
| 8372 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the act of understanding is specified by the intelligible object, as is every other act from its own object. Hence | |
| 8373 the intellectual act is so much the nobler, the nobler the object understood. But God is His own intellectual act. If therefore | |
| 8374 God understands anything other than Himself, then God Himself is specified by something else than Himself; which cannot be. | |
| 8375 Therefore He does not understand things other than Himself. | |
| 8376 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 5 arg. 3"><a name="28926" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28926] Iª q. 14 a. 5 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, ipsum | |
| 8377 intelligere speciem habet ab intelligibili, sicut et omnis alius | |
| 8378 actus a suo obiecto, unde et ipsum intelligere tanto est nobilius, | |
| 8379 quanto etiam nobilius est ipsum quod intelligitur. Sed Deus est | |
| 8380 ipsum suum intelligere, ut ex dictis patet. Si igitur Deus | |
| 8381 intelligit aliquid aliud a se, ipse Deus specificatur per aliquid | |
| 8382 aliud a se, quod est impossibile. Non igitur intelligit alia a | |
| 8383 se.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A5-p5"> | |
| 8384 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written: "All things are naked and open to His eyes" ( | |
| 8385 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q14_A5-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Heb.4.13" target="asv">Heb. 4:13</a>). | |
| 8386 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 5 s. c."><a name="28927" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28927] Iª q. 14 a. 5 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est | |
| 8387 quod dicitur Hebr. IV, <i>omnia nuda et aperta sunt oculis | |
| 8388 eius</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q14_A5-p6"> | |
| 8389 <b>I answer that,</b> God necessarily knows things other than Himself. For it is manifest that He perfectly understands Himself; otherwise His | |
| 8390 existence would not be perfect, since His existence is His act of understanding. Now if anything is perfectly known, it follows | |
| 8391 of necessity that its power is perfectly known. But the power of anything can be perfectly known only by knowing to what its | |
| 8392 power extends. Since therefore the divine power extends to other things by the very fact | |
| 8393 that it is the first effective cause of all things, as is clear from the aforesaid ( | |
| 8394 <a id="FP_Q14_A5-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q2_A3.html">Q[2], A[3]</a>), God must necessarily know things other than Himself. And this appears still more plainly if we add that the every existence | |
| 8395 of the first effective cause---viz. God---is His own act of understanding. Hence whatever effects pre-exist in God, as in | |
| 8396 the first cause, must be in His act of understanding, and all things must be in Him according to an intelligible mode: for | |
| 8397 everything which is in another, is in it according to the mode of that in which it is. | |
| 8398 </p><p id="FP_Q14_A5-p7"> Now in order to know how God knows things other than Himself, we must consider that a thing is known in two ways: in itself, | |
| 8399 and in another. A thing is known in itself when it is known by the proper species adequate to the knowable object; as when | |
| 8400 the eye sees a man through the image of a man. A thing is seen in another through the image of that which contains it; as | |
| 8401 when a part is seen in the whole by the image of the whole; or when a man is seen in a mirror by the image in the | |
| 8402 mirror, or by any other mode by which one thing is seen in another. | |
| 8403 </p><p id="FP_Q14_A5-p8"> So we say that God sees Himself in Himself, because He sees Himself through His essence; and He sees other things not in | |
| 8404 themselves, but in Himself; inasmuch as His essence contains the similitude of things other than Himself. | |
| 8405 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 5 co."><a name="28928" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28928] Iª q. 14 a. 5 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum | |
| 8406 quod necesse est Deum cognoscere alia a se. Manifestum est enim | |
| 8407 quod seipsum perfecte intelligit, alioquin suum esse non esset | |
| 8408 perfectum, cum suum esse sit suum intelligere. Si autem perfecte | |
| 8409 aliquid cognoscitur, necesse est quod virtus eius perfecte | |
| 8410 cognoscatur. Virtus autem alicuius rei perfecte cognosci non | |
| 8411 potest, nisi cognoscantur ea ad quae virtus se extendit. Unde, cum | |
| 8412 virtus divina se extendat ad alia, eo quod ipsa est prima causa | |
| 8413 effectiva omnium entium, ut ex supradictis patet; necesse est quod | |
| 8414 Deus alia a se cognoscat. Et hoc etiam evidentius fit, si | |
| 8415 adiungatur quod ipsum esse causae agentis primae, scilicet Dei, est | |
| 8416 eius intelligere. Unde quicumque effectus praeexistunt in Deo sicut | |
| 8417 in causa prima, necesse est quod sint in ipso eius intelligere; et | |
| 8418 quod omnia in eo sint secundum modum intelligibilem, nam omne quod | |
| 8419 est in altero, est in eo secundum modum eius in quo est. Ad | |
| 8420 sciendum autem qualiter alia a se cognoscat, considerandum est quod | |
| 8421 dupliciter aliquid cognoscitur, uno modo, in seipso; alio modo, in | |
| 8422 altero. In seipso quidem cognoscitur aliquid, quando cognoscitur | |
| 8423 per speciem propriam adaequatam ipsi cognoscibili, sicut cum oculus | |
| 8424 videt hominem per speciem hominis. In alio autem videtur id quod | |
| 8425 videtur per speciem continentis, sicut cum pars videtur in toto per | |
| 8426 speciem totius, vel cum homo videtur in speculo per speciem | |
| 8427 speculi, vel quocumque alio modo contingat aliquid in alio videri. | |
| 8428 Sic igitur dicendum est quod Deus seipsum videt in seipso, quia | |
| 8429 seipsum videt per essentiam suam. Alia autem a se videt non in | |
| 8430 ipsis, sed in seipso, inquantum essentia sua continet similitudinem | |
| 8431 aliorum ab ipso.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A5-p9"> | |
| 8432 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The passage of Augustine in which it is said that God "sees nothing outside Himself" is not to be taken in such a way, as | |
| 8433 if God saw nothing outside Himself, but in the sense that what is outside Himself He does not see except in Himself, as above | |
| 8434 explained. | |
| 8435 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 5 ad 1"><a name="28929" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28929] Iª q. 14 a. 5 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo | |
| 8436 dicendum quod verbum Augustini dicentis quod Deus nihil extra se | |
| 8437 intuetur, non est sic intelligendum, quasi nihil quod sit extra se | |
| 8438 intueatur, sed quia id quod est extra seipsum, non intuetur nisi in | |
| 8439 seipso, ut dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A5-p10"> | |
| 8440 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The object understood is a perfection of the one understanding not by its substance, but by its image, according to which | |
| 8441 it is in the intellect, as its form and perfection, as is said in De Anima iii. For "a stone is not in the soul, but its image." | |
| 8442 Now those things which are other than God are understood by God, inasmuch as the essence of God contains their images as above | |
| 8443 explained; hence it does not follow that there is any perfection in the | |
| 8444 divine intellect other than the divine essence. | |
| 8445 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 5 ad 2"><a name="28930" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28930] Iª q. 14 a. 5 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 8446 dicendum quod intellectum est perfectio intelligentis non quidem | |
| 8447 secundum suam substantiam, sed secundum suam speciem, secundum quam | |
| 8448 est in intellectu, ut forma et perfectio eius, <i>lapis enim non | |
| 8449 est in anima, sed species eius</i>, ut dicitur in III de anima. Ea | |
| 8450 vero quae sunt alia a Deo, intelliguntur a Deo inquantum essentia | |
| 8451 Dei continet species eorum, ut dictum est. Unde non sequitur quod | |
| 8452 aliquid aliud sit perfectio divini intellectus, quam ipsa essentia | |
| 8453 Dei.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A5-p11"> | |
| 8454 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The intellectual act is not specified by what is understood in another, but by the principal object understood in which other | |
| 8455 things are understood. For the intellectual act is specified by its object, inasmuch as the intelligible form is the principle | |
| 8456 of the intellectual operation: since every operation is specified by the form which is its principle of operation; as heating | |
| 8457 by heat. Hence the intellectual operation is specified by that intelligible | |
| 8458 form which makes the intellect in act. And this is the image of the principal thing understood, which in God is nothing but | |
| 8459 His own essence in which all images of things are comprehended. Hence it does not follow that the divine intellectual act, | |
| 8460 or rather God Himself, is specified by anything else than the divine essence itself. | |
| 8461 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 5 ad 3"><a name="28931" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28931] Iª q. 14 a. 5 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 8462 dicendum quod ipsum intelligere non specificatur per id quod in | |
| 8463 alio intelligitur, sed per principale intellectum, in quo alia | |
| 8464 intelliguntur. Intantum enim ipsum intelligere specificatur per | |
| 8465 obiectum suum, inquantum forma intelligibilis est principium | |
| 8466 intellectualis operationis, nam omnis operatio specificatur per | |
| 8467 formam quae est principium operationis, sicut calefactio per | |
| 8468 calorem. Unde per illam formam intelligibilem specificatur | |
| 8469 intellectualis operatio, quae facit intellectum in actu. Et haec | |
| 8470 est species principalis intellecti, quae in Deo nihil est aliud | |
| 8471 quam essentia sua, in qua omnes species rerum comprehenduntur. Unde | |
| 8472 non oportet quod ipsum intelligere divinum, vel potius ipse Deus, | |
| 8473 specificetur per aliud quam per essentiam divinam.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q14_A6" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q14_A6-p0.1">Q. 14. A. 6. Whether God knows things other than Himself by proper knowledge?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A6-p2"> | |
| 8474 <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God does not know things other than Himself by proper knowledge. For, as was shown | |
| 8475 <a id="FP_Q14_A6-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q14_A5.html">(A[5])</a>, God knows things other than Himself, according as they are in Himself. But other things are in Him as in their common and | |
| 8476 universal cause, and are known by God as in their first and universal cause. This is to know them by general, and not by proper | |
| 8477 knowledge. Therefore God knows things besides Himself by general, and not by proper | |
| 8478 knowledge. | |
| 8479 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 6 arg. 1"><a name="28932" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28932] Iª q. 14 a. 6 arg. 1</span></a> Ad sextum sic | |
| 8480 proceditur. Videtur quod Deus non cognoscat alia a se propria | |
| 8481 cognitione. Sic enim cognoscit alia a se, ut dictum est, secundum | |
| 8482 quod alia ab ipso in eo sunt. Sed alia ab eo sunt in ipso sicut in | |
| 8483 prima causa communi et universali. Ergo et alia cognoscuntur a Deo, | |
| 8484 sicut in causa prima et universali. Hoc autem est cognoscere in | |
| 8485 universali, et non secundum propriam cognitionem. Ergo Deus | |
| 8486 cognoscit alia a se in universali, et non secundum propriam | |
| 8487 cognitionem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A6-p3"> | |
| 8488 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the created essence is as distant from the divine essence, as the divine essence is distant from the created essence. | |
| 8489 But the divine essence cannot be known by the created essence, as said above (Q[12]/A[2]). Therefore neither can the created | |
| 8490 essence be known by the divine essence. Thus as God knows only by His essence, it follows that He does not know what the creature | |
| 8491 is in its essence, so as to know "what it is," which is to have proper knowledge | |
| 8492 of it. | |
| 8493 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 6 arg. 2"><a name="28933" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28933] Iª q. 14 a. 6 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 8494 quantum distat essentia creaturae ab essentia divina, tantum distat | |
| 8495 essentia divina ab essentia creaturae. Sed per essentiam creaturae | |
| 8496 non potest cognosci essentia divina, ut supra dictum est. Ergo nec | |
| 8497 per essentiam divinam potest cognosci essentia creaturae. Et sic, | |
| 8498 cum Deus nihil cognoscat nisi per essentiam suam, sequitur quod non | |
| 8499 cognoscat creaturam secundum eius essentiam, ut cognoscat de ea | |
| 8500 quid est, quod est propriam cognitionem de re habere.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A6-p4"> | |
| 8501 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, proper knowledge of a thing can come only through its proper ratio. But as God knows all things by His essence, | |
| 8502 it seems that He does not know each thing by its proper ratio; for one thing cannot be the proper ratio of many and diverse | |
| 8503 things. Therefore God has not a proper knowledge of things, but a general knowledge; for to know things otherwise than by | |
| 8504 their proper ratio is to have only a common and general knowledge of them. | |
| 8505 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 6 arg. 3"><a name="28934" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28934] Iª q. 14 a. 6 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 8506 propria cognitio non habetur de re, nisi per propriam eius | |
| 8507 rationem. Sed cum Deus cognoscat omnia per essentiam suam, non | |
| 8508 videtur quod unumquodque per propriam rationem cognoscat, idem enim | |
| 8509 non potest esse propria ratio multorum et diversorum. Non ergo | |
| 8510 habet propriam cognitionem Deus de rebus, sed communem, nam | |
| 8511 cognoscere res non secundum propriam rationem, est cognoscere res | |
| 8512 solum in communi.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A6-p5"> | |
| 8513 <b>On the contrary,</b> To have a proper knowledge of things is to know them not only in general, but as they are distinct from each other. Now God | |
| 8514 knows things in that manner. Hence it is written that He reaches "even to the division of the soul and the spirit, of the | |
| 8515 joints also and the marrow, and is a discerner of thoughts and intents of the heart; neither is there any creature invisible | |
| 8516 in His sight" ( | |
| 8517 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q14_A6-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Heb.4.12" target="asv">Heb. 4:12,13</a>). | |
| 8518 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 6 s. c."><a name="28935" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28935] Iª q. 14 a. 6 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra, | |
| 8519 habere propriam cognitionem de rebus, est cognoscere res non solum | |
| 8520 in communi, sed secundum quod sunt ab invicem distinctae. Sic autem | |
| 8521 Deus cognoscit res. Unde dicitur Heb. IV, quod <i>pertingit usque | |
| 8522 ad divisionem spiritus et animae, compagum quoque et medullarum; et | |
| 8523 discretor cogitationum et intentionum cordis; et non est ulla | |
| 8524 creatura invisibilis in conspectu eius</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q14_A6-p6"> | |
| 8525 <b>I answer that,</b> Some have erred on this point, saying that God knows things other than Himself only in general, that is, only as beings. | |
| 8526 For as fire, if it knew the nature of heat, and all things else in so far as they are hot; so God, through knowing Himself | |
| 8527 as the principle of being, knows the nature of being, and all other things in so far as they are beings. | |
| 8528 </p><p id="FP_Q14_A6-p7"> But this cannot be. For to know a thing in general and not in particular, is to have an imperfect knowledge. Hence our intellect, | |
| 8529 when it is reduced from potentiality to act, acquires first a universal and confused knowledge of things, before it knows | |
| 8530 them in particular; as proceeding from the imperfect to the perfect, as is clear from Phys. i. If therefore the knowledge | |
| 8531 of God regarding things other than Himself is only universal and not special, it would follow that His | |
| 8532 understanding would not be absolutely perfect; therefore neither would His being be perfect; and this is against what was | |
| 8533 said above ( | |
| 8534 <a id="FP_Q14_A6-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q4_A1.html">Q[4], A[1]</a>). We must therefore hold that God knows things other than Himself with a proper knowledge; not only in so far as being is | |
| 8535 common to them, but in so far as one is distinguished from the other. In proof thereof we may observe that some wishing to | |
| 8536 show that God knows many things by one, bring forward some examples, as, for | |
| 8537 instance, that if the centre knew itself, it would know all lines that proceed from the centre; or if light knew itself, it | |
| 8538 would know all colors. | |
| 8539 </p><p id="FP_Q14_A6-p8"> Now these examples although they are similar in part, namely, as regards universal causality, nevertheless they fail in this | |
| 8540 respect, that multitude and diversity are caused by the one universal principle, not as regards that which is the principle | |
| 8541 of distinction, but only as regards that in which they communicate. For the diversity of colors is not caused by the light | |
| 8542 only, but by the different disposition of the diaphanous medium which receives it; and likewise, the diversity | |
| 8543 of the lines is caused by their different position. Hence it is that this kind of diversity and multitude cannot be known | |
| 8544 in its principle by proper knowledge, but only in a general way. In God, however, it is otherwise. For it was shown above | |
| 8545 ( | |
| 8546 <a id="FP_Q14_A6-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q4_A2.html">Q[4], A[2]</a>) that whatever perfection exists in any creature, wholly pre-exists and is contained in God in an excelling manner. Now not | |
| 8547 only what is common to creatures--viz. being---belongs to their perfection, but also what makes | |
| 8548 them distinguished from each other; as living and understanding, and the like, whereby living beings are distinguished from | |
| 8549 the non-living, and the intelligent from the non-intelligent. Likewise every form whereby each thing is constituted in its | |
| 8550 own species, is a perfection; and thus all things pre-exist in God, not only as regards what is common to all, but also as | |
| 8551 regards what distinguishes one thing from another. And therefore as God contains all perfections in Himself, the essence of | |
| 8552 God | |
| 8553 is compared to all other essences of things, not as the common to the proper, as unity is to numbers, or as the centre (of | |
| 8554 a circle) to the (radiating) lines; but as perfect acts to imperfect; as if I were to compare man to animal; or six, a perfect | |
| 8555 number, to the imperfect numbers contained under it. Now it is manifest that by a perfect act imperfect acts can be known | |
| 8556 not only in general, but also by proper knowledge; thus, for example, whoever knows a man, knows an animal by proper knowledge; | |
| 8557 and whoever knows the number six, knows the number three also by proper knowledge. | |
| 8558 </p><p id="FP_Q14_A6-p9"> As therefore the essence of God contains in itself all the perfection contained in the essence of any other being, and far | |
| 8559 more, God can know in Himself all of them with proper knowledge. For the nature proper to each thing consists in some degree | |
| 8560 of participation in the divine perfection. Now God could not be said to know Himself perfectly unless He knew all the ways | |
| 8561 in which His own perfection can be shared by others. Neither could He know the very nature of being perfectly, | |
| 8562 unless He knew all modes of being. Hence it is manifest that God knows all things with proper knowledge, in their distinction | |
| 8563 from each other. | |
| 8564 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 6 co."><a name="28936" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28936] Iª q. 14 a. 6 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum | |
| 8565 quod circa hoc quidam erraverunt, dicentes quod Deus alia a se non | |
| 8566 cognoscit nisi in communi, scilicet inquantum sunt entia. Sicut | |
| 8567 enim ignis, si cognosceret seipsum ut est principium caloris, | |
| 8568 cognosceret naturam caloris, et omnia alia inquantum sunt calida; | |
| 8569 ita Deus, inquantum cognoscit se ut principium essendi, cognoscit | |
| 8570 naturam entis, et omnia alia inquantum sunt entia. Sed hoc non | |
| 8571 potest esse. Nam intelligere aliquid in communi, et non in | |
| 8572 speciali, est imperfecte aliquid cognoscere. Unde intellectus | |
| 8573 noster, dum de potentia in actum reducitur, pertingit prius ad | |
| 8574 cognitionem universalem et confusam de rebus, quam ad propriam | |
| 8575 rerum cognitionem, sicut de imperfecto ad perfectum procedens, ut | |
| 8576 patet in I Physic. Si igitur cognitio Dei de rebus aliis a se, | |
| 8577 esset in universali tantum, et non in speciali, sequeretur quod | |
| 8578 eius intelligere non esset omnibus modis perfectum, et per | |
| 8579 consequens nec eius esse, quod est contra ea quae superius ostensa | |
| 8580 sunt. Oportet igitur dicere quod alia a se cognoscat propria | |
| 8581 cognitione; non solum secundum quod communicant in ratione entis, | |
| 8582 sed secundum quod unum ab alio distinguitur. Et ad huius | |
| 8583 evidentiam, considerandum est quod quidam, volentes ostendere quod | |
| 8584 Deus per unum cognoscit multa, utuntur quibusdam exemplis, ut puta | |
| 8585 quod, si centrum cognosceret seipsum, cognosceret omnes lineas | |
| 8586 progredientes a centro; vel lux, si cognosceret seipsam, | |
| 8587 cognosceret omnes colores. Sed haec exempla, licet quantum ad | |
| 8588 aliquid similia sint, scilicet quantum ad universalem causalitatem; | |
| 8589 tamen deficiunt quantum ad hoc, quod multitudo et diversitas non | |
| 8590 causantur ab illo uno principio universali, quantum ad id quod | |
| 8591 principium distinctionis est, sed solum quantum ad id in quo | |
| 8592 communicant. Non enim diversitas colorum causatur ex luce solum, | |
| 8593 sed ex diversa dispositione diaphani recipientis, et similiter | |
| 8594 diversitas linearum ex diverso situ. Et inde est quod huiusmodi | |
| 8595 diversitas et multitudo non potest cognosci in suo principio | |
| 8596 secundum propriam cognitionem, sed solum in communi. Sed in Deo non | |
| 8597 sic est. Supra enim ostensum est quod quidquid perfectionis est in | |
| 8598 quacumque creatura, totum praeexistit et continetur in Deo secundum | |
| 8599 modum excellentem. Non solum autem id in quo creaturae communicant, | |
| 8600 scilicet ipsum esse, ad perfectionem pertinet; sed etiam ea per | |
| 8601 quae creaturae ad invicem distinguuntur, sicut vivere, et | |
| 8602 intelligere, et huiusmodi, quibus viventia a non viventibus, et | |
| 8603 intelligentia a non intelligentibus distinguuntur. Et omnis forma, | |
| 8604 per quam quaelibet res in propria specie constituitur, perfectio | |
| 8605 quaedam est. Et sic omnia in Deo praeexistunt, non solum quantum ad | |
| 8606 id quod commune est omnibus, sed etiam quantum ad ea secundum quae | |
| 8607 res distinguuntur. Et sic, cum Deus in se omnes perfectiones | |
| 8608 contineat, comparatur Dei essentia ad omnes rerum essentias, non | |
| 8609 sicut commune ad propria, ut unitas ad numeros, vel centrum ad | |
| 8610 lineas; sed sicut perfectus actus ad imperfectos, ut si dicerem, | |
| 8611 homo ad animal, vel senarius, qui est numerus perfectus, ad numeros | |
| 8612 imperfectos sub ipso contentos. Manifestum est autem quod per actum | |
| 8613 perfectum cognosci possunt actus imperfecti, non solum in communi, | |
| 8614 sed etiam propria cognitione. Sicut qui cognoscit hominem, | |
| 8615 cognoscit animal propria cognitione, et qui cognoscit senarium, | |
| 8616 cognoscit trinarium propria cognitione. Sic igitur, cum essentia | |
| 8617 Dei habeat in se quidquid perfectionis habet essentia cuiuscumque | |
| 8618 rei alterius, et adhuc amplius, Deus in seipso potest omnia propria | |
| 8619 cognitione cognoscere. Propria enim natura uniuscuiusque consistit, | |
| 8620 secundum quod per aliquem modum divinam perfectionem participat. | |
| 8621 Non autem Deus perfecte seipsum cognosceret, nisi cognosceret | |
| 8622 quomodocumque participabilis est ab aliis sua perfectio, nec etiam | |
| 8623 ipsam naturam essendi perfecte sciret, nisi cognosceret omnes modos | |
| 8624 essendi. Unde manifestum est quod Deus cognoscit omnes res propria | |
| 8625 cognitione, secundum quod ab aliis distinguuntur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q14_A6-p10"> | |
| 8626 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> So to know a thing as it is in the knower, may be understood in two ways. In one way this adverb "so" imports the mode of | |
| 8627 knowledge on the part of the thing known; and in that sense it is false. For the knower does not always know the object known | |
| 8628 according to the existence it has in the knower; since the eye does not know a stone according to the existence it has in | |
| 8629 the eye; but by the image of the stone which is in the eye, the eye knows the stone | |
| 8630 according to its existence outside the eye. And if any knower has a knowledge of the object known according to the (mode of) | |
| 8631 existence it has in the knower, the knower nevertheless knows it according to its (mode of) existence outside the knower; | |
| 8632 thus the intellect knows a stone according to the intelligible existence it has in the intellect, inasmuch as it knows that | |
| 8633 it understands; while nevertheless it knows what a stone is in its own nature. If however the adverb 'so' be understood to | |
| 8634 import the mode (of knowledge) on the part of the knower, in that sense it is true that only the knower has knowledge of the | |
| 8635 object known as it is in the knower; for the more perfectly the thing known is in the knower, the more perfect is the mode | |
| 8636 of knowledge. | |
| 8637 </p><p id="FP_Q14_A6-p11"> We must say therefore that God not only knows that all things are in Himself; but by the fact that they are in Him, He knows | |
| 8638 them in their own nature and all the more perfectly, the more perfectly each one is in Him. | |
| 8639 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 6 ad 1"><a name="28937" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28937] Iª q. 14 a. 6 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo | |
| 8640 dicendum quod sic cognoscere aliquid sicut in cognoscente est, | |
| 8641 potest dupliciter intelligi. Uno modo, secundum quod hoc adverbium | |
| 8642 sic importat modum cognitionis ex parte rei cognitae. Et sic falsum | |
| 8643 est. Non enim semper cognoscens cognoscit cognitum secundum illud | |
| 8644 esse quod habet in cognoscente, oculus enim non cognoscit lapidem | |
| 8645 secundum esse quod habet in oculo; sed per speciem lapidis quam | |
| 8646 habet in se, cognoscit lapidem secundum esse quod habet extra | |
| 8647 oculum. Et si aliquis cognoscens cognoscat cognitum secundum esse | |
| 8648 quod habet in cognoscente, nihilominus cognoscit ipsum secundum | |
| 8649 esse quod habet extra cognoscentem, sicut intellectus cognoscit | |
| 8650 lapidem secundum esse intelligibile quod habet in intellectu, | |
| 8651 inquantum cognoscit se intelligere; sed nihilominus cognoscit esse | |
| 8652 lapidis in propria natura. Si vero intelligatur secundum quod hoc | |
| 8653 adverbium sic importat modum ex parte cognoscentis, verum est quod | |
| 8654 sic solum cognoscens cognoscit cognitum, secundum quod est in | |
| 8655 cognoscente, quia quanto perfectius est cognitum in cognoscente, | |
| 8656 tanto perfectior est modus cognitionis. Sic igitur dicendum est | |
| 8657 quod Deus non solum cognoscit res esse in seipso; sed per id quod | |
| 8658 in seipso continet res, cognoscit eas in propria natura; et tanto | |
| 8659 perfectius, quanto perfectius est unumquodque in ipso.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A6-p12"> | |
| 8660 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The created essence is compared to the essence of God as the imperfect to the perfect act. Therefore the created essence | |
| 8661 cannot sufficiently lead us to the knowledge of the divine essence, but rather the converse. | |
| 8662 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 6 ad 2"><a name="28938" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28938] Iª q. 14 a. 6 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 8663 dicendum quod essentia creaturae comparatur ad essentiam Dei, ut | |
| 8664 actus imperfectus ad perfectum. Et ideo essentia creaturae non | |
| 8665 sufficienter ducit in cognitionem essentiae divinae, sed e | |
| 8666 converso.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A6-p13"> | |
| 8667 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The same thing cannot be taken in an equal manner as the ratio of different things. But the divine essence excels all creatures. | |
| 8668 Hence it can be taken as the proper ration of each thing according to the diverse ways in which diverse creatures participate | |
| 8669 in, and imitate it. | |
| 8670 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 6 ad 3"><a name="28939" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28939] Iª q. 14 a. 6 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 8671 dicendum quod idem non potest accipi ut ratio diversorum per modum | |
| 8672 adaequationis. Sed divina essentia est aliquid excedens omnes | |
| 8673 creaturas. Unde potest accipi ut propria ratio uniuscuiusque, | |
| 8674 secundum quod diversimode est participabilis vel imitabilis a | |
| 8675 diversis creaturis.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q14_A7" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q14_A7-p0.1">Q. 14. A. 7. Whether the knowledge of God is discursive?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A7-p2"> | |
| 8676 <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the knowledge of God is discursive. For the knowledge of God is not habitual knowledge, but actual knowledge. | |
| 8677 Now the Philosopher says (Topic. ii): "The habit of knowledge may regard many things at once; but actual understanding regards | |
| 8678 only one thing at a time." Therefore as God knows many things, Himself and others, as shown above (AA 2,5), it seems that | |
| 8679 He does not understand all at once, but discourses from one to another. | |
| 8680 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 7 arg. 1"><a name="28940" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28940] Iª q. 14 a. 7 arg. 1</span></a> Ad septimum sic | |
| 8681 proceditur. Videtur quod scientia Dei sit discursiva. Scientia enim | |
| 8682 Dei non est secundum scire in habitu, sed secundum intelligere in | |
| 8683 actu. Sed secundum philosophum, in II Topic., scire in habitu | |
| 8684 contingit multa simul, sed intelligere actu unum tantum. Cum ergo | |
| 8685 Deus multa cognoscat, quia et se et alia, ut ostensum est, videtur | |
| 8686 quod non simul omnia intelligat, sed de uno in aliud discurrat.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A7-p3"> | |
| 8687 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, discursive knowledge is to know the effect through its cause. But God knows things through Himself; as an effect | |
| 8688 (is known) through its cause. Therefore His knowledge is discursive. | |
| 8689 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 7 arg. 2"><a name="28941" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28941] Iª q. 14 a. 7 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 8690 cognoscere effectum per causam est scire discurrentis. Sed Deus | |
| 8691 cognoscit alia per seipsum, sicut effectum per causam. Ergo | |
| 8692 cognitio sua est discursiva.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A7-p4"> | |
| 8693 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, God knows each creature more perfectly than we know it. But we know the effects in their created causes; and thus | |
| 8694 we go discursively from causes to things caused. Therefore it seems that the same applies to God. | |
| 8695 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 7 arg. 3"><a name="28942" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28942] Iª q. 14 a. 7 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 8696 perfectius Deus scit unamquamque creaturam quam nos sciamus. Sed | |
| 8697 nos in causis creatis cognoscimus earum effectus, et sic de causis | |
| 8698 ad causata discurrimus. Ergo videtur similiter esse in Deo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A7-p5"> | |
| 8699 <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Trin. xv), "God does not see all things in their particularity or separately, as if He saw alternately | |
| 8700 here and there; but He sees all things together at once." | |
| 8701 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 7 s. c."><a name="28943" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28943] Iª q. 14 a. 7 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est | |
| 8702 quod Augustinus dicit, in XV de Trin., quod <i>Deus non | |
| 8703 particulatim vel singillatim omnia videt, velut alternante | |
| 8704 conspectu hinc illuc, et inde huc; sed omnia videt simul</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A7-p6"> | |
| 8705 <b>I answer that,</b> In the divine knowledge there is no discursion; the proof of which is as follows. In our knowledge there is a twofold discursion: | |
| 8706 one is according to succession only, as when we have actually understood anything, we turn ourselves to understand something | |
| 8707 else; while the other mode of discursion is according to causality, as when through principles we arrive at the knowledge | |
| 8708 of conclusions. The first kind of discursion cannot belong to God. For many things, | |
| 8709 which we understand in succession if each is considered in itself, we understand simultaneously if we see them in some one | |
| 8710 thing; if, for instance, we understand the parts in the whole, or see different things in a mirror. Now God sees all things | |
| 8711 in one (thing), which is Himself. Therefore God sees all things together, and not successively. Likewise the second mode of | |
| 8712 discursion cannot be applied to God. First, because this second mode of discursion presupposes the first mode; for whosoever | |
| 8713 proceeds from principles to conclusions does not consider both at once; secondly, because to discourse thus is to proceed | |
| 8714 from the known to the unknown. Hence it is manifest that when the first is known, the second is still unknown; and thus the | |
| 8715 second is known not in the first, but from the first. Now the term discursive reasoning is attained when the second is seen | |
| 8716 in the first, by resolving the effects into their causes; and then the discursion ceases. Hence as God sees His effects in | |
| 8717 Himself as their cause, His knowledge is not discursive. | |
| 8718 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 7 co."><a name="28944" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28944] Iª q. 14 a. 7 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum | |
| 8719 quod in scientia divina nullus est discursus. Quod sic patet. In | |
| 8720 scientia enim nostra duplex est discursus. Unus secundum | |
| 8721 successionem tantum, sicut cum, postquam intelligimus aliquid in | |
| 8722 actu, convertimus nos ad intelligendum aliud. Alius discursus est | |
| 8723 secundum causalitatem, sicut cum per principia pervenimus in | |
| 8724 cognitionem conclusionum. Primus autem discursus Deo convenire non | |
| 8725 potest. Multa enim, quae successive intelligimus si unumquodque | |
| 8726 eorum in seipso consideretur, omnia simul intelligimus si in aliquo | |
| 8727 uno ea intelligamus, puta si partes intelligamus in toto, vel si | |
| 8728 diversas res videamus in speculo. Deus autem omnia videt in uno, | |
| 8729 quod est ipse, ut habitum est. Unde simul, et non successive omnia | |
| 8730 videt. Similiter etiam et secundus discursus Deo competere non | |
| 8731 potest. Primo quidem, quia secundus discursus praesupponit primum, | |
| 8732 procedentes enim a principiis ad conclusiones, non simul utrumque | |
| 8733 considerant. Deinde, quia discursus talis est procedentis de noto | |
| 8734 ad ignotum. Unde manifestum est quod, quando cognoscitur primum, | |
| 8735 adhuc ignoratur secundum. Et sic secundum non cognoscitur in primo, | |
| 8736 sed ex primo. Terminus vero discursus est, quando secundum videtur | |
| 8737 in primo, resolutis effectibus in causas, et tunc cessat discursus. | |
| 8738 Unde, cum Deus effectus suos in seipso videat sicut in causa, eius | |
| 8739 cognitio non est discursiva.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A7-p7"> | |
| 8740 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Altogether there is only one act of understanding in itself, nevertheless many things may be understood in one (medium), | |
| 8741 as shown above. | |
| 8742 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 7 ad 1"><a name="28945" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28945] Iª q. 14 a. 7 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo | |
| 8743 dicendum quod, licet sit unum tantum intelligere in seipso, tamen | |
| 8744 contingit multa intelligere in aliquo uno, ut dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A7-p8"> | |
| 8745 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> God does not know by their cause, known, as it were previously, effects unknown; but He knows the effects in the cause; and | |
| 8746 hence His knowledge is not discursive, as was shown above. | |
| 8747 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 7 ad 2"><a name="28946" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28946] Iª q. 14 a. 7 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 8748 dicendum quod Deus non cognoscit per causam quasi prius cognitam, | |
| 8749 effectus incognitos, sed eos cognoscit in causa. Unde eius cognitio | |
| 8750 est sine discursu, ut dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A7-p9"> | |
| 8751 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> God sees the effects of created causes in the causes themselves, much better than we can; but still not in such a manner | |
| 8752 that the knowledge of the effects is caused in Him by the knowledge of the created causes, as is the case with us; and hence | |
| 8753 His knowledge is not discursive. | |
| 8754 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 7 ad 3"><a name="28947" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28947] Iª q. 14 a. 7 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 8755 dicendum quod effectus causarum creatarum videt quidem Deus in | |
| 8756 ipsis causis, multo melius quam nos, non tamen ita quod cognitio | |
| 8757 effectuum causetur in ipso ex cognitione causarum creatarum, sicut | |
| 8758 in nobis. Unde eius scientia non est discursiva.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q14_A8" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q14_A8-p0.1">Q. 14. A. 8. Whether the knowledge of God is the cause of things?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A8-p2"> | |
| 8759 <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the knowledge of God is not the cause of things. For Origen says, on | |
| 8760 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q14_A8-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.8.30" target="asv"> Rom. 8:30, </a> "Whom He called, them He also justified," etc.: "A thing will happen not because God knows it as future; but because it is | |
| 8761 future, it is on that account known by God, before it exists." | |
| 8762 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 8 arg. 1"><a name="28948" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28948] Iª q. 14 a. 8 arg. 1</span></a> Ad octavum sic | |
| 8763 proceditur. Videtur quod scientia Dei non sit causa rerum. Dicit | |
| 8764 enim Origenes, super epistolam ad Rom., <i>non propterea aliquid | |
| 8765 erit, quia id scit Deus futurum; sed quia futurum est, ideo scitur | |
| 8766 a Deo antequam fiat</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A8-p3"> | |
| 8767 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, given the cause, the effect follows. But the knowledge of God is eternal. Therefore if the knowledge of God is the | |
| 8768 cause of things created, it seems that creatures are eternal. | |
| 8769 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 8 arg. 2"><a name="28949" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28949] Iª q. 14 a. 8 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 8770 posita causa ponitur effectus. Sed scientia Dei est aeterna. Si | |
| 8771 ergo scientia Dei est causa rerum creatarum, videtur quod creaturae | |
| 8772 sint ab aeterno.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A8-p4"> | |
| 8773 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, "The thing known is prior to knowledge, and is its measure," as the Philosopher says (Metaph. x). But what is posterior | |
| 8774 and measured cannot be a cause. Therefore the knowledge of God is not the cause of things. | |
| 8775 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 8 arg. 3"><a name="28950" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28950] Iª q. 14 a. 8 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 8776 scibile est prius scientia, et mensura eius, ut dicitur in X | |
| 8777 Metaphys. Sed id quod est posterius et mensuratum, non potest esse | |
| 8778 causa. Ergo scientia Dei non est causa rerum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A8-p5"> | |
| 8779 <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Trin. xv), "Not because they are, does God know all creatures spiritual and temporal, but because He knows | |
| 8780 them, therefore they are." | |
| 8781 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 8 s. c."><a name="28951" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28951] Iª q. 14 a. 8 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est | |
| 8782 quod dicit Augustinus, XV de Trin., <i>universas creaturas, et | |
| 8783 spirituales et corporales, non quia sunt, ideo novit Deus; sed ideo | |
| 8784 sunt, quia novit</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A8-p6"> | |
| 8785 <b>I answer that,</b> The knowledge of God is the cause of things. For the knowledge of God is to all creatures what the knowledge of the artificer | |
| 8786 is to things made by his art. Now the knowledge of the artificer is the cause of the things made by his art from the fact | |
| 8787 that the artificer works by his intellect. Hence the form of the intellect must be the principle of action; as heat is the | |
| 8788 principle of heating. Nevertheless, we must observe that a natural form, being a form that | |
| 8789 remains in that to which it gives existence, denotes a principle of action according only as it has an inclination to an effect; | |
| 8790 and likewise, the intelligible form does not denote a principle of action in so far as it resides in the one who understands | |
| 8791 unless there is added to it the inclination to an effect, which inclination is through the will. For since the intelligible | |
| 8792 form has a relation to opposite things (inasmuch as the same knowledge relates to opposites), it would not produce a | |
| 8793 determinate effect unless it were determined to one thing by the appetite, as the Philosopher says (Metaph. ix). Now it is | |
| 8794 manifest that God causes things by His intellect, since His being is His act of understanding; and hence His knowledge must | |
| 8795 be the cause of things, in so far as His will is joined to it. Hence the knowledge of God as the cause of things is usually | |
| 8796 called the "knowledge of approbation." | |
| 8797 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 8 co."><a name="28952" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28952] Iª q. 14 a. 8 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum | |
| 8798 quod scientia Dei est causa rerum. Sic enim scientia Dei se habet | |
| 8799 ad omnes res creatas, sicut scientia artificis se habet ad | |
| 8800 artificiata. Scientia autem artificis est causa artificiatorum, eo | |
| 8801 quod artifex operatur per suum intellectum, unde oportet quod forma | |
| 8802 intellectus sit principium operationis, sicut calor est principium | |
| 8803 calefactionis. Sed considerandum est quod forma naturalis, | |
| 8804 inquantum est forma manens in eo cui dat esse, non nominat | |
| 8805 principium actionis; sed secundum quod habet inclinationem ad | |
| 8806 effectum. Et similiter forma intelligibilis non nominat principium | |
| 8807 actionis secundum quod est tantum in intelligente, nisi adiungatur | |
| 8808 ei inclinatio ad effectum, quae est per voluntatem. Cum enim forma | |
| 8809 intelligibilis ad opposita se habeat (cum sit eadem scientia | |
| 8810 oppositorum), non produceret determinatum effectum, nisi | |
| 8811 determinaretur ad unum per appetitum, ut dicitur in IX Metaphys. | |
| 8812 Manifestum est autem quod Deus per intellectum suum causat res, cum | |
| 8813 suum esse sit suum intelligere. Unde necesse est quod sua scientia | |
| 8814 sit causa rerum, secundum quod habet voluntatem coniunctam. Unde | |
| 8815 scientia Dei, secundum quod est causa rerum, consuevit nominari | |
| 8816 scientia approbationis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q14_A8-p7"> | |
| 8817 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Origen spoke in reference to that aspect of knowledge to which the idea of causality does not belong unless the will is joined | |
| 8818 to it, as is said above. | |
| 8819 </p><p id="FP_Q14_A8-p8"> But when he says the reason why God foreknows some things is because they are future, this must be understood according to | |
| 8820 the cause of consequence, and not according to the cause of essence. For if things are in the future, it follows that God | |
| 8821 knows them; but not that the futurity of things is the cause why God knows them. | |
| 8822 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 8 ad 1"><a name="28953" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28953] Iª q. 14 a. 8 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo | |
| 8823 dicendum quod Origenes locutus est attendens rationem scientiae, | |
| 8824 cui non competit ratio causalitatis, nisi adiuncta voluntate, ut | |
| 8825 dictum est. Sed quod dicit ideo praescire Deum aliqua, quia sunt | |
| 8826 futura, intelligendum est secundum causam consequentiae, non | |
| 8827 secundum causam essendi. Sequitur enim, si aliqua sunt futura, quod | |
| 8828 Deus ea praescierit, non tamen res futurae sunt causa quod Deus | |
| 8829 sciat.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A8-p9"> | |
| 8830 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The knowledge of God is the cause of things according as things are in His knowledge. Now that things should be eternal was | |
| 8831 not in the knowledge of God; hence although the knowledge of God is eternal, it does not follow that creatures are eternal. | |
| 8832 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 8 ad 2"><a name="28954" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28954] Iª q. 14 a. 8 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 8833 dicendum quod scientia Dei est causa rerum, secundum quod res sunt | |
| 8834 in scientia. Non fuit autem in scientia Dei, quod res essent ab | |
| 8835 aeterno. Unde, quamvis scientia Dei sit aeterna, non sequitur tamen | |
| 8836 quod creaturae sint ab aeterno.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A8-p10"> | |
| 8837 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Natural things are midway between the knowledge of God and our knowledge: for we receive knowledge from natural things, of | |
| 8838 which God is the cause by His knowledge. Hence, as the natural objects of knowledge are prior to our knowledge, and are its | |
| 8839 measure, so, the knowledge of God is prior to natural things, and is the measure of them; as, for instance, a house is midway | |
| 8840 between the knowledge of the builder who made it, and the knowledge of the one who | |
| 8841 gathers his knowledge of the house from the house already built. | |
| 8842 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 8 ad 3"><a name="28955" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28955] Iª q. 14 a. 8 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 8843 dicendum quod res naturales sunt mediae inter scientiam Dei et | |
| 8844 scientiam nostram, nos enim scientiam accipimus a rebus | |
| 8845 naturalibus, quarum Deus per suam scientiam causa est. Unde, sicut | |
| 8846 scibilia naturalia sunt priora quam scientia nostra, et mensura | |
| 8847 eius, ita scientia Dei est prior quam res naturales, et mensura | |
| 8848 ipsarum. Sicut aliqua domus est media inter scientiam artificis qui | |
| 8849 eam fecit, et scientiam illius qui eius cognitionem ex ipsa iam | |
| 8850 facta capit.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q14_A9" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q14_A9-p0.1">Q. 14. A. 9. Whether God has knowledge of things that are not?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A9-p2"> | |
| 8851 <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God has not knowledge of things that are not. For the knowledge of God is of true things. But "truth" and "being" | |
| 8852 are convertible terms. Therefore the knowledge of God is not of things that are not. | |
| 8853 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 9 arg. 1"><a name="28956" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28956] Iª q. 14 a. 9 arg. 1</span></a> Ad nonum sic | |
| 8854 proceditur. Videtur quod Deus non habeat scientiam non entium. | |
| 8855 Scientia enim Dei non est nisi verorum. Sed verum et ens | |
| 8856 convertuntur. Ergo scientia Dei non est non entium.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A9-p3"> | |
| 8857 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, knowledge requires likeness between the knower and the thing known. But those things that are not cannot have any | |
| 8858 likeness to God, Who is very being. Therefore what is not, cannot be known by God. | |
| 8859 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 9 arg. 2"><a name="28957" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28957] Iª q. 14 a. 9 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 8860 scientia requirit similitudinem inter scientem et scitum. Sed ea | |
| 8861 quae non sunt, non possunt habere aliquam similitudinem ad Deum, | |
| 8862 qui est ipsum esse. Ergo ea quae non sunt, non possunt sciri a | |
| 8863 Deo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A9-p4"> | |
| 8864 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the knowledge of God is the cause of what is known by Him. But it is not the cause of things that are not, because | |
| 8865 a thing that is not, has no cause. Therefore God has no knowledge of things that are not. | |
| 8866 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 9 arg. 3"><a name="28958" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28958] Iª q. 14 a. 9 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 8867 scientia Dei est causa scitorum ab ipso. Sed non est causa non | |
| 8868 entium, quia non ens non habet causam. Ergo Deus non habet | |
| 8869 scientiam de non entibus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A9-p5"> | |
| 8870 <b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle says: "Who . . . calleth those things that are not as those that are" ( | |
| 8871 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q14_A9-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.4.17" target="asv">Rom. 4:17</a>). | |
| 8872 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 9 s. c."><a name="28959" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28959] Iª q. 14 a. 9 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est | |
| 8873 quod dicit apostolus ad Rom. IV, <i>qui vocat ea quae non sunt, | |
| 8874 tanquam ea quae sunt</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q14_A9-p6"> | |
| 8875 <b>I answer that,</b> God knows all things whatsoever that in any way are. Now it is possible that things that are not absolutely, should be in | |
| 8876 a certain sense. For things absolutely are which are actual; whereas things which are not actual, are in the power either | |
| 8877 of God Himself or of a creature, whether in active power, or passive; whether in power of thought or of imagination, or of | |
| 8878 any other manner of meaning whatsoever. Whatever therefore can be made, or thought, or said by | |
| 8879 the creature, as also whatever He Himself can do, all are known to God, although they are not actual. And in so far it can | |
| 8880 be said that He has knowledge even of things that are not. | |
| 8881 </p><p id="FP_Q14_A9-p7"> Now a certain difference is to be noted in the consideration of those things that are not actual. For though some of them | |
| 8882 may not be in act now, still they were, or they will be; and God is said to know all these with the knowledge of vision: for | |
| 8883 since God's act of understanding, which is His being, is measured by eternity; and since eternity is without succession, comprehending | |
| 8884 all time, the present glance of God extends over all time, and to all things which exist in any time, | |
| 8885 as to objects present to Him. But there are other things in God's power, or the creature's, which nevertheless are not, nor | |
| 8886 will be, nor were; and as regards these He is said to have knowledge, not of vision, but of simple intelligence. This is so | |
| 8887 called because the things we see around us have distinct being outside the seer. | |
| 8888 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 9 co."><a name="28960" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28960] Iª q. 14 a. 9 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum | |
| 8889 quod Deus scit omnia quaecumque sunt quocumque modo. Nihil autem | |
| 8890 prohibet ea quae non sunt simpliciter, aliquo modo esse. | |
| 8891 Simpliciter enim sunt, quae actu sunt. Ea vero quae non sunt actu, | |
| 8892 sunt in potentia vel ipsius Dei, vel creaturae; sive in potentia | |
| 8893 activa, sive in passiva, sive in potentia opinandi, vel imaginandi, | |
| 8894 vel quocumque modo significandi. Quaecumque igitur possunt per | |
| 8895 creaturam fieri vel cogitari vel dici, et etiam quaecumque ipse | |
| 8896 facere potest, omnia cognoscit Deus, etiam si actu non sint. Et pro | |
| 8897 tanto dici potest quod habet etiam non entium scientiam. Sed horum | |
| 8898 quae actu non sunt, est attendenda quaedam diversitas. Quaedam | |
| 8899 enim, licet non sint nunc in actu, tamen vel fuerunt vel erunt, et | |
| 8900 omnia ista dicitur Deus scire scientia visionis. Quia, cum | |
| 8901 intelligere Dei, quod est eius esse, aeternitate mensuretur, quae | |
| 8902 sine successione existens totum tempus comprehendit, praesens | |
| 8903 intuitus Dei fertur in totum tempus, et in omnia quae sunt in | |
| 8904 quocumque tempore, sicut in subiecta sibi praesentialiter. Quaedam | |
| 8905 vero sunt, quae sunt in potentia Dei vel creaturae, quae tamen nec | |
| 8906 sunt nec erunt neque fuerunt. Et respectu horum non dicitur habere | |
| 8907 scientiam visionis, sed simplicis intelligentiae. Quod ideo | |
| 8908 dicitur, quia ea quae videntur apud nos, habent esse distinctum | |
| 8909 extra videntem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A9-p8"> | |
| 8910 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Those things that are not actual are true in so far as they are in potentiality; for it is true that they are in potentiality; | |
| 8911 and as such they are known by God. | |
| 8912 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 9 ad 1"><a name="28961" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28961] Iª q. 14 a. 9 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo | |
| 8913 dicendum quod, secundum quod sunt in potentia, sic habent veritatem | |
| 8914 ea quae non sunt actu, verum est enim ea esse in potentia. Et sic | |
| 8915 sciuntur a Deo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A9-p9"> | |
| 8916 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Since God is very being everything is, in so far as it participates in the likeness of God; as everything is hot in so far | |
| 8917 as it participates in heat. So, things in potentiality are known by God, although they are not in act. | |
| 8918 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 9 ad 2"><a name="28962" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28962] Iª q. 14 a. 9 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 8919 dicendum quod, cum Deus sit ipsum esse, intantum unumquodque est, | |
| 8920 inquantum participat de Dei similitudine, sicut unumquodque | |
| 8921 intantum est calidum, inquantum participat calorem. Sic et ea quae | |
| 8922 sunt in potentia, etiam si non sunt in actu, cognoscuntur a | |
| 8923 Deo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A9-p10"> | |
| 8924 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The knowledge of God, joined to His will is the cause of things. Hence it is not necessary that what ever God knows, is, | |
| 8925 or was, or will be; but only is this necessary as regards what He wills to be, or permits to be. Further, it is in the knowledge | |
| 8926 of God not that they be, but that they be possible. | |
| 8927 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 9 ad 3"><a name="28963" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28963] Iª q. 14 a. 9 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 8928 dicendum quod Dei scientia est causa rerum, voluntate adiuncta. | |
| 8929 Unde non oportet quod quaecumque scit Deus, sint vel fuerint vel | |
| 8930 futura sint, sed solum ea quae vult esse, vel permittit esse. Et | |
| 8931 iterum, non est in scientia Dei ut illa sint, sed quod esse | |
| 8932 possint.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q14_A10" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q14_A10-p0.1">Q. 14. A. 10. Whether God knows evil things?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A10-p2"> | |
| 8933 <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God does not know evil things. For the Philosopher (De Anima iii) says that the intellect which is not in potentiality | |
| 8934 does not know privation. But "evil is the privation of good," as Augustine says (Confess. iii, 7). Therefore, as the intellect | |
| 8935 of God is never in potentiality, but is always in act, as is clear from the foregoing (A[2] ), it seems that God does not | |
| 8936 know evil things. | |
| 8937 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 10 arg. 1"><a name="28964" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28964] Iª q. 14 a. 10 arg. 1</span></a> Ad decimum sic | |
| 8938 proceditur. Videtur quod Deus non cognoscat mala. Dicit enim | |
| 8939 philosophus, in III de anima, quod intellectus qui non est in | |
| 8940 potentia, non cognoscit privationem. Sed malum est privatio boni, | |
| 8941 ut dicit Augustinus. Igitur, cum intellectus Dei nunquam sit in | |
| 8942 potentia, sed semper actu, ut ex dictis patet, videtur quod Deus | |
| 8943 non cognoscat mala.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A10-p3"> | |
| 8944 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, all knowledge is either the cause of the thing known, or is caused by it. But the knowledge of God is not the cause | |
| 8945 of evil, nor is it caused by evil. Therefore God does not know evil things. | |
| 8946 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 10 arg. 2"><a name="28965" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28965] Iª q. 14 a. 10 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 8947 omnis scientia vel est causa sciti, vel causatur ab eo. Sed | |
| 8948 scientia Dei non est causa mali, nec causatur a malo. Ergo scientia | |
| 8949 Dei non est malorum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A10-p4"> | |
| 8950 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, everything known is known either by its likeness, or by its opposite. But whatever God knows, He knows through His | |
| 8951 essence, as is clear from the foregoing | |
| 8952 <a id="FP_Q14_A10-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q14_A5.html">(A[5])</a>. Now the divine essence neither is the likeness of evil, nor is evil contrary to it; for to the divine essence there is no | |
| 8953 contrary, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xii). Therefore God does not know evil things. | |
| 8954 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 10 arg. 3"><a name="28966" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28966] Iª q. 14 a. 10 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, omne | |
| 8955 quod cognoscitur, cognoscitur per suam similitudinem, vel per suum | |
| 8956 oppositum. Quidquid autem cognoscit Deus, cognoscit per suam | |
| 8957 essentiam, ut ex dictis patet. Divina autem essentia neque est | |
| 8958 similitudo mali, neque ei malum opponitur, divinae enim essentiae | |
| 8959 nihil est contrarium, ut dicit Augustinus, XII de Civ. Dei. Ergo | |
| 8960 Deus non cognoscit mala.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A10-p5"> | |
| 8961 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, what is known through another and not through itself, is imperfectly known. But evil is not known by God; for the | |
| 8962 thing known must be in the knower. Therefore if evil is known through another, namely, through good, it would be known by | |
| 8963 Him imperfectly; which cannot be, for the knowledge of God is not imperfect. Therefore God does not know evil things. | |
| 8964 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 10 arg. 4"><a name="28967" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28967] Iª q. 14 a. 10 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, quod | |
| 8965 cognoscitur non per seipsum, sed per aliud, imperfecte cognoscitur. | |
| 8966 Sed malum non cognoscitur a Deo per seipsum, quia sic oporteret | |
| 8967 quod malum esset in Deo; oportet enim cognitum esse in cognoscente. | |
| 8968 Si ergo cognoscitur per aliud, scilicet per bonum, imperfecte | |
| 8969 cognoscetur ab ipso, quod est impossibile, quia nulla cognitio Dei | |
| 8970 est imperfecta. Ergo scientia Dei non est malorum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A10-p6"> | |
| 8971 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( | |
| 8972 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q14_A10-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Prov.15.11" target="asv">Prov. 15:11</a>), "Hell and destruction are before God [Vulg: 'the Lord']." | |
| 8973 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 10 s. c."><a name="28968" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28968] Iª q. 14 a. 10 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est | |
| 8974 quod dicitur Proverb. XV, <i>Infernus et perditio coram | |
| 8975 Deo</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A10-p7"> | |
| 8976 <b>I answer that,</b> Whoever knows a thing perfectly, must know all that can be accidental to it. Now there are some good things to which corruption | |
| 8977 by evil may be accidental. Hence God would not know good things perfectly, unless He also knew evil things. Now a thing is | |
| 8978 knowable in the degree in which it is; hence since this is the essence of evil that it is the privation of good, by the fact | |
| 8979 that God knows good things, He knows evil things also; as by light is known darkness. | |
| 8980 Hence Dionysius says (Div. Nom. vii): "God through Himself receives the vision of darkness, not otherwise seeing darkness | |
| 8981 except through light." | |
| 8982 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 10 co."><a name="28969" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28969] Iª q. 14 a. 10 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum | |
| 8983 quod quicumque perfecte cognoscit aliquid, oportet quod cognoscat | |
| 8984 omnia quae possunt illi accidere. Sunt autem quaedam bona, quibus | |
| 8985 accidere potest ut per mala corrumpantur. Unde Deus non perfecte | |
| 8986 cognosceret bona, nisi etiam cognosceret mala. Sic autem est | |
| 8987 cognoscibile unumquodque, secundum quod est. Unde, cum hoc sit esse | |
| 8988 mali, quod est privatio boni, per hoc ipsum quod Deus cognoscit | |
| 8989 bona, cognoscit etiam mala; sicut per lucem cognoscuntur tenebrae. | |
| 8990 Unde dicit Dionysius, VII cap. de Div. Nom., quod <i>Deus per | |
| 8991 semetipsum tenebrarum accipit visionem, non aliunde videns tenebras | |
| 8992 quam a lumine</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A10-p8"> | |
| 8993 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The saying of the Philosopher must be understood as meaning that the intellect which is not in potentiality, does not know | |
| 8994 privation by privation existing in it; and this agrees with what he said previously, that a point and every indivisible thing | |
| 8995 are known by privation of division. This is because simple and indivisible forms are in our intellect not actually, but only | |
| 8996 potentially; for were they actually in our intellect, they would not be known by | |
| 8997 privation. It is thus that simple things are known by separate substances. God therefore knows evil, not by privation existing | |
| 8998 in Himself, but by the opposite good. | |
| 8999 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 10 ad 1"><a name="28970" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28970] Iª q. 14 a. 10 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo | |
| 9000 dicendum quod verbum philosophi est sic intelligendum, quod | |
| 9001 intellectus qui non est in potentia, non cognoscit privationem per | |
| 9002 privationem in ipso existentem. Et hoc congruit cum eo quod supra | |
| 9003 dixerat, quod punctum et omne indivisibile per privationem | |
| 9004 divisionis cognoscitur. Quod contingit ex hoc, quia formae | |
| 9005 simplices et indivisibiles non sunt actu in intellectu nostro, sed | |
| 9006 in potentia tantum, nam si essent actu in intellectu nostro, non | |
| 9007 per privationem cognoscerentur. Et sic cognoscuntur simplicia a | |
| 9008 substantiis separatis. Deus igitur non cognoscit malum per | |
| 9009 privationem in se existentem, sed per bonum oppositum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A10-p9"> | |
| 9010 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The knowledge of God is not the cause of evil; but is the cause of the good whereby evil is known. | |
| 9011 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 10 ad 2"><a name="28971" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28971] Iª q. 14 a. 10 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 9012 dicendum quod scientia Dei non est causa mali, sed est causa boni, | |
| 9013 per quod cognoscitur malum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A10-p10"> | |
| 9014 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Although evil is not opposed to the divine essence, which is not corruptible by evil; it is opposed to the effects of God, | |
| 9015 which He knows by His essence; and knowing them, He knows the opposite evils. | |
| 9016 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 10 ad 3"><a name="28972" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28972] Iª q. 14 a. 10 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 9017 dicendum quod, licet malum non opponatur essentiae divinae, quae | |
| 9018 non est corruptibilis per malum, opponitur tamen effectibus Dei; | |
| 9019 quos per essentiam suam cognoscit, et eos cognoscens, mala opposita | |
| 9020 cognoscit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A10-p11"> | |
| 9021 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> To know a thing by something else only, belongs to imperfect knowledge, if that thing is of itself knowable; but evil is | |
| 9022 not of itself knowable, forasmuch as the very nature of evil means the privation of good; therefore evil can neither be defined | |
| 9023 nor known except by good. | |
| 9024 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 10 ad 4"><a name="28973" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28973] Iª q. 14 a. 10 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum | |
| 9025 dicendum quod cognoscere aliquid per aliud tantum, est imperfectae | |
| 9026 cognitionis, si illud sit cognoscibile per se. Sed malum non est | |
| 9027 per se cognoscibile, quia de ratione mali est, quod sit privatio | |
| 9028 boni. Et sic neque definiri, neque cognosci potest, nisi per | |
| 9029 bonum.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q14_A11" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q14_A11-p0.1">Q. 14. A. 11. Whether God knows singular things?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A11-p2"> | |
| 9030 <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God does not know singular things. For the divine intellect is more immaterial than the human intellect. Now | |
| 9031 the human intellect by reason of its immateriality does not know singular things; but as the Philosopher says (De Anima ii), | |
| 9032 "reason has to do with universals, sense with singular things." Therefore God does not know singular things. | |
| 9033 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 11 arg. 1"><a name="28974" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28974] Iª q. 14 a. 11 arg. 1</span></a> Ad undecimum | |
| 9034 sic proceditur. Videtur quod Deus non cognoscat singularia. | |
| 9035 Intellectus enim divinus immaterialior est quam intellectus | |
| 9036 humanus. Sed intellectus humanus, propter suam immaterialitatem, | |
| 9037 non cognoscit singularia, sed, sicut dicitur in II de anima, | |
| 9038 <i>ratio est universalium, sensus vero singularium</i>. Ergo Deus | |
| 9039 non cognoscit singularia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A11-p3"> | |
| 9040 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, in us those faculties alone know the singular, which receive the species not abstracted from material conditions. | |
| 9041 But in God things are in the highest degree abstracted from all materiality. Therefore God does not know singular things. | |
| 9042 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 11 arg. 2"><a name="28975" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28975] Iª q. 14 a. 11 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 9043 illae solae virtutes in nobis sunt singularium cognoscitivae, quae | |
| 9044 recipiunt species non abstractas a materialibus conditionibus. Sed | |
| 9045 res in Deo sunt maxime abstractae ab omni materialitate. Ergo Deus | |
| 9046 non cognoscit singularia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A11-p4"> | |
| 9047 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, all knowledge comes about through the medium of some likeness. But the likeness of singular things in so far as | |
| 9048 they are singular, does not seem to be in God; for the principle of singularity is matter, which, since it is in potentiality | |
| 9049 only, is altogether unlike God, Who is pure act. Therefore God cannot know singular things. | |
| 9050 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 11 arg. 3"><a name="28976" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28976] Iª q. 14 a. 11 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 9051 omnis cognitio est per aliquam similitudinem. Sed similitudo | |
| 9052 singularium, inquantum sunt singularia, non videtur esse in Deo, | |
| 9053 quia principium singularitatis est materia, quae, cum sit ens in | |
| 9054 potentia tantum, omnino est dissimilis Deo, qui est actus purus. | |
| 9055 Non ergo Deus potest cognoscere singularia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A11-p5"> | |
| 9056 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( | |
| 9057 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q14_A11-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Prov.16.2" target="asv">Prov. 16:2</a>), "All the ways of a man are open to His eyes." | |
| 9058 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 11 s. c."><a name="28977" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28977] Iª q. 14 a. 11 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est | |
| 9059 quod dicitur, Proverb. XVI, <i>omnes viae hominum patent oculis | |
| 9060 eius</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q14_A11-p6"> | |
| 9061 <b>I answer that,</b> God knows singular things. For all perfections found in creatures pre-exist in God in a higher way, as is clear from the | |
| 9062 foregoing ( | |
| 9063 <a id="FP_Q14_A11-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q4_A2.html">Q[4], A[2]</a>). Now to know singular things is part of our perfection. Hence God must know singular things. Even the Philosopher considers | |
| 9064 it incongruous that anything known by us should be unknown to God; and thus against Empedocles he argues (De Anima i and Metaph. | |
| 9065 iii) that God would be most ignorant if | |
| 9066 He did not know discord. Now the perfections which are divided among inferior beings, exist simply and unitedly in God; hence, | |
| 9067 although by one faculty we know the universal and immaterial, and by another we know singular and material things, nevertheless | |
| 9068 God knows both by His simple intellect. | |
| 9069 </p><p id="FP_Q14_A11-p7"> Now some, wishing to show how this can be, said that God knows singular things by universal causes. For nothing exists in | |
| 9070 any singular thing, that does not arise from some universal cause. They give the example of an astrologer who knows all the | |
| 9071 universal movements of the heavens, and can thence foretell all eclipses that are to come. This, however, is not enough; for | |
| 9072 singular things from universal causes attain to certain forms and powers which, however they may be joined | |
| 9073 together, are not individualized except by individual matter. Hence he who knows Socrates because he is white, or because | |
| 9074 he is the son of Sophroniscus, or because of something of that kind, would not know him in so far as he is this particular | |
| 9075 man. Hence according to the aforesaid mode, God would not know | |
| 9076 </p><p id="FP_Q14_A11-p8"> singular things in their singularity.</p><p id="FP_Q14_A11-p9"> On the other hand, others have said that God knows singular things by the application of universal causes to particular effects. | |
| 9077 But this will not hold; forasmuch as no one can apply a thing to another unless he first knows that thing; hence the said | |
| 9078 application cannot be the reason of knowing the particular, for it presupposes the knowledge of singular things. | |
| 9079 </p><p id="FP_Q14_A11-p10"> Therefore it must be said otherwise, that, since God is the cause of things by His knowledge, as stated above | |
| 9080 <a id="FP_Q14_A11-p10.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q14_A8.html">(A[8])</a>, His knowledge extends as far as His causality extends. Hence as the active power of God extends not only to forms, which | |
| 9081 are the source of universality, but also to matter, as we shall prove further on ( | |
| 9082 <a id="FP_Q14_A11-p10.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q44_A2.html">Q[44], A[2]</a>), the knowledge of God must extend to singular things, which are individualized by matter. For since | |
| 9083 He knows things other than Himself by His essence, as being the likeness of things, or as their active principle, His essence | |
| 9084 must be the sufficing principle of knowing all things made by Him, not only in the universal, but also in the singular. The | |
| 9085 same would apply to the knowledge of the artificer, if it were productive of the whole thing, and not only of the form. | |
| 9086 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 11 co."><a name="28978" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28978] Iª q. 14 a. 11 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum | |
| 9087 quod Deus cognoscit singularia. Omnes enim perfectiones in | |
| 9088 creaturis inventae, in Deo praeexistunt secundum altiorem modum, ut | |
| 9089 ex dictis patet. Cognoscere autem singularia pertinet ad | |
| 9090 perfectionem nostram. Unde necesse est quod Deus singularia | |
| 9091 cognoscat. Nam et philosophus pro inconvenienti habet, quod aliquid | |
| 9092 cognoscatur a nobis, quod non cognoscatur a Deo. Unde contra | |
| 9093 Empedoclem arguit, in I de anima et in III Metaphys., quod | |
| 9094 accideret Deum esse insipientissimum, si discordiam ignoraret. Sed | |
| 9095 perfectiones quae in inferioribus dividuntur, in Deo simpliciter et | |
| 9096 unite existunt. Unde, licet nos per aliam potentiam cognoscamus | |
| 9097 universalia et immaterialia, et per aliam singularia et materialia; | |
| 9098 Deus tamen per suum simplicem intellectum utraque cognoscit. Sed | |
| 9099 qualiter hoc esse possit, quidam manifestare volentes, dixerunt | |
| 9100 quod Deus cognoscit singularia per causas universales, nam nihil | |
| 9101 est in aliquo singularium, quod non ex aliqua causa oriatur | |
| 9102 universali. Et ponunt exemplum, sicut si aliquis astrologus | |
| 9103 cognosceret omnes motus universales caeli, posset praenuntiare | |
| 9104 omnes eclipses futuras. Sed istud non sufficit. Quia singularia ex | |
| 9105 causis universalibus sortiuntur quasdam formas et virtutes, quae, | |
| 9106 quantumcumque ad invicem coniungantur, non individuantur nisi per | |
| 9107 materiam individualem. Unde qui cognosceret Socratem per hoc quod | |
| 9108 est albus vel Sophronisci filius, vel quidquid aliud sic dicatur, | |
| 9109 non cognosceret ipsum inquantum est hic homo. Unde secundum modum | |
| 9110 praedictum, Deus non cognosceret singularia in sua singularitate. | |
| 9111 Alii vero dixerunt quod Deus cognoscit singularia, applicando | |
| 9112 causas universales ad particulares effectus. Sed hoc nihil est. | |
| 9113 Quia nullus potest applicare aliquid ad alterum, nisi illud | |
| 9114 praecognoscat, unde dicta applicatio non potest esse ratio | |
| 9115 cognoscendi particularia, sed cognitionem singularium praesupponit. | |
| 9116 Et ideo aliter dicendum est, quod, cum Deus sit causa rerum per | |
| 9117 suam scientiam, ut dictum est, intantum se extendit scientia Dei, | |
| 9118 inquantum se extendit eius causalitas. Unde, cum virtus activa Dei | |
| 9119 se extendat non solum ad formas, a quibus accipitur ratio | |
| 9120 universalis, sed etiam usque ad materiam, ut infra ostendetur; | |
| 9121 necesse est quod scientia Dei usque ad singularia se extendat, quae | |
| 9122 per materiam individuantur. Cum enim sciat alia a se per essentiam | |
| 9123 suam, inquantum est similitudo rerum velut principium activum | |
| 9124 earum, necesse est quod essentia sua sit principium sufficiens | |
| 9125 cognoscendi omnia quae per ipsum fiunt, non solum in universali, | |
| 9126 sed etiam in singulari. Et esset simile de scientia artificis, si | |
| 9127 esset productiva totius rei, et non formae tantum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A11-p11"> | |
| 9128 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Our intellect abstracts the intelligible species from the individualizing principles; hence the intelligible species in our | |
| 9129 intellect cannot be the likeness of the individual principles; and on that account our intellect does not know the singular. | |
| 9130 But the intelligible species in the divine intellect, which is the essence of God, is immaterial not by abstraction, but of | |
| 9131 itself, being the principle of all the principles which enter into the composition | |
| 9132 of things, whether principles of the species or principles of the individual; hence by it God knows not only universal, but | |
| 9133 also singular things. | |
| 9134 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 11 ad 1"><a name="28979" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28979] Iª q. 14 a. 11 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo | |
| 9135 dicendum quod intellectus noster speciem intelligibilem abstrahit a | |
| 9136 principiis individuantibus, unde species intelligibilis nostri | |
| 9137 intellectus non potest esse similitudo principiorum individualium. | |
| 9138 Et propter hoc, intellectus noster singularia non cognoscit. Sed | |
| 9139 species intelligibilis divini intellectus, quae est Dei essentia, | |
| 9140 non est immaterialis per abstractionem, sed per seipsam, principium | |
| 9141 existens omnium principiorum quae intrant rei compositionem, sive | |
| 9142 sint principia speciei, sive principia individui. Unde per eam Deus | |
| 9143 cognoscit non solum universalia, sed etiam singularia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A11-p12"> | |
| 9144 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Although as regards the species in the divine intellect its being has no material conditions like the images received in | |
| 9145 the imagination and sense, yet its power extends to both immaterial and material things. | |
| 9146 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 11 ad 2"><a name="28980" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28980] Iª q. 14 a. 11 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 9147 dicendum quod, quamvis species intellectus divini secundum esse | |
| 9148 suum non habeat conditiones materiales, sicut species receptae in | |
| 9149 imaginatione et sensu; tamen virtute se extendit ad immaterialia et | |
| 9150 materialia, ut dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A11-p13"> | |
| 9151 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Although matter as regards its potentiality recedes from likeness to God, yet, even in so far as it has being in this wise, | |
| 9152 it retains a certain likeness to the divine being. | |
| 9153 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 11 ad 3"><a name="28981" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28981] Iª q. 14 a. 11 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 9154 dicendum quod materia, licet recedat a Dei similitudine secundum | |
| 9155 suam potentialitatem, tamen inquantum vel sic esse habet, | |
| 9156 similitudinem quandam retinet divini esse.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q14_A12" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q14_A12-p0.1">Q. 14. A. 12. Whether God can know infinite things?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A12-p2"> | |
| 9157 <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God cannot know infinite things. For the infinite, as such, is unknown; since the infinite is that which, "to | |
| 9158 those who measure it, leaves always something more to be measured," as the Philosopher says (Phys. iii). Moreover, Augustine | |
| 9159 says (De Civ. Dei xii) that "whatever is comprehended by knowledge, is bounded by the comprehension of the knower." Now infinite | |
| 9160 things have no boundary. Therefore they cannot be comprehended by the knowledge of | |
| 9161 God. | |
| 9162 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 12 arg. 1"><a name="28982" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28982] Iª q. 14 a. 12 arg. 1</span></a> Ad duodecimum | |
| 9163 sic proceditur. Videtur quod Deus non possit cognoscere infinita. | |
| 9164 Infinitum enim, secundum quod est infinitum, est ignotum, quia | |
| 9165 infinitum est cuius quantitatem accipientibus semper est aliquid | |
| 9166 extra assumere, ut dicitur in III Physic. Augustinus etiam dicit, | |
| 9167 XII de Civ. Dei, quod <i>quidquid scientia comprehenditur, scientis | |
| 9168 comprehensione finitur</i>. Sed infinita non possunt finiri. Ergo | |
| 9169 non possunt scientia Dei comprehendi.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A12-p3"> | |
| 9170 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, if we say that things infinite in themselves are finite in God's knowledge, against this it may be urged that the | |
| 9171 essence of the infinite is that it is untraversable, and the finite that it is traversable, as said in Phys. iii. But the | |
| 9172 infinite is not traversable either by the finite or by the infinite, as is proved in Phys. vi. Therefore the infinite cannot | |
| 9173 be bounded by the finite, nor even by the infinite; and so the infinite cannot be finite in | |
| 9174 God's knowledge, which is infinite. | |
| 9175 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 12 arg. 2"><a name="28983" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28983] Iª q. 14 a. 12 arg. 2</span></a> Si dicatur quod | |
| 9176 ea quae in se sunt infinita, scientiae Dei finita sunt, contra, | |
| 9177 ratio infiniti est quod sit impertransibile; et finiti quod sit | |
| 9178 pertransibile, ut dicitur in III Physic. Sed infinitum non potest | |
| 9179 transiri nec a finito, nec ab infinito, ut probatur in VI Physic. | |
| 9180 Ergo infinitum non potest esse finitum finito, neque etiam | |
| 9181 infinito. Et ita infinita non sunt finita scientiae Dei, quae est | |
| 9182 infinita.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A12-p4"> | |
| 9183 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the knowledge of God is the measure of what is known. But it is contrary to the essence of the infinite that it | |
| 9184 be measured. Therefore infinite things cannot be known by God. | |
| 9185 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 12 arg. 3"><a name="28984" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28984] Iª q. 14 a. 12 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 9186 scientia Dei est mensura scitorum. Sed contra rationem infiniti | |
| 9187 est, quod sit mensuratum. Ergo infinita non possunt sciri a | |
| 9188 Deo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A12-p5"> | |
| 9189 <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xii), "Although we cannot number the infinite, nevertheless it can be comprehended by Him whose | |
| 9190 knowledge has no bounds." | |
| 9191 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 12 s. c."><a name="28985" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28985] Iª q. 14 a. 12 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est | |
| 9192 quod dicit Augustinus, XII de Civ. Dei, <i>quamvis infinitorum | |
| 9193 numerorum nullus sit numerus, non est tamen incomprehensibilis ei, | |
| 9194 cuius scientiae non est numerus</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q14_A12-p6"> | |
| 9195 <b>I answer that,</b> Since God knows not only things actual but also things possible to Himself or to created things, as shown above | |
| 9196 <a id="FP_Q14_A12-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q14_A9.html">(A[9])</a>, and as these must be infinite, it must be held that He knows infinite things. Although the knowledge of vision which has | |
| 9197 relation only to things that are, or will be, or were, is not of infinite things, as some say, for we do not say that the | |
| 9198 world is eternal, nor that generation and movement will go on for ever, so | |
| 9199 that individuals be infinitely multiplied; yet, if we consider more attentively, we must hold that God knows infinite things | |
| 9200 even by the knowledge of vision. For God knows even the thoughts and affections of hearts, which will be multiplied to infinity | |
| 9201 as rational creatures go on for ever. | |
| 9202 </p><p id="FP_Q14_A12-p7"> The reason of this is to be found in the fact that the knowledge of every knower is measured by the mode of the form which | |
| 9203 is the principle of knowledge. For the sensible image in sense is the likeness of only one individual thing, and can give | |
| 9204 the knowledge of only one individual. But the intelligible species of our intellect is the likeness of the thing as regards | |
| 9205 its specific nature, which is participable by infinite particulars; hence our intellect by the intelligible | |
| 9206 species of man in a certain way knows infinite men; not however as distinguished from each other, but as communicating in | |
| 9207 the nature of the species; and the reason is because the intelligible species of our intellect is the likeness of man not | |
| 9208 as to the individual principles, but as to the principles of the species. On the other hand, the divine essence, whereby the | |
| 9209 divine intellect understands, is a sufficing likeness of all things that are, or can be, not only as regards the universal | |
| 9210 principles, but also as regards the principles proper to each one, as shown above. Hence it follows that the knowledge of | |
| 9211 God extends to infinite things, even as distinct from each other. | |
| 9212 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 12 co."><a name="28986" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28986] Iª q. 14 a. 12 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum | |
| 9213 quod, cum Deus sciat non solum ea quae sunt actu, sed etiam ea quae | |
| 9214 sunt in potentia vel sua vel creaturae, ut ostensum est; haec autem | |
| 9215 constat esse infinita; necesse est dicere quod Deus sciat infinita. | |
| 9216 Et licet scientia visionis, quae est tantum eorum quae sunt vel | |
| 9217 erunt vel fuerunt, non sit infinitorum, ut quidam dicunt, cum non | |
| 9218 ponamus mundum ab aeterno fuisse, nec generationem et motum in | |
| 9219 aeternum mansura, ut individua in infinitum multiplicentur, tamen, | |
| 9220 si diligentius consideretur, necesse est dicere quod Deus etiam | |
| 9221 scientia visionis sciat infinita. Quia Deus scit etiam cogitationes | |
| 9222 et affectiones cordium, quae in infinitum multiplicabuntur, | |
| 9223 creaturis rationalibus permanentibus absque fine. Hoc autem ideo | |
| 9224 est, quia cognitio cuiuslibet cognoscentis se extendit secundum | |
| 9225 modum formae quae est principium cognitionis. Species enim | |
| 9226 sensibilis, quae est in sensu, est similitudo solum unius | |
| 9227 individui, unde per eam solum unum individuum cognosci potest. | |
| 9228 Species autem intelligibilis intellectus nostri est similitudo rei | |
| 9229 quantum ad naturam speciei, quae est participabilis a | |
| 9230 particularibus infinitis, unde intellectus noster per speciem | |
| 9231 intelligibilem hominis, cognoscit quodammodo homines infinitos. Sed | |
| 9232 tamen non inquantum distinguuntur ab invicem, sed secundum quod | |
| 9233 communicant in natura speciei; propter hoc quod species | |
| 9234 intelligibilis intellectus nostri non est similitudo hominum | |
| 9235 quantum ad principia individualia, sed solum quantum ad principia | |
| 9236 speciei. Essentia autem divina, per quam intellectus divinus | |
| 9237 intelligit, est similitudo sufficiens omnium quae sunt vel esse | |
| 9238 possunt, non solum quantum ad principia communia, sed etiam quantum | |
| 9239 ad principia propria uniuscuiusque, ut ostensum est. Unde sequitur | |
| 9240 quod scientia Dei se extendat ad infinita, etiam secundum quod sunt | |
| 9241 ab invicem distincta.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A12-p8"> | |
| 9242 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The idea of the infinite pertains to quantity, as the Philosopher says (Phys. i). But the idea of quantity implies the order | |
| 9243 of parts. Therefore to know the infinite according to the mode of the infinite is to know part after part; and in this way | |
| 9244 the infinite cannot be known; for whatever quantity of parts be taken, there will always remain something else outside. But | |
| 9245 God does not know the infinite or infinite things, as if He enumerated part after | |
| 9246 part; since He knows all things simultaneously, and not successively, as said above | |
| 9247 <a id="FP_Q14_A12-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q14_A7.html">(A[7])</a>. Hence there is nothing to prevent Him from knowing infinite things. | |
| 9248 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 12 ad 1"><a name="28987" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28987] Iª q. 14 a. 12 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo | |
| 9249 dicendum quod <i>infiniti ratio congruit quantitati</i>, secundum | |
| 9250 philosophum in I Physic. De ratione autem quantitatis est ordo | |
| 9251 partium. Cognoscere ergo infinitum secundum modum infiniti, est | |
| 9252 cognoscere partem post partem. Et sic nullo modo contingit cognosci | |
| 9253 infinitum, quia quantacumque quantitas partium accipiatur, semper | |
| 9254 remanet aliquid extra accipientem. Deus autem non sic cognoscit | |
| 9255 infinitum vel infinita, quasi enumerando partem post partem; cum | |
| 9256 cognoscat omnia simul, non successive, ut supra dictum est. Unde | |
| 9257 nihil prohibet ipsum cognoscere infinita.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A12-p9"> | |
| 9258 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Transition imports a certain succession of parts; and hence it is that the infinite cannot be traversed by the finite, nor | |
| 9259 by the infinite. But equality suffices for comprehension, because that is said to be comprehended which has nothing outside | |
| 9260 the comprehender. Hence it is not against the idea of the infinite to be comprehended by the infinite. And so, what is infinite | |
| 9261 in itself can be called finite to the knowledge of God as comprehended; but not | |
| 9262 as if it were traversable. | |
| 9263 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 12 ad 2"><a name="28988" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28988] Iª q. 14 a. 12 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 9264 dicendum quod transitio importat quandam successionem in partibus, | |
| 9265 et inde est quod infinitum transiri non potest, neque a finito | |
| 9266 neque ab infinito. Sed ad rationem comprehensionis sufficit | |
| 9267 adaequatio, quia id comprehendi dicitur, cuius nihil est extra | |
| 9268 comprehendentem. Unde non est contra rationem infiniti, quod | |
| 9269 comprehendatur ab infinito. Et sic, quod in se est infinitum, | |
| 9270 potest dici finitum scientiae Dei, tanquam comprehensum, non tamen | |
| 9271 tanquam pertransibile.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A12-p10"> | |
| 9272 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The knowledge of God is the measure of things, not quantitatively, for the infinite is not subject to this kind of measure; | |
| 9273 but it is the measure of the essence and truth of things. For everything has truth of nature according to the degree in which | |
| 9274 it imitates the knowledge of God, as the thing made by art agrees with the art. Granted, however, an actually infinite number | |
| 9275 of things, for instance, an infinitude of men, or an infinitude in continuous | |
| 9276 quantity, as an infinitude of air, as some of the ancients held; yet it is manifest that these would have a determinate and | |
| 9277 finite being, because their being would be limited to some determinate nature. Hence they would be measurable as regards the | |
| 9278 knowledge of God. | |
| 9279 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 12 ad 3"><a name="28989" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28989] Iª q. 14 a. 12 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 9280 dicendum quod scientia Dei est mensura rerum, non quantitativa, qua | |
| 9281 quidem mensura carent infinita; sed quia mensurat essentiam et | |
| 9282 veritatem rei. Unumquodque enim intantum habet de veritate suae | |
| 9283 naturae, inquantum imitatur Dei scientiam; sicut artificiatum | |
| 9284 inquantum concordat arti. Dato autem quod essent aliqua infinita | |
| 9285 actu secundum numerum, puta infiniti homines; vel secundum | |
| 9286 quantitatem continuam, ut si esset aer infinitus, ut quidam antiqui | |
| 9287 dixerunt, tamen manifestum est quod haberent esse determinatum et | |
| 9288 finitum, quia esse eorum esset limitatum ad aliquas determinatas | |
| 9289 naturas. Unde mensurabilia essent secundum scientiam Dei.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q14_A13" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q14_A13-p0.1">Q. 14. A. 13. Whether the knowledge of God is of future contingent things?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A13-p2"> | |
| 9290 <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the knowledge of God is not of future contingent things. For from a necessary cause proceeds a necessary effect. | |
| 9291 But the knowledge of God is the cause of things known, as said above | |
| 9292 <a id="FP_Q14_A13-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q14_A8.html">(A[8])</a>. Since therefore that knowledge is necessary, what He knows must also be necessary. Therefore the knowledge of God is not | |
| 9293 of contingent things. | |
| 9294 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 13 arg. 1"><a name="28990" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28990] Iª q. 14 a. 13 arg. 1</span></a> Ad | |
| 9295 decimumtertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod scientia Dei non sit | |
| 9296 futurorum contingentium. A causa enim necessaria procedit effectus | |
| 9297 necessarius. Sed scientia Dei est causa scitorum, ut supra dictum | |
| 9298 est. Cum ergo ipsa sit necessaria, sequitur scita eius esse | |
| 9299 necessaria. Non ergo scientia Dei est contingentium.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A13-p3"> | |
| 9300 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, every conditional proposition of which the antecedent is absolutely necessary must have an absolutely necessary | |
| 9301 consequent. For the antecedent is to the consequent as principles are to the conclusion: and from necessary principles only | |
| 9302 a necessary conclusion can follow, as is proved in Poster. i. But this is a true conditional proposition, "If God knew that | |
| 9303 this thing will be, it will be," for the knowledge of God is only of true things. Now the | |
| 9304 antecedent conditional of this is absolutely necessary, because it is eternal, and because it is signified as past. Therefore | |
| 9305 the consequent is also absolutely necessary. Therefore whatever God knows, is necessary; and so the knowledge of God is not | |
| 9306 of contingent things. | |
| 9307 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 13 arg. 2"><a name="28991" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28991] Iª q. 14 a. 13 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 9308 omnis conditionalis cuius antecedens est necessarium absolute, | |
| 9309 consequens est necessarium absolute. Sic enim se habet antecedens | |
| 9310 ad consequens, sicut principia ad conclusionem, ex principiis autem | |
| 9311 necessariis non sequitur conclusio nisi necessaria, ut in I Poster. | |
| 9312 probatur. Sed haec est quaedam conditionalis vera, si Deus scivit | |
| 9313 hoc futurum esse, hoc erit, quia scientia Dei non est nisi verorum. | |
| 9314 Huius autem conditionalis antecedens est necessarium absolute, tum | |
| 9315 quia est aeternum; tum quia significatur ut praeteritum. Ergo et | |
| 9316 consequens est necessarium absolute. Igitur quidquid scitur a Deo, | |
| 9317 est necessarium. Et sic scientia Dei non est contingentium.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A13-p4"> | |
| 9318 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, everything known by God must necessarily be, because even what we ourselves know, must necessarily be; and, of course, | |
| 9319 the knowledge of God is much more certain than ours. But no future contingent things must necessarily be. Therefore no contingent | |
| 9320 future thing is known by God. | |
| 9321 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 13 arg. 3"><a name="28992" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28992] Iª q. 14 a. 13 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, omne | |
| 9322 scitum a Deo necesse est esse, quia etiam omne scitum a nobis | |
| 9323 necesse est esse, cum tamen scientia Dei certior sit quam scientia | |
| 9324 nostra. Sed nullum contingens futurum necesse est esse. Ergo nullum | |
| 9325 contingens futurum est scitum a Deo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A13-p5"> | |
| 9326 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( | |
| 9327 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q14_A13-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.32.15" target="asv">Ps. 32:15</a>), "He Who hath made the hearts of every one of them; Who understandeth all their works," i.e. of men. Now the works of men | |
| 9328 are contingent, being subject to free will. Therefore God knows future contingent things. | |
| 9329 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 13 s. c."><a name="28993" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28993] Iª q. 14 a. 13 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est | |
| 9330 quod dicitur in Psalmo XXXII, <i>qui finxit singillatim corda | |
| 9331 eorum, qui intelligit omnia opera eorum</i>, scilicet hominum. Sed | |
| 9332 opera hominum sunt contingentia, utpote libero arbitrio subiecta. | |
| 9333 Ergo Deus scit futura contingentia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q14_A13-p6"> | |
| 9334 <b>I answer that,</b> Since as was shown above | |
| 9335 <a id="FP_Q14_A13-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q14_A9.html">(A[9])</a>, God knows all things; not only things actual but also things possible to Him and creature; and since some of these are future | |
| 9336 contingent to us, it follows that God knows future contingent things. | |
| 9337 </p><p id="FP_Q14_A13-p7"> In evidence of this, we must consider that a contingent thing can be considered in two ways; first, in itself, in so far | |
| 9338 as it is now in act: and in this sense it is not considered as future, but as present; neither is it considered as contingent | |
| 9339 (as having reference) to one of two terms, but as determined to one; and on account of this it can be infallibly the object | |
| 9340 of certain knowledge, for instance to the sense of sight, as when I see that Socrates is sitting down. In | |
| 9341 another way a contingent thing can be considered as it is in its cause; and in this way it is considered as future, and as | |
| 9342 a contingent thing not yet determined to one; forasmuch as a contingent cause has relation to opposite things: and in this | |
| 9343 sense a contingent thing is not subject to any certain knowledge. Hence, whoever knows a contingent effect in its cause only, | |
| 9344 has merely a conjectural knowledge of it. Now God knows all contingent things not only as they are in their causes, but also | |
| 9345 as | |
| 9346 each one of them is actually in itself. And although contingent things become actual successively, nevertheless God knows | |
| 9347 contingent things not successively, as they are in their own being, as we do but simultaneously. The reason is because His | |
| 9348 knowledge is measured by eternity, as is also His being; and eternity being simultaneously whole comprises all time, as said | |
| 9349 above ( | |
| 9350 <a id="FP_Q14_A13-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q10_A2.html">Q[10], A[2]</a> ). Hence all things that are in time are present to God from eternity, not only | |
| 9351 because He has the types of things present within Him, as some say; but because His glance is carried from eternity over all | |
| 9352 things as they are in their presentiality. Hence it is manifest that contingent things are infallibly known by God, inasmuch | |
| 9353 as they are subject to the divine sight in their presentiality; yet they are future contingent things in relation to their | |
| 9354 own causes. | |
| 9355 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 13 co."><a name="28994" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28994] Iª q. 14 a. 13 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum | |
| 9356 quod, cum supra ostensum sit quod Deus sciat omnia non solum quae | |
| 9357 actu sunt, sed etiam quae sunt in potentia sua vel creaturae; horum | |
| 9358 autem quaedam sunt contingentia nobis futura; sequitur quod Deus | |
| 9359 contingentia futura cognoscat. Ad cuius evidentiam, considerandum | |
| 9360 est quod contingens aliquod dupliciter potest considerari. Uno | |
| 9361 modo, in seipso, secundum quod iam actu est. Et sic non | |
| 9362 consideratur ut futurum, sed ut praesens, neque ut ad utrumlibet | |
| 9363 contingens, sed ut determinatum ad unum. Et propter hoc, sic | |
| 9364 infallibiliter subdi potest certae cognitioni, utpote sensui visus, | |
| 9365 sicut cum video Socratem sedere. Alio modo potest considerari | |
| 9366 contingens, ut est in sua causa. Et sic consideratur ut futurum, et | |
| 9367 ut contingens nondum determinatum ad unum, quia causa contingens se | |
| 9368 habet ad opposita. Et sic contingens non subditur per certitudinem | |
| 9369 alicui cognitioni. Unde quicumque cognoscit effectum contingentem | |
| 9370 in causa sua tantum, non habet de eo nisi coniecturalem | |
| 9371 cognitionem. Deus autem cognoscit omnia contingentia, non solum | |
| 9372 prout sunt in suis causis, sed etiam prout unumquodque eorum est | |
| 9373 actu in seipso. Et licet contingentia fiant in actu successive, non | |
| 9374 tamen Deus successive cognoscit contingentia, prout sunt in suo | |
| 9375 esse, sicut nos, sed simul. Quia sua cognitio mensuratur | |
| 9376 aeternitate, sicut etiam suum esse, aeternitas autem, tota simul | |
| 9377 existens, ambit totum tempus, ut supra dictum est. Unde omnia quae | |
| 9378 sunt in tempore, sunt Deo ab aeterno praesentia, non solum ea | |
| 9379 ratione qua habet rationes rerum apud se praesentes, ut quidam | |
| 9380 dicunt, sed quia eius intuitus fertur ab aeterno super omnia, prout | |
| 9381 sunt in sua praesentialitate. Unde manifestum est quod contingentia | |
| 9382 et infallibiliter a Deo cognoscuntur, inquantum subduntur divino | |
| 9383 conspectui secundum suam praesentialitatem, et tamen sunt futura | |
| 9384 contingentia, suis causis comparata.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A13-p8"> | |
| 9385 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Although the supreme cause is necessary, the effect may be contingent by reason of the proximate contingent cause; just as | |
| 9386 the germination of a plant is contingent by reason of the proximate contingent cause, although the movement of the sun which | |
| 9387 is the first cause, is necessary. So likewise things known by God are contingent on account of their proximate causes, while | |
| 9388 the knowledge of God, which is the first cause, is necessary. | |
| 9389 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 13 ad 1"><a name="28995" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28995] Iª q. 14 a. 13 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo | |
| 9390 dicendum quod, licet causa suprema sit necessaria, tamen effectus | |
| 9391 potest esse contingens, propter causam proximam contingentem, sicut | |
| 9392 germinatio plantae est contingens propter causam proximam | |
| 9393 contingentem, licet motus solis, qui est causa prima, sit | |
| 9394 necessarius. Et similiter scita a Deo sunt contingentia propter | |
| 9395 causas proximas, licet scientia Dei, quae est causa prima, sit | |
| 9396 necessaria.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q14_A13-p9"> | |
| 9397 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Some say that this antecedent, "God knew this contingent to be future," is not necessary, but contingent; because, although | |
| 9398 it is past, still it imports relation to the future. This however does not remove necessity from it; for whatever has had | |
| 9399 relation to the future, must have had it, although the future sometimes does not follow. On the other hand some say that this | |
| 9400 antecedent is contingent, because it is a compound of necessary and contingent; as | |
| 9401 this saying is contingent, "Socrates is a white man." But this also is to no purpose; for when we say, "God knew this contingent | |
| 9402 to be future," contingent is used here only as the matter of the word, and not as the chief part of the proposition. Hence | |
| 9403 its contingency or necessity has no reference to the necessity or contingency of the proposition, or to its being true or | |
| 9404 false. For it may be just as true that I said a man is an ass, as that I said Socrates runs, or God is: and the same applies | |
| 9405 to necessary and contingent. Hence it must be said that this antecedent is absolutely necessary. Nor does it follow, as some | |
| 9406 say, that the consequent is absolutely necessary, because the antecedent is the remote cause of the consequent, which is contingent | |
| 9407 by reason of the proximate cause. But this is to no purpose. For the conditional would be false were its antecedent the remote | |
| 9408 necessary cause, and the consequent a contingent effect; as, for example, if I said, "if the sun moves, the grass | |
| 9409 will grow." | |
| 9410 </p><p id="FP_Q14_A13-p10"> Therefore we must reply otherwise; that when the antecedent contains anything belonging to an act of the soul, the consequent | |
| 9411 must be taken not as it is in itself, but as it is in the soul: for the existence of a thing in itself is different from the | |
| 9412 existence of a thing in the soul. For example, when I say, "What the soul understands is immaterial," this is to be understood | |
| 9413 that it is immaterial as it is in the intellect, not as it is in itself. Likewise if I say, "If God knew | |
| 9414 anything, it will be," the consequent must be understood as it is subject to the divine knowledge, i.e. as it is in its presentiality. | |
| 9415 And thus it is necessary, as also is the antecedent: "For everything that is, while it is, must be necessarily be," as the | |
| 9416 Philosopher says in Peri Herm. i. | |
| 9417 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 13 ad 2"><a name="28996" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28996] Iª q. 14 a. 13 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 9418 dicendum quod quidam dicunt quod hoc antecedens, Deus scivit hoc | |
| 9419 contingens futurum, non est necessarium, sed contingens, quia, | |
| 9420 licet sit praeteritum, tamen importat respectum ad futurum. Sed hoc | |
| 9421 non tollit ei necessitatem, quia id quod habuit respectum ad | |
| 9422 futurum, necesse est habuisse, licet etiam futurum non sequatur | |
| 9423 quandoque. Alii vero dicunt hoc antecedens esse contingens, quia | |
| 9424 est compositum ex necessario et contingenti; sicut istud dictum est | |
| 9425 contingens, Socratem esse hominem album. Sed hoc etiam nihil est. | |
| 9426 Quia cum dicitur, Deus scivit esse futurum hoc contingens, | |
| 9427 contingens non ponitur ibi nisi ut materia verbi, et non sicut | |
| 9428 principalis pars propositionis, unde contingentia eius vel | |
| 9429 necessitas nihil refert ad hoc quod propositio sit necessaria vel | |
| 9430 contingens, vera vel falsa. Ita enim potest esse verum me dixisse | |
| 9431 hominem esse asinum, sicut me dixisse Socratem currere, vel Deum | |
| 9432 esse, et eadem ratio est de necessario et contingenti. Unde | |
| 9433 dicendum est quod hoc antecedens est necessarium absolute. Nec | |
| 9434 tamen sequitur, ut quidam dicunt, quod consequens sit necessarium | |
| 9435 absolute, quia antecedens est causa remota consequentis, quod | |
| 9436 propter causam proximam contingens est. Sed hoc nihil est. Esset | |
| 9437 enim conditionalis falsa, cuius antecedens esset causa remota | |
| 9438 necessaria, et consequens effectus contingens, ut puta si dicerem, | |
| 9439 si sol movetur, herba germinabit. Et ideo aliter dicendum est, quod | |
| 9440 quando in antecedente ponitur aliquid pertinens ad actum animae, | |
| 9441 consequens est accipiendum non secundum quod in se est, sed | |
| 9442 secundum quod est in anima, aliud enim est esse rei in seipsa, et | |
| 9443 esse rei in anima. Ut puta, si dicam, si anima intelligit aliquid, | |
| 9444 illud est immateriale, intelligendum est quod illud est immateriale | |
| 9445 secundum quod est in intellectu, non secundum quod est in seipso. | |
| 9446 Et similiter si dicam, si Deus scivit aliquid, illud erit, | |
| 9447 consequens intelligendum est prout subest divinae scientiae, | |
| 9448 scilicet prout est in sua praesentialitate. Et sic necessarium est, | |
| 9449 sicut et antecedens, <i>quia omne quod est, dum est, necesse est | |
| 9450 esse</i>, ut dicitur in I Periherm.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q14_A13-p11"> | |
| 9451 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Things reduced to act in time, as known by us successively in time, but by God (are known) in eternity, which is above time. | |
| 9452 Whence to us they cannot be certain, forasmuch as we know future contingent things as such; but (they are certain) to God | |
| 9453 alone, whose understanding is in eternity above time. Just as he who goes along the road, does not see those who come after | |
| 9454 him; whereas he who sees the whole road from a height, sees at once all travelling | |
| 9455 by the way. Hence what is known by us must be necessary, even as it is in itself; for what is future contingent in itself, | |
| 9456 cannot be known by us. Whereas what is known by God must be necessary according to the mode in which they are subject to the | |
| 9457 divine knowledge, as already stated, but not absolutely as considered in their own causes. Hence also this proposition, "Everything | |
| 9458 known by God must necessarily be," is usually distinguished; for this may refer to the thing, or to the saying. If it | |
| 9459 refers to the thing, it is divided and false; for the sense is, "Everything which God knows is necessary." If understood of | |
| 9460 the saying, it is composite and true; for the sense is, "This proposition, 'that which is known by God is' is necessary." | |
| 9461 </p><p id="FP_Q14_A13-p12"> Now some urge an objection and say that this distinction holds good with regard to forms that are separable from the subject; | |
| 9462 thus if I said, "It is possible for a white thing to be black," it is false as applied to the saying, and true as applied | |
| 9463 to the thing: for a thing which is white, can become black; whereas this saying, " a white thing is black" can never be true. | |
| 9464 But in forms that are inseparable from the subject, this distinction does not hold, for instance, if I said, | |
| 9465 "A black crow can be white"; for in both senses it is false. Now to be known by God is inseparable from the thing; for what | |
| 9466 is known by God cannot be known. This objection, however, would hold if these words "that which is known" implied any disposition | |
| 9467 inherent to the subject; but since they import an act of the knower, something can be attributed to the thing known, in itself | |
| 9468 (even if it always be known), which is not attributed to it in so far as it stands under actual knowledge; thus | |
| 9469 material existence is attributed to a stone in itself, which is not attributed to it inasmuch as it is known. | |
| 9470 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 13 ad 3"><a name="28997" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28997] Iª q. 14 a. 13 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 9471 dicendum quod ea quae temporaliter in actum reducuntur, a nobis | |
| 9472 successive cognoscuntur in tempore, sed a Deo in aeternitate, quae | |
| 9473 est supra tempus. Unde nobis, quia cognoscimus futura contingentia | |
| 9474 inquantum talia sunt, certa esse non possunt, sed soli Deo, cuius | |
| 9475 intelligere est in aeternitate supra tempus. Sicut ille qui vadit | |
| 9476 per viam, non videt illos qui post eum veniunt, sed ille qui ab | |
| 9477 aliqua altitudine totam viam intuetur, simul videt omnes | |
| 9478 transeuntes per viam. Et ideo illud quod scitur a nobis, oportet | |
| 9479 esse necessarium etiam secundum quod in se est, quia ea quae in se | |
| 9480 sunt contingentia futura, a nobis sciri non possunt. Sed ea quae | |
| 9481 sunt scita a Deo, oportet esse necessaria secundum modum quo | |
| 9482 subsunt divinae scientiae, ut dictum est, non autem absolute, | |
| 9483 secundum quod in propriis causis considerantur. Unde et haec | |
| 9484 propositio, omne scitum a Deo necessarium est esse, consuevit | |
| 9485 distingui. Quia potest esse de re, vel de dicto. Si intelligatur de | |
| 9486 re, est divisa et falsa, et est sensus, omnis res quam Deus scit, | |
| 9487 est necessaria. Vel potest intelligi de dicto, et sic est composita | |
| 9488 et vera; et est sensus, hoc dictum, scitum a Deo esse, est | |
| 9489 necessarium. Sed obstant quidam, dicentes quod ista distinctio | |
| 9490 habet locum in formis separabilibus a subiecto; ut si dicam, album | |
| 9491 possibile est esse nigrum. Quae quidem de dicto est falsa, et de re | |
| 9492 est vera, res enim quae est alba, potest esse nigra; sed hoc | |
| 9493 dictum, album esse nigrum, nunquam potest esse verum. In formis | |
| 9494 autem inseparabilibus a subiecto, non habet locum praedicta | |
| 9495 distinctio; ut si dicam, corvum nigrum possibile est esse album, | |
| 9496 quia in utroque sensu est falsa. Esse autem scitum a Deo, est | |
| 9497 inseparabile a re, quia quod est scitum a Deo, non potest esse non | |
| 9498 scitum. Haec autem instantia locum haberet, si hoc quod dico | |
| 9499 scitum, importaret aliquam dispositionem subiecto inhaerentem. Sed | |
| 9500 cum importet actum scientis, ipsi rei scitae, licet semper sciatur, | |
| 9501 potest aliquid attribui secundum se, quod non attribuitur ei | |
| 9502 inquantum stat sub actu sciendi, sicut esse materiale attribuitur | |
| 9503 lapidi secundum se, quod non attribuitur ei secundum quod est | |
| 9504 intelligibile.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q14_A14" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q14_A14-p0.1">Q. 14. A. 14. Whether God knows enunciable things?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A14-p2"> | |
| 9505 <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God does not know enunciable things. For to know enunciable things belongs to our intellect as it composes | |
| 9506 and divides. But in the divine intellect, there is no composition. Therefore God does not know enunciable things. | |
| 9507 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 14 arg. 1"><a name="28998" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28998] Iª q. 14 a. 14 arg. 1</span></a> Ad | |
| 9508 decimumquartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod Deus non cognoscat | |
| 9509 enuntiabilia. Cognoscere enim enuntiabilia convenit intellectui | |
| 9510 nostro, secundum quod componit et dividit. Sed in intellectu divino | |
| 9511 nulla est compositio. Ergo Deus non cognoscit enuntiabilia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A14-p3"> | |
| 9512 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, every kind of knowledge is made through some likeness. But in God there is no likeness of enunciable things, since | |
| 9513 He is altogether simple. Therefore God does not know enunciable things. | |
| 9514 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 14 arg. 2"><a name="28999" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[28999] Iª q. 14 a. 14 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 9515 omnis cognitio fit per aliquam similitudinem. Sed in Deo nulla est | |
| 9516 similitudo enuntiabilium, cum sit omnino simplex. Ergo Deus non | |
| 9517 cognoscit enuntiabilia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A14-p4"> | |
| 9518 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written: "The Lord knoweth the thoughts of men" ( | |
| 9519 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q14_A14-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.93.11" target="asv">Ps. 93:11</a>). But enunciable things are contained in the thoughts of men. Therefore God knows enunciable things. | |
| 9520 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 14 s. c."><a name="29000" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29000] Iª q. 14 a. 14 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est | |
| 9521 quod dicitur in Psalmo XCIII, <i>dominus scit cogitationes | |
| 9522 hominum</i>. Sed enuntiabilia continentur in cogitationibus | |
| 9523 hominum. Ergo Deus cognoscit enuntiabilia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q14_A14-p5"> | |
| 9524 <b>I answer that,</b> Since it is in the power of our intellect to form enunciations, and since God knows whatever is in His own power or in that | |
| 9525 of creatures, as said above | |
| 9526 <a id="FP_Q14_A14-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q14_A9.html">(A[9])</a>, it follows of necessity that God knows all enunciations that can be formed. | |
| 9527 </p><p id="FP_Q14_A14-p6"> Now just as He knows material things immaterially, and composite things simply, so likewise He knows enunciable things not | |
| 9528 after the manner of enunciable things, as if in His intellect there were composition or division of enunciations; for He knows | |
| 9529 each thing by simple intelligence, by understanding the essence of each thing; as if we by the very fact that we understand | |
| 9530 what man is, were to understand all that can be predicated of man. This, however, does not happen in our | |
| 9531 intellect, which discourses from one thing to another, forasmuch as the intelligible species represents one thing in such | |
| 9532 a way as not to represent another. Hence when we understand what man is, we do not forthwith understand other things which | |
| 9533 belong to him, but we understand them one by one, according to a certain succession. On this account the things we understand | |
| 9534 as separated, we must reduce to one by way of composition or division, by forming an enunciation. Now the species of the divine | |
| 9535 intellect, which is God's essence, suffices to represent all things. Hence by understanding His essence, God knows the essences | |
| 9536 of all things, and also whatever can be accidental to them. | |
| 9537 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 14 co."><a name="29001" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29001] Iª q. 14 a. 14 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum | |
| 9538 quod, cum formare enuntiabilia sit in potestate intellectus nostri; | |
| 9539 Deus autem scit quidquid est in potentia sua vel creaturae, ut | |
| 9540 supra dictum est; necesse est quod Deus sciat omnia enuntiabilia | |
| 9541 quae formari possunt. Sed, sicut scit materialia immaterialiter, et | |
| 9542 composita simpliciter, ita scit enuntiabilia non per modum | |
| 9543 enuntiabilium, quasi scilicet in intellectu eius sit compositio vel | |
| 9544 divisio enuntiabilium; sed unumquodque cognoscit per simplicem | |
| 9545 intelligentiam, intelligendo essentiam uniuscuiusque. Sicut si nos | |
| 9546 in hoc ipso quod intelligimus quid est homo, intelligeremus omnia | |
| 9547 quae de homine praedicari possunt. Quod quidem in intellectu nostro | |
| 9548 non contingit, qui de uno in aliud discurrit, propter hoc quod | |
| 9549 species intelligibilis sic repraesentat unum, quod non repraesentat | |
| 9550 aliud. Unde, intelligendo quid est homo, non ex hoc ipso alia quae | |
| 9551 ei insunt, intelligimus; sed divisim, secundum quandam | |
| 9552 successionem. Et propter hoc, ea quae seorsum intelligimus, oportet | |
| 9553 nos in unum redigere per modum compositionis vel divisionis, | |
| 9554 enuntiationem formando. Sed species intellectus divini, scilicet | |
| 9555 eius essentia, sufficit ad demonstrandum omnia. Unde, intelligendo | |
| 9556 essentiam suam, cognoscit essentias omnium, et quaecumque eis | |
| 9557 accidere possunt.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A14-p7"> | |
| 9558 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This objection would avail if God knew enunciable things after the manner of enunciable things. | |
| 9559 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 14 ad 1"><a name="29002" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29002] Iª q. 14 a. 14 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo | |
| 9560 dicendum quod ratio illa procederet, si Deus cognosceret | |
| 9561 enuntiabilia per modum enuntiabilium.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A14-p8"> | |
| 9562 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Enunciatory composition signifies some existence of a thing; and thus God by His existence, which is His essence, is the | |
| 9563 similitude of all those things which are signified by enunciation. | |
| 9564 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 14 ad 2"><a name="29003" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29003] Iª q. 14 a. 14 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 9565 dicendum quod compositio enuntiabilis significat aliquod esse rei, | |
| 9566 et sic Deus per suum esse, quod est eius essentia, est similitudo | |
| 9567 omnium eorum quae per enuntiabilia significantur.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q14_A15" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q14_A15-p0.1">Q. 14. A. 15. Whether the knowledge of God is variable?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A15-p2"> | |
| 9568 <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the knowledge of God is variable. For knowledge is related to what is knowable. But whatever imports relation | |
| 9569 to the creature is applied to God from time, and varies according to the variation of creatures. Therefore the knowledge of | |
| 9570 God is variable according to the variation of creatures. | |
| 9571 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 15 arg. 1"><a name="29004" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29004] Iª q. 14 a. 15 arg. 1</span></a> Ad | |
| 9572 decimumquintum sic proceditur. Videtur quod scientia Dei sit | |
| 9573 variabilis. Scientia enim relative dicitur ad scibile. Sed ea quae | |
| 9574 important relationem ad creaturam, dicuntur de Deo ex tempore, et | |
| 9575 variantur secundum variationem creaturarum. Ergo scientia Dei est | |
| 9576 variabilis, secundum variationem creaturarum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A15-p3"> | |
| 9577 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, whatever God can make, He can know. But God can make more than He does. Therefore He can know more than He knows. | |
| 9578 Thus His knowledge can vary according to increase and diminution. | |
| 9579 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 15 arg. 2"><a name="29005" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29005] Iª q. 14 a. 15 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 9580 quidquid potest Deus facere, potest scire. Sed Deus potest plura | |
| 9581 facere quam faciat. Ergo potest plura scire quam sciat. Et sic | |
| 9582 scientia sua potest variari secundum augmentum et diminutionem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A15-p4"> | |
| 9583 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, God knew that Christ would be born. But He does not know now that Christ will be born; because Christ is not to | |
| 9584 be born in the future. Therefore God does not know everything He once knew; and thus the knowledge of God is variable. | |
| 9585 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 15 arg. 3"><a name="29006" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29006] Iª q. 14 a. 15 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, Deus | |
| 9586 scivit Christum nasciturum. Nunc autem nescit Christum nasciturum, | |
| 9587 quia Christus nasciturus non est. Ergo non quidquid Deus scivit, | |
| 9588 scit. Et ita scientia Dei videtur esse variabilis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A15-p5"> | |
| 9589 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is said, that in God "there is no change nor shadow of alteration" ( | |
| 9590 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q14_A15-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Jas.1.17" target="asv">James 1:17</a>). | |
| 9591 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 15 s. c."><a name="29007" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29007] Iª q. 14 a. 15 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est | |
| 9592 quod dicitur Iac. I, quod <i>apud Deum non est transmutatio, neque | |
| 9593 vicissitudinis obumbratio</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A15-p6"> | |
| 9594 <b>I answer that,</b> Since the knowledge of God is His substance, as is clear from the foregoing | |
| 9595 <a id="FP_Q14_A15-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q14_A4.html">(A[4])</a>, just as His substance is altogether immutable, as shown above ( | |
| 9596 <a id="FP_Q14_A15-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q9_A1.html">Q[9], A[1]</a>), so His knowledge likewise must be altogether invariable. | |
| 9597 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 15 co."><a name="29008" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29008] Iª q. 14 a. 15 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum | |
| 9598 quod, cum scientia Dei sit eius substantia, ut ex dictis patet; | |
| 9599 sicut substantia eius est omnino immutabilis, ut supra ostensum | |
| 9600 est, ita oportet scientiam eius omnino invariabilem esse.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A15-p7"> | |
| 9601 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> "Lord", "Creator" and the like, import relations to creatures in so far as they are in themselves. But the knowledge of God | |
| 9602 imports relation to creatures in so far as they are in God; because everything is actually understood according as it is in | |
| 9603 the one who understands. Now created things are in God in an invariable manner; while they exist variably in themselves. We | |
| 9604 may also say that "Lord", "Creator" and the like, import the relations consequent | |
| 9605 upon the acts which are understood as terminating in the creatures themselves, as they are in themselves; and thus these relations | |
| 9606 are attributed to God variously, according to the variation of creatures. But "knowledge" and "love," and the like, import | |
| 9607 relations consequent upon the acts which are understood to be in God; and therefore these are predicated of God in an invariable | |
| 9608 manner. | |
| 9609 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 15 ad 1"><a name="29009" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29009] Iª q. 14 a. 15 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo | |
| 9610 dicendum quod dominus et creator, et huiusmodi, important | |
| 9611 relationes ad creaturas secundum quod in seipsis sunt. Sed scientia | |
| 9612 Dei importat relationem ad creaturas secundum quod sunt in Deo, | |
| 9613 quia secundum hoc est unumquodque intellectum in actu quod est in | |
| 9614 intelligente. Res autem creatae sunt in Deo invariabiliter, in | |
| 9615 seipsis autem variabiliter. Vel aliter dicendum est, quod dominus | |
| 9616 et creator, et huiusmodi, important relationes quae consequuntur | |
| 9617 actus qui intelliguntur terminari ad ipsas creaturas secundum quod | |
| 9618 in seipsis sunt, et ideo huiusmodi relationes varie de Deo | |
| 9619 dicuntur, secundum variationem creaturarum. Sed scientia et amor, | |
| 9620 et huiusmodi, important relationes quae consequuntur actus qui | |
| 9621 intelliguntur in Deo esse, et ideo invariabiliter praedicantur de | |
| 9622 Deo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A15-p8"> | |
| 9623 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> God knows also what He can make, and does not make. Hence from the fact that He can make more than He makes, it does not | |
| 9624 follow that He can know more than He knows, unless this be referred to the knowledge of vision, according to which He is said | |
| 9625 to know those things which are in act in some period of time. But from the fact that He knows some things might be which are | |
| 9626 not, or that some things might not be which are, it does not follow that His | |
| 9627 knowledge is variable, but rather that He knows the variability of things. If, however, anything existed which God did not | |
| 9628 previously know, and afterwards knew, then His knowledge would be variable. But this could not be; for whatever is, or can | |
| 9629 be in any period of time, is known by God in His eternity. Therefore from the fact that a thing exists in some period of time, | |
| 9630 it follows that it is known by God from eternity. Therefore it cannot be granted that God can know more than He knows; because | |
| 9631 such a proposition implies that first of all He did not know, and then afterwards knew. | |
| 9632 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 15 ad 2"><a name="29010" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29010] Iª q. 14 a. 15 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 9633 dicendum quod Deus scit etiam ea quae potest facere et non facit. | |
| 9634 Unde ex hoc quod potest plura facere quam facit, non sequitur quod | |
| 9635 possit plura scire quam sciat, nisi hoc referatur ad scientiam | |
| 9636 visionis, secundum quam dicitur scire ea quae sunt in actu secundum | |
| 9637 aliquod tempus. Ex hoc tamen quod scit quod aliqua possunt esse | |
| 9638 quae non sunt, vel non esse quae sunt, non sequitur quod scientia | |
| 9639 sua sit variabilis, sed quod cognoscat rerum variabilitatem. Si | |
| 9640 tamen aliquid esset quod prius Deus nescivisset et postea sciret, | |
| 9641 esset eius scientia variabilis. Sed hoc esse non potest, quia | |
| 9642 quidquid est vel potest esse secundum aliquod tempus, Deus in | |
| 9643 aeterno suo scit. Et ideo ex hoc ipso quod ponitur aliquid esse | |
| 9644 secundum quodcumque tempus, oportet poni quod ab aeterno sit scitum | |
| 9645 a Deo. Et ideo non debet concedi quod Deus possit plura scire quam | |
| 9646 sciat, quia haec propositio implicat quod ante nesciverit et postea | |
| 9647 sciat.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A15-p9"> | |
| 9648 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The ancient Nominalists said that it was the same thing to say "Christ is born" and "will be born" and "was born"; because | |
| 9649 the same thing is signified by these three---viz. the nativity of Christ. Therefore it follows, they said, that whatever God | |
| 9650 knew, He knows; because now He knows that Christ is born, which means the same thing as that Christ will be born. This opinion, | |
| 9651 however, is false; both because the diversity in the parts of a sentence causes | |
| 9652 a diversity of enunciations; and because it would follow that a proposition which is true once would be always true; which | |
| 9653 is contrary to what the Philosopher lays down (Categor. iii) when he says that this sentence, "Socrates sits," is true when | |
| 9654 he is sitting, and false when he rises up. Therefore, it must be conceded that this proposition is not true, "Whatever God | |
| 9655 knew He knows," if referred to enunciable propositions. But because of this, it does not follow that the knowledge of God | |
| 9656 is | |
| 9657 variable. For as it is without variation in the divine knowledge that God knows one and the same thing sometime to be, and | |
| 9658 sometime not to be, so it is without variation in the divine knowledge that God knows an enunciable proposition is sometime | |
| 9659 true, and sometime false. The knowledge of God, however, would be variable if He knew enunciable things by way of enunciation, | |
| 9660 by composition and division, as occurs in our intellect. Hence our knowledge varies either as regards truth and falsity, for | |
| 9661 example, if when either as regards truth and falsity, for example, if when a thing suffers change we retained the same opinion | |
| 9662 about it; or as regards diverse opinions, as if we first thought that anyone was sitting, and afterwards thought that he was | |
| 9663 not sitting; neither of which can be in God. | |
| 9664 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 15 ad 3"><a name="29011" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29011] Iª q. 14 a. 15 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 9665 dicendum quod antiqui nominales dixerunt idem esse enuntiabile, | |
| 9666 Christum nasci, et esse nasciturum, et esse natum, quia eadem res | |
| 9667 significatur per haec tria, scilicet nativitas Christi. Et secundum | |
| 9668 hoc sequitur quod Deus quidquid scivit, sciat, quia modo scit | |
| 9669 Christum natum, quod significat idem ei quod est Christum esse | |
| 9670 nasciturum. Sed haec opinio falsa est. Tum quia diversitas partium | |
| 9671 orationis diversitatem enuntiabilium causat. Tum etiam quia | |
| 9672 sequeretur quod propositio quae semel est vera, esset semper vera, | |
| 9673 quod est contra philosophum, qui dicit quod haec oratio, Socrates | |
| 9674 sedet, vera est eo sedente, et eadem falsa est, eo surgente. Et | |
| 9675 ideo concedendum est quod haec non est vera, quidquid Deus scivit, | |
| 9676 scit, si ad enuntiabilia referatur. Sed ex hoc non sequitur quod | |
| 9677 scientia Dei sit variabilis. Sicut enim absque variatione divinae | |
| 9678 scientiae est, quod sciat unam et eandem rem quandoque esse et | |
| 9679 quandoque non esse; ita absque variatione divinae scientiae est, | |
| 9680 quod scit aliquod enuntiabile quandoque esse verum, et quandoque | |
| 9681 esse falsum. Esset autem ex hoc scientia Dei variabilis, si | |
| 9682 enuntiabilia cognosceret per modum enuntiabilium, componendo et | |
| 9683 dividendo, sicut accidit in intellectu nostro. Unde cognitio nostra | |
| 9684 variatur, vel secundum veritatem et falsitatem, puta si, mutata re, | |
| 9685 eandem opinionem de re illa retineamus, vel secundum diversas | |
| 9686 opiniones, ut si primo opinemur aliquem sedere, et postea opinemur | |
| 9687 eum non sedere. Quorum neutrum potest esse in Deo.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q14_A16" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q14_A16-p0.1">Q. 14. A. 16. Whether God has a speculative knowledge of things?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A16-p2"> | |
| 9688 <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God has not a speculative knowledge of things. For the knowledge of God is the cause of things, as shown above | |
| 9689 | |
| 9690 <a id="FP_Q14_A16-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q14_A8.html">(A[8])</a>. But speculative knowledge is not the cause of the things known. Therefore the knowledge of God is not speculative. | |
| 9691 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 16 arg. 1"><a name="29012" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29012] Iª q. 14 a. 16 arg. 1</span></a> Ad | |
| 9692 decimumsextum sic proceditur. Videtur quod Deus de rebus non habeat | |
| 9693 scientiam speculativam. Scientia enim Dei est causa rerum, ut supra | |
| 9694 ostensum est. Sed scientia speculativa non est causa rerum | |
| 9695 scitarum. Ergo scientia Dei non est speculativa.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A16-p3"> | |
| 9696 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, speculative knowledge comes by abstraction from things; which does not belong to the divine knowledge. Therefore | |
| 9697 the knowledge of God is not speculative. | |
| 9698 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 16 arg. 2"><a name="29013" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29013] Iª q. 14 a. 16 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea. | |
| 9699 Scientia speculativa est per abstractionem a rebus, quod divinae | |
| 9700 scientiae non competit. Ergo scientia Dei non est speculativa.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A16-p4"> | |
| 9701 <b>On the contrary,</b> Whatever is the more excellent must be attributed to God. But speculative knowledge is more excellent than practical knowledge, | |
| 9702 as the Philosopher says in the beginning of Metaphysics. Therefore God has a speculative knowledge of things. | |
| 9703 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 16 s. c."><a name="29014" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29014] Iª q. 14 a. 16 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra, omne | |
| 9704 quod est nobilius, Deo est attribuendum. Sed scientia speculativa | |
| 9705 est nobilior quam practica, ut patet per philosophum, in principio | |
| 9706 Metaphys. Ergo Deus habet de rebus scientiam speculativam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q14_A16-p5"> | |
| 9707 <b>I answer that,</b> Some knowledge is speculative only; some is practical only; and some is partly speculative and partly practical. In proof | |
| 9708 whereof it must be observed that knowledge can be called speculative in three ways: first, on the part of the things known, | |
| 9709 which are not operable by the knower; such is the knowledge of man about natural or divine thing. Secondly, as regards the | |
| 9710 manner of knowing---as, for instance, if a builder consider a house by defining and dividing, | |
| 9711 and considering what belongs to it in general: for this is to consider operable things in a speculative manner, and not as | |
| 9712 practically operable; for operable means the application of form to matter, and not the resolution of the composite into its | |
| 9713 universal formal principles. Thirdly, as regards the end; "for the practical intellect differs in its end from the speculative," | |
| 9714 as the Philosopher says (De Anima iii). For the practical intellect is ordered to the end of the operation; whereas the | |
| 9715 end of the speculative intellect is the consideration of truth. Hence if a builder should consider how a house can be made, | |
| 9716 not ordering this to the end of operation, but only to know (how to do it), this would be only a speculative considerations | |
| 9717 as regards the end, although it concerns an operable thing. Therefore knowledge which is speculative by reason of the thing | |
| 9718 itself known, is merely speculative. But that which is speculative either in its mode or as to its end is partly speculative | |
| 9719 and partly practical: and when it is ordained to an operative end it is simply practical. | |
| 9720 </p><p id="FP_Q14_A16-p6"> In accordance with this, therefore, it must be said that God has of Himself a speculative knowledge only; for He Himself | |
| 9721 is not operable. But of all other things He has both speculative and practical knowledge. He has speculative knowledge as | |
| 9722 regards the mode; for whatever we know speculatively in things by defining and dividing, God knows all this much more perfectly. | |
| 9723 </p><p id="FP_Q14_A16-p7"> Now of things which He can make, but does not make at any time, He has not a practical knowledge, according as knowledge | |
| 9724 is called practical from the end. But He has a practical knowledge of what He makes in some period of time. And, as regards | |
| 9725 evil things, although they are not operable by Him, yet they fall under His practical knowledge, like good things, inasmuch | |
| 9726 as He permits, or impedes, or directs them; as also sicknesses fall under the practical knowledge of the | |
| 9727 physician, inasmuch as he cures them by his art. | |
| 9728 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 16 co."><a name="29015" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29015] Iª q. 14 a. 16 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum | |
| 9729 quod aliqua scientia est speculativa tantum, aliqua practica | |
| 9730 tantum, aliqua vero secundum aliquid speculativa et secundum | |
| 9731 aliquid practica. Ad cuius evidentiam, sciendum est quod aliqua | |
| 9732 scientia potest dici speculativa tripliciter. Primo, ex parte rerum | |
| 9733 scitarum, quae non sunt operabiles a sciente, sicut est scientia | |
| 9734 hominis de rebus naturalibus vel divinis. Secundo, quantum ad modum | |
| 9735 sciendi, ut puta si aedificator consideret domum definiendo et | |
| 9736 dividendo et considerando universalia praedicata ipsius. Hoc | |
| 9737 siquidem est operabilia modo speculativo considerare, et non | |
| 9738 secundum quod operabilia sunt, operabile enim est aliquid per | |
| 9739 applicationem formae ad materiam, non per resolutionem compositi in | |
| 9740 principia universalia formalia. Tertio, quantum ad finem, <i>nam | |
| 9741 intellectus practicus differt fine a speculativo</i>, sicut dicitur | |
| 9742 in III de anima. Intellectus enim practicus ordinatur ad finem | |
| 9743 operationis, finis autem intellectus speculativi est consideratio | |
| 9744 veritatis. Unde, si quis aedificator consideret qualiter posset | |
| 9745 fieri aliqua domus, non ordinans ad finem operationis, sed ad | |
| 9746 cognoscendum tantum, erit, quantum ad finem, speculativa | |
| 9747 consideratio, tamen de re operabili. Scientia igitur quae est | |
| 9748 speculativa ratione ipsius rei scitae, est speculativa tantum. Quae | |
| 9749 vero speculativa est vel secundum modum vel secundum finem, est | |
| 9750 secundum quid speculativa et secundum quid practica. Cum vero | |
| 9751 ordinatur ad finem operationis, est simpliciter practica. Secundum | |
| 9752 hoc ergo, dicendum est quod Deus de seipso habet scientiam | |
| 9753 speculativam tantum, ipse enim operabilis non est. De omnibus vero | |
| 9754 aliis habet scientiam et speculativam et practicam. Speculativam | |
| 9755 quidem, quantum ad modum, quidquid enim in rebus nos speculative | |
| 9756 cognoscimus definiendo et dividendo, hoc totum Deus multo | |
| 9757 perfectius novit. Sed de his quae potest quidem facere, sed | |
| 9758 secundum nullum tempus facit, non habet practicam scientiam, | |
| 9759 secundum quod practica scientia dicitur a fine. Sic autem habet | |
| 9760 practicam scientiam de his quae secundum aliquod tempus facit. Mala | |
| 9761 vero, licet ab eo non sint operabilia, tamen sub cognitione | |
| 9762 practica ipsius cadunt, sicut et bona, inquantum permittit vel | |
| 9763 impedit vel ordinat ea, sicut et aegritudines cadunt sub practica | |
| 9764 scientia medici, inquantum per artem suam curat eas.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A16-p8"> | |
| 9765 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The knowledge of God is the cause, not indeed of Himself, but of other things. He is actually the cause of some, that is, | |
| 9766 of things that come to be in some period of time; and He is virtually the cause of others, that is, of things which He can | |
| 9767 make, and which nevertheless are never made. | |
| 9768 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 16 ad 1"><a name="29016" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29016] Iª q. 14 a. 16 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo | |
| 9769 dicendum quod scientia Dei est causa, non quidem sui ipsius, sed | |
| 9770 aliorum, quorundam quidem actu, scilicet eorum quae secundum | |
| 9771 aliquod tempus fiunt; quorundam vero virtute, scilicet eorum quae | |
| 9772 potest facere, et tamen nunquam fiunt.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A16-p9"> | |
| 9773 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The fact that knowledge is derived from things known does not essentially belong to speculative knowledge, but only accidentally | |
| 9774 in so far as it is human. | |
| 9775 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 16 ad 2"><a name="29017" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29017] Iª q. 14 a. 16 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 9776 dicendum quod scientiam esse acceptam a rebus scitis, non per se | |
| 9777 convenit scientiae speculativae, sed per accidens, inquantum est | |
| 9778 humana.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q14_A16-p10"><b>Reply to Objections:</b> | |
| 9779 In answer to what is objected on the contrary, we must say that perfect knowledge of operable things is obtainable only if | |
| 9780 they are known in so far as they are operable. Therefore, since the knowledge of God is in every way perfect, He must know | |
| 9781 what is operable by Him, formally as such, and not only in so far as they are speculative. Nevertheless this does not impair | |
| 9782 the nobility of His speculative knowledge, forasmuch as He sees all things other than Himself in Himself, and He | |
| 9783 knows Himself speculatively; and so in the speculative knowledge of Himself, he possesses both speculative and practical knowledge | |
| 9784 of all other things. | |
| 9785 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 14 a. 16 ad 3"><a name="29018" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29018] Iª q. 14 a. 16 ad 3</span></a> Ad id vero quod | |
| 9786 in contrarium obiicitur, dicendum quod de operabilibus perfecta | |
| 9787 scientia non habetur, nisi sciantur inquantum operabilia sunt. Et | |
| 9788 ideo, cum scientia Dei sit omnibus modis perfecta, oportet quod | |
| 9789 sciat ea quae sunt a se operabilia, inquantum huiusmodi, et non | |
| 9790 solum secundum quod sunt speculabilia. Sed tamen non receditur a | |
| 9791 nobilitate speculativae scientiae, quia omnia alia a se videt in | |
| 9792 seipso, seipsum autem speculative cognoscit; et sic in speculativa | |
| 9793 sui ipsius scientia, habet cognitionem et speculativam et practicam | |
| 9794 omnium aliorum.</p></div></div></div></div> | |
| 9795 <div id="FP_Q15" class="div3"> | |
| 9796 <h3 id="FP_Q15-p0.1">Q. 15. OF IDEAS (THREE ARTICLES)</h3> | |
| 9797 <div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> | |
| 9798 <p id="FP_Q15-p2"> After considering the knowledge of God, it remains to consider ideas. And about this there are three points of inquiry:</p><p id="FP_Q15-p3"> (1) Whether there are ideas?</p><p id="FP_Q15-p4"> (2) Whether they are many, or one only?</p><p id="FP_Q15-p5"> (3) Whether there are ideas of all things known by God?</p> | |
| 9799 </div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 15 pr."><a name="29019" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29019] | |
| 9800 Iª q. 15 pr.</span></a> Post considerationem de scientia Dei, | |
| 9801 restat considerare de ideis. Et circa hoc quaeruntur tria. Primo, | |
| 9802 an sint ideae. Secundo, utrum sint plures, vel una tantum. Tertio, | |
| 9803 utrum sint omnium quae cognoscuntur a Deo.</p></div></div></div> | |
| 9804 <div id="FP_Q15_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q15_A1-p0.1">Q. 15. A. 1. Whether there are ideas?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q15_A1-p2"> | |
| 9805 <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that there are no ideas. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. vii), that God does not know things by ideas. But ideas are | |
| 9806 for nothing else except that things may be known through them. Therefore there are no ideas. | |
| 9807 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 15 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="29020" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29020] Iª q. 15 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum sic | |
| 9808 proceditur. Videtur quod ideae non sint. Dicit enim Dionysius, VII | |
| 9809 cap. de Div. Nom., quod Deus non cognoscit res secundum ideam. Sed | |
| 9810 ideae non ponuntur ad aliud, nisi ut per eas cognoscantur res. Ergo | |
| 9811 ideae non sunt.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q15_A1-p3"> | |
| 9812 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, God knows all things in Himself, as has been already said ( | |
| 9813 <a id="FP_Q15_A1-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q14_A5.html">Q[14], A[5]</a>). But He does not know Himself through an idea; neither therefore other things. | |
| 9814 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 15 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="29021" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29021] Iª q. 15 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, Deus | |
| 9815 in seipso cognoscit omnia, ut supra dictum est. Sed seipsum non | |
| 9816 cognoscit per ideam. Ergo nec alia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q15_A1-p4"> | |
| 9817 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, an idea is considered to be the principle of knowledge and action. But the divine essence is a sufficient principle | |
| 9818 of knowing and effecting all things. It is not therefore necessary to suppose ideas. | |
| 9819 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 15 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="29022" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29022] Iª q. 15 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, idea | |
| 9820 ponitur ut principium cognoscendi et operandi. Sed essentia divina | |
| 9821 est sufficiens principium cognoscendi et operandi omnia. Non ergo | |
| 9822 necesse est ponere ideas.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q15_A1-p5"> | |
| 9823 <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (Octog. Tri. Quaest. qu. xlvi),"Such is the power inherent in ideas, that no one can be wise unless they are | |
| 9824 understood." | |
| 9825 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 15 a. 1 s. c."><a name="29023" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29023] Iª q. 15 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est | |
| 9826 quod dicit Augustinus, in libro octoginta trium quaest., <i>tanta | |
| 9827 vis in ideis constituitur, ut, nisi his intellectis, sapiens esse | |
| 9828 nemo possit</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q15_A1-p6"> | |
| 9829 <b>I answer that,</b> It is necessary to suppose ideas in the divine mind. For the Greek word {Idea} is in Latin "forma." Hence by ideas are understood | |
| 9830 the forms of things, existing apart from the things themselves. Now the form of anything existing apart from the thing itself | |
| 9831 can be for one of two ends: either to be the type of that of which it is called the form, or to be the principle of the knowledge | |
| 9832 of that thing, inasmuch as the forms of things knowable are said to be in | |
| 9833 him who knows them. In either case we must suppose ideas, as is clear for the following reason: | |
| 9834 </p><p id="FP_Q15_A1-p7"> In all things not generated by chance, the form must be the end of any generation whatsoever. But an agent does not act on | |
| 9835 account of the form, except in so far as the likeness of the form is in the agent, as may happen in two ways. For in some | |
| 9836 agents the form of the thing to be made pre-exists according to its natural being, as in those that act by their nature; as | |
| 9837 a man generates a man, or fire generates fire. Whereas in other agents (the form of the thing to be made | |
| 9838 pre-exists) according to intelligible being, as in those that act by the intellect; and thus the likeness of a house pre-exists | |
| 9839 in the mind of the builder. And this may be called the idea of the house, since the builder intends to build his house like | |
| 9840 to the form conceived in his mind. As then the world was not made by chance, but by God acting by His intellect, as will appear | |
| 9841 later ( | |
| 9842 <a id="FP_Q15_A1-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q46_A1.html">Q[46], A[1]</a>), there must exist in the divine mind a form to the likeness of which the | |
| 9843 world was made. And in this the notion of an idea consists. | |
| 9844 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 15 a. 1 co."><a name="29024" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29024] Iª q. 15 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum | |
| 9845 quod necesse est ponere in mente divina ideas. Idea enim Graece, | |
| 9846 Latine forma dicitur, unde per ideas intelliguntur formae aliarum | |
| 9847 rerum, praeter ipsas res existentes. Forma autem alicuius rei | |
| 9848 praeter ipsam existens, ad duo esse potest, vel ut sit exemplar | |
| 9849 eius cuius dicitur forma; vel ut sit principium cognitionis ipsius, | |
| 9850 secundum quod formae cognoscibilium dicuntur esse in cognoscente. | |
| 9851 Et quantum ad utrumque est necesse ponere ideas. Quod sic patet. In | |
| 9852 omnibus enim quae non a casu generantur, necesse est formam esse | |
| 9853 finem generationis cuiuscumque. Agens autem non ageret propter | |
| 9854 formam, nisi inquantum similitudo formae est in ipso. Quod quidem | |
| 9855 contingit dupliciter. In quibusdam enim agentibus praeexistit forma | |
| 9856 rei fiendae secundum esse naturale, sicut in his quae agunt per | |
| 9857 naturam; sicut homo generat hominem, et ignis ignem. In quibusdam | |
| 9858 vero secundum esse intelligibile, ut in his quae agunt per | |
| 9859 intellectum; sicut similitudo domus praeexistit in mente | |
| 9860 aedificatoris. Et haec potest dici idea domus, quia artifex | |
| 9861 intendit domum assimilare formae quam mente concepit. Quia igitur | |
| 9862 mundus non est casu factus, sed est factus a Deo per intellectum | |
| 9863 agente, ut infra patebit, necesse est quod in mente divina sit | |
| 9864 forma, ad similitudinem cuius mundus est factus. Et in hoc | |
| 9865 consistit ratio ideae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q15_A1-p8"> | |
| 9866 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> God does not understand things according to an idea existing outside Himself. Thus Aristotle (Metaph. ix) rejects the opinion | |
| 9867 of Plato, who held that ideas existed of themselves, and not in the intellect. | |
| 9868 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 15 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="29025" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29025] Iª q. 15 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo | |
| 9869 dicendum quod Deus non intelligit res secundum ideam extra se | |
| 9870 existentem. Et sic etiam Aristoteles improbat opinionem Platonis de | |
| 9871 ideis, secundum quod ponebat eas per se existentes, non in | |
| 9872 intellectu.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q15_A1-p9"> | |
| 9873 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Although God knows Himself and all else by His own essence, yet His essence is the operative principle of all things, except | |
| 9874 of Himself. It has therefore the nature of an idea with respect to other things; though not with respect to Himself. | |
| 9875 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 15 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="29026" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29026] Iª q. 15 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 9876 dicendum quod, licet Deus per essentiam suam se et alia cognoscat, | |
| 9877 tamen essentia sua est principium operativum aliorum, non autem sui | |
| 9878 ipsius, et ideo habet rationem ideae secundum quod ad alia | |
| 9879 comparatur, non autem secundum quod comparatur ad ipsum Deum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q15_A1-p10"> | |
| 9880 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> God is the similitude of all things according to His essence; therefore an idea in God is identical with His essence. | |
| 9881 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 15 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="29027" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29027] Iª q. 15 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 9882 dicendum quod Deus secundum essentiam suam est similitudo omnium | |
| 9883 rerum. Unde idea in Deo nihil est aliud quam Dei essentia.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q15_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q15_A2-p0.1">Q. 15. A. 2. Whether ideas are many?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q15_A2-p2"> | |
| 9884 <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that ideas are not many. For an idea in God is His essence. But God's essence is one only. Therefore there is only | |
| 9885 one idea. | |
| 9886 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 15 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="29028" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29028] Iª q. 15 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum sic | |
| 9887 proceditur. Videtur quod non sint plures ideae. Idea enim in Deo | |
| 9888 est eius essentia. Sed essentia Dei est una tantum. Ergo et idea | |
| 9889 est una.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q15_A2-p3"> | |
| 9890 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, as the idea is the principle of knowing and operating, so are art and wisdom. But in God there are not several arts | |
| 9891 or wisdoms. Therefore in Him there is no plurality of ideas. | |
| 9892 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 15 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="29029" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29029] Iª q. 15 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, sicut | |
| 9893 idea est principium cognoscendi et operandi, ita ars et sapientia. | |
| 9894 Sed in Deo non sunt plures artes et sapientiae. Ergo nec plures | |
| 9895 ideae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q15_A2-p4"> | |
| 9896 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if it be said that ideas are multiplied according to their relations to different creatures, it may be argued on | |
| 9897 the contrary that the plurality of ideas is eternal. If, then, ideas are many, but creatures temporal, then the temporal must | |
| 9898 be the cause of the eternal. | |
| 9899 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 15 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="29030" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29030] Iª q. 15 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Si dicatur quod | |
| 9900 ideae multiplicantur secundum respectus ad diversas creaturas, | |
| 9901 contra, pluralitas idearum est ab aeterno. Si ergo ideae sunt | |
| 9902 plures, creaturae autem sunt temporales, ergo temporale erit causa | |
| 9903 aeterni.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q15_A2-p5"> | |
| 9904 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, these relations are either real in creatures only, or in God also. If in creatures only, since creatures are not | |
| 9905 from eternity, the plurality of ideas cannot be from eternity, if ideas are multiplied only according to these relations. | |
| 9906 But if they are real in God, it follows that there is a real plurality in God other than the plurality of Persons: and this | |
| 9907 is against the teaching of Damascene (De Fide Orth. i, 10), who says, in God all things are one, | |
| 9908 except "ingenerability, generation, and procession." Ideas therefore are not many. | |
| 9909 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 15 a. 2 arg. 4"><a name="29031" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29031] Iª q. 15 a. 2 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 9910 respectus isti aut sunt secundum rem in creaturis tantum, aut etiam | |
| 9911 in Deo. Si in creaturis tantum, cum creaturae non sint ab aeterno, | |
| 9912 pluralitas idearum non erit ab aeterno, si multiplicentur solum | |
| 9913 secundum huiusmodi respectus. Si autem realiter sunt in Deo, | |
| 9914 sequitur quod alia pluralitas realis sit in Deo quam pluralitas | |
| 9915 personarum, quod est contra Damascenum, dicentem quod in divinis | |
| 9916 omnia unum sunt, praeter ingenerationem, generationem et | |
| 9917 processionem. Sic igitur non sunt plures ideae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q15_A2-p6"> | |
| 9918 <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (Octog. Tri. Quaest. qu. xlvi), "Ideas are certain principal forms, or permanent and immutable types of things, | |
| 9919 they themselves not being formed. Thus they are eternal, and existing always in the same manner, as being contained in the | |
| 9920 divine intelligence. Whilst, however, they themselves neither come into being nor decay, yet we say that in accordance with | |
| 9921 them everything is formed that can rise or decay, and all that actually does so." | |
| 9922 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 15 a. 2 s. c."><a name="29032" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29032] Iª q. 15 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est | |
| 9923 quod dicit Augustinus, in libro octoginta trium quaest., <i>ideae | |
| 9924 sunt principales quaedam formae vel rationes rerum stabiles atque | |
| 9925 incommutabiles, quia ipsae formatae non sunt, ac per hoc aeternae | |
| 9926 ac semper eodem modo se habentes, quae divina intelligentia | |
| 9927 continentur. Sed cum ipsae neque oriantur neque intereant, secundum | |
| 9928 eas tamen formari dicitur omne quod oriri et interire potest, et | |
| 9929 omne quod oritur et interit</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q15_A2-p7"> | |
| 9930 <b>I answer that,</b> It must necessarily be held that ideas are many. In proof of which it is to be considered that in every effect the ultimate | |
| 9931 end is the proper intention of the principal agent, as the order of an army (is the proper intention) of the general. Now | |
| 9932 the highest good existing in things is the good of the order of the universe, as the Philosopher clearly teaches in Metaph. | |
| 9933 xii. Therefore the order of the universe is properly intended by God, and is not the | |
| 9934 accidental result of a succession of agents, as has been supposed by those who have taught that God created only the first | |
| 9935 creature, and that this creature created the second creature, and so on, until this great multitude of beings was produced. | |
| 9936 According to this opinion God would have the idea of the first created thing alone; whereas, if the order itself of the universe | |
| 9937 was created by Him immediately, and intended by Him, He must have the idea of the order of the universe. Now there cannot | |
| 9938 be an idea of any whole, unless particular ideas are had of those parts of which the whole is made; just as a builder cannot | |
| 9939 conceive the idea of a house unless he has the idea of each of its parts. So, then, it must needs be that in the divine mind | |
| 9940 there are the proper ideas of all things. Hence Augustine says (Octog. Tri. Quaest. qu. xlvi), "that each thing was created | |
| 9941 by God according to the idea proper to it," from which it follows that in the divine mind ideas are many. Now it can easily | |
| 9942 be seen how this is not repugnant to the simplicity of God, if we consider that the idea of a work is in the mind of the operator | |
| 9943 as that which is understood, and not as the image whereby he understands, which is a form that makes the intellect in act. | |
| 9944 For the form of the house in the mind of the builder, is something understood by him, to the likeness of which he forms the | |
| 9945 house in matter. Now, it is not repugnant to the simplicity of the divine mind that it understand many things; though it | |
| 9946 would be repugnant to its simplicity were His understanding to be formed by a plurality of images. Hence many ideas exist | |
| 9947 in the divine mind, as things understood by it; as can be proved thus. Inasmuch as He knows His own essence perfectly, He | |
| 9948 knows it according to every mode in which it can be known. Now it can be known not only as it is in itself, but as it can | |
| 9949 be participated in by creatures according to some degree of likeness. But every creature has its own proper species, according | |
| 9950 to | |
| 9951 which it participates in some degree in likeness to the divine essence. So far, therefore, as God knows His essence as capable | |
| 9952 of such imitation by any creature, He knows it as the particular type and idea of that creature; and in like manner as regards | |
| 9953 other creatures. So it is clear that God understands many particular types of things and these are many ideas. | |
| 9954 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 15 a. 2 co."><a name="29033" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29033] Iª q. 15 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum | |
| 9955 quod necesse est ponere plures ideas. Ad cuius evidentiam, | |
| 9956 considerandum est quod in quolibet effectu illud quod est ultimus | |
| 9957 finis, proprie est intentum a principali agente; sicut ordo | |
| 9958 exercitus a duce. Illud autem quod est optimum in rebus existens, | |
| 9959 est bonum ordinis universi, ut patet per philosophum in XII | |
| 9960 Metaphys. Ordo igitur universi est proprie a Deo intentus, et non | |
| 9961 per accidens proveniens secundum successionem agentium, prout | |
| 9962 quidam dixerunt quod Deus creavit primum creatum tantum, quod | |
| 9963 creatum creavit secundum creatum, et sic inde quousque producta est | |
| 9964 tanta rerum multitudo, secundum quam opinionem, Deus non haberet | |
| 9965 nisi ideam primi creati. Sed si ipse ordo universi est per se | |
| 9966 creatus ab eo, et intentus ab ipso, necesse est quod habeat ideam | |
| 9967 ordinis universi. Ratio autem alicuius totius haberi non potest, | |
| 9968 nisi habeantur propriae rationes eorum ex quibus totum | |
| 9969 constituitur, sicut aedificator speciem domus concipere non posset, | |
| 9970 nisi apud ipsum esset propria ratio cuiuslibet partium eius. Sic | |
| 9971 igitur oportet quod in mente divina sint propriae rationes omnium | |
| 9972 rerum. Unde dicit Augustinus, in libro octoginta trium quaest., | |
| 9973 quod <i>singula propriis rationibus a Deo creata sunt</i>. Unde | |
| 9974 sequitur quod in mente divina sint plures ideae. Hoc autem quomodo | |
| 9975 divinae simplicitati non repugnet, facile est videre, si quis | |
| 9976 consideret ideam operati esse in mente operantis sicut quod | |
| 9977 intelligitur; non autem sicut species qua intelligitur, quae est | |
| 9978 forma faciens intellectum in actu. Forma enim domus in mente | |
| 9979 aedificatoris est aliquid ab eo intellectum, ad cuius similitudinem | |
| 9980 domum in materia format. Non est autem contra simplicitatem divini | |
| 9981 intellectus, quod multa intelligat, sed contra simplicitatem eius | |
| 9982 esset, si per plures species eius intellectus formaretur. Unde | |
| 9983 plures ideae sunt in mente divina ut intellectae ab ipso. Quod hoc | |
| 9984 modo potest videri. Ipse enim essentiam suam perfecte cognoscit, | |
| 9985 unde cognoscit eam secundum omnem modum quo cognoscibilis est. | |
| 9986 Potest autem cognosci non solum secundum quod in se est, sed | |
| 9987 secundum quod est participabilis secundum aliquem modum | |
| 9988 similitudinis a creaturis. Unaquaeque autem creatura habet propriam | |
| 9989 speciem, secundum quod aliquo modo participat divinae essentiae | |
| 9990 similitudinem. Sic igitur inquantum Deus cognoscit suam essentiam | |
| 9991 ut sic imitabilem a tali creatura, cognoscit eam ut propriam | |
| 9992 rationem et ideam huius creaturae. Et similiter de aliis. Et sic | |
| 9993 patet quod Deus intelligit plures rationes proprias plurium rerum; | |
| 9994 quae sunt plures ideae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q15_A2-p8"> | |
| 9995 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The divine essence is not called an idea in so far as it is that essence, but only in so far as it is the likeness or type | |
| 9996 of this or that thing. Hence ideas are said to be many, inasmuch as many types are understood through the self-same essence. | |
| 9997 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 15 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="29034" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29034] Iª q. 15 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo | |
| 9998 dicendum quod idea non nominat divinam essentiam inquantum est | |
| 9999 essentia, sed inquantum est similitudo vel ratio huius vel illius | |
| 10000 rei. Unde secundum quod sunt plures rationes intellectae ex una | |
| 10001 essentia, secundum hoc dicuntur plures ideae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q15_A2-p9"> | |
| 10002 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> By wisdom and art we signify that by which God understands; but an idea, that which God understands. For God by one understands | |
| 10003 many things, and that not only according to what they are in themselves, but also according as they are understood, and this | |
| 10004 is to understand the several types of things. In the same way, an architect is said to understand a house, when he understands | |
| 10005 the form of the house in matter. But if he understands the form of a house, | |
| 10006 as devised by himself, from the fact that he understands that he understands it, he thereby understands the type or idea of | |
| 10007 the house. Now not only does God understand many things by His essence, but He also understands that He understands many things | |
| 10008 by His essence. And this means that He understands the several types of things; or that many ideas are in His intellect as | |
| 10009 understood by Him. | |
| 10010 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 15 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="29035" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29035] Iª q. 15 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 10011 dicendum quod sapientia et ars significantur ut quo Deus | |
| 10012 intelligit, sed idea ut quod Deus intelligit. Deus autem uno | |
| 10013 intelligit multa; et non solum secundum quod in seipsis sunt, sed | |
| 10014 etiam secundum quod intellecta sunt; quod est intelligere plures | |
| 10015 rationes rerum. Sicut artifex, dum intelligit formam domus in | |
| 10016 materia, dicitur intelligere domum, dum autem intelligit formam | |
| 10017 domus ut a se speculatam, ex eo quod intelligit se intelligere eam, | |
| 10018 intelligit ideam vel rationem domus. Deus autem non solum | |
| 10019 intelligit multas res per essentiam suam, sed etiam intelligit se | |
| 10020 intelligere multa per essentiam suam. Sed hoc est intelligere | |
| 10021 plures rationes rerum; vel, plures ideas esse in intellectu eius ut | |
| 10022 intellectas.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q15_A2-p10"> | |
| 10023 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Such relations, whereby ideas are multiplied, are caused not by the things themselves, but by the divine intellect comparing | |
| 10024 its own essence with these things. | |
| 10025 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 15 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="29036" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29036] Iª q. 15 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 10026 dicendum quod huiusmodi respectus, quibus multiplicantur ideae, non | |
| 10027 causantur a rebus, sed ab intellectu divino, comparante essentiam | |
| 10028 suam ad res.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q15_A2-p11"> | |
| 10029 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Relations multiplying ideas do not exist in created things, but in God. Yet they are not real relations, such as those whereby | |
| 10030 the Persons are distinguished, but relations understood by God. | |
| 10031 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 15 a. 2 ad 4"><a name="29037" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29037] Iª q. 15 a. 2 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum | |
| 10032 dicendum quod respectus multiplicantes ideas, non sunt in rebus | |
| 10033 creatis, sed in Deo. Non tamen sunt reales respectus, sicut illi | |
| 10034 quibus distinguuntur personae, sed respectus intellecti a Deo.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q15_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q15_A3-p0.1">Q. 15. A. 3. Whether there are ideas of all things that God knows?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q15_A3-p2"> | |
| 10035 <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that there are not ideas in God of all things that He knows. For the idea of evil is not in God; since it would | |
| 10036 follow that evil was in Him. But evil things are known by God. Therefore there are not ideas of all things that God knows. | |
| 10037 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 15 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="29038" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29038] Iª q. 15 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium sic | |
| 10038 proceditur. Videtur quod non omnium quae cognoscit Deus, sint ideae | |
| 10039 in ipso. Mali enim idea non est in Deo, quia sequeretur malum esse | |
| 10040 in Deo. Sed mala cognoscuntur a Deo. Ergo non omnium quae | |
| 10041 cognoscuntur a Deo, sunt ideae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q15_A3-p3"> | |
| 10042 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, God knows things that neither are, nor will be, nor have been, as has been said above | |
| 10043 <a id="FP_Q15_A3-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q15_A9.html">(A[9])</a>. But of such things there are no ideas, since, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. v): "Acts of the divine will are the determining | |
| 10044 and effective types of things." Therefore there are not in God ideas of all things known by Him. | |
| 10045 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 15 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="29039" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29039] Iª q. 15 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, Deus | |
| 10046 cognoscit ea quae nec sunt nec erunt nec fuerunt, ut supra dictum | |
| 10047 est. Sed horum non sunt ideae, quia dicit Dionysius, V cap. de Div. | |
| 10048 Nom., quod <i>exemplaria sunt divinae voluntates, determinativae et | |
| 10049 effectivae rerum</i>. Ergo non omnium quae a Deo cognoscuntur, sunt | |
| 10050 ideae in ipso.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q15_A3-p4"> | |
| 10051 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, God knows primary matter, of which there can be no idea, since it has no form. Hence the same conclusion. | |
| 10052 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 15 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="29040" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29040] Iª q. 15 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, Deus | |
| 10053 cognoscit materiam primam, quae non potest habere ideam, cum nullam | |
| 10054 habeat formam. Ergo idem quod prius.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q15_A3-p5"> | |
| 10055 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, it is certain that God knows not only species, but also genera, singulars, and accidents. But there are not ideas | |
| 10056 of these, according to Plato's teaching, who first taught ideas, as Augustine says (Octog. Tri. Quaest. qu. xlvi). Therefore | |
| 10057 there are not ideas in God of all things known by Him. | |
| 10058 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 15 a. 3 arg. 4"><a name="29041" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29041] Iª q. 15 a. 3 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 10059 constat quod Deus scit non solum species, sed etiam genera et | |
| 10060 singularia et accidentia. Sed horum non sunt ideae, secundum | |
| 10061 positionem Platonis, qui primus ideas introduxit, ut dicit | |
| 10062 Augustinus. Non ergo omnium cognitorum a Deo sunt ideae in | |
| 10063 ipso.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q15_A3-p6"> | |
| 10064 <b>On the contrary,</b> Ideas are types existing in the divine mind, as is clear from Augustine (Octog. Tri. Quaest. qu. xlvi). But God has the proper | |
| 10065 types of all things that He knows; and therefore He has ideas of all things known by Him. | |
| 10066 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 15 a. 3 s. c."><a name="29042" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29042] Iª q. 15 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra, ideae | |
| 10067 sunt rationes in mente divina existentes, ut per Augustinum patet. | |
| 10068 Sed omnium quae cognoscit, Deus habet proprias rationes. Ergo | |
| 10069 omnium quae cognoscit, habet ideam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q15_A3-p7"> | |
| 10070 <b>I answer that,</b> As ideas, according to Plato, are principles of the knowledge of things and of their generation, an idea has this twofold | |
| 10071 office, as it exists in the mind of God. So far as the idea is the principle of the making of things, it may be called an | |
| 10072 "exemplar," and belongs to practical knowledge. But so far as it is a principle of knowledge, it is properly called a "type," | |
| 10073 and may belong to speculative knowledge also. As an exemplar, therefore, it has respect to | |
| 10074 everything made by God in any period of time; whereas as a principle of knowledge it has respect to all things known by God, | |
| 10075 even though they never come to be in time; and to all things that He knows according to their proper type, in so far as they | |
| 10076 are known by Him in a speculative manner. | |
| 10077 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 15 a. 3 co."><a name="29043" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29043] Iª q. 15 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum | |
| 10078 quod, cum ideae a Platone ponerentur principia cognitionis rerum et | |
| 10079 generationis ipsarum, ad utrumque se habet idea, prout in mente | |
| 10080 divina ponitur. Et secundum quod est principium factionis rerum, | |
| 10081 exemplar dici potest, et ad practicam cognitionem pertinet. | |
| 10082 Secundum autem quod principium cognoscitivum est, proprie dicitur | |
| 10083 ratio; et potest etiam ad scientiam speculativam pertinere. | |
| 10084 Secundum ergo quod exemplar est, secundum hoc se habet ad omnia | |
| 10085 quae a Deo fiunt secundum aliquod tempus. Secundum vero quod | |
| 10086 principium cognoscitivum est, se habet ad omnia quae cognoscuntur a | |
| 10087 Deo, etiam si nullo tempore fiant; et ad omnia quae a Deo | |
| 10088 cognoscuntur secundum propriam rationem, et secundum quod | |
| 10089 cognoscuntur ab ipso per modum speculationis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q15_A3-p8"> | |
| 10090 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Evil is known by God not through its own type, but through the type of good. Evil, therefore, has no idea in God, neither | |
| 10091 in so far as an idea is an "exemplar" nor as a "type." | |
| 10092 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 15 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="29044" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29044] Iª q. 15 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo | |
| 10093 dicendum quod malum cognoscitur a Deo non per propriam rationem, | |
| 10094 sed per rationem boni. Et ideo malum non habet in Deo ideam, neque | |
| 10095 secundum quod idea est exemplar, neque secundum quod est ratio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q15_A3-p9"> | |
| 10096 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> God has no practical knowledge, except virtually, of things which neither are, nor will be, nor have been. Hence, with respect | |
| 10097 to these there is no idea in God in so far as idea signifies an "exemplar" but only in so far as it denotes a "type." | |
| 10098 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 15 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="29045" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29045] Iª q. 15 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 10099 dicendum quod eorum quae neque sunt neque erunt neque fuerunt, Deus | |
| 10100 non habet practicam cognitionem, nisi virtute tantum. Unde respectu | |
| 10101 eorum non est idea in Deo, secundum quod idea significat exemplar, | |
| 10102 sed solum secundum quod significat rationem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q15_A3-p10"> | |
| 10103 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Plato is said by some to have considered matter as not created; and therefore he postulated not an idea of matter but a concause | |
| 10104 with matter. Since, however, we hold matter to be created by God, though not apart from form, matter has its idea in God; | |
| 10105 but not apart from the idea of the composite; for matter in itself can neither exist, nor be known. | |
| 10106 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 15 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="29046" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29046] Iª q. 15 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 10107 dicendum quod Plato, secundum quosdam, posuit materiam non creatam, | |
| 10108 et ideo non posuit ideam esse materiae, sed materiae concausam. Sed | |
| 10109 quia nos ponimus materiam creatam a Deo, non tamen sine forma, | |
| 10110 habet quidem materia ideam in Deo, non tamen aliam ab idea | |
| 10111 compositi. Nam materia secundum se neque esse habet, neque | |
| 10112 cognoscibilis est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q15_A3-p11"> | |
| 10113 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Genus can have no idea apart from the idea of species, in so far as idea denotes an "exemplar"; for genus cannot exist except | |
| 10114 in some species. The same is the case with those accidents that inseparably accompany their subject; for these come into being | |
| 10115 along with their subject. But accidents which supervene to the subject, have their special idea. For an architect produces | |
| 10116 through the form of the house all the accidents that originally accompany it; | |
| 10117 whereas those that are superadded to the house when completed, such as painting, or any other such thing, are produced through | |
| 10118 some other form. Now individual things, according to Plato, have no other idea than that of species; both because particular | |
| 10119 things are individualized by matter, which, as some say, he held to be uncreated and the concause with the idea; and because | |
| 10120 the intention of nature regards the species, and produces individuals only that in them the species may be preserved. | |
| 10121 However, divine providence extends not merely to species; but to individuals as will be shown later ( | |
| 10122 <a id="FP_Q15_A3-p11.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q22_A3.html">Q[22], A[3]</a> ). | |
| 10123 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 15 a. 3 ad 4"><a name="29047" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29047] Iª q. 15 a. 3 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum | |
| 10124 dicendum quod genera non possunt habere ideam aliam ab idea | |
| 10125 speciei, secundum quod idea significat exemplar, quia nunquam genus | |
| 10126 fit nisi in aliqua specie. Similiter etiam est de accidentibus quae | |
| 10127 inseparabiliter concomitantur subiectum, quia haec simul fiunt cum | |
| 10128 subiecto. Accidentia autem quae superveniunt subiecto, specialem | |
| 10129 ideam habent. Artifex enim per formam domus facit omnia accidentia | |
| 10130 quae a principio concomitantur domum, sed ea quae superveniunt | |
| 10131 domui iam factae, ut picturae vel aliquid aliud, facit per aliquam | |
| 10132 aliam formam. Individua vero, secundum Platonem, non habebant aliam | |
| 10133 ideam quam ideam speciei, tum quia singularia individuantur per | |
| 10134 materiam, quam ponebat esse increatam, ut quidam dicunt, et | |
| 10135 concausam ideae; tum quia intentio naturae consistit in speciebus, | |
| 10136 nec particularia producit, nisi ut in eis species salventur. Sed | |
| 10137 providentia divina non solum se extendit ad species, sed ad | |
| 10138 singularia, ut infra dicetur.</p></div></div></div></div> | |
| 10139 <div id="FP_Q16" class="div3"> | |
| 10140 <h3 id="FP_Q16-p0.1">Q. 16. OF TRUTH (EIGHT ARTICLES)</h3> | |
| 10141 <div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> | |
| 10142 <p id="FP_Q16-p2"> Since knowledge is of things that are true, after the consideration of the knowledge of God, we must inquire concerning truth. | |
| 10143 About this there are eight points of inquiry: | |
| 10144 </p><p id="FP_Q16-p3"> (1) Whether truth resides in the thing, or only in the intellect?</p><p id="FP_Q16-p4"> (2) Whether it resides only in the intellect composing and dividing?</p><p id="FP_Q16-p5"> (3) On the comparison of the true to being.</p><p id="FP_Q16-p6"> (4) On the comparison of the true to the good.</p><p id="FP_Q16-p7"> (5) Whether God is truth?</p><p id="FP_Q16-p8"> (6) Whether all things are true by one truth, or by many?</p><p id="FP_Q16-p9"> (7) On the eternity of truth.</p><p id="FP_Q16-p10"> (8) On the unchangeableness of truth.</p> | |
| 10145 </div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 16 pr."><a name="29048" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29048] | |
| 10146 Iª q. 16 pr.</span></a> Quoniam autem scientia verorum est, | |
| 10147 post considerationem scientiae Dei, de veritate inquirendum est. | |
| 10148 Circa quam quaeruntur octo. Primo, utrum veritas sit in re, vel | |
| 10149 tantum in intellectu. Secundo, utrum sit tantum in intellectu | |
| 10150 componente et dividente. Tertio, de comparatione veri ad ens. | |
| 10151 Quarto, de comparatione veri ad bonum. Quinto, utrum Deus sit | |
| 10152 veritas. Sexto, utrum omnia sint vera veritate una, vel pluribus. | |
| 10153 Septimo, de aeternitate veritatis. Octavo, de incommutabilitate | |
| 10154 ipsius.</p></div></div></div> | |
| 10155 <div id="FP_Q16_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q16_A1-p0.1">Q. 16. A. 1. Whether truth resides only in the intellect?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q16_A1-p2"> | |
| 10156 <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that truth does not reside only in the intellect, but rather in things. For Augustine (Soliloq. ii, 5) condemns | |
| 10157 this definition of truth, "That is true which is seen"; since it would follow that stones hidden in the bosom of the earth | |
| 10158 would not be true stones, as they are not seen. He also condemns the following, "That is true which is as it appears to the | |
| 10159 knower, who is willing and able to know," for hence it would follow that nothing would be true, | |
| 10160 unless someone could know it. Therefore he defines truth thus: "That is true which is." It seems, then, that truth resides | |
| 10161 in things, and not in the intellect. | |
| 10162 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 16 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="29049" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29049] Iª q. 16 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum sic | |
| 10163 proceditur. Videtur quod veritas non sit tantum in intellectu, sed | |
| 10164 magis in rebus. Augustinus enim, in libro Soliloq., reprobat hanc | |
| 10165 notificationem veri, verum est id quod videtur, quia secundum hoc, | |
| 10166 lapides qui sunt in abditissimo terrae sinu, non essent veri | |
| 10167 lapides, quia non videntur. Reprobat etiam istam, verum est quod | |
| 10168 ita se habet ut videtur cognitori, si velit et possit cognoscere, | |
| 10169 quia secundum hoc sequeretur quod nihil esset verum, si nullus | |
| 10170 posset cognoscere. Et definit sic verum, verum est id quod est. Et | |
| 10171 sic videtur quod veritas sit in rebus, et non in intellectu.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q16_A1-p3"> | |
| 10172 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, whatever is true, is true by reason of truth. If, then, truth is only in the intellect, nothing will be true except | |
| 10173 in so far as it is understood. But this is the error of the ancient philosophers, who said that whatever seems to be true | |
| 10174 is so. Consequently mutual contradictories seem to be true as seen by different persons at the same time. | |
| 10175 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 16 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="29050" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29050] Iª q. 16 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 10176 quidquid est verum, veritate verum est. Si igitur veritas est in | |
| 10177 intellectu solo, nihil erit verum nisi secundum quod intelligitur, | |
| 10178 quod est error antiquorum philosophorum, qui dicebant omne quod | |
| 10179 videtur, esse verum. Ad quod sequitur contradictoria simul esse | |
| 10180 vera, cum contradictoria simul a diversis vera esse videantur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q16_A1-p4"> | |
| 10181 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, "that, on account of which a thing is so, is itself more so," as is evident from the Philosopher (Poster. i). But | |
| 10182 it is from the fact that a thing is or is not, that our thought or word is true or false, as the Philosopher teaches (Praedicam. | |
| 10183 iii). Therefore truth resides rather in things than in the intellect. | |
| 10184 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 16 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="29051" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29051] Iª q. 16 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> <i>Praeterea, | |
| 10185 propter quod unumquodque, et illud magis</i>, ut patet I Poster. | |
| 10186 <i>Sed ex eo quod res est vel non est, est opinio vel oratio vera | |
| 10187 vel falsa</i>, secundum philosophum in praedicamentis. Ergo veritas | |
| 10188 magis est in rebus quam in intellectu.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q16_A1-p5"> | |
| 10189 <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Metaph. vi), " The true and the false reside not in things, but in the intellect." | |
| 10190 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 16 a. 1 s. c."><a name="29052" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29052] Iª q. 16 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est | |
| 10191 quod philosophus dicit, VI Metaphys., quod <i>verum et falsum non | |
| 10192 sunt in rebus, sed in intellectu</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q16_A1-p6"> | |
| 10193 <b>I answer that,</b> As the good denotes that towards which the appetite tends, so the true denotes that towards which the intellect tends. Now | |
| 10194 there is this difference between the appetite and the intellect, or any knowledge whatsoever, that knowledge is according | |
| 10195 as the thing known is in the knower, whilst appetite is according as the desirer tends towards the thing desired. Thus the | |
| 10196 term of the appetite, namely good, is in the object desirable, and the term of the intellect, | |
| 10197 namely true, is in the intellect itself. Now as good exists in a thing so far as that thing is related to the appetite---and | |
| 10198 hence the aspect of goodness passes on from the desirable thing to the appetite, in so far as the appetite is called good | |
| 10199 if its object is good; so, since the true is in the intellect in so far as it is conformed to the object understood, the aspect | |
| 10200 of the true must needs pass from the intellect to the object understood, so that also the thing understood is said to be | |
| 10201 true in so far as it has some relation to the intellect. Now a thing understood may be in relation to an intellect either | |
| 10202 essentially or accidentally. It is related essentially to an intellect on which it depends as regards its essence; but accidentally | |
| 10203 to an intellect by which it is knowable; even as we may say that a house is related essentially to the intellect of the architect, | |
| 10204 but accidentally to the intellect upon which it does not depend. | |
| 10205 </p><p id="FP_Q16_A1-p7"> Now we do not judge of a thing by what is in it accidentally, but by what is in it essentially. Hence, everything is said | |
| 10206 to be true absolutely, in so far as it is related to the intellect from which it depends; and thus it is that artificial things | |
| 10207 are said to be true a being related to our intellect. For a house is said to be true that expresses the likeness of the form | |
| 10208 in the architect's mind; and words are said to be true so far as they are the signs of truth in the | |
| 10209 intellect. In the same way natural things are said to be true in so far as they express the likeness of the species that are | |
| 10210 in the divine mind. For a stone is called true, which possesses the nature proper to a stone, according to the preconception | |
| 10211 in the divine intellect. Thus, then, truth resides primarily in the intellect, and secondarily in things according as they | |
| 10212 are related to the intellect as their principle. Consequently there are various definitions of truth. Augustine says (De Vera | |
| 10213 Relig. xxxvi), "Truth is that whereby is made manifest that which is;" and Hilary says (De Trin. v) that "Truth makes being | |
| 10214 clear and evident" and this pertains to truth according as it is in the intellect. As to the truth of things in so far as | |
| 10215 they are related to the intellect, we have Augustine's definition (De Vera Relig. xxxvi), "Truth is a supreme likeness without | |
| 10216 any unlikeness to a principle": also Anselm's definition (De Verit. xii), "Truth is rightness, perceptible by the mind alone"; | |
| 10217 for that is right which is in accordance with the principle; also Avicenna's definition (Metaph. viii, 6), "The truth of each | |
| 10218 thing is a property of the essence which is immutably attached to it." The definition that "Truth is the equation of thought | |
| 10219 and thing" is applicable to it under either aspect. | |
| 10220 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 16 a. 1 co."><a name="29053" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29053] Iª q. 16 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum | |
| 10221 quod, sicut bonum nominat id in quod tendit appetitus, ita verum | |
| 10222 nominat id in quod tendit intellectus. Hoc autem distat inter | |
| 10223 appetitum et intellectum, sive quamcumque cognitionem, quia | |
| 10224 cognitio est secundum quod cognitum est in cognoscente, appetitus | |
| 10225 autem est secundum quod appetens inclinatur in ipsam rem appetitam. | |
| 10226 Et sic terminus appetitus, quod est bonum, est in re appetibili, | |
| 10227 sed terminus cognitionis, quod est verum, est in ipso intellectu. | |
| 10228 Sicut autem bonum est in re, inquantum habet ordinem ad appetitum; | |
| 10229 et propter hoc ratio bonitatis derivatur a re appetibili in | |
| 10230 appetitum, secundum quod appetitus dicitur bonus, prout est boni, | |
| 10231 ita, cum verum sit in intellectu secundum quod conformatur rei | |
| 10232 intellectae, necesse est quod ratio veri ab intellectu ad rem | |
| 10233 intellectam derivetur, ut res etiam intellecta vera dicatur, | |
| 10234 secundum quod habet aliquem ordinem ad intellectum. Res autem | |
| 10235 intellecta ad intellectum aliquem potest habere ordinem vel per se, | |
| 10236 vel per accidens. Per se quidem habet ordinem ad intellectum a quo | |
| 10237 dependet secundum suum esse, per accidens autem ad intellectum a | |
| 10238 quo cognoscibilis est. Sicut si dicamus quod domus comparatur ad | |
| 10239 intellectum artificis per se, per accidens autem comparatur ad | |
| 10240 intellectum a quo non dependet. Iudicium autem de re non sumitur | |
| 10241 secundum id quod inest ei per accidens, sed secundum id quod inest | |
| 10242 ei per se. Unde unaquaeque res dicitur vera absolute, secundum | |
| 10243 ordinem ad intellectum a quo dependet. Et inde est quod res | |
| 10244 artificiales dicuntur verae per ordinem ad intellectum nostrum, | |
| 10245 dicitur enim domus vera, quae assequitur similitudinem formae quae | |
| 10246 est in mente artificis; et dicitur oratio vera, inquantum est | |
| 10247 signum intellectus veri. Et similiter res naturales dicuntur esse | |
| 10248 verae, secundum quod assequuntur similitudinem specierum quae sunt | |
| 10249 in mente divina, dicitur enim verus lapis, qui assequitur propriam | |
| 10250 lapidis naturam, secundum praeconceptionem intellectus divini. Sic | |
| 10251 ergo veritas principaliter est in intellectu; secundario vero in | |
| 10252 rebus, secundum quod comparantur ad intellectum ut ad principium. | |
| 10253 Et secundum hoc, veritas diversimode notificatur. Nam Augustinus, | |
| 10254 in libro de vera Relig., dicit quod <i>veritas est, qua ostenditur | |
| 10255 id quod est</i>. Et Hilarius dicit quod <i>verum est declarativum | |
| 10256 aut manifestativum esse</i>. Et hoc pertinet ad veritatem secundum | |
| 10257 quod est in intellectu. Ad veritatem autem rei secundum ordinem ad | |
| 10258 intellectum, pertinet definitio Augustini in libro de vera Relig., | |
| 10259 <i>veritas est summa similitudo principii, quae sine ulla | |
| 10260 dissimilitudine est</i>. Et quaedam definitio Anselmi, <i>veritas | |
| 10261 est rectitudo sola mente perceptibilis</i>; nam rectum est, quod | |
| 10262 principio concordat. Et quaedam definitio Avicennae, <i>veritas | |
| 10263 uniuscuiusque rei est proprietas sui esse quod stabilitum est | |
| 10264 ei</i>. Quod autem dicitur quod veritas est adaequatio rei et | |
| 10265 intellectus potest ad utrumque pertinere.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q16_A1-p8"> | |
| 10266 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Augustine is speaking about the truth of things, and excludes from the notion of this truth, relation to our intellect; for | |
| 10267 what is accidental is excluded from every definition. | |
| 10268 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 16 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="29054" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29054] Iª q. 16 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo | |
| 10269 dicendum quod Augustinus loquitur de veritate rei; et excludit a | |
| 10270 ratione huius veritatis, comparationem ad intellectum nostrum. Nam | |
| 10271 id quod est per accidens, ab unaquaque definitione excluditur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q16_A1-p9"> | |
| 10272 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The ancient philosophers held that the species of natural things did not proceed from any intellect, but were produced by | |
| 10273 chance. But as they saw that truth implies relation to intellect, they were compelled to base the truth of things on their | |
| 10274 relation to our intellect. From this, conclusions result that are inadmissible, and which the Philosopher refutes (Metaph. | |
| 10275 iv). Such, however, do not follow, if we say that the truth of things consists in their | |
| 10276 relation to the divine intellect. | |
| 10277 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 16 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="29055" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29055] Iª q. 16 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 10278 dicendum quod antiqui philosophi species rerum naturalium non | |
| 10279 dicebant procedere ab aliquo intellectu, sed eas provenire a casu, | |
| 10280 et quia considerabant quod verum importat comparationem ad | |
| 10281 intellectum, cogebantur veritatem rerum constituere in ordine ad | |
| 10282 intellectum nostrum. Ex quo inconvenientia sequebantur quae | |
| 10283 philosophus prosequitur in IV Metaphys. Quae quidem inconvenientia | |
| 10284 non accidunt, si ponamus veritatem rerum consistere in comparatione | |
| 10285 ad intellectum divinum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q16_A1-p10"> | |
| 10286 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Although the truth of our intellect is caused by the thing, yet it is not necessary that truth should be there primarily, | |
| 10287 any more than that health should be primarily in medicine, rather than in the animal: for the virtue of medicine, and not | |
| 10288 its health, is the cause of health, for here the agent is not univocal. In the same way, the being of the thing, not its truth, | |
| 10289 is the cause of truth in the intellect. Hence the Philosopher says that a thought | |
| 10290 or a word is true "from the fact that a thing is, not because a thing is true." | |
| 10291 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 16 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="29056" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29056] Iª q. 16 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 10292 dicendum quod, licet veritas intellectus nostri a re causetur, non | |
| 10293 tamen oportet quod in re per prius inveniatur ratio veritatis, | |
| 10294 sicut neque in medicina per prius invenitur ratio sanitatis quam in | |
| 10295 animali; virtus enim medicinae, non sanitas eius, causat sanitatem, | |
| 10296 cum non sit agens univocum. Et similiter esse rei, non veritas | |
| 10297 eius, causat veritatem intellectus. Unde philosophus dicit quod | |
| 10298 opinio et oratio vera est <i>ex eo quod res est, non ex eo quod res | |
| 10299 vera est</i>.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q16_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q16_A2-p0.1">Q. 16. A. 2. Whether truth resides only in the intellect composing and dividing?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q16_A2-p2"> | |
| 10300 <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that truth does not reside only in the intellect composing and dividing. For the Philosopher says (De Anima iii) | |
| 10301 that as the senses are always true as regards their proper sensible objects, so is the intellect as regards "what a thing | |
| 10302 is." Now composition and division are neither in the senses nor in the intellect knowing "what a thing is." Therefore truth | |
| 10303 does not reside only in the intellect composing and dividing. | |
| 10304 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 16 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="29057" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29057] Iª q. 16 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum sic | |
| 10305 proceditur. Videtur quod veritas non sit solum in intellectu | |
| 10306 componente et dividente. Dicit enim philosophus, in III de anima, | |
| 10307 quod sicut sensus propriorum sensibilium semper veri sunt, ita et | |
| 10308 intellectus eius quod quid est. Sed compositio et divisio non est | |
| 10309 neque in sensu, neque in intellectu cognoscente quod quid est. Ergo | |
| 10310 veritas non solum est in compositione et divisione intellectus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q16_A2-p3"> | |
| 10311 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Isaac says in his book On Definitions that truth is the equation of thought and thing. Now just as the intellect | |
| 10312 with regard to complex things can be equated to things, so also with regard to simple things; and this is true also of sense | |
| 10313 apprehending a thing as it is. Therefore truth does not reside only in the intellect composing and dividing. | |
| 10314 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 16 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="29058" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29058] Iª q. 16 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, Isaac | |
| 10315 dicit, in libro de definitionibus, quod veritas est adaequatio rei | |
| 10316 et intellectus. Sed sicut intellectus complexorum potest adaequari | |
| 10317 rebus, ita intellectus incomplexorum, et etiam sensus sentiens rem | |
| 10318 ut est. Ergo veritas non est solum in compositione et divisione | |
| 10319 intellectus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q16_A2-p4"> | |
| 10320 <b>On the contrary,</b> the Philosopher says (Metaph. vi) that with regard to simple things and "what a thing is," truth is "found neither in the | |
| 10321 intellect nor in things." | |
| 10322 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 16 a. 2 s. c."><a name="29059" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29059] Iª q. 16 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est | |
| 10323 quod dicit philosophus, in VI Metaphys., quod circa simplicia et | |
| 10324 quod quid est non est veritas, nec in intellectu neque in | |
| 10325 rebus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q16_A2-p5"> | |
| 10326 <b>I answer that,</b> As stated before, truth resides, in its primary aspect, in the intellect. Now since everything is true according as it has | |
| 10327 the form proper to its nature, the intellect, in so far as it is knowing, must be true, so far as it has the likeness of the | |
| 10328 thing known, this being its form, as knowing. For this reason truth is defined by the conformity of intellect and thing; and | |
| 10329 hence to know this conformity is to know truth. But in no way can sense know this. For | |
| 10330 although sight has the likeness of a visible thing, yet it does not know the comparison which exists between the thing seen | |
| 10331 and that which itself apprehends concerning it. But the intellect can know its own conformity with the intelligible thing; | |
| 10332 yet it does not apprehend it by knowing of a thing "what a thing is." When, however, it judges that a thing corresponds to | |
| 10333 the form which it apprehends about that thing, then first it knows and expresses truth. This it does by composing and dividing: | |
| 10334 for in every proposition it either applies to, or removes from the thing signified by the subject, some form signified by | |
| 10335 the predicate: and this clearly shows that the sense is true of any thing, as is also the intellect, when it knows "what a | |
| 10336 thing is"; but it does not thereby know or affirm truth. This is in like manner the case with complex or non-complex words. | |
| 10337 Truth therefore may be in the senses, or in the intellect knowing "what a thing is," as in anything that is true; yet not | |
| 10338 as the | |
| 10339 thing known in the knower, which is implied by the word "truth"; for the perfection of the intellect is truth as known. Therefore, | |
| 10340 properly speaking, truth resides in the intellect composing and dividing; and not in the senses; nor in the intellect knowing | |
| 10341 "what a thing is." | |
| 10342 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 16 a. 2 co."><a name="29060" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29060] Iª q. 16 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum | |
| 10343 quod verum, sicut dictum est, secundum sui primam rationem est in | |
| 10344 intellectu. Cum autem omnis res sit vera secundum quod habet | |
| 10345 propriam formam naturae suae, necesse est quod intellectus, | |
| 10346 inquantum est cognoscens, sit verus inquantum habet similitudinem | |
| 10347 rei cognitae, quae est forma eius inquantum est cognoscens. Et | |
| 10348 propter hoc per conformitatem intellectus et rei veritas definitur. | |
| 10349 Unde conformitatem istam cognoscere, est cognoscere veritatem. Hanc | |
| 10350 autem nullo modo sensus cognoscit, licet enim visus habeat | |
| 10351 similitudinem visibilis, non tamen cognoscit comparationem quae est | |
| 10352 inter rem visam et id quod ipse apprehendit de ea. Intellectus | |
| 10353 autem conformitatem sui ad rem intelligibilem cognoscere potest, | |
| 10354 sed tamen non apprehendit eam secundum quod cognoscit de aliquo | |
| 10355 quod quid est; sed quando iudicat rem ita se habere sicut est forma | |
| 10356 quam de re apprehendit, tunc primo cognoscit et dicit verum. Et hoc | |
| 10357 facit componendo et dividendo, nam in omni propositione aliquam | |
| 10358 formam significatam per praedicatum, vel applicat alicui rei | |
| 10359 significatae per subiectum, vel removet ab ea. Et ideo bene | |
| 10360 invenitur quod sensus est verus de aliqua re, vel intellectus | |
| 10361 cognoscendo quod quid est, sed non quod cognoscat aut dicat verum. | |
| 10362 Et similiter est de vocibus complexis aut incomplexis. Veritas | |
| 10363 quidem igitur potest esse in sensu, vel in intellectu cognoscente | |
| 10364 quod quid est, ut in quadam re vera, non autem ut cognitum in | |
| 10365 cognoscente, quod importat nomen veri; perfectio enim intellectus | |
| 10366 est verum ut cognitum. Et ideo, proprie loquendo, veritas est in | |
| 10367 intellectu componente et dividente, non autem in sensu, neque in | |
| 10368 intellectu cognoscente quod quid est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q16_A2-p6"> And thus the Objections given are solved.</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 16 a. 2 ad arg."><a name="29061" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29061] Iª q. 16 a. 2 ad arg.</span></a> Et per hoc | |
| 10369 patet solutio ad obiecta.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q16_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q16_A3-p0.1">Q. 16. A. 3. Whether the true and being are convertible terms?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q16_A3-p2"> | |
| 10370 <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the true and being are not convertible terms. For the true resides properly in the intellect, as stated | |
| 10371 <a id="FP_Q16_A3-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q16_A1.html">(A[1])</a>; but being is properly in things. Therefore they are not convertible. | |
| 10372 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 16 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="29062" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29062] Iª q. 16 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium sic | |
| 10373 proceditur. Videtur quod verum et ens non convertantur. Verum enim | |
| 10374 est proprie in intellectu, ut dictum est. Ens autem proprie est in | |
| 10375 rebus. Ergo non convertuntur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q16_A3-p3"> | |
| 10376 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, that which extends to being and not-being is not convertible with being. But the true extends to being and not-being; | |
| 10377 for it is true that what is, is; and that what is not, is not. Therefore the true and being are not convertible. | |
| 10378 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 16 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="29063" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29063] Iª q. 16 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, id | |
| 10379 quod se extendit ad ens et non ens, non convertitur cum ente. Sed | |
| 10380 verum se extendit ad ens et non ens, nam verum est quod est esse, | |
| 10381 et quod non est non esse. Ergo verum et ens non convertuntur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q16_A3-p4"> | |
| 10382 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, things which stand to each other in order of priority and posteriority seem not to be convertible. But the true | |
| 10383 appears to be prior to being; for being is not understood except under the aspect of the true. Therefore it seems they are | |
| 10384 not convertible. | |
| 10385 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 16 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="29064" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29064] Iª q. 16 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, quae | |
| 10386 se habent secundum prius et posterius, non videntur converti. Sed | |
| 10387 verum videtur prius esse quam ens, nam ens non intelligitur nisi | |
| 10388 sub ratione veri. Ergo videtur quod non sint convertibilia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q16_A3-p5"> | |
| 10389 <b>On the contrary,</b> the Philosopher says (Metaph. ii) that there is the same disposition of things in being and in truth. | |
| 10390 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 16 a. 3 s. c."><a name="29065" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29065] Iª q. 16 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est | |
| 10391 quod dicit philosophus, II Metaphys., quod eadem est dispositio | |
| 10392 rerum in esse et veritate.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q16_A3-p6"> | |
| 10393 <b>I answer that,</b> As good has the nature of what is desirable, so truth is related to knowledge. Now everything, in as far as it has being, | |
| 10394 so far is it knowable. Wherefore it is said in De Anima iii that "the soul is in some manner all things," through the senses | |
| 10395 and the intellect. And therefore, as good is convertible with being, so is the true. But as good adds to being the notion | |
| 10396 of desirable, so the true adds relation to the intellect. | |
| 10397 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 16 a. 3 co."><a name="29066" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29066] Iª q. 16 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum | |
| 10398 quod, sicut bonum habet rationem appetibilis, ita verum habet | |
| 10399 ordinem ad cognitionem. Unumquodque autem inquantum habet de esse, | |
| 10400 intantum est cognoscibile. Et propter hoc dicitur in III de anima, | |
| 10401 quod anima est quodammodo omnia secundum sensum et intellectum. Et | |
| 10402 ideo, sicut bonum convertitur cum ente, ita et verum. Sed tamen, | |
| 10403 sicut bonum addit rationem appetibilis supra ens, ita et verum | |
| 10404 comparationem ad intellectum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q16_A3-p7"> | |
| 10405 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The true resides in things and in the intellect, as said before | |
| 10406 <a id="FP_Q16_A3-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q16_A1.html">(A[1])</a>. But the true that is in things is convertible with being as to substance; while the true that is in the intellect is convertible | |
| 10407 with being, as the manifestation with the manifested; for this belongs to the nature of truth, as has been said already | |
| 10408 <a id="FP_Q16_A3-p7.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q16_A1.html">(A[1])</a>. It may, however, be said that being also is in the things and in the | |
| 10409 intellect, as is the true; although truth is primarily in things; and this is so because truth and being differ in idea. | |
| 10410 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 16 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="29067" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29067] Iª q. 16 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo | |
| 10411 dicendum quod verum est in rebus et in intellectu, ut dictum est. | |
| 10412 Verum autem quod est in rebus, convertitur cum ente secundum | |
| 10413 substantiam. Sed verum quod est in intellectu, convertitur cum | |
| 10414 ente, ut manifestativum cum manifestato. Hoc enim est de ratione | |
| 10415 veri, ut dictum est. Quamvis posset dici quod etiam ens est in | |
| 10416 rebus et in intellectu, sicut et verum; licet verum principaliter | |
| 10417 in intellectu, ens vero principaliter in rebus. Et hoc accidit | |
| 10418 propter hoc, quod verum et ens differunt ratione.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q16_A3-p8"> | |
| 10419 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Not-being has nothing in itself whereby it can be known; yet it is known in so far as the intellect renders it knowable. | |
| 10420 Hence the true is based on being, inasmuch as not-being is a kind of logical being, apprehended, that is, by reason. | |
| 10421 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 16 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="29068" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29068] Iª q. 16 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 10422 dicendum quod non ens non habet in se unde cognoscatur, sed | |
| 10423 cognoscitur inquantum intellectus facit illud cognoscibile. Unde | |
| 10424 verum fundatur in ente, inquantum non ens est quoddam ens rationis, | |
| 10425 apprehensum scilicet a ratione.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q16_A3-p9"> | |
| 10426 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> When it is said that being cannot be apprehended except under the notion of the true, this can be understood in two ways. | |
| 10427 In the one way so as to mean that being is not apprehended, unless the idea of the true follows apprehension of being; and | |
| 10428 this is true. In the other way, so as to mean that being cannot be apprehended unless the idea of the true be apprehended | |
| 10429 also; and this is false. But the true cannot be apprehended unless the idea of being be | |
| 10430 apprehended also; since being is included in the idea of the true. The case is the same if we compare the intelligible object | |
| 10431 with being. For being cannot be understood, unless being is intelligible. Yet being can be understood while its intelligibility | |
| 10432 is not understood. Similarly, being when understood is true, yet the true is not understood by understanding being. | |
| 10433 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 16 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="29069" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29069] Iª q. 16 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 10434 dicendum quod, cum dicitur quod ens non potest apprehendi sine | |
| 10435 ratione veri, hoc potest dupliciter intelligi. Uno modo, ita quod | |
| 10436 non apprehendatur ens, nisi ratio veri assequatur apprehensionem | |
| 10437 entis. Et sic locutio habet veritatem. Alio modo posset sic | |
| 10438 intelligi, quod ens non posset apprehendi, nisi apprehenderetur | |
| 10439 ratio veri. Et hoc falsum est. Sed verum non potest apprehendi, | |
| 10440 nisi apprehendatur ratio entis, quia ens cadit in ratione veri. Et | |
| 10441 est simile sicut si comparemus intelligibile ad ens. Non enim | |
| 10442 potest intelligi ens, quin ens sit intelligibile, sed tamen potest | |
| 10443 intelligi ens, ita quod non intelligatur eius intelligibilitas. Et | |
| 10444 similiter ens intellectum est verum, non tamen intelligendo ens, | |
| 10445 intelligitur verum.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q16_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q16_A4-p0.1">Q. 16. A. 4. Whether good is logically prior to the true?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q16_A4-p2"> | |
| 10446 <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that good is logically prior to the true. For what is more universal is logically prior, as is evident from Phys. | |
| 10447 i. But the good is more universal than the true, since the true is a kind of good, namely, of the intellect. Therefore the | |
| 10448 good is logically prior to the true. | |
| 10449 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 16 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="29070" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29070] Iª q. 16 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum sic | |
| 10450 proceditur. Videtur quod bonum secundum rationem sit prius quam | |
| 10451 verum. Quod enim est universalius, secundum rationem prius est, ut | |
| 10452 patet ex I Physic. Sed bonum est universalius quam verum, nam verum | |
| 10453 est quoddam bonum, scilicet intellectus. Ergo bonum prius est | |
| 10454 secundum rationem quam verum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q16_A4-p3"> | |
| 10455 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, good is in things, but the true in the intellect composing and dividing as said above | |
| 10456 <a id="FP_Q16_A4-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q16_A2.html">(A[2])</a>. But that which is in things is prior to that which is in the intellect. Therefore good is logically prior to the true. | |
| 10457 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 16 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="29071" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29071] Iª q. 16 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, bonum | |
| 10458 est in rebus, verum autem in compositione et divisione intellectus, | |
| 10459 ut dictum est. Sed ea quae sunt in re, sunt priora his quae sunt in | |
| 10460 intellectu. Ergo prius est secundum rationem bonum quam verum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q16_A4-p4"> | |
| 10461 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, truth is a species of virtue, as is clear from Ethic. iv. But virtue is included under good; since, as Augustine | |
| 10462 says (De Lib. Arbit. ii, 19), it is a good quality of the mind. Therefore the good is prior to the true. | |
| 10463 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 16 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="29072" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29072] Iª q. 16 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 10464 veritas est quaedam species virtutis, ut patet in IV Ethic. Sed | |
| 10465 virtus continetur sub bono, est enim bona qualitas mentis, ut dicit | |
| 10466 Augustinus. Ergo bonum est prius quam verum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q16_A4-p5"> | |
| 10467 <b>On the contrary,</b> What is in more things is prior logically. But the true is in some things wherein good is not, as, for instance, in mathematics. | |
| 10468 Therefore the true is prior to good. | |
| 10469 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 16 a. 4 s. c."><a name="29073" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29073] Iª q. 16 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra, quod | |
| 10470 est in pluribus, est prius secundum rationem. Sed verum est in | |
| 10471 quibusdam in quibus non est bonum, scilicet in mathematicis. Ergo | |
| 10472 verum est prius quam bonum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q16_A4-p6"> | |
| 10473 <b>I answer that,</b> Although the good and the true are convertible with being, as to suppositum, yet they differ logically. And in this manner | |
| 10474 the true, speaking absolutely, is prior to good, as appears from two reasons. First, because the true is more closely related | |
| 10475 to being than is good. For the true regards being itself simply and immediately; while the nature of good follows being in | |
| 10476 so far as being is in some way perfect; for thus it is desirable. Secondly, it is evident | |
| 10477 from the fact that knowledge naturally precedes appetite. Hence, since the true regards knowledge, but the good regards the | |
| 10478 appetite, the true must be prior in idea to the good. | |
| 10479 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 16 a. 4 co."><a name="29074" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29074] Iª q. 16 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum | |
| 10480 quod, licet bonum et verum supposito convertantur cum ente, tamen | |
| 10481 ratione differunt. Et secundum hoc verum, absolute loquendo, prius | |
| 10482 est quam bonum. Quod ex duobus apparet. Primo quidem ex hoc, quod | |
| 10483 verum propinquius se habet ad ens, quod est prius, quam bonum. Nam | |
| 10484 verum respicit ipsum esse simpliciter et immediate, ratio autem | |
| 10485 boni consequitur esse, secundum quod est aliquo modo perfectum; sic | |
| 10486 enim appetibile est. Secundo apparet ex hoc, quod cognitio | |
| 10487 naturaliter praecedit appetitum. Unde, cum verum respiciat | |
| 10488 cognitionem, bonum autem appetitum, prius erit verum quam bonum | |
| 10489 secundum rationem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q16_A4-p7"> | |
| 10490 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The will and the intellect mutually include one another: for the intellect understands the will, and the will wills the intellect | |
| 10491 to understand. So then, among things directed to the object of the will, are comprised also those that belong to the intellect; | |
| 10492 and conversely. Whence in the order of things desirable, good stands as the universal, and the true as the particular; whereas | |
| 10493 in the order of intelligible things the converse of the case. From the | |
| 10494 fact, then, that the true is a kind of good, it follows that the good is prior in the order of things desirable; but not that | |
| 10495 it is prior absolutely. | |
| 10496 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 16 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="29075" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29075] Iª q. 16 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo | |
| 10497 dicendum quod voluntas et intellectus mutuo se includunt, nam | |
| 10498 intellectus intelligit voluntatem, et voluntas vult intellectum | |
| 10499 intelligere. Sic ergo inter illa quae ordinantur ad obiectum | |
| 10500 voluntatis, continentur etiam ea quae sunt intellectus; et e | |
| 10501 converso. Unde in ordine appetibilium, bonum se habet ut | |
| 10502 universale, et verum ut particulare, in ordine autem | |
| 10503 intelligibilium est e converso. Ex hoc ergo quod verum est quoddam | |
| 10504 bonum, sequitur quod bonum sit prius in ordine appetibilium, non | |
| 10505 autem quod sit prius simpliciter.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q16_A4-p8"> | |
| 10506 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> A thing is prior logically in so far as it is prior to the intellect. Now the intellect apprehends primarily being itself; | |
| 10507 secondly, it apprehends that it understands being; and thirdly, it apprehends that it desires being. Hence the idea of being | |
| 10508 is first, that of truth second, and the idea of good third, though good is in things. | |
| 10509 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 16 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="29076" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29076] Iª q. 16 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 10510 dicendum quod secundum hoc est aliquid prius ratione, quod prius | |
| 10511 cadit in intellectu. Intellectus autem per prius apprehendit ipsum | |
| 10512 ens; et secundario apprehendit se intelligere ens; et tertio | |
| 10513 apprehendit se appetere ens. Unde primo est ratio entis, secundo | |
| 10514 ratio veri, tertio ratio boni, licet bonum sit in rebus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q16_A4-p9"> | |
| 10515 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The virtue which is called "truth" is not truth in general, but a certain kind of truth according to which man shows himself | |
| 10516 in deed and word as he really is. But truth as applied to "life" is used in a particular sense, inasmuch as a man fulfills | |
| 10517 in his life that to which he is ordained by the divine intellect, as it has been said that truth exists in other things | |
| 10518 <a id="FP_Q16_A4-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q16_A1.html">(A[1])</a>. Whereas the truth of "justice" is found in man as he | |
| 10519 fulfills his duty to his neighbor, as ordained by law. Hence we cannot argue from these particular truths to truth in general. | |
| 10520 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 16 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="29077" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29077] Iª q. 16 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 10521 dicendum quod virtus quae dicitur veritas, non est veritas | |
| 10522 communis, sed quaedam veritas secundum quam homo in dictis et | |
| 10523 factis ostendit se ut est. Veritas autem vitae dicitur | |
| 10524 particulariter, secundum quod homo in vita sua implet illud ad quod | |
| 10525 ordinatur per intellectum divinum, sicut etiam dictum est veritatem | |
| 10526 esse in ceteris rebus. Veritas autem iustitiae est secundum quod | |
| 10527 homo servat id quod debet alteri secundum ordinem legum. Unde ex | |
| 10528 his particularibus veritatibus non est procedendum ad veritatem | |
| 10529 communem.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q16_A5" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q16_A5-p0.1">Q. 16. A. 5. Whether God is truth?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q16_A5-p2"> | |
| 10530 <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God is not truth. For truth consists in the intellect composing and dividing. But in God there is not composition | |
| 10531 and division. Therefore in Him there is not truth. | |
| 10532 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 16 a. 5 arg. 1"><a name="29078" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29078] Iª q. 16 a. 5 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quintum sic | |
| 10533 proceditur. Videtur quod Deus non sit veritas. Veritas enim | |
| 10534 consistit in compositione et divisione intellectus. Sed in Deo non | |
| 10535 est compositio et divisio. Ergo non est ibi veritas.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q16_A5-p3"> | |
| 10536 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, truth, according to Augustine (De Vera Relig. xxxvi) is a "likeness to the principle." But in God there is no likeness | |
| 10537 to a principle. Therefore in God there is not truth. | |
| 10538 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 16 a. 5 arg. 2"><a name="29079" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29079] Iª q. 16 a. 5 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 10539 veritas, secundum Augustinum, in libro de vera Relig., est | |
| 10540 similitudo principii. Sed Dei non est similitudo ad principium. | |
| 10541 Ergo in Deo non est veritas.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q16_A5-p4"> | |
| 10542 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, whatever is said of God, is said of Him as of the first cause of all things; thus the being of God is the cause | |
| 10543 of all being; and His goodness the cause of all good. If therefore there is truth in God, all truth will be from Him. But | |
| 10544 it is true that someone sins. Therefore this will be from God; which is evidently false. | |
| 10545 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 16 a. 5 arg. 3"><a name="29080" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29080] Iª q. 16 a. 5 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 10546 quidquid dicitur de Deo, dicitur de eo ut de prima causa omnium, | |
| 10547 sicut esse Dei est causa omnis esse, et bonitas eius est causa | |
| 10548 omnis boni. Si ergo in Deo sit veritas, ergo omne verum erit ab | |
| 10549 ipso. Sed aliquem peccare est verum. Ergo hoc erit a Deo. Quod | |
| 10550 patet esse falsum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q16_A5-p5"> | |
| 10551 <b>On the contrary,</b> Our Lord says, "I am the Way, the Truth, and the Life" ( | |
| 10552 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q16_A5-p5.1" href="./asv.html#John.14.6" target="asv">Jn. 14:6</a>). | |
| 10553 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 16 a. 5 s. c."><a name="29081" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29081] Iª q. 16 a. 5 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est | |
| 10554 quod dicit dominus, Ioan. XIV, <i>ego sum via, veritas et | |
| 10555 vita</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q16_A5-p6"> | |
| 10556 <b>I answer that,</b> As said above | |
| 10557 <a id="FP_Q16_A5-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q16_A1.html">(A[1])</a>, truth is found in the intellect according as it apprehends a thing as it is; and in things according as they have being | |
| 10558 conformable to an intellect. This is to the greatest degree found in God. For His being is not only conformed to His intellect, | |
| 10559 but it is the very act of His intellect; and His act of understanding is the measure and cause of every other being and of | |
| 10560 every other intellect, and He Himself is His | |
| 10561 own existence and act of understanding. Whence it follows not only that truth is in Him, but that He is truth itself, and | |
| 10562 the sovereign and first truth. | |
| 10563 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 16 a. 5 co."><a name="29082" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29082] Iª q. 16 a. 5 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum | |
| 10564 quod, sicut dictum est, veritas invenitur in intellectu secundum | |
| 10565 quod apprehendit rem ut est, et in re secundum quod habet esse | |
| 10566 conformabile intellectui. Hoc autem maxime invenitur in Deo. Nam | |
| 10567 esse suum non solum est conforme suo intellectui, sed etiam est | |
| 10568 ipsum suum intelligere; et suum intelligere est mensura et causa | |
| 10569 omnis alterius esse, et omnis alterius intellectus; et ipse est | |
| 10570 suum esse et intelligere. Unde sequitur quod non solum in ipso sit | |
| 10571 veritas, sed quod ipse sit ipsa summa et prima veritas.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q16_A5-p7"> | |
| 10572 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Although in the divine intellect there is neither composition nor division, yet in His simple act of intelligence He judges | |
| 10573 of all things and knows all things complex; and thus there is truth in His intellect. | |
| 10574 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 16 a. 5 ad 1"><a name="29083" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29083] Iª q. 16 a. 5 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo | |
| 10575 dicendum quod, licet in intellectu divino non sit compositio et | |
| 10576 divisio, tamen secundum suam simplicem intelligentiam iudicat de | |
| 10577 omnibus, et cognoscit omnia complexa. Et sic in intellectu eius est | |
| 10578 veritas.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q16_A5-p8"> | |
| 10579 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The truth of our intellect is according to its conformity with its principle, that is to say, to the things from which it | |
| 10580 receives knowledge. The truth also of things is according to their conformity with their principle, namely, the divine intellect. | |
| 10581 Now this cannot be said, properly speaking, of divine truth; unless perhaps in so far as truth is appropriated to the Son, | |
| 10582 Who has a principle. But if we speak of divine truth in its essence, we cannot | |
| 10583 understand this unless the affirmative must be resolved into the negative, as when one says: "the Father is of Himself, because | |
| 10584 He is not from another." Similarly, the divine truth can be called a "likeness to the principle," inasmuch as His existence | |
| 10585 is not dissimilar to His intellect. | |
| 10586 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 16 a. 5 ad 2"><a name="29084" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29084] Iª q. 16 a. 5 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 10587 dicendum quod verum intellectus nostri est secundum quod | |
| 10588 conformatur suo principio, scilicet rebus, a quibus cognitionem | |
| 10589 accipit. Veritas etiam rerum est secundum quod conformantur suo | |
| 10590 principio, scilicet intellectui divino. Sed hoc, proprie loquendo, | |
| 10591 non potest dici in veritate divina, nisi forte secundum quod | |
| 10592 veritas appropriatur filio, qui habet principium. Sed si de | |
| 10593 veritate essentialiter dicta loquamur, non potest intelligi, nisi | |
| 10594 resolvatur affirmativa in negativam, sicut cum dicitur, pater est a | |
| 10595 se, quia non est ab alio. Et similiter dici potest similitudo | |
| 10596 principii veritas divina, inquantum esse suum non est suo | |
| 10597 intellectui dissimile.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q16_A5-p9"> | |
| 10598 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Not-being and privation have no truth of themselves, but only in the apprehension of the intellect. Now all apprehension | |
| 10599 of the intellect is from God. Hence all the truth that exists in the statement---"that a person commits fornication is true"---is | |
| 10600 entirely from God. But to argue, "Therefore that this person fornicates is from God", is a fallacy of Accident. | |
| 10601 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 16 a. 5 ad 3"><a name="29085" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29085] Iª q. 16 a. 5 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 10602 dicendum quod non ens et privationes non habent ex seipsis | |
| 10603 veritatem, sed solum ex apprehensione intellectus. Omnis autem | |
| 10604 apprehensio intellectus a Deo est, unde quidquid est veritatis in | |
| 10605 hoc quod dico, istum fornicari est verum, totum est a Deo. Sed si | |
| 10606 arguatur, ergo istum fornicari est a Deo, est fallacia | |
| 10607 accidentis.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q16_A6" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q16_A6-p0.1">Q. 16. A. 6. Whether there is only one truth, according to which all things are true?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q16_A6-p2"> | |
| 10608 <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that there is only one truth, according to which all things are true. For according to Augustine (De Trin. xv, 1), | |
| 10609 "nothing is greater than the mind of man, except God." Now truth is greater than the mind of man; otherwise the mind would | |
| 10610 be the judge of truth: whereas in fact it judges all things according to truth, and not according to its own measure. Therefore | |
| 10611 God alone is truth. Therefore there is no other truth but God. | |
| 10612 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 16 a. 6 arg. 1"><a name="29086" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29086] Iª q. 16 a. 6 arg. 1</span></a> Ad sextum sic | |
| 10613 proceditur. Videtur quod una sola sit veritas, secundum quam omnia | |
| 10614 sunt vera. Quia, secundum Augustinum, nihil est maius mente humana, | |
| 10615 nisi Deus. Sed veritas est maior mente humana, alioquin mens | |
| 10616 iudicaret de veritate; nunc autem omnia iudicat secundum veritatem, | |
| 10617 et non secundum seipsam. Ergo solus Deus est veritas. Ergo non est | |
| 10618 alia veritas quam Deus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q16_A6-p3"> | |
| 10619 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Anselm says (De Verit. xiv), that, "as is the relation of time to temporal things, so is that of truth to true things." | |
| 10620 But there is only one time for all temporal things. Therefore there is only one truth, by which all things are true. | |
| 10621 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 16 a. 6 arg. 2"><a name="29087" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29087] Iª q. 16 a. 6 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 10622 Anselmus dicit, in libro de veritate, quod sicut tempus se habet ad | |
| 10623 temporalia, ita veritas ad res veras. Sed unum est tempus omnium | |
| 10624 temporalium. Ergo una est veritas, qua omnia vera sunt.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q16_A6-p4"> | |
| 10625 <b>On the contrary,</b> it is written ( | |
| 10626 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q16_A6-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.11.2" target="asv">Ps. 11:2</a>), "Truths are decayed from among the children of men." | |
| 10627 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 16 a. 6 s. c."><a name="29088" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29088] Iª q. 16 a. 6 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est | |
| 10628 quod in Psalmo XI dicitur, <i>diminutae sunt veritates a filiis | |
| 10629 hominum</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q16_A6-p5"> | |
| 10630 <b>I answer that,</b> In one sense truth, whereby all things are true, is one, and in another sense it is not. In proof of which we must consider | |
| 10631 that when anything is predicated of many things univocally, it is found in each of them according to its proper nature; as | |
| 10632 animal is found in each species of animal. But when anything is predicated of many things analogically, it is found in only | |
| 10633 one of them according to its proper nature, and from this one the rest are denominated. So | |
| 10634 healthiness is predicated of animal, of urine, and of medicine, not that health is only in the animal; but from the health | |
| 10635 of the animal, medicine is called healthy, in so far as it is the cause of health, and urine is called healthy, in so far | |
| 10636 as it indicates health. And although health is neither in medicine nor in urine, yet in either there is something whereby | |
| 10637 the one causes, and the other indicates health. Now we have said | |
| 10638 <a id="FP_Q16_A6-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q16_A1.html">(A[1])</a> that truth resides primarily in the | |
| 10639 intellect; and secondarily in things, according as they are related to the divine intellect. If therefore we speak of truth, | |
| 10640 as it exists in the intellect, according to its proper nature, then are there many truths in many created intellects; and | |
| 10641 even in one and the same intellect, according to the number of things known. Whence a gloss on | |
| 10642 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q16_A6-p5.2" href="./asv.html#Ps.11.2" target="asv"> Ps. 11:2, </a> "Truths are decayed from among the children of men," says: "As from one man's face many likenesses are reflected in a mirror, | |
| 10643 so many truths are reflected from the one divine truth." But if we speak of truth as it is in things, then all things are | |
| 10644 true by one primary truth; to which each one is assimilated according to its own entity. And thus, although the essences or | |
| 10645 forms of things are many, yet the truth of the divine intellect is one, in conformity to which all things are said to be true. | |
| 10646 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 16 a. 6 co."><a name="29089" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29089] Iª q. 16 a. 6 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum | |
| 10647 quod quodammodo una est veritas, qua omnia sunt vera, et quodammodo | |
| 10648 non. Ad cuius evidentiam, sciendum est quod, quando aliquid | |
| 10649 praedicatur univoce de multis, illud in quolibet eorum secundum | |
| 10650 propriam rationem invenitur, sicut animal in qualibet specie | |
| 10651 animalis. Sed quando aliquid dicitur analogice de multis, illud | |
| 10652 invenitur secundum propriam rationem in uno eorum tantum, a quo | |
| 10653 alia denominantur. Sicut sanum dicitur de animali et urina et | |
| 10654 medicina, non quod sanitas sit nisi in animali tantum, sed a | |
| 10655 sanitate animalis denominatur medicina sana, inquantum est illius | |
| 10656 sanitatis effectiva, et urina, inquantum est illius sanitatis | |
| 10657 significativa. Et quamvis sanitas non sit in medicina neque in | |
| 10658 urina, tamen in utroque est aliquid per quod hoc quidem facit, | |
| 10659 illud autem significat sanitatem. Dictum est autem quod veritas per | |
| 10660 prius est in intellectu, et per posterius in rebus, secundum quod | |
| 10661 ordinantur ad intellectum divinum. Si ergo loquamur de veritate | |
| 10662 prout existit in intellectu, secundum propriam rationem, sic in | |
| 10663 multis intellectibus creatis sunt multae veritates; etiam in uno et | |
| 10664 eodem intellectu, secundum plura cognita. Unde dicit Glossa super | |
| 10665 illud Psalmi XI, <i>diminutae sunt veritates a filiis hominum</i> | |
| 10666 etc., quod sicut ab una facie hominis resultant plures | |
| 10667 similitudines in speculo, sic ab una veritate divina resultant | |
| 10668 plures veritates. Si vero loquamur de veritate secundum quod est in | |
| 10669 rebus, sic omnes sunt verae una prima veritate, cui unumquodque | |
| 10670 assimilatur secundum suam entitatem. Et sic, licet plures sint | |
| 10671 essentiae vel formae rerum, tamen una est veritas divini | |
| 10672 intellectus, secundum quam omnes res denominantur verae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q16_A6-p6"> | |
| 10673 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The soul does not judge of things according to any kind of truth, but according to the primary truth, inasmuch as it is reflected | |
| 10674 in the soul, as in a mirror, by reason of the first principles of the understanding. It follows, therefore, that the primary | |
| 10675 truth is greater than the soul. And yet, even created truth, which resides in our intellect, is greater than the soul, not | |
| 10676 simply, but in a certain degree, in so far as it is its perfection; even as | |
| 10677 science may be said to be greater than the soul. Yet it is true that nothing subsisting is greater than the rational soul, | |
| 10678 except God. | |
| 10679 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 16 a. 6 ad 1"><a name="29090" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29090] Iª q. 16 a. 6 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo | |
| 10680 dicendum quod anima non secundum quamcumque veritatem iudicat de | |
| 10681 rebus omnibus; sed secundum veritatem primam, inquantum resultat in | |
| 10682 ea sicut in speculo, secundum prima intelligibilia. Unde sequitur | |
| 10683 quod veritas prima sit maior anima. Et tamen etiam veritas creata, | |
| 10684 quae est in intellectu nostro, est maior anima, non simpliciter, | |
| 10685 sed secundum quid, inquantum est perfectio eius; sicut etiam | |
| 10686 scientia posset dici maior anima. Sed verum est quod nihil | |
| 10687 subsistens est maius mente rationali, nisi Deus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q16_A6-p7"> | |
| 10688 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The saying of Anselm is correct in so far as things are said to be true by their relation to the divine intellect. | |
| 10689 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 16 a. 6 ad 2"><a name="29091" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29091] Iª q. 16 a. 6 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 10690 dicendum quod dictum Anselmi veritatem habet, secundum quod res | |
| 10691 dicuntur verae per comparationem ad intellectum divinum.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q16_A7" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q16_A7-p0.1">Q. 16. A. 7. Whether created truth is eternal?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q16_A7-p2"> | |
| 10692 <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that created truth is eternal. For Augustine says (De Lib. Arbit. ii, 8) "Nothing is more eternal than the nature | |
| 10693 of a circle, and that two added to three make five." But the truth of these is a created truth. Therefore created truth is | |
| 10694 eternal. | |
| 10695 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 16 a. 7 arg. 1"><a name="29092" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29092] Iª q. 16 a. 7 arg. 1</span></a> Ad septimum sic | |
| 10696 proceditur. Videtur quod veritas creata sit aeterna. Dicit enim | |
| 10697 Augustinus, in libro de libero arbitrio, quod nihil est magis | |
| 10698 aeternum quam ratio circuli, et duo et tria esse quinque. Sed horum | |
| 10699 veritas est veritas creata. Ergo veritas creata est aeterna.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q16_A7-p3"> | |
| 10700 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, that which is always, is eternal. But universals are always and everywhere; therefore they are eternal. So therefore | |
| 10701 is truth, which is the most universal. | |
| 10702 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 16 a. 7 arg. 2"><a name="29093" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29093] Iª q. 16 a. 7 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, omne | |
| 10703 quod est semper, est aeternum. Sed universalia sunt ubique et | |
| 10704 semper. Ergo sunt aeterna. Ergo et verum, quod est maxime | |
| 10705 universale.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q16_A7-p4"> | |
| 10706 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, it was always true that what is true in the present was to be in the future. But as the truth of a proposition regarding | |
| 10707 the present is a created truth, so is that of a proposition regarding the future. Therefore some created truth is eternal. | |
| 10708 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 16 a. 7 arg. 3"><a name="29094" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29094] Iª q. 16 a. 7 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, id | |
| 10709 quod est verum in praesenti, semper fuit verum esse futurum. Sed | |
| 10710 sicut veritas propositionis de praesenti est veritas creata, ita | |
| 10711 veritas propositionis de futuro. Ergo aliqua veritas creata est | |
| 10712 aeterna.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q16_A7-p5"> | |
| 10713 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, all that is without beginning and end is eternal. But the truth of enunciables is without beginning and end; for | |
| 10714 if their truth had a beginning, since it was not before, it was true that truth was not, and true, of course, by reason of | |
| 10715 truth; so that truth was before it began to be. Similarly, if it be asserted that truth has an end, it follows that it is | |
| 10716 after it has ceased to be, for it will still be true that truth is not. Therefore truth is | |
| 10717 eternal. | |
| 10718 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 16 a. 7 arg. 4"><a name="29095" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29095] Iª q. 16 a. 7 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, omne | |
| 10719 quod caret principio et fine, est aeternum. Sed veritas | |
| 10720 enuntiabilium caret principio et fine. Quia, si veritas incoepit | |
| 10721 cum ante non esset, verum erat veritatem non esse, et utique aliqua | |
| 10722 veritate verum erat, et sic veritas erat antequam inciperet. Et | |
| 10723 similiter si ponatur veritatem habere finem, sequitur quod sit | |
| 10724 postquam desierit, verum enim erit veritatem non esse. Ergo veritas | |
| 10725 est aeterna.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q16_A7-p6"> | |
| 10726 <b>On the contrary,</b> God alone is eternal, as laid down before ( | |
| 10727 <a id="FP_Q16_A7-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q10_A3.html">Q[10], A[3]</a>). | |
| 10728 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 16 a. 7 s. c."><a name="29096" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29096] Iª q. 16 a. 7 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est | |
| 10729 quod solus Deus est aeternus, ut supra habitum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q16_A7-p7"> | |
| 10730 <b>I answer that,</b> The truth of enunciations is no other than the truth of the intellect. For an enunciation resides in the intellect, and in | |
| 10731 speech. Now according as it is in the intellect it has truth of itself: but according as it is in speech, it is called enunciable | |
| 10732 truth, according as it signifies some truth of the intellect, not on account of any truth residing in the enunciation, as | |
| 10733 though in a subject. Thus urine is called healthy, not from any health within it but | |
| 10734 from the health of an animal which it indicates. In like manner it has been already said that things are called true from | |
| 10735 the truth of the intellect. Hence, if no intellect were eternal, no truth would be eternal. Now because only the divine intellect | |
| 10736 is eternal, in it alone truth has eternity. Nor does it follow from this that anything else but God is eternal; since the | |
| 10737 truth of the divine intellect is God Himself, as shown already | |
| 10738 <a id="FP_Q16_A7-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q16_A5.html">(A[5])</a>. | |
| 10739 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 16 a. 7 co."><a name="29097" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29097] Iª q. 16 a. 7 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum | |
| 10740 quod veritas enuntiabilium non est aliud quam veritas intellectus. | |
| 10741 Enuntiabile enim et est in intellectu, et est in voce. Secundum | |
| 10742 autem quod est in intellectu, habet per se veritatem. Sed secundum | |
| 10743 quod est in voce, dicitur verum enuntiabile, secundum quod | |
| 10744 significat aliquam veritatem intellectus; non propter aliquam | |
| 10745 veritatem in enuntiabili existentem sicut in subiecto. Sicut urina | |
| 10746 dicitur sana, non a sanitate quae in ipsa sit, sed a sanitate | |
| 10747 animalis, quam significat. Similiter etiam supra dictum est quod | |
| 10748 res denominantur verae a veritate intellectus. Unde si nullus | |
| 10749 intellectus esset aeternus, nulla veritas esset aeterna. Sed quia | |
| 10750 solus intellectus divinus est aeternus, in ipso solo veritas | |
| 10751 aeternitatem habet. Nec propter hoc sequitur quod aliquid aliud sit | |
| 10752 aeternum quam Deus, quia veritas intellectus divini est ipse Deus, | |
| 10753 ut supra ostensum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q16_A7-p8"> | |
| 10754 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The nature of a circle, and the fact that two and three make five, have eternity in the mind of God. | |
| 10755 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 16 a. 7 ad 1"><a name="29098" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29098] Iª q. 16 a. 7 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo | |
| 10756 dicendum quod ratio circuli, et duo et tria esse quinque, habent | |
| 10757 aeternitatem in mente divina.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q16_A7-p9"> | |
| 10758 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> That something is always and everywhere, can be understood in two ways. In one way, as having in itself the power of extension | |
| 10759 to all time and to all places, as it belongs to God to be everywhere and always. In the other way as not having in itself | |
| 10760 determination to any place or time, as primary matter is said to be one, not because it has one form, but by the absence of | |
| 10761 all distinguishing form. In this manner all universals are said to be everywhere | |
| 10762 and always, in so far as universals are independent of place and time. It does not, however, follow from this that they are | |
| 10763 eternal, except in an intellect, if one exists that is eternal. | |
| 10764 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 16 a. 7 ad 2"><a name="29099" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29099] Iª q. 16 a. 7 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 10765 dicendum quod aliquid esse semper et ubique, potest intelligi | |
| 10766 dupliciter. Uno modo, quia habet in se unde se extendat ad omne | |
| 10767 tempus et ad omnem locum, sicut Deo competit esse ubique et semper. | |
| 10768 Alio modo, quia non habet in se quo determinetur ad aliquem locum | |
| 10769 vel tempus, sicut materia prima dicitur esse una, non quia habet | |
| 10770 unam formam, sicut homo est unus ab unitate unius formae, sed per | |
| 10771 remotionem omnium formarum distinguentium. Et per hunc modum, | |
| 10772 quodlibet universale dicitur esse ubique et semper, inquantum | |
| 10773 universalia abstrahunt ab hic et nunc. Sed ex hoc non sequitur ea | |
| 10774 esse aeterna, nisi in intellectu, si quis sit aeternus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q16_A7-p10"> | |
| 10775 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> That which now is, was future, before it (actually) was; because it was in its cause that it would be. Hence, if the cause | |
| 10776 were removed, that thing's coming to be was not future. But the first cause is alone eternal. Hence it does not follow that | |
| 10777 it was always true that what now is would be, except in so far as its future being was in the sempiternal cause; and God alone | |
| 10778 is such a cause. | |
| 10779 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 16 a. 7 ad 3"><a name="29100" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29100] Iª q. 16 a. 7 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 10780 dicendum quod illud quod nunc est, ex eo futurum fuit antequam | |
| 10781 esset, quia in causa sua erat ut fieret. Unde, sublata causa, non | |
| 10782 esset futurum illud fieri. Sola autem causa prima est aeterna. Unde | |
| 10783 ex hoc non sequitur quod ea quae sunt, semper fuerit verum ea esse | |
| 10784 futura, nisi quatenus in causa sempiterna fuit ut essent futura. | |
| 10785 Quae quidem causa solus Deus est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q16_A7-p11"> | |
| 10786 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Because our intellect is not eternal, neither is the truth of enunciable propositions which are formed by us, eternal, but | |
| 10787 it had a beginning in time. Now before such truth existed, it was not true to say that such a truth did exist, except by reason | |
| 10788 of the divine intellect, wherein alone truth is eternal. But it is true now to say that that truth did not then exist: and | |
| 10789 this is true only by reason of the truth that is now in our intellect; and not by | |
| 10790 reason of any truth in the things. For this is truth concerning not-being; and not-being has not truth of itself, but only | |
| 10791 so far as our intellect apprehends it. Hence it is true to say that truth did not exist, in so far as we apprehend its not-being | |
| 10792 as preceding its being. | |
| 10793 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 16 a. 7 ad 4"><a name="29101" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29101] Iª q. 16 a. 7 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum | |
| 10794 dicendum quod, quia intellectus noster non est aeternus, nec | |
| 10795 veritas enuntiabilium quae a nobis formantur, est aeterna, sed | |
| 10796 quandoque incoepit. Et antequam huiusmodi veritas esset, non erat | |
| 10797 verum dicere veritatem talem non esse, nisi ab intellectu divino, | |
| 10798 in quo solum veritas est aeterna. Sed nunc verum est dicere | |
| 10799 veritatem tunc non fuisse. Quod quidem non est verum nisi veritate | |
| 10800 quae nunc est in intellectu nostro, non autem per aliquam veritatem | |
| 10801 ex parte rei. Quia ista est veritas de non ente; non ens autem non | |
| 10802 habet ex se ut sit verum, sed solummodo ex intellectu apprehendente | |
| 10803 ipsum. Unde intantum est verum dicere veritatem non fuisse, | |
| 10804 inquantum apprehendimus non esse ipsius ut praecedens esse | |
| 10805 eius.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q16_A8" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q16_A8-p0.1">Q. 16. A. 8. Whether truth is immutable?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q16_A8-p2"> | |
| 10806 <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that truth is immutable. For Augustine says (De Lib. Arbit. ii, 12), that "Truth and mind do not rank as equals, | |
| 10807 otherwise truth would be mutable, as the mind is." | |
| 10808 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 16 a. 8 arg. 1"><a name="29102" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29102] Iª q. 16 a. 8 arg. 1</span></a> Ad octavum sic | |
| 10809 proceditur. Videtur quod veritas sit immutabilis. Dicit enim | |
| 10810 Augustinus, in libro II de libero arbitrio, quod veritas non est | |
| 10811 aequalis menti, quia esset mutabilis, sicut et mens.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q16_A8-p3"> | |
| 10812 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, what remains after every change is immutable; as primary matter is unbegotten and incorruptible, since it remains | |
| 10813 after all generation and corruption. But truth remains after all change; for after every change it is true to say that a thing | |
| 10814 is, or is not. Therefore truth is immutable. | |
| 10815 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 16 a. 8 arg. 2"><a name="29103" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29103] Iª q. 16 a. 8 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, id | |
| 10816 quod remanet post omnem mutationem, est immutabile, sicut prima | |
| 10817 materia est ingenita et incorruptibilis, quia remanet post omnem | |
| 10818 generationem et corruptionem. Sed veritas remanet post omnem | |
| 10819 mutationem, quia post omnem mutationem verum est dicere esse vel | |
| 10820 non esse. Ergo veritas est immutabilis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q16_A8-p4"> | |
| 10821 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if the truth of an enunciation changes, it changes mostly with the changing of the thing. But it does not thus change. | |
| 10822 For truth, according to Anselm (De Verit. viii), "is a certain rightness" in so far as a thing answers to that which is in | |
| 10823 the divine mind concerning it. But this proposition that "Socrates sits", receives from the divine mind the signification | |
| 10824 that Socrates does sit; and it has the same signification even though he does not sit. | |
| 10825 Therefore the truth of the proposition in no way changes. | |
| 10826 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 16 a. 8 arg. 3"><a name="29104" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29104] Iª q. 16 a. 8 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, si | |
| 10827 veritas enuntiationis mutatur, maxime mutatur ad mutationem rei. | |
| 10828 Sed sic non mutatur. Veritas enim, secundum Anselmum, est rectitudo | |
| 10829 quaedam, inquantum aliquid implet id quod est de ipso in mente | |
| 10830 divina. Haec autem propositio, Socrates sedet, accipit a mente | |
| 10831 divina ut significet Socratem sedere, quod significat etiam eo non | |
| 10832 sedente. Ergo veritas propositionis nullo modo mutatur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q16_A8-p5"> | |
| 10833 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, where there is the same cause, there is the same effect. But the same thing is the cause of the truth of the three | |
| 10834 propositions, "Socrates sits, will sit, sat." Therefore the truth of each is the same. But one or other of these must be the | |
| 10835 true one. Therefore the truth of these propositions remains immutable; and for the same reason that of any other. | |
| 10836 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 16 a. 8 arg. 4"><a name="29105" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29105] Iª q. 16 a. 8 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, ubi | |
| 10837 est eadem causa, et idem effectus. Sed eadem res est causa | |
| 10838 veritatis harum trium propositionum Socrates sedet, sedebit, et | |
| 10839 sedit. Ergo eadem est harum veritas. Sed oportet quod alterum horum | |
| 10840 sit verum. Ergo veritas harum propositionum immutabiliter manet. Et | |
| 10841 eadem ratione cuiuslibet alterius propositionis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q16_A8-p6"> | |
| 10842 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( | |
| 10843 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q16_A8-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.11.2" target="asv">Ps. 11:2</a>),"Truths are decayed from among the children of men." | |
| 10844 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 16 a. 8 s. c."><a name="29106" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29106] Iª q. 16 a. 8 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est | |
| 10845 quod dicitur in Psalmo XI, <i>diminutae sunt veritates a filiis | |
| 10846 hominum</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q16_A8-p7"> | |
| 10847 <b>I answer that,</b> Truth, properly speaking, resides only in the intellect, as said before | |
| 10848 <a id="FP_Q16_A8-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q16_A1.html">(A[1])</a>; but things are called true in virtue of the truth residing in an intellect. Hence the mutability of truth must be regarded | |
| 10849 from the point of view of the intellect, the truth of which consists in its conformity to the thing understood. Now this conformity | |
| 10850 may vary in two ways, even as any other likeness, through change in one of the two extremes. Hence in | |
| 10851 one way truth varies on the part of the intellect, from the fact that a change of opinion occurs about a thing which in itself | |
| 10852 has not changed, and in another way, when the thing is changed, but not the opinion; and in either way there can be a change | |
| 10853 from true to false. If, then, there is an intellect wherein there can be no alternation of opinions, and the knowledge of | |
| 10854 which nothing can escape, in this is immutable truth. Now such is the divine intellect, as is clear from what has been said | |
| 10855 before ( | |
| 10856 <a id="FP_Q16_A8-p7.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q14_A15.html">Q[14], A[15]</a>). Hence the truth of the divine intellect is immutable. But the truth of our intellect is mutable; not because it is itself | |
| 10857 the subject of change, but in so far as our intellect changes from truth to falsity, for thus forms may be called mutable. | |
| 10858 Whereas the truth of the divine intellect is that according to which natural things are said to be true, and this is altogether | |
| 10859 immutable. | |
| 10860 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 16 a. 8 co."><a name="29107" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29107] Iª q. 16 a. 8 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum | |
| 10861 quod, sicut supra dictum est, veritas proprie est in solo | |
| 10862 intellectu, res autem dicuntur verae a veritate quae est in aliquo | |
| 10863 intellectu. Unde mutabilitas veritatis consideranda est circa | |
| 10864 intellectum. Cuius quidem veritas in hoc consistit, quod habeat | |
| 10865 conformitatem ad res intellectas. Quae quidem conformitas variari | |
| 10866 potest dupliciter, sicut et quaelibet alia similitudo, ex mutatione | |
| 10867 alterius extremi. Unde uno modo variatur veritas ex parte | |
| 10868 intellectus, ex eo quod de re eodem modo se habente aliquis aliam | |
| 10869 opinionem accipit, alio modo si, opinione eadem manente, res | |
| 10870 mutetur. Et utroque modo fit mutatio de vero in falsum. Si ergo sit | |
| 10871 aliquis intellectus in quo non possit esse alternatio opinionum, | |
| 10872 vel cuius acceptionem non potest subterfugere res aliqua, in eo est | |
| 10873 immutabilis veritas. Talis autem est intellectus divinus, ut ex | |
| 10874 superioribus patet. Unde veritas divini intellectus est | |
| 10875 immutabilis. Veritas autem intellectus nostri mutabilis est. Non | |
| 10876 quod ipsa sit subiectum mutationis, sed inquantum intellectus | |
| 10877 noster mutatur de veritate in falsitatem; sic enim formae mutabiles | |
| 10878 dici possunt. Veritas autem intellectus divini est secundum quam | |
| 10879 res naturales dicuntur verae, quae est omnino immutabilis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q16_A8-p8"> | |
| 10880 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Augustine is speaking of divine truth. | |
| 10881 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 16 a. 8 ad 1"><a name="29108" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29108] Iª q. 16 a. 8 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo | |
| 10882 dicendum quod Augustinus loquitur de veritate divina.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q16_A8-p9"> | |
| 10883 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The true and being are convertible terms. Hence just as being is not generated nor corrupted of itself, but accidentally, | |
| 10884 in so far as this being or that is corrupted or generated, as is said in Phys. i, so does truth change, not so as that no | |
| 10885 truth remains, but because that truth does not remain which was before. | |
| 10886 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 16 a. 8 ad 2"><a name="29109" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29109] Iª q. 16 a. 8 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 10887 dicendum quod verum et ens sunt convertibilia. Unde, sicut ens non | |
| 10888 generatur neque corrumpitur per se, sed per accidens, inquantum hoc | |
| 10889 vel illud ens corrumpitur vel generatur, ut dicitur in I Physic.; | |
| 10890 ita veritas mutatur, non quod nulla veritas remaneat, sed quia non | |
| 10891 remanet illa veritas quae prius erat.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q16_A8-p10"> | |
| 10892 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> A proposition not only has truth, as other things are said to have it, in so far, that is, as they correspond to that which | |
| 10893 is the design of the divine intellect concerning them; but it said to have truth in a special way, in so far as it indicates | |
| 10894 the truth of the intellect, which consists in the conformity of the intellect with a thing. When this disappears, the truth | |
| 10895 of an opinion changes, and consequently the truth of the proposition. So therefore | |
| 10896 this proposition, "Socrates sits," is true, as long as he is sitting, both with the truth of the thing, in so far as the expression | |
| 10897 is significative, and with the truth of signification, in so far as it signifies a true opinion. When Socrates rises, the | |
| 10898 first truth remains, but the second is changed. | |
| 10899 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 16 a. 8 ad 3"><a name="29110" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29110] Iª q. 16 a. 8 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 10900 dicendum quod propositio non solum habet veritatem sicut res aliae | |
| 10901 veritatem habere dicuntur, inquantum implent id quod de eis est | |
| 10902 ordinatum ab intellectu divino; sed dicitur habere veritatem quodam | |
| 10903 speciali modo, inquantum significat veritatem intellectus. Quae | |
| 10904 quidem consistit in conformitate intellectus et rei. Qua quidem | |
| 10905 subtracta, mutatur veritas opinionis, et per consequens veritas | |
| 10906 propositionis. Sic igitur haec propositio, Socrates sedet, eo | |
| 10907 sedente vera est et veritate rei, inquantum est quaedam vox | |
| 10908 significativa; et veritate significationis, inquantum significat | |
| 10909 opinionem veram. Socrate vero surgente, remanet prima veritas, sed | |
| 10910 mutatur secunda.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q16_A8-p11"> | |
| 10911 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> The sitting of Socrates, which is the cause of the truth of the proposition, "Socrates sits," has not the same meaning when | |
| 10912 Socrates sits, after he sits, and before he sits. Hence the truth which results, varies, and is variously signified by these | |
| 10913 propositions concerning present, past, or future. Thus it does not follow, though one of the three propositions is true, that | |
| 10914 the same truth remains invariable. | |
| 10915 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 16 a. 8 ad 4"><a name="29111" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29111] Iª q. 16 a. 8 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum | |
| 10916 dicendum quod sessio Socratis, quae est causa veritatis huius | |
| 10917 propositionis, Socrates sedet, non eodem modo se habet dum Socrates | |
| 10918 sedet, et postquam sederit, et antequam sederet. Unde et veritas ab | |
| 10919 hoc causata, diversimode se habet; et diversimode significatur | |
| 10920 propositionibus de praesenti, praeterito et futuro. Unde non | |
| 10921 sequitur quod, licet altera trium propositionum sit vera, quod | |
| 10922 eadem veritas invariabilis maneat.</p></div></div></div></div> | |
| 10923 <div id="FP_Q17" class="div3"> | |
| 10924 <h3 id="FP_Q17-p0.1">Q. 17. CONCERNING FALSITY (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3> | |
| 10925 <div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> | |
| 10926 <p id="FP_Q17-p2"> We next consider falsity. About this four points of inquiry arise:</p><p id="FP_Q17-p3"> (1) Whether falsity exists in things?</p><p id="FP_Q17-p4"> (2) Whether it exists in the sense?</p><p id="FP_Q17-p5"> (3) Whether it exists in the intellect?</p><p id="FP_Q17-p6"> (4) Concerning the opposition of the true and the false.</p> | |
| 10927 </div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 17 pr."><a name="29112" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29112] | |
| 10928 Iª q. 17 pr.</span></a> Deinde quaeritur de falsitate. Et | |
| 10929 circa hoc quaeruntur quatuor. Primo, utrum falsitas sit in rebus. | |
| 10930 Secundo, utrum sit in sensu. Tertio, utrum sit in intellectu. | |
| 10931 Quarto, de oppositione veri et falsi.</p></div></div></div> | |
| 10932 <div id="FP_Q17_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q17_A1-p0.1">Q. 17. A. 1. Whether falsity exists in things?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q17_A1-p2"> | |
| 10933 <b>Objection 1:</b> It appears that falsity does not exist in things. For Augustine says (Soliloq. ii, 8), "If the true is that which is, it | |
| 10934 will be concluded that the false exists nowhere; whatever reason may appear to the contrary." | |
| 10935 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 17 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="29113" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29113] Iª q. 17 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum sic | |
| 10936 proceditur. Videtur quod falsitas non sit in rebus. Dicit enim | |
| 10937 Augustinus, in libro Soliloq., <i>si verum est id quod est, falsum | |
| 10938 non esse uspiam concludetur, quovis repugnante</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q17_A1-p3"> | |
| 10939 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, false is derived from "fallere" [to deceive]. But things do not deceive; for, as Augustine says (De Vera Relig. | |
| 10940 33), they show nothing but their own species. Therefore the false is not found in things. | |
| 10941 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 17 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="29114" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29114] Iª q. 17 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 10942 falsum dicitur a fallendo. Sed res non fallunt, ut dicit Augustinus | |
| 10943 in libro de vera Relig., <i>quia non ostendunt aliud quam suam | |
| 10944 speciem</i>. Ergo falsum in rebus non invenitur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q17_A1-p4"> | |
| 10945 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the true is said to exist in things by conformity to the divine intellect, as stated above | |
| 10946 <a id="FP_Q17_A1-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q16.html">(Q[16])</a>. But everything, in so far as it exists, imitates God. Therefore everything is true without admixture of falsity; and thus | |
| 10947 nothing is false. | |
| 10948 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 17 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="29115" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29115] Iª q. 17 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, verum | |
| 10949 dicitur in rebus per comparationem ad intellectum divinum, ut supra | |
| 10950 dictum est. Sed quaelibet res, inquantum est, imitatur Deum. Ergo | |
| 10951 quaelibet res vera est, absque falsitate. Et sic nulla res est | |
| 10952 falsa.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q17_A1-p5"> | |
| 10953 <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Vera Relig. 34): "Every body is a true body and a false unity: for it imitates unity without being unity." | |
| 10954 But everything imitates the divine unity yet falls short of it. Therefore in all things falsity exists. | |
| 10955 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 17 a. 1 s. c."><a name="29116" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29116] Iª q. 17 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est | |
| 10956 quod dicit Augustinus, in libro de vera Relig., quod <i>omne corpus | |
| 10957 est verum corpus et falsa unitas</i>; quia imitatur unitatem, et | |
| 10958 non est unitas. Sed quaelibet res imitatur divinam bonitatem, et ab | |
| 10959 ea deficit. Ergo in omnibus rebus est falsitas.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q17_A1-p6"> | |
| 10960 <b>I answer that,</b> Since true and false are opposed, and since opposites stand in relation to the same thing, we must needs seek falsity, where | |
| 10961 primarily we find truth; that is to say, in the intellect. Now, in things, neither truth nor falsity exists, except in relation | |
| 10962 to the intellect. And since every thing is denominated simply by what belongs to it "per se," but is denominated relatively | |
| 10963 by what belongs to it accidentally; a thing indeed may be called false simply when | |
| 10964 compared with the intellect on which it depends, and to which it is compared "per se" but may be called false relatively as | |
| 10965 directed to another intellect, to which it is compared accidentally. Now natural things depend on the divine intellect, as | |
| 10966 artificial things on the human. Wherefore artificial things are said to be false simply and in themselves, in so far as they | |
| 10967 fall short of the form of the art; whence a craftsman is said to produce a false work, if it falls short of the proper | |
| 10968 operation of his art. | |
| 10969 </p><p id="FP_Q17_A1-p7"> In things that depend on God, falseness cannot be found, in so far as they are compared with the divine intellect; since | |
| 10970 whatever takes place in things proceeds from the ordinance of that intellect, unless perhaps in the case of voluntary agents | |
| 10971 only, who have it in their power to withdraw themselves from what is so ordained; wherein consists the evil of sin. Thus sins | |
| 10972 themselves are called untruths and lies in the Scriptures, according to the words of the text, "Why do you love | |
| 10973 vanity, and seek after lying?" ( | |
| 10974 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q17_A1-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.4.3" target="asv">Ps. 4:3</a>): as on the other hand virtuous deeds are called the "truth of life" as being obedient to the order of the divine intellect. | |
| 10975 Thus it is said, "He that doth truth, cometh to the light" ( | |
| 10976 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q17_A1-p7.2" href="./asv.html#John.3.21" target="asv">Jn. 3:21</a>). | |
| 10977 </p><p id="FP_Q17_A1-p8"> But in relation to our intellect, natural things which are compared thereto accidentally, can be called false; not simply, | |
| 10978 but relatively; and that in two ways. In one way according to the thing signified, and thus a thing is said to be false as | |
| 10979 being signified or represented by word or thought that is false. In this respect anything can be said to be false as regards | |
| 10980 any quality not possessed by it; as if we should say that a diameter is a false commensurable thing, as the | |
| 10981 Philosopher says (Metaph. v, 34). So, too, Augustine says (Soliloq. ii, 10): "The true tragedian is a false Hector": even | |
| 10982 as, on the contrary, anything can be called true, in regard to that which is becoming to it. In another way a thing can be | |
| 10983 called false, by way of cause---and thus a thing is said to be false that naturally begets a false opinion. And whereas it | |
| 10984 is innate in us to judge things by external appearances, since our knowledge takes its rise from sense, which principally | |
| 10985 and | |
| 10986 naturally deals with external accidents, therefore those external accidents, which resemble things other than themselves, | |
| 10987 are said to be false with respect to those things; thus gall is falsely honey; and tin, false gold. Regarding this, Augustine | |
| 10988 says (Soliloq. ii, 6): "We call those things false that appear to our apprehension like the true:" and the Philosopher says | |
| 10989 (Metaph. v, 34): "Things are called false that are naturally apt to appear such as they are not, or what they are not." In | |
| 10990 this | |
| 10991 way a man is called false as delighting in false opinions or words, and not because he can invent them; for in this way many | |
| 10992 wise and learned persons might be called false, as stated in Metaph. v, 34. | |
| 10993 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 17 a. 1 co."><a name="29117" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29117] Iª q. 17 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum | |
| 10994 quod, cum verum et falsum opponantur; opposita autem sunt circa | |
| 10995 idem; necesse est ut ibi prius quaeratur falsitas, ubi primo | |
| 10996 veritas invenitur, hoc est in intellectu. In rebus autem neque | |
| 10997 veritas neque falsitas est, nisi per ordinem ad intellectum. Et | |
| 10998 quia unumquodque secundum id quod convenit ei per se, simpliciter | |
| 10999 nominatur; secundum autem id quod convenit ei per accidens, non | |
| 11000 nominatur nisi secundum quid; res quidem simpliciter falsa dici | |
| 11001 posset per comparationem ad intellectum a quo dependet, cui | |
| 11002 comparatur per se; in ordine autem ad alium intellectum, cui | |
| 11003 comparatur per accidens, non posset dici falsa nisi secundum quid. | |
| 11004 Dependent autem ab intellectu divino res naturales, sicut ab | |
| 11005 intellectu humano res artificiales. Dicuntur igitur res | |
| 11006 artificiales falsae simpliciter et secundum se, inquantum deficiunt | |
| 11007 a forma artis, unde dicitur aliquis artifex opus falsum facere, | |
| 11008 quando deficit ab operatione artis. Sic autem in rebus | |
| 11009 dependentibus a Deo, falsitas inveniri non potest per comparationem | |
| 11010 ad intellectum divinum, cum quidquid in rebus accidit, ex | |
| 11011 ordinatione divini intellectus procedat, nisi forte in voluntariis | |
| 11012 agentibus tantum, in quorum potestate est subducere se ab | |
| 11013 ordinatione divini intellectus; in quo malum culpae consistit, | |
| 11014 secundum quod ipsa peccata falsitates et mendacia dicuntur in | |
| 11015 Scripturis, secundum illud Psalmi IV, <i>ut quid diligitis | |
| 11016 vanitatem et quaeritis mendacium?</i> Sicut per oppositum operatio | |
| 11017 virtuosa veritas vitae nominatur, inquantum subditur ordini divini | |
| 11018 intellectus; sicut dicitur Ioan. III, <i>qui facit veritatem, venit | |
| 11019 ad lucem</i>. Sed per ordinem ad intellectum nostrum, ad quem | |
| 11020 comparantur res naturales per accidens, possunt dici falsae, non | |
| 11021 simpliciter, sed secundum quid. Et hoc dupliciter. Uno modo, | |
| 11022 secundum rationem significati, ut dicatur illud esse falsum in | |
| 11023 rebus, quod significatur vel repraesentatur oratione vel intellectu | |
| 11024 falso. Secundum quem modum quaelibet res potest dici esse falsa, | |
| 11025 quantum ad id quod ei non inest, sicut si dicamus diametrum esse | |
| 11026 falsum commensurabile, ut dicit philosophus in V Metaphys.; et | |
| 11027 sicut dicit Augustinus, in libro Soliloq., quod <i>tragoedus est | |
| 11028 falsus Hector</i>. Sicut e contrario potest unumquodque dici verum, | |
| 11029 secundum id quod competit ei. Alio modo, per modum causae. Et sic | |
| 11030 dicitur res esse falsa, quae nata est facere de se opinionem | |
| 11031 falsam. Et quia innatum est nobis per ea quae exterius apparent de | |
| 11032 rebus iudicare, eo quod nostra cognitio a sensu ortum habet, qui | |
| 11033 primo et per se est exteriorum accidentium; ideo ea quae in | |
| 11034 exterioribus accidentibus habent similitudinem aliarum rerum, | |
| 11035 dicuntur esse falsa secundum illas res; sicut fel est falsum mel, | |
| 11036 et stannum est falsum argentum. Et secundum hoc dicit Augustinus, | |
| 11037 in libro Soliloq., quod <i>eas res falsas nominamus, quae | |
| 11038 verisimilia apprehendimus</i>. Et philosophus dicit, in V | |
| 11039 Metaphys., quod <i>falsa dicuntur quaecumque apta nata sunt | |
| 11040 apparere aut qualia non sunt, aut quae non sunt</i>. Et per hunc | |
| 11041 modum etiam dicitur homo falsus, inquantum est amativus falsarum | |
| 11042 opinionum vel locutionum. Non autem ex hoc quod potest eas | |
| 11043 confingere, quia sic etiam sapientes et scientes falsi dicerentur, | |
| 11044 ut dicitur in V Metaphys.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q17_A1-p9"> | |
| 11045 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> A thing compared with the intellect is said to be true in respect to what it is; and false in respect to what it is not. | |
| 11046 Hence, "The true tragedian is a false Hector," as stated in Soliloq. ii, 6. As, therefore, in things that are is found a certain | |
| 11047 non-being, so in things that are is found a degree of falseness. | |
| 11048 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 17 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="29118" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29118] Iª q. 17 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo | |
| 11049 dicendum quod res comparata ad intellectum, secundum id quod est, | |
| 11050 dicitur vera, secundum id quod non est, dicitur falsa. <i>Unde | |
| 11051 verus tragoedus est falsus Hector</i>, ut dicitur in II Soliloq. | |
| 11052 Sicut igitur in his quae sunt, invenitur quoddam non esse; ita in | |
| 11053 his quae sunt, invenitur quaedam ratio falsitatis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q17_A1-p10"> | |
| 11054 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Things do not deceive by their own nature, but by accident. For they give occasion to falsity, by the likeness they bear | |
| 11055 to things which they actually are not. | |
| 11056 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 17 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="29119" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29119] Iª q. 17 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 11057 dicendum quod res per se non fallunt, sed per accidens. Dant enim | |
| 11058 occasionem falsitatis, eo quod similitudinem eorum gerunt, quorum | |
| 11059 non habent existentiam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q17_A1-p11"> | |
| 11060 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Things are said to be false, not as compared with the divine intellect, in which case they would be false simply, but as | |
| 11061 compared with our intellect; and thus they are false only relatively. | |
| 11062 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 17 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="29120" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29120] Iª q. 17 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 11063 dicendum quod per comparationem ad intellectum divinum non dicuntur | |
| 11064 res falsae, quod esset eas esse falsas simpliciter, sed per | |
| 11065 comparationem ad intellectum nostrum, quod est eas esse falsas | |
| 11066 secundum quid.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q17_A1-p12"><b>Reply to further objection:</b> To the argument which is urged on the contrary, likeness or defective representation does not involve the idea of falsity | |
| 11067 except in so far as it gives occasion to false opinion. Hence a thing is not always said to be false, because it resembles | |
| 11068 another thing; but only when the resemblance is such as naturally to produce a false opinion, not in any one case, but in | |
| 11069 the majority of instances. | |
| 11070 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 17 a. 1 ad 4"><a name="29121" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29121] Iª q. 17 a. 1 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum, quod | |
| 11071 in oppositum obiicitur, dicendum quod similitudo vel repraesentatio | |
| 11072 deficiens non inducit rationem falsitatis, nisi inquantum praestat | |
| 11073 occasionem falsae opinionis. Unde non ubicumque est similitudo, | |
| 11074 dicitur res falsa, sed ubicumque est talis similitudo, quae nata | |
| 11075 est facere opinionem falsam, non cuicumque, sed ut in pluribus.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q17_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q17_A2-p0.1">Q. 17. A. 2. Whether there is falsity in the senses?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q17_A2-p2"> | |
| 11076 <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that falsity is not in the senses. For Augustine says (De Vera Relig. 33): "If all the bodily senses report as they | |
| 11077 are affected, I do not know what more we can require from them." Thus it seems that we are not deceived by the senses; and | |
| 11078 therefore that falsity is not in them. | |
| 11079 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 17 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="29122" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29122] Iª q. 17 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum sic | |
| 11080 proceditur. Videtur quod in sensu non sit falsitas. Dicit enim | |
| 11081 Augustinus, in libro de vera Relig., <i>si omnes corporis sensus | |
| 11082 ita nuntiant ut afficiuntur, quid ab eis amplius exigere debemus, | |
| 11083 ignoro</i>. Et sic videtur quod ex sensibus non fallamur. Et sic | |
| 11084 falsitas in sensu non est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q17_A2-p3"> | |
| 11085 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the Philosopher says (Metaph. iv, 24) that falsity is not proper to the senses, but to the imagination. | |
| 11086 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 17 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="29123" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29123] Iª q. 17 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 11087 philosophus dicit, in IV Metaphys., quod <i>falsitas non est | |
| 11088 propria sensui, sed phantasiae</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q17_A2-p4"> | |
| 11089 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, in non-complex things there is neither true nor false, but in complex things only. But affirmation and negation | |
| 11090 do not belong to the senses. Therefore in the senses there is no falsity. | |
| 11091 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 17 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="29124" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29124] Iª q. 17 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, in | |
| 11092 incomplexis non est verum nec falsum, sed solum in complexis. Sed | |
| 11093 componere et dividere non pertinet ad sensum. Ergo in sensu non est | |
| 11094 falsitas.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q17_A2-p5"> | |
| 11095 <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (Soliloq. ii, 6), "It appears that the senses entrap us into error by their deceptive similitudes." | |
| 11096 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 17 a. 2 s. c."><a name="29125" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29125] Iª q. 17 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est | |
| 11097 quod dicit Augustinus, in libro Soliloq., <i>apparet nos in omnibus | |
| 11098 sensibus similitudine lenocinante falli</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q17_A2-p6"> | |
| 11099 <b>I answer that,</b> Falsity is not to be sought in the senses except as truth is in them. Now truth is not in them in such a way as that the | |
| 11100 senses know truth, but in so far as they apprehend sensible things truly, as said above ( | |
| 11101 <a id="FP_Q17_A2-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q16_A2.html">Q[16], A[2]</a>), and this takes place through the senses apprehending things as they are, and hence it happens that falsity exists in the | |
| 11102 senses through their apprehending or judging things to be otherwise than they really | |
| 11103 are. | |
| 11104 </p><p id="FP_Q17_A2-p7"> The knowledge of things by the senses is in proportion to the existence of their likeness in the senses; and the likeness | |
| 11105 of a thing can exist in the senses in three ways. In the first way, primarily and of its own nature, as in sight there is | |
| 11106 the likeness of colors, and of other sensible objects proper to it. Secondly, of its own nature, though not primarily; as | |
| 11107 in sight there is the likeness of shape, size, and of other sensible objects common to more than one sense. Thirdly, | |
| 11108 neither primarily nor of its own nature, but accidentally, as in sight, there is the likeness of a man, not as man, but in | |
| 11109 so far as it is accidental to the colored object to be a man. | |
| 11110 </p><p id="FP_Q17_A2-p8"> Sense, then, has no false knowledge about its proper objects, except accidentally and rarely, and then, because of the unsound | |
| 11111 organ it does not receive the sensible form rightly; just as other passive subjects because of their indisposition receive | |
| 11112 defectively the impressions of the agent. Hence, for instance, it happens that on account of an unhealthy tongue sweet seems | |
| 11113 bitter to a sick person. But as to common objects of sense, and accidental objects, even a rightly disposed | |
| 11114 sense may have a false judgment, because it is referred to them not directly, but accidentally, or as a consequence of being | |
| 11115 directed to other things. | |
| 11116 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 17 a. 2 co."><a name="29126" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29126] Iª q. 17 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum | |
| 11117 quod falsitas non est quaerenda in sensu, nisi sicut ibi est | |
| 11118 veritas. Veritas autem non sic est in sensu, ut sensus cognoscat | |
| 11119 veritatem; sed inquantum veram apprehensionem habet de | |
| 11120 sensibilibus, ut supra dictum est. Quod quidem contingit eo quod | |
| 11121 apprehendit res ut sunt. Unde contingit falsitatem esse in sensu, | |
| 11122 ex hoc quod apprehendit vel iudicat res aliter quam sint. Sic autem | |
| 11123 se habet ad cognoscendum res, inquantum similitudo rerum est in | |
| 11124 sensu. Similitudo autem alicuius rei est in sensu tripliciter. Uno | |
| 11125 modo, primo et per se; sicut in visu est similitudo colorum et | |
| 11126 aliorum propriorum sensibilium. Alio modo, per se, sed non primo; | |
| 11127 sicut in visu est similitudo figurae vel magnitudinis, et aliorum | |
| 11128 communium sensibilium. Tertio modo, nec primo nec per se, sed per | |
| 11129 accidens; sicut in visu est similitudo hominis, non inquantum est | |
| 11130 homo, sed inquantum huic colorato accidit esse hominem. Et circa | |
| 11131 propria sensibilia sensus non habet falsam cognitionem, nisi per | |
| 11132 accidens, et ut in paucioribus, ex eo scilicet quod, propter | |
| 11133 indispositionem organi, non convenienter recipit formam sensibilem, | |
| 11134 sicut et alia passiva, propter suam indispositionem, deficienter | |
| 11135 recipiunt impressionem agentium. Et inde est quod, propter | |
| 11136 corruptionem linguae, infirmis dulcia amara esse videntur. De | |
| 11137 sensibilibus vero communibus et per accidens, potest esse falsum | |
| 11138 iudicium etiam in sensu recte disposito, quia sensus non directe | |
| 11139 refertur ad illa, sed per accidens, vel ex consequenti, inquantum | |
| 11140 refertur ad alia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q17_A2-p9"> | |
| 11141 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The affection of sense is its sensation itself. Hence, from the fact that sense reports as it is affected, it follows that | |
| 11142 we are not deceived in the judgment by which we judge that we experience sensation. Since, however, sense is sometimes affected | |
| 11143 erroneously of that object, it follows that it sometimes reports erroneously of that object; and thus we are deceived by sense | |
| 11144 about the object, but not about the fact of sensation. | |
| 11145 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 17 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="29127" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29127] Iª q. 17 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo | |
| 11146 dicendum quod sensum affici, est ipsum eius sentire. Unde per hoc | |
| 11147 quod sensus ita nuntiant sicut afficiuntur, sequitur quod non | |
| 11148 decipiamur in iudicio quo iudicamus nos sentire aliquid. Sed ex eo | |
| 11149 quod sensus aliter afficitur interdum quam res sit, sequitur quod | |
| 11150 nuntiet nobis aliquando rem aliter quam sit. Et ex hoc fallimur per | |
| 11151 sensum circa rem, non circa ipsum sentire.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q17_A2-p10"> | |
| 11152 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Falsity is said not to be proper to sense, since sense is not deceived as to its proper object. Hence in another translation | |
| 11153 it is said more plainly, "Sense, about its proper object, is never false." Falsity is attributed to the imagination, as it | |
| 11154 represents the likeness of something even in its absence. Hence, when anyone perceives the likeness of a thing as if it were | |
| 11155 the thing itself, falsity results from such an apprehension; and for this reason | |
| 11156 the Philosopher says (Metaph. v, 34) that shadows, pictures, and dreams are said to be false inasmuch as they convey the likeness | |
| 11157 of things that are not present in substance. | |
| 11158 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 17 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="29128" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29128] Iª q. 17 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 11159 dicendum quod falsitas dicitur non esse propria sensui, quia non | |
| 11160 decipitur circa proprium obiectum. Unde in alia translatione | |
| 11161 planius dicitur, quod <i>sensus proprii sensibilis falsus non | |
| 11162 est</i>. Phantasiae autem attribuitur falsitas, quia repraesentat | |
| 11163 similitudinem rei etiam absentis; unde quando aliquis convertitur | |
| 11164 ad similitudinem rei tanquam ad rem ipsam, provenit ex tali | |
| 11165 apprehensione falsitas. Unde etiam philosophus, in V Metaphys., | |
| 11166 dicit quod umbrae et picturae et somnia dicuntur falsa, inquantum | |
| 11167 non subsunt res quarum habent similitudinem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q17_A2-p11"> | |
| 11168 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This argument proves that the false is not in the sense, as in that which knows the true and the false. | |
| 11169 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 17 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="29129" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29129] Iª q. 17 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 11170 dicendum quod ratio illa procedit, quod falsitas non sit in sensu | |
| 11171 sicut in cognoscente verum et falsum.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q17_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q17_A3-p0.1">Q. 17. A. 3. Whether falsity is in the intellect?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q17_A3-p2"> | |
| 11172 <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that falsity is not in the intellect. For Augustine says (Qq. lxxxiii, 32), "Everyone who is deceived, understands | |
| 11173 not that in which he is deceived." But falsity is said to exist in any knowledge in so far as we are deceived therein. Therefore | |
| 11174 falsity does not exist in the intellect. | |
| 11175 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 17 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="29130" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29130] Iª q. 17 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium sic | |
| 11176 proceditur. Videtur quod falsitas non sit in intellectu. Dicit enim | |
| 11177 Augustinus, in libro octoginta trium quaest., <i>omnis qui | |
| 11178 fallitur, id in quo fallitur, non intelligit</i>. Sed falsum | |
| 11179 dicitur esse in aliqua cognitione, secundum quod per eam fallimur. | |
| 11180 Ergo in intellectu non est falsitas.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q17_A3-p3"> | |
| 11181 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 51) that the intellect is always right. Therefore there is no falsity in the | |
| 11182 intellect. | |
| 11183 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 17 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="29131" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29131] Iª q. 17 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 11184 philosophus dicit, in III de anima, quod intellectus semper est | |
| 11185 rectus. Non ergo in intellectu est falsitas.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q17_A3-p4"> | |
| 11186 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is said in De Anima iii, 21,[22] that "where there is composition of objects understood, there is truth and falsehood." | |
| 11187 But such composition is in the intellect. Therefore truth and falsehood exist in the intellect. | |
| 11188 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 17 a. 3 s. c."><a name="29132" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29132] Iª q. 17 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est | |
| 11189 quod dicitur in III de anima, quod <i>ubi compositio intellectuum | |
| 11190 est, ibi verum et falsum est</i>. Sed compositio intellectuum est | |
| 11191 in intellectu. Ergo verum et falsum est in intellectu.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q17_A3-p5"> | |
| 11192 <b>I answer that,</b> Just as a thing has being by its proper form, so the knowing faculty has knowledge by the likeness of the thing known. Hence, | |
| 11193 as natural things cannot fall short of the being that belongs to them by their form, but may fall short of accidental or consequent | |
| 11194 qualities, even as a man may fail to possess two feet, but not fail to be a man; so the faculty of knowing cannot fail in | |
| 11195 knowledge of the thing with the likeness of which it is informed; but may fail | |
| 11196 with regard to something consequent upon that form, or accidental thereto. For it has been said | |
| 11197 <a id="FP_Q17_A3-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q17_A2.html">(A[2])</a> that sight is not deceived in its proper sensible, but about common sensibles that are consequent to that object; or about | |
| 11198 accidental objects of sense. Now as the sense is directly informed by the likeness of its proper object, so is the intellect | |
| 11199 by the likeness of the essence of a thing. Hence the intellect is not deceived about the essence of a thing, as neither the | |
| 11200 sense about its proper object. But in affirming and denying, the intellect may be deceived, by attributing to the thing of | |
| 11201 which it understands the essence, something which is not consequent upon it, or is opposed to it. For the intellect is in | |
| 11202 the same position as regards judging of such things, as sense is as to judging of common, or accidental, sensible objects. | |
| 11203 There is, however, this difference, as before mentioned regarding truth ( | |
| 11204 <a id="FP_Q17_A3-p5.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q16_A2.html">Q[16], A[2]</a>), that falsity can | |
| 11205 exist in the intellect not only because the intellect is conscious of that knowledge, as it is conscious of truth; whereas | |
| 11206 in sense falsity does not exist as known, as stated above | |
| 11207 <a id="FP_Q17_A3-p5.3" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q17_A2.html">(A[2])</a>. | |
| 11208 </p><p id="FP_Q17_A3-p6"> But because falsity of the intellect is concerned essentially only with the composition of the intellect, falsity occurs | |
| 11209 also accidentally in that operation of the intellect whereby it knows the essence of a thing, in so far as composition of | |
| 11210 the intellect is mixed up in it. This can take place in two ways. In one way, by the intellect applying to one thing the definition | |
| 11211 proper to another; as that of a circle to a man. Wherefore the definition of one thing is false of another. | |
| 11212 In another way, by composing a definition of parts which are mutually exclusive. For thus the definition is not only false | |
| 11213 of the thing, but false in itself. A definition such as " a reasonable four-footed animal" would be of this kind, and the | |
| 11214 intellect false in making it; for such a statement as "some reasonable animals are four-footed" is false in itself. For this | |
| 11215 reason the intellect cannot be false in its knowledge of simple essences; but it is either true, or it understands nothing | |
| 11216 at | |
| 11217 all. | |
| 11218 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 17 a. 3 co."><a name="29133" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29133] Iª q. 17 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum | |
| 11219 quod, sicut res habet esse per propriam formam, ita virtus | |
| 11220 cognoscitiva habet cognoscere per similitudinem rei cognitae. Unde, | |
| 11221 sicut res naturalis non deficit ab esse quod sibi competit secundum | |
| 11222 suam formam, potest autem deficere ab aliquibus accidentalibus vel | |
| 11223 consequentibus; sicut homo ab hoc quod est habere duos pedes, non | |
| 11224 autem ab hoc quod est esse hominem, ita virtus cognoscitiva non | |
| 11225 deficit in cognoscendo respectu illius rei cuius similitudine | |
| 11226 informatur; potest autem deficere circa aliquid consequens ad | |
| 11227 ipsam, vel accidens ei. Sicut est dictum quod visus non decipitur | |
| 11228 circa sensibile proprium, sed circa sensibilia communia, quae | |
| 11229 consequenter se habent ad illud, et circa sensibilia per accidens. | |
| 11230 Sicut autem sensus informatur directe similitudine propriorum | |
| 11231 sensibilium, ita intellectus informatur similitudine quidditatis | |
| 11232 rei. Unde circa quod quid est intellectus non decipitur, sicut | |
| 11233 neque sensus circa sensibilia propria. In componendo vero vel | |
| 11234 dividendo potest decipi, dum attribuit rei cuius quidditatem | |
| 11235 intelligit, aliquid quod eam non consequitur, vel quod ei | |
| 11236 opponitur. Sic enim se habet intellectus ad iudicandum de | |
| 11237 huiusmodi, sicut sensus ad iudicandum de sensibilibus communibus | |
| 11238 vel per accidens. Hac tamen differentia servata, quae supra circa | |
| 11239 veritatem dicta est, quod falsitas in intellectu esse potest, non | |
| 11240 solum quia cognitio intellectus falsa est, sed quia intellectus eam | |
| 11241 cognoscit, sicut et veritatem, in sensu autem falsitas non est ut | |
| 11242 cognita, ut dictum est. Quia vero falsitas intellectus per se solum | |
| 11243 circa compositionem intellectus est, per accidens etiam in | |
| 11244 operatione intellectus qua cognoscit quod quid est, potest esse | |
| 11245 falsitas, inquantum ibi compositio intellectus admiscetur. Quod | |
| 11246 potest esse dupliciter. Uno modo, secundum quod intellectus | |
| 11247 definitionem unius attribuit alteri; ut si definitionem circuli | |
| 11248 attribuat homini. Unde definitio unius rei est falsa de altera. | |
| 11249 Alio modo, secundum quod partes definitionis componit ad invicem, | |
| 11250 quae simul sociari non possunt, sic enim definitio non est solum | |
| 11251 falsa respectu alicuius rei, sed est falsa in se. Ut si formet | |
| 11252 talem definitionem, animal rationale quadrupes, falsus est | |
| 11253 intellectus sic definiendo, propterea quod falsus est in formando | |
| 11254 hanc compositionem, aliquod animal rationale est quadrupes. Et | |
| 11255 propter hoc, in cognoscendo quidditates simplices non potest esse | |
| 11256 intellectus falsus, sed vel est verus, vel totaliter nihil | |
| 11257 intelligit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q17_A3-p7"> | |
| 11258 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Because the essence of a thing is the proper object of the intellect, we are properly said to understand a thing when we | |
| 11259 reduce it to its essence, and judge of it thereby; as takes place in demonstrations, in which there is no falsity. In this | |
| 11260 sense Augustine's words must be understood, "that he who is deceived, understands not that wherein he is deceived;" and not | |
| 11261 in the sense that no one is ever deceived in any operation of the intellect. | |
| 11262 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 17 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="29134" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29134] Iª q. 17 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo | |
| 11263 dicendum quod, quia quidditas rei est proprium obiectum | |
| 11264 intellectus, propter hoc tunc proprie dicimur aliquid intelligere, | |
| 11265 quando, reducentes illud in quod quid est, sic de eo iudicamus, | |
| 11266 sicut accidit in demonstrationibus, in quibus non est falsitas. Et | |
| 11267 hoc modo intelligitur verbum Augustini, quod omnis qui fallitur, | |
| 11268 non intelligit id in quo fallitur, non autem ita, quod in nulla | |
| 11269 operatione intellectus aliquis fallatur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q17_A3-p8"> | |
| 11270 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The intellect is always right as regards first principles; since it is not deceived about them for the same reason that it | |
| 11271 is not deceived about what a thing is. For self-known principles are such as are known as soon as the terms are understood, | |
| 11272 from the fact that the predicate is contained in the definition of the subject. | |
| 11273 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 17 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="29135" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29135] Iª q. 17 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 11274 dicendum quod intellectus semper est rectus, secundum quod | |
| 11275 intellectus est principiorum, circa quae non decipitur, ex eadem | |
| 11276 causa qua non decipitur circa quod quid est. Nam principia per se | |
| 11277 nota sunt illa quae statim, intellectis terminis, cognoscuntur, ex | |
| 11278 eo quod praedicatum ponitur in definitione subiecti.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q17_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q17_A4-p0.1">Q. 17. A. 4. Whether true and false are contraries?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q17_A4-p2"> | |
| 11279 <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that true and false are not contraries. For true and false are opposed, as that which is to that which is not; for | |
| 11280 "truth," as Augustine says (Soliloq. ii, 5), "is that which is." But that which is and that which is not are not opposed as | |
| 11281 contraries. Therefore true and false are not contrary things. | |
| 11282 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 17 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="29136" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29136] Iª q. 17 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum sic | |
| 11283 proceditur. Videtur quod verum et falsum non sint contraria. Verum | |
| 11284 enim et falsum opponuntur sicut quod est et quod non est, <i>nam | |
| 11285 verum est id quod est</i>, ut dicit Augustinus. Sed quod est et | |
| 11286 quod non est, non opponuntur ut contraria. Ergo verum et falsum non | |
| 11287 sunt contraria.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q17_A4-p3"> | |
| 11288 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, one of two contraries is not in the other. But falsity is in truth, because, as Augustine says, (Soliloq. ii, 10), | |
| 11289 "A tragedian would not be a false Hector, if he were not a true tragedian." Therefore true and false are not contraries. | |
| 11290 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 17 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="29137" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29137] Iª q. 17 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, unum | |
| 11291 contrariorum non est in alio. Sed falsum est in vero, quia, sicut | |
| 11292 dicit Augustinus in libro Soliloq., <i>tragoedus non esset falsus | |
| 11293 Hector, si non esset verus tragoedus</i>. Ergo verum et falsum non | |
| 11294 sunt contraria.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q17_A4-p4"> | |
| 11295 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, in God there is no contrariety, for "nothing is contrary to the Divine Substance," as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei | |
| 11296 xii, 2). But falsity is opposed to God, for an idol is called in Scripture a lie, "They have laid hold on lying" ( | |
| 11297 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q17_A4-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Jer.8.5" target="asv">Jer. 8:5</a>), that is to say, "an idol," as a gloss says. Therefore false and true are not contraries. | |
| 11298 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 17 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="29138" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29138] Iª q. 17 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, in | |
| 11299 Deo non est contrarietas aliqua, nihil enim divinae substantiae est | |
| 11300 contrarium, ut dicit Augustinus, XII de Civit. Dei. Sed Deo | |
| 11301 opponitur falsitas, nam idolum in Scriptura mendacium nominatur, | |
| 11302 Ierem. VIII, <i>apprehenderunt mendacium</i>; Glossa, <i>idest | |
| 11303 idola</i>. Ergo verum et falsum non sunt contraria.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q17_A4-p5"> | |
| 11304 <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (Peri Herm. ii), that a false opinion is contrary to a true one. | |
| 11305 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 17 a. 4 s. c."><a name="29139" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29139] Iª q. 17 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est | |
| 11306 quod dicit philosophus, in II Periherm., ponit enim falsam | |
| 11307 opinionem verae contrariam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q17_A4-p6"> | |
| 11308 <b>I answer that,</b> True and false are opposed as contraries, and not, as some have said, as affirmation and negation. In proof of which it must | |
| 11309 be considered that negation neither asserts anything nor determines any subject, and can therefore be said of being as of | |
| 11310 not-being, for instance not-seeing or not-sitting. But privation asserts nothing, whereas it determines its subject, for it | |
| 11311 is "negation in a subject," as stated in Metaph. iv, 4: v. 27; for blindness is not said | |
| 11312 except of one whose nature it is to see. Contraries, however, both assert something and determine the subject, for blackness | |
| 11313 is a species of color. Falsity asserts something, for a thing is false, as the Philosopher says (Metaph. iv, 27), inasmuch | |
| 11314 as something is said or seems to be something that it is not, or not to be what it really is. For as truth implies an adequate | |
| 11315 apprehension of a thing, so falsity implies the contrary. Hence it is clear that true and false are contraries. | |
| 11316 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 17 a. 4 co."><a name="29140" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29140] Iª q. 17 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum | |
| 11317 quod verum et falsum opponuntur ut contraria, et non sicut | |
| 11318 affirmatio et negatio, ut quidam dixerunt. Ad cuius evidentiam, | |
| 11319 sciendum est quod negatio neque ponit aliquid, neque determinat | |
| 11320 sibi aliquod subiectum. Et propter hoc, potest dici tam de ente | |
| 11321 quam de non ente; sicut non videns, et non sedens. Privatio autem | |
| 11322 non ponit aliquid, sed determinat sibi subiectum. Est enim negatio | |
| 11323 in subiecto, ut dicitur IV Metaphys., caecum enim non dicitur nisi | |
| 11324 de eo quod est natum videre. Contrarium vero et aliquid ponit, et | |
| 11325 subiectum determinat, nigrum enim est aliqua species coloris. | |
| 11326 Falsum autem aliquid ponit. Est enim falsum, ut dicit philosophus, | |
| 11327 IV Metaphys., ex eo quod dicitur vel videtur aliquid esse quod non | |
| 11328 est, vel non esse quod est. Sicut enim verum ponit acceptionem | |
| 11329 adaequatam rei, ita falsum acceptionem rei non adaequatam. Unde | |
| 11330 manifestum est quod verum et falsum sunt contraria.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q17_A4-p7"> | |
| 11331 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> What is in things is the truth of the thing; but what is apprehended, is the truth of the intellect, wherein truth primarily | |
| 11332 resides. Hence the false is that which is not as apprehended. To apprehend being, and not-being, implies contrariety; for, | |
| 11333 as the Philosopher proves (Peri Herm. ii), the contrary of this statement "God is good," is, "God is not good." | |
| 11334 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 17 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="29141" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29141] Iª q. 17 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo | |
| 11335 dicendum quod id quod est in rebus, est veritas rei sed id quod est | |
| 11336 ut apprehensum, est verum intellectus, in quo primo est veritas. | |
| 11337 Unde et falsum est id quod non est ut apprehensum. Apprehendere | |
| 11338 autem esse et non esse, contrarietatem habet, sicut probat | |
| 11339 philosophus, in II Periherm., quod huic opinioni, bonum est bonum, | |
| 11340 contraria est, bonum non est bonum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q17_A4-p8"> | |
| 11341 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Falsity is not founded in the truth which is contrary to it, just as evil is not founded in the good which is contrary to | |
| 11342 it, but in that which is its proper subject. This happens in either, because true and good are universals, and convertible | |
| 11343 with being. Hence, as every privation is founded in a subject, that is a being, so every evil is founded in some good, and | |
| 11344 every falsity in some truth. | |
| 11345 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 17 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="29142" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29142] Iª q. 17 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 11346 dicendum quod falsum non fundatur in vero sibi contrario, sicut nec | |
| 11347 malum in bono sibi contrario; sed in eo quod sibi subiicitur. Et | |
| 11348 hoc ideo in utroque accidit, quia verum et bonum communia sunt, et | |
| 11349 convertuntur cum ente, unde, sicut omnis privatio fundatur in | |
| 11350 subiecto quod est ens, ita omne malum fundatur in aliquo bono, et | |
| 11351 omne falsum in aliquo vero.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q17_A4-p9"> | |
| 11352 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Because contraries, and opposites by way of privation, are by nature about one and the same thing, therefore there is nothing | |
| 11353 contrary to God, considered in Himself, either with respect to His goodness or His truth, for in His intellect there can be | |
| 11354 nothing false. But in our apprehension of Him contraries exist, for the false opinion concerning Him is contrary to the true. | |
| 11355 So idols are called lies, opposed to the divine truth, inasmuch as the false | |
| 11356 opinion concerning them is contrary to the true opinion of the divine unity. | |
| 11357 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 17 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="29143" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29143] Iª q. 17 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 11358 dicendum quod, quia contraria et opposita privative nata sunt fieri | |
| 11359 circa idem, ideo Deo, prout in se consideratur, non est aliquid | |
| 11360 contrarium, neque ratione suae bonitatis, neque ratione suae | |
| 11361 veritatis, quia in intellectu eius non potest esse falsitas aliqua. | |
| 11362 Sed in apprehensione nostra habet aliquid contrarium, nam verae | |
| 11363 opinioni de ipso contrariatur falsa opinio. Et sic idola mendacia | |
| 11364 dicuntur opposita veritati divinae, inquantum falsa opinio de | |
| 11365 idolis contrariatur verae opinioni de unitate Dei.</p></div></div></div></div> | |
| 11366 <div id="FP_Q18" class="div3"> | |
| 11367 <h3 id="FP_Q18-p0.1">Q. 18. THE LIFE OF GOD (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3> | |
| 11368 <div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> | |
| 11369 <p id="FP_Q18-p2"> Since to understand belongs to living beings, after considering the divine knowledge and intellect, we must consider the | |
| 11370 divine life. About this, four points of inquiry arise: | |
| 11371 </p><p id="FP_Q18-p3"> (1) To whom does it belong to live?</p><p id="FP_Q18-p4"> (2) What is life?</p><p id="FP_Q18-p5"> (3) Whether life is properly attributed to God?</p><p id="FP_Q18-p6"> (4) Whether all things in God are life?</p> | |
| 11372 </div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 18 pr."><a name="29144" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29144] | |
| 11373 Iª q. 18 pr.</span></a> Quoniam autem intelligere viventium | |
| 11374 est, post considerationem de scientia et intellectu divino, | |
| 11375 considerandum est de vita ipsius. Et circa hoc quaeruntur quatuor. | |
| 11376 Primo, quorum sit vivere. Secundo, quid sit vita. Tertio, utrum | |
| 11377 vita Deo conveniat. Quarto, utrum omnia in Deo sint vita.</p></div></div></div> | |
| 11378 <div id="FP_Q18_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q18_A1-p0.1">Q. 18. A. 1. Whether to live belongs to all natural things?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q18_A1-p2"> | |
| 11379 <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that to live belongs to all natural things. For the Philosopher says (Phys. viii, 1) that "Movement is like a kind | |
| 11380 of life possessed by all things existing in nature." But all natural things participate in movement. Therefore all natural | |
| 11381 things partake of life. | |
| 11382 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 18 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="29145" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29145] Iª q. 18 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum sic | |
| 11383 proceditur. Videtur quod omnium rerum naturalium sit vivere. Dicit | |
| 11384 enim philosophus, in VIII Physic., quod motus est ut vita quaedam | |
| 11385 natura existentibus omnibus. Sed omnes res naturales participant | |
| 11386 motum. Ergo omnes res naturales participant vitam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q18_A1-p3"> | |
| 11387 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, plants are said to live, inasmuch as they in themselves a principle of movement of growth and decay. But local movement | |
| 11388 is naturally more perfect than, and prior to, movement of growth and decay, as the Philosopher shows (Phys. viii, 56,57). | |
| 11389 Since then, all natural bodies have in themselves some principle of local movement, it seems that all natural bodies live. | |
| 11390 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 18 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="29146" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29146] Iª q. 18 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 11391 plantae dicuntur vivere, inquantum habent in seipsis principium | |
| 11392 motus augmenti et decrementi. Sed motus localis est perfectior et | |
| 11393 prior secundum naturam quam motus augmenti et decrementi, ut | |
| 11394 probatur in VIII Physic. Cum igitur omnia corpora naturalia habeant | |
| 11395 aliquod principium motus localis, videtur quod omnia corpora | |
| 11396 naturalia vivant.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q18_A1-p4"> | |
| 11397 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, amongst natural bodies the elements are the less perfect. Yet life is attributed to them, for we speak of "living | |
| 11398 waters." Much more, therefore, have other natural bodies life. | |
| 11399 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 18 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="29147" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29147] Iª q. 18 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, inter | |
| 11400 corpora naturalia imperfectiora sunt elementa. Sed eis attribuitur | |
| 11401 vita, dicuntur enim aquae vivae. Ergo multo magis alia corpora | |
| 11402 naturalia vitam habent.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q18_A1-p5"> | |
| 11403 <b>On the contrary,</b> Dionysius says (Div. Nom. vi, 1) that "The last echo of life is heard in the plants," whereby it is inferred that their life | |
| 11404 is life in its lowest degree. But inanimate bodies are inferior to plants. Therefore they have not life. | |
| 11405 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 18 a. 1 s. c."><a name="29148" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29148] Iª q. 18 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est | |
| 11406 quod dicit Dionysius, VI cap. de Div. Nom., quod <i>plantae | |
| 11407 secundum ultimam resonantiam vitae habent vivere</i>, ex quo potest | |
| 11408 accipi quod ultimum gradum vitae obtinent plantae. Sed corpora | |
| 11409 inanimata sunt infra plantas. Ergo eorum non est vivere.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q18_A1-p6"> | |
| 11410 <b>I answer that,</b> We can gather to what things life belongs, and to what it does not, from such things as manifestly possess life. Now life | |
| 11411 manifestly belongs to animals, for it said in De Vegetab. i [*De Plantis i, 1] that in animals life is manifest. We must, | |
| 11412 therefore, distinguish living from lifeless things, by comparing them to that by reason of which animals are said to live: | |
| 11413 and this it is in which life is manifested first and remains last. We say then that an animal | |
| 11414 begins to live when it begins to move of itself: and as long as such movement appears in it, so long as it is considered to | |
| 11415 be alive. When it no longer has any movement of itself, but is only moved by another power, then its life is said to fail, | |
| 11416 and the animal to be dead. Whereby it is clear that those things are properly called living that move themselves by some kind | |
| 11417 of movement, whether it be movement properly so called, as the act of an imperfect being, i.e. of a thing in potentiality, | |
| 11418 is | |
| 11419 called movement; or movement in a more general sense, as when said of the act of a perfect thing, as understanding and feeling | |
| 11420 are called movement. Accordingly all things are said to be alive that determine themselves to movement or operation of any | |
| 11421 kind: whereas those things that cannot by their nature do so, cannot be called living, unless by a similitude. | |
| 11422 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 18 a. 1 co."><a name="29149" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29149] Iª q. 18 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum | |
| 11423 quod ex his quae manifeste vivunt, accipere possumus quorum sit | |
| 11424 vivere, et quorum non sit vivere. Vivere autem manifeste animalibus | |
| 11425 convenit, dicitur enim in libro de vegetabilibus, quod <i>vita in | |
| 11426 animalibus manifesta est</i>. Unde secundum illud oportet | |
| 11427 distinguere viventia a non viventibus secundum quod animalia | |
| 11428 dicuntur vivere. Hoc autem est in quo primo manifestatur vita, et | |
| 11429 in quo ultimo remanet. Primo autem dicimus animal vivere, quando | |
| 11430 incipit ex se motum habere; et tandiu iudicatur animal vivere, | |
| 11431 quandiu talis motus in eo apparet; quando vero iam ex se non habet | |
| 11432 aliquem motum, sed movetur tantum ab alio tunc dicitur animal | |
| 11433 mortuum, per defectum vitae. Ex quo patet quod illa proprie sunt | |
| 11434 viventia, quae seipsa secundum aliquam speciem motus movent; sive | |
| 11435 accipiatur motus proprie, sicut motus dicitur actus imperfecti, | |
| 11436 idest existentis in potentia; sive motus accipiatur communiter, | |
| 11437 prout motus dicitur actus perfecti, prout intelligere et sentire | |
| 11438 dicitur moveri, ut dicitur in III de anima. Ut sic viventia | |
| 11439 dicantur quaecumque se agunt ad motum vel operationem aliquam, ea | |
| 11440 vero in quorum natura non est ut se agant ad aliquem motum vel | |
| 11441 operationem, viventia dici non possunt, nisi per aliquam | |
| 11442 similitudinem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q18_A1-p7"> | |
| 11443 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> These words of the Philosopher may be understood either of the first movement, namely, that of the celestial bodies, or of | |
| 11444 the movement in its general sense. In either way is movement called the life, as it were, of natural bodies, speaking by a | |
| 11445 similitude, and not attributing it to them as their property. The movement of the heavens is in the universe of corporeal | |
| 11446 natures as the movement of the heart, whereby life is preserved, is in animals. | |
| 11447 Similarly also every natural movement in respect to natural things has a certain similitude to the operations of life. Hence, | |
| 11448 if the whole corporeal universe were one animal, so that its movement came from an "intrinsic moving force," as some in fact | |
| 11449 have held, in that case movement would really be the life of all natural bodies. | |
| 11450 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 18 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="29150" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29150] Iª q. 18 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo | |
| 11451 dicendum quod verbum illud philosophi potest intelligi vel de motu | |
| 11452 primo, scilicet corporum caelestium; vel de motu communiter. Et | |
| 11453 utroque modo motus dicitur quasi vita corporum naturalium, per | |
| 11454 similitudinem; et non per proprietatem. Nam motus caeli est in | |
| 11455 universo corporalium naturarum, sicut motus cordis in animali, quo | |
| 11456 conservatur vita. Similiter etiam quicumque motus naturalis hoc | |
| 11457 modo se habet ad res naturales, ut quaedam similitudo vitalis | |
| 11458 operationis. Unde, si totum universum corporale esset unum animal, | |
| 11459 ita quod iste motus esset a movente intrinseco, ut quidam | |
| 11460 posuerunt, sequeretur quod motus esset vita omnium naturalium | |
| 11461 corporum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q18_A1-p8"> | |
| 11462 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> To bodies, whether heavy or light, movement does not belong, except in so far as they are displaced from their natural conditions, | |
| 11463 and are out of their proper place; for when they are in the place that is proper and natural to them, then they are at rest. | |
| 11464 Plants and other living things move with vital movement, in accordance with the disposition of their nature, but not by approaching | |
| 11465 thereto, or by receding from it, for in so far as they recede from | |
| 11466 such movement, so far do they recede from their natural disposition. Heavy and light bodies are moved by an extrinsic force, | |
| 11467 either generating them and giving them form, or removing obstacles from their way. They do not therefore move themselves, | |
| 11468 as do living bodies. | |
| 11469 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 18 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="29151" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29151] Iª q. 18 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 11470 dicendum quod corporibus gravibus et levibus non competit moveri, | |
| 11471 nisi secundum quod sunt extra dispositionem suae naturae, utpote | |
| 11472 cum sunt extra locum proprium, cum enim sunt in loco proprio et | |
| 11473 naturali, quiescunt. Sed plantae et aliae res viventes moventur | |
| 11474 motu vitali, secundum hoc quod sunt in sua dispositione naturali, | |
| 11475 non autem in accedendo ad eam vel in recedendo ab ea, imo secundum | |
| 11476 quod recedunt a tali motu, recedunt a naturali dispositione. Et | |
| 11477 praeterea, corpora gravia et levia moventur a motore extrinseco, | |
| 11478 vel generante, qui dat formam, vel removente prohibens, ut dicitur | |
| 11479 in VIII Physic., et ita non movent seipsa, sicut corpora | |
| 11480 viventia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q18_A1-p9"> | |
| 11481 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Waters are called living that have a continuous current: for standing waters, that are not connected with a continually flowing | |
| 11482 source, are called dead, as in cisterns and ponds. This is merely a similitude, inasmuch as the movement they are seen to | |
| 11483 possess makes them look as if they were alive. Yet this is not life in them in its real sense, since this movement of theirs | |
| 11484 is not from themselves but from the cause that generates them. The same is the | |
| 11485 case with the movement of other heavy and light bodies. | |
| 11486 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 18 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="29152" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29152] Iª q. 18 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 11487 dicendum quod aquae vivae dicuntur, quae habent continuum fluxum, | |
| 11488 aquae enim stantes, quae non continuantur ad principium continue | |
| 11489 fluens, dicuntur mortuae, ut aquae cisternarum et lacunarum. Et hoc | |
| 11490 dicitur per similitudinem, inquantum enim videntur se movere, | |
| 11491 habent similitudinem vitae. Sed tamen non est in eis vera ratio | |
| 11492 vitae, quia hunc motum non habent a seipsis, sed a causa generante | |
| 11493 eas; sicut accidit circa motum aliorum gravium et levium.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q18_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q18_A2-p0.1">Q. 18. A. 2. Whether life is an operation?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q18_A2-p2"> | |
| 11494 <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that life is an operation. For nothing is divided except into parts of the same genus. But life is divided by certain | |
| 11495 operations, as is clear from the Philosopher (De Anima ii, 13), who distinguishes four kinds of life, namely, nourishment, | |
| 11496 sensation, local movement and understanding. Therefore life is an operation. | |
| 11497 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 18 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="29153" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29153] Iª q. 18 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum sic | |
| 11498 proceditur. Videtur quod vita sit quaedam operatio. Nihil enim | |
| 11499 dividitur nisi per ea quae sunt sui generis. Sed vivere dividitur | |
| 11500 per operationes quasdam, ut patet per philosophum in II libro de | |
| 11501 anima, qui distinguit vivere per quatuor, scilicet alimento uti, | |
| 11502 sentire, moveri secundum locum, et intelligere. Ergo vita est | |
| 11503 operatio quaedam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q18_A2-p3"> | |
| 11504 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the active life is said to be different from the contemplative. But the contemplative is only distinguished from | |
| 11505 the active by certain operations. Therefore life is an operation. | |
| 11506 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 18 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="29154" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29154] Iª q. 18 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, vita | |
| 11507 activa dicitur alia esse a contemplativa. Sed contemplativi ab | |
| 11508 activis non diversificantur nisi secundum operationes quasdam. Ergo | |
| 11509 vita est quaedam operatio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q18_A2-p4"> | |
| 11510 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, to know God is an operation. But this is life, as is clear from the words of | |
| 11511 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q18_A2-p4.1" href="./asv.html#John.18.3" target="asv"> Jn. 18:3, </a> "Now this is eternal life, that they may know Thee, the only true God." Therefore life is an operation. | |
| 11512 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 18 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="29155" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29155] Iª q. 18 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 11513 cognoscere Deum est operatio quaedam. Haec autem est vita, ut patet | |
| 11514 per illud Ioan. XVII, <i>haec est autem vita aeterna, ut cognoscant | |
| 11515 te solum verum Deum</i>. Ergo vita est operatio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q18_A2-p5"> | |
| 11516 <b>On the contrary,</b> The Philosopher says (De Anima ii, 37), "In living things, to live is to be." | |
| 11517 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 18 a. 2 s. c."><a name="29156" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29156] Iª q. 18 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est | |
| 11518 quod dicit philosophus, in II de anima, <i>vivere viventibus est | |
| 11519 esse</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q18_A2-p6"> | |
| 11520 <b>I answer that,</b> As is clear from what has been said ( | |
| 11521 <a id="FP_Q18_A2-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q17_A3.html">Q[17], A[3]</a>), our intellect, which takes cognizance of the essence of a thing as its proper object, gains knowledge from sense, of which | |
| 11522 the proper objects are external accidents. Hence from external appearances we come to the knowledge of the essence of things. | |
| 11523 And because we name a thing in accordance with our knowledge of it, as is clear from what has already been said ( | |
| 11524 <a id="FP_Q18_A2-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q13_A1.html">Q[13], A[1]</a>), so from external properties names are often imposed to signify essences. Hence such names are sometimes taken strictly | |
| 11525 to denote the essence itself, the signification of which is their principal object; but sometimes, and less strictly, to denote | |
| 11526 the properties by reason of which they are imposed. And so we see that the word "body" is used to denote a genus of substances | |
| 11527 from the fact of their possessing three dimensions: and is sometimes taken to denote the | |
| 11528 dimensions themselves; in which sense body is said to be a species of quantity. The same must be said of life. The name is | |
| 11529 given from a certain external appearance, namely, self-movement, yet not precisely to signify this, but rather a substance | |
| 11530 to which self-movement and the application of itself to any kind of operation, belong naturally. To live, accordingly, is | |
| 11531 nothing else than to exist in this or that nature; and life signifies this, though in the abstract, just as the word "running" | |
| 11532 denotes "to run" in the abstract. | |
| 11533 </p><p id="FP_Q18_A2-p7"> Hence "living" is not an accidental but an essential predicate. Sometimes, however, life is used less properly for the operations | |
| 11534 from which its name is taken, and thus the Philosopher says (Ethic. ix, 9) that to live is principally to sense or to understand. | |
| 11535 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 18 a. 2 co."><a name="29157" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29157] Iª q. 18 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum | |
| 11536 quod, sicut ex dictis patet, intellectus noster, qui proprie est | |
| 11537 cognoscitivus quidditatis rei ut proprii obiecti, accipit a sensu, | |
| 11538 cuius propria obiecta sunt accidentia exteriora. Et inde est quod | |
| 11539 ex his quae exterius apparent de re, devenimus ad cognoscendam | |
| 11540 essentiam rei. Et quia sic nominamus aliquid sicut cognoscimus | |
| 11541 illud, ut ex supradictis patet, inde est quod plerumque a | |
| 11542 proprietatibus exterioribus imponuntur nomina ad significandas | |
| 11543 essentias rerum. Unde huiusmodi nomina quandoque accipiuntur | |
| 11544 proprie pro ipsis essentiis rerum, ad quas significandas | |
| 11545 principaliter sunt imposita, aliquando autem sumuntur pro | |
| 11546 proprietatibus a quibus imponuntur, et hoc minus proprie. Sicut | |
| 11547 patet quod hoc nomen corpus impositum est ad significandum quoddam | |
| 11548 genus substantiarum, ex eo quod in eis inveniuntur tres | |
| 11549 dimensiones, et ideo aliquando ponitur hoc nomen corpus ad | |
| 11550 significandas tres dimensiones, secundum quod corpus ponitur | |
| 11551 species quantitatis. Sic ergo dicendum est et de vita. Nam vitae | |
| 11552 nomen sumitur ex quodam exterius apparenti circa rem, quod est | |
| 11553 movere seipsum, non tamen est impositum hoc nomen ad hoc | |
| 11554 significandum, sed ad significandam substantiam cui convenit | |
| 11555 secundum suam naturam movere seipsam, vel agere se quocumque modo | |
| 11556 ad operationem. Et secundum hoc, vivere nihil aliud est quam esse | |
| 11557 in tali natura, et vita significat hoc ipsum, sed in abstracto; | |
| 11558 sicut hoc nomen cursus significat ipsum currere in abstracto. Unde | |
| 11559 vivum non est praedicatum accidentale, sed substantiale. Quandoque | |
| 11560 tamen vita sumitur minus proprie pro operationibus vitae, a quibus | |
| 11561 nomen vitae assumitur; sicut dicit philosophus, IX Ethic., quod | |
| 11562 <i>vivere principaliter est sentire vel intelligere</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q18_A2-p8"> | |
| 11563 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The Philosopher here takes "to live" to mean an operation of life. Or it would be better to say that sensation and intelligence | |
| 11564 and the like, are sometimes taken for the operations, sometimes for the existence itself of the operator. For he says (Ethic. | |
| 11565 ix, 9) that to live is to sense or to understand---in other words, to have a nature capable of sensation or understanding. | |
| 11566 Thus, then, he distinguishes life by the four operations mentioned. For in | |
| 11567 this lower world there are four kinds of living things. It is the nature of some to be capable of nothing more than taking | |
| 11568 nourishment, and, as a consequence, of growing and generating. Others are able, in addition, to sense, as we see in the case | |
| 11569 of shellfish and other animals without movement. Others have the further power of moving from place to place, as perfect animals, | |
| 11570 such as quadrupeds, and birds, and so on. Others, as man, have the still higher faculty of understanding. | |
| 11571 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 18 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="29158" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29158] Iª q. 18 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo | |
| 11572 dicendum quod philosophus ibi accipit vivere pro operatione vitae. | |
| 11573 Vel dicendum est melius, quod sentire et intelligere, et huiusmodi, | |
| 11574 quandoque sumuntur pro quibusdam operationibus; quandoque autem pro | |
| 11575 ipso esse sic operantium. Dicitur enim IX Ethic., quod <i>esse est | |
| 11576 sentire vel intelligere</i>, idest habere naturam ad sentiendum vel | |
| 11577 intelligendum. Et hoc modo distinguit philosophus vivere per illa | |
| 11578 quatuor. Nam in istis inferioribus quatuor sunt genera viventium. | |
| 11579 Quorum quaedam habent naturam solum ad utendum alimento, et ad | |
| 11580 consequentia, quae sunt augmentum et generatio; quaedam ulterius ad | |
| 11581 sentiendum, ut patet in animalibus immobilibus, sicut sunt ostrea; | |
| 11582 quaedam vero, cum his, ulterius ad movendum se secundum locum, | |
| 11583 sicut animalia perfecta, ut quadrupedia et volatilia et huiusmodi; | |
| 11584 quaedam vero ulterius ad intelligendum, sicut homines.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q18_A2-p9"> | |
| 11585 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> By vital operations are meant those whose principles are within the operator, and in virtue of which the operator produces | |
| 11586 such operations of itself. It happens that there exist in men not merely such natural principles of certain operations as | |
| 11587 are their natural powers, but something over and above these, such as habits inclining them like a second nature to particular | |
| 11588 kinds of operations, so that the operations become sources of pleasure. Thus, as by | |
| 11589 a similitude, any kind of work in which a man takes delight, so that his bent is towards it, his time spent in it, and his | |
| 11590 whole life ordered with a view to it, is said to be the life of that man. Hence some are said to lead to life of self-indulgence, | |
| 11591 others a life of virtue. In this way the contemplative life is distinguished from the active, and thus to know God is said | |
| 11592 to be life eternal. | |
| 11593 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 18 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="29159" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29159] Iª q. 18 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 11594 dicendum quod opera vitae dicuntur, quorum principia sunt in | |
| 11595 operantibus, ut seipsos inducant in tales operationes. Contingit | |
| 11596 autem aliquorum operum inesse hominibus non solum principia | |
| 11597 naturalia, ut sunt potentiae naturales; sed etiam quaedam | |
| 11598 superaddita, ut sunt habitus inclinantes ad quaedam operationum | |
| 11599 genera quasi per modum naturae, et facientes illas operationes esse | |
| 11600 delectabiles. Et ex hoc dicitur, quasi per quandam similitudinem, | |
| 11601 quod illa operatio quae est homini delectabilis, et ad quam | |
| 11602 inclinatur, et in qua conversatur, et ordinat vitam suam ad ipsam, | |
| 11603 dicitur vita hominis, unde quidam dicuntur agere vitam luxuriosam, | |
| 11604 quidam vitam honestam. Et per hunc modum vita contemplativa ab | |
| 11605 activa distinguitur. Et per hunc etiam modum cognoscere Deum | |
| 11606 dicitur vita aeterna.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q18_A2-p10"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Wherefore the Reply to the Third Objection is clear.</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 18 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="29160" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29160] Iª q. 18 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Unde patet solutio | |
| 11607 ad tertium.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q18_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q18_A3-p0.1">Q. 18. A. 3. Whether life is properly attributed to God?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q18_A3-p2"> | |
| 11608 <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that life is not properly attributed to God. For things are said to live inasmuch as they move themselves, as previously | |
| 11609 stated | |
| 11610 <a id="FP_Q18_A3-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q18_A2.html">(A[2])</a>. But movement does not belong to God. Neither therefore does life. | |
| 11611 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 18 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="29161" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29161] Iª q. 18 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium sic | |
| 11612 proceditur. Videtur quod Deo non conveniat vita. Vivere enim | |
| 11613 dicuntur aliqua secundum quod movent seipsa, ut dictum est. Sed Deo | |
| 11614 non competit moveri. Ergo neque vivere.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q18_A3-p3"> | |
| 11615 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, in all living things we must needs suppose some principle of life. Hence it is said by the Philosopher (De Anima | |
| 11616 ii, 4) that "the soul is the cause and principle of the living body." But God has no principle. Therefore life cannot be attributed | |
| 11617 to Him. | |
| 11618 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 18 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="29162" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29162] Iª q. 18 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, in | |
| 11619 omnibus quae vivunt, est accipere aliquod vivendi principium, unde | |
| 11620 dicitur in II de anima, quod <i>anima est viventis corporis causa | |
| 11621 et principium</i>. Sed Deus non habet aliquod principium. Ergo sibi | |
| 11622 non competit vivere.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q18_A3-p4"> | |
| 11623 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the principle of life in the living things that exist among us is the vegetative soul. But this exists only in corporeal | |
| 11624 things. Therefore life cannot be attributed to incorporeal things. | |
| 11625 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 18 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="29163" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29163] Iª q. 18 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 11626 principium vitae in rebus viventibus quae apud nos sunt, est anima | |
| 11627 vegetabilis, quae non est nisi in rebus corporalibus. Ergo rebus | |
| 11628 incorporalibus non competit vivere.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q18_A3-p5"> | |
| 11629 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is said ( | |
| 11630 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q18_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.83.3" target="asv">Ps. 83:3</a>): "My heart and my flesh have rejoiced in the living God." | |
| 11631 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 18 a. 3 s. c."><a name="29164" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29164] Iª q. 18 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est | |
| 11632 quod dicitur in Psalmo LXXXIII, <i>cor meum et caro mea | |
| 11633 exultaverunt in Deum vivum</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q18_A3-p6"> | |
| 11634 <b>I answer that,</b> Life is in the highest degree properly in God. In proof of which it must be considered that since a thing is said to live | |
| 11635 in so far as it operates of itself and not as moved by another, the more perfectly this power is found in anything, the more | |
| 11636 perfect is the life of that thing. In things that move and are moved, a threefold order is found. In the first place, the | |
| 11637 end moves the agent: and the principal agent is that which acts through its form, and | |
| 11638 sometimes it does so through some instrument that acts by virtue not of its own form, but of the principal agent, and does | |
| 11639 no more than execute the action. Accordingly there are things that move themselves, not in respect of any form or end naturally | |
| 11640 inherent in them, but only in respect of the executing of the movement; the form by which they act, and the end of the action | |
| 11641 being alike determined for them by their nature. Of this kind are plants, which move themselves according to their | |
| 11642 inherent nature, with regard only to executing the movements of growth and decay. | |
| 11643 </p><p id="FP_Q18_A3-p7"> Other things have self-movement in a higher degree, that is, not only with regard to executing the movement, but even as | |
| 11644 regards to the form, the principle of movement, which form they acquire of themselves. Of this kind are animals, in which | |
| 11645 the principle of movement is not a naturally implanted form; but one received through sense. Hence the more perfect is their | |
| 11646 sense, the more perfect is their power of self-movement. Such as have only the sense of touch, as shellfish, move | |
| 11647 only with the motion of expansion and contraction; and thus their movement hardly exceeds that of plants. Whereas such as | |
| 11648 have the sensitive power in perfection, so as to recognize not only connection and touch, but also objects apart from themselves, | |
| 11649 can move themselves to a distance by progressive movement. Yet although animals of the latter kind receive through sense the | |
| 11650 form that is the principle of their movement, nevertheless they cannot of themselves propose to themselves the end of | |
| 11651 their operation, or movement; for this has been implanted in them by nature; and by natural instinct they are moved to any | |
| 11652 action through the form apprehended by sense. Hence such animals as move themselves in respect to an end they themselves propose | |
| 11653 are superior to these. This can only be done by reason and intellect; whose province it is to know the proportion between | |
| 11654 the end and the means to that end, and duly coordinate them. Hence a more perfect degree of life is that of intelligible | |
| 11655 beings; for their power of self-movement is more perfect. This is shown by the fact that in one and the same man the intellectual | |
| 11656 faculty moves the sensitive powers; and these by their command move the organs of movement. Thus in the arts we see that the | |
| 11657 art of using a ship, i.e. the art of navigation, rules the art of ship-designing; and this in its turn rules the art that | |
| 11658 is only concerned with preparing the material for the ship. | |
| 11659 </p><p id="FP_Q18_A3-p8"> But although our intellect moves itself to some things, yet others are supplied by nature, as are first principles, which | |
| 11660 it cannot doubt; and the last end, which it cannot but will. Hence, although with respect to some things it moves itself, | |
| 11661 yet with regard to other things it must be moved by another. Wherefore that being whose act of understanding is its very nature, | |
| 11662 and which, in what it naturally possesses, is not determined by another, must have life in the most perfect | |
| 11663 degree. Such is God; and hence in Him principally is life. From this the Philosopher concludes (Metaph. xii, 51), after showing | |
| 11664 God to be intelligent, that God has life most perfect and eternal, since His intellect is most perfect and always in act. | |
| 11665 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 18 a. 3 co."><a name="29165" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29165] Iª q. 18 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum | |
| 11666 quod vita maxime proprie in Deo est. Ad cuius evidentiam, | |
| 11667 considerandum est quod, cum vivere dicantur aliqua secundum quod | |
| 11668 operantur ex seipsis, et non quasi ab aliis mota; quanto perfectius | |
| 11669 competit hoc alicui, tanto perfectius in eo invenitur vita. In | |
| 11670 moventibus autem et motis tria per ordinem inveniuntur. Nam primo, | |
| 11671 finis movet agentem; agens vero principale est quod per suam formam | |
| 11672 agit; et hoc interdum agit per aliquod instrumentum, quod non agit | |
| 11673 ex virtute suae formae, sed ex virtute principalis agentis; cui | |
| 11674 instrumento competit sola executio actionis. Inveniuntur igitur | |
| 11675 quaedam, quae movent seipsa, non habito respectu ad formam vel | |
| 11676 finem, quae inest eis a natura, sed solum quantum ad executionem | |
| 11677 motus, sed forma per quam agunt, et finis propter quem agunt, | |
| 11678 determinantur eis a natura. Et huiusmodi sunt plantae, quae | |
| 11679 secundum formam inditam eis a natura, movent seipsas secundum | |
| 11680 augmentum et decrementum. Quaedam vero ulterius movent seipsa, non | |
| 11681 solum habito respectu ad executionem motus, sed etiam quantum ad | |
| 11682 formam quae est principium motus, quam per se acquirunt. Et | |
| 11683 huiusmodi sunt animalia, quorum motus principium est forma non a | |
| 11684 natura indita, sed per sensum accepta. Unde quanto perfectiorem | |
| 11685 sensum habent, tanto perfectius movent seipsa. Nam ea quae non | |
| 11686 habent nisi sensum tactus, movent solum seipsa motu dilatationis et | |
| 11687 constrictionis, ut ostrea, parum excedentia motum plantae. Quae | |
| 11688 vero habent virtutem sensitivam perfectam, non solum ad | |
| 11689 cognoscendum coniuncta et tangentia, sed etiam ad cognoscendum | |
| 11690 distantia, movent seipsa in remotum motu processivo. Sed quamvis | |
| 11691 huiusmodi animalia formam quae est principium motus, per sensum | |
| 11692 accipiant, non tamen per seipsa praestituunt sibi finem suae | |
| 11693 operationis, vel sui motus; sed est eis inditus a natura, cuius | |
| 11694 instinctu ad aliquid agendum moventur per formam sensu apprehensam. | |
| 11695 Unde supra talia animalia sunt illa quae movent seipsa, etiam | |
| 11696 habito respectu ad finem, quem sibi praestituunt. Quod quidem non | |
| 11697 fit nisi per rationem et intellectum, cuius est cognoscere | |
| 11698 proportionem finis et eius quod est ad finem, et unum ordinare in | |
| 11699 alterum. Unde perfectior modus vivendi est eorum quae habent | |
| 11700 intellectum, haec enim perfectius movent seipsa. Et huius est | |
| 11701 signum, quod in uno et eodem homine virtus intellectiva movet | |
| 11702 potentias sensitivas; et potentiae sensitivae per suum imperium | |
| 11703 movent organa, quae exequuntur motum. Sicut etiam in artibus, | |
| 11704 videmus quod ars ad quam pertinet usus navis, scilicet ars | |
| 11705 gubernatoria, praecipit ei quae inducit formam navis, et haec | |
| 11706 praecipit illi quae habet executionem tantum, in disponendo | |
| 11707 materiam. Sed quamvis intellectus noster ad aliqua se agat, tamen | |
| 11708 aliqua sunt ei praestituta a natura; sicut sunt prima principia, | |
| 11709 circa quae non potest aliter se habere, et ultimus finis, quem non | |
| 11710 potest non velle. Unde, licet quantum ad aliquid moveat se, tamen | |
| 11711 oportet quod quantum ad aliqua ab alio moveatur. Illud igitur cuius | |
| 11712 sua natura est ipsum eius intelligere, et cui id quod naturaliter | |
| 11713 habet, non determinatur ab alio, hoc est quod obtinet summum gradum | |
| 11714 vitae. Tale autem est Deus. Unde in Deo maxime est vita. Unde | |
| 11715 philosophus, in XII Metaphys., ostenso quod Deus sit intelligens, | |
| 11716 concludit quod habeat vitam perfectissimam et sempiternam, quia | |
| 11717 intellectus eius est perfectissimus, et semper in actu.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q18_A3-p9"> | |
| 11718 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> As stated in Metaph. ix, 16, action is twofold. Actions of one kind pass out to external matter, as to heat or to cut; whilst | |
| 11719 actions of the other kind remain in the agent, as to understand, to sense and to will. The difference between them is this, | |
| 11720 that the former action is the perfection not of the agent that moves, but of the thing moved; whereas the latter action is | |
| 11721 the perfection of the agent. Hence, because movement is an act of the thing in | |
| 11722 movement, the latter action, in so far as it is the act of the operator, is called its movement, by this similitude, that | |
| 11723 as movement is an act of the thing moved, so an act of this kind is the act of the agent, although movement is an act of the | |
| 11724 imperfect, that is, of what is in potentiality; while this kind of act is an act of the perfect, that is to say, of what is | |
| 11725 in act as stated in De Anima iii, 28. In the sense, therefore, in which understanding is movement, that which understands | |
| 11726 itself | |
| 11727 is said to move itself. It is in this sense that Plato also taught that God moves Himself; not in the sense in which movement | |
| 11728 is an act of the imperfect. | |
| 11729 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 18 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="29166" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29166] Iª q. 18 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo | |
| 11730 dicendum quod, sicut dicitur in IX Metaphys., duplex est actio, | |
| 11731 una, quae transit in exteriorem materiam, ut calefacere et secare; | |
| 11732 alia, quae manet in agente, ut intelligere, sentire et velle. | |
| 11733 Quarum haec est differentia, quia prima actio non est perfectio | |
| 11734 agentis quod movet, sed ipsius moti; secunda autem actio est | |
| 11735 perfectio agentis. Unde, quia motus est actus mobilis, secunda | |
| 11736 actio, inquantum est actus operantis, dicitur motus eius; ex hac | |
| 11737 similitudine, quod, sicut motus est actus mobilis, ita huiusmodi | |
| 11738 actio est actus agentis; licet motus sit actus imperfecti, scilicet | |
| 11739 existentis in potentia, huiusmodi autem actio est actus perfecti, | |
| 11740 idest existentis in actu, ut dicitur in III de anima. Hoc igitur | |
| 11741 modo quo intelligere est motus, id quod se intelligit, dicitur se | |
| 11742 movere. Et per hunc modum etiam Plato posuit quod Deus movet | |
| 11743 seipsum, non eo modo quo motus est actus imperfecti.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q18_A3-p10"> | |
| 11744 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As God is His own very existence and understanding, so is He His own life; and therefore He so lives that He has not principle | |
| 11745 of life. | |
| 11746 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 18 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="29167" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29167] Iª q. 18 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 11747 dicendum quod, sicut Deus est ipsum suum esse et suum intelligere, | |
| 11748 ita est suum vivere. Et propter hoc, sic vivit, quod non habet | |
| 11749 vivendi principium.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q18_A3-p11"> | |
| 11750 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Life in this lower world is bestowed on a corruptible nature, that needs generation to preserve the species, and nourishment | |
| 11751 to preserve the individual. For this reason life is not found here below apart from a vegetative soul: but this does not hold | |
| 11752 good with incorruptible natures. | |
| 11753 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 18 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="29168" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29168] Iª q. 18 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 11754 dicendum quod vita in istis inferioribus recipitur in natura | |
| 11755 corruptibili, quae indiget et generatione ad conservationem | |
| 11756 speciei, et alimento ad conservationem individui. Et propter hoc, | |
| 11757 in istis inferioribus non invenitur vita sine anima vegetabili. Sed | |
| 11758 hoc non habet locum in rebus incorruptibilibus.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q18_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q18_A4-p0.1">Q. 18. A. 4. Whether all things are life in God?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q18_A4-p2"> | |
| 11759 <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that not all things are life in God. For it is said ( | |
| 11760 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q18_A4-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Acts.17.28" target="asv">Acts 17:28</a>), "In Him we live, and move, and be." But not all things in God are movement. Therefore not all things are life in Him. | |
| 11761 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 18 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="29169" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29169] Iª q. 18 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum sic | |
| 11762 proceditur. Videtur quod non omnia sint vita in Deo. Dicitur enim | |
| 11763 Act. XVII, <i>in ipso vivimus, movemur et sumus</i>. Sed non omnia | |
| 11764 in Deo sunt motus. Ergo non omnia in ipso sunt vita.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q18_A4-p3"> | |
| 11765 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, all things are in God as their first model. But things modelled ought to conform to the model. Since, then, not | |
| 11766 all things have life in themselves, it seems that not all things are life in God. | |
| 11767 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 18 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="29170" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29170] Iª q. 18 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, omnia | |
| 11768 sunt in Deo sicut in primo exemplari. Sed exemplata debent | |
| 11769 conformari exemplari. Cum igitur non omnia vivant in seipsis, | |
| 11770 videtur quod non omnia in Deo sint vita.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q18_A4-p4"> | |
| 11771 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, as Augustine says (De Vera Relig. 29), a living substance is better than a substance that does not live. If, therefore, | |
| 11772 things which in themselves have not life, are life in God, it seems that things exist more truly in God than themselves. But | |
| 11773 this appears to be false; since in themselves they exist actually, but in God potentially. | |
| 11774 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 18 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="29171" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29171] Iª q. 18 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, sicut | |
| 11775 Augustinus dicit in libro de vera Relig., substantia vivens est | |
| 11776 melior qualibet substantia non vivente. Si igitur ea quae in | |
| 11777 seipsis non vivunt, in Deo sunt vita, videtur quod verius sint res | |
| 11778 in Deo quam in seipsis. Quod tamen videtur esse falsum, cum in | |
| 11779 seipsis sint in actu, in Deo vero in potentia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q18_A4-p5"> | |
| 11780 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, just as good things and things made in time are known by God, so are bad things, and things that God can make, but | |
| 11781 never will be made. If, therefore, all things are life in God, inasmuch as known by Him, it seems that even bad things and | |
| 11782 things that will never be made are life in God, as known by Him, and this appears inadmissible. | |
| 11783 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 18 a. 4 arg. 4"><a name="29172" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29172] Iª q. 18 a. 4 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, sicut | |
| 11784 sciuntur a Deo bona, et ea quae fiunt secundum aliquod tempus; ita | |
| 11785 mala, et ea quae Deus potest facere, sed nunquam fiunt. Si ergo | |
| 11786 omnia sunt vita in Deo, inquantum sunt scita ab ipso, videtur quod | |
| 11787 etiam mala, et quae nunquam fiunt, sunt vita in Deo, inquantum sunt | |
| 11788 scita ab eo. Quod videtur inconveniens.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q18_A4-p6"> | |
| 11789 <b>On the contrary,</b> ( | |
| 11790 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q18_A4-p6.1" href="./asv.html#John.1.3" target="asv">Jn. 1:3,4</a>), it is said, "What was made, in Him was life." But all things were made, except God. Therefore all things are life in God. | |
| 11791 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 18 a. 4 s. c."><a name="29173" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29173] Iª q. 18 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est | |
| 11792 quod dicitur Ioan. I, <i>quod factum est, in ipso vita erat</i>. | |
| 11793 Sed omnia praeter Deum facta sunt. Ergo omnia in Deo sunt vita.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q18_A4-p7"> | |
| 11794 <b>I answer that,</b> In God to live is to understand, as before stated | |
| 11795 <a id="FP_Q18_A4-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q18_A3.html">(A[3])</a>. In God intellect, the thing understood, and the act of understanding, are one and the same. Hence whatever is in God as | |
| 11796 understood is the very living or life of God. Now, wherefore, since all things that have been made by God are in Him as things | |
| 11797 understood, it follows that all things in Him are the divine life itself. | |
| 11798 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 18 a. 4 co."><a name="29174" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29174] Iª q. 18 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum | |
| 11799 quod, sicut dictum est, vivere Dei est eius intelligere. In Deo | |
| 11800 autem est idem intellectus et quod intelligitur, et ipsum | |
| 11801 intelligere eius. Unde quidquid est in Deo ut intellectum, est | |
| 11802 ipsum vivere vel vita eius. Unde, cum omnia quae facta sunt a Deo, | |
| 11803 sint in ipso ut intellecta, sequitur quod omnia in ipso sunt ipsa | |
| 11804 vita divina.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q18_A4-p8"> | |
| 11805 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Creatures are said to be in God in a twofold sense. In one way, so far are they are held together and preserved by the divine | |
| 11806 power; even as we say that things that are in our power are in us. And creatures are thus said to be in God, even as they | |
| 11807 exist in their own natures. In this sense we must understand the words of the Apostle when he says, "In Him we live, move, | |
| 11808 and be"; since our being, living, and moving are themselves caused by God. In | |
| 11809 another sense things are said to be in God, as in Him who knows them, in which sense they are in God through their proper | |
| 11810 ideas, which in God are not distinct from the divine essence. Hence things as they are in God are the divine essence. And | |
| 11811 since the divine essence is life and not movement, it follows that things existing in God in this manner are not movement, | |
| 11812 but life. | |
| 11813 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 18 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="29175" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29175] Iª q. 18 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo | |
| 11814 dicendum quod creaturae in Deo esse dicuntur dupliciter. Uno modo, | |
| 11815 inquantum continentur et conservantur virtute divina, sicut dicimus | |
| 11816 ea esse in nobis, quae sunt in nostra potestate. Et sic creaturae | |
| 11817 dicuntur esse in Deo, etiam prout sunt in propriis naturis. Et hoc | |
| 11818 modo intelligendum est verbum apostoli dicentis, <i>in ipso | |
| 11819 vivimus, movemur et sumus</i>, quia et nostrum vivere, et nostrum | |
| 11820 esse, et nostrum moveri causantur a Deo. Alio modo dicuntur res | |
| 11821 esse in Deo sicut in cognoscente. Et sic sunt in Deo per proprias | |
| 11822 rationes, quae non sunt aliud in Deo ab essentia divina. Unde res, | |
| 11823 prout sic in Deo sunt, sunt essentia divina. Et quia essentia | |
| 11824 divina est vita, non autem motus, inde est quod res, hoc modo | |
| 11825 loquendi, in Deo non sunt motus, sed vita.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q18_A4-p9"> | |
| 11826 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The thing modelled must be like the model according to the form, not the mode of being. For sometimes the form has being | |
| 11827 of another kind in the model from that which it has in the thing modelled. Thus the form of a house has in the mind of the | |
| 11828 architect immaterial and intelligible being; but in the house that exists outside his mind, material and sensible being. Hence | |
| 11829 the ideas of things, though not existing in themselves, are life in the divine mind, | |
| 11830 as having a divine existence in that mind. | |
| 11831 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 18 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="29176" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29176] Iª q. 18 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 11832 dicendum quod exemplata oportet conformari exemplari secundum | |
| 11833 rationem formae, non autem secundum modum essendi. Nam alterius | |
| 11834 modi esse habet quandoque forma in exemplari et in exemplato, sicut | |
| 11835 forma domus in mente artificis habet esse immateriale et | |
| 11836 intelligibile, in domo autem quae est extra animam, habet esse | |
| 11837 materiale et sensibile. Unde et rationes rerum quae in seipsis non | |
| 11838 vivunt, in mente divina sunt vita, quia in mente divina habent esse | |
| 11839 divinum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q18_A4-p10"> | |
| 11840 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> If form only, and not matter, belonged to natural things, then in all respects natural things would exist more truly in the | |
| 11841 divine mind, by the ideas of them, than in themselves. For which reason, in fact, Plato held that the "separate" man was the | |
| 11842 true man; and that man as he exists in matter, is man only by participation. But since matter enters into the being of natural | |
| 11843 things, we must say that those things have simply being in the divine mind more | |
| 11844 truly than in themselves, because in that mind they have an uncreated being, but in themselves a created being: whereas this | |
| 11845 particular being, a man, or horse, for example, has this being more truly in its own nature than in the divine mind, because | |
| 11846 it belongs to human nature to be material, which, as existing in the divine mind, it is not. Even so a house has nobler being | |
| 11847 in the architect's mind than in matter; yet a material house is called a house more truly than the one which exists in the | |
| 11848 mind; since the former is actual, the latter only potential. | |
| 11849 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 18 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="29177" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29177] Iª q. 18 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 11850 dicendum quod, si de ratione rerum naturalium non esset materia, | |
| 11851 sed tantum forma, omnibus modis veriori modo essent res naturales | |
| 11852 in mente divina per suas ideas, quam in seipsis. Propter quod et | |
| 11853 Plato posuit quod homo separatus erat verus homo, homo autem | |
| 11854 materialis est homo per participationem. Sed quia de ratione rerum | |
| 11855 naturalium est materia, dicendum quod res naturales verius esse | |
| 11856 habent simpliciter in mente divina, quam in seipsis, quia in mente | |
| 11857 divina habent esse increatum, in seipsis autem esse creatum. Sed | |
| 11858 esse hoc, utpote homo vel equus, verius habent in propria natura | |
| 11859 quam in mente divina, quia ad veritatem hominis pertinet esse | |
| 11860 materiale, quod non habent in mente divina. Sicut domus nobilius | |
| 11861 esse habet in mente artificis, quam in materia, sed tamen verius | |
| 11862 dicitur domus quae est in materia, quam quae est in mente; quia | |
| 11863 haec est domus in actu, illa autem domus in potentia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q18_A4-p11"> | |
| 11864 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Although bad things are in God's knowledge, as being comprised under that knowledge, yet they are not in God as created by | |
| 11865 Him, or preserved by Him, or as having their type in Him. They are known by God through the types of good things. Hence it | |
| 11866 cannot be said that bad things are life in God. Those things that are not in time may be called life in God in so far as life | |
| 11867 means understanding only, and inasmuch as they are understood by God; but not in so | |
| 11868 far as life implies a principle of operation. | |
| 11869 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 18 a. 4 ad 4"><a name="29178" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29178] Iª q. 18 a. 4 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum | |
| 11870 dicendum quod, licet mala sint in Dei scientia, inquantum sub Dei | |
| 11871 scientia comprehenduntur, non tamen sunt in Deo sicut creata a Deo | |
| 11872 vel conservata ab ipso, neque sicut habentia rationem in Deo, | |
| 11873 cognoscuntur enim a Deo per rationes bonorum. Unde non potest dici | |
| 11874 quod mala sint vita in Deo. Ea vero quae secundum nullum tempus | |
| 11875 sunt, possunt dici esse vita in Deo, secundum quod vivere nominat | |
| 11876 intelligere tantum, inquantum intelliguntur a Deo, non autem | |
| 11877 secundum quod vivere importat principium operationis.</p></div></div></div></div> | |
| 11878 <div id="FP_Q19" class="div3"> | |
| 11879 <h3 id="FP_Q19-p0.1">Q. 19. THE WILL OF GOD (TWELVE ARTICLES)</h3> | |
| 11880 <div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> | |
| 11881 <p id="FP_Q19-p2"> After considering the things belonging to the divine knowledge, we consider what belongs to the divine will. The first consideration | |
| 11882 is about the divine will itself; the second about what belongs strictly to His will; the third about what belongs to the intellect | |
| 11883 in relation to His will. About His will itself there are twelve points of inquiry: | |
| 11884 </p><p id="FP_Q19-p3"> (1) Whether there is will in God?</p><p id="FP_Q19-p4"> (2) Whether God wills things apart from Himself?</p><p id="FP_Q19-p5"> (3) Whether whatever God wills, He wills necessarily?</p><p id="FP_Q19-p6"> (4) Whether the will of God is the cause of things?</p><p id="FP_Q19-p7"> (5) Whether any cause can be assigned to the divine will?</p><p id="FP_Q19-p8"> (6) Whether the divine will is always fulfilled?</p><p id="FP_Q19-p9"> (7) Whether the will of God is mutable?</p><p id="FP_Q19-p10"> (8) Whether the will of God imposes necessity on the things willed?</p><p id="FP_Q19-p11"> (9) Whether there is in God the will of evil?</p><p id="FP_Q19-p12"> (10) Whether God has free will?</p><p id="FP_Q19-p13"> (11) Whether the will of expression is distinguished in God?</p><p id="FP_Q19-p14"> (12) Whether five expressions of will are rightly assigned to the divine will?</p> | |
| 11885 </div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 pr."><a name="29179" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29179] | |
| 11886 Iª q. 19 pr.</span></a> Post considerationem eorum quae ad | |
| 11887 divinam scientiam pertinent, considerandum est de his quae | |
| 11888 pertinent ad voluntatem divinam, ut sit prima consideratio de ipsa | |
| 11889 Dei voluntate; secunda, de his quae ad voluntatem absolute | |
| 11890 pertinent; tertia, de his quae ad intellectum in ordine ad | |
| 11891 voluntatem pertinent. Circa ipsam autem voluntatem quaeruntur | |
| 11892 duodecim. Primo, utrum in Deo sit voluntas. Secundo, utrum Deus | |
| 11893 velit alia a se. Tertio, utrum quidquid Deus vult, ex necessitate | |
| 11894 velit. Quarto, utrum voluntas Dei sit causa rerum. Quinto, utrum | |
| 11895 voluntatis divinae sit assignare aliquam causam. Sexto, utrum | |
| 11896 voluntas divina semper impleatur. Septimo, utrum voluntas Dei sit | |
| 11897 mutabilis. Octavo, utrum voluntas Dei necessitatem rebus volitis | |
| 11898 imponat. Nono, utrum in Deo sit voluntas malorum. Decimo, utrum | |
| 11899 Deus habeat liberum arbitrium. Undecimo, utrum sit distinguenda in | |
| 11900 Deo voluntas signi. Duodecimo, utrum convenienter circa divinam | |
| 11901 voluntatem ponantur quinque signa.</p></div></div></div> | |
| 11902 <div id="FP_Q19_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q19_A1-p0.1">Q. 19. A. 1. Whether there is will in God?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A1-p2"> | |
| 11903 <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that there is not will in God. For the object of will is the end and the good. But we cannot assign to God any end. | |
| 11904 Therefore there is not will in God. | |
| 11905 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="29180" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29180] Iª q. 19 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum sic | |
| 11906 proceditur. Videtur quod in Deo non sit voluntas. Obiectum enim | |
| 11907 voluntatis est finis et bonum. Sed Dei non est assignare aliquem | |
| 11908 finem. Ergo voluntas non est in Deo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A1-p3"> | |
| 11909 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, will is a kind of appetite. But appetite, as it is directed to things not possessed, implies imperfection, which | |
| 11910 cannot be imputed to God. Therefore there is not will in God. | |
| 11911 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="29181" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29181] Iª q. 19 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 11912 voluntas est appetitus quidam. Appetitus autem, cum sit rei non | |
| 11913 habitae, imperfectionem designat, quae Deo non competit. Ergo | |
| 11914 voluntas non est in Deo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A1-p4"> | |
| 11915 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, according to the Philosopher (De Anima iii, 54), the will moves, and is moved. But God is the first cause of movement, | |
| 11916 and Himself is unmoved, as proved in Phys. viii, 49. Therefore there is not will in God. | |
| 11917 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="29182" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29182] Iª q. 19 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 11918 secundum philosophum, in III de anima, voluntas est movens motum. | |
| 11919 Sed Deus est primum movens immobile. Ut probatur VIII Physic. Ergo | |
| 11920 in Deo non est voluntas.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A1-p5"> | |
| 11921 <b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle says ( | |
| 11922 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q19_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.12.2" target="asv">Rom. 12:2</a>): "That you may prove what is the will of God." | |
| 11923 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 1 s. c."><a name="29183" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29183] Iª q. 19 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est | |
| 11924 quod dicit apostolus, Rom. XII, <i>ut probetis quae sit voluntas | |
| 11925 Dei</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A1-p6"> | |
| 11926 <b>I answer that,</b> There is will in God, as there is intellect: since will follows upon intellect. For as natural things have actual existence | |
| 11927 by their form, so the intellect is actually intelligent by its intelligible form. Now everything has this aptitude towards | |
| 11928 its natural form, that when it has it not, it tends towards it; and when it has it, it is at rest therein. It is the same | |
| 11929 with every natural perfection, which is a natural good. This aptitude to good in things | |
| 11930 without knowledge is called natural appetite. Whence also intellectual natures have a like aptitude as apprehended through | |
| 11931 its intelligible form; so as to rest therein when possessed, and when not possessed to seek to possess it, both of which pertain | |
| 11932 to the will. Hence in every intellectual being there is will, just as in every sensible being there is animal appetite. And | |
| 11933 so there must be will in God, since there is intellect in Him. And as His intellect is His own existence, so is His | |
| 11934 will. | |
| 11935 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 1 co."><a name="29184" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29184] Iª q. 19 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum | |
| 11936 in Deo voluntatem esse, sicut et in eo est intellectus, voluntas | |
| 11937 enim intellectum consequitur. Sicut enim res naturalis habet esse | |
| 11938 in actu per suam formam, ita intellectus intelligens actu per suam | |
| 11939 formam intelligibilem. Quaelibet autem res ad suam formam naturalem | |
| 11940 hanc habet habitudinem, ut quando non habet ipsam, tendat in eam; | |
| 11941 et quando habet ipsam, quiescat in ea. Et idem est de qualibet | |
| 11942 perfectione naturali, quod est bonum naturae. Et haec habitudo ad | |
| 11943 bonum, in rebus carentibus cognitione, vocatur appetitus naturalis. | |
| 11944 Unde et natura intellectualis ad bonum apprehensum per formam | |
| 11945 intelligibilem, similem habitudinem habet, ut scilicet, cum habet | |
| 11946 ipsum, quiescat in illo; cum vero non habet, quaerat ipsum. Et | |
| 11947 utrumque pertinet ad voluntatem. Unde in quolibet habente | |
| 11948 intellectum, est voluntas; sicut in quolibet habente sensum, est | |
| 11949 appetitus animalis. Et sic oportet in Deo esse voluntatem, cum sit | |
| 11950 in eo intellectus. Et sicut suum intelligere est suum esse, ita | |
| 11951 suum velle.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A1-p7"> | |
| 11952 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Although nothing apart from God is His end, yet He Himself is the end with respect to all things made by Him. And this by | |
| 11953 His essence, for by His essence He is good, as shown above ( | |
| 11954 <a id="FP_Q19_A1-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q6_A3.html">Q[6], A[3]</a>): for the end has the aspect of good. | |
| 11955 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="29185" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29185] Iª q. 19 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo | |
| 11956 dicendum quod, licet nihil aliud a Deo sit finis Dei, tamen ipsemet | |
| 11957 est finis respectu omnium quae ab eo fiunt. Et hoc per suam | |
| 11958 essentiam, cum per suam essentiam sit bonus, ut supra ostensum est, | |
| 11959 finis enim habet rationem boni.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A1-p8"> | |
| 11960 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Will in us belongs to the appetitive part, which, although named from appetite, has not for its only act the seeking what | |
| 11961 it does not possess; but also the loving and the delighting in what it does possess. In this respect will is said to be in | |
| 11962 God, as having always good which is its object, since, as already said, it is not distinct from His essence. | |
| 11963 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="29186" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29186] Iª q. 19 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 11964 dicendum quod voluntas in nobis pertinet ad appetitivam partem, | |
| 11965 quae licet ab appetendo nominetur, non tamen hunc solum habet | |
| 11966 actum, ut appetat quae non habet; sed etiam ut amet quod habet, et | |
| 11967 delectetur in illo. Et quantum ad hoc voluntas in Deo ponitur; quae | |
| 11968 semper habet bonum quod est eius obiectum, cum sit indifferens ab | |
| 11969 eo secundum essentiam, ut dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A1-p9"> | |
| 11970 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> A will of which the principal object is a good outside itself, must be moved by another; but the object of the divine will | |
| 11971 is His goodness, which is His essence. Hence, since the will of God is His essence, it is not moved by another than itself, | |
| 11972 but by itself alone, in the same sense as understanding and willing are said to be movement. This is what Plato meant when | |
| 11973 he said that the first mover moves itself. | |
| 11974 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="29187" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29187] Iª q. 19 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 11975 dicendum quod voluntas cuius obiectum principale est bonum quod est | |
| 11976 extra voluntatem, oportet quod sit mota ab aliquo. Sed obiectum | |
| 11977 divinae voluntatis est bonitas sua, quae est eius essentia. Unde, | |
| 11978 cum voluntas Dei sit eius essentia, non movetur ab alio a se, sed a | |
| 11979 se tantum, eo modo loquendi quo intelligere et velle dicitur motus. | |
| 11980 Et secundum hoc Plato dixit quod primum movens movet seipsum.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q19_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q19_A2-p0.1">Q. 19. A. 2. Whether God wills things apart from Himself?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A2-p2"> | |
| 11981 <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God does not will things apart from Himself. For the divine will is the divine existence. But God is not other | |
| 11982 than Himself. Therefore He does not will things other than Himself. | |
| 11983 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="29188" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29188] Iª q. 19 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum sic | |
| 11984 proceditur. Videtur quod Deus non velit alia a se. Velle enim | |
| 11985 divinum est eius esse. Sed Deus non est aliud a se. Ergo non vult | |
| 11986 aliud a se.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A2-p3"> | |
| 11987 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the willed moves the willer, as the appetible the appetite, as stated in De Anima iii, 54. If, therefore, God wills | |
| 11988 anything apart from Himself, His will must be moved by another; which is impossible. | |
| 11989 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="29189" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29189] Iª q. 19 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 11990 volitum movet voluntatem, sicut appetibile appetitum, ut dicitur in | |
| 11991 III de anima. Si igitur Deus velit aliquid aliud a se, movebitur | |
| 11992 eius voluntas ab aliquo alio, quod est impossibile.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A2-p4"> | |
| 11993 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if what is willed suffices the willer, he seeks nothing beyond it. But His own goodness suffices God, and completely | |
| 11994 satisfies His will. Therefore God does not will anything apart from Himself. | |
| 11995 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="29190" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29190] Iª q. 19 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 11996 cuicumque voluntati sufficit aliquod volitum, nihil quaerit extra | |
| 11997 illud. Sed Deo sufficit sua bonitas, et voluntas eius ex ea | |
| 11998 satiatur. Ergo Deus non vult aliquid aliud a se.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A2-p5"> | |
| 11999 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, acts of will are multiplied in proportion to the number of their objects. If, therefore, God wills Himself and things | |
| 12000 apart from Himself, it follows that the act of His will is manifold, and consequently His existence, which is His will. But | |
| 12001 this is impossible. Therefore God does not will things apart from Himself. | |
| 12002 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 2 arg. 4"><a name="29191" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29191] Iª q. 19 a. 2 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, actus | |
| 12003 voluntatis multiplicatur secundum volita. Si igitur Deus velit se | |
| 12004 et alia a se, sequitur quod actus voluntatis eius sit multiplex, et | |
| 12005 per consequens eius esse, quod est eius velle. Hoc autem est | |
| 12006 impossibile. Non ergo vult alia a se.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A2-p6"> | |
| 12007 <b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle says ( | |
| 12008 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q19_A2-p6.1" href="./asv.html#iThess.4.3" target="asv">1 Thess. 4:3</a>): "This is the will of God, your sanctification." | |
| 12009 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 2 s. c."><a name="29192" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29192] Iª q. 19 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est | |
| 12010 quod apostolus dicit, I Thess. IV, <i>haec est voluntas Dei, | |
| 12011 sanctificatio vestra</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A2-p7"> | |
| 12012 <b>I answer that,</b> God wills not only Himself, but other things apart from Himself. This is clear from the comparison which we made above | |
| 12013 <a id="FP_Q19_A2-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q19_A1.html">(A[1])</a>. For natural things have a natural inclination not only towards their own proper good, to acquire it if not possessed, and, | |
| 12014 if possessed, to rest therein; but also to spread abroad their own good amongst others, so far as possible. Hence we see that | |
| 12015 every agent, in so far as it is perfect and in act, produces | |
| 12016 its like. It pertains, therefore, to the nature of the will to communicate as far as possible to others the good possessed; | |
| 12017 and especially does this pertain to the divine will, from which all perfection is derived in some kind of likeness. Hence, | |
| 12018 if natural things, in so far as they are perfect, communicate their good to others, much more does it appertain to the divine | |
| 12019 will to communicate by likeness its own good to others as much as possible. Thus, then, He wills both Himself to be, and other | |
| 12020 things to be; but Himself as the end, and other things as ordained to that end; inasmuch as it befits the divine goodness | |
| 12021 that other things should be partakers therein. | |
| 12022 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 2 co."><a name="29193" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29193] Iª q. 19 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum | |
| 12023 quod Deus non solum se vult, sed etiam alia a se. Quod apparet a | |
| 12024 simili prius introducto. Res enim naturalis non solum habet | |
| 12025 naturalem inclinationem respectu proprii boni, ut acquirat ipsum | |
| 12026 cum non habet, vel ut quiescat in illo cum habet; sed etiam ut | |
| 12027 proprium bonum in alia diffundat, secundum quod possibile est. Unde | |
| 12028 videmus quod omne agens, inquantum est actu et perfectum, facit | |
| 12029 sibi simile. Unde et hoc pertinet ad rationem voluntatis, ut bonum | |
| 12030 quod quis habet, aliis communicet, secundum quod possibile est. Et | |
| 12031 hoc praecipue pertinet ad voluntatem divinam, a qua, per quandam | |
| 12032 similitudinem, derivatur omnis perfectio. Unde, si res naturales, | |
| 12033 inquantum perfectae sunt, suum bonum aliis communicant, multo magis | |
| 12034 pertinet ad voluntatem divinam, ut bonum suum aliis per | |
| 12035 similitudinem communicet, secundum quod possibile est. Sic igitur | |
| 12036 vult et se esse, et alia. Sed se ut finem, alia vero ut ad finem, | |
| 12037 inquantum condecet divinam bonitatem etiam alia ipsam | |
| 12038 participare.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A2-p8"> | |
| 12039 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The divine will is God's own existence essentially, yet they differ in aspect, according to the different ways of understanding | |
| 12040 them and expressing them, as is clear from what has already been said ( | |
| 12041 <a id="FP_Q19_A2-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q13_A4.html">Q[13], A[4]</a>). For when we say that God exists, no relation to any other object is implied, as we do imply when we say that God wills. | |
| 12042 Therefore, although He is not anything apart from Himself, yet He does will things apart from | |
| 12043 Himself. | |
| 12044 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="29194" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29194] Iª q. 19 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo | |
| 12045 dicendum quod, licet divinum velle sit eius esse secundum rem, | |
| 12046 tamen differt ratione, secundum diversum modum intelligendi et | |
| 12047 significandi, ut ex superioribus patet. In hoc enim quod dico Deum | |
| 12048 esse, non importatur habitudo ad aliquid, sicut in hoc quod dico | |
| 12049 Deum velle. Et ideo, licet non sit aliquid aliud a se, vult tamen | |
| 12050 aliquid aliud a se.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A2-p9"> | |
| 12051 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> In things willed for the sake of the end, the whole reason for our being moved is the end, and this it is that moves the | |
| 12052 will, as most clearly appears in things willed only for the sake of the end. He who wills to take a bitter draught, in doing | |
| 12053 so wills nothing else than health; and this alone moves his will. It is different with one who takes a draught that is pleasant, | |
| 12054 which anyone may will to do, not only for the sake of health, but also for its | |
| 12055 own sake. Hence, although God wills things apart from Himself only for the sake of the end, which is His own goodness, it | |
| 12056 does not follow that anything else moves His will, except His goodness. So, as He understands things apart from Himself by | |
| 12057 understanding His own essence, so He wills things apart from Himself by willing His own goodness. | |
| 12058 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="29195" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29195] Iª q. 19 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 12059 dicendum quod in his quae volumus propter finem, tota ratio movendi | |
| 12060 est finis, et hoc est quod movet voluntatem. Et hoc maxime apparet | |
| 12061 in his quae volumus tantum propter finem. Qui enim vult sumere | |
| 12062 potionem amaram, nihil in ea vult nisi sanitatem, et hoc solum est | |
| 12063 quod movet eius voluntatem. Secus autem est in eo qui sumit | |
| 12064 potionem dulcem, quam non solum propter sanitatem, sed etiam | |
| 12065 propter se aliquis velle potest. Unde, cum Deus alia a se non velit | |
| 12066 nisi propter finem qui est sua bonitas, ut dictum est, non sequitur | |
| 12067 quod aliquid aliud moveat voluntatem eius nisi bonitas sua. Et sic, | |
| 12068 sicut alia a se intelligit intelligendo essentiam suam, ita alia a | |
| 12069 se vult, volendo bonitatem suam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A2-p10"> | |
| 12070 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> From the fact that His own goodness suffices the divine will, it does not follow that it wills nothing apart from itself, | |
| 12071 but rather that it wills nothing except by reason of its goodness. Thus, too, the divine intellect, though its perfection | |
| 12072 consists in its very knowledge of the divine essence, yet in that essence knows other things. | |
| 12073 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="29196" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29196] Iª q. 19 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 12074 dicendum quod ex hoc quod voluntati divinae sufficit sua bonitas, | |
| 12075 non sequitur quod nihil aliud velit, sed quod nihil aliud vult nisi | |
| 12076 ratione suae bonitatis. Sicut etiam intellectus divinus, licet sit | |
| 12077 perfectus ex hoc ipso quod essentiam divinam cognoscit, tamen in ea | |
| 12078 cognoscit alia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A2-p11"> | |
| 12079 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> As the divine intellect is one, as seeing the many only in the one, in the same way the divine will is one and simple, as | |
| 12080 willing the many only through the one, that is, through its own goodness. | |
| 12081 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 2 ad 4"><a name="29197" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29197] Iª q. 19 a. 2 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum | |
| 12082 dicendum quod, sicut intelligere divinum est unum, quia multa non | |
| 12083 videt nisi in uno; ita velle divinum est unum et simplex, quia | |
| 12084 multa non vult nisi per unum, quod est bonitas sua.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q19_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q19_A3-p0.1">Q. 19. A. 3. Whether whatever God wills He wills necessarily?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A3-p2"> | |
| 12085 <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that whatever God wills He wills necessarily. For everything eternal is necessary. But whatever God wills, He wills | |
| 12086 from eternity, for otherwise His will would be mutable. Therefore whatever He wills, He wills necessarily. | |
| 12087 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="29198" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29198] Iª q. 19 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium sic | |
| 12088 proceditur. Videtur quod quidquid Deus vult, ex necessitate velit. | |
| 12089 Omne enim aeternum est necessarium. Sed quidquid Deus vult, ab | |
| 12090 aeterno vult, alias, voluntas eius esset mutabilis. Ergo quidquid | |
| 12091 vult, ex necessitate vult.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A3-p3"> | |
| 12092 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, God wills things apart from Himself, inasmuch as He wills His own goodness. Now God wills His own goodness necessarily. | |
| 12093 Therefore He wills things apart from Himself necessarily. | |
| 12094 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="29199" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29199] Iª q. 19 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, Deus | |
| 12095 vult alia a se, inquantum vult bonitatem suam. Sed Deus bonitatem | |
| 12096 suam ex necessitate vult. Ergo alia a se ex necessitate vult.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A3-p4"> | |
| 12097 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, whatever belongs to the nature of God is necessary, for God is of Himself necessary being, and the principle of | |
| 12098 all necessity, as above shown ( | |
| 12099 <a id="FP_Q19_A3-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q2_A3.html">Q[2], A[3]</a>). But it belongs to His nature to will whatever He wills; since in God there can be nothing over and above His nature as | |
| 12100 stated in Metaph. v, 6. Therefore whatever He wills, He wills necessarily. | |
| 12101 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="29200" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29200] Iª q. 19 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 12102 quidquid est Deo naturale, est necessarium, quia Deus est per se | |
| 12103 necesse esse, et principium omnis necessitatis, ut supra ostensum | |
| 12104 est. Sed naturale est ei velle quidquid vult, quia in Deo nihil | |
| 12105 potest esse praeter naturam, ut dicitur in V Metaphys. Ergo | |
| 12106 quidquid vult, ex necessitate vult.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A3-p5"> | |
| 12107 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, being that is not necessary, and being that is possible not to be, are one and the same thing. If, therefore, God | |
| 12108 does not necessarily will a thing that He wills, it is possible for Him not to will it, and therefore possible for Him to | |
| 12109 will what He does not will. And so the divine will is contingent upon one or the other of two things, and imperfect, since | |
| 12110 everything contingent is imperfect and mutable. | |
| 12111 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 3 arg. 4"><a name="29201" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29201] Iª q. 19 a. 3 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, non | |
| 12112 necesse esse, et possibile non esse, aequipollent. Si igitur non | |
| 12113 necesse est Deum velle aliquid eorum quae vult, possibile est eum | |
| 12114 non velle illud; et possibile est eum velle illud quod non vult. | |
| 12115 Ergo voluntas divina est contingens ad utrumlibet. Et sic | |
| 12116 imperfecta, quia omne contingens est imperfectum et mutabile.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A3-p6"> | |
| 12117 <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, on the part of that which is indifferent to one or the other of two things, no action results unless it is inclined | |
| 12118 to one or the other by some other power, as the Commentator [*Averroes] says in Phys. ii. If, then, the Will of God is indifferent | |
| 12119 with regard to anything, it follows that His determination to act comes from another; and thus He has some cause prior to | |
| 12120 Himself. | |
| 12121 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 3 arg. 5"><a name="29202" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29202] Iª q. 19 a. 3 arg. 5</span></a> Praeterea, ab eo | |
| 12122 quod est ad utrumlibet, non sequitur aliqua actio, nisi ab aliquo | |
| 12123 alio inclinetur ad unum, ut dicit Commentator, in II Physic. Si | |
| 12124 ergo voluntas Dei in aliquibus se habet ad utrumlibet, sequitur | |
| 12125 quod ab aliquo alio determinetur ad effectum. Et sic habet aliquam | |
| 12126 causam priorem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A3-p7"> | |
| 12127 <b>Objection 6:</b> Further, whatever God knows, He knows necessarily. But as the divine knowledge is His essence, so is the divine will. Therefore | |
| 12128 whatever God wills, He wills necessarily. | |
| 12129 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 3 arg. 6"><a name="29203" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29203] Iª q. 19 a. 3 arg. 6</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 12130 quidquid Deus scit, ex necessitate scit. Sed sicut scientia divina | |
| 12131 est eius essentia, ita voluntas divina. Ergo quidquid Deus vult, ex | |
| 12132 necessitate vult.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A3-p8"> | |
| 12133 <b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle says ( | |
| 12134 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q19_A3-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Eph.1.11" target="asv">Eph. 1:11</a>): "Who worketh all things according to the counsel of His will." Now, what we work according to the counsel of the will, | |
| 12135 we do not will necessarily. Therefore God does not will necessarily whatever He wills. | |
| 12136 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 3 s. c."><a name="29204" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29204] Iª q. 19 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est | |
| 12137 quod dicit apostolus, Ephes. I, <i>qui operatur omnia secundum | |
| 12138 consilium voluntatis suae</i>. Quod autem operamur ex consilio | |
| 12139 voluntatis, non ex necessitate volumus. Non ergo quidquid Deus | |
| 12140 vult, ex necessitate vult.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A3-p9"> | |
| 12141 <b>I answer that,</b> There are two ways in which a thing is said to be necessary, namely, absolutely, and by supposition. We judge a thing to | |
| 12142 be absolutely necessary from the relation of the terms, as when the predicate forms part of the definition of the subject: | |
| 12143 thus it is absolutely necessary that man is an animal. It is the same when the subject forms part of the notion of the predicate; | |
| 12144 thus it is absolutely necessary that a number must be odd or even. In this way it is not | |
| 12145 necessary that Socrates sits: wherefore it is not necessary absolutely, though it may be so by supposition; for, granted that | |
| 12146 he is sitting, he must necessarily sit, as long as he is sitting. Accordingly as to things willed by God, we must observe | |
| 12147 that He wills something of absolute necessity: but this is not true of all that He wills. For the divine will has a necessary | |
| 12148 relation to the divine goodness, since that is its proper object. Hence God wills His own goodness necessarily, even as we | |
| 12149 will our own happiness necessarily, and as any other faculty has necessary relation to its proper and principal object, for | |
| 12150 instance the sight to color, since it tends to it by its own nature. But God wills things apart from Himself in so far as | |
| 12151 they are ordered to His own goodness as their end. Now in willing an end we do not necessarily will things that conduce to | |
| 12152 it, unless they are such that the end cannot be attained without them; as, we will to take food to preserve life, or to take | |
| 12153 ship | |
| 12154 in order to cross the sea. But we do not necessarily will things without which the end is attainable, such as a horse for | |
| 12155 a journey which we can take on foot, for we can make the journey without one. The same applies to other means. Hence, since | |
| 12156 the goodness of God is perfect, and can exist without other things inasmuch as no perfection can accrue to Him from them, | |
| 12157 it follows that His willing things apart from Himself is not absolutely necessary. Yet it can be necessary by supposition, | |
| 12158 for | |
| 12159 supposing that He wills a thing, then He is unable not to will it, as His will cannot change. | |
| 12160 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 3 co."><a name="29205" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29205] Iª q. 19 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum | |
| 12161 quod necessarium dicitur aliquid dupliciter, scilicet absolute, et | |
| 12162 ex suppositione. Necessarium absolute iudicatur aliquid ex | |
| 12163 habitudine terminorum, utpote quia praedicatum est in definitione | |
| 12164 subiecti, sicut necessarium est hominem esse animal; vel quia | |
| 12165 subiectum est de ratione praedicati, sicut hoc est necessarium, | |
| 12166 numerum esse parem vel imparem. Sic autem non est necessarium | |
| 12167 Socratem sedere. Unde non est necessarium absolute, sed potest dici | |
| 12168 necessarium ex suppositione, supposito enim quod sedeat, necesse | |
| 12169 est eum sedere dum sedet. Circa divina igitur volita hoc | |
| 12170 considerandum est, quod aliquid Deum velle est necessarium | |
| 12171 absolute, non tamen hoc est verum de omnibus quae vult. Voluntas | |
| 12172 enim divina necessariam habitudinem habet ad bonitatem suam, quae | |
| 12173 est proprium eius obiectum. Unde bonitatem suam esse Deus ex | |
| 12174 necessitate vult; sicut et voluntas nostra ex necessitate vult | |
| 12175 beatitudinem. Sicut et quaelibet alia potentia necessariam | |
| 12176 habitudinem habet ad proprium et principale obiectum, ut visus ad | |
| 12177 colorem; quia de sui ratione est, ut in illud tendat. Alia autem a | |
| 12178 se Deus vult, inquantum ordinantur ad suam bonitatem ut in finem. | |
| 12179 Ea autem quae sunt ad finem, non ex necessitate volumus volentes | |
| 12180 finem, nisi sint talia, sine quibus finis esse non potest, sicut | |
| 12181 volumus cibum, volentes conservationem vitae; et navem, volentes | |
| 12182 transfretare. Non sic autem ex necessitate volumus ea sine quibus | |
| 12183 finis esse potest, sicut equum ad ambulandum, quia sine hoc | |
| 12184 possumus ire; et eadem ratio est in aliis. Unde, cum bonitas Dei | |
| 12185 sit perfecta, et esse possit sine aliis, cum nihil ei perfectionis | |
| 12186 ex aliis accrescat; sequitur quod alia a se eum velle, non sit | |
| 12187 necessarium absolute. Et tamen necessarium est ex suppositione, | |
| 12188 supposito enim quod velit, non potest non velle, quia non potest | |
| 12189 voluntas eius mutari.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A3-p10"> | |
| 12190 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> From the fact that God wills from eternity whatever He wills, it does not follow that He wills it necessarily; except by | |
| 12191 supposition. | |
| 12192 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="29206" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29206] Iª q. 19 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo | |
| 12193 dicendum quod ex hoc quod Deus ab aeterno vult aliquid, non | |
| 12194 sequitur quod necesse est eum illud velle, nisi ex | |
| 12195 suppositione.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A3-p11"> | |
| 12196 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Although God necessarily wills His own goodness, He does not necessarily will things willed on account of His goodness; for | |
| 12197 it can exist without other things. | |
| 12198 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="29207" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29207] Iª q. 19 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 12199 dicendum quod, licet Deus ex necessitate velit bonitatem suam, non | |
| 12200 tamen ex necessitate vult ea quae vult propter bonitatem suam, quia | |
| 12201 bonitas eius potest esse sine aliis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A3-p12"> | |
| 12202 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> It is not natural to God to will any of those other things that He does not will necessarily; and yet it is not unnatural | |
| 12203 or contrary to His nature, but voluntary. | |
| 12204 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="29208" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29208] Iª q. 19 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 12205 dicendum quod non est naturale Deo velle aliquid aliorum, quae non | |
| 12206 ex necessitate vult. Neque tamen innaturale, aut contra naturam, | |
| 12207 sed est voluntarium.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A3-p13"> | |
| 12208 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Sometimes a necessary cause has a non-necessary relation to an effect; owing to a deficiency in the effect, and not in the | |
| 12209 cause. Even so, the sun's power has a non-necessary relation to some contingent events on this earth, owing to a defect not | |
| 12210 in the solar power, but in the effect that proceeds not necessarily from the cause. In the same way, that God does not necessarily | |
| 12211 will some of the things that He wills, does not result from defect in the | |
| 12212 divine will, but from a defect belonging to the nature of the thing willed, namely, that the perfect goodness of God can be | |
| 12213 without it; and such defect accompanies all created good. | |
| 12214 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 3 ad 4"><a name="29209" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29209] Iª q. 19 a. 3 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum | |
| 12215 dicendum quod aliquando aliqua causa necessaria habet non | |
| 12216 necessariam habitudinem ad aliquem effectum, quod est propter | |
| 12217 defectum effectus, et non propter defectum causae. Sicut virtus | |
| 12218 solis habet non necessariam habitudinem ad aliquid eorum quae | |
| 12219 contingenter hic eveniunt, non propter defectum virtutis solaris, | |
| 12220 sed propter defectum effectus non necessario ex causa provenientis. | |
| 12221 Et similiter, quod Deus non ex necessitate velit aliquid eorum quae | |
| 12222 vult, non accidit ex defectu voluntatis divinae, sed ex defectu qui | |
| 12223 competit volito secundum suam rationem, quia scilicet est tale, ut | |
| 12224 sine eo esse possit perfecta bonitas Dei. Qui quidem defectus | |
| 12225 consequitur omne bonum creatum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A3-p14"> | |
| 12226 <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> A naturally contingent cause must be determined to act by some external power. The divine will, which by its nature is necessary, | |
| 12227 determines itself to will things to which it has no necessary relation. | |
| 12228 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 3 ad 5"><a name="29210" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29210] Iª q. 19 a. 3 ad 5</span></a> Ad quintum ergo | |
| 12229 dicendum quod causa quae est ex se contingens, oportet quod | |
| 12230 determinetur ab aliquo exteriori ad effectum. Sed voluntas divina, | |
| 12231 quae ex se necessitatem habet, determinat seipsam ad volitum, ad | |
| 12232 quod habet habitudinem non necessariam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A3-p15"> | |
| 12233 <b>Reply to Objection 6:</b> As the divine essence is necessary of itself, so is the divine will and the divine knowledge; but the divine knowledge has | |
| 12234 a necessary relation to the thing known; not the divine will to the thing willed. The reason for this is that knowledge is | |
| 12235 of things as they exist in the knower; but the will is directed to things as they exist in themselves. Since then all other | |
| 12236 things have necessary existence inasmuch as they exist in God; but no absolute | |
| 12237 necessity so as to be necessary in themselves, in so far as they exist in themselves; it follows that God knows necessarily | |
| 12238 whatever He wills, but does not will necessarily whatever He wills. | |
| 12239 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 3 ad 6"><a name="29211" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29211] Iª q. 19 a. 3 ad 6</span></a> Ad sextum dicendum | |
| 12240 quod, sicut divinum esse in se est necessarium, ita et divinum | |
| 12241 velle et divinum scire, sed divinum scire habet necessariam | |
| 12242 habitudinem ad scita, non autem divinum velle ad volita. Quod ideo | |
| 12243 est, quia scientia habetur de rebus, secundum quod sunt in sciente, | |
| 12244 voluntas autem comparatur ad res, secundum quod sunt in seipsis. | |
| 12245 Quia igitur omnia alia habent necessarium esse secundum quod sunt | |
| 12246 in Deo; non autem secundum quod sunt in seipsis, habent | |
| 12247 necessitatem absolutam ita quod sint per seipsa necessaria; propter | |
| 12248 hoc Deus quaecumque scit, ex necessitate scit, non autem quaecumque | |
| 12249 vult, ex necessitate vult.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q19_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q19_A4-p0.1">Q. 19. A. 4. Whether the will of God is the cause of things?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A4-p2"> | |
| 12250 <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the will of God is not the cause of things. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv, 1): "As our sun, not by reason | |
| 12251 nor by pre-election, but by its very being, enlightens all things that can participate in its light, so the divine good by | |
| 12252 its very essence pours the rays of goodness upon everything that exists." But every voluntary agent acts by reason and pre-election. | |
| 12253 Therefore God does not act by will; and so His will is not the cause of things. | |
| 12254 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="29212" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29212] Iª q. 19 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum sic | |
| 12255 proceditur. Videtur quod voluntas Dei non sit causa rerum. Dicit | |
| 12256 enim Dionysius, cap. IV de Div. Nom., <i>sicut noster sol, non | |
| 12257 ratiocinans aut praeeligens, sed per ipsum esse illuminat omnia | |
| 12258 participare lumen ipsius valentia; ita et bonum divinum per ipsam | |
| 12259 essentiam omnibus existentibus immittit bonitatis suae radios</i>. | |
| 12260 Sed omne quod agit per voluntatem, agit ut ratiocinans et | |
| 12261 praeeligens. Ergo Deus non agit per voluntatem. Ergo voluntas Dei | |
| 12262 non est causa rerum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A4-p3"> | |
| 12263 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, The first in any order is that which is essentially so, thus in the order of burning things, that comes first which | |
| 12264 is fire by its essence. But God is the first agent. Therefore He acts by His essence; and that is His nature. He acts then | |
| 12265 by nature, and not by will. Therefore the divine will is not the cause of things. | |
| 12266 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="29213" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29213] Iª q. 19 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, id | |
| 12267 quod est per essentiam, est primum in quolibet ordine sicut in | |
| 12268 ordine ignitorum est primum, quod est ignis per essentiam sed Deus | |
| 12269 est primum agens. Ergo est agens per essentiam suam, quae est | |
| 12270 natura eius. Agit igitur per naturam, et non per voluntatem. | |
| 12271 Voluntas igitur divina non est causa rerum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A4-p4"> | |
| 12272 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Whatever is the cause of anything, through being "such" a thing, is the cause by nature, and not by will. For fire | |
| 12273 is the cause of heat, as being itself hot; whereas an architect is the cause of a house, because he wills to build it. Now | |
| 12274 Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 32), "Because God is good, we exist." Therefore God is the cause of things by His nature, | |
| 12275 and not by His will. | |
| 12276 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="29214" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29214] Iª q. 19 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 12277 quidquid est causa alicuius per hoc quod est tale, est causa per | |
| 12278 naturam, et non per voluntatem, ignis enim causa est calefactionis, | |
| 12279 quia est calidus; sed artifex est causa domus, quia vult eam | |
| 12280 facere. Sed Augustinus dicit, in I de Doct. Christ., quod <i>quia | |
| 12281 Deus bonus est, sumus</i>. Ergo Deus per suam naturam est causa | |
| 12282 rerum, et non per voluntatem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A4-p5"> | |
| 12283 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, Of one thing there is one cause. But the created things is the knowledge of God, as said before ( | |
| 12284 <a id="FP_Q19_A4-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q14_A8.html">Q[14], A[8]</a>). Therefore the will of God cannot be considered the cause of things. | |
| 12285 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 4 arg. 4"><a name="29215" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29215] Iª q. 19 a. 4 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, unius | |
| 12286 rei una est causa. Sed rerum creatarum est causa scientia Dei, ut | |
| 12287 supra dictum est. Ergo voluntas Dei non debet poni causa rerum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A4-p6"> | |
| 12288 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is said ( | |
| 12289 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q19_A4-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.11.26" target="asv">Wis. 11:26</a>), "How could anything endure, if Thou wouldst not?" | |
| 12290 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 4 s. c."><a name="29216" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29216] Iª q. 19 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est | |
| 12291 quod dicitur Sap. XI, <i>quomodo posset aliquid permanere, nisi tu | |
| 12292 voluisses?</i></p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q19_A4-p7"> | |
| 12293 <b>I answer that,</b> We must hold that the will of God is the cause of things; and that He acts by the will, and not, as some have supposed, by | |
| 12294 a necessity of His nature. | |
| 12295 </p><p id="FP_Q19_A4-p8"> This can be shown in three ways: First, from the order itself of active causes. Since both intellect and nature act for an | |
| 12296 end, as proved in Phys. ii, 49, the natural agent must have the end and the necessary means predetermined for it by some higher | |
| 12297 intellect; as the end and definite movement is predetermined for the arrow by the archer. Hence the intellectual and voluntary | |
| 12298 agent must precede the agent that acts by nature. Hence, since God is first in the order of agents, He | |
| 12299 must act by intellect and will. | |
| 12300 </p><p id="FP_Q19_A4-p9"> This is shown, secondly, from the character of a natural agent, of which the property is to produce one and the same effect; | |
| 12301 for nature operates in one and the same way unless it be prevented. This is because the nature of the act is according to | |
| 12302 the nature of the agent; and hence as long as it has that nature, its acts will be in accordance with that nature; for every | |
| 12303 natural agent has a determinate being. Since, then, the Divine Being is undetermined, and contains in Himself | |
| 12304 the full perfection of being, it cannot be that He acts by a necessity of His nature, unless He were to cause something undetermined | |
| 12305 and indefinite in being: and that this is impossible has been already shown ( | |
| 12306 <a id="FP_Q19_A4-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q7_A2.html">Q[7], A[2]</a>). He does not, therefore, act by a necessity of His nature, but determined effects proceed from His own infinite perfection | |
| 12307 according to the determination of His will and intellect. | |
| 12308 </p><p id="FP_Q19_A4-p10"> Thirdly, it is shown by the relation of effects to their cause. For effects proceed from the agent that causes them, in so | |
| 12309 far as they pre-exist in the agent; since every agent produces its like. Now effects pre-exist in their cause after the mode | |
| 12310 of the cause. Wherefore since the Divine Being is His own intellect, effects pre-exist in Him after the mode of intellect, | |
| 12311 and therefore proceed from Him after the same mode. Consequently, they proceed from Him after the mode of will, | |
| 12312 for His inclination to put in act what His intellect has conceived appertains to the will. Therefore the will of God is the | |
| 12313 cause of things. | |
| 12314 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 4 co."><a name="29217" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29217] Iª q. 19 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum | |
| 12315 quod necesse est dicere voluntatem Dei esse causam rerum, et Deum | |
| 12316 agere per voluntatem, non per necessitatem naturae, ut quidam | |
| 12317 existimaverunt. Quod quidem apparere potest tripliciter. Primo | |
| 12318 quidem, ex ipso ordine causarum agentium. Cum enim propter finem | |
| 12319 agat et intellectus et natura, ut probatur in II Physic., necesse | |
| 12320 est ut agenti per naturam praedeterminetur finis, et media | |
| 12321 necessaria ad finem, ab aliquo superiori intellectu; sicut sagittae | |
| 12322 praedeterminatur finis et certus modus a sagittante. Unde necesse | |
| 12323 est quod agens per intellectum et voluntatem, sit prius agente per | |
| 12324 naturam. Unde, cum primum in ordine agentium sit Deus, necesse est | |
| 12325 quod per intellectum et voluntatem agat. Secundo, ex ratione | |
| 12326 naturalis agentis, ad quod pertinet ut unum effectum producat, quia | |
| 12327 natura uno et eodem modo operatur, nisi impediatur. Et hoc ideo, | |
| 12328 quia secundum quod est tale, agit, unde, quandiu est tale, non | |
| 12329 facit nisi tale. Omne enim agens per naturam, habet esse | |
| 12330 determinatum. Cum igitur esse divinum non sit determinatum, sed | |
| 12331 contineat in se totam perfectionem essendi, non potest esse quod | |
| 12332 agat per necessitatem naturae, nisi forte causaret aliquid | |
| 12333 indeterminatum et infinitum in essendo; quod est impossibile, ut ex | |
| 12334 superioribus patet. Non igitur agit per necessitatem naturae sed | |
| 12335 effectus determinati ab infinita ipsius perfectione procedunt | |
| 12336 secundum determinationem voluntatis et intellectus ipsius. Tertio, | |
| 12337 ex habitudine effectuum ad causam. Secundum hoc enim effectus | |
| 12338 procedunt a causa agente, secundum quod praeexistunt in ea, quia | |
| 12339 omne agens agit sibi simile. Praeexistunt autem effectus in causa | |
| 12340 secundum modum causae. Unde, cum esse divinum sit ipsum eius | |
| 12341 intelligere, praeexistunt in eo effectus eius secundum modum | |
| 12342 intelligibilem. Unde et per modum intelligibilem procedunt ab eo. | |
| 12343 Et sic, per consequens, per modum voluntatis, nam inclinatio eius | |
| 12344 ad agendum quod intellectu conceptum est, pertinet ad voluntatem. | |
| 12345 Voluntas igitur Dei est causa rerum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A4-p11"> | |
| 12346 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Dionysius in these words does not intend to exclude election from God absolutely; but only in a certain sense, in so far, | |
| 12347 that is, as He communicates His goodness not merely to certain things, but to all; and as election implies a certain distinction. | |
| 12348 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="29218" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29218] Iª q. 19 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo | |
| 12349 dicendum quod Dionysius per verba illa non intendit excludere | |
| 12350 electionem a Deo simpliciter, sed secundum quid, inquantum | |
| 12351 scilicet, non quibusdam solum bonitatem suam communicat, sed | |
| 12352 omnibus, prout scilicet electio discretionem quandam importat.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A4-p12"> | |
| 12353 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Because the essence of God is His intellect and will, from the fact of His acting by His essence, it follows that He acts | |
| 12354 after the mode of intellect and will. | |
| 12355 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="29219" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29219] Iª q. 19 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 12356 dicendum quod, quia essentia Dei est eius intelligere et velle, ex | |
| 12357 hoc ipso quod per essentiam suam agit, sequitur quod agat per modum | |
| 12358 intellectus et voluntatis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A4-p13"> | |
| 12359 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Good is the object of the will. The words, therefore, "Because God is good, we exist," are true inasmuch as His goodness | |
| 12360 is the reason of His willing all other things, as said before (A[2], ad 2). | |
| 12361 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="29220" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29220] Iª q. 19 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 12362 dicendum quod bonum est obiectum voluntatis. Pro tanto ergo | |
| 12363 dicitur, quia Deus bonus est, sumus, inquantum sua bonitas est ei | |
| 12364 ratio volendi omnia alia, ut supra dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A4-p14"> | |
| 12365 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Even in us the cause of one and the same effect is knowledge as directing it, whereby the form of the work is conceived, | |
| 12366 and will as commanding it, since the form as it is in the intellect only is not determined to exist or not to exist in the | |
| 12367 effect, except by the will. Hence, the speculative intellect has nothing to say to operation. But the power is cause, as executing | |
| 12368 the effect, since it denotes the immediate principle of operation. But in God | |
| 12369 all these things are one. | |
| 12370 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 4 ad 4"><a name="29221" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29221] Iª q. 19 a. 4 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum | |
| 12371 dicendum quod unius et eiusdem effectus, etiam in nobis, est causa | |
| 12372 scientia ut dirigens, qua concipitur forma operis, et voluntas ut | |
| 12373 imperans, quia forma, ut est in intellectu tantum, non determinatur | |
| 12374 ad hoc quod sit vel non sit in effectu, nisi per voluntatem. Unde | |
| 12375 intellectus speculativus nihil dicit de operando. Sed potentia est | |
| 12376 causa ut exequens, quia nominat immediatum principium operationis. | |
| 12377 Sed haec omnia in Deo unum sunt.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q19_A5" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q19_A5-p0.1">Q. 19. A. 5. Whether any cause can be assigned to the divine will?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A5-p2"> | |
| 12378 <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that some cause can be assigned to the divine will. For Augustine says (Qq. lxxxiii, 46): "Who would venture to | |
| 12379 say that God made all things irrationally?" But to a voluntary agent, what is the reason of operating, is the cause of willing. | |
| 12380 Therefore the will of God has some cause. | |
| 12381 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 5 arg. 1"><a name="29222" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29222] Iª q. 19 a. 5 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quintum sic | |
| 12382 proceditur. Videtur quod voluntatis divinae sit assignare aliquam | |
| 12383 causam. Dicit enim Augustinus, libro octoginta trium quaest., | |
| 12384 <i>quis audeat dicere Deum irrationabiliter omnia condidisse?</i> | |
| 12385 Sed agenti voluntario, quod est ratio operandi, est etiam causa | |
| 12386 volendi. Ergo voluntas Dei habet aliquam causam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A5-p3"> | |
| 12387 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, in things made by one who wills to make them, and whose will is influenced by no cause, there can be no cause assigned | |
| 12388 except by the will of him who wills. But the will of God is the cause of all things, as has been already shown | |
| 12389 <a id="FP_Q19_A5-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q19_A4.html">(A[4])</a>. If, then, there is no cause of His will, we cannot seek in any natural things any cause, except the divine will alone. Thus | |
| 12390 all science would be in vain, since science seeks to assign causes | |
| 12391 to effects. This seems inadmissible, and therefore we must assign some cause to the divine will. | |
| 12392 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 5 arg. 2"><a name="29223" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29223] Iª q. 19 a. 5 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, in | |
| 12393 his quae fiunt a volente qui propter nullam causam aliquid vult, | |
| 12394 non oportet aliam causam assignare nisi voluntatem volentis. Sed | |
| 12395 voluntas Dei est causa omnium rerum, ut ostensum est. Si igitur | |
| 12396 voluntatis eius non sit aliqua causa, non oportebit in omnibus | |
| 12397 rebus naturalibus aliam causam quaerere, nisi solam voluntatem | |
| 12398 divinam. Et sic omnes scientiae essent supervacuae, quae causas | |
| 12399 aliquorum effectuum assignare nituntur, quod videtur inconveniens. | |
| 12400 Est igitur assignare aliquam causam voluntatis divinae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A5-p4"> | |
| 12401 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, what is done by the willer, on account of no cause, depends simply on his will. If, therefore, the will of God has | |
| 12402 no cause, it follows that all things made depend simply on His will, and have no other cause. But this also is not admissible. | |
| 12403 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 5 arg. 3"><a name="29224" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29224] Iª q. 19 a. 5 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, quod | |
| 12404 fit a volente non propter aliquam causam, dependet ex simplici | |
| 12405 voluntate eius. Si igitur voluntas Dei non habeat aliquam causam, | |
| 12406 sequitur quod omnia quae fiunt, dependeant ex simplici eius | |
| 12407 voluntate, et non habeant aliquam aliam causam. Quod est | |
| 12408 inconveniens.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A5-p5"> | |
| 12409 <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (Qq. lxxxiii, 28): "Every efficient cause is greater than the thing effected." But nothing is greater than | |
| 12410 the will of God. We must not then seek for a cause of it. | |
| 12411 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 5 s. c."><a name="29225" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29225] Iª q. 19 a. 5 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est | |
| 12412 quod dicit Augustinus, in libro octoginta trium quaest., <i>omnis | |
| 12413 causa efficiens maior est eo quod efficitur; nihil tamen maius est | |
| 12414 voluntate Dei; non ergo causa eius quaerenda est</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q19_A5-p6"> | |
| 12415 <b>I answer that,</b> In no wise has the will of God a cause. In proof of which we must consider that, since the will follows from the intellect, | |
| 12416 there is cause of the will in the person who wills, in the same way as there is a cause of the understanding, in the person | |
| 12417 that understands. The case with the understanding is this: that if the premiss and its conclusion are understood separately | |
| 12418 from each other, the understanding the premiss is the cause that the conclusion is known. | |
| 12419 If the understanding perceive the conclusion in the premiss itself, apprehending both the one and the other at the same glance, | |
| 12420 in this case the knowing of the conclusion would not be caused by understanding the premisses, since a thing cannot be its | |
| 12421 own cause; and yet, it would be true that the thinker would understand the premisses to be the cause of the conclusion. It | |
| 12422 is the same with the will, with respect to which the end stands in the same relation to the means to the end, as do the | |
| 12423 premisses to the conclusion with regard to the understanding. | |
| 12424 </p><p id="FP_Q19_A5-p7"> Hence, if anyone in one act wills an end, and in another act the means to that end, his willing the end will be the cause | |
| 12425 of his willing the means. This cannot be the case if in one act he wills both end and means; for a thing cannot be its own | |
| 12426 cause. Yet it will be true to say that he wills to order to the end the means to the end. Now as God by one act understands | |
| 12427 all things in His essence, so by one act He wills all things in His goodness. Hence, as in God to understand the | |
| 12428 cause is not the cause of His understanding the effect, for He understands the effect in the cause, so, in Him, to will an | |
| 12429 end is not the cause of His willing the means, yet He wills the ordering of the means to the end. Therefore, He wills this | |
| 12430 to be as means to that; but does not will this on account of that. | |
| 12431 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 5 co."><a name="29226" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29226] Iª q. 19 a. 5 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum | |
| 12432 quod nullo modo voluntas Dei causam habet. Ad cuius evidentiam, | |
| 12433 considerandum est quod, cum voluntas sequatur intellectum, eodem | |
| 12434 modo contingit esse causam alicuius volentis ut velit, et alicuius | |
| 12435 intelligentis ut intelligat. In intellectu autem sic est quod, si | |
| 12436 seorsum intelligat principium, et seorsum conclusionem, | |
| 12437 intelligentia principii est causa scientiae conclusionis. Sed si | |
| 12438 intellectus in ipso principio inspiceret conclusionem, uno intuitu | |
| 12439 apprehendens utrumque, in eo scientia conclusionis non causaretur | |
| 12440 ab intellectu principiorum, quia idem non est causa sui ipsius. Sed | |
| 12441 tamen intelligeret principia esse causas conclusionis. Similiter | |
| 12442 est ex parte voluntatis, circa quam sic se habet finis ad ea quae | |
| 12443 sunt ad finem, sicut in intellectu principia ad conclusiones. Unde, | |
| 12444 si aliquis uno actu velit finem, et alio actu ea quae sunt ad | |
| 12445 finem, velle finem erit ei causa volendi ea quae sunt ad finem. Sed | |
| 12446 si uno actu velit finem et ea quae sunt ad finem, hoc esse non | |
| 12447 poterit, quia idem non est causa sui ipsius. Et tamen erit verum | |
| 12448 dicere quod velit ordinare ea quae sunt ad finem, in finem. Deus | |
| 12449 autem, sicut uno actu omnia in essentia sua intelligit, ita uno | |
| 12450 actu vult omnia in sua bonitate. Unde, sicut in Deo intelligere | |
| 12451 causam non est causa intelligendi effectus, sed ipse intelligit | |
| 12452 effectus in causa; ita velle finem non est ei causa volendi ea quae | |
| 12453 sunt ad finem, sed tamen vult ea quae sunt ad finem, ordinari in | |
| 12454 finem. Vult ergo hoc esse propter hoc, sed non propter hoc vult | |
| 12455 hoc.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A5-p8"> | |
| 12456 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The will of God is reasonable, not because anything is to God a cause of willing, but in so far as He wills one thing to | |
| 12457 be on account of another. | |
| 12458 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 5 ad 1"><a name="29227" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29227] Iª q. 19 a. 5 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo | |
| 12459 dicendum quod voluntas Dei rationabilis est, non quod aliquid sit | |
| 12460 Deo causa volendi, sed inquantum vult unum esse propter aliud.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A5-p9"> | |
| 12461 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Since God wills effects to proceed from definite causes, for the preservation of order in the universe, it is not unreasonable | |
| 12462 to seek for causes secondary to the divine will. It would, however, be unreasonable to do so, if such were considered as primary, | |
| 12463 and not as dependent on the will of God. In this sense Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 2): "Philosophers in their vanity have | |
| 12464 thought fit to attribute contingent effects to other causes, being utterly | |
| 12465 unable to perceive the cause that is shown above all others, the will of God." | |
| 12466 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 5 ad 2"><a name="29228" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29228] Iª q. 19 a. 5 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 12467 dicendum quod, cum velit Deus effectus sic esse, ut ex causis | |
| 12468 certis proveniant, ad hoc quod servetur ordo in rebus; non est | |
| 12469 supervacuum, etiam cum voluntate Dei, alias causas quaerere. Esset | |
| 12470 tamen supervacuum, si aliae causae quaererentur ut primae, et non | |
| 12471 dependentes a divina voluntate. Et sic loquitur Augustinus in III | |
| 12472 de Trin., <i>placuit vanitati philosophorum etiam aliis causis | |
| 12473 effectus contingentes tribuere, cum omnino videre non possent | |
| 12474 superiorem ceteris omnibus causam, idest voluntatem Dei</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A5-p10"> | |
| 12475 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Since God wills effects to come from causes, all effects that presuppose some other effect do not depend solely on the will | |
| 12476 of God, but on something else besides: but the first effect depends on the divine will alone. Thus, for example, we may say | |
| 12477 that God willed man to have hands to serve his intellect by their work, and intellect, that he might be man; and willed him | |
| 12478 to be man that he might enjoy Him, or for the completion of the universe. But this | |
| 12479 cannot be reduced to other created secondary ends. Hence such things depend on the simple will of God; but the others on the | |
| 12480 order of other causes. | |
| 12481 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 5 ad 3"><a name="29229" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29229] Iª q. 19 a. 5 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 12482 dicendum quod, cum Deus velit effectus esse propter causas, | |
| 12483 quicumque effectus praesupponunt aliquem alium effectum, non | |
| 12484 dependent ex sola Dei voluntate, sed ex aliquo alio. Sed primi | |
| 12485 effectus ex sola divina voluntate dependent. Utpote si dicamus quod | |
| 12486 Deus voluit hominem habere manus, ut deservirent intellectui, | |
| 12487 operando diversa opera, et voluit eum habere intellectum, ad hoc | |
| 12488 quod esset homo, et voluit eum esse hominem, ut frueretur ipso, vel | |
| 12489 ad complementum universi. Quae quidem non est reducere ad alios | |
| 12490 fines creatos ulteriores. Unde huiusmodi dependent ex simplici | |
| 12491 voluntate Dei, alia vero ex ordine etiam aliarum causarum.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q19_A6" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q19_A6-p0.1">Q. 19. A. 6. Whether the will of God is always fulfilled?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A6-p2"> | |
| 12492 <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the will of God is not always fulfilled. For the Apostle says ( | |
| 12493 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q19_A6-p2.1" href="./asv.html#iTim.2.4" target="asv">1 Tim. 2:4</a>): "God will have all men to be saved, and to come to the knowledge of the truth." But this does not happen. Therefore the | |
| 12494 will of God is not always fulfilled. | |
| 12495 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 6 arg. 1"><a name="29230" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29230] Iª q. 19 a. 6 arg. 1</span></a> Ad sextum sic | |
| 12496 proceditur. Videtur quod voluntas Dei non semper impleatur. Dicit | |
| 12497 enim apostolus, I ad Tim. II, quod <i>Deus vult omnes homines | |
| 12498 salvos fieri, et ad agnitionem veritatis venire</i>. Sed hoc non | |
| 12499 ita evenit. Ergo voluntas Dei non semper impletur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A6-p3"> | |
| 12500 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, as is the relation of knowledge to truth, so is that of the will to good. Now God knows all truth. Therefore He | |
| 12501 wills all good. But not all good actually exists; for much more good might exist. Therefore the will of God is not always | |
| 12502 fulfilled. | |
| 12503 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 6 arg. 2"><a name="29231" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29231] Iª q. 19 a. 6 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, sicut | |
| 12504 se habet scientia ad verum, ita voluntas ad bonum. Sed Deus scit | |
| 12505 omne verum. Ergo vult omne bonum. Sed non omne bonum fit, multa | |
| 12506 enim bona possunt fieri, quae non fiunt. Non ergo voluntas Dei | |
| 12507 semper impletur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A6-p4"> | |
| 12508 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, since the will of God is the first cause, it does not exclude intermediate causes. But the effect of a first cause | |
| 12509 may be hindered by a defect of a secondary cause; as the effect of the motive power may be hindered by the weakness of the | |
| 12510 limb. Therefore the effect of the divine will may be hindered by a defect of the secondary causes. The will of God, therefore, | |
| 12511 is not always fulfilled. | |
| 12512 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 6 arg. 3"><a name="29232" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29232] Iª q. 19 a. 6 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 12513 voluntas Dei, cum sit causa prima, non excludit causas medias, ut | |
| 12514 dictum est. Sed effectus causae primae potest impediri per defectum | |
| 12515 causae secundae, sicut effectus virtutis motivae impeditur propter | |
| 12516 debilitatem tibiae. Ergo et effectus divinae voluntatis potest | |
| 12517 impediri propter defectum secundarum causarum. Non ergo voluntas | |
| 12518 Dei semper impletur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A6-p5"> | |
| 12519 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is said ( | |
| 12520 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q19_A6-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.113.11" target="asv">Ps. 113:11</a>): "God hath done all things, whatsoever He would." | |
| 12521 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 6 s. c."><a name="29233" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29233] Iª q. 19 a. 6 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est | |
| 12522 quod dicitur in Psalmo CXIII, <i>omnia quaecumque voluit Deus, | |
| 12523 fecit</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A6-p6"> | |
| 12524 <b>I answer that,</b> The will of God must needs always be fulfilled. In proof of which we must consider that since an effect is conformed to the | |
| 12525 agent according to its form, the rule is the same with active causes as with formal causes. The rule in forms is this: that | |
| 12526 although a thing may fall short of any particular form, it cannot fall short of the universal form. For though a thing may | |
| 12527 fail to be, for example, a man or a living being, yet it cannot fail to be a being. Hence | |
| 12528 the same must happen in active causes. Something may fall outside the order of any particular active cause, but not outside | |
| 12529 the order of the universal cause; under which all particular causes are included: and if any particular cause fails of its | |
| 12530 effect, this is because of the hindrance of some other particular cause, which is included in the order of the universal cause. | |
| 12531 Therefore an effect cannot possibly escape the order of the universal cause. Even in corporeal things this is clearly seen. | |
| 12532 For it may happen that a star is hindered from producing its effects; yet whatever effect does result, in corporeal things, | |
| 12533 from this hindrance of a corporeal cause, must be referred through intermediate causes to the universal influence of the first | |
| 12534 heaven. Since, then, the will of God is the universal cause of all things, it is impossible that the divine will should not | |
| 12535 produce its effect. Hence that which seems to depart from the divine will in one order, returns into it in another order; | |
| 12536 as | |
| 12537 does the sinner, who by sin falls away from the divine will as much as lies in him, yet falls back into the order of that | |
| 12538 will, when by its justice he is punished. | |
| 12539 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 6 co."><a name="29234" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29234] Iª q. 19 a. 6 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum | |
| 12540 quod necesse est voluntatem Dei semper impleri. Ad cuius | |
| 12541 evidentiam, considerandum est quod, cum effectus conformetur agenti | |
| 12542 secundum suam formam, eadem ratio est in causis agentibus, quae est | |
| 12543 in causis formalibus. In formis autem sic est quod, licet aliquid | |
| 12544 possit deficere ab aliqua forma particulari, tamen a forma | |
| 12545 universali nihil deficere potest, potest enim esse aliquid quod non | |
| 12546 est homo vel vivum, non autem potest esse aliquid quod non sit ens. | |
| 12547 Unde et hoc idem in causis agentibus contingere oportet. Potest | |
| 12548 enim aliquid fieri extra ordinem alicuius causae particularis | |
| 12549 agentis, non autem extra ordinem alicuius causae universalis, sub | |
| 12550 qua omnes causae particulares comprehenduntur. Quia, si aliqua | |
| 12551 causa particularis deficiat a suo effectu, hoc est propter aliquam | |
| 12552 aliam causam particularem impedientem, quae continetur sub ordine | |
| 12553 causae universalis, unde effectus ordinem causae universalis nullo | |
| 12554 modo potest exire. Et hoc etiam patet in corporalibus. Potest enim | |
| 12555 impediri quod aliqua stella non inducat suum effectum, sed tamen | |
| 12556 quicumque effectus ex causa corporea impediente in rebus | |
| 12557 corporalibus consequatur, oportet quod reducatur per aliquas causas | |
| 12558 medias in universalem virtutem primi caeli. Cum igitur voluntas Dei | |
| 12559 sit universalis causa omnium rerum, impossibile est quod divina | |
| 12560 voluntas suum effectum non consequatur. Unde quod recedere videtur | |
| 12561 a divina voluntate secundum unum ordinem, relabitur in ipsam | |
| 12562 secundum alium, sicut peccator, qui, quantum est in se, recedit a | |
| 12563 divina voluntate peccando, incidit in ordinem divinae voluntatis, | |
| 12564 dum per eius iustitiam punitur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q19_A6-p7"> | |
| 12565 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The words of the Apostle, "God will have all men to be saved," etc. can be understood in three ways. First, by a restricted | |
| 12566 application, in which case they would mean, as Augustine says (De praed. sanct. i, 8: Enchiridion 103), "God wills all men | |
| 12567 to be saved that are saved, not because there is no man whom He does not wish saved, but because there is no man saved whose | |
| 12568 salvation He does not will." Secondly, they can be understood as applying to every | |
| 12569 class of individuals, not to every individual of each class; in which case they mean that God wills some men of every class | |
| 12570 and condition to be saved, males and females, Jews and Gentiles, great and small, but not all of every condition. Thirdly, | |
| 12571 according to Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 29), they are understood of the antecedent will of God; not of the consequent will. | |
| 12572 This distinction must not be taken as applying to the divine will itself, in which there is nothing antecedent nor consequent, | |
| 12573 but to the things willed. | |
| 12574 </p><p id="FP_Q19_A6-p8"> To understand this we must consider that everything, in so far as it is good, is willed by God. A thing taken in its primary | |
| 12575 sense, and absolutely considered, may be good or evil, and yet when some additional circumstances are taken into account, | |
| 12576 by a consequent consideration may be changed into the contrary. Thus that a man should live is good; and that a man should | |
| 12577 be killed is evil, absolutely considered. But if in a particular case we add that a man is a murderer or | |
| 12578 dangerous to society, to kill him is a good; that he live is an evil. Hence it may be said of a just judge, that antecedently | |
| 12579 he wills all men to live; but consequently wills the murderer to be hanged. In the same way God antecedently wills all men | |
| 12580 to be saved, but consequently wills some to be damned, as His justice exacts. Nor do we will simply, what we will antecedently, | |
| 12581 but rather we will it in a qualified manner; for the will is directed to things as they are in themselves, and in | |
| 12582 themselves they exist under particular qualifications. Hence we will a thing simply inasmuch as we will it when all particular | |
| 12583 circumstances are considered; and this is what is meant by willing consequently. Thus it may be said that a just judge wills | |
| 12584 simply the hanging of a murderer, but in a qualified manner he would will him to live, to wit, inasmuch as he is a man. Such | |
| 12585 a qualified will may be called a willingness rather than an absolute will. Thus it is clear that whatever God simply wills | |
| 12586 takes place; although what He wills antecedently may not take place. | |
| 12587 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 6 ad 1"><a name="29235" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29235] Iª q. 19 a. 6 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo | |
| 12588 dicendum quod illud verbum apostoli, quod Deus vult omnes homines | |
| 12589 salvos fieri etc., potest tripliciter intelligi. Uno modo, ut sit | |
| 12590 accommoda distributio, secundum hunc sensum, Deus vult salvos fieri | |
| 12591 omnes homines qui salvantur, non quia nullus homo sit quem salvum | |
| 12592 fieri non velit, sed quia nullus salvus fit, quem non velit salvum | |
| 12593 fieri, ut dicit Augustinus secundo potest intelligi, ut fiat | |
| 12594 distributio pro generibus singulorum, et non pro singulis generum, | |
| 12595 secundum hunc sensum, Deus vult de quolibet statu hominum salvos | |
| 12596 fieri, mares et feminas, Iudaeos et gentiles, parvos et magnos; non | |
| 12597 tamen omnes de singulis statibus. Tertio, secundum Damascenum, | |
| 12598 intelligitur de voluntate antecedente, non de voluntate | |
| 12599 consequente. Quae quidem distinctio non accipitur ex parte ipsius | |
| 12600 voluntatis divinae, in qua nihil est prius vel posterius; sed ex | |
| 12601 parte volitorum. Ad cuius intellectum, considerandum est quod | |
| 12602 unumquodque, secundum quod bonum est, sic est volitum a Deo. | |
| 12603 Aliquid autem potest esse in prima sui consideratione, secundum | |
| 12604 quod absolute consideratur, bonum vel malum, quod tamen, prout cum | |
| 12605 aliquo adiuncto consideratur, quae est consequens consideratio | |
| 12606 eius, e contrario se habet. Sicut hominem vivere est bonum, et | |
| 12607 hominem occidi est malum, secundum absolutam considerationem, sed | |
| 12608 si addatur circa aliquem hominem, quod sit homicida, vel vivens in | |
| 12609 periculum multitudinis, sic bonum est eum occidi, et malum est eum | |
| 12610 vivere. Unde potest dici quod iudex iustus antecedenter vult omnem | |
| 12611 hominem vivere; sed consequenter vult homicidam suspendi. Similiter | |
| 12612 Deus antecedenter vult omnem hominem salvari; sed consequenter vult | |
| 12613 quosdam damnari, secundum exigentiam suae iustitiae. Neque tamen id | |
| 12614 quod antecedenter volumus, simpliciter volumus, sed secundum quid. | |
| 12615 Quia voluntas comparatur ad res, secundum quod in seipsis sunt, in | |
| 12616 seipsis autem sunt in particulari, unde simpliciter volumus | |
| 12617 aliquid, secundum quod volumus illud consideratis omnibus | |
| 12618 circumstantiis particularibus, quod est consequenter velle. Unde | |
| 12619 potest dici quod iudex iustus simpliciter vult homicidam suspendi, | |
| 12620 sed secundum quid vellet eum vivere, scilicet inquantum est homo. | |
| 12621 Unde magis potest dici velleitas, quam absoluta voluntas. Et sic | |
| 12622 patet quod quidquid Deus simpliciter vult, fit; licet illud quod | |
| 12623 antecedenter vult, non fiat.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A6-p9"> | |
| 12624 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> An act of the cognitive faculty is according as the thing known is in the knower; while an act of the appetite faculty is | |
| 12625 directed to things as they exist in themselves. But all that can have the nature of being and truth virtually exists in God, | |
| 12626 though it does not all exist in created things. Therefore God knows all truth; but does not will all good, except in so far | |
| 12627 as He wills Himself, in Whom all good virtually exists. | |
| 12628 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 6 ad 2"><a name="29236" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29236] Iª q. 19 a. 6 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 12629 dicendum quod actus cognoscitivae virtutis est secundum quod | |
| 12630 cognitum est in cognoscente, actus autem virtutis appetitivae est | |
| 12631 ordinatus ad res, secundum quod in seipsis sunt. Quidquid autem | |
| 12632 potest habere rationem entis et veri, totum est virtualiter in Deo; | |
| 12633 sed non totum existit in rebus creatis. Et ideo Deus cognoscit omne | |
| 12634 verum, non tamen vult omne bonum, nisi inquantum vult se, in quo | |
| 12635 virtualiter omne bonum existit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A6-p10"> | |
| 12636 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> A first cause can be hindered in its effect by deficiency in the secondary cause, when it is not the universal first cause, | |
| 12637 including within itself all causes; for then the effect could in no way escape its order. And thus it is with the will of | |
| 12638 God, as said above. | |
| 12639 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 6 ad 3"><a name="29237" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29237] Iª q. 19 a. 6 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 12640 dicendum quod causa prima tunc potest impediri a suo effectu per | |
| 12641 defectum causae secundae, quando non est universaliter prima, sub | |
| 12642 se omnes causas comprehendens, quia sic effectus nullo modo posset | |
| 12643 suum ordinem evadere. Et sic est de voluntate Dei, ut dictum | |
| 12644 est.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q19_A7" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q19_A7-p0.1">Q. 19. A. 7. Whether the will of God is changeable?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A7-p2"> | |
| 12645 <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the Will of God is changeable. For the Lord says ( | |
| 12646 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q19_A7-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.6.7" target="asv">Gn. 6:7</a>): "It repenteth Me that I have made man." But whoever repents of what he has done, has a changeable will. Therefore God has | |
| 12647 a changeable will. | |
| 12648 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 7 arg. 1"><a name="29238" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29238] Iª q. 19 a. 7 arg. 1</span></a> Ad septimum sic | |
| 12649 proceditur. Videtur quod voluntas Dei sit mutabilis. Dicit enim | |
| 12650 dominus Genes. VI, <i>poenitet me fecisse hominem</i>. Sed | |
| 12651 quemcumque poenitet de eo quod fecit, habet mutabilem voluntatem. | |
| 12652 Ergo Deus habet mutabilem voluntatem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A7-p3"> | |
| 12653 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it is said in the person of the Lord: "I will speak against a nation and against a kingdom, to root out, and to | |
| 12654 pull down, and to destroy it; but if that nation shall repent of its evil, I also will repent of the evil that I have thought | |
| 12655 to do to them" ( | |
| 12656 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q19_A7-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Jer.18.7" target="asv">Jer. 18:7,8</a>) Therefore God has a changeable will. | |
| 12657 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 7 arg. 2"><a name="29239" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29239] Iª q. 19 a. 7 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 12658 Ierem. XVIII, ex persona domini dicitur, <i>loquar adversus gentem | |
| 12659 et adversus regnum, ut eradicem et destruam et disperdam illud; sed | |
| 12660 si poenitentiam egerit gens illa a malo suo, agam et ego | |
| 12661 poenitentiam super malo quod cogitavi ut facerem ei</i>. Ergo Deus | |
| 12662 habet mutabilem voluntatem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A7-p4"> | |
| 12663 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, whatever God does, He does voluntarily. But God does not always do the same thing, for at one time He ordered the | |
| 12664 law to be observed, and at another time forbade it. Therefore He has a changeable will. | |
| 12665 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 7 arg. 3"><a name="29240" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29240] Iª q. 19 a. 7 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 12666 quidquid Deus facit, voluntarie facit. Sed Deus non semper eadem | |
| 12667 facit, nam quandoque praecepit legalia observari, quandoque | |
| 12668 prohibuit. Ergo habet mutabilem voluntatem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A7-p5"> | |
| 12669 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, God does not will of necessity what He wills, as said before | |
| 12670 <a id="FP_Q19_A7-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q19_A3.html">(A[3])</a>. Therefore He can both will and not will the same thing. But whatever can incline to either of two opposites, is changeable | |
| 12671 substantially; and that which can exist in a place or not in that place, is changeable locally. Therefore God is changeable | |
| 12672 as regards His will. | |
| 12673 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 7 arg. 4"><a name="29241" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29241] Iª q. 19 a. 7 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, Deus | |
| 12674 non ex necessitate vult quod vult, ut supra dictum est. Ergo potest | |
| 12675 velle et non velle idem. Sed omne quod habet potentiam ad opposita, | |
| 12676 est mutabile, sicut quod potest esse et non esse, est mutabile | |
| 12677 secundum substantiam; et quod potest esse hic et non esse hic, est | |
| 12678 mutabile secundum locum. Ergo Deus est mutabilis secundum | |
| 12679 voluntatem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A7-p6"> | |
| 12680 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is said: "God is not as a man, that He should lie, nor as the son of man, that He should be changed" ( | |
| 12681 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q19_A7-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Num.23.19" target="asv">Num. 23:19</a>). | |
| 12682 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 7 s. c."><a name="29242" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29242] Iª q. 19 a. 7 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est | |
| 12683 quod dicitur Num. XXIII, <i>non est Deus, quasi homo, ut mentiatur; | |
| 12684 neque ut filius hominis, ut mutetur</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A7-p7"> | |
| 12685 <b>I answer that,</b> The will of God is entirely unchangeable. On this point we must consider that to change the will is one thing; to will that | |
| 12686 certain things should be changed is another. It is possible to will a thing to be done now, and its contrary afterwards; and | |
| 12687 yet for the will to remain permanently the same: whereas the will would be changed, if one should begin to will what before | |
| 12688 he had not willed; or cease to will what he had willed before. This cannot happen, unless | |
| 12689 we presuppose change either in the knowledge or in the disposition of the substance of the willer. For since the will regards | |
| 12690 good, a man may in two ways begin to will a thing. In one way when that thing begins to be good for him, and this does not | |
| 12691 take place without a change in him. Thus when the cold weather begins, it becomes good to sit by the fire; though it was not | |
| 12692 so before. In another way when he knows for the first time that a thing is good for him, though he did not know it before; | |
| 12693 hence we take counsel in order to know what is good for us. Now it has already been shown that both the substance of God and | |
| 12694 His knowledge are entirely unchangeable ( | |
| 12695 <a id="FP_Q19_A7-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q9_A1.html">Q[9], A[1]</a>; | |
| 12696 <a id="FP_Q19_A7-p7.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q14_A15.html">Q[14], A[15]</a>). Therefore His will must be entirely unchangeable. | |
| 12697 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 7 co."><a name="29243" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29243] Iª q. 19 a. 7 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum | |
| 12698 quod voluntas Dei est omnino immutabilis. Sed circa hoc | |
| 12699 considerandum est, quod aliud est mutare voluntatem; et aliud est | |
| 12700 velle aliquarum rerum mutationem. Potest enim aliquis, eadem | |
| 12701 voluntate immobiliter permanente, velle quod nunc fiat hoc, et | |
| 12702 postea fiat contrarium. Sed tunc voluntas mutaretur, si aliquis | |
| 12703 inciperet velle quod prius non voluit, vel desineret velle quod | |
| 12704 voluit. Quod quidem accidere non potest, nisi praesupposita | |
| 12705 mutatione vel ex parte cognitionis, vel circa dispositionem | |
| 12706 substantiae ipsius volentis. Cum enim voluntas sit boni, aliquis de | |
| 12707 novo dupliciter potest incipere aliquid velle. Uno modo sic, quod | |
| 12708 de novo incipiat sibi illud esse bonum. Quod non est absque | |
| 12709 mutatione eius, sicut adveniente frigore, incipit esse bonum sedere | |
| 12710 ad ignem, quod prius non erat. Alio modo sic, quod de novo | |
| 12711 cognoscat illud esse sibi bonum, cum prius hoc ignorasset, ad hoc | |
| 12712 enim consiliamur, ut sciamus quid nobis sit bonum. Ostensum est | |
| 12713 autem supra quod tam substantia Dei quam eius scientia est omnino | |
| 12714 immutabilis. Unde oportet voluntatem eius omnino esse | |
| 12715 immutabilem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A7-p8"> | |
| 12716 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> These words of the Lord are to be understood metaphorically, and according to the likeness of our nature. For when we repent, | |
| 12717 we destroy what we have made; although we may even do so without change of will; as, when a man wills to make a thing, at | |
| 12718 the same time intending to destroy it later. Therefore God is said to have repented, by way of comparison with our mode of | |
| 12719 acting, in so far as by the deluge He destroyed from the face of the earth man whom | |
| 12720 He had made. | |
| 12721 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 7 ad 1"><a name="29244" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29244] Iª q. 19 a. 7 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo | |
| 12722 dicendum quod illud verbum domini metaphorice intelligendum est, | |
| 12723 secundum similitudinem nostram, cum enim nos poenitet, destruimus | |
| 12724 quod fecimus. Quamvis hoc esse possit absque mutatione voluntatis, | |
| 12725 cum etiam aliquis homo, absque mutatione voluntatis, interdum velit | |
| 12726 aliquid facere, simul intendens postea illud destruere. Sic igitur | |
| 12727 Deus poenituisse dicitur, secundum similitudinem operationis, | |
| 12728 inquantum hominem quem fecerat, per diluvium a facie terrae | |
| 12729 delevit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A7-p9"> | |
| 12730 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The will of God, as it is the first and universal cause, does not exclude intermediate causes that have power to produce | |
| 12731 certain effects. Since however all intermediate causes are inferior in power to the first cause, there are many things in | |
| 12732 the divine power, knowledge and will that are not included in the order of inferior causes. Thus in the case of the raising | |
| 12733 of Lazarus, one who looked only on inferior causes might have said: "Lazarus will not | |
| 12734 rise again," but looking at the divine first cause might have said: "Lazarus will rise again." And God wills both: that is, | |
| 12735 that in the order of the inferior cause a thing shall happen; but that in the order of the higher cause it shall not happen; | |
| 12736 or He may will conversely. We may say, then, that God sometimes declares that a thing shall happen according as it falls under | |
| 12737 the order of inferior causes, as of nature, or merit, which yet does not happen as not being in the designs of the divine | |
| 12738 and higher cause. Thus He foretold to Ezechias: "Take order with thy house, for thou shalt die, and not live" ( | |
| 12739 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q19_A7-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.38.1" target="asv">Is. 38:1</a>). Yet this did not take place, since from eternity it was otherwise disposed in the divine knowledge and will, which is unchangeable. | |
| 12740 Hence Gregory says (Moral. xvi, 5): "The sentence of God changes, but not His counsel"---that is to say, the counsel of His | |
| 12741 will. When therefore He says, "I also will repent," His words must be understood metaphorically. For | |
| 12742 men seem to repent, when they do not fulfill what they have threatened. | |
| 12743 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 7 ad 2"><a name="29245" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29245] Iª q. 19 a. 7 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 12744 dicendum quod voluntas Dei, cum sit causa prima et universalis, non | |
| 12745 excludit causas medias, in quarum virtute est ut aliqui effectus | |
| 12746 producantur. Sed quia omnes causae mediae non adaequant virtutem | |
| 12747 causae primae, multa sunt in virtute et scientia et voluntate | |
| 12748 divina, quae non continentur sub ordine causarum inferiorum; sicut | |
| 12749 resuscitatio Lazari. Unde aliquis respiciens ad causas inferiores, | |
| 12750 dicere poterat, Lazarus non resurget, respiciens vero ad causam | |
| 12751 primam divinam, poterat dicere, Lazarus resurget. Et utrumque horum | |
| 12752 Deus vult, scilicet quod aliquid quandoque sit futurum secundum | |
| 12753 causam inferiorem, quod tamen futurum non sit secundum causam | |
| 12754 superiorem; vel e converso. Sic ergo dicendum est quod Deus | |
| 12755 aliquando pronuntiat aliquid futurum, secundum quod continetur in | |
| 12756 ordine causarum inferiorum, ut puta secundum dispositionem naturae | |
| 12757 vel meritorum; quod tamen non fit, quia aliter est in causa | |
| 12758 superiori divina. Sicut cum praedixit Ezechiae, <i>dispone domui | |
| 12759 tuae, quia morieris et non vives</i>, ut habetur Isaiae XXXVIII; | |
| 12760 neque tamen ita evenit, quia ab aeterno aliter fuit in scientia et | |
| 12761 voluntate divina, quae immutabilis est. Propter quod dicit | |
| 12762 Gregorius, quod <i>Deus immutat sententiam, non tamen mutat | |
| 12763 consilium</i>, scilicet voluntatis suae. Quod ergo dicit, | |
| 12764 poenitentiam agam ego, intelligitur metaphorice dictum, nam homines | |
| 12765 quando non implent quod comminati sunt, poenitere videntur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A7-p10"> | |
| 12766 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> It does not follow from this argument that God has a will that changes, but that He sometimes wills that things should change. | |
| 12767 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 7 ad 3"><a name="29246" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29246] Iª q. 19 a. 7 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 12768 dicendum quod ex ratione illa non potest concludi quod Deus habeat | |
| 12769 mutabilem voluntatem; sed quod mutationem velit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A7-p11"> | |
| 12770 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Although God's willing a thing is not by absolute necessity, yet it is necessary by supposition, on account of the unchangeableness | |
| 12771 of the divine will, as has been said above | |
| 12772 <a id="FP_Q19_A7-p11.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q19_A3.html">(A[3])</a>. | |
| 12773 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 7 ad 4"><a name="29247" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29247] Iª q. 19 a. 7 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum | |
| 12774 dicendum quod, licet Deum velle aliquid non sit necessarium | |
| 12775 absolute, tamen necessarium est ex suppositione, propter | |
| 12776 immutabilitatem divinae voluntatis, ut supra dictum est.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q19_A8" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q19_A8-p0.1">Q. 19. A. 8. Whether the will of God imposes necessity on the things willed?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A8-p2"> | |
| 12777 <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the will of God imposes necessity on the things willed. For Augustine says (Enchiridion 103): "No one is saved, | |
| 12778 except whom God has willed to be saved. He must therefore be asked to will it; for if He wills it, it must necessarily be." | |
| 12779 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 8 arg. 1"><a name="29248" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29248] Iª q. 19 a. 8 arg. 1</span></a> Ad octavum sic | |
| 12780 proceditur. Videtur quod voluntas Dei rebus volitis necessitatem | |
| 12781 imponat. Dicit enim Augustinus, in Enchirid., <i>nullus fit salvus, | |
| 12782 nisi quem Deus voluerit salvari. Et ideo rogandus est ut velit, | |
| 12783 quia necesse est fieri, si voluerit</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A8-p3"> | |
| 12784 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, every cause that cannot be hindered, produces its effect necessarily, because, as the Philosopher says (Phys. ii, | |
| 12785 84) "Nature always works in the same way, if there is nothing to hinder it." But the will of God cannot be hindered. For the | |
| 12786 Apostle says ( | |
| 12787 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q19_A8-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.9.19" target="asv">Rom. 9:19</a>): "Who resisteth His will?" Therefore the will of God imposes necessity on the things willed. | |
| 12788 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 8 arg. 2"><a name="29249" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29249] Iª q. 19 a. 8 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, omnis | |
| 12789 causa quae non potest impediri, ex necessitate suum effectum | |
| 12790 producit, quia et natura semper idem operatur, nisi aliquid | |
| 12791 impediat, ut dicitur in II Physic. Sed voluntas Dei non potest | |
| 12792 impediri, dicit enim apostolus, ad Rom. IX, <i>voluntati enim eius | |
| 12793 quis resistit?</i> Ergo voluntas Dei imponit rebus volitis | |
| 12794 necessitatem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A8-p4"> | |
| 12795 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, whatever is necessary by its antecedent cause is necessary absolutely; it is thus necessary that animals should | |
| 12796 die, being compounded of contrary elements. Now things created by God are related to the divine will as to an antecedent cause, | |
| 12797 whereby they have necessity. For the conditional statement is true that if God wills a thing, it comes to pass; and every | |
| 12798 true conditional statement is necessary. It follows therefore that all that God wills is | |
| 12799 necessary absolutely. | |
| 12800 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 8 arg. 3"><a name="29250" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29250] Iª q. 19 a. 8 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, illud | |
| 12801 quod habet necessitatem ex priori, est necessarium absolute, sicut | |
| 12802 animal mori est necessarium, quia est ex contrariis compositum. Sed | |
| 12803 res creatae a Deo, comparantur ad voluntatem divinam sicut ad | |
| 12804 aliquid prius, a quo habent necessitatem, cum haec conditionalis | |
| 12805 sit vera, si aliquid Deus vult, illud est; omnis autem | |
| 12806 conditionalis vera est necessaria. Sequitur ergo quod omne quod | |
| 12807 Deus vult, sit necessarium absolute.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A8-p5"> | |
| 12808 <b>On the contrary,</b> All good things that exist God wills to be. If therefore His will imposes necessity on things willed, it follows that all | |
| 12809 good happens of necessity; and thus there is an end of free will, counsel, and all other such things. | |
| 12810 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 8 s. c."><a name="29251" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29251] Iª q. 19 a. 8 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra, omnia | |
| 12811 bona quae fiunt, Deus vult fieri. Si igitur eius voluntas imponat | |
| 12812 rebus volitis necessitatem, sequitur quod omnia bona ex necessitate | |
| 12813 eveniunt. Et sic perit liberum arbitrium et consilium, et omnia | |
| 12814 huiusmodi.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q19_A8-p6"> | |
| 12815 <b>I answer that,</b> The divine will imposes necessity on some things willed but not on all. The reason of this some have chosen to assign to | |
| 12816 intermediate causes, holding that what God produces by necessary causes is necessary; and what He produces by contingent causes | |
| 12817 contingent. | |
| 12818 </p><p id="FP_Q19_A8-p7"> This does not seem to be a sufficient explanation, for two reasons. First, because the effect of a first cause is contingent | |
| 12819 on account of the secondary cause, from the fact that the effect of the first cause is hindered by deficiency in the second | |
| 12820 cause, as the sun's power is hindered by a defect in the plant. But no defect of a secondary cause can hinder God's will from | |
| 12821 producing its effect. Secondly, because if the distinction between the contingent and the necessary is to be | |
| 12822 referred only to secondary causes, this must be independent of the divine intention and will; which is inadmissible. It is | |
| 12823 better therefore to say that this happens on account of the efficacy of the divine will. For when a cause is efficacious to | |
| 12824 act, the effect follows upon the cause, not only as to the thing done, but also as to its manner of being done or of being. | |
| 12825 Thus from defect of active power in the seed it may happen that a child is born unlike its father in accidental points, that | |
| 12826 belong to its manner of being. Since then the divine will is perfectly efficacious, it follows not only that things are done, | |
| 12827 which God wills to be done, but also that they are done in the way that He wills. Now God wills some things to be done necessarily, | |
| 12828 some contingently, to the right ordering of things, for the building up of the universe. Therefore to some effects He has | |
| 12829 attached necessary causes, that cannot fail; but to others defectible and contingent causes, from which arise | |
| 12830 contingent effects. Hence it is not because the proximate causes are contingent that the effects willed by God happen contingently, | |
| 12831 but because God prepared contingent causes for them, it being His will that they should happen contingently. | |
| 12832 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 8 co."><a name="29252" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29252] Iª q. 19 a. 8 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum | |
| 12833 quod divina voluntas quibusdam volitis necessitatem imponit, non | |
| 12834 autem omnibus. Cuius quidem rationem aliqui assignare voluerunt ex | |
| 12835 causis mediis quia ea quae producit per causas necessarias, sunt | |
| 12836 necessaria; ea vero quae producit per causas contingentes, sunt | |
| 12837 contingentia. Sed hoc non videtur sufficienter dictum, propter duo. | |
| 12838 Primo quidem, quia effectus alicuius primae causae est contingens | |
| 12839 propter causam secundam, ex eo quod impeditur effectus causae | |
| 12840 primae per defectum causae secundae; sicut virtus solis per | |
| 12841 defectum plantae impeditur. Nullus autem defectus causae secundae | |
| 12842 impedire potest quin voluntas Dei effectum suum producat. Secundo, | |
| 12843 quia, si distinctio contingentium a necessariis referatur solum in | |
| 12844 causas secundas, sequitur hoc esse praeter intentionem et | |
| 12845 voluntatem divinam, quod est inconveniens. Et ideo melius dicendum | |
| 12846 est, quod hoc contingit propter efficaciam divinae voluntatis. Cum | |
| 12847 enim aliqua causa efficax fuerit ad agendum, effectus consequitur | |
| 12848 causam non tantum secundum id quod fit, sed etiam secundum modum | |
| 12849 fiendi vel essendi, ex debilitate enim virtutis activae in semine, | |
| 12850 contingit quod filius nascitur dissimilis patri in accidentibus, | |
| 12851 quae pertinent ad modum essendi. Cum igitur voluntas divina sit | |
| 12852 efficacissima, non solum sequitur quod fiant ea quae Deus vult | |
| 12853 fieri; sed quod eo modo fiant, quo Deus ea fieri vult. Vult autem | |
| 12854 quaedam fieri Deus necessario, et quaedam contingenter, ut sit ordo | |
| 12855 in rebus, ad complementum universi. Et ideo quibusdam effectibus | |
| 12856 aptavit causas necessarias, quae deficere non possunt, ex quibus | |
| 12857 effectus de necessitate proveniunt, quibusdam autem aptavit causas | |
| 12858 contingentes defectibiles, ex quibus effectus contingenter | |
| 12859 eveniunt. Non igitur propterea effectus voliti a Deo, eveniunt | |
| 12860 contingenter, quia causae proximae sunt contingentes, sed propterea | |
| 12861 quia Deus voluit eos contingenter evenire, contingentes causas ad | |
| 12862 eos praeparavit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A8-p8"> | |
| 12863 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> By the words of Augustine we must understand a necessity in things willed by God that is not absolute, but conditional. For | |
| 12864 the conditional statement that if God wills a thing it must necessarily be, is necessarily true. | |
| 12865 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 8 ad 1"><a name="29253" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29253] Iª q. 19 a. 8 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo | |
| 12866 dicendum quod per illud verbum Augustini intelligenda est | |
| 12867 necessitas in rebus volitis a Deo, non absoluta, sed conditionalis, | |
| 12868 necesse est enim hanc conditionalem veram esse, si Deus hoc vult, | |
| 12869 necesse est hoc esse.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A8-p9"> | |
| 12870 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> From the very fact that nothing resists the divine will, it follows that not only those things happen that God wills to happen, | |
| 12871 but that they happen necessarily or contingently according to His will. | |
| 12872 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 8 ad 2"><a name="29254" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29254] Iª q. 19 a. 8 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 12873 dicendum quod, ex hoc ipso quod nihil voluntati divinae resistit, | |
| 12874 sequitur quod non solum fiant ea quae Deus vult fieri; sed quod | |
| 12875 fiant contingenter vel necessario, quae sic fieri vult.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A8-p10"> | |
| 12876 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Consequents have necessity from their antecedents according to the mode of the antecedents. Hence things effected by the | |
| 12877 divine will have that kind of necessity that God wills them to have, either absolute or conditional. Not all things, therefore, | |
| 12878 are absolute necessities. | |
| 12879 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 8 ad 3"><a name="29255" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29255] Iª q. 19 a. 8 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 12880 dicendum quod posteriora habent necessitatem a prioribus, secundum | |
| 12881 modum priorum. Unde et ea quae fiunt a voluntate divina, talem | |
| 12882 necessitatem habent, qualem Deus vult ea habere, scilicet, vel | |
| 12883 absolutam, vel conditionalem tantum. Et sic, non omnia sunt | |
| 12884 necessaria absolute.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q19_A9" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q19_A9-p0.1">Q. 19. A. 9. Whether God wills evils?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A9-p2"> | |
| 12885 <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God wills evils. For every good that exists, God wills. But it is a good that evil should exist. For Augustine | |
| 12886 says (Enchiridion 95): "Although evil in so far as it is evil is not a good, yet it is good that not only good things should | |
| 12887 exist, but also evil things." Therefore God wills evil things. | |
| 12888 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 9 arg. 1"><a name="29256" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29256] Iª q. 19 a. 9 arg. 1</span></a> Ad nonum sic | |
| 12889 proceditur. Videtur quod voluntas Dei sit malorum. Omne enim bonum | |
| 12890 quod fit, Deus vult. Sed mala fieri bonum est, dicit enim | |
| 12891 Augustinus, in Enchirid., <i>quamvis ea quae mala sunt, inquantum | |
| 12892 mala sunt, non sint bona; tamen, ut non solum bona, sed etiam ut | |
| 12893 sint mala, bonum est</i>. Ergo Deus vult mala.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A9-p3"> | |
| 12894 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv, 23): "Evil would conduce to the perfection of everything," i.e. the universe. And | |
| 12895 Augustine says (Enchiridion 10,11): "Out of all things is built up the admirable beauty of the universe, wherein even that | |
| 12896 which is called evil, properly ordered and disposed, commends the good more evidently in that good is more pleasing and praiseworthy | |
| 12897 when contrasted with evil." But God wills all that appertains to the perfection and | |
| 12898 beauty of the universe, for this is what God desires above all things in His creatures. Therefore God wills evil. | |
| 12899 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 9 arg. 2"><a name="29257" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29257] Iª q. 19 a. 9 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, dicit | |
| 12900 Dionysius, IV cap. de Div. Nom., erit malum ad omnis (idest | |
| 12901 universi) perfectionem conferens. Et Augustinus dicit, in | |
| 12902 Enchirid., <i>ex omnibus consistit universitatis admirabilis | |
| 12903 pulchritudo; in qua etiam illud quod malum dicitur, bene ordinatum, | |
| 12904 et loco suo positum, eminentius commendat bona; ut magis placeant, | |
| 12905 et laudabiliora sint, dum comparantur malis</i>. Sed Deus vult omne | |
| 12906 illud quod pertinet ad perfectionem et decorem universi, quia hoc | |
| 12907 est quod Deus maxime vult in creaturis. Ergo Deus vult mala.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A9-p4"> | |
| 12908 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, that evil should exist, and should not exist, are contradictory opposites. But God does not will that evil should | |
| 12909 not exist; otherwise, since various evils do exist, God's will would not always be fulfilled. Therefore God wills that evil | |
| 12910 should exist. | |
| 12911 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 9 arg. 3"><a name="29258" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29258] Iª q. 19 a. 9 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, mala | |
| 12912 fieri, et non fieri, sunt contradictorie opposita. Sed Deus non | |
| 12913 vult mala non fieri, quia, cum mala quaedam fiant, non semper | |
| 12914 voluntas Dei impleretur. Ergo Deus vult mala fieri.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A9-p5"> | |
| 12915 <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (Qq. 83,3): "No wise man is the cause of another man becoming worse. Now God surpasses all men in wisdom. | |
| 12916 Much less therefore is God the cause of man becoming worse; and when He is said to be the cause of a thing, He is said to | |
| 12917 will it." Therefore it is not by God's will that man becomes worse. Now it is clear that every evil makes a thing worse. Therefore | |
| 12918 God wills not evil things. | |
| 12919 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 9 s. c."><a name="29259" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29259] Iª q. 19 a. 9 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est | |
| 12920 quod dicit Augustinus, in libro octoginta trium quaest., <i>nullo | |
| 12921 sapiente homine auctore, fit homo deterior; est autem Deus omni | |
| 12922 sapiente homine praestantior; multo igitur minus, Deo auctore, fit | |
| 12923 aliquis deterior. Illo autem auctore cum dicitur, illo volente | |
| 12924 dicitur</i>. Non ergo volente Deo, fit homo deterior. Constat autem | |
| 12925 quod quolibet malo fit aliquid deterius. Ergo Deus non vult | |
| 12926 mala.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A9-p6"> | |
| 12927 <b>I answer that,</b> Since the ratio of good is the ratio of appetibility, as said before ( | |
| 12928 <a id="FP_Q19_A9-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q5_A1.html">Q[5], A[1]</a>), and since evil is opposed to good, it is impossible that any evil, as such, should be sought for by the appetite, either | |
| 12929 natural, or animal, or by the intellectual appetite which is the will. Nevertheless evil may be sought accidentally, so far | |
| 12930 as it accompanies a good, as appears in each of the appetites. For a natural agent intends not privation or | |
| 12931 corruption, but the form to which is annexed the privation of some other form, and the generation of one thing, which implies | |
| 12932 the corruption of another. Also when a lion kills a stag, his object is food, to obtain which the killing of the animal is | |
| 12933 only the means. Similarly the fornicator has merely pleasure for his object, and the deformity of sin is only an accompaniment. | |
| 12934 Now the evil that accompanies one good, is the privation of another good. Never therefore would evil be sought after, not | |
| 12935 even accidentally, unless the good that accompanies the evil were more desired than the good of which the evil is the privation. | |
| 12936 Now God wills no good more than He wills His own goodness; yet He wills one good more than another. Hence He in no way wills | |
| 12937 the evil of sin, which is the privation of right order towards the divine good. The evil of natural defect, or of punishment, | |
| 12938 He does will, by willing the good to which such evils are attached. Thus in willing justice He wills punishment; and in | |
| 12939 willing the preservation of the natural order, He wills some things to be naturally corrupted. | |
| 12940 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 9 co."><a name="29260" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29260] Iª q. 19 a. 9 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum | |
| 12941 quod, cum ratio boni sit ratio appetibilis, ut supra dictum est, | |
| 12942 malum autem opponatur bono; impossibile est quod aliquod malum, | |
| 12943 inquantum huiusmodi, appetatur, neque appetitu naturali, neque | |
| 12944 animali, neque intellectuali, qui est voluntas. Sed aliquod malum | |
| 12945 appetitur per accidens, inquantum consequitur ad aliquod bonum. Et | |
| 12946 hoc apparet in quolibet appetitu. Non enim agens naturale intendit | |
| 12947 privationem vel corruptionem; sed formam, cui coniungitur privatio | |
| 12948 alterius formae; et generationem unius, quae est corruptio | |
| 12949 alterius. Leo etiam, occidens cervum, intendit cibum, cui | |
| 12950 coniungitur occisio animalis. Similiter fornicator intendit | |
| 12951 delectationem, cui coniungitur deformitas culpae. Malum autem quod | |
| 12952 coniungitur alicui bono, est privatio alterius boni. Nunquam igitur | |
| 12953 appeteretur malum, nec per accidens, nisi bonum cui coniungitur | |
| 12954 malum, magis appeteretur quam bonum quod privatur per malum. Nullum | |
| 12955 autem bonum Deus magis vult quam suam bonitatem, vult tamen aliquod | |
| 12956 bonum magis quam aliud quoddam bonum. Unde malum culpae, quod | |
| 12957 privat ordinem ad bonum divinum, Deus nullo modo vult. Sed malum | |
| 12958 naturalis defectus, vel malum poenae vult, volendo aliquod bonum, | |
| 12959 cui coniungitur tale malum, sicut, volendo iustitiam, vult poenam; | |
| 12960 et volendo ordinem naturae servari, vult quaedam naturaliter | |
| 12961 corrumpi.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A9-p7"> | |
| 12962 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Some have said that although God does not will evil, yet He wills that evil should be or be done, because, although evil | |
| 12963 is not a good, yet it is good that evil should be or be done. This they said because things evil in themselves are ordered | |
| 12964 to some good end; and this order they thought was expressed in the words "that evil should be or be done." This, however, | |
| 12965 is not correct; since evil is not of itself ordered to good, but accidentally. For it is | |
| 12966 beside the intention of the sinner, that any good should follow from his sin; as it was beside the intention of tyrants that | |
| 12967 the patience of the martyrs should shine forth from all their persecutions. It cannot therefore be said that such an ordering | |
| 12968 to good is implied in the statement that it is a good thing that evil should be or be done, since nothing is judged of by | |
| 12969 that which appertains to it accidentally, but by that which belongs to it essentially. | |
| 12970 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 9 ad 1"><a name="29261" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29261] Iª q. 19 a. 9 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo | |
| 12971 dicendum quod quidam dixerunt quod, licet Deus non velit mala, vult | |
| 12972 tamen mala esse vel fieri, quia, licet mala non sint bona, bonum | |
| 12973 tamen est mala esse vel fieri. Quod ideo dicebant, quia ea quae in | |
| 12974 se mala sunt, ordinantur ad aliquod bonum, quem quidem ordinem | |
| 12975 importari credebant in hoc quod dicitur, mala esse vel fieri. Sed | |
| 12976 hoc non recte dicitur. Quia malum non ordinatur ad bonum per se, | |
| 12977 sed per accidens. Praeter intentionem enim peccantis est, quod ex | |
| 12978 hoc sequatur aliquod bonum; sicut praeter intentionem tyrannorum | |
| 12979 fuit, quod ex eorum persecutionibus claresceret patientia martyrum. | |
| 12980 Et ideo non potest dici quod talis ordo ab bonum importetur per hoc | |
| 12981 quod dicitur, quod malum esse vel fieri sit bonum, quia nihil | |
| 12982 iudicatur secundum illud quod competit ei per accidens, sed | |
| 12983 secundum illud quod competit ei per se.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A9-p8"> | |
| 12984 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Evil does not operate towards the perfection and beauty of the universe, except accidentally, as said above (ad 1). Therefore | |
| 12985 Dionysius in saying that "evil would conduce to the perfection of the universe," draws a conclusion by reduction to an absurdity. | |
| 12986 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 9 ad 2"><a name="29262" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29262] Iª q. 19 a. 9 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 12987 dicendum quod malum non operatur ad perfectionem et decorem | |
| 12988 universi nisi per accidens, ut dictum est. Unde et hoc quod dicit | |
| 12989 Dionysius, quod malum est ad universi perfectionem conferens, | |
| 12990 concludit inducendo quasi ad inconveniens.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A9-p9"> | |
| 12991 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The statements that evil exists, and that evil exists not, are opposed as contradictories; yet the statements that anyone | |
| 12992 wills evil to exist and that he wills it not to be, are not so opposed; since either is affirmative. God therefore neither | |
| 12993 wills evil to be done, nor wills it not to be done, but wills to permit evil to be done; and this is a good. | |
| 12994 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 9 ad 3"><a name="29263" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29263] Iª q. 19 a. 9 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 12995 dicendum quod, licet mala fieri, et mala non fieri, contradictorie | |
| 12996 opponantur; tamen velle mala fieri, et velle mala non fieri, non | |
| 12997 opponuntur contradictorie, cum utrumque sit affirmativum. Deus | |
| 12998 igitur neque vult mala fieri, neque vult mala non fieri, sed vult | |
| 12999 permittere mala fieri. Et hoc est bonum.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q19_A10" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q19_A10-p0.1">Q. 19. A. 10. Whether God has free-will?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A10-p2"> | |
| 13000 <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God has not free-will. For Jerome says, in a homily on the prodigal son [*Ep. 146, ad Damas.]; "God alone is | |
| 13001 He who is not liable to sin, nor can be liable: all others, as having free-will, can be inclined to either side." | |
| 13002 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 10 arg. 1"><a name="29264" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29264] Iª q. 19 a. 10 arg. 1</span></a> Ad decimum sic | |
| 13003 proceditur. Videtur quod Deus non habeat liberum arbitrium. Dicit | |
| 13004 enim Hieronymus, in homilia de filio prodigo, <i>solus Deus est, in | |
| 13005 quem peccatum non cadit, nec cadere potest; cetera, cum sint liberi | |
| 13006 arbitrii, in utramque partem flecti possunt</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A10-p3"> | |
| 13007 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, free-will is the faculty of the reason and will, by which good and evil are chosen. But God does not will evil, | |
| 13008 as has been said | |
| 13009 <a id="FP_Q19_A10-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q19_A9.html">(A[9])</a>. Therefore there is not free-will in God. | |
| 13010 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 10 arg. 2"><a name="29265" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29265] Iª q. 19 a. 10 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 13011 liberum arbitrium est facultas rationis et voluntatis, qua bonum et | |
| 13012 malum eligitur. Sed Deus non vult malum, ut dictum est. Ergo | |
| 13013 liberum arbitrium non est in Deo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A10-p4"> | |
| 13014 <b>On the contrary,</b> Ambrose says (De Fide ii, 3): "The Holy Spirit divideth unto each one as He will, namely, according to the free choice of | |
| 13015 the will, not in obedience to necessity." | |
| 13016 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 10 s. c."><a name="29266" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29266] Iª q. 19 a. 10 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est | |
| 13017 quod dicit Ambrosius, in libro de fide, <i>spiritus sanctus dividit | |
| 13018 singulis prout vult, idest pro liberae voluntatis arbitrio, non | |
| 13019 necessitatis obsequio</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A10-p5"> | |
| 13020 <b>I answer that,</b> We have free-will with respect to what we will not of necessity, nor be natural instinct. For our will to be happy does not | |
| 13021 appertain to free-will, but to natural instinct. Hence other animals, that are moved to act by natural instinct, are not said | |
| 13022 to be moved by free-will. Since then God necessarily wills His own goodness, but other things not necessarily, as shown above | |
| 13023 | |
| 13024 <a id="FP_Q19_A10-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q19_A3.html">(A[3])</a>, He has free will with respect to what He does not | |
| 13025 necessarily will. | |
| 13026 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 10 co."><a name="29267" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29267] Iª q. 19 a. 10 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum | |
| 13027 quod liberum arbitrium habemus respectu eorum quae non necessario | |
| 13028 volumus, vel naturali instinctu. Non enim ad liberum arbitrium | |
| 13029 pertinet quod volumus esse felices, sed ad naturalem instinctum. | |
| 13030 Unde et alia animalia, quae naturali instinctu moventur ad aliquid, | |
| 13031 non dicuntur libero arbitrio moveri. Cum igitur Deus ex necessitate | |
| 13032 suam bonitatem velit, alia vero non ex necessitate, ut supra | |
| 13033 ostensum est; respectu illorum quae non ex necessitate vult, | |
| 13034 liberum arbitrium habet.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A10-p6"> | |
| 13035 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Jerome seems to deny free-will to God not simply, but only as regards the inclination to sin. | |
| 13036 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 10 ad 1"><a name="29268" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29268] Iª q. 19 a. 10 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo | |
| 13037 dicendum quod Hieronymus videtur excludere a Deo liberum arbitrium, | |
| 13038 non simpliciter, sed solum quantum ad hoc quod est deflecti in | |
| 13039 peccatum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A10-p7"> | |
| 13040 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Since the evil of sin consists in turning away from the divine goodness, by which God wills all things, as above shown (De | |
| 13041 Fide ii, 3), it is manifestly impossible for Him to will the evil of sin; yet He can make choice of one of two opposites, | |
| 13042 inasmuch as He can will a thing to be, or not to be. In the same way we ourselves, without sin, can will to sit down, and | |
| 13043 not will to sit down. | |
| 13044 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 10 ad 2"><a name="29269" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29269] Iª q. 19 a. 10 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 13045 dicendum quod, cum malum culpae dicatur per aversionem a bonitate | |
| 13046 divina, per quam Deus omnia vult, ut supra ostensum est, manifestum | |
| 13047 est quod impossibile est eum malum culpae velle. Et tamen ad | |
| 13048 opposita se habet, inquantum velle potest hoc esse vel non esse. | |
| 13049 Sicut et nos, non peccando, possumus velle sedere, et non velle | |
| 13050 sedere.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q19_A11" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q19_A11-p0.1">Q. 19. A. 11. Whether the will of expression is to be distinguished in God?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A11-p2"> | |
| 13051 <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the will of expression is not to be distinguished in God. For as the will of God is the cause of things, so | |
| 13052 is His wisdom. But no expressions are assigned to the divine wisdom. Therefore no expressions ought to be assigned to the | |
| 13053 divine will. | |
| 13054 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 11 arg. 1"><a name="29270" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29270] Iª q. 19 a. 11 arg. 1</span></a> Ad undecimum | |
| 13055 sic proceditur. Videtur quod non sit distinguenda in Deo voluntas | |
| 13056 signi. Sicut enim voluntas Dei est causa rerum, ita et scientia. | |
| 13057 Sed non assignantur aliqua signa ex parte divinae scientiae. Ergo | |
| 13058 neque debent assignari aliqua signa ex parte divinae | |
| 13059 voluntatis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A11-p3"> | |
| 13060 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, every expression that is not in agreement with the mind of him who expresses himself, is false. If therefore the | |
| 13061 expressions assigned to the divine will are not in agreement with that will, they are false. But if they do agree, they are | |
| 13062 superfluous. No expressions therefore must be assigned to the divine will. | |
| 13063 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 11 arg. 2"><a name="29271" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29271] Iª q. 19 a. 11 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, omne | |
| 13064 signum quod non concordat ei cuius est signum, est falsum. Si | |
| 13065 igitur signa quae assignantur circa voluntatem divinam, non | |
| 13066 concordant divinae voluntati, sunt falsa, si autem concordant, | |
| 13067 superflue assignantur. Non igitur sunt aliqua signa circa | |
| 13068 voluntatem divinam assignanda.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A11-p4"> | |
| 13069 <b>On the contrary,</b> The will of God is one, since it is the very essence of God. Yet sometimes it is spoken of as many, as in the words of | |
| 13070 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q19_A11-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.110.2" target="asv"> Ps. 110:2</a>: "Great are the works of the Lord, sought out according to all His wills." Therefore sometimes the sign must be taken for | |
| 13071 the will. | |
| 13072 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 11 s. c."><a name="29272" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29272] Iª q. 19 a. 11 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est | |
| 13073 quod voluntas Dei est una, cum ipsa sit Dei essentia. Quandoque | |
| 13074 autem pluraliter significatur, ut cum dicitur, <i>magna opera | |
| 13075 domini, exquisita in omnes voluntates eius</i>. Ergo oportet quod | |
| 13076 aliquando signum voluntatis pro voluntate accipiatur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A11-p5"> | |
| 13077 <b>I answer that,</b> Some things are said of God in their strict sense; others by metaphor, as appears from what has been said before ( | |
| 13078 <a id="FP_Q19_A11-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q13_A3.html">Q[13], A[3]</a>). When certain human passions are predicated of the Godhead metaphorically, this is done because of a likeness in the effect. | |
| 13079 Hence a thing that is in us a sign of some passion, is signified metaphorically in God under the name of that passion. Thus | |
| 13080 with us it is usual for an angry man to punish, so that | |
| 13081 punishment becomes an expression of anger. Therefore punishment itself is signified by the word anger, when anger is attributed | |
| 13082 to God. In the same way, what is usually with us an expression of will, is sometimes metaphorically called will in God; just | |
| 13083 as when anyone lays down a precept, it is a sign that he wishes that precept obeyed. Hence a divine precept is sometimes called | |
| 13084 by metaphor the will of God, as in the words: "Thy will be done on earth, as it is in heaven" ( | |
| 13085 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q19_A11-p5.2" href="./asv.html#Matt.6.10" target="asv">Mat. | |
| 13086 6:10 | |
| 13087 </a>). There is, however, this difference between will and anger, that anger is never attributed to God properly, since in its | |
| 13088 primary meaning it includes passion; whereas will is attributed to Him properly. Therefore in God there are distinguished | |
| 13089 will in its proper sense, and will as attributed to Him by metaphor. Will in its proper sense is called the will of good pleasure; | |
| 13090 and will metaphorically taken is the will of expression, inasmuch as the sign itself of will is called | |
| 13091 will. | |
| 13092 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 11 co."><a name="29273" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29273] Iª q. 19 a. 11 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum | |
| 13093 quod in Deo quaedam dicuntur proprie, et quaedam secundum | |
| 13094 metaphoram, ut ex supradictis patet. Cum autem aliquae passiones | |
| 13095 humanae in divinam praedicationem metaphorice assumuntur, hoc fit | |
| 13096 secundum similitudinem effectus, unde illud quod est signum talis | |
| 13097 passionis in nobis, in Deo nomine illius passionis metaphorice | |
| 13098 significatur. Sicut, apud nos, irati punire consueverunt, unde ipsa | |
| 13099 punitio est signum irae, et propter hoc, ipsa punitio nomine irae | |
| 13100 significatur, cum Deo attribuitur. Similiter id quod solet esse in | |
| 13101 nobis signum voluntatis, quandoque metaphorice in Deo voluntas | |
| 13102 dicitur. Sicut, cum aliquis praecipit aliquid, signum est quod | |
| 13103 velit illud fieri, unde praeceptum divinum quandoque metaphorice | |
| 13104 voluntas Dei dicitur, secundum illud Matth. VI, <i>fiat voluntas | |
| 13105 tua, sicut in caelo et in terra</i>. Sed hoc distat inter | |
| 13106 voluntatem et iram, quia ira de Deo nunquam proprie dicitur, cum in | |
| 13107 suo principali intellectu includat passionem, voluntas autem | |
| 13108 proprie de Deo dicitur. Et ideo in Deo distinguitur voluntas | |
| 13109 proprie, et metaphorice dicta. Voluntas enim proprie dicta, vocatur | |
| 13110 voluntas beneplaciti, voluntas autem metaphorice dicta, est | |
| 13111 voluntas signi, eo quod ipsum signum voluntatis voluntas | |
| 13112 dicitur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A11-p6"> | |
| 13113 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Knowledge is not the cause of a thing being done, unless through the will. For we do not put into act what we know, unless | |
| 13114 we will to do so. Accordingly expression is not attributed to knowledge, but to will. | |
| 13115 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 11 ad 1"><a name="29274" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29274] Iª q. 19 a. 11 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo | |
| 13116 dicendum quod scientia non est causa eorum quae fiunt, nisi per | |
| 13117 voluntatem, non enim quae scimus facimus, nisi velimus. Et ideo | |
| 13118 signum non attribuitur scientiae, sicut attribuitur voluntati.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A11-p7"> | |
| 13119 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Expressions of will are called divine wills, not as being signs that God wills anything; but because what in us is the usual | |
| 13120 expression of our will, is called the divine will in God. Thus punishment is not a sign that there is anger in God; but it | |
| 13121 is called anger in Him, from the fact that it is an expression of anger in ourselves. | |
| 13122 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 11 ad 2"><a name="29275" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29275] Iª q. 19 a. 11 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 13123 dicendum quod signa voluntatis dicuntur voluntates divinae, non | |
| 13124 quia sint signa quod Deus velit, sed quia ea quae in nobis solent | |
| 13125 esse signa volendi, in Deo divinae voluntates dicuntur. Sicut | |
| 13126 punitio non est signum quod in Deo sit ira, sed punitio, ex eo ipso | |
| 13127 quod in nobis est signum irae, in Deo dicitur ira.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q19_A12" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q19_A12-p0.1">Q. 19. A. 12. Whether five expressions of will are rightly assigned to the divine will?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A12-p2"> | |
| 13128 <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that five expressions of will---namely, prohibition, precept, counsel, operation, and permission---are not rightly | |
| 13129 assigned to the divine will. For the same things that God bids us do by His precept or counsel, these He sometimes operates | |
| 13130 in us, and the same things that He prohibits, these He sometimes permits. They ought not therefore to be enumerated as distinct. | |
| 13131 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 12 arg. 1"><a name="29276" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29276] Iª q. 19 a. 12 arg. 1</span></a> Ad duodecimum | |
| 13132 sic proceditur. Videtur quod inconvenienter circa divinam | |
| 13133 voluntatem ponantur quinque signa, scilicet, prohibitio, | |
| 13134 praeceptum, consilium, operatio et permissio. Nam eadem quae nobis | |
| 13135 praecipit Deus vel consulit, in nobis quandoque operatur, et eadem | |
| 13136 quae prohibet, quandoque permittit. Ergo non debent ex opposito | |
| 13137 dividi.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A12-p3"> | |
| 13138 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, God works nothing unless He wills it, as the Scripture says ( | |
| 13139 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q19_A12-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.11.26" target="asv">Wis. 11:26</a>). But the will of expression is distinct from the will of good pleasure. Therefore operation ought not to be comprehended | |
| 13140 in the will of expression. | |
| 13141 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 12 arg. 2"><a name="29277" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29277] Iª q. 19 a. 12 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 13142 nihil Deus operatur, nisi volens, ut dicitur Sap. XI. Sed voluntas | |
| 13143 signi distinguitur a voluntate beneplaciti. Ergo operatio sub | |
| 13144 voluntate signi comprehendi non debet.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A12-p4"> | |
| 13145 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, operation and permission appertain to all creatures in common, since God works in them all, and permits some action | |
| 13146 in them all. But precept, counsel, and prohibition belong to rational creatures only. Therefore they do not come rightly under | |
| 13147 one division, not being of one order. | |
| 13148 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 12 arg. 3"><a name="29278" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29278] Iª q. 19 a. 12 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 13149 operatio et permissio communiter ad omnes creaturas pertinent, quia | |
| 13150 in omnibus Deus operatur, et in omnibus aliquid fieri permittit. | |
| 13151 Sed praeceptum, consilium et prohibitio pertinent ad solam | |
| 13152 rationalem creaturam. Ergo non veniunt convenienter in unam | |
| 13153 divisionem, cum non sint unius ordinis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A12-p5"> | |
| 13154 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, evil happens in more ways than good, since "good happens in one way, but evil in all kinds of ways," as declared | |
| 13155 by the Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 6), and Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv, 22). It is not right therefore to assign one expression only | |
| 13156 in the case of evil---namely, prohibition---and two---namely, counsel and precept---in the case of good. | |
| 13157 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 12 arg. 4"><a name="29279" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29279] Iª q. 19 a. 12 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 13158 malum pluribus modis contingit quam bonum, quia bonum contingit uno | |
| 13159 modo, sed malum omnifariam, ut patet per philosophum in II Ethic., | |
| 13160 et per Dionysium in IV cap. de Div. Nom. Inconvenienter igitur | |
| 13161 respectu mali assignatur unum signum tantum, scilicet prohibitio; | |
| 13162 respectu vero boni, duo signa, scilicet consilium et | |
| 13163 praeceptum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q19_A12-p6"> | |
| 13164 <b>I answer that,</b> By these signs we name the expression of will by which we are accustomed to show that we will something. A man may show that | |
| 13165 he wills something, either by himself or by means of another. He may show it by himself, by doing something either directly, | |
| 13166 or indirectly and accidentally. He shows it directly when he works in his own person; in that way the expression of his will | |
| 13167 is his own working. He shows it indirectly, by not hindering the doing of a thing; for | |
| 13168 what removes an impediment is called an accidental mover. In this respect the expression is called permission. He declares | |
| 13169 his will by means of another when he orders another to perform a work, either by insisting upon it as necessary by precept, | |
| 13170 and by prohibiting its contrary; or by persuasion, which is a part of counsel. Since in these ways the will of man makes itself | |
| 13171 known, the same five are sometimes denominated with regard to the divine will, as the expression of that will. That precept, | |
| 13172 counsel, and prohibition are called the will of God is clear from the words of | |
| 13173 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q19_A12-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.6.10" target="asv">Mat. 6:10</a>: "Thy will be done on earth as it is in heaven." That permission and operation are called the will of God is clear from Augustine | |
| 13174 (Enchiridion 95), who says: "Nothing is done, unless the Almighty wills it to be done, either by permitting it, or by actually | |
| 13175 doing it." | |
| 13176 </p><p id="FP_Q19_A12-p7"> Or it may be said that permission and operation refer to present time, permission being with respect to evil, operation with | |
| 13177 regard to good. Whilst as to future time, prohibition is in respect to evil, precept to good that is necessary and counsel | |
| 13178 to good that is of supererogation. | |
| 13179 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 12 co."><a name="29280" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29280] Iª q. 19 a. 12 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum | |
| 13180 quod huiusmodi signa voluntatis dicuntur ea, quibus consuevimus | |
| 13181 demonstrare nos aliquid velle. Potest autem aliquis declarare se | |
| 13182 velle aliquid, vel per seipsum, vel per alium. Per seipsum quidem, | |
| 13183 inquantum facit aliquid, vel directe, vel indirecte et per | |
| 13184 accidens. Directe quidem, cum per se aliquid operatur, et quantum | |
| 13185 ad hoc, dicitur esse signum operatio. Indirecte autem, inquantum | |
| 13186 non impedit operationem, nam removens prohibens dicitur movens per | |
| 13187 accidens, ut dicitur in VIII Physic. Et quantum ad hoc, dicitur | |
| 13188 signum permissio. Per alium autem declarat se aliquid velle, | |
| 13189 inquantum ordinat alium ad aliquid faciendum; vel necessaria | |
| 13190 inductione, quod fit praecipiendo quod quis vult, et prohibendo | |
| 13191 contrarium; vel aliqua persuasoria inductione, quod pertinet ad | |
| 13192 consilium. Quia igitur his modis declaratur aliquem velle aliquid, | |
| 13193 propter hoc ista quinque nominantur interdum nomine voluntatis | |
| 13194 divinae, tanquam signa voluntatis. Quod enim praeceptum, consilium | |
| 13195 et prohibitio dicantur Dei voluntas, patet per id quod dicitur | |
| 13196 Matth. VI <i>fiat voluntas tua, sicut in caelo et in terra</i>. | |
| 13197 Quod autem permissio vel operatio dicantur Dei voluntas patet per | |
| 13198 Augustinum, qui dicit in Enchirid., <i>nihil fit, nisi omnipotens | |
| 13199 fieri velit, vel sinendo ut fiat, vel faciendo</i>. Vel potest dici | |
| 13200 quod permissio et operatio referuntur ad praesens permissio quidem | |
| 13201 ad malum, operatio vero ad bonum. Ad futurum vero, prohibitio, | |
| 13202 respectu mali; respectu vero boni necessarii, praeceptum; respectu | |
| 13203 vero superabundantis boni, consilium.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A12-p8"> | |
| 13204 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> There is nothing to prevent anyone declaring his will about the same matter in different ways; thus we find many words that | |
| 13205 mean the same thing. Hence there is not reason why the same thing should not be the subject of precept, operation, and counsel; | |
| 13206 or of prohibition or permission. | |
| 13207 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 12 ad 1"><a name="29281" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29281] Iª q. 19 a. 12 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo | |
| 13208 dicendum quod nihil prohibet, circa eandem rem, aliquem diversimode | |
| 13209 declarare se aliquid velle, sicut inveniuntur multa nomina idem | |
| 13210 significantia. Unde nihil prohibet idem subiacere praecepto et | |
| 13211 consilio et operationi, et prohibitioni vel permissioni.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A12-p9"> | |
| 13212 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As God may by metaphor be said to will what by His will, properly speaking, He wills not; so He may by metaphor be said to | |
| 13213 will what He does, properly speaking, will. Hence there is nothing to prevent the same thing being the object of the will | |
| 13214 of good pleasure, and of the will of expression. But operation is always the same as the will of good pleasure; while precept | |
| 13215 and counsel are not; both because the former regards the present, and the two latter | |
| 13216 the future; and because the former is of itself the effect of the will; the latter its effect as fulfilled by means of another. | |
| 13217 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 12 ad 2"><a name="29282" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29282] Iª q. 19 a. 12 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 13218 dicendum quod, sicut Deus potest significari metaphorice velle id | |
| 13219 quod non vult voluntate proprie accepta, ita potest metaphorice | |
| 13220 significari velle id quod proprie vult. Unde nihil prohibet de | |
| 13221 eodem esse voluntatem beneplaciti, et voluntatem signi. Sed | |
| 13222 operatio semper est eadem cum voluntate beneplaciti, non autem | |
| 13223 praeceptum vel consilium, tum quia haec est de praesenti, illud de | |
| 13224 futuro; tum quia haec per se est effectus voluntatis, illud autem | |
| 13225 per alium, ut dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A12-p10"> | |
| 13226 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Rational creatures are masters of their own acts; and for this reason certain special expressions of the divine will are | |
| 13227 assigned to their acts, inasmuch as God ordains rational creatures to act voluntarily and of themselves. Other creatures act | |
| 13228 only as moved by the divine operation; therefore only operation and permission are concerned with these. | |
| 13229 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 12 ad 3"><a name="29283" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29283] Iª q. 19 a. 12 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 13230 dicendum quod creatura rationalis est domina sui actus, et ideo | |
| 13231 circa ipsam specialia quaedam signa divinae voluntatis assignantur, | |
| 13232 inquantum rationalem creaturam Deus ordinat ad agendum voluntarie | |
| 13233 et per se. Sed aliae creaturae non agunt nisi motae ex operatione | |
| 13234 divina, et ideo circa alias non habent locum nisi operatio et | |
| 13235 permissio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q19_A12-p11"> | |
| 13236 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> All evil of sin, though happening in many ways, agrees in being out of harmony with the divine will. Hence with regard to | |
| 13237 evil, only one expression is assigned, that of prohibition. On the other hand, good stands in various relations to the divine | |
| 13238 goodness, since there are good deeds without which we cannot attain to the fruition of that goodness, and these are the subject | |
| 13239 of precept; and there are others by which we attain to it more perfectly, and | |
| 13240 these are the subject of counsel. Or it may be said that counsel is not only concerned with the obtaining of greater good; | |
| 13241 but also with the avoiding of lesser evils. | |
| 13242 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 19 a. 12 ad 4"><a name="29284" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29284] Iª q. 19 a. 12 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum | |
| 13243 dicendum quod omne malum culpae, licet multipliciter contingat, | |
| 13244 tamen in hoc convenit, quod discordat a voluntate divina et ideo | |
| 13245 unum signum respectu malorum assignatur, scilicet prohibitio. Sed | |
| 13246 diversimode bona se habent ad bonitatem divinam. Quia quaedam sunt, | |
| 13247 sine quibus fruitionem divinae bonitatis consequi non possumus, et | |
| 13248 respectu horum est praeceptum. Quaedam vero sunt, quibus perfectius | |
| 13249 consequimur, et respectu horum est consilium. Vel dicendum quod | |
| 13250 consilium est non solum de melioribus bonis assequendis, sed etiam | |
| 13251 de minoribus malis vitandis.</p></div></div></div></div> | |
| 13252 <div id="FP_Q20" class="div3"> | |
| 13253 <h3 id="FP_Q20-p0.1">Q. 20. GOD'S LOVE (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3> | |
| 13254 <div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> | |
| 13255 <p id="FP_Q20-p2"> We next consider those things that pertain absolutely to the will of God. In the appetitive part of the soul there are found | |
| 13256 in ourselves both the passions of the soul, as joy, love, and the like; and the habits of the moral virtues, as justice, fortitude | |
| 13257 and the like. Hence we shall first consider the love of God, and secondly His justice and mercy. About the first there are | |
| 13258 four points of inquiry: | |
| 13259 </p><p id="FP_Q20-p3"> (1) Whether love exists in God?</p><p id="FP_Q20-p4"> (2) Whether He loves all things?</p><p id="FP_Q20-p5"> (3) Whether He loves one thing more than another?</p><p id="FP_Q20-p6"> (4) Whether He loves more the better things?</p> | |
| 13260 </div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 20 pr."><a name="29285" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29285] | |
| 13261 Iª q. 20 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de his quae | |
| 13262 absolute ad voluntatem Dei pertinent. In parte autem appetitiva | |
| 13263 inveniuntur in nobis et passiones animae, ut gaudium, amor, et | |
| 13264 huiusmodi; et habitus moralium virtutum, ut iustitia, fortitudo, et | |
| 13265 huiusmodi. Unde primo considerabimus de amore Dei; secundo, de | |
| 13266 iustitia Dei, et misericordia eius. Circa primum quaeruntur | |
| 13267 quatuor. Primo, utrum in Deo sit amor. Secundo, utrum amet omnia. | |
| 13268 Tertio, utrum magis amet unum quam aliud. Quarto, utrum meliora | |
| 13269 magis amet.</p></div></div></div> | |
| 13270 <div id="FP_Q20_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q20_A1-p0.1">Q. 20. A. 1. Whether love exists in God?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q20_A1-p2"> | |
| 13271 <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that love does not exist in God. For in God there are no passions. Now love is a passion. Therefore love is not | |
| 13272 in God. | |
| 13273 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 20 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="29286" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29286] Iª q. 20 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum sic | |
| 13274 proceditur. Videtur quod amor non sit in Deo. Nulla enim passio est | |
| 13275 in Deo. Amor est passio. Ergo amor non est in Deo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q20_A1-p3"> | |
| 13276 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, love, anger, sorrow and the like, are mutually divided against one another. But sorrow and anger are not attributed | |
| 13277 to God, unless by metaphor. Therefore neither is love attributed to Him. | |
| 13278 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 20 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="29287" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29287] Iª q. 20 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, amor, | |
| 13279 ira, tristitia, et huiusmodi, contra se dividuntur. Sed tristitia | |
| 13280 et ira non dicuntur de Deo nisi metaphorice. Ergo nec amor.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q20_A1-p4"> | |
| 13281 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv): "Love is a uniting and binding force." But this cannot take place in God, since He | |
| 13282 is simple. Therefore love does not exist in God. | |
| 13283 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 20 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="29288" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29288] Iª q. 20 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 13284 Dionysius dicit, IV cap. de Div. Nom., <i>amor est vis unitiva et | |
| 13285 concretiva</i>. Hoc autem in Deo locum habere non potest, cum sit | |
| 13286 simplex. Ergo in Deo non est amor.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q20_A1-p5"> | |
| 13287 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written: "God is love" ( | |
| 13288 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q20_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#John.4.16" target="asv">Jn. 4:16</a>). | |
| 13289 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 20 a. 1 s. c."><a name="29289" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29289] Iª q. 20 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est | |
| 13290 quod dicitur I Ioan. IV, <i>Deus caritas est</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q20_A1-p6"> | |
| 13291 <b>I answer that,</b> We must needs assert that in God there is love: because love is the first movement of the will and of every appetitive faculty. | |
| 13292 For since the acts of the will and of every appetitive faculty tend towards good and evil, as to their proper objects: and | |
| 13293 since good is essentially and especially the object of the will and the appetite, whereas evil is only the object secondarily | |
| 13294 and indirectly, as opposed to good; it follows that the acts of the will and appetite | |
| 13295 that regard good must naturally be prior to those that regard evil; thus, for instance, joy is prior to sorrow, love to hate: | |
| 13296 because what exists of itself is always prior to that which exists through another. Again, the more universal is naturally | |
| 13297 prior to what is less so. Hence the intellect is first directed to universal truth; and in the second place to particular | |
| 13298 and special truths. Now there are certain acts of the will and appetite that regard good under some special condition, as | |
| 13299 joy | |
| 13300 and delight regard good present and possessed; whereas desire and hope regard good not as yet possessed. Love, however, regards | |
| 13301 good universally, whether possessed or not. Hence love is naturally the first act of the will and appetite; for which reason | |
| 13302 all the other appetite movements presuppose love, as their root and origin. For nobody desires anything nor rejoices in anything, | |
| 13303 except as a good that is loved: nor is anything an object of hate except as opposed to the object of love. | |
| 13304 Similarly, it is clear that sorrow, and other things like to it, must be referred to love as to their first principle. Hence, | |
| 13305 in whomsoever there is will and appetite, there must also be love: since if the first is wanting, all that follows is also | |
| 13306 wanting. Now it has been shown that will is in God ( | |
| 13307 <a id="FP_Q20_A1-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q19_A1.html">Q[19], A[1]</a>), and hence we must attribute love to Him. | |
| 13308 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 20 a. 1 co."><a name="29290" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29290] Iª q. 20 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum | |
| 13309 quod necesse est ponere amorem in Deo. Primus enim motus | |
| 13310 voluntatis, et cuiuslibet appetitivae virtutis, est amor. Cum enim | |
| 13311 actus voluntatis, et cuiuslibet appetitivae virtutis tendat in | |
| 13312 bonum et malum, sicut in propria obiecta; bonum autem principalius | |
| 13313 et per se est obiectum voluntatis et appetitus, malum autem | |
| 13314 secundario et per aliud, inquantum scilicet opponitur bono, oportet | |
| 13315 naturaliter esse priores actus voluntatis et appetitus qui | |
| 13316 respiciunt bonum, his qui respiciunt malum; ut gaudium quam | |
| 13317 tristitia, et amor quam odium. Semper enim quod est per se, prius | |
| 13318 est eo quod est per aliud. Rursus, quod est communius, naturaliter | |
| 13319 est prius, unde et intellectus per prius habet ordinem ad verum | |
| 13320 commune, quam ad particularia quaedam vera. Sunt autem quidam actus | |
| 13321 voluntatis et appetitus, respicientes bonum sub aliqua speciali | |
| 13322 conditione, sicut gaudium et delectatio est de bono praesenti et | |
| 13323 habito; desiderium autem et spes, de bono nondum adepto. Amor autem | |
| 13324 respicit bonum in communi, sive sit habitum, sive non habitum. Unde | |
| 13325 amor naturaliter est primus actus voluntatis et appetitus. Et | |
| 13326 propter hoc, omnes alii motus appetitivi praesupponunt amorem, | |
| 13327 quasi primam radicem. Nullus enim desiderat aliquid, nisi bonum | |
| 13328 amatum, neque aliquis gaudet, nisi de bono amato. Odium etiam non | |
| 13329 est nisi de eo quod contrariatur rei amatae. Et similiter | |
| 13330 tristitiam, et cetera huiusmodi, manifestum est in amorem referri, | |
| 13331 sicut in primum principium. Unde in quocumque est voluntas vel | |
| 13332 appetitus, oportet esse amorem, remoto enim primo, removentur alia. | |
| 13333 Ostensum est autem in Deo esse voluntatem. Unde necesse est in eo | |
| 13334 ponere amorem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q20_A1-p7"> | |
| 13335 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The cognitive faculty does not move except through the medium of the appetitive: and just as in ourselves the universal reason | |
| 13336 moves through the medium of the particular reason, as stated in De Anima iii, 58,75, so in ourselves the intellectual appetite, | |
| 13337 or the will as it is called, moves through the medium of the sensitive appetite. Hence, in us the sensitive appetite is the | |
| 13338 proximate motive-force of our bodies. Some bodily change therefore always | |
| 13339 accompanies an act of the sensitive appetite, and this change affects especially the heart, which, as the Philosopher says | |
| 13340 (De part. animal. iii, 4), is the first principle of movement in animals. Therefore acts of the sensitive appetite, inasmuch | |
| 13341 as they have annexed to them some bodily change, are called passions; whereas acts of the will are not so called. Love, therefore, | |
| 13342 and joy and delight are passions; in so far as they denote acts of the intellective appetite, they are not passions. It | |
| 13343 is in this latter sense that they are in God. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii): "God rejoices by an operation that | |
| 13344 is one and simple," and for the same reason He loves without passion. | |
| 13345 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 20 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="29291" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29291] Iª q. 20 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo | |
| 13346 dicendum quod vis cognitiva non movet, nisi mediante appetitiva. Et | |
| 13347 sicut in nobis ratio universalis movet mediante ratione | |
| 13348 particulari, ut dicitur in III de anima; ita appetitus | |
| 13349 intellectivus, qui dicitur voluntas, movet in nobis mediante | |
| 13350 appetitu sensitivo. Unde proximum motivum corporis in nobis est | |
| 13351 appetitus sensitivus. Unde semper actum appetitus sensitivi | |
| 13352 concomitatur aliqua transmutatio corporis; et maxime circa cor, | |
| 13353 quod est primum principium motus in animali. Sic igitur actus | |
| 13354 appetitus sensitivi, inquantum habent transmutationem corporalem | |
| 13355 annexam, passiones dicuntur, non autem actus voluntatis. Amor | |
| 13356 igitur et gaudium et delectatio, secundum quod significant actus | |
| 13357 appetitus sensitivi, passiones sunt, non autem secundum quod | |
| 13358 significant actus appetitus intellectivi. Et sic ponuntur in Deo. | |
| 13359 Unde dicit philosophus, in VII Ethic., quod <i>Deus una et simplici | |
| 13360 operatione gaudet</i>. Et eadem ratione, sine passione amat.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q20_A1-p8"> | |
| 13361 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> In the passions of the sensitive appetite there may be distinguished a certain material element---namely, the bodily change---and | |
| 13362 a certain formal element, which is on the part of the appetite. Thus in anger, as the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 15,63,64), | |
| 13363 the material element is the kindling of the blood about the heart; but the formal, the appetite for revenge. Again, as regards | |
| 13364 the formal element of certain passions a certain imperfection is | |
| 13365 implied, as in desire, which is of the good we have not, and in sorrow, which is about the evil we have. This applies also | |
| 13366 to anger, which supposes sorrow. Certain other passions, however, as love and joy, imply no imperfection. Since therefore | |
| 13367 none of these can be attributed to God on their material side, as has been said (ad 1); neither can those that even on their | |
| 13368 formal side imply imperfection be attributed to Him; except metaphorically, and from likeness of effects, as already show | |
| 13369 ( | |
| 13370 <a id="FP_Q20_A1-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q3_A2.html">Q[3], A[2]</a> , ad 2; | |
| 13371 <a id="FP_Q20_A1-p8.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q19_A11.html">Q[19], A[11]</a>). Whereas, those that do not imply imperfection, such as love and joy, can be properly predicated of God, though without | |
| 13372 attributing passion to Him, as said before ( | |
| 13373 <a id="FP_Q20_A1-p8.3" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q19_A11.html">Q[19], A[11]</a>). | |
| 13374 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 20 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="29292" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29292] Iª q. 20 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 13375 dicendum quod in passionibus sensitivi appetitus, est considerare | |
| 13376 aliquid quasi materiale, scilicet corporalem transmutationem; et | |
| 13377 aliquid quasi formale, quod est ex parte appetitus. Sicut in ira, | |
| 13378 ut dicitur in I de anima, materiale est accensio sanguinis circa | |
| 13379 cor, vel aliquid huiusmodi; formale vero, appetitus vindictae. Sed | |
| 13380 rursus, ex parte eius quod est formale, in quibusdam horum | |
| 13381 designatur aliqua imperfectio; sicut in desiderio, quod est boni | |
| 13382 non habiti; et in tristitia, quae est mali habiti. Et eadem ratio | |
| 13383 est de ira, quae tristitiam supponit. Quaedam vero nullam | |
| 13384 imperfectionem designant, ut amor et gaudium. Cum igitur nihil | |
| 13385 horum Deo conveniat secundum illud quod est materiale in eis, ut | |
| 13386 dictum est; illa quae imperfectionem important etiam formaliter, | |
| 13387 Deo convenire non possunt nisi metaphorice, propter similitudinem | |
| 13388 effectus, ut supra dictum est. Quae autem imperfectionem non | |
| 13389 important, de Deo proprie dicuntur, ut amor et gaudium, tamen sine | |
| 13390 passione, ut dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q20_A1-p9"> | |
| 13391 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> An act of love always tends towards two things; to the good that one wills, and to the person for whom one wills it: since | |
| 13392 to love a person is to wish that person good. Hence, inasmuch as we love ourselves, we wish ourselves good; and, so far as | |
| 13393 possible, union with that good. So love is called the unitive force, even in God, yet without implying composition; for the | |
| 13394 good that He wills for Himself, is no other than Himself, Who is good by His essence, | |
| 13395 as above shown ( | |
| 13396 <a id="FP_Q20_A1-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q6_A1.html">Q[6], AA[1]</a>,3). And by the fact that anyone loves another, he wills good to that other. Thus he puts the other, as it were, in the place | |
| 13397 of himself; and regards the good done to him as done to himself. So far love is a binding force, since it aggregates another | |
| 13398 to ourselves, and refers his good to our own. And then again the divine love is a binding force, inasmuch as God wills good | |
| 13399 to others; yet it implies no composition in God. | |
| 13400 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 20 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="29293" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29293] Iª q. 20 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 13401 dicendum quod actus amoris semper tendit in duo, scilicet in bonum | |
| 13402 quod quis vult alicui; et in eum cui vult bonum. Hoc enim est | |
| 13403 proprie amare aliquem, velle ei bonum. Unde in eo quod aliquis amat | |
| 13404 se, vult bonum sibi. Et sic illud bonum quaerit sibi unire, | |
| 13405 inquantum potest. Et pro tanto dicitur amor vis unitiva, etiam in | |
| 13406 Deo, sed absque compositione, quia illud bonum quod vult sibi, non | |
| 13407 est aliud quam ipse, qui est per suam essentiam bonus, ut supra | |
| 13408 ostensum est. In hoc vero quod aliquis amat alium, vult bonum illi. | |
| 13409 Et sic utitur eo tanquam seipso, referens bonum ad illum, sicut ad | |
| 13410 seipsum. Et pro tanto dicitur amor vis concretiva, quia alium | |
| 13411 aggregat sibi habens se ad eum sicut ad seipsum. Et sic etiam amor | |
| 13412 divinus est vis concretiva, absque compositione quae sit in Deo, | |
| 13413 inquantum aliis bona vult.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q20_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q20_A2-p0.1">Q. 20. A. 2. Whether God loves all things?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q20_A2-p2"> | |
| 13414 <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God does not love all things. For according to Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv, 1), love places the lover outside himself, | |
| 13415 and causes him to pass, as it were, into the object of his love. But it is not admissible to say that God is placed outside | |
| 13416 of Himself, and passes into other things. Therefore it is inadmissible to say that God loves things other than Himself. | |
| 13417 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 20 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="29294" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29294] Iª q. 20 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum sic | |
| 13418 proceditur. Videtur quod Deus non omnia amet. Quia, secundum | |
| 13419 Dionysium, IV cap. de Div. Nom., amor amantem extra se ponit, et | |
| 13420 eum quodammodo in amatum transfert. Inconveniens autem est dicere | |
| 13421 quod Deus, extra se positus, in alia transferatur. Ergo | |
| 13422 inconveniens est dicere quod Deus alia a se amet.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q20_A2-p3"> | |
| 13423 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the love of God is eternal. But things apart from God are not from eternity; except in God. Therefore God does not | |
| 13424 love anything, except as it exists in Himself. But as existing in Him, it is no other than Himself. Therefore God does not | |
| 13425 love things other than Himself. | |
| 13426 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 20 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="29295" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29295] Iª q. 20 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, amor | |
| 13427 Dei aeternus est. Sed ea quae sunt alia a Deo, non sunt ab aeterno | |
| 13428 nisi in Deo. Ergo Deus non amat ea nisi in seipso. Sed secundum | |
| 13429 quod sunt in eo, non sunt aliud ab eo. Ergo Deus non amat alia a | |
| 13430 seipso.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q20_A2-p4"> | |
| 13431 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, love is twofold---the love, namely, of desire, and the love of friendship. Now God does not love irrational creatures | |
| 13432 with the love of desire, since He needs no creature outside Himself. Nor with the love of friendship; since there can be no | |
| 13433 friendship with irrational creatures, as the Philosopher shows (Ethic. viii, 2). Therefore God does not love all things. | |
| 13434 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 20 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="29296" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29296] Iª q. 20 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 13435 duplex est amor, scilicet concupiscentiae, et amicitiae. Sed Deus | |
| 13436 creaturas irrationales non amat amore concupiscentiae, quia nullius | |
| 13437 extra se eget, nec etiam amore amicitiae, quia non potest ad res | |
| 13438 irrationales haberi, ut patet per philosophum, in VIII Ethic. Ergo | |
| 13439 Deus non omnia amat.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q20_A2-p5"> | |
| 13440 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, it is written ( | |
| 13441 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q20_A2-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.5.7" target="asv">Ps. 5:7</a>): "Thou hatest all the workers of iniquity." Now nothing is at the same time hated and loved. Therefore God does not love | |
| 13442 all things. | |
| 13443 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 20 a. 2 arg. 4"><a name="29297" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29297] Iª q. 20 a. 2 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, in | |
| 13444 Psalmo dicitur, <i>odisti omnes qui operantur iniquitatem</i>. | |
| 13445 Nihil autem simul odio habetur et amatur. Ergo Deus non omnia | |
| 13446 amat.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q20_A2-p6"> | |
| 13447 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is said ( | |
| 13448 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q20_A2-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.11.25" target="asv">Wis. 11:25</a>): "Thou lovest all things that are, and hatest none of the things which Thou hast made." | |
| 13449 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 20 a. 2 s. c."><a name="29298" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29298] Iª q. 20 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est | |
| 13450 quod dicitur Sap. XI, <i>diligis omnia quae sunt, et nihil odisti | |
| 13451 eorum quae fecisti</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q20_A2-p7"> | |
| 13452 <b>I answer that,</b> God loves all existing things. For all existing things, in so far as they exist, are good, since the existence of a thing | |
| 13453 is itself a good; and likewise, whatever perfection it possesses. Now it has been shown above ( | |
| 13454 <a id="FP_Q20_A2-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q19_A4.html">Q[19], A[4]</a>) that God's will is the cause of all things. It must needs be, therefore, that a thing has existence, or any kind of good, | |
| 13455 only inasmuch as it is willed by God. To every existing thing, then, God wills some | |
| 13456 good. Hence, since to love anything is nothing else than to will good to that thing, it is manifest that God loves everything | |
| 13457 that exists. Yet not as we love. Because since our will is not the cause of the goodness of things, but is moved by it as | |
| 13458 by its object, our love, whereby we will good to anything, is not the cause of its goodness; but conversely its goodness, | |
| 13459 whether real or imaginary, calls forth our love, by which we will that it should preserve the good it has, and receive besides | |
| 13460 the good it has not, and to this end we direct our actions: whereas the love of God infuses and creates goodness. | |
| 13461 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 20 a. 2 co."><a name="29299" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29299] Iª q. 20 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum | |
| 13462 quod Deus omnia existentia amat. Nam omnia existentia, inquantum | |
| 13463 sunt, bona sunt, ipsum enim esse cuiuslibet rei quoddam bonum est, | |
| 13464 et similiter quaelibet perfectio ipsius. Ostensum est autem supra | |
| 13465 quod voluntas Dei est causa omnium rerum et sic oportet quod | |
| 13466 intantum habeat aliquid esse, aut quodcumque bonum, inquantum est | |
| 13467 volitum a Deo. Cuilibet igitur existenti Deus vult aliquod bonum. | |
| 13468 Unde, cum amare nil aliud sit quam velle bonum alicui, manifestum | |
| 13469 est quod Deus omnia quae sunt, amat. Non tamen eo modo sicut nos. | |
| 13470 Quia enim voluntas nostra non est causa bonitatis rerum, sed ab ea | |
| 13471 movetur sicut ab obiecto, amor noster, quo bonum alicui volumus, | |
| 13472 non est causa bonitatis ipsius, sed e converso bonitas eius, vel | |
| 13473 vera vel aestimata, provocat amorem, quo ei volumus et bonum | |
| 13474 conservari quod habet, et addi quod non habet, et ad hoc operamur. | |
| 13475 Sed amor Dei est infundens et creans bonitatem in rebus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q20_A2-p8"> | |
| 13476 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> A lover is placed outside himself, and made to pass into the object of his love, inasmuch as he wills good to the beloved; | |
| 13477 and works for that good by his providence even as he works for his own. Hence Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv, 1): "On behalf | |
| 13478 of the truth we must make bold to say even this, that He Himself, the cause of all things, by His abounding love and goodness, | |
| 13479 is placed outside Himself by His providence for all existing things." | |
| 13480 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 20 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="29300" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29300] Iª q. 20 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo | |
| 13481 dicendum quod amans sic fit extra se in amatum translatus, | |
| 13482 inquantum vult amato bonum, et operatur per suam providentiam, | |
| 13483 sicut et sibi. Unde et Dionysius dicit, IV cap. de Div. Nom., | |
| 13484 <i>audendum est autem et hoc pro veritate dicere, quod et ipse | |
| 13485 omnium causa, per abundantiam amativae bonitatis, extra seipsum fit | |
| 13486 ad omnia existentia providentiis</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q20_A2-p9"> | |
| 13487 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Although creatures have not existed from eternity, except in God, yet because they have been in Him from eternity, God has | |
| 13488 known them eternally in their proper natures; and for that reason has loved them, even as we, by the images of things within | |
| 13489 us, know things existing in themselves. | |
| 13490 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 20 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="29301" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29301] Iª q. 20 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 13491 dicendum quod, licet creaturae ab aeterno non fuerint nisi in Deo, | |
| 13492 tamen per hoc quod ab aeterno in Deo fuerunt, ab aeterno Deus | |
| 13493 cognovit res in propriis naturis, et eadem ratione amavit. Sicut et | |
| 13494 nos per similitudines rerum, quae in nobis sunt, cognoscimus res in | |
| 13495 seipsis existentes.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q20_A2-p10"> | |
| 13496 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Friendship cannot exist except towards rational creatures, who are capable of returning love, and communicating one with | |
| 13497 another in the various works of life, and who may fare well or ill, according to the changes of fortune and happiness; even | |
| 13498 as to them is benevolence properly speaking exercised. But irrational creatures cannot attain to loving God, nor to any share | |
| 13499 in the intellectual and beatific life that He lives. Strictly speaking, therefore, | |
| 13500 God does not love irrational creatures with the love of friendship; but as it were with the love of desire, in so far as He | |
| 13501 orders them to rational creatures, and even to Himself. Yet this is not because He stands in need of them; but only on account | |
| 13502 of His goodness, and of the services they render to us. For we can desire a thing for others as well as for ourselves. | |
| 13503 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 20 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="29302" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29302] Iª q. 20 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 13504 dicendum quod amicitia non potest haberi nisi ad rationales | |
| 13505 creaturas, in quibus contingit esse redamationem, et | |
| 13506 communicationem in operibus vitae, et quibus contingit bene evenire | |
| 13507 vel male, secundum fortunam et felicitatem, sicut et ad eas proprie | |
| 13508 benevolentia est. Creaturae autem irrationales non possunt | |
| 13509 pertingere ad amandum Deum, neque ad communicationem intellectualis | |
| 13510 et beatae vitae, qua Deus vivit. Sic igitur Deus, proprie loquendo, | |
| 13511 non amat creaturas irrationales amore amicitiae, sed amore quasi | |
| 13512 concupiscentiae; inquantum ordinat eas ad rationales creaturas, et | |
| 13513 etiam ad seipsum; non quasi eis indigeat, sed propter suam | |
| 13514 bonitatem et nostram utilitatem. Concupiscimus enim aliquid et | |
| 13515 nobis et aliis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q20_A2-p11"> | |
| 13516 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Nothing prevents one and the same thing being loved under one aspect, while it is hated under another. God loves sinners | |
| 13517 in so far as they are existing natures; for they have existence and have it from Him. In so far as they are sinners, they | |
| 13518 have not existence at all, but fall short of it; and this in them is not from God. Hence under this aspect, they are hated | |
| 13519 by Him. | |
| 13520 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 20 a. 2 ad 4"><a name="29303" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29303] Iª q. 20 a. 2 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum | |
| 13521 dicendum quod nihil prohibet unum et idem secundum aliquid amari, | |
| 13522 et secundum aliquid odio haberi. Deus autem peccatores, inquantum | |
| 13523 sunt naturae quaedam, amat, sic enim et sunt, et ab ipso sunt. | |
| 13524 Inquantum vero peccatores sunt, non sunt, sed ab esse deficiunt, et | |
| 13525 hoc in eis a Deo non est. Unde secundum hoc ab ipso odio | |
| 13526 habentur.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q20_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q20_A3-p0.1">Q. 20. A. 3. Whether God loves all things equally?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q20_A3-p2"> | |
| 13527 <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God loves all things equally. For it is said: "He hath equally care of all" ( | |
| 13528 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q20_A3-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.6.8" target="asv">Wis. 6:8</a>). But God's providence over things comes from the love wherewith He loves them. Therefore He loves all things equally. | |
| 13529 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 20 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="29304" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29304] Iª q. 20 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium sic | |
| 13530 proceditur. Videtur quod Deus aequaliter diligat omnia. Dicitur | |
| 13531 enim Sap. VI, <i>aequaliter est ei cura de omnibus</i>. Sed | |
| 13532 providentia Dei, quam habet de rebus, est ex amore quo amat res. | |
| 13533 Ergo aequaliter amat omnia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q20_A3-p3"> | |
| 13534 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the love of God is His essence. But God's essence does not admit of degree; neither therefore does His love. He | |
| 13535 does not therefore love some things more than others. | |
| 13536 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 20 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="29305" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29305] Iª q. 20 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, amor | |
| 13537 Dei est eius essentia. Sed essentia Dei magis et minus non recipit. | |
| 13538 Ergo nec amor eius. Non igitur quaedam aliis magis amat.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q20_A3-p4"> | |
| 13539 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, as God's love extends to created things, so do His knowledge and will extend. But God is not said to know some things | |
| 13540 more than others; nor will one thing more than another. Neither therefore does He love some things more than others. | |
| 13541 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 20 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="29306" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29306] Iª q. 20 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, sicut | |
| 13542 amor Dei se extendit ad res creatas, ita et scientia et voluntas. | |
| 13543 Sed Deus non dicitur scire quaedam magis quam alia, neque magis | |
| 13544 velle. Ergo nec magis quaedam aliis diligit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q20_A3-p5"> | |
| 13545 <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (Tract. in Joan. cx): "God loves all things that He has made, and amongst them rational creatures more, and | |
| 13546 of these especially those who are members of His only-begotten Son Himself." | |
| 13547 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 20 a. 3 s. c."><a name="29307" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29307] Iª q. 20 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est | |
| 13548 quod dicit Augustinus, super Ioann., <i>omnia diligit Deus quae | |
| 13549 fecit; et inter ea magis diligit creaturas rationales; et de illis | |
| 13550 eas amplius, quae sunt membra unigeniti sui; et multo magis ipsum | |
| 13551 unigenitum suum</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q20_A3-p6"> | |
| 13552 <b>I answer that,</b> Since to love a thing is to will it good, in a twofold way anything may be loved more, or less. In one way on the part of | |
| 13553 the act of the will itself, which is more or less intense. In this way God does not love some things more than others, because | |
| 13554 He loves all things by an act of the will that is one, simple, and always the same. In another way on the part of the good | |
| 13555 itself that a person wills for the beloved. In this way we are said to love that one more | |
| 13556 than another, for whom we will a greater good, though our will is not more intense. In this way we must needs say that God | |
| 13557 loves some things more than others. For since God's love is the cause of goodness in things, as has been said | |
| 13558 <a id="FP_Q20_A3-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q20_A2.html">(A[2])</a>, no one thing would be better than another, if God did not will greater good for one than for another. | |
| 13559 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 20 a. 3 co."><a name="29308" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29308] Iª q. 20 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum | |
| 13560 quod, cum amare sit velle bonum alicui, duplici ratione potest | |
| 13561 aliquid magis vel minus amari. Uno modo, ex parte ipsius actus | |
| 13562 voluntatis, qui est magis vel minus intensus. Et sic Deus non magis | |
| 13563 quaedam aliis amat, quia omnia amat uno et simplici actu | |
| 13564 voluntatis, et semper eodem modo se habente. Alio modo, ex parte | |
| 13565 ipsius boni quod aliquis vult amato. Et sic dicimur aliquem magis | |
| 13566 alio amare, cui volumus maius bonum; quamvis non magis intensa | |
| 13567 voluntate. Et hoc modo necesse est dicere quod Deus quaedam aliis | |
| 13568 magis amat. Cum enim amor Dei sit causa bonitatis rerum, ut dictum | |
| 13569 est, non esset aliquid alio melius, si Deus non vellet uni maius | |
| 13570 bonum quam alteri.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q20_A3-p7"> | |
| 13571 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> God is said to have equally care of all, not because by His care He deals out equal good to all, but because He administers | |
| 13572 all things with a like wisdom and goodness. | |
| 13573 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 20 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="29309" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29309] Iª q. 20 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo | |
| 13574 dicendum quod dicitur Deo aequaliter esse cura de omnibus, non quia | |
| 13575 aequalia bona sua cura omnibus dispenset; sed quia ex aequali | |
| 13576 sapientia et bonitate omnia administrat.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q20_A3-p8"> | |
| 13577 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> This argument is based on the intensity of love on the part of the act of the will, which is the divine essence. But the | |
| 13578 good that God wills for His creatures, is not the divine essence. Therefore there is no reason why it may not vary in degree. | |
| 13579 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 20 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="29310" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29310] Iª q. 20 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 13580 dicendum quod ratio illa procedit de intensione amoris ex parte | |
| 13581 actus voluntatis, qui est divina essentia. Bonum autem quod Deus | |
| 13582 creaturae vult, non est divina essentia. Unde nihil prohibet illud | |
| 13583 intendi vel remitti.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q20_A3-p9"> | |
| 13584 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> To understand and to will denote the act alone, and do not include in their meaning objects from the diversity of which God | |
| 13585 may be said to know or will more or less, as has been said with respect to God's love. | |
| 13586 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 20 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="29311" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29311] Iª q. 20 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 13587 dicendum quod intelligere et velle significant solum actus, non | |
| 13588 autem in sua significatione includunt aliqua obiecta, ex quorum | |
| 13589 diversitate possit dici Deus magis vel minus scire aut velle; sicut | |
| 13590 circa amorem dictum est.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q20_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q20_A4-p0.1">Q. 20. A. 4. Whether God always loves more the better things?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q20_A4-p2"> | |
| 13591 <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God does not always love more the better things. For it is manifest that Christ is better than the whole human | |
| 13592 race, being God and man. But God loved the human race more than He loved Christ; for it is said: "He spared not His own Son, | |
| 13593 but delivered Him up for us all" ( | |
| 13594 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q20_A4-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.8.32" target="asv">Rom. 8:32</a>). Therefore God does not always love more the better things. | |
| 13595 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 20 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="29312" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29312] Iª q. 20 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum sic | |
| 13596 proceditur. Videtur quod Deus non semper magis diligat meliora. | |
| 13597 Manifestum est enim quod Christus est melior toto genere humano, | |
| 13598 cum sit Deus et homo. Sed Deus magis dilexit genus humanum quam | |
| 13599 Christum, quia dicitur Rom. VIII, <i>proprio filio suo non | |
| 13600 pepercit, sed pro nobis omnibus tradidit illum</i>. Ergo Deus non | |
| 13601 semper magis diligit meliora.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q20_A4-p3"> | |
| 13602 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, an angel is better than a man. Hence it is said of man: "Thou hast made him a little less than the angels" ( | |
| 13603 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q20_A4-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.8.6" target="asv">Ps. 8:6</a>). But God loved men more than He loved the angels, for it is said: "Nowhere doth He take hold of the angels, but of the seed | |
| 13604 of Abraham He taketh hold" ( | |
| 13605 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q20_A4-p3.2" href="./asv.html#Heb.2.16" target="asv">Heb. 2:16</a>). Therefore God does not always love more the better things. | |
| 13606 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 20 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="29313" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29313] Iª q. 20 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 13607 Angelus est melior homine, unde in Psalmo VIII dicitur de homine, | |
| 13608 <i>minuisti eum paulo minus ab Angelis</i>. Sed Deus plus dilexit | |
| 13609 hominem quam Angelum, dicitur enim Hebr. II, <i>nusquam Angelos | |
| 13610 apprehendit, sed semen Abrahae apprehendit</i>. Ergo Deus non | |
| 13611 semper magis diligit meliora.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q20_A4-p4"> | |
| 13612 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Peter was better than John, since he loved Christ more. Hence the Lord, knowing this to be true, asked Peter, saying: | |
| 13613 "Simon, son of John, lovest thou Me more than these?" Yet Christ loved John more than He loved Peter. For as Augustine says, | |
| 13614 commenting on the words, "Simon, son of John, lovest thou Me?": "By this very mark is John distinguished from the other disciples, | |
| 13615 not that He loved him only, but that He loved him more than the rest." Therefore | |
| 13616 God does not always love more the better things. | |
| 13617 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 20 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="29314" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29314] Iª q. 20 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 13618 Petrus fuit melior Ioanne, quia plus Christum diligebat. Unde | |
| 13619 dominus, sciens hoc esse verum, interrogavit Petrum, dicens, | |
| 13620 <i>Simon Ioannis, diligis me plus his?</i> Sed tamen Christus plus | |
| 13621 dilexit Ioannem quam Petrum, ut enim dicit Augustinus, super illud | |
| 13622 Ioan. XXI, <i>Simon Ioannis diligis me? Hoc ipso signo Ioannes a | |
| 13623 ceteris discipulis discernitur; non quod solum eum, sed quod plus | |
| 13624 eum ceteris diligebat</i>. Non ergo semper magis diligit | |
| 13625 meliora.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q20_A4-p5"> | |
| 13626 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, the innocent man is better than the repentant, since repentance is, as Jerome says (Cap. 3 in Isa.), "a second plank | |
| 13627 after shipwreck." But God loves the penitent more than the innocent; since He rejoices over him the more. For it is said: | |
| 13628 "I say to you that there shall be joy in heaven upon the one sinner that doth penance, more than upon ninety-nine just who | |
| 13629 need not penance" ( | |
| 13630 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q20_A4-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Luke.15.7" target="asv">Lk. 15:7</a>). Therefore God does not always love more | |
| 13631 the better things. | |
| 13632 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 20 a. 4 arg. 4"><a name="29315" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29315] Iª q. 20 a. 4 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 13633 melior est innocens poenitente; <i>cum poenitentia sit secunda | |
| 13634 tabula post naufragium</i>, ut dicit Hieronymus. Sed Deus plus | |
| 13635 diligit poenitentem quam innocentem, quia plus de eo gaudet, | |
| 13636 dicitur enim Luc. XV, <i>dico vobis quod maius gaudium erit in | |
| 13637 caelo super uno peccatore poenitentiam agente, quam super nonaginta | |
| 13638 novem iustis, qui non indigent poenitentia</i>. Ergo Deus non | |
| 13639 semper magis diligit meliora.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q20_A4-p6"> | |
| 13640 <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, the just man who is foreknown is better than the predestined sinner. Now God loves more the predestined sinner, | |
| 13641 since He wills for him a greater good, life eternal. Therefore God does not always love more the better things. | |
| 13642 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 20 a. 4 arg. 5"><a name="29316" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29316] Iª q. 20 a. 4 arg. 5</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 13643 melior est iustus praescitus, quam peccator praedestinatus. Sed | |
| 13644 Deus plus diligit peccatorem praedestinatum, quia vult ei maius | |
| 13645 bonum, scilicet vitam aeternam. Ergo Deus non semper magis diligit | |
| 13646 meliora.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q20_A4-p7"> | |
| 13647 <b>On the contrary,</b> Everything loves what is like it, as appears from ( | |
| 13648 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q20_A4-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.13.19" target="asv">Ecclus. 13:19</a>): "Every beast loveth its like." Now the better a thing is, the more like is it to God. Therefore the better things are more | |
| 13649 loved by God. | |
| 13650 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 20 a. 4 s. c."><a name="29317" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29317] Iª q. 20 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra, | |
| 13651 unumquodque diligit sibi simile; ut patet per illud quod habetur | |
| 13652 Eccli. XIII, <i>omne animal diligit sibi simile</i>. Sed intantum | |
| 13653 aliquid est melius, inquantum est Deo similius. Ergo meliora magis | |
| 13654 diliguntur a Deo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q20_A4-p8"> | |
| 13655 <b>I answer that,</b> It must needs be, according to what has been said before, that God loves more the better things . For it has been shown ( | |
| 13656 <a id="FP_Q20_A4-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q20_A2.html">AA[2]</a>,3), that God's loving one thing more than another is nothing else than His willing for that thing a greater good: because | |
| 13657 God's will is the cause of goodness in things; and the reason why some things are better than others, is that God wills for | |
| 13658 them a greater good. Hence it follows that He loves more the | |
| 13659 better things. | |
| 13660 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 20 a. 4 co."><a name="29318" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29318] Iª q. 20 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum | |
| 13661 quod necesse est dicere, secundum praedicta, quod Deus magis | |
| 13662 diligat meliora. Dictum est enim quod Deum diligere magis aliquid, | |
| 13663 nihil aliud est quam ei maius bonum velle, voluntas enim Dei est | |
| 13664 causa bonitatis in rebus. Et sic, ex hoc sunt aliqua meliora, quod | |
| 13665 Deus eis maius bonum vult. Unde sequitur quod meliora plus | |
| 13666 amet.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q20_A4-p9"> | |
| 13667 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> God loves Christ not only more than He loves the whole human race, but more than He loves the entire created universe: because | |
| 13668 He willed for Him the greater good in giving Him "a name that is above all names," in so far as He was true God. Nor did anything | |
| 13669 of His excellence diminish when God delivered Him up to death for the salvation of the human race; rather did He become thereby | |
| 13670 a glorious conqueror: "The government was placed upon His shoulder," | |
| 13671 according to | |
| 13672 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q20_A4-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Isa.9.6" target="asv"> Is. 9:6.</a> | |
| 13673 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 20 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="29319" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29319] Iª q. 20 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo | |
| 13674 dicendum quod Deus Christum diligit, non solum plus quam totum | |
| 13675 humanum genus, sed etiam magis quam totam universitatem | |
| 13676 creaturarum, quia scilicet ei maius bonum voluit, quia dedit ei | |
| 13677 nomen, quod est super omne nomen, ut verus Deus esset. Nec eius | |
| 13678 excellentiae deperiit ex hoc quod Deus dedit eum in mortem pro | |
| 13679 salute humani generis, quinimo ex hoc factus est victor gloriosus; | |
| 13680 <i>factus enim est principatus super humerum eius</i>, ut dicitur | |
| 13681 Isaiae IX.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q20_A4-p10"> | |
| 13682 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> God loves the human nature assumed by the Word of God in the person of Christ more than He loves all the angels; for that | |
| 13683 nature is better, especially on the ground of the union with the Godhead. But speaking of human nature in general, and comparing | |
| 13684 it with the angelic, the two are found equal, in the order of grace and of glory: since according to | |
| 13685 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q20_A4-p10.1" href="./asv.html#Rev.21.17" target="asv"> Rev 21:17, </a> the measure of a man and of an angel is the same. Yet so that, in this | |
| 13686 respect, some angels are found nobler than some men, and some men nobler than some angels. But as to natural condition an | |
| 13687 angel is better than a man. God therefore did not assume human nature because He loved man, absolutely speaking, more; but | |
| 13688 because the needs of man were greater; just as the master of a house may give some costly delicacy to a sick servant, that | |
| 13689 he does not give to his own son in sound health. | |
| 13690 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 20 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="29320" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29320] Iª q. 20 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 13691 dicendum quod naturam humanam assumptam a Dei verbo in persona | |
| 13692 Christi, secundum praedicta, Deus plus amat quam omnes Angelos, et | |
| 13693 melior est, maxime ratione unionis. Sed loquendo de humana natura | |
| 13694 communiter, eam angelicae comparando, secundum ordinem ad gratiam | |
| 13695 et gloriam, aequalitas invenitur; cum eadem sit mensura hominis et | |
| 13696 Angeli, ut dicitur Apoc. XXI; ita tamen quod quidam Angeli | |
| 13697 quibusdam hominibus, et quidam homines quibusdam Angelis, quantum | |
| 13698 ad hoc, potiores inveniuntur. Sed quantum ad conditionem naturae, | |
| 13699 Angelus est melior homine. Nec ideo naturam humanam assumpsit Deus, | |
| 13700 quia hominem absolute plus diligeret, sed quia plus indigebat. | |
| 13701 Sicut bonus paterfamilias aliquid pretiosius dat servo aegrotanti, | |
| 13702 quod non dat filio sano.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q20_A4-p11"> | |
| 13703 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This doubt concerning Peter and John has been solved in various ways. Augustine interprets it mystically, and says that the | |
| 13704 active life, signified by Peter, loves God more than the contemplative signified by John, because the former is more conscious | |
| 13705 of the miseries of this present life, and therefore the more ardently desires to be freed from them, and depart to God. God, | |
| 13706 he says, loves more the contemplative life, since He preserves it longer. For | |
| 13707 it does not end, as the active life does, with the life of the body. | |
| 13708 </p><p id="FP_Q20_A4-p12"> Some say that Peter loved Christ more in His members, and therefore was loved more by Christ also, for which reason He gave | |
| 13709 him the care of the Church; but that John loved Christ more in Himself, and so was loved more by Him; on which account Christ | |
| 13710 commended His mother to his care. Others say that it is uncertain which of them loved Christ more with the love of charity, | |
| 13711 and uncertain also which of them God loved more and ordained to a greater degree of glory in eternal life. | |
| 13712 Peter is said to have loved more, in regard to a certain promptness and fervor; but John to have been more loved, with respect | |
| 13713 to certain marks of familiarity which Christ showed to him rather than to others, on account of his youth and purity. While | |
| 13714 others say that Christ loved Peter more, from his more excellent gift of charity; but John more, from his gifts of intellect. | |
| 13715 Hence, absolutely speaking, Peter was the better and more beloved; but, in a certain sense, John was the better, and was | |
| 13716 loved the more. However, it may seem presumptuous to pass judgment on these matters; since "the Lord" and no other "is the | |
| 13717 weigher of spirits" ( | |
| 13718 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q20_A4-p12.1" href="./asv.html#Prov.16.2" target="asv">Prov. 16:2</a>). | |
| 13719 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 20 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="29321" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29321] Iª q. 20 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 13720 dicendum quod haec dubitatio de Petro et Ioanne multipliciter | |
| 13721 solvitur. Augustinus namque refert hoc ad mysterium, dicens quod | |
| 13722 vita activa, quae significatur per Petrum, plus diligit Deum quam | |
| 13723 vita contemplativa, quae significatur per Ioannem, quia magis | |
| 13724 sentit praesentis vitae angustias, et aestuantius ab eis liberari | |
| 13725 desiderat, et ad Deum ire. Contemplativam vero vitam Deus plus | |
| 13726 diligit, quia magis eam conservat; non enim finitur simul cum vita | |
| 13727 corporis, sicut vita activa. Quidam vero dicunt quod Petrus plus | |
| 13728 dilexit Christum in membris; et sic etiam a Christo plus fuit | |
| 13729 dilectus; unde ei Ecclesiam commendavit. Ioannes vero plus dilexit | |
| 13730 Christum in seipso; et sic etiam plus ab eo fuit dilectus; unde ei | |
| 13731 commendavit matrem. Alii vero dicunt quod incertum est quis horum | |
| 13732 plus Christum dilexerit amore caritatis, et similiter quem Deus | |
| 13733 plus dilexerit in ordine ad maiorem gloriam vitae aeternae. Sed | |
| 13734 Petrus dicitur plus dilexisse, quantum ad quandam promptitudinem | |
| 13735 vel fervorem, Ioannes vero plus dilectus, quantum ad quaedam | |
| 13736 familiaritatis indicia, quae Christus ei magis demonstrabat, | |
| 13737 propter eius iuventutem et puritatem. Alii vero dicunt quod | |
| 13738 Christus plus dilexit Petrum, quantum ad excellentius donum | |
| 13739 caritatis, Ioannem vero plus, quantum ad donum intellectus. Unde | |
| 13740 simpliciter Petrus fuit melior, et magis dilectus, sed Ioannes | |
| 13741 secundum quid. Praesumptuosum tamen videtur hoc diiudicare, quia, | |
| 13742 ut dicitur Prov. XVI, <i>spirituum ponderator est dominus</i>, et | |
| 13743 non alius.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q20_A4-p13"> | |
| 13744 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> The penitent and the innocent are related as exceeding and exceeded. For whether innocent or penitent, those are the better | |
| 13745 and better loved who have most grace. Other things being equal, innocence is the nobler thing and the more beloved. God is | |
| 13746 said to rejoice more over the penitent than over the innocent, because often penitents rise from sin more cautious, humble, | |
| 13747 and fervent. Hence Gregory commenting on these words (Hom. 34 in Ev.) says that, "In | |
| 13748 battle the general loves the soldier who after flight returns and bravely pursues the enemy, more than him who has never fled, | |
| 13749 but has never done a brave deed." | |
| 13750 </p><p id="FP_Q20_A4-p14"> Or it may be answered that gifts of grace, equal in themselves, are more as conferred on the penitent, who deserved punishment, | |
| 13751 than as conferred on the innocent, to whom no punishment was due; just as a hundred pounds [marcoe] are a greater gift to | |
| 13752 a poor man than to a king. | |
| 13753 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 20 a. 4 ad 4"><a name="29322" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29322] Iª q. 20 a. 4 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum | |
| 13754 dicendum quod poenitentes et innocentes se habent sicut excedentia | |
| 13755 et excessa. Nam sive sint innocentes, sive poenitentes, illi sunt | |
| 13756 meliores et magis dilecti, qui plus habent de gratia. Ceteris tamen | |
| 13757 paribus, innocentia dignior est et magis dilecta. Dicitur tamen | |
| 13758 Deus plus gaudere de poenitente quam de innocente, quia plerumque | |
| 13759 poenitentes cautiores, humiliores et ferventiores resurgunt. Unde | |
| 13760 Gregorius dicit ibidem, quod <i>dux in praelio eum militem plus | |
| 13761 diligit, qui post fugam conversus, fortiter hostem premit, quam qui | |
| 13762 nunquam fugit, nec unquam fortiter fecit</i>. Vel, alia ratione, | |
| 13763 quia aequale donum gratiae plus est, comparatum poenitenti, qui | |
| 13764 meruit poenam, quam innocenti, qui non meruit. Sicut centum marcae | |
| 13765 maius donum est, si dentur pauperi, quam si dentur regi.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q20_A4-p15"> | |
| 13766 <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> Since God's will is the cause of goodness in things, the goodness of one who is loved by God is to be reckoned according | |
| 13767 to the time when some good is to be given to him by divine goodness. According therefore to the time, when there is to be | |
| 13768 given by the divine will to the predestined sinner a greater good, the sinner is better; although according to some other | |
| 13769 time he is the worse; because even according to some time he is neither good nor bad. | |
| 13770 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 20 a. 4 ad 5"><a name="29323" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29323] Iª q. 20 a. 4 ad 5</span></a> Ad quintum | |
| 13771 dicendum quod, cum voluntas Dei sit causa bonitatis in rebus, | |
| 13772 secundum illud tempus pensanda est bonitas eius qui amatur a Deo, | |
| 13773 secundum quod dandum est ei ex bonitate divina aliquod bonum. | |
| 13774 Secundum ergo illud tempus quo praedestinato peccatori dandum est | |
| 13775 ex divina voluntate maius bonum, melior est; licet secundum aliquod | |
| 13776 aliud tempus, sit peior; quia et secundum aliquod tempus, non est | |
| 13777 nec bonus neque malus.</p></div></div></div></div> | |
| 13778 <div id="FP_Q21" class="div3"> | |
| 13779 <h3 id="FP_Q21-p0.1">Q. 21. THE JUSTICE AND MERCY OF GOD (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3> | |
| 13780 <div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> | |
| 13781 <p id="FP_Q21-p2"> After considering the divine love, we must treat of God's justice and mercy. Under this head there are four points of inquiry:</p><p id="FP_Q21-p3"> (1) Whether there is justice in God?</p><p id="FP_Q21-p4"> (2) Whether His justice can be called truth?</p><p id="FP_Q21-p5"> (3) Whether there is mercy in God?</p><p id="FP_Q21-p6"> (4) Whether in every work of God there are justice and mercy?</p> | |
| 13782 </div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 21 pr."><a name="29324" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29324] | |
| 13783 Iª q. 21 pr.</span></a> Post considerationem divini amoris, de | |
| 13784 iustitia et misericordia eius agendum est. Et circa hoc quaeruntur | |
| 13785 quatuor. Primo, utrum in Deo sit iustitia. Secundo, utrum iustitia | |
| 13786 eius veritas dici possit. Tertio, utrum in Deo sit misericordia. | |
| 13787 Quarto, utrum in omni opere Dei sit iustitia et misericordia.</p></div></div></div> | |
| 13788 <div id="FP_Q21_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q21_A1-p0.1">Q. 21. A. 1. Whether there is justice in God?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q21_A1-p2"> | |
| 13789 <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that there is not justice in God. For justice is divided against temperance. But temperance does not exist in God: | |
| 13790 neither therefore does justice. | |
| 13791 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 21 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="29325" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29325] Iª q. 21 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum sic | |
| 13792 proceditur. Videtur quod in Deo non sit iustitia. Iustitia enim | |
| 13793 contra temperantiam dividitur. Temperantia autem non est in Deo. | |
| 13794 Ergo nec iustitia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q21_A1-p3"> | |
| 13795 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, he who does whatsoever he wills and pleases does not work according to justice. But, as the Apostle says: "God worketh | |
| 13796 all things according to the counsel of His will" ( | |
| 13797 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q21_A1-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Eph.1.11" target="asv">Eph. 1:11</a>). Therefore justice cannot be attributed to Him. | |
| 13798 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 21 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="29326" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29326] Iª q. 21 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 13799 quicumque facit omnia pro libito suae voluntatis, non secundum | |
| 13800 iustitiam operatur. Sed, sicut dicit apostolus, ad Ephes. I, Deus | |
| 13801 <i>operatur omnia secundum consilium suae voluntatis</i>. Non ergo | |
| 13802 ei iustitia debet attribui.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q21_A1-p4"> | |
| 13803 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the act of justice is to pay what is due. But God is no man's debtor. Therefore justice does not belong to God. | |
| 13804 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 21 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="29327" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29327] Iª q. 21 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, actus | |
| 13805 iustitiae est reddere debitum. Sed Deus nulli est debitor. Ergo Deo | |
| 13806 non competit iustitia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q21_A1-p5"> | |
| 13807 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, whatever is in God, is His essence. But justice cannot belong to this. For Boethius says (De Hebdom.): "Good regards | |
| 13808 the essence; justice the act." Therefore justice does not belong to God. | |
| 13809 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 21 a. 1 arg. 4"><a name="29328" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29328] Iª q. 21 a. 1 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 13810 quidquid est in Deo, est eius essentia. Sed hoc non competit | |
| 13811 iustitiae, dicit enim Boetius, in libro de Hebdomad., quod <i>bonum | |
| 13812 essentiam, iustum vero actum respicit</i>. Ergo iustitia non | |
| 13813 competit Deo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q21_A1-p6"> | |
| 13814 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is said ( | |
| 13815 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q21_A1-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.10.8" target="asv">Ps. 10:8</a>): "The Lord is just, and hath loved justice." | |
| 13816 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 21 a. 1 s. c."><a name="29329" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29329] Iª q. 21 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est | |
| 13817 quod dicitur in Psalmo X, <i>iustus dominus, et iustitias | |
| 13818 dilexit</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q21_A1-p7"> | |
| 13819 <b>I answer that,</b> There are two kinds of justice. The one consists in mutual giving and receiving, as in buying and selling, and other kinds | |
| 13820 of intercourse and exchange. This the Philosopher (Ethic. v, 4) calls commutative justice, that directs exchange and intercourse | |
| 13821 of business. This does not belong to God, since, as the Apostle says: "Who hath first given to Him, and recompense shall be | |
| 13822 made him?" ( | |
| 13823 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q21_A1-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.11.35" target="asv">Rom. 11:35</a>). The other consists in distribution, and | |
| 13824 is called distributive justice; whereby a ruler or a steward gives to each what his rank deserves. As then the proper order | |
| 13825 displayed in ruling a family or any kind of multitude evinces justice of this kind in the ruler, so the order of the universe, | |
| 13826 which is seen both in effects of nature and in effects of will, shows forth the justice of God. Hence Dionysius says (Div. | |
| 13827 Nom. viii, 4): "We must needs see that God is truly just, in seeing how He gives to all existing things what is proper to | |
| 13828 the | |
| 13829 condition of each; and preserves the nature of each in the order and with the powers that properly belong to it." | |
| 13830 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 21 a. 1 co."><a name="29330" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29330] Iª q. 21 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum | |
| 13831 quod duplex est species iustitiae. Una, quae consistit in mutua | |
| 13832 datione et acceptione, ut puta quae consistit in emptione et | |
| 13833 venditione, et aliis huiusmodi communicationibus vel | |
| 13834 commutationibus. Et haec dicitur a philosopho, in V Ethic., | |
| 13835 iustitia commutativa, vel directiva commutationum sive | |
| 13836 communicationum. Et haec non competit Deo, quia, ut dicit | |
| 13837 apostolus, Rom. XI, <i>quis prior dedit illi, et retribuetur | |
| 13838 ei?</i> Alia, quae consistit in distribuendo, et dicitur | |
| 13839 distributiva iustitia, secundum quam aliquis gubernator vel | |
| 13840 dispensator dat unicuique secundum suam dignitatem. Sicut igitur | |
| 13841 ordo congruus familiae, vel cuiuscumque multitudinis gubernatae, | |
| 13842 demonstrat huiusmodi iustitiam in gubernante; ita ordo universi, | |
| 13843 qui apparet tam in rebus naturalibus quam in rebus voluntariis, | |
| 13844 demonstrat Dei iustitiam. Unde dicit Dionysius, VIII cap. de Div. | |
| 13845 Nom., <i>oportet videre in hoc veram Dei esse iustitiam, quod | |
| 13846 omnibus tribuit propria, secundum uniuscuiusque existentium | |
| 13847 dignitatem; et uniuscuiusque naturam in proprio salvat ordine et | |
| 13848 virtute</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q21_A1-p8"> | |
| 13849 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Certain of the moral virtues are concerned with the passions, as temperance with concupiscence, fortitude with fear and daring, | |
| 13850 meekness with anger. Such virtues as these can only metaphorically be attributed to God; since, as stated above ( | |
| 13851 <a id="FP_Q21_A1-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q20_A1.html">Q[20], A[1]</a> ), in God there are no passions; nor a sensitive appetite, which is, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 10), the subject | |
| 13852 of those virtues. On the other hand, certain moral | |
| 13853 virtues are concerned with works of giving and expending; such as justice, liberality, and magnificence; and these reside | |
| 13854 not in the sensitive faculty, but in the will. Hence, there is nothing to prevent our attributing these virtues to God; although | |
| 13855 not in civil matters, but in such acts as are not unbecoming to Him. For, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. x, 8), it would | |
| 13856 be absurd to praise God for His political virtues. | |
| 13857 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 21 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="29331" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29331] Iª q. 21 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo | |
| 13858 dicendum quod virtutum moralium quaedam sunt circa passiones; sicut | |
| 13859 temperantia circa concupiscentias, fortitudo circa timores et | |
| 13860 audacias, mansuetudo circa iram. Et huiusmodi virtutes Deo attribui | |
| 13861 non possunt, nisi secundum metaphoram, quia in Deo neque passiones | |
| 13862 sunt, ut supra dictum est; neque appetitus sensitivus, in quo sunt | |
| 13863 huiusmodi virtutes sicut in subiecto, ut dicit philosophus in III | |
| 13864 Ethic. Quaedam vero virtutes morales sunt circa operationes; ut | |
| 13865 puta circa dationes et sumptus, ut iustitia et liberalitas et | |
| 13866 magnificentia; quae etiam non sunt in parte sensitiva, sed in | |
| 13867 voluntate. Unde nihil prohibet huiusmodi virtutes in Deo ponere, | |
| 13868 non tamen circa actiones civiles sed circa actiones Deo | |
| 13869 convenientes. Ridiculum est enim secundum virtutes politicas Deum | |
| 13870 laudare, ut dicit philosophus in X Ethic.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q21_A1-p9"> | |
| 13871 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Since good as perceived by intellect is the object of the will, it is impossible for God to will anything but what His wisdom | |
| 13872 approves. This is, as it were, His law of justice, in accordance with which His will is right and just. Hence, what He does | |
| 13873 according to His will He does justly: as we do justly what we do according to law. But whereas law comes to us from some higher | |
| 13874 power, God is a law unto Himself. | |
| 13875 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 21 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="29332" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29332] Iª q. 21 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 13876 dicendum quod, cum bonum intellectum sit obiectum voluntatis, | |
| 13877 impossibile est Deum velle nisi quod ratio suae sapientiae habet. | |
| 13878 Quae quidem est sicut lex iustitiae, secundum quam eius voluntas | |
| 13879 recta et iusta est. Unde quod secundum suam voluntatem facit, iuste | |
| 13880 facit, sicut et nos quod secundum legem facimus, iuste facimus. Sed | |
| 13881 nos quidem secundum legem alicuius superioris, Deus autem sibi ipsi | |
| 13882 est lex.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q21_A1-p10"> | |
| 13883 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> To each one is due what is his own. Now that which is directed to a man is said to be his own. Thus the master owns the servant, | |
| 13884 and not conversely, for that is free which is its own cause. In the word debt, therefore, is implied a certain exigence or | |
| 13885 necessity of the thing to which it is directed. Now a twofold order has to be considered in things: the one, whereby one created | |
| 13886 thing is directed to another, as the parts of the whole, accident to | |
| 13887 substance, and all things whatsoever to their end; the other, whereby all created things are ordered to God. Thus in the divine | |
| 13888 operations debt may be regarded in two ways, as due either to God, or to creatures, and in either way God pays what is due. | |
| 13889 It is due to God that there should be fulfilled in creatures what His will and wisdom require, and what manifests His goodness. | |
| 13890 In this respect, God's justice regards what befits Him; inasmuch as He renders to Himself what is due to Himself. It is | |
| 13891 also due to a created thing that it should possess what is ordered to it; thus it is due to man to have hands, and that other | |
| 13892 animals should serve him. Thus also God exercises justice, when He gives to each thing what is due to it by its nature and | |
| 13893 condition. This debt however is derived from the former; since what is due to each thing is due to it as ordered to it according | |
| 13894 to the divine wisdom. And although God in this way pays each thing its due, yet He Himself is not the debtor, since He is | |
| 13895 not directed to other things, but rather other things to Him. Justice, therefore, in God is sometimes spoken of as the fitting | |
| 13896 accompaniment of His goodness; sometimes as the reward of merit. Anselm touches on either view where he says (Prosolog. 10): | |
| 13897 "When Thou dost punish the wicked, it is just, since it agrees with their deserts; and when Thou dost spare the wicked, it | |
| 13898 is also just; since it befits Thy goodness." | |
| 13899 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 21 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="29333" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29333] Iª q. 21 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 13900 dicendum quod unicuique debetur quod suum est. Dicitur autem esse | |
| 13901 suum alicuius, quod ad ipsum ordinatur; sicut servus est domini, et | |
| 13902 non e converso; nam liberum est quod sui causa est. In nomine ergo | |
| 13903 debiti, importatur quidam ordo exigentiae vel necessitatis alicuius | |
| 13904 ad quod ordinatur. Est autem duplex ordo considerandus in rebus. | |
| 13905 Unus, quo aliquid creatum ordinatur ad aliud creatum, sicut partes | |
| 13906 ordinantur ad totum, et accidentia ad substantias, et unaquaeque | |
| 13907 res ad suum finem. Alius ordo, quo omnia creata ordinantur in Deum. | |
| 13908 Sic igitur et debitum attendi potest dupliciter in operatione | |
| 13909 divina, aut secundum quod aliquid debetur Deo; aut secundum quod | |
| 13910 aliquid debetur rei creatae. Et utroque modo Deus debitum reddit. | |
| 13911 Debitum enim est Deo, ut impleatur in rebus id quod eius sapientia | |
| 13912 et voluntas habet, et quod suam bonitatem manifestat, et secundum | |
| 13913 hoc iustitia Dei respicit decentiam ipsius, secundum quam reddit | |
| 13914 sibi quod sibi debetur. Debitum etiam est alicui rei creatae, quod | |
| 13915 habeat id quod ad ipsam ordinatur, sicut homini, quod habeat manus, | |
| 13916 et quod ei alia animalia serviant. Et sic etiam Deus operatur | |
| 13917 iustitiam, quando dat unicuique quod ei debetur secundum rationem | |
| 13918 suae naturae et conditionis. Sed hoc debitum dependet ex primo, | |
| 13919 quia hoc unicuique debetur, quod est ordinatum ad ipsum secundum | |
| 13920 ordinem divinae sapientiae. Et licet Deus hoc modo debitum alicui | |
| 13921 det, non tamen ipse est debitor, quia ipse ad alia non ordinatur, | |
| 13922 sed potius alia in ipsum. Et ideo iustitia quandoque dicitur in Deo | |
| 13923 condecentia suae bonitatis; quandoque vero retributio pro meritis. | |
| 13924 Et utrumque modum tangit Anselmus, dicens, <i>cum punis malos, | |
| 13925 iustum est, quia illorum meritis convenit; cum vero parcis malis, | |
| 13926 iustum est, quia bonitati tuae condecens est</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q21_A1-p11"> | |
| 13927 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Although justice regards act, this does not prevent its being the essence of God; since even that which is of the essence | |
| 13928 of a thing may be the principle of action. But good does not always regard act; since a thing is called good not merely with | |
| 13929 respect to act, but also as regards perfection in its essence. For this reason it is said (De Hebdom.) that the good is related | |
| 13930 to the just, as the general to the special. | |
| 13931 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 21 a. 1 ad 4"><a name="29334" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29334] Iª q. 21 a. 1 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum | |
| 13932 dicendum quod, licet iustitia respiciat actum, non tamen per hoc | |
| 13933 excluditur quin sit essentia Dei, quia etiam id quod est de | |
| 13934 essentia rei, potest esse principium actionis. Sed bonum non semper | |
| 13935 respicit actum, quia aliquid dicitur esse bonum, non solum secundum | |
| 13936 quod agit, sed etiam secundum quod in sua essentia perfectum est. | |
| 13937 Et propter hoc ibidem dicitur quod bonum comparatur ad iustum, | |
| 13938 sicut generale ad speciale.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q21_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q21_A2-p0.1">Q. 21. A. 2. Whether the justice of God is truth?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q21_A2-p2"> | |
| 13939 <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the justice of God is not truth. For justice resides in the will; since, as Anselm says (Dial. Verit. 13), | |
| 13940 it is a rectitude of the will, whereas truth resides in the intellect, as the Philosopher says (Metaph. vi; Ethic. vi, 2,6). | |
| 13941 Therefore justice does not appertain to truth. | |
| 13942 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 21 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="29335" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29335] Iª q. 21 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum sic | |
| 13943 proceditur. Videtur quod iustitia Dei non sit veritas. Iustitia | |
| 13944 enim est in voluntate, est enim rectitudo voluntatis, ut dicit | |
| 13945 Anselmus. Veritas autem est in intellectu, secundum philosophum in | |
| 13946 VI Metaphys. et in VI Ethic. Ergo iustitia non pertinet ad | |
| 13947 veritatem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q21_A2-p3"> | |
| 13948 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 7), truth is a virtue distinct from justice. Truth therefore does not appertain | |
| 13949 to the idea of justice. | |
| 13950 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 21 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="29336" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29336] Iª q. 21 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 13951 veritas, secundum philosophum in IV Ethic., est quaedam alia virtus | |
| 13952 a iustitia. Non ergo veritas pertinet ad rationem iustitiae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q21_A2-p4"> | |
| 13953 <b>On the contrary,</b> it is said ( | |
| 13954 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q21_A2-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.84.11" target="asv">Ps. 84:11</a>): "Mercy and truth have met each other": where truth stands for justice. | |
| 13955 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 21 a. 2 s. c."><a name="29337" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29337] Iª q. 21 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est | |
| 13956 quod in Psalmo LXXXIV dicitur, <i>misericordia et veritas | |
| 13957 obviaverunt sibi</i>; et ponitur ibi veritas pro iustitia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q21_A2-p5"> | |
| 13958 <b>I answer that,</b> Truth consists in the equation of mind and thing, as said above ( | |
| 13959 <a id="FP_Q21_A2-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q16_A1.html">Q[16], A[1]</a>). Now the mind, that is the cause of the thing, is related to it as its rule and measure; whereas the converse is the case | |
| 13960 with the mind that receives its knowledge from things. When therefore things are the measure and rule of the mind, truth consists | |
| 13961 in the equation of the mind to the thing, as happens in ourselves. For according as a thing is, or is not, | |
| 13962 our thoughts or our words about it are true or false. But when the mind is the rule or measure of things, truth consists in | |
| 13963 the equation of the thing to the mind; just as the work of an artist is said to be true, when it is in accordance with his | |
| 13964 art. | |
| 13965 </p><p id="FP_Q21_A2-p6"> Now as works of art are related to art, so are works of justice related to the law with which they accord. Therefore God's | |
| 13966 justice, which establishes things in the order conformable to the rule of His wisdom, which is the law of His justice, is | |
| 13967 suitably called truth. Thus we also in human affairs speak of the truth of justice. | |
| 13968 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 21 a. 2 co."><a name="29338" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29338] Iª q. 21 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum | |
| 13969 quod veritas consistit in adaequatione intellectus et rei, sicut | |
| 13970 supra dictum est. Intellectus autem qui est causa rei, comparatur | |
| 13971 ad ipsam sicut regula et mensura, e converso autem est de | |
| 13972 intellectu qui accipit scientiam a rebus. Quando igitur res sunt | |
| 13973 mensura et regula intellectus, veritas consistit in hoc, quod | |
| 13974 intellectus adaequatur rei, ut in nobis accidit, ex eo enim quod | |
| 13975 res est vel non est, opinio nostra et oratio vera vel falsa est. | |
| 13976 Sed quando intellectus est regula vel mensura rerum, veritas | |
| 13977 consistit in hoc, quod res adaequantur intellectui, sicut dicitur | |
| 13978 artifex facere verum opus, quando concordat arti. Sicut autem se | |
| 13979 habent artificiata ad artem, ita se habent opera iusta ad legem cui | |
| 13980 concordant. Iustitia igitur Dei, quae constituit ordinem in rebus | |
| 13981 conformem rationi sapientiae suae, quae est lex eius, convenienter | |
| 13982 veritas nominatur. Et sic etiam dicitur in nobis veritas | |
| 13983 iustitiae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q21_A2-p7"> | |
| 13984 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Justice, as to the law that governs, resides in the reason or intellect; but as to the command whereby our actions are governed | |
| 13985 according to the law, it resides in the will. | |
| 13986 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 21 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="29339" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29339] Iª q. 21 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo | |
| 13987 dicendum quod iustitia, quantum ad legem regulantem, est in ratione | |
| 13988 vel intellectu, sed quantum ad imperium, quo opera regulantur | |
| 13989 secundum legem, est in voluntate.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q21_A2-p8"> | |
| 13990 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The truth of which the Philosopher is speaking in this passage, is that virtue whereby a man shows himself in word and deed | |
| 13991 such as he really is. Thus it consists in the conformity of the sign with the thing signified; and not in that of the effect | |
| 13992 with its cause and rule: as has been said regarding the truth of justice. | |
| 13993 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 21 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="29340" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29340] Iª q. 21 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 13994 dicendum quod veritas illa de qua loquitur philosophus ibi, est | |
| 13995 quaedam virtus per quam aliquis demonstrat se talem in dictis vel | |
| 13996 factis, qualis est. Et sic consistit in conformitate signi ad | |
| 13997 significatum, non autem in conformitate effectus ad causam et | |
| 13998 regulam, sicut de veritate iustitiae dictum est.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q21_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q21_A3-p0.1">Q. 21. A. 3. Whether mercy can be attributed to God?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q21_A3-p2"> | |
| 13999 <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that mercy cannot be attributed to God. For mercy is a kind of sorrow, as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 14). | |
| 14000 But there is no sorrow in God; and therefore there is no mercy in Him. | |
| 14001 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 21 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="29341" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29341] Iª q. 21 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium sic | |
| 14002 proceditur. Videtur quod misericordia Deo non competat. | |
| 14003 Misericordia enim est species tristitiae, ut dicit Damascenus. Sed | |
| 14004 tristitia non est in Deo. Ergo nec misericordia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q21_A3-p3"> | |
| 14005 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, mercy is a relaxation of justice. But God cannot remit what appertains to His justice. For it is said ( | |
| 14006 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q21_A3-p3.1" href="./asv.html#iiTim.2.13" target="asv">2 Tim. 2:13</a>): "If we believe not, He continueth faithful: He cannot deny Himself." But He would deny Himself, as a gloss says, if He | |
| 14007 should deny His words. Therefore mercy is not becoming to God. | |
| 14008 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 21 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="29342" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29342] Iª q. 21 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 14009 misericordia est relaxatio iustitiae. Sed Deus non potest | |
| 14010 praetermittere id quod ad iustitiam suam pertinet. Dicitur enim II | |
| 14011 ad Tim. II, <i>si non credimus, ille fidelis permanet, seipsum | |
| 14012 negare non potest</i>, negaret autem seipsum, ut dicit Glossa | |
| 14013 ibidem, si dicta sua negaret. Ergo misericordia Deo non | |
| 14014 competit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q21_A3-p4"> | |
| 14015 <b>On the contrary,</b> it is said ( | |
| 14016 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q21_A3-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.110.4" target="asv">Ps. 110:4</a>): "He is a merciful and gracious Lord." | |
| 14017 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 21 a. 3 s. c."><a name="29343" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29343] Iª q. 21 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est | |
| 14018 quod dicitur in Psalmo CX, <i>miserator et misericors | |
| 14019 dominus</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q21_A3-p5"> | |
| 14020 <b>I answer that,</b> Mercy is especially to be attributed to God, as seen in its effect, but not as an affection of passion. In proof of which | |
| 14021 it must be considered that a person is said to be merciful [misericors], as being, so to speak, sorrowful at heart [miserum | |
| 14022 cor]; being affected with sorrow at the misery of another as though it were his own. Hence it follows that he endeavors to | |
| 14023 dispel the misery of this other, as if it were his; and this is the effect of mercy. To | |
| 14024 sorrow, therefore, over the misery of others belongs not to God; but it does most properly belong to Him to dispel that misery, | |
| 14025 whatever be the defect we call by that name. Now defects are not removed, except by the perfection of some kind of goodness; | |
| 14026 and the primary source of goodness is God, as shown above ( | |
| 14027 <a id="FP_Q21_A3-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q6_A4.html">Q[6] , A[4]</a>). It must, however, be considered that to bestow perfections appertains not only to the divine goodness, but also to His | |
| 14028 justice, liberality, and | |
| 14029 mercy; yet under different aspects. The communicating of perfections, absolutely considered, appertains to goodness, as shown | |
| 14030 above ( | |
| 14031 <a id="FP_Q21_A3-p5.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q6_A1.html">Q[6], AA[1]</a>,4); in so far as perfections are given to things in proportion, the bestowal of them belongs to justice, as has been already | |
| 14032 said | |
| 14033 <a id="FP_Q21_A3-p5.3" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q21_A1.html">(A[1])</a>; in so far as God does not bestow them for His own use, but only on account of His goodness, it belongs to liberality; in | |
| 14034 so far as perfections given to things by God | |
| 14035 expel defects, it belongs to mercy. | |
| 14036 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 21 a. 3 co."><a name="29344" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29344] Iª q. 21 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum | |
| 14037 quod misericordia est Deo maxime attribuenda, tamen secundum | |
| 14038 effectum, non secundum passionis affectum. Ad cuius evidentiam, | |
| 14039 considerandum est quod misericors dicitur aliquis quasi habens | |
| 14040 miserum cor, quia scilicet afficitur ex miseria alterius per | |
| 14041 tristitiam, ac si esset eius propria miseria. Et ex hoc sequitur | |
| 14042 quod operetur ad depellendam miseriam alterius, sicut miseriam | |
| 14043 propriam, et hic est misericordiae effectus. Tristari ergo de | |
| 14044 miseria alterius non competit Deo, sed repellere miseriam alterius, | |
| 14045 hoc maxime ei competit, ut per miseriam quemcumque defectum | |
| 14046 intelligamus. Defectus autem non tolluntur, nisi per alicuius | |
| 14047 bonitatis perfectionem, prima autem origo bonitatis Deus est, ut | |
| 14048 supra ostensum est. Sed considerandum est quod elargiri | |
| 14049 perfectiones rebus, pertinet quidem et ad bonitatem divinam, et ad | |
| 14050 iustitiam, et ad liberalitatem, et misericordiam, tamen secundum | |
| 14051 aliam et aliam rationem. Communicatio enim perfectionum, absolute | |
| 14052 considerata, pertinet ad bonitatem, ut supra ostensum est. Sed | |
| 14053 inquantum perfectiones rebus a Deo dantur secundum earum | |
| 14054 proportionem, pertinet ad iustitiam, ut dictum est supra. Inquantum | |
| 14055 vero non attribuit rebus perfectiones propter utilitatem suam, sed | |
| 14056 solum propter suam bonitatem, pertinet ad liberalitatem. Inquantum | |
| 14057 vero perfectiones datae rebus a Deo, omnem defectum expellunt, | |
| 14058 pertinet ad misericordiam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q21_A3-p6"> | |
| 14059 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This argument is based on mercy, regarded as an affection of passion. | |
| 14060 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 21 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="29345" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29345] Iª q. 21 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum igitur | |
| 14061 dicendum quod obiectio illa procedit de misericordia, quantum ad | |
| 14062 passionis affectum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q21_A3-p7"> | |
| 14063 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> God acts mercifully, not indeed by going against His justice, but by doing something more than justice; thus a man who pays | |
| 14064 another two hundred pieces of money, though owing him only one hundred, does nothing against justice, but acts liberally or | |
| 14065 mercifully. The case is the same with one who pardons an offence committed against him, for in remitting it he may be said | |
| 14066 to bestow a gift. Hence the Apostle calls remission a forgiving: "Forgive one | |
| 14067 another, as Christ has forgiven you" ( | |
| 14068 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q21_A3-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Eph.4.32" target="asv">Eph. 4:32</a>). Hence it is clear that mercy does not destroy justice, but in a sense is the fulness thereof. And thus it is said: "Mercy | |
| 14069 exalteth itself above judgement" ( | |
| 14070 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q21_A3-p7.2" href="./asv.html#Jas.2.13" target="asv">James 2:13</a>). | |
| 14071 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 21 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="29346" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29346] Iª q. 21 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 14072 dicendum quod Deus misericorditer agit, non quidem contra iustitiam | |
| 14073 suam faciendo, sed aliquid supra iustitiam operando, sicut si | |
| 14074 alicui cui debentur centum denarii, aliquis ducentos det de suo, | |
| 14075 tamen non contra iustitiam facit, sed liberaliter vel | |
| 14076 misericorditer operatur. Et similiter si aliquis offensam in se | |
| 14077 commissam remittat. Qui enim aliquid remittit, quodammodo donat | |
| 14078 illud, unde apostolus remissionem donationem vocat, Ephes. V, | |
| 14079 <i>donate invicem, sicut et Christus vobis donavit</i>. Ex quo | |
| 14080 patet quod misericordia non tollit iustitiam, sed est quaedam | |
| 14081 iustitiae plenitudo. Unde dicitur Iac. II, quod <i>misericordia | |
| 14082 superexaltat iudicium</i>.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q21_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q21_A4-p0.1">Q. 21. A. 4. Whether in every work of God there are mercy and justice?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q21_A4-p2"> | |
| 14083 <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that not in every work of God are mercy and justice. For some works of God are attributed to mercy, as the justification | |
| 14084 of the ungodly; and others to justice, as the damnation of the wicked. Hence it is said: "Judgment without mercy to him that | |
| 14085 hath not done mercy" ( | |
| 14086 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q21_A4-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Jas.2.13" target="asv">James 2:13</a>). Therefore not in every work of God do mercy and justice appear. | |
| 14087 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 21 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="29347" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29347] Iª q. 21 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum sic | |
| 14088 proceditur. Videtur quod non in omnibus Dei operibus sit | |
| 14089 misericordia et iustitia. Quaedam enim opera Dei attribuuntur | |
| 14090 misericordiae, ut iustificatio impii, quaedam vero iustitiae, ut | |
| 14091 damnatio impiorum. Unde dicitur Iac. II, <i>iudicium sine | |
| 14092 misericordia fiet ei qui non fecerit misericordiam</i>. Non ergo in | |
| 14093 omni opere Dei apparet misericordia et iustitia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q21_A4-p3"> | |
| 14094 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the Apostle attributes the conversion of the Jews to justice and truth, but that of the Gentiles to mercy ( | |
| 14095 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q21_A4-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.15" target="asv">Rom. 15</a>). Therefore not in every work of God are justice and mercy. | |
| 14096 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 21 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="29348" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29348] Iª q. 21 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 14097 apostolus, ad Rom. XV, conversionem Iudaeorum attribuit iustitiae | |
| 14098 et veritati; conversionem autem gentium, misericordiae. Ergo non in | |
| 14099 quolibet opere Dei est iustitia et misericordia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q21_A4-p4"> | |
| 14100 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, many just persons are afflicted in this world; which is unjust. Therefore not in every work of God are justice and | |
| 14101 mercy. | |
| 14102 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 21 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="29349" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29349] Iª q. 21 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, multi | |
| 14103 iusti in hoc mundo affliguntur. Hoc autem est iniustum. Non ergo in | |
| 14104 omni opere Dei est iustitia et misericordia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q21_A4-p5"> | |
| 14105 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, it is the part of justice to pay what is due, but of mercy to relieve misery. Thus both justice and mercy presuppose | |
| 14106 something in their works: whereas creation presupposes nothing. Therefore in creation neither mercy nor justice is found. | |
| 14107 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 21 a. 4 arg. 4"><a name="29350" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29350] Iª q. 21 a. 4 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 14108 iustitiae est reddere debitum, misericordiae autem sublevare | |
| 14109 miseriam, et sic tam iustitia quam misericordia aliquid | |
| 14110 praesupponit in suo opere. Sed creatio nihil praesupponit. Ergo in | |
| 14111 creatione neque misericordia est, neque iustitia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q21_A4-p6"> | |
| 14112 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is said ( | |
| 14113 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q21_A4-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.24.10" target="asv">Ps. 24:10</a>): "All the ways of the Lord are mercy and truth." | |
| 14114 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 21 a. 4 s. c."><a name="29351" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29351] Iª q. 21 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est | |
| 14115 quod dicitur in Psalmo XXIV, <i>omnes viae domini misericordia et | |
| 14116 veritas</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q21_A4-p7"> | |
| 14117 <b>I answer that,</b> Mercy and truth are necessarily found in all God's works, if mercy be taken to mean the removal of any kind of defect. Not | |
| 14118 every defect, however, can properly be called a misery; but only defect in a rational nature whose lot is to be happy; for | |
| 14119 misery is opposed to happiness. For this necessity there is a reason, because since a debt paid according to the divine justice | |
| 14120 is one due either to God, or to some creature, neither the one nor the other can be | |
| 14121 lacking in any work of God: because God can do nothing that is not in accord with His wisdom and goodness; and it is in this | |
| 14122 sense, as we have said, that anything is due to God. Likewise, whatever is done by Him in created things, is done according | |
| 14123 to proper order and proportion wherein consists the idea of justice. Thus justice must exist in all God's works. Now the work | |
| 14124 of divine justice always presupposes the work of mercy; and is founded thereupon. For nothing is due to creatures, except | |
| 14125 for something pre-existing in them, or foreknown. Again, if this is due to a creature, it must be due on account of something | |
| 14126 that precedes. And since we cannot go on to infinity, we must come to something that depends only on the goodness of the divine | |
| 14127 will---which is the ultimate end. We may say, for instance, that to possess hands is due to man on account of his rational | |
| 14128 soul; and his rational soul is due to him that he may be man; and his being man is on account of the divine goodness. So | |
| 14129 in every work of God, viewed at its primary source, there appears mercy. In all that follows, the power of mercy remains, | |
| 14130 and works indeed with even greater force; as the influence of the first cause is more intense than that of second causes. | |
| 14131 For this reason does God out of abundance of His goodness bestow upon creatures what is due to them more bountifully than | |
| 14132 is proportionate to their deserts: since less would suffice for preserving the order of justice than what the divine goodness | |
| 14133 confers; because between creatures and God's goodness there can be no proportion. | |
| 14134 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 21 a. 4 co."><a name="29352" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29352] Iª q. 21 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum | |
| 14135 quod necesse est quod in quolibet opere Dei misericordia et veritas | |
| 14136 inveniantur; si tamen misericordia pro remotione cuiuscumque | |
| 14137 defectus accipiatur; quamvis non omnis defectus proprie possit dici | |
| 14138 miseria, sed solum defectus rationalis naturae, quam contingit esse | |
| 14139 felicem; nam miseria felicitati opponitur. Huius autem necessitatis | |
| 14140 ratio est, quia, cum debitum quod ex divina iustitia redditur, sit | |
| 14141 vel debitum Deo, vel debitum alicui creaturae, neutrum potest in | |
| 14142 aliquo opere Dei praetermitti. Non enim potest facere aliquid Deus, | |
| 14143 quod non sit conveniens sapientiae et bonitati ipsius; secundum | |
| 14144 quem modum diximus aliquid esse debitum Deo. Similiter etiam | |
| 14145 quidquid in rebus creatis facit, secundum convenientem ordinem et | |
| 14146 proportionem facit; in quo consistit ratio iustitiae. Et sic | |
| 14147 oportet in omni opere Dei esse iustitiam. Opus autem divinae | |
| 14148 iustitiae semper praesupponit opus misericordiae, et in eo | |
| 14149 fundatur. Creaturae enim non debetur aliquid, nisi propter aliquid | |
| 14150 in eo praeexistens, vel praeconsideratum, et rursus, si illud | |
| 14151 creaturae debetur, hoc erit propter aliquid prius. Et cum non sit | |
| 14152 procedere in infinitum, oportet devenire ad aliquid quod ex sola | |
| 14153 bonitate divinae voluntatis dependeat, quae est ultimus finis. | |
| 14154 Utpote si dicamus quod habere manus debitum est homini propter | |
| 14155 animam rationalem; animam vero rationalem habere, ad hoc quod sit | |
| 14156 homo; hominem vero esse, propter divinam bonitatem. Et sic in | |
| 14157 quolibet opere Dei apparet misericordia, quantum ad primam radicem | |
| 14158 eius. Cuius virtus salvatur in omnibus consequentibus; et etiam | |
| 14159 vehementius in eis operatur, sicut causa primaria vehementius | |
| 14160 influit quam causa secunda. Et propter hoc etiam ea quae alicui | |
| 14161 creaturae debentur, Deus, ex abundantia suae bonitatis, largius | |
| 14162 dispensat quam exigat proportio rei. Minus enim est quod sufficeret | |
| 14163 ad conservandum ordinem iustitiae, quam quod divina bonitas | |
| 14164 confert, quae omnem proportionem creaturae excedit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q21_A4-p8"> | |
| 14165 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Certain works are attributed to justice, and certain others to mercy, because in some justice appears more forcibly and in | |
| 14166 others mercy. Even in the damnation of the reprobate mercy is seen, which, though it does not totally remit, yet somewhat | |
| 14167 alleviates, in punishing short of what is deserved. | |
| 14168 </p><p id="FP_Q21_A4-p9"> In the justification of the ungodly, justice is seen, when God remits sins on account of love, though He Himself has mercifully | |
| 14169 infused that love. So we read of Magdalen: "Many sins are forgiven her, because she hath loved much" ( | |
| 14170 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q21_A4-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Luke.7.47" target="asv">Lk. 7:47</a>). | |
| 14171 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 21 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="29353" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29353] Iª q. 21 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo | |
| 14172 dicendum quod quaedam opera attribuuntur iustitiae et quaedam | |
| 14173 misericordiae, quia in quibusdam vehementius apparet iustitia, in | |
| 14174 quibusdam misericordia. Et tamen in damnatione reproborum apparet | |
| 14175 misericordia, non quidem totaliter relaxans, sed aliqualiter | |
| 14176 allevians, dum punit citra condignum. Et in iustificatione impii | |
| 14177 apparet iustitia, dum culpas relaxat propter dilectionem, quam | |
| 14178 tamen ipse misericorditer infundit, sicut de Magdalena legitur, | |
| 14179 Luc. VII, <i>dimissa sunt ei peccata multa, quoniam dilexit | |
| 14180 multum</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q21_A4-p10"> | |
| 14181 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> God's justice and mercy appear both in the conversion of the Jews and of the Gentiles. But an aspect of justice appears in | |
| 14182 the conversion of the Jews which is not seen in the conversion of the Gentiles; inasmuch as the Jews were saved on account | |
| 14183 of the promises made to the fathers. | |
| 14184 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 21 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="29354" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29354] Iª q. 21 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 14185 dicendum quod iustitia et misericordia Dei apparet in conversione | |
| 14186 Iudaeorum et gentium, sed aliqua ratio iustitiae apparet in | |
| 14187 conversione Iudaeorum, quae non apparet in conversione gentium, | |
| 14188 sicut quod salvati sunt propter promissiones patribus factas.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q21_A4-p11"> | |
| 14189 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Justice and mercy appear in the punishment of the just in this world, since by afflictions lesser faults are cleansed in | |
| 14190 them, and they are the more raised up from earthly affections to God. As to this Gregory says (Moral. xxvi, 9): "The evils | |
| 14191 that press on us in this world force us to go to God." | |
| 14192 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 21 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="29355" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29355] Iª q. 21 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 14193 dicendum quod in hoc etiam quod iusti puniuntur in hoc mundo, | |
| 14194 apparet iustitia et misericordia; inquantum per huiusmodi | |
| 14195 afflictiones aliqua levia in eis purgantur, et ab affectu | |
| 14196 terrenorum in Deum magis eriguntur; secundum illud Gregorii, | |
| 14197 <i>mala quae in hoc mundo nos premunt, ad Deum nos ire | |
| 14198 compellunt</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q21_A4-p12"> | |
| 14199 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Although creation presupposes nothing in the universe; yet it does presuppose something in the knowledge of God. In this | |
| 14200 way too the idea of justice is preserved in creation; by the production of beings in a manner that accords with the divine | |
| 14201 wisdom and goodness. And the idea of mercy, also, is preserved in the change of creatures from non-existence to existence. | |
| 14202 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 21 a. 4 ad 4"><a name="29356" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29356] Iª q. 21 a. 4 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum | |
| 14203 dicendum quod, licet creationi non praesupponatur aliquid in rerum | |
| 14204 natura, praesupponitur tamen aliquid in Dei cognitione. Et secundum | |
| 14205 hoc etiam salvatur ibi ratio iustitiae, inquantum res in esse | |
| 14206 producitur, secundum quod convenit divinae sapientiae et bonitati. | |
| 14207 Et salvatur quodammodo ratio misericordiae, inquantum res de non | |
| 14208 esse in esse mutatur.</p></div></div></div></div> | |
| 14209 <div id="FP_Q22" class="div3"> | |
| 14210 <h3 id="FP_Q22-p0.1">Q. 22. THE PROVIDENCE OF GOD (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3> | |
| 14211 <div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> | |
| 14212 <p id="FP_Q22-p2"> Having considered all that relates to the will absolutely, we must now proceed to those things which have relation to both | |
| 14213 the intellect and the will, namely providence, in respect to all created things; predestination and reprobation and all that | |
| 14214 is connected with these acts in respect especially of man as regards his eternal salvation. For in the science of morals, | |
| 14215 after the moral virtues themselves, comes the consideration of prudence, to which providence would seem to belong. | |
| 14216 Concerning God's providence there are four points of inquiry: | |
| 14217 </p><p id="FP_Q22-p3"> (1) Whether providence is suitably assigned to God?</p><p id="FP_Q22-p4"> (2) Whether everything comes under divine providence?</p><p id="FP_Q22-p5"> (3) Whether divine providence is immediately concerned with all things?</p><p id="FP_Q22-p6"> (4) Whether divine providence imposes any necessity upon things foreseen?</p> | |
| 14218 </div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 22 pr."><a name="29357" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29357] | |
| 14219 Iª q. 22 pr.</span></a> Consideratis autem his quae ad | |
| 14220 voluntatem absolute pertinent, procedendum est ad ea quae | |
| 14221 respiciunt simul intellectum et voluntatem. Huiusmodi autem est | |
| 14222 providentia quidem respectu omnium; praedestinatio vero et | |
| 14223 reprobatio, et quae ad haec consequuntur, respectu hominum | |
| 14224 specialiter, in ordine ad aeternam salutem. Nam et post morales | |
| 14225 virtutes, in scientia morali, consideratur de prudentia, ad quam | |
| 14226 providentia pertinere videtur. Circa providentiam autem Dei | |
| 14227 quaeruntur quatuor. Primo, utrum Deo conveniat providentia. | |
| 14228 Secundo, utrum omnia divinae providentiae subsint. Tertio, utrum | |
| 14229 divina providentia immediate sit de omnibus. Quarto, utrum | |
| 14230 providentia divina imponat necessitatem rebus provisis.</p></div></div></div> | |
| 14231 <div id="FP_Q22_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q22_A1-p0.1">Q. 22. A. 1. Whether providence can suitably be attributed to God?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q22_A1-p2"> | |
| 14232 <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that providence is not becoming to God. For providence, according to Tully (De Invent. ii), is a part of prudence. | |
| 14233 But prudence, since, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 5,9,18), it gives good counsel, cannot belong to God, Who never | |
| 14234 has any doubt for which He should take counsel. Therefore providence cannot belong to God. | |
| 14235 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 22 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="29358" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29358] Iª q. 22 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum sic | |
| 14236 proceditur. Videtur quod providentia Deo non conveniat. Providentia | |
| 14237 enim, secundum Tullium, est pars prudentiae. Prudentia autem, cum | |
| 14238 sit bene consiliativa, secundum philosophum in VI Ethic., Deo | |
| 14239 competere non potest, qui nullum dubium habet, unde eum consiliari | |
| 14240 oporteat. Ergo providentia Deo non competit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q22_A1-p3"> | |
| 14241 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, whatever is in God, is eternal. But providence is not anything eternal, for it is concerned with existing things | |
| 14242 that are not eternal, according to Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 29). Therefore there is no providence in God. | |
| 14243 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 22 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="29359" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29359] Iª q. 22 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 14244 quidquid est in Deo, est aeternum. Sed providentia non est aliquid | |
| 14245 aeternum, est enim circa existentia, quae non sunt aeterna, | |
| 14246 secundum Damascenum. Ergo providentia non est in Deo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q22_A1-p4"> | |
| 14247 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, there is nothing composite in God. But providence seems to be something composite, because it includes both the | |
| 14248 intellect and the will. Therefore providence is not in God. | |
| 14249 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 22 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="29360" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29360] Iª q. 22 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 14250 nullum compositum est in Deo. Sed providentia videtur esse aliquid | |
| 14251 compositum, quia includit in se voluntatem et intellectum. Ergo | |
| 14252 providentia non est in Deo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q22_A1-p5"> | |
| 14253 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is said ( | |
| 14254 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q22_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.14.3" target="asv">Wis. 14:3</a>): "But Thou, Father, governest all things by providence [*Vulg. But 'Thy providence, O Father, governeth it.']." | |
| 14255 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 22 a. 1 s. c."><a name="29361" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29361] Iª q. 22 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est | |
| 14256 quod dicitur Sap. XIV, <i>tu autem, pater, gubernas omnia | |
| 14257 providentia</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q22_A1-p6"> | |
| 14258 <b>I answer that,</b> It is necessary to attribute providence to God. For all the good that is in created things has been created by God, as was | |
| 14259 shown above ( | |
| 14260 <a id="FP_Q22_A1-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q6_A4.html">Q[6], A[4]</a>). In created things good is found not only as regards their substance, but also as regards their order towards an end and | |
| 14261 especially their last end, which, as was said above, is the divine goodness ( | |
| 14262 <a id="FP_Q22_A1-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q21_A4.html">Q[21], A[4]</a>). This good of order existing in things created, is | |
| 14263 itself created by God. Since, however, God is the cause of things by His intellect, and thus it behooves that the type of | |
| 14264 every effect should pre-exist in Him, as is clear from what has gone before ( | |
| 14265 <a id="FP_Q22_A1-p6.3" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q19_A4.html">Q[19], A[4]</a>), it is necessary that the type of the order of things towards their end should pre-exist in the divine mind: and the type | |
| 14266 of things ordered towards an end is, properly speaking, providence. For it is the chief part of prudence, to which two other | |
| 14267 parts are | |
| 14268 directed---namely, remembrance of the past, and understanding of the present; inasmuch as from the remembrance of what is | |
| 14269 past and the understanding of what is present, we gather how to provide for the future. Now it belongs to prudence, according | |
| 14270 to the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 12), to direct other things towards an end whether in regard to oneself---as for instance, | |
| 14271 a man is said to be prudent, who orders well his acts towards the end of life--or in regard to others subject to him, in a | |
| 14272 family, city or kingdom; in which sense it is said ( | |
| 14273 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q22_A1-p6.4" href="./asv.html#Matt.24.45" target="asv">Mat. 24:45</a>), "a faithful and wise servant, whom his lord hath appointed over his family." In this way prudence or providence may suitably | |
| 14274 be attributed to God. For in God Himself there can be nothing ordered towards an end, since He is the last end. This type | |
| 14275 of order in things towards an end is therefore in God called providence. Whence Boethius says (De Consol. iv, 6) that "Providence | |
| 14276 is the divine type itself, seated in | |
| 14277 the Supreme Ruler; which disposeth all things": which disposition may refer either to the type of the order of things towards | |
| 14278 an end, or to the type of the order of parts in the whole. | |
| 14279 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 22 a. 1 co."><a name="29362" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29362] Iª q. 22 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum | |
| 14280 quod necesse est ponere providentiam in Deo. Omne enim bonum quod | |
| 14281 est in rebus, a Deo creatum est, ut supra ostensum est. In rebus | |
| 14282 autem invenitur bonum, non solum quantum ad substantiam rerum, sed | |
| 14283 etiam quantum ad ordinem earum in finem, et praecipue in finem | |
| 14284 ultimum, qui est bonitas divina, ut supra habitum est. Hoc igitur | |
| 14285 bonum ordinis in rebus creatis existens, a Deo creatum est. Cum | |
| 14286 autem Deus sit causa rerum per suum intellectum, et sic cuiuslibet | |
| 14287 sui effectus oportet rationem in ipso praeexistere, ut ex | |
| 14288 superioribus patet; necesse est quod ratio ordinis rerum in finem | |
| 14289 in mente divina praeexistat. Ratio autem ordinandorum in finem, | |
| 14290 proprie providentia est. Est enim principalis pars prudentiae, ad | |
| 14291 quam aliae duae partes ordinantur, scilicet memoria praeteritorum, | |
| 14292 et intelligentia praesentium; prout ex praeteritis memoratis, et | |
| 14293 praesentibus intellectis, coniectamus de futuris providendis. | |
| 14294 Prudentiae autem proprium est, secundum philosophum in VI Ethic., | |
| 14295 ordinare alia in finem; sive respectu sui ipsius, sicut dicitur | |
| 14296 homo prudens, qui bene ordinat actus suos ad finem vitae suae; sive | |
| 14297 respectu aliorum sibi subiectorum in familia vel civitate vel | |
| 14298 regno, secundum quem modum dicitur Matt. XXIV, <i>fidelis servus et | |
| 14299 prudens, quem constituit dominus super familiam suam</i>. Secundum | |
| 14300 quem modum prudentia vel providentia Deo convenire potest, nam in | |
| 14301 ipso Deo nihil est in finem ordinabile, cum ipse sit finis ultimus. | |
| 14302 Ipsa igitur ratio ordinis rerum in finem, providentia in Deo | |
| 14303 nominatur. Unde Boetius, IV de Consol., dicit quod <i>providentia | |
| 14304 est ipsa divina ratio in summo omnium principe constituta, quae | |
| 14305 cuncta disponit</i>. Dispositio autem potest dici tam ratio ordinis | |
| 14306 rerum in finem, quam ratio ordinis partium in toto.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q22_A1-p7"> | |
| 14307 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> According to the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 9,10), "Prudence is what, strictly speaking, commands all that 'ebulia' has rightly | |
| 14308 counselled and 'synesis' rightly judged" [*Cf. | |
| 14309 <a id="FP_Q22_A1-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FS_Q57_A6.html">FS, Q[57], A[6]</a>]. Whence, though to take counsel may not be fitting to God, from the fact that counsel is an inquiry into matters that are | |
| 14310 doubtful, nevertheless to give a command as to the ordering of things towards an end, the right reason of which He | |
| 14311 possesses, does belong to God, according to | |
| 14312 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q22_A1-p7.2" href="./asv.html#Ps.148.6" target="asv"> Ps. 148:6</a>: "He hath made a decree, and it shall not pass away." In this manner both prudence and providence belong to God. Although | |
| 14313 at the same time it may be said that the very reason of things to be done is called counsel in God; not because of any inquiry | |
| 14314 necessitated, but from the certitude of the knowledge, to which those who take counsel come by inquiry. Whence it is said: | |
| 14315 "Who worketh all things according to the counsel of | |
| 14316 His will" ( | |
| 14317 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q22_A1-p7.3" href="./asv.html#Eph.1.11" target="asv">Eph. 1:11</a>). | |
| 14318 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 22 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="29363" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29363] Iª q. 22 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo | |
| 14319 dicendum quod, secundum philosophum in VI Ethic., prudentia proprie | |
| 14320 est praeceptiva eorum, de quibus eubulia recte consiliatur, et | |
| 14321 synesis recte iudicat. Unde, licet consiliari non competat Deo, | |
| 14322 secundum quod consilium est inquisitio de rebus dubiis; tamen | |
| 14323 praecipere de ordinandis in finem, quorum rectam rationem habet, | |
| 14324 competit Deo, secundum illud Psalmi, <i>praeceptum posuit, et non | |
| 14325 praeteribit</i>. Et secundum hoc competit Deo ratio prudentiae et | |
| 14326 providentiae. Quamvis etiam dici possit, quod ipsa ratio rerum | |
| 14327 agendarum consilium in Deo dicitur; non propter inquisitionem, sed | |
| 14328 propter certitudinem cognitionis, ad quam consiliantes inquirendo | |
| 14329 perveniunt. Unde dicitur Ephes. I, <i>qui operatur omnia secundum | |
| 14330 consilium voluntatis suae</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q22_A1-p8"> | |
| 14331 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Two things pertain to the care of providence---namely, the "reason of order," which is called providence and disposition; | |
| 14332 and the execution of order, which is termed government. Of these, the first is eternal, and the second is temporal. | |
| 14333 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 22 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="29364" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29364] Iª q. 22 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 14334 dicendum quod ad curam duo pertinent, scilicet ratio ordinis, quae | |
| 14335 dicitur providentia et dispositio; et executio ordinis, quae | |
| 14336 dicitur gubernatio. Quorum primum est aeternum, secundum | |
| 14337 temporale.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q22_A1-p9"> | |
| 14338 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Providence resides in the intellect; but presupposes the act of willing the end. Nobody gives a precept about things done | |
| 14339 for an end; unless he will that end. Hence prudence presupposes the moral virtues, by means of which the appetitive faculty | |
| 14340 is directed towards good, as the Philosopher says. Even if Providence has to do with the divine will and intellect equally, | |
| 14341 this would not affect the divine simplicity, since in God both the will and intellect | |
| 14342 are one and the same thing, as we have said above | |
| 14343 <a id="FP_Q22_A1-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q19.html">(Q[19])</a>. | |
| 14344 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 22 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="29365" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29365] Iª q. 22 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 14345 dicendum quod providentia est in intellectu, sed praesupponit | |
| 14346 voluntatem finis, nullus enim praecipit de agendis propter finem, | |
| 14347 nisi velit finem. Unde et prudentia praesupponit virtutes morales, | |
| 14348 per quas appetitus se habet ad bonum, ut dicitur in VI Ethic. Et | |
| 14349 tamen si providentia ex aequali respiceret voluntatem et | |
| 14350 intellectum divinum, hoc esset absque detrimento divinae | |
| 14351 simplicitatis; cum voluntas et intellectus in Deo sint idem, ut | |
| 14352 supra dictum est.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q22_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q22_A2-p0.1">Q. 22. A. 2. Whether everything is subject to the providence of God?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q22_A2-p2"> | |
| 14353 <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that everything is not subject to divine providence. For nothing foreseen can happen by chance. If then everything | |
| 14354 was foreseen by God, nothing would happen by chance. And thus hazard and luck would disappear; which is against common opinion. | |
| 14355 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 22 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="29366" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29366] Iª q. 22 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum sic | |
| 14356 proceditur. Videtur quod non omnia sint subiecta divinae | |
| 14357 providentiae. Nullum enim provisum est fortuitum. Si ergo omnia | |
| 14358 sunt provisa a Deo, nihil erit fortuitum, et sic perit casus et | |
| 14359 fortuna. Quod est contra communem opinionem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q22_A2-p3"> | |
| 14360 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, a wise provider excludes any defect or evil, as far as he can, from those over whom he has a care. But we see many | |
| 14361 evils existing. Either, then, God cannot hinder these, and thus is not omnipotent; or else He does not have care for everything. | |
| 14362 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 22 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="29367" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29367] Iª q. 22 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, omnis | |
| 14363 sapiens provisor excludit defectum et malum, quantum potest, ab his | |
| 14364 quorum curam gerit. Videmus autem multa mala in rebus esse. Aut | |
| 14365 igitur Deus non potest ea impedire, et sic non est omnipotens, aut | |
| 14366 non de omnibus curam habet.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q22_A2-p4"> | |
| 14367 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, whatever happens of necessity does not require providence or prudence. Hence, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. | |
| 14368 vi, 5,9, 10,11): "Prudence is the right reason of things contingent concerning which there is counsel and choice." Since, | |
| 14369 then, many things happen from necessity, everything cannot be subject to providence. | |
| 14370 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 22 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="29368" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29368] Iª q. 22 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, quae | |
| 14371 ex necessitate eveniunt, providentiam seu prudentiam non requirunt, | |
| 14372 unde, secundum philosophum in VI Ethic., prudentia est recta ratio | |
| 14373 contingentium, de quibus est consilium et electio. Cum igitur multa | |
| 14374 in rebus ex necessitate eveniant, non omnia providentiae | |
| 14375 subduntur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q22_A2-p5"> | |
| 14376 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, whatsoever is left to itself cannot be subject to the providence of a governor. But men are left to themselves by | |
| 14377 God in accordance with the words: "God made man from the beginning, and left him in the hand of his own counsel" ( | |
| 14378 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q22_A2-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.15.14" target="asv">Ecclus. 15:14</a>). And particularly in reference to the wicked: "I let them go according to the desires of their heart" ( | |
| 14379 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q22_A2-p5.2" href="./asv.html#Ps.80.13" target="asv">Ps. 80:13</a>). Everything, therefore, cannot be subject to divine | |
| 14380 providence. | |
| 14381 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 22 a. 2 arg. 4"><a name="29369" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29369] Iª q. 22 a. 2 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 14382 quicumque dimittitur sibi, non subest providentiae alicuius | |
| 14383 gubernantis. Sed homines sibi ipsis dimittuntur a Deo, secundum | |
| 14384 illud Eccli. XV, <i>Deus ab initio constituit hominem, et reliquit | |
| 14385 eum in manu consilii sui</i>; et specialiter mali, secundum illud, | |
| 14386 <i>dimisit illos secundum desideria cordis eorum</i>. Non igitur | |
| 14387 omnia divinae providentiae subsunt.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q22_A2-p6"> | |
| 14388 <b>Objection 5:</b> Further, the Apostle says ( | |
| 14389 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q22_A2-p6.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.9.9" target="asv">1 Cor. 9:9</a>): "God doth not care for oxen [*Vulg. 'Doth God take care for oxen?']": and we may say the same of other irrational creatures. | |
| 14390 Thus everything cannot be under the care of divine providence. | |
| 14391 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 22 a. 2 arg. 5"><a name="29370" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29370] Iª q. 22 a. 2 arg. 5</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 14392 apostolus, I Cor. IX, dicit quod <i>non est Deo cura de bobus</i>, | |
| 14393 et eadem ratione, de aliis creaturis irrationalibus. Non igitur | |
| 14394 omnia subsunt divinae providentiae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q22_A2-p7"> | |
| 14395 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is said of Divine Wisdom: "She reacheth from end to end mightily, and ordereth all things sweetly" ( | |
| 14396 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q22_A2-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.8.1" target="asv">Wis. 8:1</a>). | |
| 14397 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 22 a. 2 s. c."><a name="29371" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29371] Iª q. 22 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est | |
| 14398 quod dicitur Sap. VIII, de divina sapientia, quod <i>attingit a | |
| 14399 fine usque ad finem fortiter, et disponit omnia suaviter</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q22_A2-p8"> | |
| 14400 <b>I answer that,</b> Certain persons totally denied the existence of providence, as Democritus and the Epicureans, maintaining that the world | |
| 14401 was made by chance. Others taught that incorruptible things only were subject to providence and corruptible things not in | |
| 14402 their individual selves, but only according to their species; for in this respect they are incorruptible. They are represented | |
| 14403 as saying ( | |
| 14404 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q22_A2-p8.1" href="./asv.html#Job.22.14" target="asv">Job 22:14</a>): "The clouds are His covert; and He doth not | |
| 14405 consider our things; and He walketh about the poles of heaven." Rabbi Moses, however, excluded men from the generality of | |
| 14406 things corruptible, on account of the excellence of the intellect which they possess, but in reference to all else that suffers | |
| 14407 corruption he adhered to the opinion of the others. | |
| 14408 </p><p id="FP_Q22_A2-p9"> We must say, however, that all things are subject to divine providence, not only in general, but even in their own individual | |
| 14409 selves. This is mad evident thus. For since every agent acts for an end, the ordering of effects towards that end extends | |
| 14410 as far as the causality of the first agent extends. Whence it happens that in the effects of an agent something takes place | |
| 14411 which has no reference towards the end, because the effect comes from a cause other than, and outside the | |
| 14412 intention of the agent. But the causality of God, Who is the first agent, extends to all being, not only as to constituent | |
| 14413 principles of species, but also as to the individualizing principles; not only of things incorruptible, but also of things | |
| 14414 corruptible. Hence all things that exist in whatsoever manner are necessarily directed by God towards some end; as the Apostle | |
| 14415 says: "Those things that are of God are well ordered [*Vulg.'Those powers that are, are ordained of God': 'Quae autem sunt, | |
| 14416 a | |
| 14417 Deo ordinatae sunt.' St. Thomas often quotes this passage, and invariably reads: 'Quae a Deo sunt, ordinata sunt.']" ( | |
| 14418 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q22_A2-p9.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.13.1" target="asv">Rom. 13:1</a>). Since, therefore, as the providence of God is nothing less than the type of the order of things towards an end, as we have | |
| 14419 said; it necessarily follows that all things, inasmuch as they participate in existence, must likewise be subject to divine | |
| 14420 providence. It has also been shown ( | |
| 14421 <a id="FP_Q22_A2-p9.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q14_A6.html">Q[14], AA[6]</a>,11) that God knows all | |
| 14422 things, both universal and particular. And since His knowledge may be compared to the things themselves, as the knowledge | |
| 14423 of art to the objects of art, all things must of necessity come under His ordering; as all things wrought by art are subject | |
| 14424 to the ordering of that art. | |
| 14425 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 22 a. 2 co."><a name="29372" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29372] Iª q. 22 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum | |
| 14426 quod quidam totaliter providentiam negaverunt, sicut Democritus et | |
| 14427 Epicurei, ponentes mundum factum esse casu. Quidam vero posuerunt | |
| 14428 incorruptibilia tantum providentiae subiacere; corruptibilia vero, | |
| 14429 non secundum individua, sed secundum species; sic enim | |
| 14430 incorruptibilia sunt. Ex quorum persona dicitur Iob XXII, <i>nubes | |
| 14431 latibulum eius, et circa cardines caeli perambulat, neque nostra | |
| 14432 considerat</i>. A corruptibilium autem generalitate excepit Rabbi | |
| 14433 Moyses homines, propter splendorem intellectus, quem participant, | |
| 14434 in aliis autem individuis corruptibilibus, aliorum opinionem est | |
| 14435 secutus. Sed necesse est dicere omnia divinae providentiae | |
| 14436 subiacere, non in universali tantum, sed etiam in singulari. Quod | |
| 14437 sic patet. Cum enim omne agens agat propter finem, tantum se | |
| 14438 extendit ordinatio effectuum in finem, quantum se extendit | |
| 14439 causalitas primi agentis. Ex hoc enim contingit in operibus | |
| 14440 alicuius agentis aliquid provenire non ad finem ordinatum, quia | |
| 14441 effectus ille consequitur ex aliqua alia causa, praeter intentionem | |
| 14442 agentis. Causalitas autem Dei, qui est primum agens, se extendit | |
| 14443 usque ad omnia entia, non solum quantum ad principia speciei, sed | |
| 14444 etiam quantum ad individualia principia, non solum | |
| 14445 incorruptibilium, sed etiam corruptibilium. Unde necesse est omnia | |
| 14446 quae habent quocumque modo esse, ordinata esse a Deo in finem, | |
| 14447 secundum illud apostoli, ad Rom. XIII, <i>quae a Deo sunt, ordinata | |
| 14448 sunt</i>. Cum ergo nihil aliud sit Dei providentia quam ratio | |
| 14449 ordinis rerum in finem, ut dictum est, necesse est omnia, inquantum | |
| 14450 participant esse, intantum subdi divinae providentiae. Similiter | |
| 14451 etiam supra ostensum est quod Deus omnia cognoscit, et universalia | |
| 14452 et particularia. Et cum cognitio eius comparetur ad res sicut | |
| 14453 cognitio artis ad artificiata, ut supra dictum est, necesse est | |
| 14454 quod omnia supponantur suo ordini, sicut omnia artificiata | |
| 14455 subduntur ordini artis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q22_A2-p10"> | |
| 14456 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> There is a difference between universal and particular causes. A thing can escape the order of a particular cause; but not | |
| 14457 the order of a universal cause. For nothing escapes the order of a particular cause, except through the intervention and hindrance | |
| 14458 of some other particular cause; as, for instance, wood may be prevented from burning, by the action of water. Since then, | |
| 14459 all particular causes are included under the universal cause, it could not be | |
| 14460 that any effect should take place outside the range of that universal cause. So far then as an effect escapes the order of | |
| 14461 a particular cause, it is said to be casual or fortuitous in respect to that cause; but if we regard the universal cause, | |
| 14462 outside whose range no effect can happen, it is said to be foreseen. Thus, for instance, the meeting of two servants, although | |
| 14463 to them it appears a chance circumstance, has been fully foreseen by their master, who has purposely sent to meet at the one | |
| 14464 place, in such a way that the one knows not about the other. | |
| 14465 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 22 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="29373" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29373] Iª q. 22 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo | |
| 14466 dicendum quod aliter est de causa universali, et de causa | |
| 14467 particulari. Ordinem enim causae particularis aliquid potest exire, | |
| 14468 non autem ordinem causae universalis. Non enim subducitur aliquid | |
| 14469 ab ordine causae particularis, nisi per aliquam aliam causam | |
| 14470 particularem impedientem, sicut lignum impeditur a combustione per | |
| 14471 actionem aquae. Unde, cum omnes causae particulares concludantur | |
| 14472 sub universali causa, impossibile est aliquem effectum ordinem | |
| 14473 causae universalis effugere. Inquantum igitur aliquis effectus | |
| 14474 ordinem alicuius causae particularis effugit, dicitur esse casuale | |
| 14475 vel fortuitum, respectu causae particularis, sed respectu causae | |
| 14476 universalis, a cuius ordine subtrahi non potest, dicitur esse | |
| 14477 provisum. Sicut et concursus duorum servorum, licet sit casualis | |
| 14478 quantum ad eos, est tamen provisus a domino, qui eos scienter sic | |
| 14479 ad unum locum mittit, ut unus de alio nesciat.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q22_A2-p11"> | |
| 14480 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> It is otherwise with one who has care of a particular thing, and one whose providence is universal, because a particular | |
| 14481 provider excludes all defects from what is subject to his care as far as he can; whereas, one who provides universally allows | |
| 14482 some little defect to remain, lest the good of the whole should be hindered. Hence, corruption and defects in natural things | |
| 14483 are said to be contrary to some particular nature; yet they are in keeping with the | |
| 14484 plan of universal nature; inasmuch as the defect in one thing yields to the good of another, or even to the universal good: | |
| 14485 for the corruption of one is the generation of another, and through this it is that a species is kept in existence. Since | |
| 14486 God, then, provides universally for all being, it belongs to His providence to permit certain defects in particular effects, | |
| 14487 that the perfect good of the universe may not be hindered, for if all evil were prevented, much good would be absent from | |
| 14488 the | |
| 14489 universe. A lion would cease to live, if there were no slaying of animals; and there would be no patience of martyrs if there | |
| 14490 were no tyrannical persecution. Thus Augustine says (Enchiridion 2): "Almighty God would in no wise permit evil to exist in | |
| 14491 His works, unless He were so almighty and so good as to produce good even from evil." It would appear that it was on account | |
| 14492 of these two arguments to which we have just replied, that some were persuaded to consider corruptible things---e.g. casual | |
| 14493 and evil things---as removed from the care of divine providence. | |
| 14494 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 22 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="29374" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29374] Iª q. 22 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 14495 dicendum quod aliter de eo est qui habet curam alicuius | |
| 14496 particularis, et de provisore universali. Quia provisor | |
| 14497 particularis excludit defectum ab eo quod eius curae subditur, | |
| 14498 quantum potest, sed provisor universalis permittit aliquem defectum | |
| 14499 in aliquo particulari accidere, ne impediatur bonum totius. Unde | |
| 14500 corruptiones et defectus in rebus naturalibus, dicuntur esse contra | |
| 14501 naturam particularem; sed tamen sunt de intentione naturae | |
| 14502 universalis, inquantum defectus unius cedit in bonum alterius, vel | |
| 14503 etiam totius universi; nam corruptio unius est generatio alterius, | |
| 14504 per quam species conservatur. Cum igitur Deus sit universalis | |
| 14505 provisor totius entis, ad ipsius providentiam pertinet ut permittat | |
| 14506 quosdam defectus esse in aliquibus particularibus rebus, ne | |
| 14507 impediatur bonum universi perfectum. Si enim omnia mala | |
| 14508 impedirentur, multa bona deessent universo, non enim esset vita | |
| 14509 leonis, si non esset occisio animalium; nec esset patientia | |
| 14510 martyrum, si non esset persecutio tyrannorum. Unde dicit Augustinus | |
| 14511 in Enchirid. <i>Deus omnipotens nullo modo sineret malum aliquod | |
| 14512 esse in operibus suis, nisi usque adeo esset omnipotens et bonus, | |
| 14513 ut bene faceret etiam de malo</i>. Ex his autem duabus rationibus | |
| 14514 quas nunc solvimus, videntur moti fuisse, qui divinae providentiae | |
| 14515 subtraxerunt corruptibilia, in quibus inveniuntur casualia et | |
| 14516 mala.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q22_A2-p12"> | |
| 14517 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Man is not the author of nature; but he uses natural things in applying art and virtue to his own use. Hence human providence | |
| 14518 does not reach to that which takes place in nature from necessity; but divine providence extends thus far, since God is the | |
| 14519 author of nature. Apparently it was this argument that moved those who withdrew the course of nature from the care of divine | |
| 14520 providence, attributing it rather to the necessity of matter, as Democritus, and | |
| 14521 others of the ancients. | |
| 14522 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 22 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="29375" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29375] Iª q. 22 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 14523 dicendum quod homo non est institutor naturae, sed utitur in | |
| 14524 operibus artis et virtutis, ad suum usum, rebus naturalibus. Unde | |
| 14525 providentia humana non se extendit ad necessaria, quae ex natura | |
| 14526 proveniunt. Ad quae tamen se extendit providentia Dei, qui est | |
| 14527 auctor naturae. Et ex hac ratione videntur moti fuisse, qui cursum | |
| 14528 rerum naturalium subtraxerunt divinae providentiae, attribuentes | |
| 14529 ipsum necessitati materiae; ut Democritus, et alii naturales | |
| 14530 antiqui.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q22_A2-p13"> | |
| 14531 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> When it is said that God left man to himself, this does not mean that man is exempt from divine providence; but merely that | |
| 14532 he has not a prefixed operating force determined to only the one effect; as in the case of natural things, which are only | |
| 14533 acted upon as though directed by another towards an end; and do not act of themselves, as if they directed themselves towards | |
| 14534 an end, like rational creatures, through the possession of free will, by which | |
| 14535 these are able to take counsel and make a choice. Hence it is significantly said: "In the hand of his own counsel." But since | |
| 14536 the very act of free will is traced to God as to a cause, it necessarily follows that everything happening from the exercise | |
| 14537 of free will must be subject to divine providence. For human providence is included under the providence of God, as a particular | |
| 14538 under a universal cause. God, however, extends His providence over the just in a certain more excellent way than over | |
| 14539 the wicked; inasmuch as He prevents anything happening which would impede their final salvation. For "to them that love God, | |
| 14540 all things work together unto good" ( | |
| 14541 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q22_A2-p13.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.8.28" target="asv">Rom. 8:28</a>). But from the fact that He does not restrain the wicked from the evil of sin, He is said to abandon them: not that He altogether | |
| 14542 withdraws His providence from them; otherwise they would return to nothing, if they were not preserved in existence by His | |
| 14543 providence. This was the reason that had weight with | |
| 14544 Tully, who withdrew from the care of divine providence human affairs concerning which we take counsel. | |
| 14545 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 22 a. 2 ad 4"><a name="29376" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29376] Iª q. 22 a. 2 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum | |
| 14546 dicendum quod in hoc quod dicitur Deum hominem sibi reliquisse, non | |
| 14547 excluditur homo a divina providentia, sed ostenditur quod non | |
| 14548 praefigitur ei virtus operativa determinata ad unum, sicut rebus | |
| 14549 naturalibus; quae aguntur tantum, quasi ab altero directae in | |
| 14550 finem, non autem seipsa agunt, quasi se dirigentia in finem, ut | |
| 14551 creaturae rationales per liberum arbitrium, quo consiliantur et | |
| 14552 eligunt. Unde signanter dicit, <i>in manu consilii sui</i>. Sed | |
| 14553 quia ipse actus liberi arbitrii reducitur in Deum sicut in causam, | |
| 14554 necesse est ut ea quae ex libero arbitrio fiunt, divinae | |
| 14555 providentiae subdantur, providentia enim hominis continetur sub | |
| 14556 providentia Dei, sicut causa particularis sub causa universali. | |
| 14557 Hominum autem iustorum quodam excellentiori modo Deus habet | |
| 14558 providentiam quam impiorum, inquantum non permittit contra eos | |
| 14559 evenire aliquid, quod finaliter impediat salutem eorum, nam | |
| 14560 <i>diligentibus Deum omnia cooperantur in bonum</i>, ut dicitur | |
| 14561 Rom. VIII. Sed ex hoc ipso quod impios non retrahit a malo culpae, | |
| 14562 dicitur eos dimittere. Non tamen ita, quod totaliter ab eius | |
| 14563 providentia excludantur, alioquin in nihilum deciderent, nisi per | |
| 14564 eius providentiam conservarentur. Et ex hac ratione videtur motus | |
| 14565 fuisse Tullius, qui res humanas, de quibus consiliamur, divinae | |
| 14566 providentiae subtraxit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q22_A2-p14"> | |
| 14567 <b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> Since a rational creature has, through its free will, control over its actions, as was said above ( | |
| 14568 <a id="FP_Q22_A2-p14.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q19_A10.html">Q[19], A[10]</a>), it is subject to divine providence in an especial manner, so that something is imputed to it as a fault, or as a merit; | |
| 14569 and there is given it accordingly something by way of punishment or reward. In this way, the Apostle withdraws oxen from the | |
| 14570 care of God: not, however, that individual irrational creatures escape | |
| 14571 the care of divine providence; as was the opinion of the Rabbi Moses. | |
| 14572 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 22 a. 2 ad 5"><a name="29377" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29377] Iª q. 22 a. 2 ad 5</span></a> Ad quintum | |
| 14573 dicendum quod, quia creatura rationalis habet per liberum arbitrium | |
| 14574 dominium sui actus, ut dictum est, speciali quodam modo subditur | |
| 14575 divinae providentiae; ut scilicet ei imputetur aliquid ad culpam | |
| 14576 vel ad meritum, et reddatur ei aliquid ut poena vel praemium. Et | |
| 14577 quantum ad hoc curam Dei apostolus a bobus removet. Non tamen ita | |
| 14578 quod individua irrationalium creaturarum ad Dei providentiam non | |
| 14579 pertineant, ut Rabbi Moyses existimavit.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q22_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q22_A3-p0.1">Q. 22. A. 3. Whether God has immediate providence over everything?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q22_A3-p2"> | |
| 14580 <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God has not immediate providence over all things. For whatever is contained in the notion of dignity, must | |
| 14581 be attributed to God. But it belongs to the dignity of a king, that he should have ministers; through whose mediation he provides | |
| 14582 for his subjects. Therefore much less has God Himself immediate providence over all things. | |
| 14583 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 22 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="29378" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29378] Iª q. 22 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium sic | |
| 14584 proceditur. Videtur quod Deus non immediate omnibus provideat. | |
| 14585 Quidquid enim est dignitatis, Deo est attribuendum. Sed ad | |
| 14586 dignitatem alicuius regis pertinet, quod habeat ministros, quibus | |
| 14587 mediantibus subditis provideat. Ergo multo magis Deus non immediate | |
| 14588 omnibus providet.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q22_A3-p3"> | |
| 14589 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it belongs to providence to order all things to an end. Now the end of everything is its perfection and its good. | |
| 14590 But it appertains to every cause to direct its effect to good; wherefore every active cause is a cause of the effect of providence. | |
| 14591 If therefore God were to have immediate providence over all things, all secondary causes would be withdrawn. | |
| 14592 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 22 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="29379" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29379] Iª q. 22 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, ad | |
| 14593 providentiam pertinet res in finem ordinare. Finis autem cuiuslibet | |
| 14594 rei est eius perfectio et bonum. Ad quamlibet autem causam pertinet | |
| 14595 effectum suum perducere ad bonum. Quaelibet igitur causa agens est | |
| 14596 causa effectus providentiae. Si igitur Deus omnibus immediate | |
| 14597 providet, subtrahuntur omnes causae secundae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q22_A3-p4"> | |
| 14598 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Augustine says (Enchiridion 17) that, "It is better to be ignorant of some things than to know them, for example, | |
| 14599 vile things": and the Philosopher says the same (Metaph. xii, 51). But whatever is better must be assigned to God. Therefore | |
| 14600 He has not immediate providence over bad and vile things. | |
| 14601 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 22 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="29380" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29380] Iª q. 22 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 14602 Augustinus dicit, in Enchirid., quod <i>melius est quaedam nescire | |
| 14603 quam scire, ut vilia</i>, et idem dicit philosophus, in XII | |
| 14604 Metaphys. Sed omne quod est melius, Deo est attribuendum. Ergo Deus | |
| 14605 non habet immediate providentiam quorundam vilium et malorum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q22_A3-p5"> | |
| 14606 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is said ( | |
| 14607 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q22_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Job.34.13" target="asv">Job 34:13</a>): "What other hath He appointed over the earth? or whom hath He set over the world which He made?" On which passage Gregory | |
| 14608 says (Moral. xxiv, 20): "Himself He ruleth the world which He Himself hath made." | |
| 14609 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 22 a. 3 s. c."><a name="29381" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29381] Iª q. 22 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est | |
| 14610 quod dicitur Iob XXXIV, <i>quem constituit alium super terram? Aut | |
| 14611 quem posuit super orbem quem fabricatus est?</i> Super quo dicit | |
| 14612 Gregorius, <i>mundum per seipsum regit, quem per seipsum | |
| 14613 condidit</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q22_A3-p6"> | |
| 14614 <b>I answer that,</b> Two things belong to providence---namely, the type of the order of things foreordained towards an end; and the execution | |
| 14615 of this order, which is called government. As regards the first of these, God has immediate providence over everything, because | |
| 14616 He has in His intellect the types of everything, even the smallest; and whatsoever causes He assigns to certain effects, He | |
| 14617 gives them the power to produce those effects. Whence it must be that He has beforehand | |
| 14618 the type of those effects in His mind. As to the second, there are certain intermediaries of God's providence; for He governs | |
| 14619 things inferior by superior, not on account of any defect in His power, but by reason of the abundance of His goodness; so | |
| 14620 that the dignity of causality is imparted even to creatures. Thus Plato's opinion, as narrated by Gregory of Nyssa (De Provid. | |
| 14621 viii, 3), is exploded. He taught a threefold providence. First, one which belongs to the supreme Deity, Who first and | |
| 14622 foremost has provision over spiritual things, and thus over the whole world as regards genus, species, and universal causes. | |
| 14623 The second providence, which is over the individuals of all that can be generated and corrupted, he attributed to the divinities | |
| 14624 who circulate in the heavens; that is, certain separate substances, which move corporeal things in a circular direction. The | |
| 14625 third providence, over human affairs, he assigned to demons, whom the Platonic philosophers placed between us and the | |
| 14626 gods, as Augustine tells us (De Civ. Dei, 1, 2: viii, 14). | |
| 14627 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 22 a. 3 co."><a name="29382" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29382] Iª q. 22 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum | |
| 14628 quod ad providentiam duo pertinent, scilicet ratio ordinis rerum | |
| 14629 provisarum in finem; et executio huius ordinis, quae gubernatio | |
| 14630 dicitur. Quantum igitur ad primum horum, Deus immediate omnibus | |
| 14631 providet. Quia in suo intellectu habet rationem omnium, etiam | |
| 14632 minimorum, et quascumque causas aliquibus effectibus praefecit, | |
| 14633 dedit eis virtutem ad illos effectus producendos. Unde oportet quod | |
| 14634 ordinem illorum effectuum in sua ratione praehabuerit. Quantum | |
| 14635 autem ad secundum, sunt aliqua media divinae providentiae. Quia | |
| 14636 inferiora gubernat per superiora; non propter defectum suae | |
| 14637 virtutis, sed propter abundantiam suae bonitatis, ut dignitatem | |
| 14638 causalitatis etiam creaturis communicet. Et secundum hoc excluditur | |
| 14639 opinio Platonis, quam narrat Gregorius Nyssenus, triplicem | |
| 14640 providentiam ponentis. Quarum prima est summi Dei, qui primo et | |
| 14641 principaliter providet rebus spiritualibus; et consequenter toti | |
| 14642 mundo, quantum ad genera, species et causas universales. Secunda | |
| 14643 vero providentia est, qua providetur singularibus generabilium et | |
| 14644 corruptibilium, et hanc attribuit diis qui circumeunt caelos, idest | |
| 14645 substantiis separatis, quae movent corpora caelestia circulariter. | |
| 14646 Tertia vero providentia est rerum humanarum, quam attribuebat | |
| 14647 Daemonibus, quos Platonici ponebant medios inter nos et deos, ut | |
| 14648 narrat Augustinus IX de Civ. Dei.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q22_A3-p7"> | |
| 14649 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> It pertains to a king's dignity to have ministers who execute his providence. But the fact that he has not the plan of those | |
| 14650 things which are done by them arises from a deficiency in himself. For every operative science is the more perfect, the more | |
| 14651 it considers the particular things with which its action is concerned. | |
| 14652 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 22 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="29383" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29383] Iª q. 22 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo | |
| 14653 dicendum quod habere ministros executores suae providentiae, | |
| 14654 pertinet ad dignitatem regis, sed quod non habeat rationem eorum | |
| 14655 quae per eos agenda sunt, est ex defectu ipsius. Omnis enim | |
| 14656 scientia operativa tanto perfectior est, quanto magis particularia | |
| 14657 considerat, in quibus est actus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q22_A3-p8"> | |
| 14658 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> God's immediate provision over everything does not exclude the action of secondary causes; which are the executors of His | |
| 14659 order, as was said above ( | |
| 14660 <a id="FP_Q22_A3-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q19_A5.html">Q[19], AA[5]</a>,8). | |
| 14661 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 22 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="29384" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29384] Iª q. 22 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 14662 dicendum quod per hoc quod Deus habet immediate providentiam de | |
| 14663 rebus omnibus, non excluduntur causae secundae, quae sunt | |
| 14664 executrices huius ordinis, ut ex supra dictis patet.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q22_A3-p9"> | |
| 14665 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> It is better for us not to know low and vile things, because by them we are impeded in our knowledge of what is better and | |
| 14666 higher; for we cannot understand many things simultaneously; because the thought of evil sometimes perverts the will towards | |
| 14667 evil. This does not hold with God, Who sees everything simultaneously at one glance, and whose will cannot turn in the direction | |
| 14668 of evil. | |
| 14669 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 22 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="29385" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29385] Iª q. 22 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 14670 dicendum quod nobis melius est non cognoscere mala et vilia, | |
| 14671 inquantum per ea impedimur a consideratione meliorum, quia non | |
| 14672 possumus simul multa intelligere, et inquantum cogitatio malorum | |
| 14673 pervertit interdum voluntatem in malum. Sed hoc non habet locum in | |
| 14674 Deo, qui simul omnia uno intuitu videt, et cuius voluntas ad malum | |
| 14675 flecti non potest.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q22_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q22_A4-p0.1">Q. 22. A. 4. Whether providence imposes any necessity on things foreseen?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q22_A4-p2"> | |
| 14676 <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that divine providence imposes necessity upon things foreseen. For every effect that has a "per se" cause, either | |
| 14677 present or past, which it necessarily follows, happens from necessity; as the Philosopher proves (Metaph. vi, 7). But the | |
| 14678 providence of God, since it is eternal, pre-exists; and the effect flows from it of necessity, for divine providence cannot | |
| 14679 be frustrated. Therefore divine providence imposes a necessity upon things foreseen. | |
| 14680 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 22 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="29386" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29386] Iª q. 22 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum sic | |
| 14681 proceditur. Videtur quod divina providentia necessitatem rebus | |
| 14682 provisis imponat. Omnis enim effectus qui habet aliquam causam per | |
| 14683 se, quae iam est vel fuit, ad quam de necessitate sequitur, | |
| 14684 provenit ex necessitate, ut philosophus probat in VI Metaphys. Sed | |
| 14685 providentia Dei, cum sit aeterna, praeexistit; et ad eam sequitur | |
| 14686 effectus de necessitate; non enim potest divina providentia | |
| 14687 frustrari. Ergo providentia divina necessitatem rebus provisis | |
| 14688 imponit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q22_A4-p3"> | |
| 14689 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, every provider makes his work as stable as he can, lest it should fail. But God is most powerful. Therefore He assigns | |
| 14690 the stability of necessity to things provided. | |
| 14691 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 22 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="29387" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29387] Iª q. 22 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 14692 unusquisque provisor stabilit opus suum quantum potest, ne | |
| 14693 deficiat. Sed Deus est summe potens. Ergo necessitatis firmitatem | |
| 14694 rebus a se provisis tribuit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q22_A4-p4"> | |
| 14695 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Boethius says (De Consol. iv, 6): "Fate from the immutable source of providence binds together human acts and fortunes | |
| 14696 by the indissoluble connection of causes." It seems therefore that providence imposes necessity upon things foreseen. | |
| 14697 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 22 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="29388" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29388] Iª q. 22 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 14698 Boetius dicit, IV de Consol., quod fatum, <i>ab immobilis | |
| 14699 providentiae proficiscens exordiis, actus fortunasque hominum | |
| 14700 indissolubili causarum connexione constringit</i>. Videtur ergo | |
| 14701 quod providentia necessitatem rebus provisis imponat.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q22_A4-p5"> | |
| 14702 <b>On the contrary,</b> Dionysius says that (Div. Nom. iv, 23) "to corrupt nature is not the work of providence." But it is in the nature of some | |
| 14703 things to be contingent. Divine providence does not therefore impose any necessity upon things so as to destroy their contingency. | |
| 14704 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 22 a. 4 s. c."><a name="29389" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29389] Iª q. 22 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est | |
| 14705 quod dicit Dionysius, IV cap. de Div. Nom., quod <i>corrumpere | |
| 14706 naturam non est providentiae</i>. Hoc autem habet quarundam rerum | |
| 14707 natura, quod sint contingentia. Non igitur divina providentia | |
| 14708 necessitatem rebus imponit, contingentiam excludens.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q22_A4-p6"> | |
| 14709 <b>I answer that,</b> Divine providence imposes necessity upon some things; not upon all, as some formerly believed. For to providence it belongs | |
| 14710 to order things towards an end. Now after the divine goodness, which is an extrinsic end to all things, the principal good | |
| 14711 in things themselves is the perfection of the universe; which would not be, were not all grades of being found in things. | |
| 14712 Whence it pertains to divine providence to produce every grade of being. And thus it has | |
| 14713 prepared for some things necessary causes, so that they happen of necessity; for others contingent causes, that they may happen | |
| 14714 by contingency, according to the nature of their proximate causes. | |
| 14715 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 22 a. 4 co."><a name="29390" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29390] Iª q. 22 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum | |
| 14716 quod providentia divina quibusdam rebus necessitatem imponit, non | |
| 14717 autem omnibus, ut quidam crediderunt. Ad providentiam enim pertinet | |
| 14718 ordinare res in finem. Post bonitatem autem divinam, quae est finis | |
| 14719 a rebus separatus, principale bonum in ipsis rebus existens, est | |
| 14720 perfectio universi, quae quidem non esset, si non omnes gradus | |
| 14721 essendi invenirentur in rebus. Unde ad divinam providentiam | |
| 14722 pertinet omnes gradus entium producere. Et ideo quibusdam | |
| 14723 effectibus praeparavit causas necessarias, ut necessario evenirent; | |
| 14724 quibusdam vero causas contingentes, ut evenirent contingenter, | |
| 14725 secundum conditionem proximarum causarum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q22_A4-p7"> | |
| 14726 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The effect of divine providence is not only that things should happen somehow; but that they should happen either by necessity | |
| 14727 or by contingency. Therefore whatsoever divine providence ordains to happen infallibly and of necessity happens infallibly | |
| 14728 and of necessity; and that happens from contingency, which the plan of divine providence conceives to happen from contingency. | |
| 14729 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 22 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="29391" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29391] Iª q. 22 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo | |
| 14730 dicendum quod effectus divinae providentiae non solum est aliquid | |
| 14731 evenire quocumque modo; sed aliquid evenire vel contingenter vel | |
| 14732 necessario. Et ideo evenit infallibiliter et necessario, quod | |
| 14733 divina providentia disponit evenire infallibiliter et necessario, | |
| 14734 et evenit contingenter, quod divinae providentiae ratio habet ut | |
| 14735 contingenter eveniat.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q22_A4-p8"> | |
| 14736 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The order of divine providence is unchangeable and certain, so far as all things foreseen happen as they have been foreseen, | |
| 14737 whether from necessity or from contingency. | |
| 14738 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 22 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="29392" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29392] Iª q. 22 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 14739 dicendum quod in hoc est immobilis et certus divinae providentiae | |
| 14740 ordo, quod ea quae ab ipso providentur, cuncta eveniunt eo modo quo | |
| 14741 ipse providet, sive necessario sive contingenter.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q22_A4-p9"> | |
| 14742 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> That indissolubility and unchangeableness of which Boethius speaks, pertain to the certainty of providence, which fails not | |
| 14743 to produce its effect, and that in the way foreseen; but they do not pertain to the necessity of the effects. We must remember | |
| 14744 that properly speaking 'necessary' and "contingent" are consequent upon being, as such. Hence the mode both of necessity and | |
| 14745 of contingency falls under the foresight of God, who provides universally for | |
| 14746 all being; not under the foresight of causes that provide only for some particular order of things. | |
| 14747 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 22 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="29393" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29393] Iª q. 22 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 14748 dicendum quod indissolubilitas illa et immutabilitas quam Boetius | |
| 14749 tangit, pertinet ad certitudinem providentiae, quae non deficit a | |
| 14750 suo effectu, neque a modo eveniendi quem providit, non autem | |
| 14751 pertinet ad necessitatem effectuum. Et considerandum est quod | |
| 14752 necessarium et contingens proprie consequuntur ens, inquantum | |
| 14753 huiusmodi. Unde modus contingentiae et necessitatis cadit sub | |
| 14754 provisione Dei, qui est universalis provisor totius entis, non | |
| 14755 autem sub provisione aliquorum particularium provisorum.</p></div></div></div></div> | |
| 14756 <div id="FP_Q23" class="div3"> | |
| 14757 <h3 id="FP_Q23-p0.1">Q. 23. OF PREDESTINATION (EIGHT ARTICLES)</h3> | |
| 14758 <div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> | |
| 14759 <p id="FP_Q23-p2"> After consideration of divine providence, we must treat of predestination and the book of life. Concerning predestination | |
| 14760 there are eight points of inquiry: | |
| 14761 </p><p id="FP_Q23-p3"> (1) Whether predestination is suitably attributed to God?</p><p id="FP_Q23-p4"> (2) What is predestination, and whether it places anything in the predestined?</p><p id="FP_Q23-p5"> (3) Whether to God belongs the reprobation of some men?</p><p id="FP_Q23-p6"> (4) On the comparison of predestination to election; whether, that is to say, the predestined are chosen?</p><p id="FP_Q23-p7"> (5) Whether merits are the cause or reason of predestination, or reprobation, or election?</p><p id="FP_Q23-p8"> (6) of the certainty of predestination; whether the predestined will infallibly be saved?</p><p id="FP_Q23-p9"> (7) Whether the number of the predestined is certain?</p><p id="FP_Q23-p10"> (8) Whether predestination can be furthered by the prayers of the saints?</p> | |
| 14762 </div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 23 pr."><a name="29394" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29394] | |
| 14763 Iª q. 23 pr.</span></a> Post considerationem divinae | |
| 14764 providentiae, agendum est de praedestinatione, et de libro vitae. | |
| 14765 Et circa praedestinationem quaeruntur octo. Primo, utrum Deo | |
| 14766 conveniat praedestinatio. Secundo, quid sit praedestinatio; et | |
| 14767 utrum ponat aliquid in praedestinato. Tertio, utrum Deo competat | |
| 14768 reprobatio aliquorum hominum. Quarto, de comparatione | |
| 14769 praedestinationis ad electionem; utrum scilicet praedestinati | |
| 14770 eligantur. Quinto, utrum merita sint causa vel ratio | |
| 14771 praedestinationis, vel reprobationis, aut electionis. Sexto, de | |
| 14772 certitudine praedestinationis; utrum scilicet praedestinati | |
| 14773 infallibiliter salventur. Septimo, utrum numerus praedestinatorum | |
| 14774 sit certus. Octavo, utrum praedestinatio possit iuvari precibus | |
| 14775 sanctorum.</p></div></div></div> | |
| 14776 <div id="FP_Q23_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q23_A1-p0.1">Q. 23. A. 1. Whether men are predestined by God?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q23_A1-p2"> | |
| 14777 <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that men are not predestined by God, for Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 30): "It must be borne in mind that God | |
| 14778 foreknows but does not predetermine everything, since He foreknows all that is in us, but does not predetermine it all." But | |
| 14779 human merit and demerit are in us, forasmuch as we are the masters of our own acts by free will. All that pertains therefore | |
| 14780 to merit or demerit is not predestined by God; and thus man's predestination is done | |
| 14781 away. | |
| 14782 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 23 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="29395" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29395] Iª q. 23 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum sic | |
| 14783 proceditur. Videtur quod homines non praedestinentur a Deo. Dicit | |
| 14784 enim Damascenus, in II libro, <i>oportet cognoscere quod omnia | |
| 14785 quidem praecognoscit Deus, non autem omnia praedeterminat. | |
| 14786 Praecognoscit enim ea quae in nobis sunt; non autem praedeterminat | |
| 14787 ea</i>. Sed merita et demerita humana sunt in nobis, inquantum | |
| 14788 sumus nostrorum actuum domini per liberum arbitrium. Ea ergo quae | |
| 14789 pertinent ad meritum vel demeritum, non praedestinantur a Deo. Et | |
| 14790 sic hominum praedestinatio tollitur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q23_A1-p3"> | |
| 14791 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, all creatures are directed to their end by divine providence, as was said above ( | |
| 14792 <a id="FP_Q23_A1-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q22_A1.html">Q[22], AA[1]</a>,2). But other creatures are not said to be predestined by God. Therefore neither are men. | |
| 14793 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 23 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="29396" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29396] Iª q. 23 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, omnes | |
| 14794 creaturae ordinantur ad suos fines per divinam providentiam, ut | |
| 14795 supra dictum est. Sed aliae creaturae non dicuntur praedestinari a | |
| 14796 Deo. Ergo nec homines.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q23_A1-p4"> | |
| 14797 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the angels are capable of beatitude, as well as men. But predestination is not suitable to angels, since in them | |
| 14798 there never was any unhappiness (miseria); for predestination, as Augustine says (De praedest. sanct. 17), is the "purpose | |
| 14799 to take pity [miserendi]" [*See | |
| 14800 <a id="FP_Q23_A1-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q22_A3.html">Q[22], A[3]</a>]. Therefore men are not predestined. | |
| 14801 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 23 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="29397" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29397] Iª q. 23 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 14802 Angeli sunt capaces beatitudinis, sicut et homines. Sed Angelis non | |
| 14803 competit praedestinari, ut videtur, cum in eis nunquam fuerit | |
| 14804 miseria; praedestinatio autem est propositum miserendi, ut dicit | |
| 14805 Augustinus. Ergo homines non praedestinantur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q23_A1-p5"> | |
| 14806 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, the benefits God confers upon men are revealed by the Holy Ghost to holy men according to the saying of the Apostle | |
| 14807 ( | |
| 14808 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q23_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.2.12" target="asv">1 Cor. 2:12</a>): "Now we have received not the spirit of this world, but the Spirit that is of God: that we may know the things that are | |
| 14809 given us from God." Therefore if man were predestined by God, since predestination is a benefit from God, his predestination | |
| 14810 would be made known to each predestined; which is clearly false. | |
| 14811 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 23 a. 1 arg. 4"><a name="29398" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29398] Iª q. 23 a. 1 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 14812 beneficia hominibus a Deo collata, per spiritum sanctum viris | |
| 14813 sanctis revelantur, secundum illud apostoli, I Cor. II, <i>nos | |
| 14814 autem non spiritum huius mundi accepimus, sed spiritum qui ex Deo | |
| 14815 est, ut sciamus quae a Deo donata sunt nobis</i>. Si ergo homines | |
| 14816 praedestinarentur a Deo, cum praedestinatio sit Dei beneficium, | |
| 14817 esset praedestinatis nota sua praedestinatio. Quod patet esse | |
| 14818 falsum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q23_A1-p6"> | |
| 14819 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is written ( | |
| 14820 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q23_A1-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.8.30" target="asv">Rom. 8:30</a>): "Whom He predestined, them He also called." | |
| 14821 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 23 a. 1 s. c."><a name="29399" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29399] Iª q. 23 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est | |
| 14822 quod dicitur Rom. VIII, <i>quos praedestinavit, hos et | |
| 14823 vocavit</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q23_A1-p7"> | |
| 14824 <b>I answer that,</b> It is fitting that God should predestine men. For all things are subject to His providence, as was shown above ( | |
| 14825 <a id="FP_Q23_A1-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q22_A2.html">Q[22], A[2]</a>). Now it belongs to providence to direct things towards their end, as was also said ( | |
| 14826 <a id="FP_Q23_A1-p7.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q22_A1.html">Q[22], AA[1]</a>,2). The end towards which created things are directed by God is twofold; one which exceeds all proportion and faculty of | |
| 14827 created nature; and this end is life eternal, that consists in seeing | |
| 14828 God which is above the nature of every creature, as shown above ( | |
| 14829 <a id="FP_Q23_A1-p7.3" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q12_A4.html">Q[12], A[4]</a>). The other end, however, is proportionate to created nature, to which end created being can attain according to the power | |
| 14830 of its nature. Now if a thing cannot attain to something by the power of its nature, it must be directed thereto by another; | |
| 14831 thus, an arrow is directed by the archer towards a mark. Hence, properly speaking, a rational creature, capable of eternal | |
| 14832 life, is led towards it, | |
| 14833 directed, as it were, by God. The reason of that direction pre-exists in God; as in Him is the type of the order of all things | |
| 14834 towards an end, which we proved above to be providence. Now the type in the mind of the doer of something to be done, is a | |
| 14835 kind of pre-existence in him of the thing to be done. Hence the type of the aforesaid direction of a rational creature towards | |
| 14836 the end of life eternal is called predestination. For to destine, is to direct or send. Thus it is clear that | |
| 14837 predestination, as regards its objects, is a part of providence. | |
| 14838 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 23 a. 1 co."><a name="29400" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29400] Iª q. 23 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum | |
| 14839 quod Deo conveniens est homines praedestinare. Omnia enim divinae | |
| 14840 providentiae subiacent, ut supra ostensum est. Ad providentiam | |
| 14841 autem pertinet res in finem ordinare, ut dictum est. Finis autem ad | |
| 14842 quem res creatae ordinantur a Deo, est duplex. Unus, qui excedit | |
| 14843 proportionem naturae creatae et facultatem, et hic finis est vita | |
| 14844 aeterna, quae in divina visione consistit, quae est supra naturam | |
| 14845 cuiuslibet creaturae, ut supra habitum est. Alius autem finis est | |
| 14846 naturae creatae proportionatus, quem scilicet res creata potest | |
| 14847 attingere secundum virtutem suae naturae. Ad illud autem ad quod | |
| 14848 non potest aliquid virtute suae naturae pervenire, oportet quod ab | |
| 14849 alio transmittatur; sicut sagitta a sagittante mittitur ad signum. | |
| 14850 Unde, proprie loquendo, rationalis creatura, quae est capax vitae | |
| 14851 aeternae, perducitur in ipsam quasi a Deo transmissa. Cuius quidem | |
| 14852 transmissionis ratio in Deo praeexistit; sicut et in eo est ratio | |
| 14853 ordinis omnium in finem, quam diximus esse providentiam. Ratio | |
| 14854 autem alicuius fiendi in mente actoris existens, est quaedam | |
| 14855 praeexistentia rei fiendae in eo. Unde ratio praedictae | |
| 14856 transmissionis creaturae rationalis in finem vitae aeternae, | |
| 14857 praedestinatio nominatur, nam destinare est mittere. Et sic patet | |
| 14858 quod praedestinatio, quantum ad obiecta, est quaedam pars | |
| 14859 providentiae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q23_A1-p8"> | |
| 14860 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Damascene calls predestination an imposition of necessity, after the manner of natural things which are predetermined towards | |
| 14861 one end. This is clear from his adding: "He does not will malice, nor does He compel virtue." Whence predestination is not | |
| 14862 excluded by Him. | |
| 14863 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 23 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="29401" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29401] Iª q. 23 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo | |
| 14864 dicendum quod Damascenus nominat praedeterminationem impositionem | |
| 14865 necessitatis; sicut est in rebus naturalibus, quae sunt | |
| 14866 praedeterminatae ad unum. Quod patet ex eo quod subdit, <i>non enim | |
| 14867 vult malitiam, neque compellit virtutem</i>. Unde praedestinatio | |
| 14868 non excluditur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q23_A1-p9"> | |
| 14869 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Irrational creatures are not capable of that end which exceeds the faculty of human nature. Whence they cannot be properly | |
| 14870 said to be predestined; although improperly the term is used in respect of any other end. | |
| 14871 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 23 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="29402" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29402] Iª q. 23 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 14872 dicendum quod creaturae irrationales non sunt capaces illius finis | |
| 14873 qui facultatem humanae naturae excedit. Unde non proprie dicuntur | |
| 14874 praedestinari, etsi aliquando abusive praedestinatio nominetur | |
| 14875 respectu cuiuscumque alterius finis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q23_A1-p10"> | |
| 14876 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Predestination applies to angels, just as it does to men, although they have never been unhappy. For movement does not take | |
| 14877 its species from the term "wherefrom" but from the term "whereto." Because it matters nothing, in respect of the notion of | |
| 14878 making white, whether he who is made white was before black, yellow or red. Likewise it matters nothing in respect of the | |
| 14879 notion of predestination whether one is predestined to life eternal from the state of | |
| 14880 misery or not. Although it may be said that every conferring of good above that which is due pertains to mercy; as was shown | |
| 14881 previously ( | |
| 14882 <a id="FP_Q23_A1-p10.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q21_A3.html">Q[21], AA[3]</a>,4). | |
| 14883 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 23 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="29403" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29403] Iª q. 23 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 14884 dicendum quod praedestinari convenit Angelis, sicut et hominibus, | |
| 14885 licet nunquam fuerint miseri. Nam motus non accipit speciem a | |
| 14886 termino a quo, sed a termino ad quem, nihil enim refert, quantum ad | |
| 14887 rationem dealbationis, utrum ille qui dealbatur, fuerit niger aut | |
| 14888 pallidus vel rubeus. Et similiter nihil refert ad rationem | |
| 14889 praedestinationis, utrum aliquis praedestinetur in vitam aeternam a | |
| 14890 statu miseriae, vel non. Quamvis dici possit quod omnis collatio | |
| 14891 boni supra debitum eius cui confertur, ad misericordiam pertineat, | |
| 14892 ut supra dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q23_A1-p11"> | |
| 14893 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Even if by a special privilege their predestination were revealed to some, it is not fitting that it should be revealed to | |
| 14894 everyone; because, if so, those who were not predestined would despair; and security would beget negligence in the predestined. | |
| 14895 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 23 a. 1 ad 4"><a name="29404" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29404] Iª q. 23 a. 1 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum | |
| 14896 dicendum quod, etiam si aliquibus ex speciali privilegio sua | |
| 14897 praedestinatio reveletur, non tamen convenit ut reveletur omnibus, | |
| 14898 quia sic illi qui non sunt praedestinati, desperarent; et securitas | |
| 14899 in praedestinatis negligentiam pareret.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q23_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q23_A2-p0.1">Q. 23. A. 2. Whether predestination places anything in the predestined?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q23_A2-p2"> | |
| 14900 <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that predestination does place something in the predestined. For every action of itself causes passion. If therefore | |
| 14901 predestination is action in God, predestination must be passion in the predestined. | |
| 14902 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 23 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="29405" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29405] Iª q. 23 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum sic | |
| 14903 proceditur. Videtur quod praedestinatio ponat aliquid in | |
| 14904 praedestinato. Omnis enim actio ex se passionem infert. Si ergo | |
| 14905 praedestinatio actio est in Deo, oportet quod praedestinatio passio | |
| 14906 sit in praedestinatis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q23_A2-p3"> | |
| 14907 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Origen says on the text, "He who was predestined," etc. ( | |
| 14908 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q23_A2-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.1.4" target="asv">Rom. 1:4</a>): "Predestination is of one who is not; destination, of one who is." And Augustine says (De Praed. Sanct.): "What is predestination | |
| 14909 but the destination of one who is?" Therefore predestination is only of one who actually exists; and it thus places something | |
| 14910 in the predestined. | |
| 14911 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 23 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="29406" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29406] Iª q. 23 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 14912 Origenes dicit, super illud Rom. I, <i>qui praedestinatus est etc., | |
| 14913 praedestinatio est eius qui non est, sed destinatio eius est qui | |
| 14914 est</i>. Sed Augustinus dicit, in libro de praedestinatione | |
| 14915 sanctorum, <i>quid est praedestinatio, nisi destinatio | |
| 14916 alicuius?</i> Ergo praedestinatio non est nisi alicuius existentis. | |
| 14917 Et ita ponit aliquid in praedestinato.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q23_A2-p4"> | |
| 14918 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, preparation is something in the thing prepared. But predestination is the preparation of God's benefits, as Augustine | |
| 14919 says (De Praed. Sanct. ii, 14). Therefore predestination is something in the predestined. | |
| 14920 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 23 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="29407" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29407] Iª q. 23 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 14921 praeparatio est aliquid in praeparato. Sed praedestinatio est | |
| 14922 praeparatio beneficiorum Dei, ut dicit Augustinus, in libro de | |
| 14923 Praedest. Sanct. Ergo praedestinatio est aliquid in | |
| 14924 praedestinatis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q23_A2-p5"> | |
| 14925 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, nothing temporal enters into the definition of eternity. But grace, which is something temporal, is found in the | |
| 14926 definition of predestination. For predestination is the preparation of grace in the present; and of glory in the future. Therefore | |
| 14927 predestination is not anything eternal. So it must needs be that it is in the predestined, and not in God; for whatever is | |
| 14928 in Him is eternal. | |
| 14929 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 23 a. 2 arg. 4"><a name="29408" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29408] Iª q. 23 a. 2 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 14930 temporale non ponitur in definitione aeterni. Sed gratia, quae est | |
| 14931 aliquid temporale, ponitur in definitione praedestinationis, nam | |
| 14932 praedestinatio dicitur esse <i>praeparatio gratiae in praesenti, et | |
| 14933 gloriae in futuro</i>. Ergo praedestinatio non est aliquid | |
| 14934 aeternum. Et ita oportet quod non sit in Deo, sed in | |
| 14935 praedestinatis, nam quidquid est in Deo, est aeternum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q23_A2-p6"> | |
| 14936 <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Praed. Sanct. ii, 14) that "predestination is the foreknowledge of God's benefits." But foreknowledge | |
| 14937 is not in the things foreknown, but in the person who foreknows them. Therefore, predestination is in the one who predestines, | |
| 14938 and not in the predestined. | |
| 14939 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 23 a. 2 s. c."><a name="29409" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29409] Iª q. 23 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est | |
| 14940 quod Augustinus dicit, quod praedestinatio est praescientia | |
| 14941 beneficiorum Dei. Sed praescientia non est in praescitis, sed in | |
| 14942 praesciente. Ergo nec praedestinatio est in praedestinatis, sed in | |
| 14943 praedestinante.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q23_A2-p7"> | |
| 14944 <b>I answer that,</b> Predestination is not anything in the predestined; but only in the person who predestines. We have said above that predestination | |
| 14945 is a part of providence. Now providence is not anything in the things provided for; but is a type in the mind of the provider, | |
| 14946 as was proved above ( | |
| 14947 <a id="FP_Q23_A2-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q22_A1.html">Q[22], A[1]</a>). But the execution of providence which is called government, is in a passive way in the thing governed, and in an active | |
| 14948 way in the governor. | |
| 14949 Whence it is clear that predestination is a kind of type of the ordering of some persons towards eternal salvation, existing | |
| 14950 in the divine mind. The execution, however, of this order is in a passive way in the predestined, but actively in God. The | |
| 14951 execution of predestination is the calling and magnification; according to the Apostle ( | |
| 14952 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q23_A2-p7.2" href="./asv.html#Rom.8.30" target="asv">Rom. 8:30</a>): "Whom He predestined, them He also called and whom He called, them He also magnified [Vulg. 'justified']." | |
| 14953 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 23 a. 2 co."><a name="29410" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29410] Iª q. 23 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum | |
| 14954 quod praedestinatio non est aliquid in praedestinatis, sed in | |
| 14955 praedestinante tantum. Dictum est enim quod praedestinatio est | |
| 14956 quaedam pars providentiae providentia autem non est in rebus | |
| 14957 provisis; sed est quaedam ratio in intellectu provisoris, ut supra | |
| 14958 dictum est. Sed executio providentiae, quae gubernatio dicitur, | |
| 14959 passive quidem est in gubernatis; active autem est in gubernante. | |
| 14960 Unde manifestum est quod praedestinatio est quaedam ratio ordinis | |
| 14961 aliquorum in salutem aeternam, in mente divina existens. Executio | |
| 14962 autem huius ordinis est passive quidem in praedestinatis; active | |
| 14963 autem est in Deo. Est autem executio praedestinationis vocatio et | |
| 14964 magnificatio, secundum illud apostoli, ad Rom. VIII, <i>quos | |
| 14965 praedestinavit, hos et vocavit; et quos vocavit, hos et | |
| 14966 magnificavit</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q23_A2-p8"> | |
| 14967 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Actions passing out to external matter imply of themselves passion---for example, the actions of warming and cutting; but | |
| 14968 not so actions remaining in the agent, as understanding and willing, as said above ( | |
| 14969 <a id="FP_Q23_A2-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q14_A2.html">Q[14], A[2]</a>; | |
| 14970 <a id="FP_Q23_A2-p8.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q18_A3.html">Q[18], A[3]</a>, ad 1). Predestination is an action of this latter class. Wherefore, it does not put anything in the predestined. But its | |
| 14971 execution, which passes out to external things, has | |
| 14972 an effect in them. | |
| 14973 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 23 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="29411" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29411] Iª q. 23 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo | |
| 14974 dicendum quod actiones in exteriorem materiam transeuntes, inferunt | |
| 14975 ex se passionem, ut calefactio et secatio, non autem actiones in | |
| 14976 agente manentes, ut sunt intelligere et velle, ut supra dictum est. | |
| 14977 Et talis actio est praedestinatio. Unde praedestinatio non ponit | |
| 14978 aliquid in praedestinato. Sed executio eius, quae transit in | |
| 14979 exteriores res, ponit in eis aliquem effectum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q23_A2-p9"> | |
| 14980 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Destination sometimes denotes a real mission of someone to a given end; thus, destination can only be said of someone actually | |
| 14981 existing. It is taken, however, in another sense for a mission which a person conceives in the mind; and in this manner we | |
| 14982 are said to destine a thing which we firmly propose in our mind. In this latter way it is said that Eleazar "determined not | |
| 14983 to do any unlawful things for the love of life" ( | |
| 14984 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q23_A2-p9.1" href="./asv.html#iiMacc.6.20" target="asv">2 Macc. | |
| 14985 6:20 | |
| 14986 </a>). Thus destination can be of a thing which does not exist. Predestination, however, by reason of the antecedent nature it | |
| 14987 implies, can be attributed to a thing which does not actually exist; in whatsoever way destination is accepted. | |
| 14988 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 23 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="29412" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29412] Iª q. 23 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 14989 dicendum quod destinatio aliquando sumitur pro reali missione | |
| 14990 alicuius ad aliquem terminum, et sic destinatio non est nisi eius | |
| 14991 quod est. Alio modo sumitur destinatio pro missione quam aliquis | |
| 14992 mente concipit, secundum quod dicimur destinare, quod mente | |
| 14993 firmiter proponimus, et hoc secundo modo dicitur II Machab. cap. | |
| 14994 VI, <i>Eleazarus destinavit non admittere illicita propter vitae | |
| 14995 amorem</i>. Et sic destinatio potest esse eius quod non est. Tamen | |
| 14996 praedestinatio, ratione antecessionis quam importat, potest esse | |
| 14997 eius quod non est, qualitercumque destinatio sumatur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q23_A2-p10"> | |
| 14998 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Preparation is twofold: of the patient in respect to passion and this is in the thing prepared; and of the agent to action, | |
| 14999 and this is in the agent. Such a preparation is predestination, and as an agent by intellect is said to prepare itself to | |
| 15000 act, accordingly as it preconceives the idea of what is to be done. Thus, God from all eternity prepared by predestination, | |
| 15001 conceiving the idea of the order of some towards salvation. | |
| 15002 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 23 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="29413" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29413] Iª q. 23 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 15003 dicendum quod duplex est praeparatio. Quaedam patientis, ut | |
| 15004 patiatur, et haec praeparatio est in praeparato. Quaedam alia est | |
| 15005 agentis, ut agat, et haec est in agente. Et talis praeparatio est | |
| 15006 praedestinatio; prout aliquod agens per intellectum dicitur se | |
| 15007 praeparare ad agendum, inquantum praeconcipit rationem operis | |
| 15008 fiendi. Et sic Deus ab aeterno praeparavit praedestinando, | |
| 15009 concipiens rationem ordinis aliquorum in salutem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q23_A2-p11"> | |
| 15010 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Grace does not come into the definition of predestination, as something belonging to its essence, but inasmuch as predestination | |
| 15011 implies a relation to grace, as of cause to effect, and of act to its object. Whence it does not follow that predestination | |
| 15012 is anything temporal. | |
| 15013 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 23 a. 2 ad 4"><a name="29414" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29414] Iª q. 23 a. 2 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum | |
| 15014 dicendum quod gratia non ponitur in definitione praedestinationis, | |
| 15015 quasi aliquid existens de essentia eius, sed inquantum | |
| 15016 praedestinatio importat respectum ad gratiam, ut causae ad | |
| 15017 effectum, et actus ad obiectum. Unde non sequitur quod | |
| 15018 praedestinatio sit aliquid temporale.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q23_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q23_A3-p0.1">Q. 23. A. 3. Whether God reprobates any man?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q23_A3-p2"> | |
| 15019 <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God reprobates no man. For nobody reprobates what he loves. But God loves every man, according to ( | |
| 15020 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q23_A3-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Wis.11.25" target="asv">Wis. 11:25</a>): "Thou lovest all things that are, and Thou hatest none of the things Thou hast made." Therefore God reprobates no man. | |
| 15021 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 23 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="29415" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29415] Iª q. 23 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium sic | |
| 15022 proceditur. Videtur quod Deus nullum hominem reprobet. Nullus enim | |
| 15023 reprobat quem diligit. Sed Deus omnem hominem diligit, secundum | |
| 15024 illud Sap. XI, <i>diligis omnia quae sunt, et nihil odisti eorum | |
| 15025 quae fecisti</i>. Ergo Deus nullum hominem reprobat.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q23_A3-p3"> | |
| 15026 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, if God reprobates any man, it would be necessary for reprobation to have the same relation to the reprobates as | |
| 15027 predestination has to the predestined. But predestination is the cause of the salvation of the predestined. Therefore reprobation | |
| 15028 will likewise be the cause of the loss of the reprobate. But this false. For it is said ( | |
| 15029 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q23_A3-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Hos.13.9" target="asv">Osee 13:9</a>): "Destruction is thy own, O Israel; Thy help is only in Me." God does not, then, reprobate | |
| 15030 any man. | |
| 15031 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 23 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="29416" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29416] Iª q. 23 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, si | |
| 15032 Deus aliquem hominem reprobat, oportet quod sic se habeat | |
| 15033 reprobatio ad reprobatos, sicut praedestinatio ad praedestinatos. | |
| 15034 Sed praedestinatio est causa salutis praedestinatorum. Ergo | |
| 15035 reprobatio erit causa perditionis reproborum. Hoc autem est falsum, | |
| 15036 dicitur enim Osee XIII, <i>perditio tua, Israel, ex te est; | |
| 15037 tantummodo ex me auxilium tuum</i>. Non ergo Deus aliquem | |
| 15038 reprobat.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q23_A3-p4"> | |
| 15039 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, to no one ought anything be imputed which he cannot avoid. But if God reprobates anyone, that one must perish. For | |
| 15040 it is said ( | |
| 15041 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q23_A3-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Eccl.7.14" target="asv">Eccles. 7:14</a>): "Consider the works of God, that no man can correct whom He hath despised." Therefore it could not be imputed to any man, | |
| 15042 were he to perish. But this is false. Therefore God does not reprobate anyone. | |
| 15043 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 23 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="29417" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29417] Iª q. 23 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, nulli | |
| 15044 debet imputari quod vitare non potest. Sed si Deus aliquem | |
| 15045 reprobat, non potest vitare quin ipse pereat, dicitur enim Eccle. | |
| 15046 VII, <i>considera opera Dei, quod nemo possit corrigere quem ipse | |
| 15047 despexerit</i>. Ergo non esset hominibus imputandum quod pereunt. | |
| 15048 Hoc autem est falsum. Non ergo Deus aliquem reprobat.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q23_A3-p5"> | |
| 15049 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is said ( | |
| 15050 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q23_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Mal.1.2" target="asv">Malachi 1:2,3</a>): "I have loved Jacob, but have hated Esau." | |
| 15051 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 23 a. 3 s. c."><a name="29418" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29418] Iª q. 23 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est | |
| 15052 quod dicitur Malach. I, <i>Iacob dilexi, Esau autem odio | |
| 15053 habui</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q23_A3-p6"> | |
| 15054 <b>I answer that,</b> God does reprobate some. For it was said above | |
| 15055 <a id="FP_Q23_A3-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q23_A1.html">(A[1])</a> that predestination is a part of providence. To providence, however, it belongs to permit certain defects in those things | |
| 15056 which are subject to providence, as was said above ( | |
| 15057 <a id="FP_Q23_A3-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q22_A2.html">Q[22], A[2]</a>). Thus, as men are ordained to eternal life through the providence of God, it likewise is part of that providence to permit | |
| 15058 some to fall away from that end; this is called | |
| 15059 reprobation. Thus, as predestination is a part of providence, in regard to those ordained to eternal salvation, so reprobation | |
| 15060 is a part of providence in regard to those who turn aside from that end. Hence reprobation implies not only foreknowledge, | |
| 15061 but also something more, as does providence, as was said above ( | |
| 15062 <a id="FP_Q23_A3-p6.3" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q22_A1.html">Q[22], A[1]</a>). Therefore, as predestination includes the will to confer grace and glory; so also reprobation includes the will to permit | |
| 15063 a person to fall into | |
| 15064 sin, and to impose the punishment of damnation on account of that sin. | |
| 15065 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 23 a. 3 co."><a name="29419" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29419] Iª q. 23 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum | |
| 15066 quod Deus aliquos reprobat. Dictum enim est supra quod | |
| 15067 praedestinatio est pars providentiae. Ad providentiam autem | |
| 15068 pertinet permittere aliquem defectum in rebus quae providentiae | |
| 15069 subduntur, ut supra dictum est. Unde, cum per divinam providentiam | |
| 15070 homines in vitam aeternam ordinentur, pertinet etiam ad divinam | |
| 15071 providentiam, ut permittat aliquos ab isto fine deficere. Et hoc | |
| 15072 dicitur reprobare. Sic igitur, sicut praedestinatio est pars | |
| 15073 providentiae respectu eorum qui divinitus ordinantur in aeternam | |
| 15074 salutem; ita reprobatio est pars providentiae respectu illorum qui | |
| 15075 ab hoc fine decidunt. Unde reprobatio non nominat praescientiam | |
| 15076 tantum, sed aliquid addit secundum rationem, sicut et providentia, | |
| 15077 ut supra dictum est. Sicut enim praedestinatio includit voluntatem | |
| 15078 conferendi gratiam et gloriam, ita reprobatio includit voluntatem | |
| 15079 permittendi aliquem cadere in culpam, et inferendi damnationis | |
| 15080 poenam pro culpa.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q23_A3-p7"> | |
| 15081 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> God loves all men and all creatures, inasmuch as He wishes them all some good; but He does not wish every good to them all. | |
| 15082 So far, therefore, as He does not wish this particular good---namely, eternal life---He is said to hate or reprobated them. | |
| 15083 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 23 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="29420" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29420] Iª q. 23 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo | |
| 15084 dicendum quod Deus omnes homines diligit, et etiam omnes creaturas, | |
| 15085 inquantum omnibus vult aliquod bonum, non tamen quodcumque bonum | |
| 15086 vult omnibus. Inquantum igitur quibusdam non vult hoc bonum quod | |
| 15087 est vita aeterna, dicitur eos habere odio, vel reprobare.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q23_A3-p8"> | |
| 15088 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Reprobation differs in its causality from predestination. This latter is the cause both of what is expected in the future | |
| 15089 life by the predestined---namely, glory---and of what is received in this life---namely, grace. Reprobation, however, is not | |
| 15090 the cause of what is in the present---namely, sin; but it is the cause of abandonment by God. It is the cause, however, of | |
| 15091 what is assigned in the future---namely, eternal punishment. But guilt proceeds from | |
| 15092 the free-will of the person who is reprobated and deserted by grace. In this way, the word of the prophet is true---namely, | |
| 15093 "Destruction is thy own, O Israel." | |
| 15094 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 23 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="29421" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29421] Iª q. 23 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 15095 dicendum quod aliter se habet reprobatio in causando, quam | |
| 15096 praedestinatio. Nam praedestinatio est causa et eius quod | |
| 15097 expectatur in futura vita a praedestinatis, scilicet gloriae; et | |
| 15098 eius quod percipitur in praesenti, scilicet gratiae. Reprobatio | |
| 15099 vero non est causa eius quod est in praesenti, scilicet culpae; sed | |
| 15100 est causa derelictionis a Deo. Est tamen causa eius quod redditur | |
| 15101 in futuro, scilicet poenae aeternae. Sed culpa provenit ex libero | |
| 15102 arbitrio eius qui reprobatur et a gratia deseritur. Et secundum hoc | |
| 15103 verificatur dictum prophetae, scilicet, <i>perditio tua, Israel, ex | |
| 15104 te</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q23_A3-p9"> | |
| 15105 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Reprobation by God does not take anything away from the power of the person reprobated. Hence, when it is said that the reprobated | |
| 15106 cannot obtain grace, this must not be understood as implying absolute impossibility: but only conditional impossibility: as | |
| 15107 was said above ( | |
| 15108 <a id="FP_Q23_A3-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q19_A3.html">Q[19], A[3]</a>), that the predestined must necessarily be saved; yet a conditional necessity, which does not do away with the liberty of | |
| 15109 choice. Whence, although | |
| 15110 anyone reprobated by God cannot acquire grace, nevertheless that he falls into this or that particular sin comes from the | |
| 15111 use of his free-will. Hence it is rightly imputed to him as guilt. | |
| 15112 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 23 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="29422" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29422] Iª q. 23 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 15113 dicendum quod reprobatio Dei non subtrahit aliquid de potentia | |
| 15114 reprobati. Unde, cum dicitur quod reprobatus non potest gratiam | |
| 15115 adipisci, non est hoc intelligendum secundum impossibilitatem | |
| 15116 absolutam, sed secundum impossibilitatem conditionatam, sicut supra | |
| 15117 dictum est quod praedestinatum necesse est salvari, necessitate | |
| 15118 conditionata, quae non tollit libertatem arbitrii. Unde, licet | |
| 15119 aliquis non possit gratiam adipisci qui reprobatur a Deo, tamen | |
| 15120 quod in hoc peccatum vel illud labatur, ex eius libero arbitrio | |
| 15121 contingit. Unde et merito sibi imputatur in culpam.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q23_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q23_A4-p0.1">Q. 23. A. 4. Whether the predestined are chosen by God? [*"Eligantur."]</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q23_A4-p2"> | |
| 15122 <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the predestined are not chosen by God. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv, 1) that as the corporeal sun sends | |
| 15123 his rays upon all without selection, so does God His goodness. But the goodness of God is communicated to some in an especial | |
| 15124 manner through a participation of grace and glory. Therefore God without any selection communicates His grace and glory; and | |
| 15125 this belongs to predestination. | |
| 15126 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 23 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="29423" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29423] Iª q. 23 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum sic | |
| 15127 proceditur. Videtur quod praedestinati non eligantur a Deo. Dicit | |
| 15128 enim Dionysius, IV cap. de Div. Nom., quod, sicut sol corporeus non | |
| 15129 eligendo omnibus corporibus lumen immittit, ita et Deus suam | |
| 15130 bonitatem. Sed bonitas divina communicatur praecipue aliquibus | |
| 15131 secundum participationem gratiae et gloriae. Ergo Deus absque | |
| 15132 electione gratiam et gloriam communicat. Quod ad praedestinationem | |
| 15133 pertinet.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q23_A4-p3"> | |
| 15134 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, election is of things that exist. But predestination from all eternity is also of things which do not exist. Therefore, | |
| 15135 some are predestined without election. | |
| 15136 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 23 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="29424" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29424] Iª q. 23 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 15137 electio est eorum quae sunt. Sed praedestinatio ab aeterno est | |
| 15138 etiam eorum quae non sunt. Ergo praedestinantur aliqui absque | |
| 15139 electione.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q23_A4-p4"> | |
| 15140 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, election implies some discrimination. Now God "wills all men to be saved" ( | |
| 15141 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q23_A4-p4.1" href="./asv.html#iTim.2.4" target="asv">1 Tim. 2:4</a>). Therefore, predestination which ordains men towards eternal salvation, is without election. | |
| 15142 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 23 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="29425" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29425] Iª q. 23 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 15143 electio quandam discretionem importat. <i>Sed Deus vult omnes | |
| 15144 homines salvos fieri</i>, ut dicitur I Tim. II. Ergo | |
| 15145 praedestinatio, quae praeordinat homines in salutem, est absque | |
| 15146 electione.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q23_A4-p5"> | |
| 15147 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is said ( | |
| 15148 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q23_A4-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Eph.1.4" target="asv">Eph. 1:4</a>): "He chose us in Him before the foundation of the world." | |
| 15149 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 23 a. 4 s. c."><a name="29426" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29426] Iª q. 23 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est | |
| 15150 quod dicitur Ephes. I, <i>elegit nos in ipso ante mundi | |
| 15151 constitutionem</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q23_A4-p6"> | |
| 15152 <b>I answer that,</b> Predestination presupposes election in the order of reason; and election presupposes love. The reason of this is that predestination, | |
| 15153 as stated above | |
| 15154 <a id="FP_Q23_A4-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q23_A1.html">(A[1])</a>, is a part of providence. Now providence, as also prudence, is the plan existing in the intellect directing the ordering | |
| 15155 of some things towards an end; as was proved above ( | |
| 15156 <a id="FP_Q23_A4-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q22_A2.html">Q[22], A[2]</a>). But nothing is directed towards an end unless the will for that end | |
| 15157 already exists. Whence the predestination of some to eternal salvation presupposes, in the order of reason, that God wills | |
| 15158 their salvation; and to this belong both election and love:---love, inasmuch as He wills them this particular good of eternal | |
| 15159 salvation; since to love is to wish well to anyone, as stated above ( | |
| 15160 <a id="FP_Q23_A4-p6.3" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q20_A2.html">Q[20], AA[2]</a>,3):---election, inasmuch as He wills this good to some in preference to others; since He reprobates some, as stated above | |
| 15161 | |
| 15162 <a id="FP_Q23_A4-p6.4" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q23_A3.html">(A[3])</a>. Election and love, however, are differently ordered in God, and in ourselves: because in us the will in loving does not | |
| 15163 cause good, but we are incited to love by the good which already exists; and therefore we choose someone to love, and so election | |
| 15164 in us precedes love. In God, however, it is the reverse. For His will, by which in loving He wishes good to someone, is the | |
| 15165 cause of that good possessed by some in preference to others. Thus it is clear that love | |
| 15166 precedes election in the order of reason, and election precedes predestination. Whence all the predestinate are objects of | |
| 15167 election and love. | |
| 15168 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 23 a. 4 co."><a name="29427" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29427] Iª q. 23 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum | |
| 15169 quod praedestinatio, secundum rationem, praesupponit electionem; et | |
| 15170 electio dilectionem. Cuius ratio est, quia praedestinatio, ut | |
| 15171 dictum est, est pars providentiae. Providentia autem, sicut et | |
| 15172 prudentia, est ratio in intellectu existens, praeceptiva | |
| 15173 ordinationis aliquorum in finem, ut supra dictum est. Non autem | |
| 15174 praecipitur aliquid ordinandum in finem, nisi praeexistente | |
| 15175 voluntate finis. Unde praedestinatio aliquorum in salutem aeternam, | |
| 15176 praesupponit, secundum rationem, quod Deus illorum velit salutem. | |
| 15177 Ad quod pertinet electio et dilectio. Dilectio quidem, inquantum | |
| 15178 vult eis hoc bonum salutis aeternae, nam diligere est velle alicui | |
| 15179 bonum, ut supra dictum est. Electio autem, inquantum hoc bonum | |
| 15180 aliquibus prae aliis vult, cum quosdam reprobet, ut supra dictum | |
| 15181 est. Electio tamen et dilectio aliter ordinantur in nobis et in | |
| 15182 Deo, eo quod in nobis voluntas diligendo non causat bonum; sed ex | |
| 15183 bono praeexistente incitamur ad diligendum. Et ideo eligimus | |
| 15184 aliquem, quem diligamus, et sic electio dilectionem praecedit in | |
| 15185 nobis. In Deo autem est e converso. Nam voluntas eius, qua vult | |
| 15186 bonum alicui diligendo, est causa quod illud bonum ab eo prae aliis | |
| 15187 habeatur. Et sic patet quod dilectio praesupponitur electioni, | |
| 15188 secundum rationem; et electio praedestinationi. Unde omnes | |
| 15189 praedestinati sunt electi et dilecti.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q23_A4-p7"> | |
| 15190 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> If the communication of the divine goodness in general be considered, God communicates His goodness without election; inasmuch | |
| 15191 as there is nothing which does not in some way share in His goodness, as we said above ( | |
| 15192 <a id="FP_Q23_A4-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q6_A4.html">Q[6], A[4]</a>). But if we consider the communication of this or that particular good, He does not allot it without election; since He gives | |
| 15193 certain goods to some men, which He does not give to others. Thus in the | |
| 15194 conferring of grace and glory election is implied. | |
| 15195 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 23 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="29428" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29428] Iª q. 23 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo | |
| 15196 dicendum quod, si consideretur communicatio bonitatis divinae in | |
| 15197 communi, absque electione bonitatem suam communicat; inquantum | |
| 15198 scilicet nihil est, quod non participet aliquid de bonitate eius, | |
| 15199 ut supra dictum est. Sed si consideretur communicatio istius vel | |
| 15200 illius boni, non absque electione tribuit, quia quaedam bona dat | |
| 15201 aliquibus, quae non dat aliis. Et sic in collatione gratiae et | |
| 15202 gloriae attenditur electio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q23_A4-p8"> | |
| 15203 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> When the will of the person choosing is incited to make a choice by the good already pre-existing in the object chosen, the | |
| 15204 choice must needs be of those things which already exist, as happens in our choice. In God it is otherwise; as was said above | |
| 15205 ( | |
| 15206 <a id="FP_Q23_A4-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q20_A2.html">Q[20], A[2]</a>). Thus, as Augustine says (De Verb. Ap. Serm. 11): "Those are chosen by God, who do not exist; yet He does not err in His | |
| 15207 choice." | |
| 15208 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 23 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="29429" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29429] Iª q. 23 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 15209 dicendum quod, quando voluntas eligentis provocatur ad eligendum a | |
| 15210 bono in re praeexistente, tunc oportet quod electio sit eorum quae | |
| 15211 sunt; sicut accidit in electione nostra. Sed in Deo est aliter, ut | |
| 15212 dictum est. Et ideo, sicut dicit Augustinus, <i>eliguntur a Deo qui | |
| 15213 non sunt, neque tamen errat qui eligit</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q23_A4-p9"> | |
| 15214 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> God wills all men to be saved by His antecedent will, which is to will not simply but relatively; and not by His consequent | |
| 15215 will, which is to will simply. | |
| 15216 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 23 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="29430" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29430] Iª q. 23 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 15217 dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, Deus vult omnes homines | |
| 15218 salvos fieri antecedenter, quod non est simpliciter velle, sed | |
| 15219 secundum quid, non autem consequenter, quod est simpliciter | |
| 15220 velle.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q23_A5" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q23_A5-p0.1">Q. 23. A. 5. Whether the foreknowledge of merits is the cause of predestination?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q23_A5-p2"> | |
| 15221 <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that foreknowledge of merits is the cause of predestination. For the Apostle says ( | |
| 15222 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q23_A5-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.8.29" target="asv">Rom. 8:29</a>): "Whom He foreknew, He also predestined." Again a gloss of Ambrose on | |
| 15223 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q23_A5-p2.2" href="./asv.html#Rom.9.15" target="asv"> Rom. 9:15</a>: "I will have mercy upon whom I will have mercy" says: "I will give mercy to him who, I foresee, will turn to Me with his | |
| 15224 whole heart." Therefore it seems the foreknowledge of merits is the cause of predestination. | |
| 15225 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 23 a. 5 arg. 1"><a name="29431" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29431] Iª q. 23 a. 5 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quintum sic | |
| 15226 proceditur. Videtur quod praescientia meritorum sit causa | |
| 15227 praedestinationis. Dicit enim apostolus, Rom. VIII, <i>quos | |
| 15228 praescivit, hos et praedestinavit</i>. Et Glossa Ambrosii, super | |
| 15229 illud Rom. IX, <i>miserebor cui miserebor</i> etc., dicit, | |
| 15230 <i>misericordiam illi dabo, quem praescio toto corde reversurum ad | |
| 15231 me</i>. Ergo videtur quod praescientia meritorum sit causa | |
| 15232 praedestinationis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q23_A5-p3"> | |
| 15233 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Divine predestination includes the divine will, which by no means can be irrational; since predestination is "the | |
| 15234 purpose to have mercy," as Augustine says (De Praed. Sanct. ii, 17). But there can be no other reason for predestination than | |
| 15235 the foreknowledge of merits. Therefore it must be the cause of reason of predestination. | |
| 15236 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 23 a. 5 arg. 2"><a name="29432" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29432] Iª q. 23 a. 5 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 15237 praedestinatio divina includit divinam voluntatem, quae | |
| 15238 irrationabilis esse non potest, cum praedestinatio sit propositum | |
| 15239 miserendi, ut Augustinus dicit. Sed nulla alia ratio potest esse | |
| 15240 praedestinationis nisi praescientia meritorum. Ergo praescientia | |
| 15241 meritorum est causa vel ratio praedestinationis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q23_A5-p4"> | |
| 15242 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, "There is no injustice in God" ( | |
| 15243 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q23_A5-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.9.14" target="asv">Rom. 9:14</a>). Now it would seem unjust that unequal things be given to equals. But all men are equal as regards both nature and original | |
| 15244 sin; and inequality in them arises from the merits or demerits of their actions. Therefore God does not prepare unequal things | |
| 15245 for men by predestinating and reprobating, unless through the foreknowledge of their merits and demerits. | |
| 15246 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 23 a. 5 arg. 3"><a name="29433" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29433] Iª q. 23 a. 5 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 15247 <i>non est iniquitas apud Deum</i>, ut dicitur Rom. IX. Iniquum | |
| 15248 autem esse videtur, ut aequalibus inaequalia dentur. Omnes autem | |
| 15249 homines sunt aequales et secundum naturam, et secundum peccatum | |
| 15250 originale, attenditur autem in eis inaequalitas secundum merita vel | |
| 15251 demerita propriorum actuum. Non igitur inaequalia praeparat Deus | |
| 15252 hominibus, praedestinando et reprobando, nisi propter differentium | |
| 15253 meritorum praescientiam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q23_A5-p5"> | |
| 15254 <b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle says ( | |
| 15255 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q23_A5-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Titus.3.5" target="asv">Titus 3:5</a>): "Not by works of justice which we have done, but according to His mercy He saved us." But as He saved us, so He predestined | |
| 15256 that we should be saved. Therefore, foreknowledge of merits is not the cause or reason of predestination. | |
| 15257 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 23 a. 5 s. c."><a name="29434" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29434] Iª q. 23 a. 5 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est | |
| 15258 quod dicit apostolus, ad Tit. III, <i>non ex operibus iustitiae, | |
| 15259 quae fecimus nos, sed secundum suam misericordiam salvos nos | |
| 15260 fecit</i>. Sicut autem salvos nos fecit, ita et praedestinavit nos | |
| 15261 salvos fieri. Non ergo praescientia meritorum est causa vel ratio | |
| 15262 praedestinationis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q23_A5-p6"> | |
| 15263 <b>I answer that,</b> Since predestination includes will, as was said above | |
| 15264 <a id="FP_Q23_A5-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q23_A4.html">(A[4])</a>, the reason of predestination must be sought for in the same way as was the reason of the will of God. Now it was shown above | |
| 15265 ( | |
| 15266 <a id="FP_Q23_A5-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q19_A5.html">Q[19], A[5]</a> ), that we cannot assign any cause of the divine will on the part of the act of willing; but a reason can be found on the | |
| 15267 part of the things willed; inasmuch as God wills one thing on account of something else. | |
| 15268 Wherefore nobody has been so insane as to say that merit is the cause of divine predestination as regards the act of the predestinator. | |
| 15269 But this is the question, whether, as regards the effect, predestination has any cause; or what comes to the same thing, whether | |
| 15270 God pre-ordained that He would give the effect of predestination to anyone on account of any merits. | |
| 15271 </p><p id="FP_Q23_A5-p7"> Accordingly there were some who held that the effect of predestination was pre-ordained for some on account of pre-existing | |
| 15272 merits in a former life. This was the opinion of Origen, who thought that the souls of men were created in the beginning, | |
| 15273 and according to the diversity of their works different states were assigned to them in this world when united with the body. | |
| 15274 The Apostle, however, rebuts this opinion where he says ( | |
| 15275 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q23_A5-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.9.11" target="asv">Rom. 9:11,12</a>): "For when they were | |
| 15276 not yet born, nor had done any good or evil . . . not of works, but of Him that calleth, it was said of her: The elder shall | |
| 15277 serve the younger." | |
| 15278 </p><p id="FP_Q23_A5-p8"> Others said that pre-existing merits in this life are the reason and cause of the effect of predestination. For the Pelagians | |
| 15279 taught that the beginning of doing well came from us; and the consummation from God: so that it came about that the effect | |
| 15280 of predestination was granted to one, and not to another, because the one made a beginning by preparing, whereas the other | |
| 15281 did not. But against this we have the saying of the Apostle ( | |
| 15282 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q23_A5-p8.1" href="./asv.html#iiCor.3.5" target="asv">2 Cor. 3:5</a>), that "we are not | |
| 15283 sufficient to think anything of ourselves as of ourselves." Now no principle of action can be imagined previous to the act | |
| 15284 of thinking. Wherefore it cannot be said that anything begun in us can be the reason of the effect of predestination. | |
| 15285 </p><p id="FP_Q23_A5-p9"> And so others said that merits following the effect of predestination are the reason of predestination; giving us to understand | |
| 15286 that God gives grace to a person, and pre-ordains that He will give it, because He knows beforehand that He will make good | |
| 15287 use of that grace, as if a king were to give a horse to a soldier because he knows he will make good use of it. But these | |
| 15288 seem to have drawn a distinction between that which flows from grace, and that which flows from free will, as | |
| 15289 if the same thing cannot come from both. It is, however, manifest that what is of grace is the effect of predestination; and | |
| 15290 this cannot be considered as the reason of predestination, since it is contained in the notion of predestination. Therefore, | |
| 15291 if anything else in us be the reason of predestination, it will outside the effect of predestination. Now there is no distinction | |
| 15292 between what flows from free will, and what is of predestination; as there is not distinction between what flows from a | |
| 15293 secondary cause and from a first cause. For the providence of God produces effects through the operation of secondary causes, | |
| 15294 as was above shown ( | |
| 15295 <a id="FP_Q23_A5-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q22_A3.html">Q[22], A[3]</a>). Wherefore, that which flows from free-will is also of predestination. We must say, therefore, that the effect of predestination | |
| 15296 may be considered in a twofold light---in one way, in particular; and thus there is no reason why one effect of predestination | |
| 15297 should not be the reason or cause of another; a subsequent | |
| 15298 effect being the reason of a previous effect, as its final cause; and the previous effect being the reason of the subsequent | |
| 15299 as its meritorious cause, which is reduced to the disposition of the matter. Thus we might say that God pre-ordained to give | |
| 15300 glory on account of merit, and that He pre-ordained to give grace to merit glory. In another way, the effect of predestination | |
| 15301 may be considered in general. Thus, it is impossible that the whole of the effect of predestination in general should have | |
| 15302 any cause as coming from us; because whatsoever is in man disposing him towards salvation, is all included under the effect | |
| 15303 of predestination; even the preparation for grace. For neither does this happen otherwise than by divine help, according to | |
| 15304 the prophet Jeremias ( | |
| 15305 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q23_A5-p9.2" href="./asv.html#Lam.5.21" target="asv">Lam. 5:21</a>): "convert us, O Lord, to Thee, and we shall be converted." Yet predestination has in this way, in regard to its effect, | |
| 15306 the goodness of God for its reason; towards which the whole effect of | |
| 15307 predestination is directed as to an end; and from which it proceeds, as from its first moving principle. | |
| 15308 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 23 a. 5 co."><a name="29435" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29435] Iª q. 23 a. 5 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum | |
| 15309 quod, cum praedestinatio includat voluntatem, ut supra dictum est, | |
| 15310 sic inquirenda est ratio praedestinationis, sicut inquiritur ratio | |
| 15311 divinae voluntatis. Dictum est autem supra quod non est assignare | |
| 15312 causam divinae voluntatis ex parte actus volendi; sed potest | |
| 15313 assignari ratio ex parte volitorum, inquantum scilicet Deus vult | |
| 15314 esse aliquid propter aliud. Nullus ergo fuit ita insanae mentis, | |
| 15315 qui diceret merita esse causam divinae praedestinationis, ex parte | |
| 15316 actus praedestinantis. Sed hoc sub quaestione vertitur, utrum ex | |
| 15317 parte effectus, praedestinatio habeat aliquam causam. Et hoc est | |
| 15318 quaerere, utrum Deus praeordinaverit se daturum effectum | |
| 15319 praedestinationis alicui, propter merita aliqua. Fuerunt igitur | |
| 15320 quidam, qui dixerunt quod effectus praedestinationis praeordinatur | |
| 15321 alicui propter merita praeexistentia in alia vita. Et haec fuit | |
| 15322 positio Origenis, qui posuit animas humanas ab initio creatas, et | |
| 15323 secundum diversitatem suorum operum, diversos status eas sortiri in | |
| 15324 hoc mundo corporibus unitas. Sed hanc opinionem excludit apostolus, | |
| 15325 Rom. IX, dicens, <i>cum nondum nati fuissent, aut aliquid egissent | |
| 15326 boni vel mali, non ex operibus, sed ex vocante dictum est, quia | |
| 15327 maior serviet minori</i>. Fuerunt ergo alii, qui dixerunt quod | |
| 15328 merita praeexistentia in hac vita sunt ratio et causa effectus | |
| 15329 praedestinationis. Posuerunt enim Pelagiani quod initium | |
| 15330 benefaciendi sit ex nobis, consummatio autem a Deo. Et sic, ex hoc | |
| 15331 contingit quod alicui datur praedestinationis effectus, et non | |
| 15332 alteri, quia unus initium dedit se praeparando, et non alius. Sed | |
| 15333 contra hoc est quod dicit apostolus, II Cor. III, quod <i>non sumus | |
| 15334 sufficientes cogitare aliquid a nobis, quasi ex nobis</i>. Nullum | |
| 15335 autem anterius principium inveniri potest quam cogitatio. Unde non | |
| 15336 potest dici quod aliquod in nobis initium existat, quod sit ratio | |
| 15337 effectus praedestinationis. Unde fuerunt alii, qui dixerunt quod | |
| 15338 merita sequentia praedestinationis effectum, sunt ratio | |
| 15339 praedestinationis, ut intelligatur quod ideo Deus dat gratiam | |
| 15340 alicui, et praeordinavit se ei daturum, quia praescivit eum bene | |
| 15341 usurum gratia; sicut si rex det alicui militi equum, quem scit eo | |
| 15342 bene usurum. Sed isti videntur distinxisse inter id quod est ex | |
| 15343 gratia, et id quod est ex libero arbitrio, quasi non possit esse | |
| 15344 idem ex utroque. Manifestum est autem quod id quod est gratiae, est | |
| 15345 praedestinationis effectus, et hoc non potest poni ut ratio | |
| 15346 praedestinationis, cum hoc sub praedestinatione concludatur. Si | |
| 15347 igitur aliquid aliud ex parte nostra sit ratio praedestinationis, | |
| 15348 hoc erit praeter effectum praedestinationis. Non est autem | |
| 15349 distinctum quod est ex libero arbitrio, et ex praedestinatione; | |
| 15350 sicut nec est distinctum quod est ex causa secunda, et causa prima, | |
| 15351 divina enim providentia producit effectus per operationes causarum | |
| 15352 secundarum, ut supra dictum est. Unde et id quod est per liberum | |
| 15353 arbitrium, est ex praedestinatione. Dicendum est ergo quod effectum | |
| 15354 praedestinationis considerare possumus dupliciter. Uno modo, in | |
| 15355 particulari. Et sic nihil prohibet aliquem effectum | |
| 15356 praedestinationis esse causam et rationem alterius, posteriorem | |
| 15357 quidem prioris, secundum rationem causae finalis; priorem vero | |
| 15358 posterioris, secundum rationem causae meritoriae, quae reducitur ad | |
| 15359 dispositionem materiae. Sicut si dicamus quod Deus praeordinavit se | |
| 15360 daturum alicui gloriam ex meritis; et quod praeordinavit se daturum | |
| 15361 alicui gratiam, ut mereretur gloriam. Alio modo potest considerari | |
| 15362 praedestinationis effectus in communi. Et sic impossibile est quod | |
| 15363 totus praedestinationis effectus in communi habeat aliquam causam | |
| 15364 ex parte nostra. Quia quidquid est in homine ordinans ipsum in | |
| 15365 salutem, comprehenditur totum sub effectu praedestinationis, etiam | |
| 15366 ipsa praeparatio ad gratiam, neque enim hoc fit nisi per auxilium | |
| 15367 divinum, secundum illud Thren. ultimi, <i>converte nos, domine, ad | |
| 15368 te, et convertemur</i>. Habet tamen hoc modo praedestinatio, ex | |
| 15369 parte effectus, pro ratione divinam bonitatem; ad quam totus | |
| 15370 effectus praedestinationis ordinatur ut in finem, et ex qua | |
| 15371 procedit sicut ex principio primo movente.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q23_A5-p10"> | |
| 15372 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The use of grace foreknown by God is not the cause of conferring grace, except after the manner of a final cause; as was | |
| 15373 explained above. | |
| 15374 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 23 a. 5 ad 1"><a name="29436" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29436] Iª q. 23 a. 5 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo | |
| 15375 dicendum quod usus gratiae praescitus, non est ratio collationis | |
| 15376 gratiae, nisi secundum rationem causae finalis, ut dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q23_A5-p11"> | |
| 15377 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Predestination has its foundation in the goodness of God as regards its effects in general. Considered in its particular | |
| 15378 effects, however, one effect is the reason of another; as already stated. | |
| 15379 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 23 a. 5 ad 2"><a name="29437" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29437] Iª q. 23 a. 5 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 15380 dicendum quod praedestinatio habet rationem ex parte effectus, in | |
| 15381 communi, ipsam divinam bonitatem. In particulari autem, unus | |
| 15382 effectus est ratio alterius, ut dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q23_A5-p12"> | |
| 15383 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The reason for the predestination of some, and reprobation of others, must be sought for in the goodness of God. Thus He | |
| 15384 is said to have made all things through His goodness, so that the divine goodness might be represented in things. Now it is | |
| 15385 necessary that God's goodness, which in itself is one and undivided, should be manifested in many ways in His creation; because | |
| 15386 creatures in themselves cannot attain to the simplicity of God. Thus it is that | |
| 15387 for the completion of the universe there are required different grades of being; some of which hold a high and some a low | |
| 15388 place in the universe. That this multiformity of grades may be preserved in things, God allows some evils, lest many good | |
| 15389 things should never happen, as was said above ( | |
| 15390 <a id="FP_Q23_A5-p12.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q22_A2.html">Q[22], A[2]</a>). Let us then consider the whole of the human race, as we consider the whole universe. God wills to manifest His goodness | |
| 15391 in men; in respect to those whom He predestines, | |
| 15392 by means of His mercy, as sparing them; and in respect of others, whom he reprobates, by means of His justice, in punishing | |
| 15393 them. This is the reason why God elects some and rejects others. To this the Apostle refers, saying ( | |
| 15394 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q23_A5-p12.2" href="./asv.html#Rom.9.22" target="asv">Rom. 9:22,23</a>): "What if God, willing to show His wrath [that is, the vengeance of His justice], and to make His power known, endured [that | |
| 15395 is, permitted] with much patience vessels of wrath, fitted for destruction; that He might show the riches of His | |
| 15396 glory on the vessels of mercy, which He hath prepared unto glory" and ( | |
| 15397 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q23_A5-p12.3" href="./asv.html#iiTim.2.20" target="asv">2 Tim. 2:20</a>): "But in a great house there are not only vessels of gold and silver; but also of wood and of earth; and some, indeed, unto | |
| 15398 honor, but some unto dishonor." Yet why He chooses some for glory, and reprobates others, has no reason, except the divine | |
| 15399 will. Whence Augustine says (Tract. xxvi. in Joan.): "Why He draws one, and another He draws not, seek not to judge, if thou | |
| 15400 dost not wish to err." | |
| 15401 Thus too, in the things of nature, a reason can be assigned, since primary matter is altogether uniform, why one part of it | |
| 15402 was fashioned by God from the beginning under the form of fire, another under the form of earth, that there might be a diversity | |
| 15403 of species in things of nature. Yet why this particular part of matter is under this particular form, and that under another, | |
| 15404 depends upon the simple will of God; as from the simple will of the artificer it depends that this stone is in part of | |
| 15405 the wall, and that in another; although the plan requires that some stones should be in this place, and some in that place. | |
| 15406 Neither on this account can there be said to be injustice in God, if He prepares unequal lots for not unequal things. This | |
| 15407 would be altogether contrary to the notion of justice, if the effect of predestination were granted as a debt, and not gratuitously. | |
| 15408 In things which are given gratuitously, a person can give more or less, just as he pleases (provided he deprives nobody | |
| 15409 of his due), without any infringement of justice. This is what the master of the house said: "Take what is thine, and go thy | |
| 15410 way. Is it not lawful for me to do what I will?" ( | |
| 15411 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q23_A5-p12.4" href="./asv.html#Matt.20.14" target="asv">Mat. 20:14,15</a>). | |
| 15412 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 23 a. 5 ad 3"><a name="29438" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29438] Iª q. 23 a. 5 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 15413 dicendum quod ex ipsa bonitate divina ratio sumi potest | |
| 15414 praedestinationis aliquorum, et reprobationis aliorum. Sic enim | |
| 15415 Deus dicitur omnia propter suam bonitatem fecisse, ut in rebus | |
| 15416 divina bonitas repraesentetur. Necesse est autem quod divina | |
| 15417 bonitas, quae in se est una et simplex, multiformiter | |
| 15418 repraesentetur in rebus; propter hoc quod res creatae ad | |
| 15419 simplicitatem divinam attingere non possunt. Et inde est quod ad | |
| 15420 completionem universi requiruntur diversi gradus rerum, quarum | |
| 15421 quaedam altum, et quaedam infimum locum teneant in universo. Et ut | |
| 15422 multiformitas graduum conservetur in rebus, Deus permittit aliqua | |
| 15423 mala fieri, ne multa bona impediantur, ut supra dictum est. Sic | |
| 15424 igitur consideremus totum genus humanum, sicut totam rerum | |
| 15425 universitatem. Voluit igitur Deus in hominibus, quantum ad aliquos, | |
| 15426 quos praedestinat, suam repraesentare bonitatem per modum | |
| 15427 misericordiae, parcendo; et quantum ad aliquos, quos reprobat, per | |
| 15428 modum iustitiae, puniendo. Et haec est ratio quare Deus quosdam | |
| 15429 eligit, et quosdam reprobat. Et hanc causam assignat apostolus, ad | |
| 15430 Rom. IX, dicens, volens Deus ostendere iram (idest vindictam | |
| 15431 iustitiae), et notam facere potentiam suam, sustinuit (idest | |
| 15432 permisit) <i>in multa patientia, vasa irae apta in interitum, ut | |
| 15433 ostenderet divitias gloriae suae in vasa misericordiae, quae | |
| 15434 praeparavit in gloriam</i>. Et II Tim. II dicit, <i>in magna autem | |
| 15435 domo non solum sunt vasa aurea et argentea, sed etiam lignea et | |
| 15436 fictilia; et quaedam quidem in honorem, quaedam in contumeliam</i>. | |
| 15437 Sed quare hos elegit in gloriam, et illos reprobavit, non habet | |
| 15438 rationem nisi divinam voluntatem. Unde Augustinus dicit, super | |
| 15439 Ioannem, <i>quare hunc trahat, et illum non trahat, noli velle | |
| 15440 diiudicare, si non vis errare</i>. Sicut etiam in rebus naturalibus | |
| 15441 potest assignari ratio, cum prima materia tota sit in se uniformis, | |
| 15442 quare una pars eius est sub forma ignis, et alia sub forma terrae, | |
| 15443 a Deo in principio condita, ut scilicet sit diversitas specierum in | |
| 15444 rebus naturalibus. Sed quare haec pars materiae est sub ista forma, | |
| 15445 et illa sub alia, dependet ex simplici divina voluntate. Sicut ex | |
| 15446 simplici voluntate artificis dependet, quod ille lapis est in ista | |
| 15447 parte parietis, et ille in alia, quamvis ratio artis habeat quod | |
| 15448 aliqui sint in hac, et aliqui sint in illa. Neque tamen propter hoc | |
| 15449 est iniquitas apud Deum, si inaequalia non inaequalibus praeparat. | |
| 15450 Hoc enim esset contra iustitiae rationem, si praedestinationis | |
| 15451 effectus ex debito redderetur, et non daretur ex gratia. In his | |
| 15452 enim quae ex gratia dantur, potest aliquis pro libito suo dare cui | |
| 15453 vult, plus vel minus, dummodo nulli subtrahat debitum, absque | |
| 15454 praeiudicio iustitiae. Et hoc est quod dicit paterfamilias, Matt. | |
| 15455 XX, <i>tolle quod tuum est, et vade. An non licet mihi quod volo, | |
| 15456 facere?</i></p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q23_A6" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q23_A6-p0.1">Q. 23. A. 6. Whether predestination is certain?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q23_A6-p2"> | |
| 15457 <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that predestination is not certain. Because on the words "Hold fast that which thou hast, that no one take thy crown," | |
| 15458 ( | |
| 15459 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q23_A6-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Rev.3.11" target="asv">Rev 3:11</a>), Augustine says (De Corr. et Grat. 15): "Another will not receive, unless this one were to lose it." Hence the crown which | |
| 15460 is the effect of predestination can be both acquired and lost. Therefore predestination cannot be certain. | |
| 15461 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 23 a. 6 arg. 1"><a name="29439" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29439] Iª q. 23 a. 6 arg. 1</span></a> Ad sextum sic | |
| 15462 proceditur. Videtur quod praedestinatio non sit certa. Quia super | |
| 15463 illud Apoc. III, <i>tene quod habes, ne alius accipiat coronam | |
| 15464 tuam</i>, dicit Augustinus, quod <i>alius non est accepturus, nisi | |
| 15465 iste perdiderit</i>. Potest ergo et acquiri et perdi corona, quae | |
| 15466 est praedestinationis effectus. Non est igitur praedestinatio | |
| 15467 certa.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q23_A6-p3"> | |
| 15468 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, granted what is possible, nothing impossible follows. But it is possible that one predestined---e.g. Peter---may | |
| 15469 sin and then be killed. But if this were so, it would follow that the effect of predestination would be thwarted. This then, | |
| 15470 is not impossible. Therefore predestination is not certain. | |
| 15471 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 23 a. 6 arg. 2"><a name="29440" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29440] Iª q. 23 a. 6 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 15472 posito possibili, nullum sequitur impossibile. Possibile est autem | |
| 15473 aliquem praedestinatum, ut Petrum, peccare, et tunc occidi. Hoc | |
| 15474 autem posito, sequitur praedestinationis effectum frustrari. Hoc | |
| 15475 igitur non est impossibile. Non ergo est praedestinatio certa.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q23_A6-p4"> | |
| 15476 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, whatever God could do in the past, He can do now. But He could have not predestined whom He hath predestined. Therefore | |
| 15477 now He is able not to predestine him. Therefore predestination is not certain. | |
| 15478 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 23 a. 6 arg. 3"><a name="29441" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29441] Iª q. 23 a. 6 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 15479 quidquid Deus potuit, potest. Sed potuit non praedestinare quem | |
| 15480 praedestinavit. Ergo nunc potest non praedestinare. Ergo | |
| 15481 praedestinatio non est certa.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q23_A6-p5"> | |
| 15482 <b>On the contrary,</b> A gloss on | |
| 15483 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q23_A6-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.8.29" target="asv"> Rom. 8:29</a>: "Whom He foreknew, He also predestinated", says: "Predestination is the foreknowledge and preparation of the benefits of | |
| 15484 God, by which whosoever are freed will most certainly be freed." | |
| 15485 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 23 a. 6 s. c."><a name="29442" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29442] Iª q. 23 a. 6 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est | |
| 15486 quod super illud Rom. VIII, <i>quos praescivit, et | |
| 15487 praedestinavit</i> etc., dicit Glossa, <i>praedestinatio est | |
| 15488 praescientia et praeparatio beneficiorum Dei, qua certissime | |
| 15489 liberantur quicumque liberantur</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q23_A6-p6"> | |
| 15490 <b>I answer that,</b> Predestination most certainly and infallibly takes effect; yet it does not impose any necessity, so that, namely, its effect | |
| 15491 should take place from necessity. For it was said above | |
| 15492 <a id="FP_Q23_A6-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q23_A1.html">(A[1])</a>, that predestination is a part of providence. But not all things subject to providence are necessary; some things happening | |
| 15493 from contingency, according to the nature of the proximate causes, which divine providence has ordained for such effects. | |
| 15494 Yet | |
| 15495 the order of providence is infallible, as was shown above ( | |
| 15496 <a id="FP_Q23_A6-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q22_A4.html">Q[22], A[4]</a>). So also the order of predestination is certain; yet free-will is not destroyed; whence the effect of predestination has | |
| 15497 its contingency. Moreover all that has been said about the divine knowledge and will ( | |
| 15498 <a id="FP_Q23_A6-p6.3" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q14_A13.html">Q[14], A[13]</a>; | |
| 15499 <a id="FP_Q23_A6-p6.4" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q19_A4.html">Q[19], A[4]</a>) must also be taken into consideration; since they do not destroy contingency in things, although they themselves are | |
| 15500 most certain and infallible. | |
| 15501 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 23 a. 6 co."><a name="29443" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29443] Iª q. 23 a. 6 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum | |
| 15502 quod praedestinatio certissime et infallibiliter consequitur suum | |
| 15503 effectum, nec tamen imponit necessitatem, ut scilicet effectus eius | |
| 15504 ex necessitate proveniat. Dictum est enim supra quod praedestinatio | |
| 15505 est pars providentiae. Sed non omnia quae providentiae subduntur, | |
| 15506 necessaria sunt, sed quaedam contingenter eveniunt, secundum | |
| 15507 conditionem causarum proximarum, quas ad tales effectus divina | |
| 15508 providentia ordinavit. Et tamen providentiae ordo est infallibilis, | |
| 15509 ut supra ostensum est. Sic igitur et ordo praedestinationis est | |
| 15510 certus; et tamen libertas arbitrii non tollitur, ex qua | |
| 15511 contingenter provenit praedestinationis effectus. Ad hoc etiam | |
| 15512 consideranda sunt quae supra dicta sunt de divina scientia et de | |
| 15513 divina voluntate, quae contingentiam a rebus non tollunt, licet | |
| 15514 certissima et infallibilia sint.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q23_A6-p7"> | |
| 15515 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The crown may be said to belong to a person in two ways; first, by God's predestination, and thus no one loses his crown: | |
| 15516 secondly, by the merit of grace; for what we merit, in a certain way is ours; and thus anyone may lose his crown by mortal | |
| 15517 sin. Another person receives that crown thus lost, inasmuch as he takes the former's place. For God does not permit some to | |
| 15518 fall, without raising others; according to | |
| 15519 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q23_A6-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Job.34.24" target="asv"> Job 34:24</a>: "He shall | |
| 15520 break in pieces many and innumerable, and make others to stand in their stead." Thus men are substituted in the place of the | |
| 15521 fallen angels; and the Gentiles in that of the Jews. He who is substituted for another in the state of grace, also receives | |
| 15522 the crown of the fallen in that in eternal life he will rejoice at the good the other has done, in which life he will rejoice | |
| 15523 at all good whether done by himself or by others. | |
| 15524 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 23 a. 6 ad 1"><a name="29444" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29444] Iª q. 23 a. 6 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo | |
| 15525 dicendum quod corona dicitur esse alicuius, dupliciter. Uno modo, | |
| 15526 ex praedestinatione divina, et sic nullus coronam suam amittit. | |
| 15527 Alio modo, ex merito gratiae, quod enim meremur, quodammodo nostrum | |
| 15528 est. Et sic suam coronam aliquis amittere potest per peccatum | |
| 15529 mortale sequens. Alius autem illam coronam amissam accipit, | |
| 15530 inquantum loco eius subrogatur. Non enim permittit Deus aliquos | |
| 15531 cadere, quin alios erigat, secundum illud Iob XXXIV, <i>conteret | |
| 15532 multos et innumerabiles, et stare faciet alios pro eis</i>. Sic | |
| 15533 enim in locum Angelorum cadentium substituti sunt homines; et in | |
| 15534 locum Iudaeorum, gentiles. Substitutus autem in statum gratiae, | |
| 15535 etiam quantum ad hoc coronam cadentis accipit, quod de bonis quae | |
| 15536 alius fecit, in aeterna vita gaudebit, in qua unusquisque gaudebit | |
| 15537 de bonis tam a se quam ab aliis factis.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q23_A6-p8"> | |
| 15538 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Although it is possible for one who is predestinated considered in himself to die in mortal sin; yet it is not possible, | |
| 15539 supposed, as in fact it is supposed. that he is predestinated. Whence it does not follow that predestination can fall short | |
| 15540 of its effect. | |
| 15541 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 23 a. 6 ad 2"><a name="29445" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29445] Iª q. 23 a. 6 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 15542 dicendum quod, licet sit possibile eum qui est praedestinatus, mori | |
| 15543 in peccato mortali, secundum se consideratum; tamen hoc est | |
| 15544 impossibile, posito (prout scilicet ponitur) eum esse | |
| 15545 praedestinatum. Unde non sequitur quod praedestinatio falli | |
| 15546 possit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q23_A6-p9"> | |
| 15547 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Since predestination includes the divine will as stated above | |
| 15548 <a id="FP_Q23_A6-p9.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q23_A4.html">(A[4])</a>: and the fact that God wills any created thing is necessary on the supposition that He so wills, on account of the immutability | |
| 15549 of the divine will, but is not necessary absolutely; so the same must be said of predestination. Wherefore one ought not to | |
| 15550 say that God is able not to predestinate one whom He has predestinated, taking it in a composite sense, | |
| 15551 thought, absolutely speaking, God can predestinate or not. But in this way the certainty of predestination is not destroyed. | |
| 15552 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 23 a. 6 ad 3"><a name="29446" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29446] Iª q. 23 a. 6 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 15553 dicendum quod, cum praedestinatio includat divinam voluntatem, | |
| 15554 sicut supra dictum est quod Deum velle aliquid creatum est | |
| 15555 necessarium ex suppositione, propter immutabilitatem divinae | |
| 15556 voluntatis, non tamen absolute; ita dicendum est hic de | |
| 15557 praedestinatione. Unde non oportet dicere quod Deus possit non | |
| 15558 praedestinare quem praedestinavit, in sensu composito accipiendo; | |
| 15559 licet, absolute considerando, Deus possit praedestinare vel non | |
| 15560 praedestinare. Sed ex hoc non tollitur praedestinationis | |
| 15561 certitudo.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q23_A7" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q23_A7-p0.1">Q. 23. A. 7. Whether the number of the predestined is certain?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q23_A7-p2"> | |
| 15562 <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the number of the predestined is not certain. For a number to which an addition can be made is not certain. | |
| 15563 But there can be an addition to the number of the predestined as it seems; for it is written ( | |
| 15564 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q23_A7-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Deut.1.11" target="asv">Dt. 1:11</a>): "The Lord God adds to this number many thousands," and a gloss adds, "fixed by God, who knows those who belong to Him." | |
| 15565 Therefore the number of the predestined is not certain. | |
| 15566 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 23 a. 7 arg. 1"><a name="29447" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29447] Iª q. 23 a. 7 arg. 1</span></a> Ad septimum sic | |
| 15567 proceditur. Videtur quod numerus praedestinatorum non sit certus. | |
| 15568 Numerus enim cui potest fieri additio, non est certus. Sed numero | |
| 15569 praedestinatorum potest fieri additio, ut videtur, dicitur enim | |
| 15570 Deut. I, <i>dominus Deus noster addat ad hunc numerum multa | |
| 15571 millia</i>; Glossa, <i>idest definitum apud Deum, qui novit qui | |
| 15572 sunt eius</i>. Ergo numerus praedestinatorum non est certus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q23_A7-p3"> | |
| 15573 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, no reason can be assigned why God pre-ordains to salvation one number of men more than another. But nothing is arranged | |
| 15574 by God without a reason. Therefore the number to be saved pre-ordained by God cannot be certain. | |
| 15575 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 23 a. 7 arg. 2"><a name="29448" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29448] Iª q. 23 a. 7 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, non | |
| 15576 potest assignari ratio quare magis in hoc numero quam in alio, Deus | |
| 15577 homines praeordinet ad salutem. Sed nihil a Deo sine ratione | |
| 15578 disponitur. Ergo non est certus numerus salvandorum praeordinatus a | |
| 15579 Deo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q23_A7-p4"> | |
| 15580 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the operations of God are more perfect than those of nature. But in the works of nature, good is found in the majority | |
| 15581 of things; defect and evil in the minority. If, then, the number of the saved were fixed by God at a certain figure, there | |
| 15582 would be more saved than lost. Yet the contrary follows from | |
| 15583 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q23_A7-p4.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.7.13" target="asv"> Mat. 7:13,14</a>: "For wide is the gate, and broad the way that leadeth to destruction, and many there are who go in thereat. How narrow | |
| 15584 is the gate, and strait is the way that leadeth to life; and few there are who find it!" Therefore the number of those pre-ordained | |
| 15585 by God to be saved is not certain. | |
| 15586 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 23 a. 7 arg. 3"><a name="29449" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29449] Iª q. 23 a. 7 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 15587 operatio Dei est perfectior quam operatio naturae. Sed in operibus | |
| 15588 naturae bonum invenitur ut in pluribus, defectus autem et malum ut | |
| 15589 in paucioribus. Si igitur a Deo institueretur numerus salvandorum, | |
| 15590 plures essent salvandi quam damnandi. Cuius contrarium ostenditur | |
| 15591 Matt. VII, ubi dicitur, <i>lata et spatiosa est via quae ducit ad | |
| 15592 perditionem, et multi sunt qui intrant per eam, angusta est porta, | |
| 15593 et arcta via, quae ducit ad vitam, et pauci sunt qui inveniunt | |
| 15594 eam</i>. Non ergo est praeordinatus a Deo numerus salvandorum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q23_A7-p5"> | |
| 15595 <b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (De Corr. et Grat. 13): "The number of the predestined is certain, and can neither be increased nor diminished." | |
| 15596 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 23 a. 7 s. c."><a name="29450" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29450] Iª q. 23 a. 7 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est | |
| 15597 quod Augustinus dicit, in libro de correptione et gratia, <i>certus | |
| 15598 est praedestinatorum numerus, qui neque augeri potest, neque | |
| 15599 minui</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q23_A7-p6"> | |
| 15600 <b>I answer that,</b> The number of the predestined is certain. Some have said that it was formally, but not materially certain; as if we were | |
| 15601 to say that it was certain that a hundred or a thousand would be saved; not however these or those individuals. But this destroys | |
| 15602 the certainty of predestination; of which we spoke above | |
| 15603 <a id="FP_Q23_A7-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q23_A6.html">(A[6])</a>. Therefore we must say that to God the number of the predestined is certain, not only formally, but also materially. It | |
| 15604 must, however, be observed that the number of the predestined is said to be certain to God, not by reason of His knowledge, | |
| 15605 because, that is to say, He knows how many will be saved (for in this way the number of drops of rain and the sands of the | |
| 15606 sea are certain to God); but by reason of His deliberate choice and determination. For the further evidence of which we must | |
| 15607 remember that every agent intends to make something finite, as is clear from what has been said above when we treated of the | |
| 15608 infinite ( | |
| 15609 <a id="FP_Q23_A7-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q7_A2.html">Q[7], AA[2]</a>,3). Now whosoever intends some definite measure in his effect thinks out some definite number in the essential parts, which | |
| 15610 are by their very nature required for the perfection of the whole. For of those things which are required not principally, | |
| 15611 but only on account of something else, he does not select any definite number "per se"; but he accepts and uses them in such | |
| 15612 numbers as are necessary on account of that other thing. For instance, a builder | |
| 15613 thinks out the definite measurements of a house, and also the definite number of rooms which he wishes to make in the house; | |
| 15614 and definite measurements of the walls and roof; he does not, however, select a definite number of stones, but accepts and | |
| 15615 uses just so many as are sufficient for the required measurements of the wall. So also must we consider concerning God in | |
| 15616 regard to the whole universe, which is His effect. For He pre-ordained the measurements of the whole of the universe, and | |
| 15617 what | |
| 15618 number would befit the essential parts of that universe---that is to say, which have in some way been ordained in perpetuity; | |
| 15619 how many spheres, how many stars, how many elements, and how many species. Individuals, however, which undergo corruption, | |
| 15620 are not ordained as it were chiefly for the good of the universe, but in a secondary way, inasmuch as the good of the species | |
| 15621 is preserved through them. Whence, although God knows the total number of individuals, the number of oxen, flies and such | |
| 15622 like, is not pre-ordained by God "per se"; but divine providence produces just so many as are sufficient for the preservation | |
| 15623 of the species. Now of all creatures the rational creature is chiefly ordained for the good of the universe, being as such | |
| 15624 incorruptible; more especially those who attain to eternal happiness, since they more immediately reach the ultimate end. | |
| 15625 Whence the number of the predestined is certain to God; not only by way of knowledge, but also by way of a principal | |
| 15626 pre-ordination. | |
| 15627 </p><p id="FP_Q23_A7-p7"> It is not exactly the same thing in the case of the number of the reprobate, who would seem to be pre-ordained by God for | |
| 15628 the good of the elect, in whose regard "all things work together unto good" ( | |
| 15629 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q23_A7-p7.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.8.28" target="asv">Rom. 8:28</a>). Concerning the number of all the predestined, some say that so many men will be saved as angels fell; some, so many as | |
| 15630 there were angels left; others, as many as the number of angels created by God. It is, however, better to say that, "to God | |
| 15631 alone is | |
| 15632 known the number for whom is reserved eternal happiness [*From the 'secret' prayer of the missal, 'pro vivis et defunctis.']" | |
| 15633 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 23 a. 7 co."><a name="29451" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29451] Iª q. 23 a. 7 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum | |
| 15634 quod numerus praedestinatorum est certus. Sed quidam dixerunt eum | |
| 15635 esse certum formaliter, sed non materialiter, ut puta si diceremus | |
| 15636 certum esse quod centum vel mille salventur, non autem quod hi vel | |
| 15637 illi. Sed hoc tollit certitudinem praedestinationis, de qua iam | |
| 15638 diximus. Et ideo oportet dicere quod numerus praedestinatorum sit | |
| 15639 certus Deo non solum formaliter, sed etiam materialiter. Sed | |
| 15640 advertendum est quod numerus praedestinatorum certus Deo dicitur, | |
| 15641 non solum ratione cognitionis, quia scilicet scit quot sunt | |
| 15642 salvandi (sic enim Deo certus est etiam numerus guttarum pluviae, | |
| 15643 et arenae maris); sed ratione electionis et definitionis cuiusdam. | |
| 15644 Ad cuius evidentiam, est sciendum quod omne agens intendit facere | |
| 15645 aliquid finitum, ut ex supradictis de infinito apparet. Quicumque | |
| 15646 autem intendit aliquam determinatam mensuram in suo effectu, | |
| 15647 excogitat aliquem numerum in partibus essentialibus eius, quae per | |
| 15648 se requiruntur ad perfectionem totius. Non enim per se eligit | |
| 15649 aliquem numerum in his quae non principaliter requiruntur, sed | |
| 15650 solum propter aliud, sed in tanto numero accipit huiusmodi, | |
| 15651 inquantum sunt necessaria propter aliud. Sicut aedificator | |
| 15652 excogitat determinatam mensuram domus, et etiam determinatum | |
| 15653 numerum mansionum quas vult facere in domo, et determinatum numerum | |
| 15654 mensurarum parietis vel tecti, non autem eligit determinatum | |
| 15655 numerum lapidum, sed accipit tot, quot sufficiunt ad explendam | |
| 15656 tantam mensuram parietis. Sic igitur considerandum est in Deo, | |
| 15657 respectu totius universitatis quae est eius effectus. Praeordinavit | |
| 15658 enim in qua mensura deberet esse totum universum, et quis numerus | |
| 15659 esset conveniens essentialibus partibus universi, quae scilicet | |
| 15660 habent aliquo modo ordinem ad perpetuitatem; quot scilicet | |
| 15661 sphaerae, quot stellae, quot elementa, quot species rerum. | |
| 15662 Individua vero corruptibilia non ordinantur ad bonum universi quasi | |
| 15663 principaliter, sed quasi secundario, inquantum in eis salvatur | |
| 15664 bonum speciei. Unde, licet Deus sciat numerum omnium individuorum, | |
| 15665 non tamen numerus vel boum vel culicum, vel aliorum huiusmodi, est | |
| 15666 per se praeordinatus a Deo, sed tot ex huiusmodi divina providentia | |
| 15667 produxit, quot sufficiunt ad specierum conservationem. Inter omnes | |
| 15668 autem creaturas, principalius ordinantur ad bonum universi | |
| 15669 creaturae rationales, quae, inquantum huiusmodi, incorruptibiles | |
| 15670 sunt; et potissime illae quae beatitudinem consequuntur, quae | |
| 15671 immediatius attingunt ultimum finem. Unde certus est Deo numerus | |
| 15672 praedestinatorum, non solum per modum cognitionis, sed etiam per | |
| 15673 modum cuiusdam principalis praefinitionis. Non sic autem omnino est | |
| 15674 de numero reproborum; qui videntur esse praeordinati a Deo in bonum | |
| 15675 electorum, quibus omnia cooperantur in bonum. De numero autem | |
| 15676 omnium praedestinatorum hominum, quis sit, dicunt quidam quod tot | |
| 15677 ex hominibus salvabuntur, quot Angeli ceciderunt. Quidam vero, quod | |
| 15678 tot salvabuntur, quot Angeli remanserunt. Quidam vero, quod tot ex | |
| 15679 hominibus salvabuntur, quot Angeli ceciderunt, et insuper tot, quot | |
| 15680 fuerunt Angeli creati. Sed melius dicitur quod <i>soli Deo est | |
| 15681 cognitus numerus electorum in superna felicitate locandus</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q23_A7-p8"> | |
| 15682 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> These words of Deuteronomy must be taken as applied to those who are marked out by God beforehand in respect to present righteousness. | |
| 15683 For their number is increased and diminished, but not the number of the predestined. | |
| 15684 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 23 a. 7 ad 1"><a name="29452" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29452] Iª q. 23 a. 7 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo | |
| 15685 dicendum quod verbum illud Deuteronomii est intelligendum de illis | |
| 15686 qui sunt praenotati a Deo respectu praesentis iustitiae. Horum enim | |
| 15687 numerus et augetur et minuitur, et non numerus | |
| 15688 praedestinatorum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q23_A7-p9"> | |
| 15689 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The reason of the quantity of any one part must be judged from the proportion of that part of the whole. Thus in God the | |
| 15690 reason why He has made so many stars, or so many species of things, or predestined so many, is according to the proportion | |
| 15691 of the principal parts to the good of the whole universe. | |
| 15692 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 23 a. 7 ad 2"><a name="29453" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29453] Iª q. 23 a. 7 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 15693 dicendum quod ratio quantitatis alicuius partis, accipienda est ex | |
| 15694 proportione illius partis ad totum. Sic enim est apud Deum ratio | |
| 15695 quare tot stellas fecerit, vel tot rerum species, et quare tot | |
| 15696 praedestinavit, ex proportione partium principalium ad bonum | |
| 15697 universi.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q23_A7-p10"> | |
| 15698 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The good that is proportionate to the common state of nature is to be found in the majority; and is wanting in the minority. | |
| 15699 The good that exceeds the common state of nature is to be found in the minority, and is wanting in the majority. Thus it is | |
| 15700 clear that the majority of men have a sufficient knowledge for the guidance of life; and those who have not this knowledge | |
| 15701 are said to be half-witted or foolish; but they who attain to a profound knowledge | |
| 15702 of things intelligible are a very small minority in respect to the rest. Since their eternal happiness, consisting in the | |
| 15703 vision of God, exceeds the common state of nature, and especially in so far as this is deprived of grace through the corruption | |
| 15704 of original sin, those who are saved are in the minority. In this especially, however, appears the mercy of God, that He has | |
| 15705 chosen some for that salvation, from which very many in accordance with the common course and tendency of nature fall | |
| 15706 short. | |
| 15707 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 23 a. 7 ad 3"><a name="29454" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29454] Iª q. 23 a. 7 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 15708 dicendum quod bonum proportionatum communi statui naturae, accidit | |
| 15709 ut in pluribus; et defectus ab hoc bono, ut in paucioribus. Sed | |
| 15710 bonum quod excedit communem statum naturae, invenitur ut in | |
| 15711 paucioribus; et defectus ab hoc bono, ut in pluribus. Sicut patet | |
| 15712 quod plures homines sunt qui habent sufficientem scientiam ad | |
| 15713 regimen vitae suae, pauciores autem qui hac scientia carent, qui | |
| 15714 moriones vel stulti dicuntur, sed paucissimi sunt, respectu | |
| 15715 aliorum, qui attingunt ad habendam profundam scientiam | |
| 15716 intelligibilium rerum. Cum igitur beatitudo aeterna, in visione Dei | |
| 15717 consistens, excedat communem statum naturae, et praecipue secundum | |
| 15718 quod est gratia destituta per corruptionem originalis peccati, | |
| 15719 pauciores sunt qui salvantur. Et in hoc etiam maxime misericordia | |
| 15720 Dei apparet, quod aliquos in illam salutem erigit, a qua plurimi | |
| 15721 deficiunt secundum communem cursum et inclinationem naturae.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q23_A8" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q23_A8-p0.1">Q. 23. A. 8. Whether predestination can be furthered by the prayers of the saints?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q23_A8-p2"> | |
| 15722 <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that predestination cannot be furthered by the prayers of the saints. For nothing eternal can be preceded by anything | |
| 15723 temporal; and in consequence nothing temporal can help towards making something else eternal. But predestination is eternal. | |
| 15724 Therefore, since the prayers of the saints are temporal, they cannot so help as to cause anyone to become predestined. Predestination | |
| 15725 therefore is not furthered by the prayers of the saints. | |
| 15726 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 23 a. 8 arg. 1"><a name="29455" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29455] Iª q. 23 a. 8 arg. 1</span></a> Ad octavum sic | |
| 15727 proceditur. Videtur quod praedestinatio non possit iuvari precibus | |
| 15728 sanctorum. Nullum enim aeternum praeceditur ab aliquo temporali, et | |
| 15729 per consequens non potest temporale iuvare ad hoc quod aliquod | |
| 15730 aeternum sit. Sed praedestinatio est aeterna. Cum igitur preces | |
| 15731 sanctorum sint temporales, non possunt iuvare ad hoc quod aliquis | |
| 15732 praedestinetur. Non ergo praedestinatio iuvatur precibus | |
| 15733 sanctorum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q23_A8-p3"> | |
| 15734 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, as there is no need of advice except on account of defective knowledge, so there is not need of help except through | |
| 15735 defective power. But neither of these things can be said of God when He predestines. Whence it is said: "Who hath helped the | |
| 15736 Spirit of the Lord? [*Vulg.: 'Who hath known the mind of the Lord?'] Or who hath been His counsellor?" ( | |
| 15737 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q23_A8-p3.1" href="./asv.html#Rom.11.34" target="asv">Rom. 11:34</a>). Therefore predestination cannot be furthered by the prayers of the saints. | |
| 15738 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 23 a. 8 arg. 2"><a name="29456" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29456] Iª q. 23 a. 8 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, sicut | |
| 15739 nihil indiget consilio nisi propter defectum cognitionis, ita nihil | |
| 15740 indiget auxilio nisi propter defectum virtutis. Sed neutrum horum | |
| 15741 competit Deo praedestinanti, unde dicitur Rom. XI, <i>quis adiuvit | |
| 15742 spiritum domini? Aut quis consiliarius eius fuit?</i> Ergo | |
| 15743 praedestinatio non iuvatur precibus sanctorum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q23_A8-p4"> | |
| 15744 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, if a thing can be helped, it can also be hindered. But predestination cannot be hindered by anything. Therefore | |
| 15745 it cannot be furthered by anything. | |
| 15746 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 23 a. 8 arg. 3"><a name="29457" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29457] Iª q. 23 a. 8 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 15747 eiusdem est adiuvari et impediri. Sed praedestinatio non potest | |
| 15748 aliquo impediri. Ergo non potest aliquo iuvari.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q23_A8-p5"> | |
| 15749 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is said that "Isaac besought the Lord for his wife because she was barren; and He heard him and made Rebecca to conceive" | |
| 15750 ( | |
| 15751 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q23_A8-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Gen.25.21" target="asv">Gn. 25:21</a>). But from that conception Jacob was born, and he was predestined. Now his predestination would not have happened if he had | |
| 15752 never been born. Therefore predestination can be furthered by the prayers of the saints. | |
| 15753 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 23 a. 8 s. c."><a name="29458" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29458] Iª q. 23 a. 8 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est | |
| 15754 quod dicitur Genes. XXV, quod <i>Isaac rogavit Deum pro Rebecca | |
| 15755 uxore sua, et dedit conceptum Rebeccae</i>. Ex illo autem conceptu | |
| 15756 natus est Iacob, qui praedestinatus fuit. Non autem fuisset impleta | |
| 15757 praedestinatio, si natus non fuisset. Ergo praedestinatio iuvatur | |
| 15758 precibus sanctorum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q23_A8-p6"> | |
| 15759 <b>I answer that,</b> Concerning this question, there were different errors. Some, regarding the certainty of divine predestination, said that | |
| 15760 prayers were superfluous, as also anything else done to attain salvation; because whether these things were done or not, the | |
| 15761 predestined would attain, and the reprobate would not attain, eternal salvation. But against this opinion are all the warnings | |
| 15762 of Holy Scripture, exhorting us to prayer and other good works. | |
| 15763 </p><p id="FP_Q23_A8-p7"> Others declared that the divine predestination was altered through prayer. This is stated to have the opinion of the Egyptians, | |
| 15764 who thought that the divine ordination, which they called fate, could be frustrated by certain sacrifices and prayers. Against | |
| 15765 this also is the authority of Scripture. For it is said: "But the triumpher in Israel will not spare and will not be moved | |
| 15766 to repentance" ( | |
| 15767 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q23_A8-p7.1" href="./asv.html#iKgs.15.29" target="asv">1 Kings 15:29</a>); and that "the gifts and the calling of God are | |
| 15768 without repentance" ( | |
| 15769 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q23_A8-p7.2" href="./asv.html#Rom.11.29" target="asv">Rom. 11:29</a>). | |
| 15770 </p><p id="FP_Q23_A8-p8"> Wherefore we must say otherwise that in predestination two things are to be considered---namely, the divine ordination; and | |
| 15771 its effect. As regards the former, in no possible way can predestination be furthered by the prayers of the saints. For it | |
| 15772 is not due to their prayers that anyone is predestined by God. As regards the latter, predestination is said to be helped | |
| 15773 by the prayers of the saints, and by other good works; because providence, of which predestination is a part, does | |
| 15774 not do away with secondary causes but so provides effects, that the order of secondary causes falls also under providence. | |
| 15775 So, as natural effects are provided by God in such a way that natural causes are directed to bring about those natural effects, | |
| 15776 without which those effects would not happen; so the salvation of a person is predestined by God in such a way, that whatever | |
| 15777 helps that person towards salvation falls under the order of predestination; whether it be one's own prayers or those of | |
| 15778 another; or other good works, and such like, without which one would not attain to salvation. Whence, the predestined must | |
| 15779 strive after good works and prayer; because through these means predestination is most certainly fulfilled. For this reason | |
| 15780 it is said: "Labor more that by good works you may make sure your calling and election" ( | |
| 15781 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q23_A8-p8.1" href="./asv.html#iiPet.1.10" target="asv">2 Pet. 1:10</a>). | |
| 15782 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 23 a. 8 co."><a name="29459" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29459] Iª q. 23 a. 8 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum | |
| 15783 quod circa hanc quaestionem diversi errores fuerunt. Quidam enim, | |
| 15784 attendentes certitudinem divinae praedestinationis, dixerunt | |
| 15785 superfluas esse orationes, vel quidquid aliud fiat ad salutem | |
| 15786 aeternam consequendam, quia his factis vel non factis, | |
| 15787 praedestinati consequuntur, reprobati non consequuntur. Sed contra | |
| 15788 hoc sunt omnes admonitiones sacrae Scripturae, exhortantes ad | |
| 15789 orationem, et ad alia bona opera. Alii vero dixerunt quod per | |
| 15790 orationes mutatur divina praedestinatio. Et haec dicitur fuisse | |
| 15791 opinio Aegyptiorum, qui ponebant ordinationem divinam, quam fatum | |
| 15792 appellabant, aliquibus sacrificiis et orationibus impediri posse. | |
| 15793 Sed contra hoc etiam est auctoritas sacrae Scripturae. Dicitur enim | |
| 15794 I Reg. XV, porro <i>triumphator in Israel non parcet, neque | |
| 15795 poenitudine flectetur</i>. Et Rom. XI dicitur quod <i>sine | |
| 15796 poenitentia sunt dona Dei et vocatio</i>. Et ideo aliter dicendum, | |
| 15797 quod in praedestinatione duo sunt consideranda, scilicet ipsa | |
| 15798 praeordinatio divina, et effectus eius. Quantum igitur ad primum, | |
| 15799 nullo modo praedestinatio iuvatur precibus sanctorum, non enim | |
| 15800 precibus sanctorum fit, quod aliquis praedestinetur a Deo. Quantum | |
| 15801 vero ad secundum, dicitur praedestinatio iuvari precibus sanctorum, | |
| 15802 et aliis bonis operibus, quia providentia, cuius praedestinatio est | |
| 15803 pars, non subtrahit causas secundas, sed sic providet effectus, ut | |
| 15804 etiam ordo causarum secundarum subiaceat providentiae. Sicut igitur | |
| 15805 sic providentur naturales effectus, ut etiam causae naturales ad | |
| 15806 illos naturales effectus ordinentur, sine quibus illi effectus non | |
| 15807 provenirent; ita praedestinatur a Deo salus alicuius, ut etiam sub | |
| 15808 ordine praedestinationis cadat quidquid hominem promovet in | |
| 15809 salutem, vel orationes propriae, vel aliorum, vel alia bona, vel | |
| 15810 quidquid huiusmodi, sine quibus aliquis salutem non consequitur. | |
| 15811 Unde praedestinatis conandum est ad bene operandum et orandum, quia | |
| 15812 per huiusmodi praedestinationis effectus certitudinaliter impletur. | |
| 15813 Propter quod dicitur II Petr. I, <i>satagite, ut per bona opera | |
| 15814 certam vestram vocationem et electionem faciatis</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q23_A8-p9"> | |
| 15815 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This argument shows that predestination is not furthered by the prayers of the saints, as regards the preordination. | |
| 15816 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 23 a. 8 ad 1"><a name="29460" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29460] Iª q. 23 a. 8 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo | |
| 15817 dicendum quod ratio illa ostendit quod praedestinatio non iuvatur | |
| 15818 precibus sanctorum, quantum ad ipsam praeordinationem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q23_A8-p10"> | |
| 15819 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> One is said to be helped by another in two ways; in one way, inasmuch as he receives power from him: and to be helped thus | |
| 15820 belongs to the weak; but this cannot be said of God, and thus we are to understand, "Who hath helped the Spirit of the Lord?" | |
| 15821 In another way one is said to be helped by a person through whom he carries out his work, as a master through a servant. In | |
| 15822 this way God is helped by us; inasmuch as we execute His orders, according to | |
| 15823 | |
| 15824 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q23_A8-p10.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.3.9" target="asv">1 Cor. 3:9</a>: "We are God's co-adjutors." Nor is this on account of any defect in the power of God, but because He employs intermediary | |
| 15825 causes, in order that the beauty of order may be preserved in the universe; and also that He may communicate to creatures | |
| 15826 the dignity of causality. | |
| 15827 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 23 a. 8 ad 2"><a name="29461" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29461] Iª q. 23 a. 8 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 15828 dicendum quod aliquis dicitur adiuvari per alium, dupliciter. Uno | |
| 15829 modo, inquantum ab eo accipit virtutem, et sic adiuvari infirmi | |
| 15830 est, unde Deo non competit. Et sic intelligitur illud, <i>quis | |
| 15831 adiuvit spiritum domini?</i> Alio modo dicitur quis adiuvari per | |
| 15832 aliquem, per quem exequitur suam operationem, sicut dominus per | |
| 15833 ministrum. Et hoc modo Deus adiuvatur per nos, inquantum exequimur | |
| 15834 suam ordinationem, secundum illud I ad Cor. III, <i>Dei enim | |
| 15835 adiutores sumus</i>. Neque hoc est propter defectum divinae | |
| 15836 virtutis, sed quia utitur causis mediis, ut ordinis pulchritudo | |
| 15837 servetur in rebus, et ut etiam creaturis dignitatem causalitatis | |
| 15838 communicet.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q23_A8-p11"> | |
| 15839 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Secondary causes cannot escape the order of the first universal cause, as has been said above ( | |
| 15840 <a id="FP_Q23_A8-p11.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q19_A6.html">Q[19], A[6]</a>), indeed, they execute that order. And therefore predestination can be furthered by creatures, but it cannot be impeded by | |
| 15841 them. | |
| 15842 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 23 a. 8 ad 3"><a name="29462" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29462] Iª q. 23 a. 8 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 15843 dicendum quod secundae causae non possunt egredi ordinem causae | |
| 15844 primae universalis, ut supra dictum est; sed ipsum exequuntur. Et | |
| 15845 ideo praedestinatio per creaturas potest adiuvari, sed non | |
| 15846 impediri.</p></div></div></div></div> | |
| 15847 <div id="FP_Q24" class="div3"> | |
| 15848 <h3 id="FP_Q24-p0.1">Q. 24. THE BOOK OF LIFE (THREE ARTICLES)</h3> | |
| 15849 <div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> | |
| 15850 <p id="FP_Q24-p2"> We now consider the book of life; concerning which there are three points of inquiry:</p><p id="FP_Q24-p3"> (1) What is the book of life?</p><p id="FP_Q24-p4"> (2) Of what life is it the book?</p><p id="FP_Q24-p5"> (3) Whether anyone can be blotted out of the book of life?</p> | |
| 15851 </div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 24 pr."><a name="29463" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29463] | |
| 15852 Iª q. 24 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de libro | |
| 15853 vitae. Et circa hoc quaeruntur tria. Primo, quid sit liber vitae. | |
| 15854 Secundo, cuius vitae sit liber. Tertio, utrum aliquis possit deleri | |
| 15855 de libro vitae.</p></div></div></div> | |
| 15856 <div id="FP_Q24_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q24_A1-p0.1">Q. 24. A. 1. Whether the book of life is the same as predestination?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q24_A1-p2"> | |
| 15857 <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the book of life is not the same thing as pre-destination. For it is said, "All things are the book of life" | |
| 15858 ( | |
| 15859 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q24_A1-p2.1" href="./asv.html#Sir.4.32" target="asv">Ecclus. 4:32</a>)---i.e. the Old and New Testament according to a gloss. This, however, is not predestination. Therefore the book of life | |
| 15860 is not predestination. | |
| 15861 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 24 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="29464" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29464] Iª q. 24 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum sic | |
| 15862 proceditur. Videtur quod liber vitae non sit idem quod | |
| 15863 praedestinatio. Dicitur enim Eccli. XXIV, <i>haec omnia liber | |
| 15864 vitae</i>; Glossa, <i>idest novum et vetus testamentum</i>. Hoc | |
| 15865 autem non est praedestinatio. Ergo liber vitae non est idem quod | |
| 15866 praedestinatio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q24_A1-p3"> | |
| 15867 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xx, 14) that "the book of life is a certain divine energy, by which it happens that | |
| 15868 to each one his good or evil works are recalled to memory." But divine energy belongs seemingly, not to predestination, but | |
| 15869 rather to divine power. Therefore the book of life is not the same thing as predestination. | |
| 15870 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 24 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="29465" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29465] Iª q. 24 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 15871 Augustinus, in libro XX de Civ. Dei, ait quod liber vitae est | |
| 15872 quaedam vis divina, qua fiet <i>ut cuique opera sua bona vel mala | |
| 15873 in memoriam reducantur</i>. Sed vis divina non videtur pertinere ad | |
| 15874 praedestinationem, sed magis ad attributum potentiae. Ergo liber | |
| 15875 vitae non est idem quod praedestinatio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q24_A1-p4"> | |
| 15876 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, reprobation is opposed to predestination. So, if the book of life were the same as predestination, there should | |
| 15877 also be a book of death, as there is a book of life. | |
| 15878 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 24 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="29466" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29466] Iª q. 24 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 15879 praedestinationi opponitur reprobatio. Si igitur liber vitae esset | |
| 15880 praedestinatio, inveniretur liber mortis, sicut liber vitae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q24_A1-p5"> | |
| 15881 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is said in a gloss upon | |
| 15882 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q24_A1-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.68.29" target="asv"> Ps. 68:29, </a> "Let them be blotted out of the book of the living. This book is the knowledge of God, by which He hath predestined to life | |
| 15883 those whom He foreknew." | |
| 15884 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 24 a. 1 s. c."><a name="29467" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29467] Iª q. 24 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est | |
| 15885 quod dicitur in Glossa, super illud Psalmi LXVIII, <i>deleantur de | |
| 15886 libro viventium, liber iste est notitia Dei, qua praedestinavit ad | |
| 15887 vitam, quos praescivit</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q24_A1-p6"> | |
| 15888 <b>I answer that,</b> The book of life is in God taken in a metaphorical sense, according to a comparison with human affairs. For it is usual among | |
| 15889 men that they who are chosen for any office should be inscribed in a book; as, for instance, soldiers, or counsellors, who | |
| 15890 formerly were called "conscript" fathers. Now it is clear from the preceding ( | |
| 15891 <a id="FP_Q24_A1-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q23_A4.html">Q[23], A[4]</a>) that all the predestined are chosen by God to possess eternal life. This conscription, therefore, | |
| 15892 of the predestined is called the book of life. A thing is said metaphorically to be written upon the mind of anyone when it | |
| 15893 is firmly held in the memory, according to | |
| 15894 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q24_A1-p6.2" href="./asv.html#Prov.3.3" target="asv"> Prov. 3:3</a>: "Forget not My Law, and let thy heart keep My commandments," and further on, "Write them in the tables of thy heart." For | |
| 15895 things are written down in material books to help the memory. Whence, the knowledge of God, by which He firmly remembers that | |
| 15896 He has predestined some to eternal life, is called | |
| 15897 the book of life. For as the writing in a book is the sign of things to be done, so the knowledge of God is a sign in Him | |
| 15898 of those who are to be brought to eternal life, according to | |
| 15899 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q24_A1-p6.3" href="./asv.html#iiTim.11.19" target="asv">2 Tim. 11:19</a>: "The sure foundation of God standeth firm, having this seal; the Lord knoweth who are His." | |
| 15900 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 24 a. 1 co."><a name="29468" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29468] Iª q. 24 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum | |
| 15901 quod liber vitae in Deo dicitur metaphorice, secundum similitudinem | |
| 15902 a rebus humanis acceptam. Est enim consuetum apud homines, quod | |
| 15903 illi qui ad aliquid eliguntur, conscribuntur in libro; utpote | |
| 15904 milites vel consiliarii, qui olim dicebantur patres conscripti. | |
| 15905 Patet autem ex praemissis quod omnes praedestinati eliguntur a Deo | |
| 15906 ad habendum vitam aeternam. Ipsa ergo praedestinatorum conscriptio | |
| 15907 dicitur liber vitae. Dicitur autem metaphorice aliquid conscriptum | |
| 15908 in intellectu alicuius, quod firmiter in memoria tenet, secundum | |
| 15909 illud Prov. III, <i>ne obliviscaris legis meae, et praecepta mea | |
| 15910 cor tuum custodiat</i>; et post pauca sequitur, <i>describe illa in | |
| 15911 tabulis cordis tui</i>. Nam et in libris materialibus aliquid | |
| 15912 conscribitur ad succurrendum memoriae. Unde ipsa Dei notitia, qua | |
| 15913 firmiter retinet se aliquos praedestinasse ad vitam aeternam, | |
| 15914 dicitur liber vitae. Nam sicut Scriptura libri est signum eorum | |
| 15915 quae fienda sunt ita Dei notitia est quoddam signum apud ipsum, | |
| 15916 eorum qui sunt perducendi ad vitam aeternam; secundum illud II Tim. | |
| 15917 II, <i>firmum fundamentum Dei stat, habens signaculum hoc, novit | |
| 15918 dominus qui sunt eius</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q24_A1-p7"> | |
| 15919 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The book of life may be understood in two senses. In one sense as the inscription of those who are chosen to life; thus we | |
| 15920 now speak of the book of life. In another sense the inscription of those things which lead us to life may be called the book | |
| 15921 of life; and this also is twofold, either as of things to be done; and thus the Old and New Testament are called a book of | |
| 15922 life; or of things already done, and thus that divine energy by which it happens | |
| 15923 that to each one his deeds will be recalled to memory, is spoken of as the book of life. Thus that also may be called the | |
| 15924 book of war, whether it contains the names inscribed of those chosen for military service; or treats of the art of warfare, | |
| 15925 or relates the deeds of soldiers. | |
| 15926 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 24 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="29469" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29469] Iª q. 24 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo | |
| 15927 dicendum quod liber vitae potest dici dupliciter. Uno modo, | |
| 15928 conscriptio eorum qui sunt electi ad vitam, et sic loquimur nunc de | |
| 15929 libro vitae. Alio modo potest dici liber vitae, conscriptio eorum | |
| 15930 quae ducunt in vitam. Et hoc dupliciter. Vel sicut agendorum, et | |
| 15931 sic novum et vetus testamentum dicitur liber vitae. Vel sicut iam | |
| 15932 factorum, et sic illa vis divina, qua fiet ut cuilibet in memoriam | |
| 15933 reducantur facta sua, dicitur liber vitae. Sicut etiam liber | |
| 15934 militiae potest dici, vel in quo scribuntur electi ad militiam, vel | |
| 15935 in quo traditur ars militaris, vel in quo recitantur facta | |
| 15936 militum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q24_A1-p8"> Hence the solution of the Second Objection.</p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 24 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="29470" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29470] Iª q. 24 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Unde patet solutio | |
| 15937 ad secundum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q24_A1-p9"> | |
| 15938 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> It is the custom to inscribe, not those who are rejected, but those who are chosen. Whence there is no book of death corresponding | |
| 15939 to reprobation; as the book of life to predestination. | |
| 15940 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 24 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="29471" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29471] Iª q. 24 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 15941 dicendum quod non est consuetum conscribi eos qui repudiantur, sed | |
| 15942 eos qui eliguntur. Unde reprobationi non respondet liber mortis, | |
| 15943 sicut praedestinationi liber vitae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q24_A1-p10"> | |
| 15944 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Predestination and the book of life are different aspects of the same thing. For this latter implies the knowledge of predestination; | |
| 15945 as also is made clear from the gloss quoted above. | |
| 15946 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 24 a. 1 ad 4"><a name="29472" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29472] Iª q. 24 a. 1 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum | |
| 15947 dicendum quod secundum rationem differt liber vitae a | |
| 15948 praedestinatione. Importat enim notitiam praedestinationis, sicut | |
| 15949 etiam ex Glossa inducta apparet.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q24_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q24_A2-p0.1">Q. 24. A. 2. Whether the book of life regards only the life of glory of the predestined?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q24_A2-p2"> | |
| 15950 <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the book of life does not only regard the life of glory of the predestined. For the book of life is the knowledge | |
| 15951 of life. But God, through His own life, knows all other life. Therefore the book of life is so called in regard to divine | |
| 15952 life; and not only in regard to the life of the predestined. | |
| 15953 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 24 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="29473" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29473] Iª q. 24 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum sic | |
| 15954 proceditur. Videtur quod liber vitae non sit solum respectu vitae | |
| 15955 gloriae praedestinatorum. Liber enim vitae est notitia vitae. Sed | |
| 15956 Deus per vitam suam cognoscit omnem aliam vitam. Ergo liber vitae | |
| 15957 praecipue dicitur respectu vitae divinae; et non solum respectu | |
| 15958 vitae praedestinatorum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q24_A2-p3"> | |
| 15959 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, as the life of glory comes from God, so also does the life of nature. Therefore, if the knowledge of the life of | |
| 15960 glory is called the book of life; so also should the knowledge of the life of nature be so called. | |
| 15961 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 24 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="29474" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29474] Iª q. 24 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, sicut | |
| 15962 vita gloriae est a Deo, ita vita naturae. Si igitur notitia vitae | |
| 15963 gloriae dicitur liber vitae, etiam notitia vitae naturae dicetur | |
| 15964 liber vitae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q24_A2-p4"> | |
| 15965 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, some are chosen to the life of grace who are not chosen to the life of glory; as it is clear from what is said: | |
| 15966 "Have not I chosen you twelve, and one of you is a devil?" ( | |
| 15967 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q24_A2-p4.1" href="./asv.html#John.6.71" target="asv">Jn. 6:71</a>). But the book of life is the inscription of the divine election, as stated above (A[1] ). Therefore it applies also to the | |
| 15968 life of grace. | |
| 15969 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 24 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="29475" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29475] Iª q. 24 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 15970 aliqui eliguntur ad gratiam, qui non eliguntur ad vitam gloriae; ut | |
| 15971 patet per id quod dicitur Ioan. VI, <i>nonne duodecim vos elegi, et | |
| 15972 unus ex vobis Diabolus est?</i> Sed liber vitae est conscriptio | |
| 15973 electionis divinae, ut dictum est. Ergo etiam est respectu vitae | |
| 15974 gratiae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q24_A2-p5"> | |
| 15975 <b>On the contrary,</b> The book of life is the knowledge of predestination, as stated above | |
| 15976 <a id="FP_Q24_A2-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q24_A1.html">(A[1])</a>. But predestination does not regard the life of grace, except so far as it is directed to glory; for those are not predestined | |
| 15977 who have grace and yet fail to obtain glory. The book of life altogether is only so called in regard to the life of glory. | |
| 15978 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 24 a. 2 s. c."><a name="29476" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29476] Iª q. 24 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est | |
| 15979 quod liber vitae est notitia praedestinationis, ut dictum est. Sed | |
| 15980 praedestinatio non respicit vitam gratiae, nisi secundum quod | |
| 15981 ordinatur ad gloriam, non enim sunt praedestinati, qui habent | |
| 15982 gratiam et deficiunt a gloria. Liber igitur vitae non dicitur nisi | |
| 15983 respectu gloriae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q24_A2-p6"> | |
| 15984 <b>I answer that,</b> The book of life, as stated above | |
| 15985 <a id="FP_Q24_A2-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q24_A1.html">(A[1])</a>, implies a conscription or a knowledge of those chosen to life. Now a man is chosen for something which does not belong to | |
| 15986 him by nature; and again that to which a man is chosen has the aspect of an end. For a soldier is not chosen or inscribed | |
| 15987 merely to put on armor, but to fight; since this is the proper duty to which military service is directed. But the life of | |
| 15988 glory is an end exceeding | |
| 15989 human nature, as said above ( | |
| 15990 <a id="FP_Q24_A2-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q23_A1.html">Q[23], A[1]</a>). Wherefore, strictly speaking, the book of life regards the life of glory. | |
| 15991 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 24 a. 2 co."><a name="29477" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29477] Iª q. 24 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum | |
| 15992 quod liber vitae, ut dictum est, importat conscriptionem quandam | |
| 15993 sive notitiam electorum ad vitam. Eligitur autem aliquis ad id quod | |
| 15994 non competit sibi secundum suam naturam. Et iterum, id ad quod | |
| 15995 eligitur aliquis, habet rationem finis, non enim miles eligitur aut | |
| 15996 conscribitur ad hoc quod armetur, sed ad hoc quod pugnet; hoc enim | |
| 15997 est proprium officium ad quod militia ordinatur. Finis autem supra | |
| 15998 naturam existens, est vita gloriae, ut supra dictum est. Unde | |
| 15999 proprie liber vitae respicit vitam gloriae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q24_A2-p7"> | |
| 16000 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The divine life, even considered as a life of glory, is natural to God; whence in His regard there is no election, and in | |
| 16001 consequence no book of life: for we do not say that anyone is chosen to possess the power of sense, or any of those things | |
| 16002 that are consequent on nature. | |
| 16003 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 24 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="29478" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29478] Iª q. 24 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo | |
| 16004 dicendum quod vita divina, etiam prout est vita gloriosa, est Deo | |
| 16005 naturalis. Unde respectu eius non est electio, et per consequens | |
| 16006 neque liber vitae. Non enim dicimus quod aliquis homo eligatur ad | |
| 16007 habendum sensum, vel aliquid eorum quae consequuntur naturam.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q24_A2-p8"> From this we gather the Reply to the Second Objection. For there is no election, nor a book of life, as regards the life | |
| 16008 of nature. | |
| 16009 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 24 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="29479" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29479] Iª q. 24 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Unde per hoc etiam | |
| 16010 patet solutio ad secundum. Respectu enim vitae naturalis non est | |
| 16011 electio, neque liber vitae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q24_A2-p9"> | |
| 16012 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The life of grace has the aspect, not of an end, but of something directed towards an end. Hence nobody is said to be chosen | |
| 16013 to the life of grace, except so far as the life of grace is directed to glory. For this reason those who, possessing grace, | |
| 16014 fail to obtain glory, are not said to be chosen simply, but relatively. Likewise they are not said to be written in the book | |
| 16015 of life simply, but relatively; that is to say, that it is in the ordination and | |
| 16016 knowledge of God that they are to have some relation to eternal life, according to their participation in grace. | |
| 16017 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 24 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="29480" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29480] Iª q. 24 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 16018 dicendum quod vita gratiae non habet rationem finis, sed rationem | |
| 16019 eius quod est ad finem. Unde ad vitam gratiae non dicitur aliquis | |
| 16020 eligi, nisi inquantum vita gratiae ordinatur ad gloriam. Et propter | |
| 16021 hoc, illi qui habent gratiam et excidunt a gloria, non dicuntur | |
| 16022 esse electi simpliciter, sed secundum quid. Et similiter non | |
| 16023 dicuntur esse scripti simpliciter in libro vitae sed secundum quid; | |
| 16024 prout scilicet de eis in ordinatione et notitia divina existit, | |
| 16025 quod sint habituri aliquem ordinem ad vitam aeternam, secundum | |
| 16026 participationem gratiae.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q24_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q24_A3-p0.1">Q. 24. A. 3. Whether anyone may be blotted out of the book of life?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q24_A3-p2"> | |
| 16027 <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that no one may be blotted out of the book of life. For Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xx, 15): "God's foreknowledge, | |
| 16028 which cannot be deceived, is the book of life." But nothing can be taken away from the foreknowledge of God, nor from predestination. | |
| 16029 Therefore neither can anyone be blotted out from the book of life. | |
| 16030 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 24 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="29481" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29481] Iª q. 24 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium sic | |
| 16031 proceditur. Videtur quod nullus deleatur de libro vitae. Dicit enim | |
| 16032 Augustinus, in XX de Civ. Dei, quod <i>praescientia Dei, quae non | |
| 16033 potest falli, liber vitae est</i>. Sed a praescientia Dei non | |
| 16034 potest aliquid subtrahi, similiter neque a praedestinatione. Ergo | |
| 16035 nec de libro vitae potest aliquis deleri.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q24_A3-p3"> | |
| 16036 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, whatever is in a thing is in it according to the disposition of that thing. But the book of life is something eternal | |
| 16037 and immutable. Therefore whatsoever is written therein, is there not in a temporary way, but immovably, and indelibly. | |
| 16038 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 24 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="29482" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29482] Iª q. 24 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 16039 quidquid est in aliquo, est in eo per modum eius in quo est. Sed | |
| 16040 liber vitae est quid aeternum et immutabile. Ergo quidquid est in | |
| 16041 eo, est ibi non temporaliter, sed immobiliter et indelebiliter.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q24_A3-p4"> | |
| 16042 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, blotting out is the contrary to inscription. But nobody can be written a second time in the book of life. Neither | |
| 16043 therefore can he be blotted out. | |
| 16044 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 24 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="29483" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29483] Iª q. 24 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 16045 deletio Scripturae opponitur. Sed aliquis non potest de novo scribi | |
| 16046 in libro vitae. Ergo neque inde deleri potest.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q24_A3-p5"> | |
| 16047 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is said, "Let them be blotted out from the book of the living" ( | |
| 16048 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q24_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.68.29" target="asv">Ps. 68:29</a>). | |
| 16049 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 24 a. 3 s. c."><a name="29484" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29484] Iª q. 24 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est | |
| 16050 quod dicitur in Psalmo LXVIII, <i>deleantur de libro | |
| 16051 viventium</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q24_A3-p6"> | |
| 16052 <b>I answer that,</b> Some have said that none could be blotted out of the book of life as a matter of fact, but only in the opinion of men. For | |
| 16053 it is customary in the Scriptures to say that something is done when it becomes known. Thus some are said to be written in | |
| 16054 the book of life, inasmuch as men think they are written therein, on account of the present righteousness they see in them; | |
| 16055 but when it becomes evident, either in this world or in the next, that they have fallen from | |
| 16056 that state of righteousness, they are then said to be blotted out. And thus a gloss explains the passage: "Let them be blotted | |
| 16057 out of the book of the living." But because not to be blotted out of the book of life is placed among the rewards of the just, | |
| 16058 according to the text, "He that shall overcome, shall thus be clothed in white garments, and I will not blot his name out | |
| 16059 of the book of life" ( | |
| 16060 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q24_A3-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Rev.3.5" target="asv">Apoc. 3:5</a>) (and what is promised to holy men, is not merely something in the | |
| 16061 opinion of men), it can therefore be said that to be blotted out, and not blotted out, of the book of life is not only to | |
| 16062 be referred to the opinion of man, but to the reality of the fact. For the book of life is the inscription of those ordained | |
| 16063 to eternal life, to which one is directed from two sources; namely, from predestination, which direction never fails, and | |
| 16064 from grace; for whoever has grace, by this very fact becomes fitted for eternal life. This direction fails sometimes; because | |
| 16065 some | |
| 16066 are directed by possessing grace, to obtain eternal life, yet they fail to obtain it through mortal sin. Therefore those who | |
| 16067 are ordained to possess eternal life through divine predestination are written down in the book of life simply, because they | |
| 16068 are written therein to have eternal life in reality; such are never blotted out from the book of life. Those, however, who | |
| 16069 are ordained to eternal life, not through divine predestination, but through grace, are said to be written in the book of | |
| 16070 life | |
| 16071 not simply, but relatively, for they are written therein not to have eternal life in itself, but in its cause only. Yet though | |
| 16072 these latter can be said to be blotted out of the book of life, this blotting out must not be referred to God, as if God foreknew | |
| 16073 a thing, and afterwards knew it not; but to the thing known, namely, because God knows one is first ordained to eternal life, | |
| 16074 and afterwards not ordained when he falls from grace. | |
| 16075 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 24 a. 3 co."><a name="29485" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29485] Iª q. 24 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum | |
| 16076 quod quidam dicunt quod de libro vitae nullus potest deleri | |
| 16077 secundum rei veritatem, potest tamen aliquis deleri secundum | |
| 16078 opinionem hominum. Est enim consuetum in Scripturis ut aliquid | |
| 16079 dicatur fieri, quando innotescit. Et secundum hoc, aliqui dicuntur | |
| 16080 esse scripti in libro vitae, inquantum homines opinantur eos ibi | |
| 16081 scriptos, propter praesentem iustitiam quam in eis vident. Sed | |
| 16082 quando apparet, vel in hoc seculo vel in futuro, quod ab hac | |
| 16083 iustitia exciderunt, dicuntur inde deleri. Et sic etiam exponitur | |
| 16084 in Glossa deletio talis, super illud Psalmi LXVIII, <i>deleantur de | |
| 16085 libro viventium</i>. Sed quia non deleri de libro vitae ponitur | |
| 16086 inter praemia iustorum, secundum illud Apoc. III, <i>qui vicerit, | |
| 16087 sic vestietur vestimentis albis, et non delebo nomen eius de libro | |
| 16088 vitae</i>; quod autem sanctis repromittitur, non est solum in | |
| 16089 hominum opinione; potest dici quod deleri vel non deleri de libro | |
| 16090 vitae, non solum ad opinionem hominum referendum est, sed etiam | |
| 16091 quantum ad rem. Est enim liber vitae conscriptio ordinatorum in | |
| 16092 vitam aeternam. Ad quam ordinatur aliquis ex duobus, scilicet ex | |
| 16093 praedestinatione divina, et haec ordinatio nunquam deficit; et ex | |
| 16094 gratia. Quicumque enim gratiam habet, ex hoc ipso est dignus vita | |
| 16095 aeterna. Et haec ordinatio deficit interdum, quia aliqui ordinati | |
| 16096 sunt ex gratia habita ad habendum vitam aeternam, a qua tamen | |
| 16097 deficiunt per peccatum mortale. Illi igitur qui sunt ordinati ad | |
| 16098 habendum vitam aeternam ex praedestinatione divina, sunt | |
| 16099 simpliciter scripti in libro vitae, quia sunt ibi scripti ut | |
| 16100 habituri vitam aeternam in seipsa. Et isti nunquam delentur de | |
| 16101 libro vitae. Sed illi qui sunt ordinati ad habendum vitam aeternam, | |
| 16102 non ex praedestinatione divina, sed solum ex gratia, dicuntur esse | |
| 16103 scripti in libro vitae, non simpliciter, sed secundum quid, quia | |
| 16104 sunt ibi scripti ut habituri vitam aeternam, non in seipsa, sed in | |
| 16105 sua causa. Et tales possunt deleri de libro vitae, ut deletio non | |
| 16106 referatur ad notitiam Dei, quasi Deus aliquid praesciat, et postea | |
| 16107 nesciat; sed ad rem scitam, quia scilicet Deus scit aliquem prius | |
| 16108 ordinari in vitam aeternam, et postea non ordinari, cum deficit a | |
| 16109 gratia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q24_A3-p7"> | |
| 16110 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The act of blotting out does not refer to the book of life as regards God's foreknowledge, as if in God there were any change; | |
| 16111 but as regards things foreknown, which can change. | |
| 16112 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 24 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="29486" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29486] Iª q. 24 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo | |
| 16113 dicendum quod deletio, ut dictum est, non refertur ad librum vitae | |
| 16114 ex parte praescientiae, quasi in Deo sit aliqua mutabilitas, sed ex | |
| 16115 parte praescitorum, quae sunt mutabilia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q24_A3-p8"> | |
| 16116 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Although things are immutably in God, yet in themselves they are subject to change. To this it is that the blotting out of | |
| 16117 the book of life refers. | |
| 16118 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 24 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="29487" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29487] Iª q. 24 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 16119 dicendum quod, licet res in Deo sint immutabiliter, tamen in | |
| 16120 seipsis mutabiles sunt. Et ad hoc pertinet deletio libri vitae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q24_A3-p9"> | |
| 16121 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The way in which one is said to be blotted out of the book of life is that in which one is said to be written therein anew; | |
| 16122 either in the opinion of men, or because he begins again to have relation towards eternal life through grace; which also is | |
| 16123 included in the knowledge of God, although not anew. | |
| 16124 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 24 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="29488" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29488] Iª q. 24 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 16125 dicendum quod eo modo quo aliquis dicitur deleri de libro vitae, | |
| 16126 potest dici quod ibi scribatur de novo; vel secundum opinionem | |
| 16127 hominum, vel secundum quod de novo incipit habere ordinem ad vitam | |
| 16128 aeternam per gratiam. Quod etiam sub divina notitia comprehenditur, | |
| 16129 licet non de novo.</p></div></div></div></div> | |
| 16130 <div id="FP_Q25" class="div3"> | |
| 16131 <h3 id="FP_Q25-p0.1">Q. 25. THE POWER OF GOD (SIX ARTICLES)</h3> | |
| 16132 <div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> | |
| 16133 <p id="FP_Q25-p2"> After considering the divine foreknowledge and will, and other things pertaining thereto, it remains for us to consider the | |
| 16134 power of God. About this are six points of inquiry: | |
| 16135 </p><p id="FP_Q25-p3"> (1) Whether there is power in God?</p><p id="FP_Q25-p4"> (2) Whether His power is infinite?</p><p id="FP_Q25-p5"> (3) Whether He is almighty?</p><p id="FP_Q25-p6"> (4) Whether He could make the past not to have been?</p><p id="FP_Q25-p7"> (5) Whether He could do what He does not, or not do what He does?</p><p id="FP_Q25-p8"> (6) Whether what He makes He could make better?</p> | |
| 16136 </div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 25 pr."><a name="29489" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29489] | |
| 16137 Iª q. 25 pr.</span></a> Post considerationem divinae scientiae | |
| 16138 et voluntatis, et eorum quae ad hoc pertinent, restat considerandum | |
| 16139 de divina potentia. Et circa hoc quaeruntur sex. Primo, utrum in | |
| 16140 Deo sit potentia. Secundo, utrum eius potentia sit infinita. | |
| 16141 Tertio, utrum sit omnipotens. Quarto, utrum possit facere quod ea | |
| 16142 quae sunt praeterita, non fuerint. Quinto, utrum Deus possit facere | |
| 16143 quae non facit, vel praetermittere quae facit. Sexto, utrum quae | |
| 16144 facit, possit facere meliora.</p></div></div></div> | |
| 16145 <div id="FP_Q25_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q25_A1-p0.1">Q. 25. A. 1. Whether there is power in God?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q25_A1-p2"> | |
| 16146 <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that power is not in God. For as primary matter is to power, so God, who is the first agent, is to act. But primary | |
| 16147 matter, considered in itself, is devoid of all act. Therefore, the first agent---namely, God---is devoid of power. | |
| 16148 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 25 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="29490" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29490] Iª q. 25 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum sic | |
| 16149 proceditur. Videtur quod in Deo non sit potentia. Sicut enim prima | |
| 16150 materia se habet ad potentiam, ita Deus, qui est agens primum, se | |
| 16151 habet ad actum. Sed prima materia, secundum se considerata, est | |
| 16152 absque omni actu. Ergo agens primum, quod est Deus, est absque | |
| 16153 potentia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q25_A1-p3"> | |
| 16154 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, according to the Philosopher (Metaph. vi, 19), better than every power is its act. For form is better than matter; | |
| 16155 and action than active power, since it is its end. But nothing is better than what is in God; because whatsoever is in God, | |
| 16156 is God, as was shown above ( | |
| 16157 <a id="FP_Q25_A1-p3.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q3_A3.html">Q[3] , A[3]</a>). Therefore, there is no power in God. | |
| 16158 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 25 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="29491" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29491] Iª q. 25 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 16159 secundum philosophum, in IX Metaphys., qualibet potentia melior est | |
| 16160 eius actus, nam forma est melior quam materia, et actio quam | |
| 16161 potentia activa; est enim finis eius. Sed nihil est melius eo quod | |
| 16162 est in Deo, quia quidquid est in Deo, est Deus, ut supra ostensum | |
| 16163 est. Ergo nulla potentia est in Deo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q25_A1-p4"> | |
| 16164 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Power is the principle of operation. But the divine power is God's essence, since there is nothing accidental in | |
| 16165 God: and of the essence of God there is no principle. Therefore there is no power in God. | |
| 16166 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 25 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="29492" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29492] Iª q. 25 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 16167 potentia est principium operationis. Sed operatio divina est eius | |
| 16168 essentia, cum in Deo nullum sit accidens. Essentiae autem divinae | |
| 16169 non est aliquod principium. Ergo ratio potentiae Deo non | |
| 16170 convenit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q25_A1-p5"> | |
| 16171 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, it was shown above ( | |
| 16172 <a id="FP_Q25_A1-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q14_A8.html">Q[14], A[8]</a>; | |
| 16173 <a id="FP_Q25_A1-p5.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q19_A4.html">Q[19], A[4]</a>) that God's knowledge and will are the cause of things. But the cause and principle of a thing are identical. We ought not, | |
| 16174 therefore, to assign power to God; but only knowledge and will. | |
| 16175 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 25 a. 1 arg. 4"><a name="29493" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29493] Iª q. 25 a. 1 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, supra | |
| 16176 ostensum est quod scientia Dei et voluntas eius sunt causa rerum. | |
| 16177 Causa autem et principium idem sunt. Ergo non oportet in Deo | |
| 16178 assignare potentiam, sed solum scientiam et voluntatem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q25_A1-p6"> | |
| 16179 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is said: "Thou art mighty, O Lord, and Thy truth is round about Thee" ( | |
| 16180 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q25_A1-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Ps.88.9" target="asv">Ps. 88:9</a>). | |
| 16181 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 25 a. 1 s. c."><a name="29494" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29494] Iª q. 25 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est | |
| 16182 quod dicitur in Psalmo LXXXVIII, <i>potens es, domine, et veritas | |
| 16183 tua in circuitu tuo</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q25_A1-p7"> | |
| 16184 <b>I answer that,</b> Power is twofold---namely, passive, which exists not at all in God; and active, which we must assign to Him in the highest | |
| 16185 degree. For it is manifest that everything, according as it is in act and is perfect, is the active principle of something: | |
| 16186 whereas everything is passive according as it is deficient and imperfect. Now it was shown above ( | |
| 16187 <a id="FP_Q25_A1-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q3_A2.html">Q[3], A[2]</a>; | |
| 16188 <a id="FP_Q25_A1-p7.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q4_A1.html">Q[4], AA[1]</a>, 2), that God is pure act, simply and in all | |
| 16189 ways perfect, nor in Him does any imperfection find place. Whence it most fittingly belongs to Him to be an active principle, | |
| 16190 and in no way whatsoever to be passive. On the other hand, the notion of active principle is consistent with active power. | |
| 16191 For active power is the principle of acting upon something else; whereas passive power is the principle of being acted upon | |
| 16192 by something else, as the Philosopher says (Metaph. v, 17). It remains, therefore, that in God there is active power in the | |
| 16193 highest degree. | |
| 16194 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 25 a. 1 co."><a name="29495" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29495] Iª q. 25 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum | |
| 16195 quod duplex est potentia, scilicet passiva, quae nullo modo est in | |
| 16196 Deo; et activa, quam oportet in Deo summe ponere. Manifestum est | |
| 16197 enim quod unumquodque, secundum quod est actu et perfectum, | |
| 16198 secundum hoc est principium activum alicuius, patitur autem | |
| 16199 unumquodque, secundum quod est deficiens et imperfectum. Ostensum | |
| 16200 est autem supra quod Deus est purus actus, et simpliciter et | |
| 16201 universaliter perfectus; neque in eo aliqua imperfectio locum | |
| 16202 habet. Unde sibi maxime competit esse principium activum, et nullo | |
| 16203 modo pati. Ratio autem activi principii convenit potentiae activae. | |
| 16204 Nam potentia activa est principium agendi in aliud, potentia vero | |
| 16205 passiva est principium patiendi ab alio, ut philosophus dicit, V | |
| 16206 Metaphys. Relinquitur ergo quod in Deo maxime sit potentia | |
| 16207 activa.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q25_A1-p8"> | |
| 16208 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Active power is not contrary to act, but is founded upon it, for everything acts according as it is actual: but passive power | |
| 16209 is contrary to act; for a thing is passive according as it is potential. Whence this potentiality is not in God, but only | |
| 16210 active power. | |
| 16211 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 25 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="29496" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29496] Iª q. 25 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo | |
| 16212 dicendum quod potentia activa non dividitur contra actum, sed | |
| 16213 fundatur in eo, nam unumquodque agit secundum quod est actu. | |
| 16214 Potentia vero passiva dividitur contra actum, nam unumquodque | |
| 16215 patitur secundum quod est in potentia. Unde haec potentia | |
| 16216 excluditur a Deo, non autem activa.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q25_A1-p9"> | |
| 16217 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Whenever act is distinct from power, act must be nobler than power. But God's action is not distinct from His power, for | |
| 16218 both are His divine essence; neither is His existence distinct from His essence. Hence it does not follow that there should | |
| 16219 be anything in God nobler than His power. | |
| 16220 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 25 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="29497" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29497] Iª q. 25 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 16221 dicendum quod, quandocumque actus est aliud a potentia, oportet | |
| 16222 quod actus sit nobilior potentia. Sed actio Dei non est aliud ab | |
| 16223 eius potentia, sed utrumque est essentia divina, quia nec esse eius | |
| 16224 est aliud ab eius essentia. Unde non oportet quod aliquid sit | |
| 16225 nobilius quam potentia Dei.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q25_A1-p10"> | |
| 16226 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> In creatures, power is the principle not only of action, but likewise of effect. Thus in God the idea of power is retained, | |
| 16227 inasmuch as it is the principle of an effect; not, however, as it is a principle of action, for this is the divine essence | |
| 16228 itself; except, perchance, after our manner of understanding, inasmuch as the divine essence, which pre-contains in itself | |
| 16229 all perfection that exists in created things, can be understood either under the | |
| 16230 notion of action, or under that of power; as also it is understood under the notion of "suppositum" possessing nature, and | |
| 16231 under that of nature. Accordingly the notion of power is retained in God in so far as it is the principle of an effect. | |
| 16232 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 25 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="29498" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29498] Iª q. 25 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 16233 dicendum quod potentia in rebus creatis non solum est principium | |
| 16234 actionis, sed etiam effectus. Sic igitur in Deo salvatur ratio | |
| 16235 potentiae quantum ad hoc, quod est principium effectus, non autem | |
| 16236 quantum ad hoc, quod est principium actionis, quae est divina | |
| 16237 essentia. Nisi forte secundum modum intelligendi, prout divina | |
| 16238 essentia, quae in se simpliciter praehabet quidquid perfectionis | |
| 16239 est in rebus creatis, potest intelligi et sub ratione actionis, et | |
| 16240 sub ratione potentiae; sicut etiam intelligitur et sub ratione | |
| 16241 suppositi habentis naturam, et sub ratione naturae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q25_A1-p11"> | |
| 16242 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Power is predicated of God not as something really distinct from His knowledge and will, but as differing from them logically; | |
| 16243 inasmuch as power implies a notion of a principle putting into execution what the will commands, and what knowledge directs, | |
| 16244 which three things in God are identified. Or we may say, that the knowledge or will of God, according as it is the effective | |
| 16245 principle, has the notion of power contained in it. Hence the consideration of | |
| 16246 the knowledge and will of God precedes the consideration of His power, as the cause precedes the operation and effect. | |
| 16247 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 25 a. 1 ad 4"><a name="29499" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29499] Iª q. 25 a. 1 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum | |
| 16248 dicendum quod potentia non ponitur in Deo ut aliquid differens a | |
| 16249 scientia et voluntate secundum rem, sed solum secundum rationem; | |
| 16250 inquantum scilicet potentia importat rationem principii exequentis | |
| 16251 id quod voluntas imperat, et ad quod scientia dirigit; quae tria | |
| 16252 Deo secundum idem conveniunt. Vel dicendum quod ipsa scientia vel | |
| 16253 voluntas divina, secundum quod est principium effectivum, habet | |
| 16254 rationem potentiae. Unde consideratio scientiae et voluntatis | |
| 16255 praecedit in Deo considerationem potentiae, sicut causa praecedit | |
| 16256 operationem et effectum.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q25_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q25_A2-p0.1">Q. 25. A. 2. Whether the power of God is infinite?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q25_A2-p2"> | |
| 16257 <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the power of God is not infinite. For everything that is infinite is imperfect according to the Philosopher | |
| 16258 (Phys. iii, 6). But the power of God is far from imperfect. Therefore it is not infinite. | |
| 16259 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 25 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="29500" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29500] Iª q. 25 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum sic | |
| 16260 proceditur. Videtur quod potentia Dei non sit infinita. Omne enim | |
| 16261 infinitum est imperfectum, secundum philosophum, in III Physic. Sed | |
| 16262 potentia Dei non est imperfecta. Ergo non est infinita.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q25_A2-p3"> | |
| 16263 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, every power is made known by its effect; otherwise it would be ineffectual. If, then, the power of God were infinite, | |
| 16264 it could produce an infinite effect, but this is impossible. | |
| 16265 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 25 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="29501" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29501] Iª q. 25 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, omnis | |
| 16266 potentia manifestatur per effectum, alias frustra esset. Si igitur | |
| 16267 potentia Dei esset infinita, posset facere effectum infinitum. Quod | |
| 16268 est impossibile.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q25_A2-p4"> | |
| 16269 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, the Philosopher proves (Phys. viii, 79) that if the power of any corporeal thing were infinite, it would cause instantaneous | |
| 16270 movement. God, however, does not cause instantaneous movement, but moves the spiritual creature in time, and the corporeal | |
| 16271 creature in place and time, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. 20,22,23). Therefore, His power is not infinite. | |
| 16272 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 25 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="29502" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29502] Iª q. 25 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 16273 philosophus probat in VIII Physic., quod si potentia alicuius | |
| 16274 corporis esset infinita, moveret in instanti. Deus autem non movet | |
| 16275 in instanti, sed movet creaturam spiritualem <i>per tempus, | |
| 16276 creaturam vero corporalem per locum et tempus</i>, secundum | |
| 16277 Augustinum, VIII super Genesim ad litteram. Non ergo est eius | |
| 16278 potentia infinita.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q25_A2-p5"> | |
| 16279 <b>On the contrary,</b> Hilary says (De Trin. viii), that "God's power is immeasurable. He is the living mighty one." Now everything that is immeasurable | |
| 16280 is infinite. Therefore the power of God is infinite. | |
| 16281 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 25 a. 2 s. c."><a name="29503" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29503] Iª q. 25 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est | |
| 16282 quod dicit Hilarius, VIII de Trin., quod Deus est immensae | |
| 16283 virtutis, vivens, potens. Omne autem immensum est infinitum. Ergo | |
| 16284 virtus divina est infinita.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q25_A2-p6"> | |
| 16285 <b>I answer that,</b> As stated above | |
| 16286 <a id="FP_Q25_A2-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q25_A1.html">(A[1])</a>, active power exists in God according to the measure in which He is actual. Now His existence is infinite, inasmuch as it | |
| 16287 is not limited by anything that receives it, as is clear from what has been said, when we discussed the infinity of the divine | |
| 16288 essence ( | |
| 16289 <a id="FP_Q25_A2-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q7_A1.html">Q[7], A[1]</a>). Wherefore, it is necessary that the active power in God should be infinite. For in every agent is it found that the | |
| 16290 more perfectly an agent has the form by which it acts the greater its power to act. For instance, the hotter a thing is, the | |
| 16291 greater the power has it to give heat; and it would have infinite power to give heat, were its own heat infinite. Whence, | |
| 16292 since the divine essence, through which God acts, is infinite, as was shown above ( | |
| 16293 <a id="FP_Q25_A2-p6.3" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q7_A1.html">Q[7], A[1]</a>) it follows that His power likewise is infinite. | |
| 16294 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 25 a. 2 co."><a name="29504" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29504] Iª q. 25 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum | |
| 16295 quod, sicut iam dictum est, secundum hoc potentia activa invenitur | |
| 16296 in Deo, secundum quod ipse actu est. Esse autem eius est infinitum, | |
| 16297 inquantum non est limitatum per aliquid recipiens; ut patet per ea | |
| 16298 quae supra dicta sunt, cum de infinitate divinae essentiae | |
| 16299 ageretur. Unde necesse est quod activa potentia Dei sit infinita. | |
| 16300 In omnibus enim agentibus hoc invenitur, quod quanto aliquod agens | |
| 16301 perfectius habet formam qua agit, tanto est maior eius potentia in | |
| 16302 agendo. Sicut quanto est aliquid magis calidum, tanto habet maiorem | |
| 16303 potentiam ad calefaciendum, et haberet utique potentiam infinitam | |
| 16304 ad calefaciendum, si eius calor esset infinitus. Unde, cum ipsa | |
| 16305 essentia divina, per quam Deus agit, sit infinita, sicut supra | |
| 16306 ostensum est, sequitur quod eius potentia sit infinita.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q25_A2-p7"> | |
| 16307 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The Philosopher is here speaking of an infinity in regard to matter not limited by any form; and such infinity belongs to | |
| 16308 quantity. But the divine essence is otherwise, as was shown above ( | |
| 16309 <a id="FP_Q25_A2-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q7_A1.html">Q[7], A[1]</a>); and consequently so also His power. It does not follow, therefore, that it is imperfect. | |
| 16310 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 25 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="29505" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29505] Iª q. 25 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo | |
| 16311 dicendum quod philosophus loquitur de infinito quod est ex parte | |
| 16312 materiae non terminatae per formam; cuiusmodi est infinitum quod | |
| 16313 congruit quantitati. Sic autem non est infinita divina essentia, ut | |
| 16314 supra ostensum est; et per consequens nec eius potentia. Unde non | |
| 16315 sequitur quod sit imperfecta.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q25_A2-p8"> | |
| 16316 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The power of a univocal agent is wholly manifested in its effect. The generative power of man, for example, is not able to | |
| 16317 do more than beget man. But the power of a non-univocal agent does not wholly manifest itself in the production of its effect: | |
| 16318 as, for example, the power of the sun does not wholly manifest itself in the production of an animal generated from putrefaction. | |
| 16319 Now it is clear that God is not a univocal agent. For nothing agrees with | |
| 16320 Him either in species or in genus, as was shown above ( | |
| 16321 <a id="FP_Q25_A2-p8.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q3_A5.html">Q[3], A[5]</a>; | |
| 16322 <a id="FP_Q25_A2-p8.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q4_A3.html">Q[4], A[3]</a>). Whence it follows that His effect is always less than His power. It is not necessary, therefore, that the infinite power | |
| 16323 of God should be manifested so as to produce an infinite effect. Yet even if it were to produce no effect, the power of God | |
| 16324 would not be ineffectual; because a thing is ineffectual which is ordained towards an end to which it does not attain. But | |
| 16325 the | |
| 16326 power of God is not ordered toward its effect as towards an end; rather, it is the end of the effect produced by it. | |
| 16327 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 25 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="29506" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29506] Iª q. 25 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 16328 dicendum quod potentia agentis univoci tota manifestatur in suo | |
| 16329 effectu, potentia enim generativa hominis nihil potest plus quam | |
| 16330 generare hominem. Sed potentia agentis non univoci non tota | |
| 16331 manifestatur in sui effectus productione, sicut potentia solis non | |
| 16332 tota manifestatur in productione alicuius animalis ex putrefactione | |
| 16333 generati. Manifestum est autem quod Deus non est agens univocum, | |
| 16334 nihil enim aliud potest cum eo convenire neque in specie, neque in | |
| 16335 genere, ut supra ostensum est. Unde relinquitur quod effectus eius | |
| 16336 semper est minor quam potentia eius. Non ergo oportet quod | |
| 16337 manifestetur infinita potentia Dei in hoc, quod producat effectum | |
| 16338 infinitum. Et tamen, etiam si nullum effectum produceret, non esset | |
| 16339 Dei potentia frustra. Quia frustra est quod ordinatur ad finem, | |
| 16340 quem non attingit, potentia autem Dei non ordinatur ad effectum | |
| 16341 sicut ad finem, sed magis ipsa est finis sui effectus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q25_A2-p9"> | |
| 16342 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The Philosopher (Phys. viii, 79) proves that if a body had infinite power, it would cause a non-temporal movement. And he | |
| 16343 shows that the power of the mover of heaven is infinite, because it can move in an infinite time. It remains, therefore, according | |
| 16344 to his reckoning, that the infinite power of a body, if such existed, would move without time; not, however, the power of | |
| 16345 an incorporeal mover. The reason of this is that one body moving another is a | |
| 16346 univocal agent; wherefore it follows that the whole power of the agent is made known in its motion. Since then the greater | |
| 16347 the power of a moving body, the more quickly does it move; the necessary conclusion is that if its power were infinite, it | |
| 16348 would move beyond comparison faster, and this is to move without time. An incorporeal mover, however, is not a univocal agent; | |
| 16349 whence it is not necessary that the whole of its power should be manifested in motion, so as to move without time; and | |
| 16350 especially since it moves in accordance with the disposition of its will. | |
| 16351 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 25 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="29507" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29507] Iª q. 25 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 16352 dicendum quod philosophus in VIII Physic., probat, quod si aliquod | |
| 16353 corpus haberet potentiam infinitam, quod moveret in non tempore. Et | |
| 16354 tamen ostendit, quod potentia motoris caeli est infinita, quia | |
| 16355 movere potest tempore infinito. Relinquitur ergo secundum eius | |
| 16356 intentionem, quod potentia infinita corporis si esset, moveret in | |
| 16357 non tempore, non autem potentia incorporei motoris. Cuius ratio | |
| 16358 est, quia corpus movens aliud corpus, est agens univocum. Unde | |
| 16359 oportet quod tota potentia agentis manifestetur in motu. Quia | |
| 16360 igitur quanto moventis corporis potentia est maior, tanto velocius | |
| 16361 movet, necesse est quod si fuerit infinita, moveat | |
| 16362 improportionabiliter citius, quod est movere in non tempore. Sed | |
| 16363 movens incorporeum est agens non univocum. Unde non oportet, quod | |
| 16364 tota virtus eius manifestetur in motu ita, quod moveat in non | |
| 16365 tempore. Et praesertim, quia movet secundum dispositionem suae | |
| 16366 voluntatis.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q25_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q25_A3-p0.1">Q. 25. A. 3. Whether God is omnipotent?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q25_A3-p2"> | |
| 16367 <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God is not omnipotent. For movement and passiveness belong to everything. But this is impossible with God, | |
| 16368 for He is immovable, as was said above ( | |
| 16369 <a id="FP_Q25_A3-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q2_A3.html">Q[2], A[3]</a>). Therefore He is not omnipotent. | |
| 16370 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 25 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="29508" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29508] Iª q. 25 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium sic | |
| 16371 proceditur. Videtur quod Deus non sit omnipotens. Moveri enim et | |
| 16372 pati aliquid omnium est. Sed hoc Deus non potest, est enim | |
| 16373 immobilis, ut supra dictum est. Non igitur est omnipotens.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q25_A3-p3"> | |
| 16374 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, sin is an act of some kind. But God cannot sin, nor "deny Himself" as it is said in | |
| 16375 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q25_A3-p3.1" href="./asv.html#iiTim.2.13" target="asv">2 Tim. 2:13.</a> Therefore He is not omnipotent. | |
| 16376 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 25 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="29509" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29509] Iª q. 25 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 16377 peccare aliquid agere est. Sed Deus non potest peccare, neque | |
| 16378 seipsum negare, ut dicitur II Tim. II. Ergo Deus non est | |
| 16379 omnipotens.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q25_A3-p4"> | |
| 16380 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, it is said of God that He manifests His omnipotence "especially by sparing and having mercy" [*Collect, 10th Sunday | |
| 16381 after Pentecost]. Therefore the greatest act possible to the divine power is to spare and have mercy. There are things much | |
| 16382 greater, however, than sparing and having mercy; for example, to create another world, and the like. Therefore God is not | |
| 16383 omnipotent. | |
| 16384 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 25 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="29510" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29510] Iª q. 25 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, de | |
| 16385 Deo dicitur quod <i>omnipotentiam suam parcendo maxime et miserando | |
| 16386 manifestat</i>. Ultimum igitur quod potest divina potentia, est | |
| 16387 parcere et misereri. Aliquid autem est multo maius quam parcere et | |
| 16388 misereri; sicut creare alium mundum, vel aliquid huiusmodi. Ergo | |
| 16389 Deus non est omnipotens.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q25_A3-p5"> | |
| 16390 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, upon the text, "God hath made foolish the wisdom of this world" ( | |
| 16391 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q25_A3-p5.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.1.20" target="asv">1 Cor. 1:20</a>), a gloss says: "God hath made the wisdom of this world foolish [*Vulg.: 'Hath not God', etc.] by showing those things to | |
| 16392 be possible which it judges to be impossible." Whence it would seem that nothing is to be judged possible or impossible in | |
| 16393 reference to inferior causes, as the wisdom of this world judges them; but in reference to the divine power. If | |
| 16394 God, then, were omnipotent, all things would be possible; nothing, therefore impossible. But if we take away the impossible, | |
| 16395 then we destroy also the necessary; for what necessarily exists is impossible not to exist. Therefore there would be nothing | |
| 16396 at all that is necessary in things if God were omnipotent. But this is an impossibility. Therefore God is not omnipotent. | |
| 16397 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 25 a. 3 arg. 4"><a name="29511" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29511] Iª q. 25 a. 3 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, super | |
| 16398 illud I Cor. I, <i>stultam fecit Deus sapientiam huius mundi</i>, | |
| 16399 dicit Glossa, <i>sapientiam huius mundi fecit Deus stultam, | |
| 16400 ostendendo possibile, quod illa impossibile iudicabat</i>. Unde | |
| 16401 videtur quod non sit aliquid iudicandum possibile vel impossibile | |
| 16402 secundum inferiores causas, prout sapientia huius mundi iudicat; | |
| 16403 sed secundum potentiam divinam. Si igitur Deus sit omnipotens, | |
| 16404 omnia erunt possibilia. Nihil ergo impossibile. Sublato autem | |
| 16405 impossibili, tollitur necessarium, nam quod necesse est esse, | |
| 16406 impossibile est non esse. Nihil ergo erit necessarium in rebus, si | |
| 16407 Deus est omnipotens. Hoc autem est impossibile. Ergo Deus non est | |
| 16408 omnipotens.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q25_A3-p6"> | |
| 16409 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is said: "No word shall be impossible with God" ( | |
| 16410 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q25_A3-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Luke.1.37" target="asv">Lk. 1:37</a>). | |
| 16411 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 25 a. 3 s. c."><a name="29512" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29512] Iª q. 25 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est | |
| 16412 quod dicitur Luc. I, <i>non erit impossibile apud Deum omne | |
| 16413 verbum</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q25_A3-p7"> | |
| 16414 <b>I answer that,</b> All confess that God is omnipotent; but it seems difficult to explain in what His omnipotence precisely consists: for there | |
| 16415 may be doubt as to the precise meaning of the word 'all' when we say that God can do all things. If, however, we consider | |
| 16416 the matter aright, since power is said in reference to possible things, this phrase, "God can do all things," is rightly understood | |
| 16417 to mean that God can do all things that are possible; and for this reason He is said | |
| 16418 to be omnipotent. Now according to the Philosopher (Metaph. v, 17), a thing is said to be possible in two ways. First in relation | |
| 16419 to some power, thus whatever is subject to human power is said to be possible to man. Secondly absolutely, on account of the | |
| 16420 relation in which the very terms stand to each other. Now God cannot be said to be omnipotent through being able to do all | |
| 16421 things that are possible to created nature; for the divine power extends farther than that. If, however, we were to say | |
| 16422 that God is omnipotent because He can do all things that are possible to His power, there would be a vicious circle in explaining | |
| 16423 the nature of His power. For this would be saying nothing else but that God is omnipotent, because He can do all that He is | |
| 16424 able to do. | |
| 16425 </p><p id="FP_Q25_A3-p8"> It remains therefore, that God is called omnipotent because He can do all things that are possible absolutely; which is the | |
| 16426 second way of saying a thing is possible. For a thing is said to be possible or impossible absolutely, according to the relation | |
| 16427 in which the very terms stand to one another, possible if the predicate is not incompatible with the subject, as that Socrates | |
| 16428 sits; and absolutely impossible when the predicate is altogether incompatible with the subject, as, for | |
| 16429 instance, that a man is a donkey. | |
| 16430 </p><p id="FP_Q25_A3-p9"> It must, however, be remembered that since every agent produces an effect like itself, to each active power there corresponds | |
| 16431 a thing possible as its proper object according to the nature of that act on which its active power is founded; for instance, | |
| 16432 the power of giving warmth is related as to its proper object to the being capable of being warmed. The divine existence, | |
| 16433 however, upon which the nature of power in God is founded, is infinite, and is not limited to any genus of | |
| 16434 being; but possesses within itself the perfection of all being. Whence, whatsoever has or can have the nature of being, is | |
| 16435 numbered among the absolutely possible things, in respect of which God is called omnipotent. Now nothing is opposed to the | |
| 16436 idea of being except non-being. Therefore, that which implies being and non-being at the same time is repugnant to the idea | |
| 16437 of an absolutely possible thing, within the scope of the divine omnipotence. For such cannot come under the divine omnipotence, | |
| 16438 not because of any defect in the power of God, but because it has not the nature of a feasible or possible thing. Therefore, | |
| 16439 everything that does not imply a contradiction in terms, is numbered amongst those possible things, in respect of which God | |
| 16440 is called omnipotent: whereas whatever implies contradiction does not come within the scope of divine omnipotence, because | |
| 16441 it cannot have the aspect of possibility. Hence it is better to say that such things cannot be done, than that God cannot | |
| 16442 do | |
| 16443 them. Nor is this contrary to the word of the angel, saying: "No word shall be impossible with God." For whatever implies | |
| 16444 a contradiction cannot be a word, because no intellect can possibly conceive such a thing. | |
| 16445 </p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 25 a. 3 co."><a name="29513" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29513] Iª q. 25 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum | |
| 16446 quod communiter confitentur omnes Deum esse omnipotentem. Sed | |
| 16447 rationem omnipotentiae assignare videtur difficile. Dubium enim | |
| 16448 potest esse quid comprehendatur sub ista distributione, cum dicitur | |
| 16449 omnia posse Deum. Sed si quis recte consideret, cum potentia | |
| 16450 dicatur ad possibilia, cum Deus omnia posse dicitur, nihil rectius | |
| 16451 intelligitur quam quod possit omnia possibilia, et ob hoc | |
| 16452 omnipotens dicatur. Possibile autem dicitur dupliciter, secundum | |
| 16453 philosophum, in V Metaphys. Uno modo, per respectum ad aliquam | |
| 16454 potentiam, sicut quod subditur humanae potentiae, dicitur esse | |
| 16455 possibile homini. Non autem potest dici quod Deus dicatur | |
| 16456 omnipotens, quia potest omnia quae sunt possibilia naturae creatae, | |
| 16457 quia divina potentia in plura extenditur. Si autem dicatur quod | |
| 16458 Deus sit omnipotens, quia potest omnia quae sunt possibilia suae | |
| 16459 potentiae, erit circulatio in manifestatione omnipotentiae, hoc | |
| 16460 enim non erit aliud quam dicere quod Deus est omnipotens, quia | |
| 16461 potest omnia quae potest. Relinquitur igitur quod Deus dicatur | |
| 16462 omnipotens, quia potest omnia possibilia absolute, quod est alter | |
| 16463 modus dicendi possibile. Dicitur autem aliquid possibile vel | |
| 16464 impossibile absolute, ex habitudine terminorum, possibile quidem, | |
| 16465 quia praedicatum non repugnat subiecto, ut Socratem sedere; | |
| 16466 impossibile vero absolute, quia praedicatum repugnat subiecto, ut | |
| 16467 hominem esse asinum. Est autem considerandum quod, cum unumquodque | |
| 16468 agens agat sibi simile, unicuique potentiae activae correspondet | |
| 16469 possibile ut obiectum proprium, secundum rationem illius actus in | |
| 16470 quo fundatur potentia activa, sicut potentia calefactiva refertur, | |
| 16471 ut ad proprium obiectum, ad esse calefactibile. Esse autem divinum, | |
| 16472 super quod ratio divinae potentiae fundatur, est esse infinitum, | |
| 16473 non limitatum ad aliquod genus entis, sed praehabens in se totius | |
| 16474 esse perfectionem. Unde quidquid potest habere rationem entis, | |
| 16475 continetur sub possibilibus absolutis, respectu quorum Deus dicitur | |
| 16476 omnipotens. Nihil autem opponitur rationi entis, nisi non ens. Hoc | |
| 16477 igitur repugnat rationi possibilis absoluti, quod subditur divinae | |
| 16478 omnipotentiae, quod implicat in se esse et non esse simul. Hoc enim | |
| 16479 omnipotentiae non subditur, non propter defectum divinae potentiae; | |
| 16480 sed quia non potest habere rationem factibilis neque possibilis. | |
| 16481 Quaecumque igitur contradictionem non implicant, sub illis | |
| 16482 possibilibus continentur, respectu quorum dicitur Deus omnipotens. | |
| 16483 Ea vero quae contradictionem implicant, sub divina omnipotentia non | |
| 16484 continentur, quia non possunt habere possibilium rationem. Unde | |
| 16485 convenientius dicitur quod non possunt fieri, quam quod Deus non | |
| 16486 potest ea facere. Neque hoc est contra verbum Angeli dicentis, | |
| 16487 <i>non erit impossibile apud Deum omne verbum</i>. Id enim quod | |
| 16488 contradictionem implicat, verbum esse non potest, quia nullus | |
| 16489 intellectus potest illud concipere.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q25_A3-p10"> | |
| 16490 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> God is said to be omnipotent in respect to His active power, not to passive power, as was shown above | |
| 16491 <a id="FP_Q25_A3-p10.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q25_A1.html">(A[1])</a>. Whence the fact that He is immovable or impassible is not repugnant to His omnipotence. | |
| 16492 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 25 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="29514" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29514] Iª q. 25 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo | |
| 16493 dicendum quod Deus dicitur omnipotens secundum potentiam activam, | |
| 16494 non secundum potentiam passivam, ut dictum est. Unde, quod non | |
| 16495 potest moveri et pati, non repugnat omnipotentiae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q25_A3-p11"> | |
| 16496 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> To sin is to fall short of a perfect action; hence to be able to sin is to be able to fall short in action, which is repugnant | |
| 16497 to omnipotence. Therefore it is that God cannot sin, because of His omnipotence. Nevertheless, the Philosopher says (Topic. | |
| 16498 iv, 3) that God can deliberately do what is evil. But this must be understood either on a condition, the antecedent of which | |
| 16499 is impossible---as, for instance, if we were to say that God can do evil things | |
| 16500 if He will. For there is no reason why a conditional proposition should not be true, though both the antecedent and consequent | |
| 16501 are impossible: as if one were to say: "If man is a donkey, he has four feet." Or he may be understood to mean that God can | |
| 16502 do some things which now seem to be evil: which, however, if He did them, would then be good. Or he is, perhaps, speaking | |
| 16503 after the common manner of the heathen, who thought that men became gods, like Jupiter or Mercury. | |
| 16504 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 25 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="29515" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29515] Iª q. 25 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 16505 dicendum quod peccare est deficere a perfecta actione, unde posse | |
| 16506 peccare est posse deficere in agendo, quod repugnat omnipotentiae. | |
| 16507 Et propter hoc, Deus peccare non potest, qui est omnipotens. | |
| 16508 Quamvis philosophus dicat, in IV Topic., quod potest Deus et | |
| 16509 studiosus prava agere. Sed hoc intelligitur vel sub conditione | |
| 16510 cuius antecedens sit impossibile, ut puta si dicamus quod potest | |
| 16511 Deus prava agere si velit, nihil enim prohibet conditionalem esse | |
| 16512 veram, cuius antecedens et consequens est impossibile; sicut si | |
| 16513 dicatur, si homo est asinus, habet quatuor pedes. Vel ut | |
| 16514 intelligatur quod Deus potest aliqua agere, quae nunc prava | |
| 16515 videntur; quae tamen si ageret, bona essent. Vel loquitur secundum | |
| 16516 communem opinionem gentilium, qui homines dicebant transferri in | |
| 16517 deos, ut Iovem vel Mercurium.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q25_A3-p12"> | |
| 16518 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> God's omnipotence is particularly shown in sparing and having mercy, because in this is it made manifest that God has supreme | |
| 16519 power, that He freely forgives sins. For it is not for one who is bound by laws of a superior to forgive sins of his own free | |
| 16520 will. Or, because by sparing and having mercy upon men, He leads them on to the participation of an infinite good; which is | |
| 16521 the ultimate effect of the divine power. Or because, as was said above ( | |
| 16522 <a id="FP_Q25_A3-p12.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q21_A4.html">Q[21], | |
| 16523 A[4] | |
| 16524 </a>), the effect of the divine mercy is the foundation of all the divine works. For nothing is due to anyone, except on account | |
| 16525 of something already given him gratuitously by God. In this way the divine omnipotence is particularly made manifest, because | |
| 16526 to it pertains the first foundation of all good things. | |
| 16527 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 25 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="29516" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29516] Iª q. 25 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 16528 dicendum quod Dei omnipotentia ostenditur maxime in parcendo et | |
| 16529 miserando, quia per hoc ostenditur Deum habere summam potestatem, | |
| 16530 quod libere peccata dimittit, eius enim qui superioris legi | |
| 16531 astringitur, non est libere peccata condonare. Vel quia, parcendo | |
| 16532 hominibus et miserando, perducit eos ad participationem infiniti | |
| 16533 boni, qui est ultimus effectus divinae virtutis. Vel quia, ut supra | |
| 16534 dictum est, effectus divinae misericordiae est fundamentum omnium | |
| 16535 divinorum operum, nihil enim debetur alicui nisi propter id quod | |
| 16536 est datum ei a Deo non debitum. In hoc autem maxime divina | |
| 16537 omnipotentia manifestatur, quod ad ipsam pertinet prima institutio | |
| 16538 omnium bonorum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q25_A3-p13"> | |
| 16539 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> The absolute possible is not so called in reference either to higher causes, or to inferior causes, but in reference to itself. | |
| 16540 But the possible in reference to some power is named possible in reference to its proximate cause. Hence those things which | |
| 16541 it belongs to God alone to do immediately---as, for example, to create, to justify, and the like---are said to be possible | |
| 16542 in reference to a higher cause. Those things, however, which are of such kind as | |
| 16543 to be done by inferior causes are said to be possible in reference to those inferior causes. For it is according to the condition | |
| 16544 of the proximate cause that the effect has contingency or necessity, as was shown above ( | |
| 16545 <a id="FP_Q25_A3-p13.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q14_A1.html">Q[14], A[1]</a>, ad 2). Thus is it that the wisdom of the world is deemed foolish, because what is impossible to nature, it judges to be | |
| 16546 impossible to God. So it is clear that the omnipotence of God does not take away from things their impossibility and | |
| 16547 necessity. | |
| 16548 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 25 a. 3 ad 4"><a name="29517" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29517] Iª q. 25 a. 3 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum | |
| 16549 dicendum quod possibile absolutum non dicitur neque secundum causas | |
| 16550 superiores, neque secundum causas inferiores sed secundum seipsum. | |
| 16551 Possibile vero quod dicitur secundum aliquam potentiam, nominatur | |
| 16552 possibile secundum proximam causam. Unde ea quae immediate nata | |
| 16553 sunt fieri a Deo solo, ut creare, iustificare, et huiusmodi, | |
| 16554 dicuntur possibilia secundum causam superiorem, quae autem nata | |
| 16555 sunt fieri a causis inferioribus, dicuntur possibilia secundum | |
| 16556 causas inferiores. Nam secundum conditionem causae proximae, | |
| 16557 effectus habet contingentiam vel necessitatem, ut supra dictum est. | |
| 16558 In hoc autem reputatur stulta mundi sapientia, quod ea quae sunt | |
| 16559 impossibilia naturae, etiam Deo impossibilia iudicabat. Et sic | |
| 16560 patet quod omnipotentia Dei impossibilitatem et necessitatem a | |
| 16561 rebus non excludit.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q25_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q25_A4-p0.1">Q. 25. A. 4. Whether God can make the past not to have been?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q25_A4-p2"> | |
| 16562 <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God can make the past not to have been. For what is impossible in itself is much more impossible than that | |
| 16563 which is only impossible accidentally. But God can do what is impossible in itself, as to give sight to the blind, or to raise | |
| 16564 the dead. Therefore, and much more can He do what is only impossible accidentally. Now for the past not to have been is impossible | |
| 16565 accidentally: thus for Socrates not to be running is accidentally impossible, from | |
| 16566 the fact that his running is a thing of the past. Therefore God can make the past not to have been. | |
| 16567 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 25 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="29518" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29518] Iª q. 25 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum sic | |
| 16568 proceditur. Videtur quod Deus possit facere quod praeterita non | |
| 16569 fuerint. Quod enim est impossibile per se, magis est impossibile | |
| 16570 quam quod est impossibile per accidens. Sed Deus potest facere id | |
| 16571 quod est impossibile per se, ut caecum illuminare, vel mortuum | |
| 16572 resuscitare. Ergo multo magis potest Deus facere illud quod est | |
| 16573 impossibile per accidens. Sed praeterita non fuisse, est | |
| 16574 impossibile per accidens, accidit enim Socratem non currere esse | |
| 16575 impossibile, ex hoc quod praeteriit. Ergo Deus potest facere quod | |
| 16576 praeterita non fuerint.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q25_A4-p3"> | |
| 16577 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, what God could do, He can do now, since His power is not lessened. But God could have effected, before Socrates | |
| 16578 ran, that he should not run. Therefore, when he has run, God could effect that he did not run. | |
| 16579 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 25 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="29519" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29519] Iª q. 25 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 16580 quidquid Deus facere potuit, potest, cum eius potentia non | |
| 16581 minuatur. Sed Deus potuit facere, antequam Socrates curreret, quod | |
| 16582 non curreret. Ergo, postquam cucurrit, potest Deus facere quod non | |
| 16583 cucurrerit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q25_A4-p4"> | |
| 16584 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, charity is a more excellent virtue than virginity. But God can supply charity that is lost; therefore also lost | |
| 16585 virginity. Therefore He can so effect that what was corrupt should not have been corrupt. | |
| 16586 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 25 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="29520" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29520] Iª q. 25 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 16587 caritas est maior virtus quam virginitas. Sed Deus potest reparare | |
| 16588 caritatem amissam. Ergo et virginitatem. Ergo potest facere quod | |
| 16589 illa quae corrupta fuit, non fuerit corrupta.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q25_A4-p5"> | |
| 16590 <b>On the contrary,</b> Jerome says ( | |
| 16591 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q25_A4-p5.1" href="./asv.html#." target="asv">Ep. 22</a> ad Eustoch.): "Although God can do all things, He cannot make a thing that is corrupt not to have been corrupted." Therefore, | |
| 16592 for the same reason, He cannot effect that anything else which is past should not have been. | |
| 16593 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 25 a. 4 s. c."><a name="29521" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29521] Iª q. 25 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est | |
| 16594 quod Hieronymus dicit, <i>cum Deus omnia possit, non potest de | |
| 16595 corrupta facere incorruptam</i>. Ergo eadem ratione non potest | |
| 16596 facere de quocumque alio praeterito quod non fuerit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q25_A4-p6"> | |
| 16597 <b>I answer that,</b> As was said above ( | |
| 16598 <a id="FP_Q25_A4-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q7_A2.html">Q[7], A[2]</a>), there does not fall under the scope of God's omnipotence anything that implies a contradiction. Now that the past should | |
| 16599 not have been implies a contradiction. For as it implies a contradiction to say that Socrates is sitting, and is not sitting, | |
| 16600 so does it to say that he sat, and did not sit. But to say that he did sit is to say that it happened in the past. To say | |
| 16601 that he did not sit, is to say that | |
| 16602 it did not happen. Whence, that the past should not have been, does not come under the scope of divine power. This is what | |
| 16603 Augustine means when he says (Contra Faust. xxix, 5): "Whosoever says, If God is almighty, let Him make what is done as if | |
| 16604 it were not done, does not see that this is to say: If God is almighty let Him effect that what is true, by the very fact | |
| 16605 that it is true, be false": and the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 2): "Of this one thing alone is God deprived---namely, to | |
| 16606 make | |
| 16607 undone the things that have been done." | |
| 16608 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 25 a. 4 co."><a name="29522" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29522] Iª q. 25 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum | |
| 16609 quod, sicut supra dictum est, sub omnipotentia Dei non cadit | |
| 16610 aliquid quod contradictionem implicat. Praeterita autem non fuisse, | |
| 16611 contradictionem implicat. Sicut enim contradictionem implicat | |
| 16612 dicere quod Socrates sedet et non sedet, ita, quod sederit et non | |
| 16613 sederit. Dicere autem quod sederit, est dicere quod sit | |
| 16614 praeteritum, dicere autem quod non sederit, est dicere quod non | |
| 16615 fuerit. Unde praeterita non fuisse, non subiacet divinae potentiae. | |
| 16616 Et hoc est quod Augustinus dicit, contra Faustum, <i>quisquis ita | |
| 16617 dicit, si Deus omnipotens est, faciat ut quae facta sunt, facta non | |
| 16618 fuerint, non videt hoc se dicere, si Deus omnipotens est, faciat ut | |
| 16619 ea quae vera sunt, eo ipso quod vera sunt, falsa sint</i>. Et | |
| 16620 philosophus dicit, in VI Ethic., quod <i>hoc solo privatur Deus, | |
| 16621 ingenita facere quae sunt facta</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q25_A4-p7"> | |
| 16622 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Although it is impossible accidentally for the past not to have been, if one considers the past thing itself, as, for instance, | |
| 16623 the running of Socrates; nevertheless, if the past thing is considered as past, that it should not have been is impossible, | |
| 16624 not only in itself, but absolutely since it implies a contradiction. Thus, it is more impossible than the raising of the dead; | |
| 16625 in which there is nothing contradictory, because this is reckoned impossible | |
| 16626 in reference to some power, that is to say, some natural power; for such impossible things do come beneath the scope of divine | |
| 16627 power. | |
| 16628 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 25 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="29523" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29523] Iª q. 25 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo | |
| 16629 dicendum quod, licet praeterita non fuisse sit impossibile per | |
| 16630 accidens, si consideretur id quod est praeteritum, idest cursus | |
| 16631 Socratis; tamen, si consideretur praeteritum sub ratione | |
| 16632 praeteriti, ipsum non fuisse est impossibile non solum per se, sed | |
| 16633 absolute, contradictionem implicans. Et sic est magis impossibile | |
| 16634 quam mortuum resurgere, quod non implicat contradictionem, quod | |
| 16635 dicitur impossibile secundum aliquam potentiam, scilicet naturalem. | |
| 16636 Talia enim impossibilia divinae potentiae subduntur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q25_A4-p8"> | |
| 16637 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As God, in accordance with the perfection of the divine power, can do all things, and yet some things are not subject to | |
| 16638 His power, because they fall short of being possible; so, also, if we regard the immutability of the divine power, whatever | |
| 16639 God could do, He can do now. Some things, however, at one time were in the nature of possibility, whilst they were yet to | |
| 16640 be done, which now fall short of the nature of possibility, when they have been done. So | |
| 16641 is God said not to be able to do them, because they themselves cannot be done. | |
| 16642 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 25 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="29524" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29524] Iª q. 25 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 16643 dicendum quod sicut Deus, quantum est ad perfectionem divinae | |
| 16644 potentiae, omnia potest, sed quaedam non subiacent eius potentiae, | |
| 16645 quia deficiunt a ratione possibilium; ita, si attendatur | |
| 16646 immutabilitas divinae potentiae, quidquid Deus potuit, potest; | |
| 16647 aliqua tamen olim habuerunt rationem possibilium, dum erant fienda, | |
| 16648 quae iam deficiunt a ratione possibilium, dum sunt facta. Et sic | |
| 16649 dicitur Deus ea non posse, quia ea non possunt fieri.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q25_A4-p9"> | |
| 16650 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> God can remove all corruption of the mind and body from a woman who has fallen; but the fact that she had been corrupt cannot | |
| 16651 be removed from her; as also is it impossible that the fact of having sinned or having lost charity thereby can be removed | |
| 16652 from the sinner. | |
| 16653 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 25 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="29525" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29525] Iª q. 25 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 16654 dicendum quod omnem corruptionem mentis et corporis Deus auferre | |
| 16655 potest a muliere corrupta, hoc tamen ab ea removeri non poterit, | |
| 16656 quod corrupta non fuerit. Sicut etiam ab aliquo peccatore auferre | |
| 16657 non potest quod non peccaverit, et quod caritatem non amiserit.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q25_A5" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q25_A5-p0.1">Q. 25. A. 5. Whether God can do what He does not?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q25_A5-p2"> | |
| 16658 <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God cannot do other than what He does. For God cannot do what He has not foreknown and pre-ordained that He | |
| 16659 would do. But He neither foreknew nor pre-ordained that He would do anything except what He does. Therefore He cannot do except | |
| 16660 what He does. | |
| 16661 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 25 a. 5 arg. 1"><a name="29526" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29526] Iª q. 25 a. 5 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quintum sic | |
| 16662 proceditur. Videtur quod Deus non possit facere nisi ea quae facit. | |
| 16663 Deus enim non potest facere quae non praescivit et praeordinavit se | |
| 16664 facturum. Sed non praescivit neque praeordinavit se facturum, nisi | |
| 16665 ea quae facit. Ergo non potest facere nisi ea quae facit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q25_A5-p3"> | |
| 16666 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, God can only do what ought to be done and what is right to be done. But God is not bound to do what He does not; | |
| 16667 nor is it right that He should do what He does not. Therefore He cannot do except what He does. | |
| 16668 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 25 a. 5 arg. 2"><a name="29527" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29527] Iª q. 25 a. 5 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, Deus | |
| 16669 non potest facere nisi quod debet, et quod iustum est fieri. Sed | |
| 16670 Deus non debet facere quae non facit, nec iustum est ut faciat quae | |
| 16671 non facit. Ergo Deus non potest facere nisi quae facit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q25_A5-p4"> | |
| 16672 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, God cannot do anything that is not good and befitting creation. But it is not good for creatures nor befitting them | |
| 16673 to be otherwise than as they are. Therefore God cannot do except what He does. | |
| 16674 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 25 a. 5 arg. 3"><a name="29528" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29528] Iª q. 25 a. 5 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, Deus | |
| 16675 non potest facere nisi quod bonum est, et conveniens rebus factis. | |
| 16676 Sed rebus factis a Deo non est bonum nec conveniens aliter esse | |
| 16677 quam sint. Ergo Deus non potest facere nisi quae facit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q25_A5-p5"> | |
| 16678 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is said: "Thinkest thou that I cannot ask My Father, and He will give Me presently more than twelve legions of angels?" | |
| 16679 ( | |
| 16680 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q25_A5-p5.1" href="./asv.html#Matt.26.53" target="asv">Mat. 26:53</a>). But He neither asked for them, nor did His Father show them to refute the Jews. Therefore God can do what He does not. | |
| 16681 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 25 a. 5 s. c."><a name="29529" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29529] Iª q. 25 a. 5 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est | |
| 16682 quod dicitur Matt. XXVI, <i>an non possum rogare patrem meum, et | |
| 16683 exhibebit mihi modo plus quam duodecim legiones Angelorum?</i> | |
| 16684 Neque autem ipse rogabat, neque pater exhibebat ad repugnandum | |
| 16685 Iudaeis. Ergo Deus potest facere quod non facit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q25_A5-p6"> | |
| 16686 <b>I answer that,</b> In this matter certain persons erred in two ways. Some laid it down that God acts from natural necessity in such way that | |
| 16687 as from the action of nature nothing else can happen beyond what actually takes place---as, for instance, from the seed of | |
| 16688 man, a man must come, and from that of an olive, an olive; so from the divine operation there could not result other things, | |
| 16689 nor another order of things, than that which now is. But we showed above ( | |
| 16690 <a id="FP_Q25_A5-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q19_A3.html">Q[19], A[3]</a>) that God does not act from natural necessity, but that His will is the cause of all things; nor is that will naturally and | |
| 16691 from any necessity determined to those things. Whence in no way at all is the present course of events produced by God from | |
| 16692 any necessity, so that other things could not happen. Others, however, said that the divine power is restricted to this present | |
| 16693 course of events through the order of the divine wisdom and justice without which God | |
| 16694 does nothing. But since the power of God, which is His essence, is nothing else but His wisdom, it can indeed be fittingly | |
| 16695 said that there is nothing in the divine power which is not in the order of the divine wisdom; for the divine wisdom includes | |
| 16696 the whole potency of the divine power. Yet the order placed in creation by divine wisdom, in which order the notion of His | |
| 16697 justice consists, as said above ( | |
| 16698 <a id="FP_Q25_A5-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q21_A2.html">Q[21], A[2]</a>), is not so adequate to the divine wisdom that the divine | |
| 16699 wisdom should be restricted to this present order of things. Now it is clear that the whole idea of order which a wise man | |
| 16700 puts into things made by him is taken from their end. So, when the end is proportionate to the things made for that end, the | |
| 16701 wisdom of the maker is restricted to some definite order. But the divine goodness is an end exceeding beyond all proportion | |
| 16702 things created. Whence the divine wisdom is not so restricted to any particular order that no other course of events could | |
| 16703 happen. Wherefore we must simply say that God can do other things than those He has done. | |
| 16704 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 25 a. 5 co."><a name="29530" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29530] Iª q. 25 a. 5 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum | |
| 16705 quod circa hoc quidam dupliciter erraverunt. Quidam enim posuerunt | |
| 16706 Deum agere quasi ex necessitate naturae; ut sicut ex actione rerum | |
| 16707 naturalium non possunt alia provenire nisi quae eveniunt, utpote ex | |
| 16708 semine hominis homo, ex semine olivae oliva; ita ex operatione | |
| 16709 divina non possint aliae res, vel alius ordo rerum effluere, nisi | |
| 16710 sicut nunc est. Sed supra ostendimus Deum non agere quasi ex | |
| 16711 necessitate naturae, sed voluntatem eius esse omnium rerum causam; | |
| 16712 neque etiam ipsam voluntatem naturaliter et ex necessitate | |
| 16713 determinari ad has res. Unde nullo modo iste cursus rerum sic ex | |
| 16714 necessitate a Deo provenit, quod alia provenire non possent. Alii | |
| 16715 vero dixerunt quod potentia divina determinatur ad hunc cursum | |
| 16716 rerum, propter ordinem sapientiae et iustitiae divinae, sine quo | |
| 16717 Deus nihil operatur. Cum autem potentia Dei, quae est eius | |
| 16718 essentia, non sit aliud quam Dei sapientia, convenienter quidem | |
| 16719 dici potest quod nihil sit in Dei potentia, quod non sit in ordine | |
| 16720 divinae sapientiae, nam divina sapientia totum posse potentiae | |
| 16721 comprehendit. Sed tamen ordo a divina sapientia rebus inditus, in | |
| 16722 quo ratio iustitiae consistit, ut supra dictum est, non adaequat | |
| 16723 divinam sapientiam, sic ut divina sapientia limitetur ad hunc | |
| 16724 ordinem. Manifestum est enim quod tota ratio ordinis, quam sapiens | |
| 16725 rebus a se factis imponit, a fine sumitur. Quando igitur finis est | |
| 16726 proportionatus rebus propter finem factis, sapientia facientis | |
| 16727 limitatur ad aliquem determinatum ordinem. Sed divina bonitas est | |
| 16728 finis improportionabiliter excedens res creatas. Unde divina | |
| 16729 sapientia non determinatur ad aliquem certum ordinem rerum, ut non | |
| 16730 possit alius cursus rerum ab ipsa effluere. Unde dicendum est | |
| 16731 simpliciter quod Deus potest alia facere quam quae facit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q25_A5-p7"> | |
| 16732 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> In ourselves, in whom power and essence are distinct from will and intellect, and again intellect from wisdom, and will from | |
| 16733 justice, there can be something in the power which is not in the just will nor in the wise intellect. But in God, power and | |
| 16734 essence, will and intellect, wisdom and justice, are one and the same. Whence, there can be nothing in the divine power which | |
| 16735 cannot also be in His just will or in His wise intellect. Nevertheless, because | |
| 16736 His will cannot be determined from necessity to this or that order of things, except upon supposition, as was said above ( | |
| 16737 <a id="FP_Q25_A5-p7.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q19_A3.html">Q[19], A[3]</a>), neither are the wisdom and justice of God restricted to this present order, as was shown above; so nothing prevents there | |
| 16738 being something in the divine power which He does not will, and which is not included in the order which He has place in things. | |
| 16739 Again, because power is considered as executing, the will as commanding, and the | |
| 16740 intellect and wisdom as directing; what is attributed to His power considered in itself, God is said to be able to do in accordance | |
| 16741 with His absolute power. Of such a kind is everything which has the nature of being, as was said above | |
| 16742 <a id="FP_Q25_A5-p7.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q25_A3.html">(A[3])</a>. What is, however, attributed to the divine power, according as it carries into execution the command of a just will, God | |
| 16743 is said to be able to do by His ordinary power. In this manner, we must say that God can do other things by | |
| 16744 His absolute power than those He has foreknown and pre-ordained He would do. But it could not happen that He should do anything | |
| 16745 which He had not foreknown, and had not pre-ordained that He would do, because His actual doing is subject to His foreknowledge | |
| 16746 and pre-ordination, though His power, which is His nature, is not so. For God does things because He wills so to do; yet the | |
| 16747 power to do them does not come from His will, but from His nature. | |
| 16748 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 25 a. 5 ad 1"><a name="29531" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29531] Iª q. 25 a. 5 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo | |
| 16749 dicendum quod in nobis, in quibus est aliud potentia et essentia a | |
| 16750 voluntate et intellectu, et iterum intellectus aliud a sapientia, | |
| 16751 et voluntas aliud a iustitia, potest esse aliquid in potentia, quod | |
| 16752 non potest esse in voluntate iusta, vel in intellectu sapiente. Sed | |
| 16753 in Deo est idem potentia et essentia et voluntas et intellectus et | |
| 16754 sapientia et iustitia. Unde nihil potest esse in potentia divina, | |
| 16755 quod non possit esse in voluntate iusta ipsius, et in intellectu | |
| 16756 sapiente eius. Tamen, quia voluntas non determinatur ex necessitate | |
| 16757 ad haec vel illa, nisi forte ex suppositione, ut supra dictum est; | |
| 16758 neque sapientia Dei et iustitia determinantur ad hunc ordinem, ut | |
| 16759 supra dictum est; nihil prohibet esse aliquid in potentia Dei, quod | |
| 16760 non vult, et quod non continetur sub ordine quem statuit rebus. Et | |
| 16761 quia potentia intelligitur ut exequens, voluntas autem ut imperans, | |
| 16762 et intellectus et sapientia ut dirigens, quod attribuitur potentiae | |
| 16763 secundum se consideratae, dicitur Deus posse secundum potentiam | |
| 16764 absolutam. Et huiusmodi est omne illud in quo potest salvari ratio | |
| 16765 entis, ut supra dictum est. Quod autem attribuitur potentiae | |
| 16766 divinae secundum quod exequitur imperium voluntatis iustae, hoc | |
| 16767 dicitur Deus posse facere de potentia ordinata. Secundum hoc ergo, | |
| 16768 dicendum est quod Deus potest alia facere, de potentia absoluta, | |
| 16769 quam quae praescivit et praeordinavit se facturum, non tamen potest | |
| 16770 esse quod aliqua faciat, quae non praesciverit et praeordinaverit | |
| 16771 se facturum. Quia ipsum facere subiacet praescientiae et | |
| 16772 praeordinationi, non autem ipsum posse, quod est naturale. Ideo | |
| 16773 enim Deus aliquid facit, quia vult, non tamen ideo potest, quia | |
| 16774 vult, sed quia talis est in sua natura.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q25_A5-p8"> | |
| 16775 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> God is bound to nobody but Himself. Hence, when it is said that God can only do what He ought, nothing else is meant by this | |
| 16776 than that God can do nothing but what is befitting to Himself, and just. But these words "befitting" and "just" may be understood | |
| 16777 in two ways: one, in direct connection with the verb "is"; and thus they would be restricted to the present order of things; | |
| 16778 and would concern His power. Then what is said in the objection is false; | |
| 16779 for the sense is that God can do nothing except what is now fitting and just. If, however, they be joined directly with the | |
| 16780 verb "can" (which has the effect of extending the meaning), and then secondly with "is," the present will be signified, but | |
| 16781 in a confused and general way. The sentence would then be true in this sense: "God cannot do anything except that which, if | |
| 16782 He did it, would be suitable and just." | |
| 16783 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 25 a. 5 ad 2"><a name="29532" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29532] Iª q. 25 a. 5 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 16784 dicendum quod Deus non debet aliquid alicui nisi sibi. Unde, cum | |
| 16785 dicitur quod Deus non potest facere nisi quod debet nihil aliud | |
| 16786 significatur nisi quod Deus non potest facere nisi quod ei est | |
| 16787 conveniens et iustum. Sed hoc quod dico conveniens et iustum, | |
| 16788 potest intelligi dupliciter. Uno modo, sic quod hoc quod dico | |
| 16789 conveniens et iustum, prius intelligatur coniungi cum hoc verbo | |
| 16790 est, ita quod restringatur ad standum pro praesentibus; et sic | |
| 16791 referatur ad potentiam. Et sic falsum est quod dicitur, est enim | |
| 16792 sensus, Deus non potest facere nisi quod modo conveniens est et | |
| 16793 iustum. Si vero prius coniungatur cum hoc verbo potest, quod habet | |
| 16794 vim ampliandi, et postmodum cum hoc verbo est, significabitur | |
| 16795 quoddam praesens confusum, et erit locutio vera, sub hoc sensu, | |
| 16796 Deus non potest facere nisi id quod, si faceret, esset conveniens | |
| 16797 et iustum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q25_A5-p9"> | |
| 16798 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Although this order of things be restricted to what now exists, the divine power and wisdom are not thus restricted. Whence, | |
| 16799 although no other order would be suitable and good to the things which now are, yet God can do other things and impose upon | |
| 16800 them another order. | |
| 16801 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 25 a. 5 ad 3"><a name="29533" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29533] Iª q. 25 a. 5 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 16802 dicendum quod, licet iste cursus rerum sit determinatus istis rebus | |
| 16803 quae nunc sunt, non tamen ad hunc cursum limitatur divina sapientia | |
| 16804 et potestas. Unde, licet istis rebus quae nunc sunt, nullus alius | |
| 16805 cursus esset bonus et conveniens, tamen Deus posset alias res | |
| 16806 facere, et alium eis imponere ordinem.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q25_A6" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q25_A6-p0.1">Q. 25. A. 6. Whether God can do better than what He does?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q25_A6-p2"> | |
| 16807 <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God cannot do better than He does. For whatever God does, He does in a most powerful and wise way. But a thing | |
| 16808 is so much the better done as it is more powerfully and wisely done. Therefore God cannot do anything better than He does. | |
| 16809 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 25 a. 6 arg. 1"><a name="29534" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29534] Iª q. 25 a. 6 arg. 1</span></a> Ad sextum sic | |
| 16810 proceditur. Videtur quod Deus non possit meliora facere ea quae | |
| 16811 facit. Quidquid enim Deus facit, potentissime et sapientissime | |
| 16812 facit. Sed tanto fit aliquid melius, quanto fit potentius et | |
| 16813 sapientius. Ergo Deus non potest aliquid facere melius quam | |
| 16814 facit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q25_A6-p3"> | |
| 16815 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Augustine thus argues (Contra Maximin. iii, 8): "If God could, but would not, beget a Son His equal, He would have | |
| 16816 been envious." For the same reason, if God could have made better things than He has done, but was not willing so to do, He | |
| 16817 would have been envious. But envy is far removed from God. Therefore God makes everything of the best. He cannot therefore | |
| 16818 make anything better than He does. | |
| 16819 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 25 a. 6 arg. 2"><a name="29535" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29535] Iª q. 25 a. 6 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 16820 Augustinus, contra Maximinum, sic argumentatur, <i>si Deus potuit, | |
| 16821 et noluit, gignere filium sibi aequalem, invidus fuit</i>. Eadem | |
| 16822 ratione, si Deus potuit res meliores facere quam fecerit, et | |
| 16823 noluit, invidus fuit. Sed invidia est omnino relegata a Deo. Ergo | |
| 16824 Deus unumquodque fecit optimum. Non ergo Deus potest aliquid facere | |
| 16825 melius quam fecit.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q25_A6-p4"> | |
| 16826 <b>Objection 3:</b> Further, what is very good and the best of all cannot be bettered; because nothing is better than the best. But as Augustine | |
| 16827 says (Enchiridion 10), "each thing that God has made is good, and, taken all together they are very good; because in them | |
| 16828 all consists the wondrous beauty of the universe." Therefore the good in the universe could not be made better by God. | |
| 16829 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 25 a. 6 arg. 3"><a name="29536" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29536] Iª q. 25 a. 6 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, id | |
| 16830 quod est maxime et valde bonum, non potest melius fieri, quia | |
| 16831 maximo nihil est maius. Sed, sicut Augustinus dicit in Enchirid., | |
| 16832 <i>bona sunt singula quae Deus fecit, sed simul universa valde | |
| 16833 bona, quia ex omnibus consistit universitatis admirabilis | |
| 16834 pulchritudo</i>. Ergo bonum universi non potest melius fieri a | |
| 16835 Deo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q25_A6-p5"> | |
| 16836 <b>Objection 4:</b> Further, Christ as man is full of grace and truth, and has the Spirit without measure; and so He cannot be better. Again | |
| 16837 created happiness is described as the highest good, and thus cannot be better. And the Blessed Virgin Mary is raised above | |
| 16838 all the choirs of angels, and so cannot be better than she is. God cannot therefore make all things better than He has made | |
| 16839 them. | |
| 16840 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 25 a. 6 arg. 4"><a name="29537" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29537] Iª q. 25 a. 6 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, homo | |
| 16841 Christus est plenus gratia et veritate, et spiritum habet non ad | |
| 16842 mensuram, et sic non potest esse melior. Beatitudo etiam creata | |
| 16843 dicitur esse summum bonum, et sic non potest esse melius. Beata | |
| 16844 etiam virgo Maria est super omnes choros Angelorum exaltata, et sic | |
| 16845 non potest esse melior. Non igitur omnia quae fecit Deus, potest | |
| 16846 facere meliora.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q25_A6-p6"> | |
| 16847 <b>On the contrary,</b> It is said ( | |
| 16848 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q25_A6-p6.1" href="./asv.html#Eph.3.20" target="asv">Eph. 3:20</a>): "God is able to do all things more abundantly than we desire or understand." | |
| 16849 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 25 a. 6 s. c."><a name="29538" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29538] Iª q. 25 a. 6 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est | |
| 16850 quod dicitur ad Ephes. III, quod <i>Deus potens est omnia facere | |
| 16851 abundantius quam petimus aut intelligimus</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q25_A6-p7"> | |
| 16852 <b>I answer that,</b> The goodness of anything is twofold; one, which is of the essence of it---thus, for instance, to be rational pertains to | |
| 16853 the essence of man. As regards this good, God cannot make a thing better than it is itself; although He can make another thing | |
| 16854 better than it; even as He cannot make the number four greater than it is; because if it were greater it would no longer be | |
| 16855 four, but another number. For the addition of a substantial difference in definitions is | |
| 16856 after the manner of the addition of unity of numbers (Metaph. viii, 10). Another kind of goodness is that which is over and | |
| 16857 above the essence; thus, the good of a man is to be virtuous or wise. As regards this kind of goodness, God can make better | |
| 16858 the things He has made. Absolutely speaking, however, God can make something else better than each thing made by Him. | |
| 16859 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 25 a. 6 co."><a name="29539" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29539] Iª q. 25 a. 6 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum | |
| 16860 quod bonitas alicuius rei est duplex. Una quidem, quae est de | |
| 16861 essentia rei; sicut esse rationale est de essentia hominis. Et | |
| 16862 quantum ad hoc bonum, Deus non potest facere aliquam rem meliorem | |
| 16863 quam ipsa sit, licet possit facere aliquam aliam ea meliorem. Sicut | |
| 16864 etiam non potest facere quaternarium maiorem, quia, si esset maior, | |
| 16865 iam non esset quaternarius, sed alius numerus. Sic enim se habet | |
| 16866 additio differentiae substantialis in definitionibus, sicut additio | |
| 16867 unitatis in numeris, ut dicitur in VIII Metaphys. Alia bonitas est, | |
| 16868 quae est extra essentiam rei; sicut bonum hominis est esse | |
| 16869 virtuosum vel sapientem. Et secundum tale bonum, potest Deus res a | |
| 16870 se factas facere meliores. Simpliciter autem loquendo, qualibet re | |
| 16871 a se facta potest Deus facere aliam meliorem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q25_A6-p8"> | |
| 16872 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> When it is said that God can make a thing better than He makes it, if "better" is taken substantively, this proposition is | |
| 16873 true. For He can always make something else better than each individual thing: and He can make the same thing in one way better | |
| 16874 than it is, and in another way not; as was explained above. If, however, "better" is taken as an adverb, implying the manner | |
| 16875 of the making; thus God cannot make anything better than He makes it, because | |
| 16876 He cannot make it from greater wisdom and goodness. But if it implies the manner of the thing done, He can make something | |
| 16877 better; because He can give to things made by Him a better manner of existence as regards the accidents, although not as regards | |
| 16878 the substance. | |
| 16879 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 25 a. 6 ad 1"><a name="29540" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29540] Iª q. 25 a. 6 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo | |
| 16880 dicendum quod, cum dicitur Deum posse aliquid facere melius quam | |
| 16881 facit, si ly melius sit nomen, verum est, qualibet enim re potest | |
| 16882 facere aliam meliorem. Eandem vero potest facere meliorem | |
| 16883 quodammodo, et quodammodo non, sicut dictum est. Si vero ly melius | |
| 16884 sit adverbium, et importet modum ex parte facientis, sic Deus non | |
| 16885 potest facere melius quam sicut facit, quia non potest facere ex | |
| 16886 maiori sapientia et bonitate. Si autem importet modum ex parte | |
| 16887 facti, sic potest facere melius, quia potest dare rebus a se factis | |
| 16888 meliorem modum essendi quantum ad accidentalia, licet non quantum | |
| 16889 ad essentialia.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q25_A6-p9"> | |
| 16890 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> It is of the nature of a son that he should be equal to his father, when he comes to maturity. But it is not of the nature | |
| 16891 of anything created, that it should be better than it was made by God. Hence the comparison fails. | |
| 16892 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 25 a. 6 ad 2"><a name="29541" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29541] Iª q. 25 a. 6 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 16893 dicendum quod de ratione filii est quod aequetur patri, cum ad | |
| 16894 perfectum venerit, non est autem de ratione creaturae alicuius, | |
| 16895 quod sit melior quam a Deo facta est. Unde non est similis | |
| 16896 ratio.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q25_A6-p10"> | |
| 16897 <b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The universe, the present creation being supposed, cannot be better, on account of the most beautiful order given to things | |
| 16898 by God; in which the good of the universe consists. For if any one thing were bettered, the proportion of order would be destroyed; | |
| 16899 as if one string were stretched more than it ought to be, the melody of the harp would be destroyed. Yet God could make other | |
| 16900 things, or add something to the present creation; and then there would be | |
| 16901 another and a better universe. | |
| 16902 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 25 a. 6 ad 3"><a name="29542" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29542] Iª q. 25 a. 6 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium | |
| 16903 dicendum quod universum, suppositis istis rebus, non potest esse | |
| 16904 melius; propter decentissimum ordinem his rebus attributum a Deo, | |
| 16905 in quo bonum universi consistit. Quorum si unum aliquod esset | |
| 16906 melius, corrumperetur proportio ordinis, sicut, si una chorda plus | |
| 16907 debito intenderetur, corrumperetur citharae melodia. Posset tamen | |
| 16908 Deus alias res facere, vel alias addere istis rebus factis, et sic | |
| 16909 esset illud universum melius.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q25_A6-p11"> | |
| 16910 <b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> The humanity of Christ, from the fact that it is united to the Godhead; and created happiness from the fact that it is the | |
| 16911 fruition of God; and the Blessed Virgin from the fact that she is the mother of God; have all a certain infinite dignity from | |
| 16912 the infinite good, which is God. And on this account there cannot be anything better than these; just as there cannot be anything | |
| 16913 better than God. | |
| 16914 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 25 a. 6 ad 4"><a name="29543" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29543] Iª q. 25 a. 6 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum | |
| 16915 dicendum quod humanitas Christi ex hoc quod est unita Deo, et | |
| 16916 beatitudo creata ex hoc quod est fruitio Dei, et beata virgo ex hoc | |
| 16917 quod est mater Dei, habent quandam dignitatem infinitam, ex bono | |
| 16918 infinito quod est Deus. Et ex hac parte non potest aliquid fieri | |
| 16919 melius eis, sicut non potest aliquid melius esse Deo.</p></div></div></div></div> | |
| 16920 <div id="FP_Q26" class="div3"> | |
| 16921 <h3 id="FP_Q26-p0.1">Q. 26. OF THE DIVINE BEATITUDE (FOUR ARTICLES) </h3> | |
| 16922 <div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="div4"> | |
| 16923 <p id="FP_Q26-p2"> After considering all that pertains to the unity of the divine essence, we come to treat of the divine beatitude. Concerning | |
| 16924 this, there are four points of inquiry: | |
| 16925 </p><p id="FP_Q26-p3"> (1) Whether beatitude belongs to God?</p><p id="FP_Q26-p4"> (2) In regard to what is God called blessed; does this regard His act of intellect?</p><p id="FP_Q26-p5"> (3) Whether He is essentially the beatitude of each of the blessed?</p><p id="FP_Q26-p6"> (4) Whether all other beatitude is included in the divine beatitude?</p> | |
| 16926 </div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 26 pr."><a name="29544" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29544] | |
| 16927 Iª q. 26 pr.</span></a> Ultimo autem, post considerationem | |
| 16928 eorum quae ad divinae essentiae unitatem pertinent, considerandum | |
| 16929 est de divina beatitudine. Et circa hoc quaeruntur quatuor. Primo, | |
| 16930 utrum beatitudo Deo competat. Secundo, secundum quid dicitur Deus | |
| 16931 esse beatus, utrum secundum actum intellectus. Tertio, utrum sit | |
| 16932 essentialiter beatitudo cuiuslibet beati. Quarto, utrum in eius | |
| 16933 beatitudine omnis beatitudo includatur.</p></div></div></div> | |
| 16934 <div id="FP_Q26_A1" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q26_A1-p0.1">Q. 26. A. 1. Whether beatitude belongs to God?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q26_A1-p2"> | |
| 16935 <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that beatitude does not belong to God. For beatitude according to Boethius (De Consol. iv) "is a state made perfect | |
| 16936 by the aggregation of all good things." But the aggregation of goods has no place in God; nor has composition. Therefore beatitude | |
| 16937 does not belong to God. | |
| 16938 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 26 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="29545" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29545] Iª q. 26 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum sic | |
| 16939 proceditur. Videtur quod beatitudo Deo non conveniat. <i>Beatitudo | |
| 16940 enim</i>, secundum Boetium, in III de Consol., <i>est status omnium | |
| 16941 bonorum aggregatione perfectus</i>. Sed aggregatio bonorum non | |
| 16942 habet locum in Deo, sicut nec compositio. Ergo Deo non convenit | |
| 16943 beatitudo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q26_A1-p3"> | |
| 16944 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, beatitude or happiness is the reward of virtue, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. i, 9). But reward does not | |
| 16945 apply to God; as neither does merit. Therefore neither does beatitude. | |
| 16946 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 26 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="29546" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29546] Iª q. 26 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 16947 beatitudo, sive felicitas, est praemium virtutis, secundum | |
| 16948 philosophum, in I Ethic. Sed Deo non convenit praemium, sicut nec | |
| 16949 meritum. Ergo nec beatitudo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q26_A1-p4"> | |
| 16950 <b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle says: "Which in His times He shall show, who is the Blessed and only Almighty, the King of Kings and Lord of | |
| 16951 Lords." ( | |
| 16952 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q26_A1-p4.1" href="./asv.html#iTim.6.15" target="asv">1 Tim. 6:15</a>). | |
| 16953 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 26 a. 1 s. c."><a name="29547" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29547] Iª q. 26 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est | |
| 16954 quod dicit apostolus, I ad Tim. ultimo, <i>quem suis temporibus | |
| 16955 ostendet Deus beatus et solus potens, rex regum et dominus | |
| 16956 dominantium</i>.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q26_A1-p5"> | |
| 16957 <b>I answer that,</b> Beatitude belongs to God in a very special manner. For nothing else is understood to be meant by the term beatitude than | |
| 16958 the perfect good of an intellectual nature; which is capable of knowing that it has a sufficiency of the good which it possesses, | |
| 16959 to which it is competent that good or ill may befall, and which can control its own actions. All of these things belong in | |
| 16960 a most excellent manner to God, namely, to be perfect, and to possess intelligence. | |
| 16961 Whence beatitude belongs to God in the highest degree. | |
| 16962 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 26 a. 1 co."><a name="29548" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29548] Iª q. 26 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum | |
| 16963 quod beatitudo maxime Deo competit. Nihil enim aliud sub nomine | |
| 16964 beatitudinis intelligitur, nisi bonum perfectum intellectualis | |
| 16965 naturae; cuius est suam sufficientiam cognoscere in bono quod | |
| 16966 habet; et cui competit ut ei contingat aliquid vel bene vel male, | |
| 16967 et sit suarum operationum domina. Utrumque autem istorum | |
| 16968 excellentissime Deo convenit, scilicet perfectum esse, et | |
| 16969 intelligentem. Unde beatitudo maxime convenit Deo.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q26_A1-p6"> | |
| 16970 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Aggregation of good is in God, after the manner not of composition, but of simplicity; for those things which in creatures | |
| 16971 is manifold, pre-exist in God, as was said above ( | |
| 16972 <a id="FP_Q26_A1-p6.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q4_A2.html">Q[4], A[2]</a>; | |
| 16973 <a id="FP_Q26_A1-p6.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q13_A4.html">Q[13], A[4]</a>), in simplicity and unity. | |
| 16974 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 26 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="29549" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29549] Iª q. 26 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo | |
| 16975 dicendum quod aggregatio bonorum est in Deo non per modum | |
| 16976 compositionis, sed per modum simplicitatis, quia quae in creaturis | |
| 16977 multiplicia sunt, in Deo praeexistunt simpliciter et unite, ut | |
| 16978 supra dictum est.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q26_A1-p7"> | |
| 16979 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> It belongs as an accident to beatitude or happiness to be the reward of virtue, so far as anyone attains to beatitude; even | |
| 16980 as to be the term of generation belongs accidentally to a being, so far as it passes from potentiality to act. As, then, God | |
| 16981 has being, though not begotten; so He has beatitude, although not acquired by merit. | |
| 16982 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 26 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="29550" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29550] Iª q. 26 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 16983 dicendum quod esse praemium virtutis accidit beatitudini vel | |
| 16984 felicitati, inquantum aliquis beatitudinem acquirit, sicut esse | |
| 16985 terminum generationis accidit enti, inquantum exit de potentia in | |
| 16986 actum. Sicut igitur Deus habet esse, quamvis non generetur; ita | |
| 16987 habet beatitudinem, quamvis non mereatur.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q26_A2" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q26_A2-p0.1">Q. 26. A. 2. Whether God is called blessed in respect of His intellect?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q26_A2-p2"> | |
| 16988 <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God is not called blessed in respect to His intellect. For beatitude is the highest good. But good is said | |
| 16989 to be in God in regard to His essence, because good has reference to being which is according to essence, according to Boethius | |
| 16990 (De Hebdom.). Therefore beatitude also is said to be in God in regard to His essence, and not to His intellect. | |
| 16991 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 26 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="29551" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29551] Iª q. 26 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum sic | |
| 16992 proceditur. Videtur quod Deus non dicatur beatus secundum | |
| 16993 intellectum. Beatitudo enim est summum bonum. Sed bonum dicitur in | |
| 16994 Deo secundum essentiam, quia bonum respicit esse, quod est secundum | |
| 16995 essentiam, secundum Boetium, in libro de Hebdomad. Ergo et | |
| 16996 beatitudo dicitur in Deo secundum essentiam, et non secundum | |
| 16997 intellectum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q26_A2-p3"> | |
| 16998 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Beatitude implies the notion of end. Now the end is the object of the will, as also is the good. Therefore beatitude | |
| 16999 is said to be in God with reference to His will, and not with reference to His intellect. | |
| 17000 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 26 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="29552" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29552] Iª q. 26 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 17001 beatitudo habet rationem finis. Finis autem est obiectum | |
| 17002 voluntatis, sicut et bonum. Ergo beatitudo dicitur in Deo secundum | |
| 17003 voluntatem, et non secundum intellectum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q26_A2-p4"> | |
| 17004 <b>On the contrary,</b> Gregory says (Moral. xxxii, 7): "He is in glory, Who whilst He rejoices in Himself, needs not further praise." To be in glory, | |
| 17005 however, is the same as to be blessed. Therefore, since we enjoy God in respect to our intellect, because "vision is the whole | |
| 17006 of the reward," as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xxii), it would seem that beatitude is said to be in God in respect of His | |
| 17007 intellect. | |
| 17008 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 26 a. 2 s. c."><a name="29553" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29553] Iª q. 26 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est | |
| 17009 quod Gregorius dicit, XXXII Moralium, <i>ipse gloriosus est, qui, | |
| 17010 dum seipso perfruitur, accedentis laudis indigens non est</i>. Esse | |
| 17011 autem gloriosum significat esse beatum. Cum igitur Deo fruamur | |
| 17012 secundum intellectum, quia visio est tota merces, ut dicit | |
| 17013 Augustinus, videtur quod beatitudo dicatur in Deo secundum | |
| 17014 intellectum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q26_A2-p5"> | |
| 17015 <b>I answer that,</b> Beatitude, as stated above | |
| 17016 <a id="FP_Q26_A2-p5.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q26_A1.html">(A[1])</a>, is the perfect good of an intellectual nature. Thus it is that, as everything desires the perfection of its nature, intellectual | |
| 17017 nature desires naturally to be happy. Now that which is most perfect in any intellectual nature is the intellectual operation, | |
| 17018 by which in some sense it grasps everything. Whence the beatitude of every intellectual nature consists in understanding. | |
| 17019 Now in God, to be and to | |
| 17020 understand are one and the same thing; differing only in the manner of our understanding them. Beatitude must therefore be | |
| 17021 assigned to God in respect of His intellect; as also to the blessed, who are called blesses [beati] by reason of the assimilation | |
| 17022 to His beatitude. | |
| 17023 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 26 a. 2 co."><a name="29554" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29554] Iª q. 26 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum | |
| 17024 quod beatitudo, sicut dictum est, significat bonum perfectum | |
| 17025 intellectualis naturae. Et inde est quod, sicut unaquaeque res | |
| 17026 appetit suam perfectionem, ita et intellectualis natura naturaliter | |
| 17027 appetit esse beata. Id autem quod est perfectissimum in qualibet | |
| 17028 intellectuali natura, est intellectualis operatio, secundum quam | |
| 17029 capit quodammodo omnia. Unde cuiuslibet intellectualis naturae | |
| 17030 creatae beatitudo consistit in intelligendo. In Deo autem non est | |
| 17031 aliud esse et intelligere secundum rem, sed tantum secundum | |
| 17032 intelligentiae rationem. Attribuenda ergo est Deo beatitudo | |
| 17033 secundum intellectum, sicut et aliis beatis, qui per assimilationem | |
| 17034 ad beatitudinem ipsius, beati dicuntur.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q26_A2-p6"> | |
| 17035 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> This argument proves that beatitude belongs to God; not that beatitude pertains essentially to Him under the aspect of His | |
| 17036 essence; but rather under the aspect of His intellect. | |
| 17037 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 26 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="29555" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29555] Iª q. 26 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo | |
| 17038 dicendum quod ex illa ratione probatur quod Deus sit beatus | |
| 17039 secundum suam essentiam, non autem quod beatitudo ei conveniat | |
| 17040 secundum rationem essentiae, sed magis secundum rationem | |
| 17041 intellectus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q26_A2-p7"> | |
| 17042 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Since beatitude is a good, it is the object of the will; now the object is understood as prior to the act of a power. Whence | |
| 17043 in our manner of understanding, divine beatitude precedes the act of the will at rest in it. This cannot be other than the | |
| 17044 act of the intellect; and thus beatitude is to be found in an act of the intellect. | |
| 17045 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 26 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="29556" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29556] Iª q. 26 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 17046 dicendum quod beatitudo, cum sit bonum, est obiectum voluntatis. | |
| 17047 Obiectum autem praeintelligitur actui potentiae. Unde, secundum | |
| 17048 modum intelligendi, prius est beatitudo divina, quam actus | |
| 17049 voluntatis in ea requiescentis. Et hoc non potest esse nisi actus | |
| 17050 intellectus. Unde in actu intellectus attenditur beatitudo.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q26_A3" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q26_A3-p0.1">Q. 26. A. 3. Whether God is the beatitude of each of the blessed?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q26_A3-p2"> | |
| 17051 <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God is the beatitude of each of the blessed. For God is the supreme good, as was said above ( | |
| 17052 <a id="FP_Q26_A3-p2.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q6_A2.html">Q[6], AA[2]</a>,4). But it is quite impossible that there should be many supreme goods, as also is clear from what has been said above ( | |
| 17053 <a id="FP_Q26_A3-p2.2" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q11_A3.html">Q[11], A[3]</a>). Therefore, since it is of the essence of beatitude that it should be the supreme good, it seems that beatitude is nothing | |
| 17054 else but God Himself. | |
| 17055 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 26 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="29557" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29557] Iª q. 26 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium sic | |
| 17056 proceditur. Videtur quod Deus sit beatitudo cuiuslibet beati. Deus | |
| 17057 enim est summum bonum, ut supra ostensum est. Impossibile est autem | |
| 17058 esse plura summa bona, ut etiam ex superioribus patet. Cum igitur | |
| 17059 de ratione beatitudinis sit, quod sit summum bonum, videtur quod | |
| 17060 beatitudo non sit aliud quam Deus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q26_A3-p3"> | |
| 17061 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, beatitude is the last end of the rational nature. But to be the last end of the rational nature belongs only to | |
| 17062 God. Therefore the beatitude of every blessed is God alone. | |
| 17063 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 26 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="29558" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29558] Iª q. 26 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 17064 beatitudo est finis rationalis naturae ultimus. Sed esse ultimum | |
| 17065 finem rationalis naturae, soli Deo convenit. Ergo beatitudo | |
| 17066 cuiuslibet beati est solus Deus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q26_A3-p4"> | |
| 17067 <b>On the contrary,</b> The beatitude of one is greater than that of another, according to | |
| 17068 <a class="scripRef" id="FP_Q26_A3-p4.1" href="./asv.html#iCor.15.41" target="asv">1 Cor. 15:41</a>: "Star differeth from star in glory." But nothing is greater than God. Therefore beatitude is something different from God. | |
| 17069 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 26 a. 3 s. c."><a name="29559" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29559] Iª q. 26 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra, | |
| 17070 beatitudo unius est maior beatitudine alterius, secundum illud I | |
| 17071 Cor. XV, <i>stella differt a stella in claritate</i>. Sed Deo nihil | |
| 17072 est maius. Ergo beatitudo est aliquid aliud quam Deus.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q26_A3-p5"> | |
| 17073 <b>I answer that,</b> The beatitude of an intellectual nature consists in an act of the intellect. In this we may consider two things, namely, | |
| 17074 the object of the act, which is the thing understood; and the act itself which is to understand. If, then, beatitude be considered | |
| 17075 on the side of the object, God is the only beatitude; for everyone is blessed from this sole fact, that he understands God, | |
| 17076 in accordance with the saying of Augustine (Confess. v, 4): "Blessed is he who knoweth | |
| 17077 Thee, though he know nought else." But as regards the act of understanding, beatitude is a created thing in beatified creatures; | |
| 17078 but in God, even in this way, it is an uncreated thing. | |
| 17079 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 26 a. 3 co."><a name="29560" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29560] Iª q. 26 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum | |
| 17080 quod beatitudo intellectualis naturae consistit in actu | |
| 17081 intellectus. In quo duo possunt considerari, scilicet obiectum | |
| 17082 actus, quod est intelligibile; et ipse actus, qui est intelligere. | |
| 17083 Si igitur beatitudo consideretur ex parte ipsius obiecti, sic solus | |
| 17084 Deus est beatitudo, quia ex hoc solo est aliquis beatus, quod Deum | |
| 17085 intelligit; secundum illud Augustini, in V libro Confess., | |
| 17086 <i>beatus est qui te novit, etiam si alia ignoret</i>. Sed ex parte | |
| 17087 actus intelligentis, beatitudo est quid creatum in creaturis | |
| 17088 beatis, in Deo autem est etiam secundum hoc, aliquid increatum.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q26_A3-p6"> | |
| 17089 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Beatitude, as regards its object, is the supreme good absolutely, but as regards its act, in beatified creatures it is their | |
| 17090 supreme good, not absolutely, but in that kind of goods which a creature can participate. | |
| 17091 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 26 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="29561" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29561] Iª q. 26 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo | |
| 17092 dicendum quod beatitudo, quantum ad obiectum, est summum bonum | |
| 17093 simpliciter, sed quantum ad actum, in creaturis beatis, est summum | |
| 17094 bonum, non simpliciter, sed in genere bonorum participabilium a | |
| 17095 creatura.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q26_A3-p7"> | |
| 17096 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> End is twofold, namely, "objective" and "subjective," as the Philosopher says (Greater Ethics i, 3), namely, the "thing itself" | |
| 17097 and "its use." Thus to a miser the end is money, and its acquisition. Accordingly God is indeed the last end of a rational | |
| 17098 creature, as the thing itself; but created beatitude is the end, as the use, or rather fruition, of the thing. | |
| 17099 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 26 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="29562" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29562] Iª q. 26 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 17100 dicendum quod finis est duplex, scilicet cuius et quo, ut | |
| 17101 philosophus dicit, scilicet ipsa res, et usus rei, sicut avaro est | |
| 17102 finis pecunia, et acquisitio pecuniae. Creaturae igitur rationalis | |
| 17103 est quidem Deus finis ultimus ut res; beatitudo autem creata ut | |
| 17104 usus, vel magis fruitio, rei.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP_Q26_A4" class="div4"><h4 id="FP_Q26_A4-p0.1">Q. 26. A. 4. Whether all other beatitude is included in the beatitude of God?</h4><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q26_A4-p2"> | |
| 17105 <b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the divine beatitude does not embrace all other beatitudes. For there are some false beatitudes. But nothing | |
| 17106 false can be in God. Therefore the divine beatitude does not embrace all other beatitudes. | |
| 17107 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 26 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="29563" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29563] Iª q. 26 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum sic | |
| 17108 proceditur. Videtur quod beatitudo divina non complectatur omnes | |
| 17109 beatitudines. Sunt enim quaedam beatitudines falsae. Sed in Deo | |
| 17110 nihil potest esse falsum. Ergo divina beatitudo non complectitur | |
| 17111 omnem beatitudinem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q26_A4-p3"> | |
| 17112 <b>Objection 2:</b> Further, a certain beatitude, according to some, consists in things corporeal; as in pleasure, riches, and such like. Now | |
| 17113 none of these have to do with God, since He is incorporeal. Therefore His beatitude does not embrace all other beatitudes. | |
| 17114 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 26 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="29564" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29564] Iª q. 26 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, | |
| 17115 quaedam beatitudo, secundum quosdam, consistit in rebus | |
| 17116 corporalibus, sicut in voluptatibus, divitiis, et huiusmodi, quae | |
| 17117 quidem Deo convenire non possunt, cum sit incorporeus. Ergo | |
| 17118 beatitudo eius non complectitur omnem beatitudinem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q26_A4-p4"> | |
| 17119 <b>On the contrary,</b> Beatitude is a certain perfection. But the divine perfection embraces all other perfection, as was shown above ( | |
| 17120 <a id="FP_Q26_A4-p4.1" shape="rect" href="summa.FP_Q4_A2.html">Q[4], A[2]</a> ). Therefore the divine beatitude embraces all other beatitudes. | |
| 17121 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 26 a. 4 s. c."><a name="29565" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29565] Iª q. 26 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est | |
| 17122 quod beatitudo est perfectio quaedam. Divina autem perfectio | |
| 17123 complectitur omnem perfectionem, ut supra ostensum est. Ergo divina | |
| 17124 beatitudo complectitur omnem beatitudinem.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q26_A4-p5"> | |
| 17125 <b>I answer that,</b> Whatever is desirable in whatsoever beatitude, whether true or false, pre-exists wholly and in a more eminent degree in the | |
| 17126 divine beatitude. As to contemplative happiness, God possesses a continual and most certain contemplation of Himself and of | |
| 17127 all things else; and as to that which is active, He has the governance of the whole universe. As to earthly happiness, which | |
| 17128 consists in delight, riches, power, dignity, and fame, according to Boethius (De Consol. | |
| 17129 iii, 10), He possesses joy in Himself and all things else for His delight; instead of riches He has that complete self-sufficiency, | |
| 17130 which is promised by riches; in place of power, He has omnipotence; for dignities, the government of all things; and in place | |
| 17131 of fame, He possesses the admiration of all creatures. | |
| 17132 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 26 a. 4 co."><a name="29566" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29566] Iª q. 26 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum | |
| 17133 quod quidquid est desiderabile in quacumque beatitudine, vel vera | |
| 17134 vel falsa, totum eminentius in divina beatitudine praeexistit. De | |
| 17135 contemplativa enim felicitate, habet continuam et certissimam | |
| 17136 contemplationem sui et omnium aliorum, de activa vero, | |
| 17137 gubernationem totius universi. De terrena vero felicitate, quae | |
| 17138 consistit in voluptate, divitiis, potestate, dignitate et fama, | |
| 17139 secundum Boetium, in III de Consol., habet gaudium de se et de | |
| 17140 omnibus aliis, pro delectatione, pro divitiis, habet omnimodam | |
| 17141 sufficientiam, quam divitiae promittunt, pro potestate, | |
| 17142 omnipotentiam, pro dignitate, omnium regimen, pro fama vero, | |
| 17143 admirationem totius creaturae.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><p class="english" id="FP_Q26_A4-p6"> | |
| 17144 <b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> A particular kind of beatitude is false according as it falls short of the idea of true beatitude; and thus it is not in | |
| 17145 God. But whatever semblance it has, howsoever slight, of beatitude, the whole of it pre-exists in the divine beatitude. | |
| 17146 </p></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 26 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="29567" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29567] Iª q. 26 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo | |
| 17147 dicendum quod beatitudo aliqua secundum hoc est falsa, secundum | |
| 17148 quod deficit a ratione verae beatitudinis, et sic non est in Deo. | |
| 17149 Sed quidquid habet de similitudine, quantumcumque tenui, | |
| 17150 beatitudinis, totum praeexistit in divina beatitudine.</p></div></div><div class="bilingual"><div class="eng"><div class="english"><p id="FP_Q26_A4-p7"> | |
| 17151 <b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The good that exists in things corporeal in a corporeal manner, is also in God, but in a spiritual manner. | |
| 17152 </p><p id="FP_Q26_A4-p8"> We have now spoken enough concerning what pertains to the unity of the divine essence.</p></div></div><div class="lat"><p class="latin" title="I q. 26 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="29568" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29568] Iª q. 26 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum | |
| 17153 dicendum quod bona quae sunt in corporalibus corporaliter, in Deo | |
| 17154 sunt spiritualiter, secundum modum suum. Et haec dicta sufficiant | |
| 17155 de his quae pertinent ad divinae essentiae unitatem.</p></div></div></div></div> | |
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