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7 xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml"><head><title>Bilingual Aquinas Questions 19--25</title><style>
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10 </style></head><body style="font-family: Bitstream Vera Serif"><div id="FP.ii" next="FP_Q2" prev="FP_Q1_A10" progress="0.25%" n="ii" title="Treatise on The One God (QQ[2-26])"><h2 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii-p0.1">TREATISE ON THE ONE GOD (QQ19-26)</h2><div id="FP.ii.FP_Q19" next="FP_Q19_A1" prev="FP_Q18_A4" progress="3.41%" n="xviii" title="Question. 19 - THE WILL OF GOD (TWELVE ARTICLES)">
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11 <h3 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19-p0.1">Question 19. THE WILL OF GOD (TWELVE ARTICLES)</h3>
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12 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><div xml:lang="en">
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13 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19-p2" shownumber="no"> After considering the things belonging to the divine knowledge, we consider what belongs to the divine will. The first consideration is about the divine will itself; the second about what belongs strictly to His will; the third about what belongs to the intellect in relation to His will. About His will itself there are twelve points of inquiry:</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19-p3" shownumber="no"> (1) Whether there is will in God?</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19-p4" shownumber="no"> (2) Whether God wills things apart from Himself?</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19-p5" shownumber="no"> (3) Whether whatever God wills, He wills necessarily?</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19-p6" shownumber="no"> (4) Whether the will of God is the cause of things?</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19-p7" shownumber="no"> (5) Whether any cause can be assigned to the divine will?</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19-p8" shownumber="no"> (6) Whether the divine will is always fulfilled?</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19-p9" shownumber="no"> (7) Whether the will of God is mutable?</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19-p10" shownumber="no"> (8) Whether the will of God imposes necessity on the things willed?</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19-p11" shownumber="no"> (9) Whether there is in God the will of evil?</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19-p12" shownumber="no"> (10) Whether God has free will?</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19-p13" shownumber="no"> (11) Whether the will of expression is distinguished in God?</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19-p14" shownumber="no"> (12) Whether five expressions of will are rightly assigned to the divine will?</p>
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14 </div></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 pr."><a name="29179"><span class="ref">[29179]
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15 Iª q. 19 pr.</span></a> Post considerationem eorum quae ad
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16 divinam scientiam pertinent, considerandum est de his quae
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17 pertinent ad voluntatem divinam, ut sit prima consideratio de ipsa
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18 Dei voluntate; secunda, de his quae ad voluntatem absolute
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19 pertinent; tertia, de his quae ad intellectum in ordine ad
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20 voluntatem pertinent. Circa ipsam autem voluntatem quaeruntur
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21 duodecim. Primo, utrum in Deo sit voluntas. Secundo, utrum Deus
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22 velit alia a se. Tertio, utrum quidquid Deus vult, ex necessitate
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23 velit. Quarto, utrum voluntas Dei sit causa rerum. Quinto, utrum
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24 voluntatis divinae sit assignare aliquam causam. Sexto, utrum
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25 voluntas divina semper impleatur. Septimo, utrum voluntas Dei sit
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26 mutabilis. Octavo, utrum voluntas Dei necessitatem rebus volitis
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27 imponat. Nono, utrum in Deo sit voluntas malorum. Decimo, utrum
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28 Deus habeat liberum arbitrium. Undecimo, utrum sit distinguenda in
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29 Deo voluntas signi. Duodecimo, utrum convenienter circa divinam
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30 voluntatem ponantur quinque signa.</p></div></div>
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31 <div id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A1" next="FP_Q19_A2" prev="FP_Q19"
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32 progress="3.42%" n="i" title="Article. 1 - Whether there is will in
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33 God?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A1-p0.1">Whether there
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34 is will in God?</h4><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div
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35 style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en"
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36 id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A1-p2" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It
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37 seems that there is not will in God. For the object of will is the end
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38 and the good. But we cannot assign to God any end. Therefore there is
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39 not will in God.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
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40 xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="29180"><span class=
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41 "ref">[29180] Iª q. 19 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum sic
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42 proceditur. Videtur quod in Deo non sit voluntas. Obiectum enim
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43 voluntatis est finis et bonum. Sed Dei non est assignare aliquem
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44 finem. Ergo voluntas non est in Deo.</p></div></div><div style="clear:
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45 both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p
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46 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A1-p3"
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47 shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, will is a kind of
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48 appetite. But appetite, as it is directed to things not possessed,
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49 implies imperfection, which cannot be imputed to God. Therefore there
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50 is not will in God.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
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51 xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="29181"><span class=
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52 "ref">[29181] Iª q. 19 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
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53 voluntas est appetitus quidam. Appetitus autem, cum sit rei non
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54 habitae, imperfectionem designat, quae Deo non competit. Ergo
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55 voluntas non est in Deo.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both;
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56 margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p
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57 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A1-p4"
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58 shownumber="no"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, according to the
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59 Philosopher (De Anima iii, 54), the will moves, and is moved. But God
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60 is the first cause of movement, and Himself is unmoved, as proved in
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61 Phys. viii, 49. Therefore there is not will in God.</p></div><div
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62 style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="29182"><span class=
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63 "ref">[29182] Iª q. 19 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
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64 secundum philosophum, in III de anima, voluntas est movens motum.
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65 Sed Deus est primum movens immobile. Ut probatur VIII Physic. Ergo
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66 in Deo non est voluntas.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both;
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67 margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p
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68 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A1-p5" shownumber="no"><b>On the
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69 contrary,</b> The Apostle says (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Rom.12.2"
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70 parsed="vul|Rom|12|2|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A1-p5.1"
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71 passage="Rom. 12:2">Rom. 12:2</scripRef>): "That you may prove what is
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72 the will of God."</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
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73 xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 1 s. c."><a name="29183"><span class=
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74 "ref">[29183] Iª q. 19 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
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75 quod dicit apostolus, Rom. XII, <i>ut probetis quae sit voluntas
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76 Dei</i>.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A1-p6" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> There is will in God, as there is intellect: since will follows upon intellect. For as natural things have actual existence by their form, so the intellect is actually intelligent by its intelligible form. Now everything has this aptitude towards its natural form, that when it has it not, it tends towards it; and when it has it, it is at rest therein. It is the same with every natural perfection, which is a natural good. This aptitude to good in things
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77 without knowledge is called natural appetite. Whence also intellectual natures have a like aptitude as apprehended through its intelligible form; so as to rest therein when possessed, and when not possessed to seek to possess it, both of which pertain to the will. Hence in every intellectual being there is will, just as in every sensible being there is animal appetite. And so there must be will in God, since there is intellect in Him. And as His intellect is His own existence, so is His
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78 will.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
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79 xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 1 co."><a name="29184"><span class=
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80 "ref">[29184] Iª q. 19 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
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81 in Deo voluntatem esse, sicut et in eo est intellectus, voluntas
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82 enim intellectum consequitur. Sicut enim res naturalis habet esse
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83 in actu per suam formam, ita intellectus intelligens actu per suam
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84 formam intelligibilem. Quaelibet autem res ad suam formam naturalem
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85 hanc habet habitudinem, ut quando non habet ipsam, tendat in eam;
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86 et quando habet ipsam, quiescat in ea. Et idem est de qualibet
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87 perfectione naturali, quod est bonum naturae. Et haec habitudo ad
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88 bonum, in rebus carentibus cognitione, vocatur appetitus naturalis.
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89 Unde et natura intellectualis ad bonum apprehensum per formam
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90 intelligibilem, similem habitudinem habet, ut scilicet, cum habet
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91 ipsum, quiescat in illo; cum vero non habet, quaerat ipsum. Et
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92 utrumque pertinet ad voluntatem. Unde in quolibet habente
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93 intellectum, est voluntas; sicut in quolibet habente sensum, est
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94 appetitus animalis. Et sic oportet in Deo esse voluntatem, cum sit
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95 in eo intellectus. Et sicut suum intelligere est suum esse, ita
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96 suum velle.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top:
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97 .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en"
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98 id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A1-p7" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection
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99 1:</b> Although nothing apart from God is His end, yet He Himself is
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100 the end with respect to all things made by Him. And this by His
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101 essence, for by His essence He is good, as shown above (<a
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102 id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A1-p7.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q6.FP_Q6_A3"
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103 shape="rect" xml:link="simple">Q[6], A[3]</a>): for the end has the
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104 aspect of good.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
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105 xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="29185"><span class=
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106 "ref">[29185] Iª q. 19 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
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107 dicendum quod, licet nihil aliud a Deo sit finis Dei, tamen ipsemet
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108 est finis respectu omnium quae ab eo fiunt. Et hoc per suam
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109 essentiam, cum per suam essentiam sit bonus, ut supra ostensum est,
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110 finis enim habet rationem boni.</p></div></div><div style="clear:
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111 both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p
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112 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A1-p8" shownumber="no"><b>Reply
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113 to Objection 2:</b> Will in us belongs to the appetitive part, which,
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114 although named from appetite, has not for its only act the seeking
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115 what it does not possess; but also the loving and the delighting in
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116 what it does possess. In this respect will is said to be in God, as
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117 having always good which is its object, since, as already said, it is
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118 not distinct from His essence.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float:
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119 right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="29186"><span class=
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120 "ref">[29186] Iª q. 19 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
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121 dicendum quod voluntas in nobis pertinet ad appetitivam partem,
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122 quae licet ab appetendo nominetur, non tamen hunc solum habet
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123 actum, ut appetat quae non habet; sed etiam ut amet quod habet, et
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124 delectetur in illo. Et quantum ad hoc voluntas in Deo ponitur; quae
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125 semper habet bonum quod est eius obiectum, cum sit indifferens ab
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126 eo secundum essentiam, ut dictum est.</p></div></div><div
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127 style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float:
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128 left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A1-p9"
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129 shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> A will of which the
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130 principal object is a good outside itself, must be moved by another;
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131 but the object of the divine will is His goodness, which is His
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132 essence. Hence, since the will of God is His essence, it is not moved
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133 by another than itself, but by itself alone, in the same sense as
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134 understanding and willing are said to be movement. This is what Plato
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135 meant when he said that the first mover moves itself.</p></div><div
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136 style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="29187"><span class=
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137 "ref">[29187] Iª q. 19 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
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138 dicendum quod voluntas cuius obiectum principale est bonum quod est
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139 extra voluntatem, oportet quod sit mota ab aliquo. Sed obiectum
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140 divinae voluntatis est bonitas sua, quae est eius essentia. Unde,
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141 cum voluntas Dei sit eius essentia, non movetur ab alio a se, sed a
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142 se tantum, eo modo loquendi quo intelligere et velle dicitur motus.
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143 Et secundum hoc Plato dixit quod primum movens movet
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144 seipsum.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A2"
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145 next="FP_Q19_A3" prev="FP_Q19_A1" progress="3.44%" n="ii"
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146 title="Article. 2 - Whether God wills things apart from Himself?"><h4
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147 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A2-p0.1">Whether God wills
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148 things apart from Himself?</h4><div style="clear: both; margin-top:
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149 .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en"
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150 id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A2-p2" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It
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151 seems that God does not will things apart from Himself. For the divine
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152 will is the divine existence. But God is not other than
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153 Himself. Therefore He does not will things other than
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154 Himself.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
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155 xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="29188"><span class=
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156 "ref">[29188] Iª q. 19 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum sic
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157 proceditur. Videtur quod Deus non velit alia a se. Velle enim
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158 divinum est eius esse. Sed Deus non est aliud a se. Ergo non vult
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159 aliud a se.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top:
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160 .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en"
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161 id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A2-p3" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b>
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162 Further, the willed moves the willer, as the appetible the appetite,
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163 as stated in De Anima iii, 54. If, therefore, God wills anything apart
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164 from Himself, His will must be moved by another; which is
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165 impossible.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
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166 xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="29189"><span class=
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167 "ref">[29189] Iª q. 19 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
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168 volitum movet voluntatem, sicut appetibile appetitum, ut dicitur in
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169 III de anima. Si igitur Deus velit aliquid aliud a se, movebitur
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170 eius voluntas ab aliquo alio, quod est
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171 impossibile.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top:
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172 .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en"
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173 id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A2-p4" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 3:</b>
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174 Further, if what is willed suffices the willer, he seeks nothing
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175 beyond it. But His own goodness suffices God, and completely satisfies
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176 His will. Therefore God does not will anything apart from
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177 Himself.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
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178 xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="29190"><span class=
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179 "ref">[29190] Iª q. 19 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
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180 cuicumque voluntati sufficit aliquod volitum, nihil quaerit extra
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181 illud. Sed Deo sufficit sua bonitas, et voluntas eius ex ea
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182 satiatur. Ergo Deus non vult aliquid aliud a se.</p></div></div><div
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183 style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float:
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184 left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A2-p5"
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185 shownumber="no"><b>Objection 4:</b> Further, acts of will are
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186 multiplied in proportion to the number of their objects. If,
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187 therefore, God wills Himself and things apart from Himself, it follows
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188 that the act of His will is manifold, and consequently His existence,
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189 which is His will. But this is impossible. Therefore God does not will
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190 things apart from Himself.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float:
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191 right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 2 arg. 4"><a name="29191"><span class=
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192 "ref">[29191] Iª q. 19 a. 2 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, actus
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193 voluntatis multiplicatur secundum volita. Si igitur Deus velit se
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194 et alia a se, sequitur quod actus voluntatis eius sit multiplex, et
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195 per consequens eius esse, quod est eius velle. Hoc autem est
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196 impossibile. Non ergo vult alia a se.</p></div></div><div
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197 style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float:
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198 left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A2-p6"
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199 shownumber="no"><b>On the contrary,</b> The Apostle says (<scripRef
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200 osisRef="Bible.vul:1Thess.4.3" parsed="vul|1Thess|4|3|0|0"
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201 id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A2-p6.1" passage="1 Thess. 4:3">1
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202 Thess. 4:3</scripRef>): "This is the will of God, your
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203 sanctification."</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
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204 xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 2 s. c."><a name="29192"><span class=
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205 "ref">[29192] Iª q. 19 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
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206 quod apostolus dicit, I Thess. IV, <i>haec est voluntas Dei,
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207 sanctificatio vestra</i>.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A2-p7" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> God wills not only Himself, but other things apart from Himself. This is clear from the comparison which we made above <a id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A2-p7.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A1" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">(A[1])</a>. For natural things have a natural inclination not only towards their own proper good, to acquire it if not possessed, and, if possessed, to rest therein; but also to spread abroad their own good amongst others, so far as possible. Hence we see that every agent, in so far as it is perfect and in act, produces
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208 its like. It pertains, therefore, to the nature of the will to communicate as far as possible to others the good possessed; and especially does this pertain to the divine will, from which all perfection is derived in some kind of likeness. Hence, if natural things, in so far as they are perfect, communicate their good to others, much more does it appertain to the divine will to communicate by likeness its own good to others as much as possible. Thus, then, He wills both Himself to be, and other
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209 things to be; but Himself as the end, and other things as ordained
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210 to that end; inasmuch as it befits the divine goodness that other
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211 things should be partakers therein.</p></div><div style="width: 45%;
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212 float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 2 co."><a name="29193"><span class=
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213 "ref">[29193] Iª q. 19 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
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214 quod Deus non solum se vult, sed etiam alia a se. Quod apparet a
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215 simili prius introducto. Res enim naturalis non solum habet
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216 naturalem inclinationem respectu proprii boni, ut acquirat ipsum
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217 cum non habet, vel ut quiescat in illo cum habet; sed etiam ut
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218 proprium bonum in alia diffundat, secundum quod possibile est. Unde
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219 videmus quod omne agens, inquantum est actu et perfectum, facit
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220 sibi simile. Unde et hoc pertinet ad rationem voluntatis, ut bonum
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221 quod quis habet, aliis communicet, secundum quod possibile est. Et
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222 hoc praecipue pertinet ad voluntatem divinam, a qua, per quandam
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223 similitudinem, derivatur omnis perfectio. Unde, si res naturales,
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224 inquantum perfectae sunt, suum bonum aliis communicant, multo magis
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225 pertinet ad voluntatem divinam, ut bonum suum aliis per
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226 similitudinem communicet, secundum quod possibile est. Sic igitur
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227 vult et se esse, et alia. Sed se ut finem, alia vero ut ad finem,
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228 inquantum condecet divinam bonitatem etiam alia ipsam
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229 participare.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A2-p8" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The divine will is God's own existence essentially, yet they differ in aspect, according to the different ways of understanding them and expressing them, as is clear from what has already been said (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A2-p8.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A4" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">Q[13], A[4]</a>). For when we say that God exists, no relation to any other object is implied, as we do imply when we say that God wills. Therefore, although He is not anything apart from Himself, yet He does will things apart from
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230 Himself.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
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231 xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="29194"><span class=
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232 "ref">[29194] Iª q. 19 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
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233 dicendum quod, licet divinum velle sit eius esse secundum rem,
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234 tamen differt ratione, secundum diversum modum intelligendi et
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235 significandi, ut ex superioribus patet. In hoc enim quod dico Deum
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236 esse, non importatur habitudo ad aliquid, sicut in hoc quod dico
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237 Deum velle. Et ideo, licet non sit aliquid aliud a se, vult tamen
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238 aliquid aliud a se.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A2-p9" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> In things willed for the sake of the end, the whole reason for our being moved is the end, and this it is that moves the will, as most clearly appears in things willed only for the sake of the end. He who wills to take a bitter draught, in doing so wills nothing else than health; and this alone moves his will. It is different with one who takes a draught that is pleasant, which anyone may will to do, not only for the sake of health, but also for its
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239 own sake. Hence, although God wills things apart from Himself only
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240 for the sake of the end, which is His own goodness, it does not follow
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241 that anything else moves His will, except His goodness. So, as He
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242 understands things apart from Himself by understanding His own
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243 essence, so He wills things apart from Himself by willing His own
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244 goodness.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
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245 xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="29195"><span class=
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246 "ref">[29195] Iª q. 19 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
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247 dicendum quod in his quae volumus propter finem, tota ratio movendi
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248 est finis, et hoc est quod movet voluntatem. Et hoc maxime apparet
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249 in his quae volumus tantum propter finem. Qui enim vult sumere
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250 potionem amaram, nihil in ea vult nisi sanitatem, et hoc solum est
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251 quod movet eius voluntatem. Secus autem est in eo qui sumit
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252 potionem dulcem, quam non solum propter sanitatem, sed etiam
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253 propter se aliquis velle potest. Unde, cum Deus alia a se non velit
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254 nisi propter finem qui est sua bonitas, ut dictum est, non sequitur
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255 quod aliquid aliud moveat voluntatem eius nisi bonitas sua. Et sic,
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256 sicut alia a se intelligit intelligendo essentiam suam, ita alia a
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257 se vult, volendo bonitatem suam.</p></div></div><div style="clear:
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258 both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p
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259 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A2-p10" shownumber="no"><b>Reply
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260 to Objection 3:</b> From the fact that His own goodness suffices the
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261 divine will, it does not follow that it wills nothing apart from
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262 itself, but rather that it wills nothing except by reason of its
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263 goodness. Thus, too, the divine intellect, though its perfection
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264 consists in its very knowledge of the divine essence, yet in that
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265 essence knows other things.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float:
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266 right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="29196"><span class=
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267 "ref">[29196] Iª q. 19 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
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268 dicendum quod ex hoc quod voluntati divinae sufficit sua bonitas,
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269 non sequitur quod nihil aliud velit, sed quod nihil aliud vult nisi
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270 ratione suae bonitatis. Sicut etiam intellectus divinus, licet sit
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271 perfectus ex hoc ipso quod essentiam divinam cognoscit, tamen in ea
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272 cognoscit alia.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top:
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273 .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en"
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274 id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A2-p11" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection
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275 4:</b> As the divine intellect is one, as seeing the many only in the
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276 one, in the same way the divine will is one and simple, as willing the
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277 many only through the one, that is, through its own
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278 goodness.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
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279 xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 2 ad 4"><a name="29197"><span class=
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280 "ref">[29197] Iª q. 19 a. 2 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum
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281 dicendum quod, sicut intelligere divinum est unum, quia multa non
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282 videt nisi in uno; ita velle divinum est unum et simplex, quia
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283 multa non vult nisi per unum, quod est bonitas
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284 sua.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A3"
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285 next="FP_Q19_A4" prev="FP_Q19_A2" progress="3.47%" n="iii"
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286 title="Article. 3 - Whether whatever God wills He wills
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287 necessarily?"><h4 xml:lang="en"
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288 id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A3-p0.1">Whether whatever God wills He wills
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289 necessarily?</h4><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div
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290 style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en"
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291 id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A3-p2" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It
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292 seems that whatever God wills He wills necessarily. For everything
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293 eternal is necessary. But whatever God wills, He wills from eternity,
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294 for otherwise His will would be mutable. Therefore whatever He wills,
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295 He wills necessarily.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float:
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296 right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="29198"><span class=
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297 "ref">[29198] Iª q. 19 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium sic
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298 proceditur. Videtur quod quidquid Deus vult, ex necessitate velit.
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299 Omne enim aeternum est necessarium. Sed quidquid Deus vult, ab
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300 aeterno vult, alias, voluntas eius esset mutabilis. Ergo quidquid
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301 vult, ex necessitate vult.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both;
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302 margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p
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303 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A3-p3"
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304 shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, God wills things apart
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305 from Himself, inasmuch as He wills His own goodness. Now God wills His
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306 own goodness necessarily. Therefore He wills things apart from Himself
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307 necessarily.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
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308 xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="29199"><span class=
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309 "ref">[29199] Iª q. 19 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, Deus
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310 vult alia a se, inquantum vult bonitatem suam. Sed Deus bonitatem
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311 suam ex necessitate vult. Ergo alia a se ex necessitate
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312 vult.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div
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313 style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en"
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314 id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A3-p4" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 3:</b>
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315 Further, whatever belongs to the nature of God is necessary, for God
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316 is of Himself necessary being, and the principle of all necessity, as
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317 above shown (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A3-p4.1"
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318 href="#FP.ii.FP_Q2.FP_Q2_A3" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">Q[2],
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319 A[3]</a>). But it belongs to His nature to will whatever He wills;
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320 since in God there can be nothing over and above His nature as stated
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321 in Metaph. v, 6. Therefore whatever He wills, He wills
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322 necessarily.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
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323 xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="29200"><span class=
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324 "ref">[29200] Iª q. 19 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
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325 quidquid est Deo naturale, est necessarium, quia Deus est per se
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326 necesse esse, et principium omnis necessitatis, ut supra ostensum
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327 est. Sed naturale est ei velle quidquid vult, quia in Deo nihil
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328 potest esse praeter naturam, ut dicitur in V Metaphys. Ergo
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329 quidquid vult, ex necessitate vult.</p></div></div><div style="clear:
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330 both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p
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331 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A3-p5"
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332 shownumber="no"><b>Objection 4:</b> Further, being that is not
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333 necessary, and being that is possible not to be, are one and the same
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334 thing. If, therefore, God does not necessarily will a thing that He
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335 wills, it is possible for Him not to will it, and therefore possible
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336 for Him to will what He does not will. And so the divine will is
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337 contingent upon one or the other of two things, and imperfect, since
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338 everything contingent is imperfect and mutable.</p></div><div
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339 style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 3 arg. 4"><a name="29201"><span class=
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340 "ref">[29201] Iª q. 19 a. 3 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, non
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341 necesse esse, et possibile non esse, aequipollent. Si igitur non
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342 necesse est Deum velle aliquid eorum quae vult, possibile est eum
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343 non velle illud; et possibile est eum velle illud quod non vult.
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344 Ergo voluntas divina est contingens ad utrumlibet. Et sic
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345 imperfecta, quia omne contingens est imperfectum et
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346 mutabile.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top:
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347 .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en"
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348 id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A3-p6" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 5:</b>
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349 Further, on the part of that which is indifferent to one or the other
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350 of two things, no action results unless it is inclined to one or the
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351 other by some other power, as the Commentator [*Averroes] says in
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352 Phys. ii. If, then, the Will of God is indifferent with regard to
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353 anything, it follows that His determination to act comes from another;
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354 and thus He has some cause prior to Himself.</p></div><div
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355 style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 3 arg. 5"><a name="29202"><span class=
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356 "ref">[29202] Iª q. 19 a. 3 arg. 5</span></a> Praeterea, ab eo
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357 quod est ad utrumlibet, non sequitur aliqua actio, nisi ab aliquo
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358 alio inclinetur ad unum, ut dicit Commentator, in II Physic. Si
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359 ergo voluntas Dei in aliquibus se habet ad utrumlibet, sequitur
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360 quod ab aliquo alio determinetur ad effectum. Et sic habet aliquam
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361 causam priorem.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top:
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362 .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en"
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363 id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A3-p7" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 6:</b>
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364 Further, whatever God knows, He knows necessarily. But as the divine
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365 knowledge is His essence, so is the divine will. Therefore whatever
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366 God wills, He wills necessarily.</p></div><div style="width: 45%;
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367 float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 3 arg. 6"><a name="29203"><span class=
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368 "ref">[29203] Iª q. 19 a. 3 arg. 6</span></a> Praeterea,
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369 quidquid Deus scit, ex necessitate scit. Sed sicut scientia divina
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370 est eius essentia, ita voluntas divina. Ergo quidquid Deus vult, ex
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371 necessitate vult.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top:
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372 .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en"
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373 id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A3-p8" shownumber="no"><b>On the contrary,</b>
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374 The Apostle says (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Eph.1.11"
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375 parsed="vul|Eph|1|11|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A3-p8.1"
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376 passage="Eph. 1:11">Eph. 1:11</scripRef>): "Who worketh all things
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377 according to the counsel of His will." Now, what we work according to
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378 the counsel of the will, we do not will necessarily. Therefore God
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379 does not will necessarily whatever He wills.</p></div><div
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380 style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 3 s. c."><a name="29204"><span class=
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381 "ref">[29204] Iª q. 19 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
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382 quod dicit apostolus, Ephes. I, <i>qui operatur omnia secundum
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383 consilium voluntatis suae</i>. Quod autem operamur ex consilio
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384 voluntatis, non ex necessitate volumus. Non ergo quidquid Deus
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385 vult, ex necessitate vult.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A3-p9" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> There are two ways in which a thing is said to be necessary, namely, absolutely, and by supposition. We judge a thing to be absolutely necessary from the relation of the terms, as when the predicate forms part of the definition of the subject: thus it is absolutely necessary that man is an animal. It is the same when the subject forms part of the notion of the predicate; thus it is absolutely necessary that a number must be odd or even. In this way it is not
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386 necessary that Socrates sits: wherefore it is not necessary absolutely, though it may be so by supposition; for, granted that he is sitting, he must necessarily sit, as long as he is sitting. Accordingly as to things willed by God, we must observe that He wills something of absolute necessity: but this is not true of all that He wills. For the divine will has a necessary relation to the divine goodness, since that is its proper object. Hence God wills His own goodness necessarily, even as we
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387 will our own happiness necessarily, and as any other faculty has necessary relation to its proper and principal object, for instance the sight to color, since it tends to it by its own nature. But God wills things apart from Himself in so far as they are ordered to His own goodness as their end. Now in willing an end we do not necessarily will things that conduce to it, unless they are such that the end cannot be attained without them; as, we will to take food to preserve life, or to take ship
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388 in order to cross the sea. But we do not necessarily will things without which the end is attainable, such as a horse for a journey which we can take on foot, for we can make the journey without one. The same applies to other means. Hence, since the goodness of God is perfect, and can exist without other things inasmuch as no perfection can accrue to Him from them, it follows that His willing things apart from Himself is not absolutely necessary. Yet it can be necessary by supposition, for
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389 supposing that He wills a thing, then He is unable not to will it,
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390 as His will cannot change.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float:
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391 right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 3 co."><a name="29205"><span class=
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392 "ref">[29205] Iª q. 19 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
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393 quod necessarium dicitur aliquid dupliciter, scilicet absolute, et
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394 ex suppositione. Necessarium absolute iudicatur aliquid ex
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395 habitudine terminorum, utpote quia praedicatum est in definitione
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396 subiecti, sicut necessarium est hominem esse animal; vel quia
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397 subiectum est de ratione praedicati, sicut hoc est necessarium,
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398 numerum esse parem vel imparem. Sic autem non est necessarium
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399 Socratem sedere. Unde non est necessarium absolute, sed potest dici
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400 necessarium ex suppositione, supposito enim quod sedeat, necesse
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401 est eum sedere dum sedet. Circa divina igitur volita hoc
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402 considerandum est, quod aliquid Deum velle est necessarium
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403 absolute, non tamen hoc est verum de omnibus quae vult. Voluntas
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404 enim divina necessariam habitudinem habet ad bonitatem suam, quae
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405 est proprium eius obiectum. Unde bonitatem suam esse Deus ex
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406 necessitate vult; sicut et voluntas nostra ex necessitate vult
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407 beatitudinem. Sicut et quaelibet alia potentia necessariam
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408 habitudinem habet ad proprium et principale obiectum, ut visus ad
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409 colorem; quia de sui ratione est, ut in illud tendat. Alia autem a
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410 se Deus vult, inquantum ordinantur ad suam bonitatem ut in finem.
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411 Ea autem quae sunt ad finem, non ex necessitate volumus volentes
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412 finem, nisi sint talia, sine quibus finis esse non potest, sicut
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413 volumus cibum, volentes conservationem vitae; et navem, volentes
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414 transfretare. Non sic autem ex necessitate volumus ea sine quibus
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415 finis esse potest, sicut equum ad ambulandum, quia sine hoc
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416 possumus ire; et eadem ratio est in aliis. Unde, cum bonitas Dei
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417 sit perfecta, et esse possit sine aliis, cum nihil ei perfectionis
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418 ex aliis accrescat; sequitur quod alia a se eum velle, non sit
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419 necessarium absolute. Et tamen necessarium est ex suppositione,
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420 supposito enim quod velit, non potest non velle, quia non potest
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421 voluntas eius mutari.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both;
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422 margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p
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423 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A3-p10" shownumber="no"><b>Reply
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424 to Objection 1:</b> From the fact that God wills from eternity
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425 whatever He wills, it does not follow that He wills it necessarily;
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426 except by supposition.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float:
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427 right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="29206"><span class=
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428 "ref">[29206] Iª q. 19 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
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429 dicendum quod ex hoc quod Deus ab aeterno vult aliquid, non
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430 sequitur quod necesse est eum illud velle, nisi ex
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431 suppositione.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top:
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432 .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en"
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433 id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A3-p11" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection
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434 2:</b> Although God necessarily wills His own goodness, He does not
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435 necessarily will things willed on account of His goodness; for it can
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436 exist without other things.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float:
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437 right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="29207"><span class=
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438 "ref">[29207] Iª q. 19 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
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439 dicendum quod, licet Deus ex necessitate velit bonitatem suam, non
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440 tamen ex necessitate vult ea quae vult propter bonitatem suam, quia
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441 bonitas eius potest esse sine aliis.</p></div></div><div style="clear:
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442 both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p
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443 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A3-p12" shownumber="no"><b>Reply
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444 to Objection 3:</b> It is not natural to God to will any of those
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445 other things that He does not will necessarily; and yet it is not
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446 unnatural or contrary to His nature, but voluntary.</p></div><div
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447 style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="29208"><span class=
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448 "ref">[29208] Iª q. 19 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
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449 dicendum quod non est naturale Deo velle aliquid aliorum, quae non
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450 ex necessitate vult. Neque tamen innaturale, aut contra naturam,
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451 sed est voluntarium.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A3-p13" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Sometimes a necessary cause has a non-necessary relation to an effect; owing to a deficiency in the effect, and not in the cause. Even so, the sun's power has a non-necessary relation to some contingent events on this earth, owing to a defect not in the solar power, but in the effect that proceeds not necessarily from the cause. In the same way, that God does not necessarily will some of the things that He wills, does not result from defect in the
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452 divine will, but from a defect belonging to the nature of the thing
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453 willed, namely, that the perfect goodness of God can be without it;
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454 and such defect accompanies all created good.</p></div><div
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455 style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 3 ad 4"><a name="29209"><span class=
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456 "ref">[29209] Iª q. 19 a. 3 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum
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457 dicendum quod aliquando aliqua causa necessaria habet non
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458 necessariam habitudinem ad aliquem effectum, quod est propter
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459 defectum effectus, et non propter defectum causae. Sicut virtus
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460 solis habet non necessariam habitudinem ad aliquid eorum quae
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461 contingenter hic eveniunt, non propter defectum virtutis solaris,
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462 sed propter defectum effectus non necessario ex causa provenientis.
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463 Et similiter, quod Deus non ex necessitate velit aliquid eorum quae
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464 vult, non accidit ex defectu voluntatis divinae, sed ex defectu qui
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465 competit volito secundum suam rationem, quia scilicet est tale, ut
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466 sine eo esse possit perfecta bonitas Dei. Qui quidem defectus
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467 consequitur omne bonum creatum.</p></div></div><div style="clear:
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468 both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p
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469 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A3-p14" shownumber="no"><b>Reply
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470 to Objection 5:</b> A naturally contingent cause must be determined to
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471 act by some external power. The divine will, which by its nature is
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472 necessary, determines itself to will things to which it has no
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473 necessary relation.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
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474 xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 3 ad 5"><a name="29210"><span class=
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475 "ref">[29210] Iª q. 19 a. 3 ad 5</span></a> Ad quintum ergo
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476 dicendum quod causa quae est ex se contingens, oportet quod
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477 determinetur ab aliquo exteriori ad effectum. Sed voluntas divina,
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478 quae ex se necessitatem habet, determinat seipsam ad volitum, ad
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479 quod habet habitudinem non necessariam.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A3-p15" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 6:</b> As the divine essence is necessary of itself, so is the divine will and the divine knowledge; but the divine knowledge has a necessary relation to the thing known; not the divine will to the thing willed. The reason for this is that knowledge is of things as they exist in the knower; but the will is directed to things as they exist in themselves. Since then all other things have necessary existence inasmuch as they exist in God; but no absolute
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480 necessity so as to be necessary in themselves, in so far as they
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481 exist in themselves; it follows that God knows necessarily whatever He
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482 wills, but does not will necessarily whatever He wills.</p></div><div
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483 style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 3 ad 6"><a name="29211"><span class=
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484 "ref">[29211] Iª q. 19 a. 3 ad 6</span></a> Ad sextum dicendum
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485 quod, sicut divinum esse in se est necessarium, ita et divinum
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486 velle et divinum scire, sed divinum scire habet necessariam
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487 habitudinem ad scita, non autem divinum velle ad volita. Quod ideo
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488 est, quia scientia habetur de rebus, secundum quod sunt in sciente,
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489 voluntas autem comparatur ad res, secundum quod sunt in seipsis.
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490 Quia igitur omnia alia habent necessarium esse secundum quod sunt
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491 in Deo; non autem secundum quod sunt in seipsis, habent
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492 necessitatem absolutam ita quod sint per seipsa necessaria; propter
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493 hoc Deus quaecumque scit, ex necessitate scit, non autem quaecumque
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494 vult, ex necessitate vult.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A4" next="FP_Q19_A5" prev="FP_Q19_A3" progress="3.51%" n="iv" title="Article. 4 - Whether the will of God is the cause of things?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A4-p0.1">Whether the will of God is the cause of things?</h4>
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495 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
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496 float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A4-p2"
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497 shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the will of God is
|
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498 not the cause of things. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv, 1): "As our
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499 sun, not by reason nor by pre-election, but by its very being,
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500 enlightens all things that can participate in its light, so the divine
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501 good by its very essence pours the rays of goodness upon everything
|
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502 that exists." But every voluntary agent acts by reason and
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503 pre-election. Therefore God does not act by will; and so His will is
|
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504 not the cause of things.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float:
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505 right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="29212"><span class=
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506 "ref">[29212] Iª q. 19 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum sic
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507 proceditur. Videtur quod voluntas Dei non sit causa rerum. Dicit
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508 enim Dionysius, cap. IV de Div. Nom., <i>sicut noster sol, non
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509 ratiocinans aut praeeligens, sed per ipsum esse illuminat omnia
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510 participare lumen ipsius valentia; ita et bonum divinum per ipsam
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511 essentiam omnibus existentibus immittit bonitatis suae radios</i>.
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512 Sed omne quod agit per voluntatem, agit ut ratiocinans et
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513 praeeligens. Ergo Deus non agit per voluntatem. Ergo voluntas Dei
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514 non est causa rerum.</p></div></div>
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515 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
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516 float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A4-p3"
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517 shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, The first in any order is
|
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518 that which is essentially so, thus in the order of burning things,
|
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519 that comes first which is fire by its essence. But God is the first
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520 agent. Therefore He acts by His essence; and that is His nature. He
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521 acts then by nature, and not by will. Therefore the divine will is not
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522 the cause of things.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
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523 xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="29213"><span class=
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524 "ref">[29213] Iª q. 19 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, id
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525 quod est per essentiam, est primum in quolibet ordine sicut in
|
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526 ordine ignitorum est primum, quod est ignis per essentiam sed Deus
|
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527 est primum agens. Ergo est agens per essentiam suam, quae est
|
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528 natura eius. Agit igitur per naturam, et non per voluntatem.
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529 Voluntas igitur divina non est causa rerum.</p></div></div>
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530 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
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531 float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A4-p4"
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532 shownumber="no"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Whatever is the cause of
|
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533 anything, through being "such" a thing, is the cause by nature, and
|
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534 not by will. For fire is the cause of heat, as being itself hot;
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535 whereas an architect is the cause of a house, because he wills to
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536 build it. Now Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 32), "Because God
|
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537 is good, we exist." Therefore God is the cause of things by His
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538 nature, and not by His will.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float:
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539 right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="29214"><span class=
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540 "ref">[29214] Iª q. 19 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
|
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541 quidquid est causa alicuius per hoc quod est tale, est causa per
|
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542 naturam, et non per voluntatem, ignis enim causa est calefactionis,
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543 quia est calidus; sed artifex est causa domus, quia vult eam
|
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544 facere. Sed Augustinus dicit, in I de Doct. Christ., quod <i>quia
|
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545 Deus bonus est, sumus</i>. Ergo Deus per suam naturam est causa
|
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546 rerum, et non per voluntatem.</p></div></div>
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547 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
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548 float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A4-p5"
|
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549 shownumber="no"><b>Objection 4:</b> Further, Of one thing there is one
|
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550 cause. But the created things is the knowledge of God, as said before
|
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551 (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A4-p5.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A8"
|
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552 shape="rect" xml:link="simple">Q[14], A[8]</a>). Therefore the will of
|
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553 God cannot be considered the cause of things.</p></div><div
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554 style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 4 arg. 4"><a name="29215"><span class=
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555 "ref">[29215] Iª q. 19 a. 4 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, unius
|
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556 rei una est causa. Sed rerum creatarum est causa scientia Dei, ut
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557 supra dictum est. Ergo voluntas Dei non debet poni causa rerum.</p></div></div>
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558 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
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559 float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A4-p6"
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560 shownumber="no"><b>On the contrary,</b> It is said (<scripRef
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561 osisRef="Bible.vul:Wis.11.26" parsed="vul|Wis|11|26|0|0"
|
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562 id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A4-p6.1"
|
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563 passage="Wis. 11:26">Wis. 11:26</scripRef>), "How could anything
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564 endure, if Thou wouldst not?"</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float:
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565 right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 4 s. c."><a name="29216"><span class=
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566 "ref">[29216] Iª q. 19 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
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567 quod dicitur Sap. XI, <i>quomodo posset aliquid permanere, nisi tu
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568 voluisses?</i></p></div></div>
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569 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><div xml:lang="en">
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570 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A4-p7" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> We must hold that the will of God is the cause of things; and that He acts by the will, and not, as some have supposed, by a necessity of His nature.</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A4-p8" shownumber="no"> This can be shown in three ways: First, from the order itself of active causes. Since both intellect and nature act for an end, as proved in Phys. ii, 49, the natural agent must have the end and the necessary means predetermined for it by some higher intellect; as the end and definite movement is predetermined for the arrow by the archer. Hence the intellectual and voluntary agent must precede the agent that acts by nature. Hence, since God is first in the order of agents, He
|
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571 must act by intellect and will.</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A4-p9" shownumber="no"> This is shown, secondly, from the character of a natural agent, of which the property is to produce one and the same effect; for nature operates in one and the same way unless it be prevented. This is because the nature of the act is according to the nature of the agent; and hence as long as it has that nature, its acts will be in accordance with that nature; for every natural agent has a determinate being. Since, then, the Divine Being is undetermined, and contains in Himself
|
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572 the full perfection of being, it cannot be that He acts by a necessity of His nature, unless He were to cause something undetermined and indefinite in being: and that this is impossible has been already shown (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A4-p9.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q7.FP_Q7_A2" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">Q[7], A[2]</a>). He does not, therefore, act by a necessity of His nature, but determined effects proceed from His own infinite perfection according to the determination of His will and intellect.</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A4-p10" shownumber="no"> Thirdly, it is shown by the relation of effects to their cause. For effects proceed from the agent that causes them, in so far as they pre-exist in the agent; since every agent produces its like. Now effects pre-exist in their cause after the mode of the cause. Wherefore since the Divine Being is His own intellect, effects pre-exist in Him after the mode of intellect, and therefore proceed from Him after the same mode. Consequently, they proceed from Him after the mode of will,
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573 for His inclination to put in act what His intellect has conceived appertains to the will. Therefore the will of God is the cause of things.</p>
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574 </div></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 4 co."><a name="29217"><span class=
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575 "ref">[29217] Iª q. 19 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
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576 quod necesse est dicere voluntatem Dei esse causam rerum, et Deum
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577 agere per voluntatem, non per necessitatem naturae, ut quidam
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578 existimaverunt. Quod quidem apparere potest tripliciter. Primo
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579 quidem, ex ipso ordine causarum agentium. Cum enim propter finem
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580 agat et intellectus et natura, ut probatur in II Physic., necesse
|
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581 est ut agenti per naturam praedeterminetur finis, et media
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582 necessaria ad finem, ab aliquo superiori intellectu; sicut sagittae
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583 praedeterminatur finis et certus modus a sagittante. Unde necesse
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584 est quod agens per intellectum et voluntatem, sit prius agente per
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585 naturam. Unde, cum primum in ordine agentium sit Deus, necesse est
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586 quod per intellectum et voluntatem agat. Secundo, ex ratione
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587 naturalis agentis, ad quod pertinet ut unum effectum producat, quia
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588 natura uno et eodem modo operatur, nisi impediatur. Et hoc ideo,
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589 quia secundum quod est tale, agit, unde, quandiu est tale, non
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590 facit nisi tale. Omne enim agens per naturam, habet esse
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591 determinatum. Cum igitur esse divinum non sit determinatum, sed
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592 contineat in se totam perfectionem essendi, non potest esse quod
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593 agat per necessitatem naturae, nisi forte causaret aliquid
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594 indeterminatum et infinitum in essendo; quod est impossibile, ut ex
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595 superioribus patet. Non igitur agit per necessitatem naturae sed
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596 effectus determinati ab infinita ipsius perfectione procedunt
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597 secundum determinationem voluntatis et intellectus ipsius. Tertio,
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598 ex habitudine effectuum ad causam. Secundum hoc enim effectus
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599 procedunt a causa agente, secundum quod praeexistunt in ea, quia
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600 omne agens agit sibi simile. Praeexistunt autem effectus in causa
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601 secundum modum causae. Unde, cum esse divinum sit ipsum eius
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602 intelligere, praeexistunt in eo effectus eius secundum modum
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603 intelligibilem. Unde et per modum intelligibilem procedunt ab eo.
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604 Et sic, per consequens, per modum voluntatis, nam inclinatio eius
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605 ad agendum quod intellectu conceptum est, pertinet ad voluntatem.
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606 Voluntas igitur Dei est causa rerum.</p></div></div>
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607 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
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608 float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A4-p11"
|
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609 shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Dionysius in these words
|
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|
610 does not intend to exclude election from God absolutely; but only in a
|
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611 certain sense, in so far, that is, as He communicates His goodness not
|
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612 merely to certain things, but to all; and as election implies a
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613 certain distinction.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
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614 xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="29218"><span class=
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615 "ref">[29218] Iª q. 19 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
|
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616 dicendum quod Dionysius per verba illa non intendit excludere
|
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617 electionem a Deo simpliciter, sed secundum quid, inquantum
|
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618 scilicet, non quibusdam solum bonitatem suam communicat, sed
|
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619 omnibus, prout scilicet electio discretionem quandam importat.</p></div></div>
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620 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
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621 float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A4-p12"
|
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622 shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Because the essence of
|
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623 God is His intellect and will, from the fact of His acting by His
|
|
|
624 essence, it follows that He acts after the mode of intellect and
|
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625 will.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="29219"><span class=
|
|
|
626 "ref">[29219] Iª q. 19 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
|
|
|
627 dicendum quod, quia essentia Dei est eius intelligere et velle, ex
|
|
|
628 hoc ipso quod per essentiam suam agit, sequitur quod agat per modum
|
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629 intellectus et voluntatis.</p></div></div>
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630 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
|
|
|
631 float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A4-p13"
|
|
|
632 shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Good is the object of the
|
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633 will. The words, therefore, "Because God is good, we exist," are true
|
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634 inasmuch as His goodness is the reason of His willing all other
|
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|
635 things, as said before (A[2], ad 2).</p></div><div style="width: 45%;
|
|
|
636 float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="29220"><span class=
|
|
|
637 "ref">[29220] Iª q. 19 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
|
|
|
638 dicendum quod bonum est obiectum voluntatis. Pro tanto ergo
|
|
|
639 dicitur, quia Deus bonus est, sumus, inquantum sua bonitas est ei
|
|
|
640 ratio volendi omnia alia, ut supra dictum est.</p></div></div>
|
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|
641 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A4-p14" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Even in us the cause of one and the same effect is knowledge as directing it, whereby the form of the work is conceived, and will as commanding it, since the form as it is in the intellect only is not determined to exist or not to exist in the effect, except by the will. Hence, the speculative intellect has nothing to say to operation. But the power is cause, as executing the effect, since it denotes the immediate principle of operation. But in God
|
|
|
642 all these things are one.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float:
|
|
|
643 right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 4 ad 4"><a name="29221"><span class=
|
|
|
644 "ref">[29221] Iª q. 19 a. 4 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum
|
|
|
645 dicendum quod unius et eiusdem effectus, etiam in nobis, est causa
|
|
|
646 scientia ut dirigens, qua concipitur forma operis, et voluntas ut
|
|
|
647 imperans, quia forma, ut est in intellectu tantum, non determinatur
|
|
|
648 ad hoc quod sit vel non sit in effectu, nisi per voluntatem. Unde
|
|
|
649 intellectus speculativus nihil dicit de operando. Sed potentia est
|
|
|
650 causa ut exequens, quia nominat immediatum principium operationis.
|
|
|
651 Sed haec omnia in Deo unum sunt.</p></div></div>
|
|
|
652 </div><div id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A5" next="FP_Q19_A6" prev="FP_Q19_A4" progress="3.55%" n="v" title="Article. 5 - Whether any cause can be assigned to the divine will?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A5-p0.1">Whether any cause can be assigned to the divine will?</h4>
|
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653 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
|
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654 float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A5-p2"
|
|
|
655 shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that some cause can be
|
|
|
656 assigned to the divine will. For Augustine says (Qq. lxxxiii, 46):
|
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|
657 "Who would venture to say that God made all things irrationally?" But
|
|
|
658 to a voluntary agent, what is the reason of operating, is the cause of
|
|
|
659 willing. Therefore the will of God has some cause.</p></div><div
|
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660 style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 5 arg. 1"><a name="29222"><span class=
|
|
|
661 "ref">[29222] Iª q. 19 a. 5 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quintum sic
|
|
|
662 proceditur. Videtur quod voluntatis divinae sit assignare aliquam
|
|
|
663 causam. Dicit enim Augustinus, libro octoginta trium quaest.,
|
|
|
664 <i>quis audeat dicere Deum irrationabiliter omnia condidisse?</i>
|
|
|
665 Sed agenti voluntario, quod est ratio operandi, est etiam causa
|
|
|
666 volendi. Ergo voluntas Dei habet aliquam causam.</p></div></div>
|
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|
667 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A5-p3" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, in things made by one who wills to make them, and whose will is influenced by no cause, there can be no cause assigned except by the will of him who wills. But the will of God is the cause of all things, as has been already shown <a id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A5-p3.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A4" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">(A[4])</a>. If, then, there is no cause of His will, we cannot seek in any natural things any cause, except the divine will alone. Thus all science would be in vain, since science seeks to assign causes
|
|
|
668 to effects. This seems inadmissible, and therefore we must assign
|
|
|
669 some cause to the divine will.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float:
|
|
|
670 right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 5 arg. 2"><a name="29223"><span class=
|
|
|
671 "ref">[29223] Iª q. 19 a. 5 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, in
|
|
|
672 his quae fiunt a volente qui propter nullam causam aliquid vult,
|
|
|
673 non oportet aliam causam assignare nisi voluntatem volentis. Sed
|
|
|
674 voluntas Dei est causa omnium rerum, ut ostensum est. Si igitur
|
|
|
675 voluntatis eius non sit aliqua causa, non oportebit in omnibus
|
|
|
676 rebus naturalibus aliam causam quaerere, nisi solam voluntatem
|
|
|
677 divinam. Et sic omnes scientiae essent supervacuae, quae causas
|
|
|
678 aliquorum effectuum assignare nituntur, quod videtur inconveniens.
|
|
|
679 Est igitur assignare aliquam causam voluntatis divinae.</p></div></div>
|
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680 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
|
|
|
681 float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A5-p4"
|
|
|
682 shownumber="no"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, what is done by the
|
|
|
683 willer, on account of no cause, depends simply on his will. If,
|
|
|
684 therefore, the will of God has no cause, it follows that all things
|
|
|
685 made depend simply on His will, and have no other cause. But this also
|
|
|
686 is not admissible.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
|
|
|
687 xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 5 arg. 3"><a name="29224"><span class=
|
|
|
688 "ref">[29224] Iª q. 19 a. 5 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, quod
|
|
|
689 fit a volente non propter aliquam causam, dependet ex simplici
|
|
|
690 voluntate eius. Si igitur voluntas Dei non habeat aliquam causam,
|
|
|
691 sequitur quod omnia quae fiunt, dependeant ex simplici eius
|
|
|
692 voluntate, et non habeant aliquam aliam causam. Quod est
|
|
|
693 inconveniens.</p></div></div>
|
|
|
694 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
|
|
|
695 float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A5-p5"
|
|
|
696 shownumber="no"><b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (Qq. lxxxiii,
|
|
|
697 28): "Every efficient cause is greater than the thing effected." But
|
|
|
698 nothing is greater than the will of God. We must not then seek for a
|
|
|
699 cause of it.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
|
|
|
700 xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 5 s. c."><a name="29225"><span class=
|
|
|
701 "ref">[29225] Iª q. 19 a. 5 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
|
|
|
702 quod dicit Augustinus, in libro octoginta trium quaest., <i>omnis
|
|
|
703 causa efficiens maior est eo quod efficitur; nihil tamen maius est
|
|
|
704 voluntate Dei; non ergo causa eius quaerenda est</i>.</p></div></div>
|
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|
705 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><div xml:lang="en">
|
|
|
706 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A5-p6" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> In no wise has the will of God a cause. In proof of which we must consider that, since the will follows from the intellect, there is cause of the will in the person who wills, in the same way as there is a cause of the understanding, in the person that understands. The case with the understanding is this: that if the premiss and its conclusion are understood separately from each other, the understanding the premiss is the cause that the conclusion is known.
|
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|
707 If the understanding perceive the conclusion in the premiss itself, apprehending both the one and the other at the same glance, in this case the knowing of the conclusion would not be caused by understanding the premisses, since a thing cannot be its own cause; and yet, it would be true that the thinker would understand the premisses to be the cause of the conclusion. It is the same with the will, with respect to which the end stands in the same relation to the means to the end, as do the
|
|
|
708 premisses to the conclusion with regard to the understanding.</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A5-p7" shownumber="no"> Hence, if anyone in one act wills an end, and in another act the means to that end, his willing the end will be the cause of his willing the means. This cannot be the case if in one act he wills both end and means; for a thing cannot be its own cause. Yet it will be true to say that he wills to order to the end the means to the end. Now as God by one act understands all things in His essence, so by one act He wills all things in His goodness. Hence, as in God to understand the
|
|
|
709 cause is not the cause of His understanding the effect, for He understands the effect in the cause, so, in Him, to will an end is not the cause of His willing the means, yet He wills the ordering of the means to the end. Therefore, He wills this to be as means to that; but does not will this on account of that.</p>
|
|
|
710 </div></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 5 co."><a name="29226"><span class=
|
|
|
711 "ref">[29226] Iª q. 19 a. 5 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
|
|
|
712 quod nullo modo voluntas Dei causam habet. Ad cuius evidentiam,
|
|
|
713 considerandum est quod, cum voluntas sequatur intellectum, eodem
|
|
|
714 modo contingit esse causam alicuius volentis ut velit, et alicuius
|
|
|
715 intelligentis ut intelligat. In intellectu autem sic est quod, si
|
|
|
716 seorsum intelligat principium, et seorsum conclusionem,
|
|
|
717 intelligentia principii est causa scientiae conclusionis. Sed si
|
|
|
718 intellectus in ipso principio inspiceret conclusionem, uno intuitu
|
|
|
719 apprehendens utrumque, in eo scientia conclusionis non causaretur
|
|
|
720 ab intellectu principiorum, quia idem non est causa sui ipsius. Sed
|
|
|
721 tamen intelligeret principia esse causas conclusionis. Similiter
|
|
|
722 est ex parte voluntatis, circa quam sic se habet finis ad ea quae
|
|
|
723 sunt ad finem, sicut in intellectu principia ad conclusiones. Unde,
|
|
|
724 si aliquis uno actu velit finem, et alio actu ea quae sunt ad
|
|
|
725 finem, velle finem erit ei causa volendi ea quae sunt ad finem. Sed
|
|
|
726 si uno actu velit finem et ea quae sunt ad finem, hoc esse non
|
|
|
727 poterit, quia idem non est causa sui ipsius. Et tamen erit verum
|
|
|
728 dicere quod velit ordinare ea quae sunt ad finem, in finem. Deus
|
|
|
729 autem, sicut uno actu omnia in essentia sua intelligit, ita uno
|
|
|
730 actu vult omnia in sua bonitate. Unde, sicut in Deo intelligere
|
|
|
731 causam non est causa intelligendi effectus, sed ipse intelligit
|
|
|
732 effectus in causa; ita velle finem non est ei causa volendi ea quae
|
|
|
733 sunt ad finem, sed tamen vult ea quae sunt ad finem, ordinari in
|
|
|
734 finem. Vult ergo hoc esse propter hoc, sed non propter hoc vult
|
|
|
735 hoc.</p></div></div>
|
|
|
736 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
|
|
|
737 float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A5-p8"
|
|
|
738 shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The will of God is
|
|
|
739 reasonable, not because anything is to God a cause of willing, but in
|
|
|
740 so far as He wills one thing to be on account of
|
|
|
741 another.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
|
|
|
742 xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 5 ad 1"><a name="29227"><span class=
|
|
|
743 "ref">[29227] Iª q. 19 a. 5 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
|
|
|
744 dicendum quod voluntas Dei rationabilis est, non quod aliquid sit
|
|
|
745 Deo causa volendi, sed inquantum vult unum esse propter aliud.</p></div></div>
|
|
|
746 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A5-p9" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Since God wills effects to proceed from definite causes, for the preservation of order in the universe, it is not unreasonable to seek for causes secondary to the divine will. It would, however, be unreasonable to do so, if such were considered as primary, and not as dependent on the will of God. In this sense Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 2): "Philosophers in their vanity have thought fit to attribute contingent effects to other causes, being utterly
|
|
|
747 unable to perceive the cause that is shown above all others, the
|
|
|
748 will of God."</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
|
|
|
749 xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 5 ad 2"><a name="29228"><span class=
|
|
|
750 "ref">[29228] Iª q. 19 a. 5 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
|
|
|
751 dicendum quod, cum velit Deus effectus sic esse, ut ex causis
|
|
|
752 certis proveniant, ad hoc quod servetur ordo in rebus; non est
|
|
|
753 supervacuum, etiam cum voluntate Dei, alias causas quaerere. Esset
|
|
|
754 tamen supervacuum, si aliae causae quaererentur ut primae, et non
|
|
|
755 dependentes a divina voluntate. Et sic loquitur Augustinus in III
|
|
|
756 de Trin., <i>placuit vanitati philosophorum etiam aliis causis
|
|
|
757 effectus contingentes tribuere, cum omnino videre non possent
|
|
|
758 superiorem ceteris omnibus causam, idest voluntatem Dei</i>.</p></div></div>
|
|
|
759 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A5-p10" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Since God wills effects to come from causes, all effects that presuppose some other effect do not depend solely on the will of God, but on something else besides: but the first effect depends on the divine will alone. Thus, for example, we may say that God willed man to have hands to serve his intellect by their work, and intellect, that he might be man; and willed him to be man that he might enjoy Him, or for the completion of the universe. But this
|
|
|
760 cannot be reduced to other created secondary ends. Hence such things
|
|
|
761 depend on the simple will of God; but the others on the order of other
|
|
|
762 causes.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
|
|
|
763 xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 5 ad 3"><a name="29229"><span class=
|
|
|
764 "ref">[29229] Iª q. 19 a. 5 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
|
|
|
765 dicendum quod, cum Deus velit effectus esse propter causas,
|
|
|
766 quicumque effectus praesupponunt aliquem alium effectum, non
|
|
|
767 dependent ex sola Dei voluntate, sed ex aliquo alio. Sed primi
|
|
|
768 effectus ex sola divina voluntate dependent. Utpote si dicamus quod
|
|
|
769 Deus voluit hominem habere manus, ut deservirent intellectui,
|
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|
770 operando diversa opera, et voluit eum habere intellectum, ad hoc
|
|
|
771 quod esset homo, et voluit eum esse hominem, ut frueretur ipso, vel
|
|
|
772 ad complementum universi. Quae quidem non est reducere ad alios
|
|
|
773 fines creatos ulteriores. Unde huiusmodi dependent ex simplici
|
|
|
774 voluntate Dei, alia vero ex ordine etiam aliarum causarum.</p></div></div>
|
|
|
775 </div><div id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A6" next="FP_Q19_A7" prev="FP_Q19_A5" progress="3.58%" n="vi" title="Article. 6 - Whether the will of God is always fulfilled?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A6-p0.1">Whether the will of God is always fulfilled?</h4>
|
|
|
776 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
|
|
|
777 float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A6-p2"
|
|
|
778 shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the will of God is
|
|
|
779 not always fulfilled. For the Apostle says (<scripRef
|
|
|
780 osisRef="Bible.vul:1Tim.2.4" parsed="vul|1Tim|2|4|0|0"
|
|
|
781 id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A6-p2.1" passage="1 Tim. 2:4">1
|
|
|
782 Tim. 2:4</scripRef>): "God will have all men to be saved, and to come
|
|
|
783 to the knowledge of the truth." But this does not happen. Therefore
|
|
|
784 the will of God is not always fulfilled.</p></div><div style="width:
|
|
|
785 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 6 arg. 1"><a name="29230"><span class=
|
|
|
786 "ref">[29230] Iª q. 19 a. 6 arg. 1</span></a> Ad sextum sic
|
|
|
787 proceditur. Videtur quod voluntas Dei non semper impleatur. Dicit
|
|
|
788 enim apostolus, I ad Tim. II, quod <i>Deus vult omnes homines
|
|
|
789 salvos fieri, et ad agnitionem veritatis venire</i>. Sed hoc non
|
|
|
790 ita evenit. Ergo voluntas Dei non semper impletur.</p></div></div>
|
|
|
791 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
|
|
|
792 float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A6-p3"
|
|
|
793 shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, as is the relation of
|
|
|
794 knowledge to truth, so is that of the will to good. Now God knows all
|
|
|
795 truth. Therefore He wills all good. But not all good actually exists;
|
|
|
796 for much more good might exist. Therefore the will of God is not
|
|
|
797 always fulfilled.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
|
|
|
798 xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 6 arg. 2"><a name="29231"><span class=
|
|
|
799 "ref">[29231] Iª q. 19 a. 6 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, sicut
|
|
|
800 se habet scientia ad verum, ita voluntas ad bonum. Sed Deus scit
|
|
|
801 omne verum. Ergo vult omne bonum. Sed non omne bonum fit, multa
|
|
|
802 enim bona possunt fieri, quae non fiunt. Non ergo voluntas Dei
|
|
|
803 semper impletur.</p></div></div>
|
|
|
804 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
|
|
|
805 float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A6-p4"
|
|
|
806 shownumber="no"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, since the will of God is
|
|
|
807 the first cause, it does not exclude intermediate causes. But the
|
|
|
808 effect of a first cause may be hindered by a defect of a secondary
|
|
|
809 cause; as the effect of the motive power may be hindered by the
|
|
|
810 weakness of the limb. Therefore the effect of the divine will may be
|
|
|
811 hindered by a defect of the secondary causes. The will of God,
|
|
|
812 therefore, is not always fulfilled.</p></div><div style="width: 45%;
|
|
|
813 float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 6 arg. 3"><a name="29232"><span class=
|
|
|
814 "ref">[29232] Iª q. 19 a. 6 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
|
|
|
815 voluntas Dei, cum sit causa prima, non excludit causas medias, ut
|
|
|
816 dictum est. Sed effectus causae primae potest impediri per defectum
|
|
|
817 causae secundae, sicut effectus virtutis motivae impeditur propter
|
|
|
818 debilitatem tibiae. Ergo et effectus divinae voluntatis potest
|
|
|
819 impediri propter defectum secundarum causarum. Non ergo voluntas
|
|
|
820 Dei semper impletur.</p></div></div>
|
|
|
821 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
|
|
|
822 float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A6-p5"
|
|
|
823 shownumber="no"><b>On the contrary,</b> It is said (<scripRef
|
|
|
824 osisRef="Bible.vul:Ps.113.11" parsed="vul|Ps|113|11|0|0"
|
|
|
825 id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A6-p5.1"
|
|
|
826 passage="Ps. 113:11">Ps. 113:11</scripRef>): "God hath done all
|
|
|
827 things, whatsoever He would."</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float:
|
|
|
828 right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 6 s. c."><a name="29233"><span class=
|
|
|
829 "ref">[29233] Iª q. 19 a. 6 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
|
|
|
830 quod dicitur in Psalmo CXIII, <i>omnia quaecumque voluit Deus,
|
|
|
831 fecit</i>.</p></div></div>
|
|
|
832 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A6-p6" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> The will of God must needs always be fulfilled. In proof of which we must consider that since an effect is conformed to the agent according to its form, the rule is the same with active causes as with formal causes. The rule in forms is this: that although a thing may fall short of any particular form, it cannot fall short of the universal form. For though a thing may fail to be, for example, a man or a living being, yet it cannot fail to be a being. Hence
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833 the same must happen in active causes. Something may fall outside the order of any particular active cause, but not outside the order of the universal cause; under which all particular causes are included: and if any particular cause fails of its effect, this is because of the hindrance of some other particular cause, which is included in the order of the universal cause. Therefore an effect cannot possibly escape the order of the universal cause. Even in corporeal things this is clearly seen.
|
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834 For it may happen that a star is hindered from producing its effects; yet whatever effect does result, in corporeal things, from this hindrance of a corporeal cause, must be referred through intermediate causes to the universal influence of the first heaven. Since, then, the will of God is the universal cause of all things, it is impossible that the divine will should not produce its effect. Hence that which seems to depart from the divine will in one order, returns into it in another order; as
|
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|
835 does the sinner, who by sin falls away from the divine will as much
|
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|
836 as lies in him, yet falls back into the order of that will, when by
|
|
|
837 its justice he is punished.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float:
|
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|
838 right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 6 co."><a name="29234"><span class=
|
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|
839 "ref">[29234] Iª q. 19 a. 6 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
|
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840 quod necesse est voluntatem Dei semper impleri. Ad cuius
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841 evidentiam, considerandum est quod, cum effectus conformetur agenti
|
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842 secundum suam formam, eadem ratio est in causis agentibus, quae est
|
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843 in causis formalibus. In formis autem sic est quod, licet aliquid
|
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|
844 possit deficere ab aliqua forma particulari, tamen a forma
|
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|
845 universali nihil deficere potest, potest enim esse aliquid quod non
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846 est homo vel vivum, non autem potest esse aliquid quod non sit ens.
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847 Unde et hoc idem in causis agentibus contingere oportet. Potest
|
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848 enim aliquid fieri extra ordinem alicuius causae particularis
|
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|
849 agentis, non autem extra ordinem alicuius causae universalis, sub
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850 qua omnes causae particulares comprehenduntur. Quia, si aliqua
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851 causa particularis deficiat a suo effectu, hoc est propter aliquam
|
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852 aliam causam particularem impedientem, quae continetur sub ordine
|
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|
853 causae universalis, unde effectus ordinem causae universalis nullo
|
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854 modo potest exire. Et hoc etiam patet in corporalibus. Potest enim
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855 impediri quod aliqua stella non inducat suum effectum, sed tamen
|
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856 quicumque effectus ex causa corporea impediente in rebus
|
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857 corporalibus consequatur, oportet quod reducatur per aliquas causas
|
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858 medias in universalem virtutem primi caeli. Cum igitur voluntas Dei
|
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|
859 sit universalis causa omnium rerum, impossibile est quod divina
|
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860 voluntas suum effectum non consequatur. Unde quod recedere videtur
|
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|
861 a divina voluntate secundum unum ordinem, relabitur in ipsam
|
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|
862 secundum alium, sicut peccator, qui, quantum est in se, recedit a
|
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|
863 divina voluntate peccando, incidit in ordinem divinae voluntatis,
|
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|
864 dum per eius iustitiam punitur.</p></div></div>
|
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|
865 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><div xml:lang="en">
|
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866 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A6-p7" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The words of the Apostle, "God will have all men to be saved," etc. can be understood in three ways. First, by a restricted application, in which case they would mean, as Augustine says (De praed. sanct. i, 8: Enchiridion 103), "God wills all men to be saved that are saved, not because there is no man whom He does not wish saved, but because there is no man saved whose salvation He does not will." Secondly, they can be understood as applying to every
|
|
|
867 class of individuals, not to every individual of each class; in which case they mean that God wills some men of every class and condition to be saved, males and females, Jews and Gentiles, great and small, but not all of every condition. Thirdly, according to Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 29), they are understood of the antecedent will of God; not of the consequent will. This distinction must not be taken as applying to the divine will itself, in which there is nothing antecedent nor consequent,
|
|
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868 but to the things willed.</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A6-p8" shownumber="no"> To understand this we must consider that everything, in so far as it is good, is willed by God. A thing taken in its primary sense, and absolutely considered, may be good or evil, and yet when some additional circumstances are taken into account, by a consequent consideration may be changed into the contrary. Thus that a man should live is good; and that a man should be killed is evil, absolutely considered. But if in a particular case we add that a man is a murderer or
|
|
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869 dangerous to society, to kill him is a good; that he live is an evil. Hence it may be said of a just judge, that antecedently he wills all men to live; but consequently wills the murderer to be hanged. In the same way God antecedently wills all men to be saved, but consequently wills some to be damned, as His justice exacts. Nor do we will simply, what we will antecedently, but rather we will it in a qualified manner; for the will is directed to things as they are in themselves, and in
|
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870 themselves they exist under particular qualifications. Hence we will a thing simply inasmuch as we will it when all particular circumstances are considered; and this is what is meant by willing consequently. Thus it may be said that a just judge wills simply the hanging of a murderer, but in a qualified manner he would will him to live, to wit, inasmuch as he is a man. Such a qualified will may be called a willingness rather than an absolute will. Thus it is clear that whatever God simply wills
|
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871 takes place; although what He wills antecedently may not take place.</p>
|
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872 </div></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 6 ad 1"><a name="29235"><span class=
|
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|
873 "ref">[29235] Iª q. 19 a. 6 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
|
|
|
874 dicendum quod illud verbum apostoli, quod Deus vult omnes homines
|
|
|
875 salvos fieri etc., potest tripliciter intelligi. Uno modo, ut sit
|
|
|
876 accommoda distributio, secundum hunc sensum, Deus vult salvos fieri
|
|
|
877 omnes homines qui salvantur, non quia nullus homo sit quem salvum
|
|
|
878 fieri non velit, sed quia nullus salvus fit, quem non velit salvum
|
|
|
879 fieri, ut dicit Augustinus secundo potest intelligi, ut fiat
|
|
|
880 distributio pro generibus singulorum, et non pro singulis generum,
|
|
|
881 secundum hunc sensum, Deus vult de quolibet statu hominum salvos
|
|
|
882 fieri, mares et feminas, Iudaeos et gentiles, parvos et magnos; non
|
|
|
883 tamen omnes de singulis statibus. Tertio, secundum Damascenum,
|
|
|
884 intelligitur de voluntate antecedente, non de voluntate
|
|
|
885 consequente. Quae quidem distinctio non accipitur ex parte ipsius
|
|
|
886 voluntatis divinae, in qua nihil est prius vel posterius; sed ex
|
|
|
887 parte volitorum. Ad cuius intellectum, considerandum est quod
|
|
|
888 unumquodque, secundum quod bonum est, sic est volitum a Deo.
|
|
|
889 Aliquid autem potest esse in prima sui consideratione, secundum
|
|
|
890 quod absolute consideratur, bonum vel malum, quod tamen, prout cum
|
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|
891 aliquo adiuncto consideratur, quae est consequens consideratio
|
|
|
892 eius, e contrario se habet. Sicut hominem vivere est bonum, et
|
|
|
893 hominem occidi est malum, secundum absolutam considerationem, sed
|
|
|
894 si addatur circa aliquem hominem, quod sit homicida, vel vivens in
|
|
|
895 periculum multitudinis, sic bonum est eum occidi, et malum est eum
|
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|
896 vivere. Unde potest dici quod iudex iustus antecedenter vult omnem
|
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|
897 hominem vivere; sed consequenter vult homicidam suspendi. Similiter
|
|
|
898 Deus antecedenter vult omnem hominem salvari; sed consequenter vult
|
|
|
899 quosdam damnari, secundum exigentiam suae iustitiae. Neque tamen id
|
|
|
900 quod antecedenter volumus, simpliciter volumus, sed secundum quid.
|
|
|
901 Quia voluntas comparatur ad res, secundum quod in seipsis sunt, in
|
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|
902 seipsis autem sunt in particulari, unde simpliciter volumus
|
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|
903 aliquid, secundum quod volumus illud consideratis omnibus
|
|
|
904 circumstantiis particularibus, quod est consequenter velle. Unde
|
|
|
905 potest dici quod iudex iustus simpliciter vult homicidam suspendi,
|
|
|
906 sed secundum quid vellet eum vivere, scilicet inquantum est homo.
|
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|
907 Unde magis potest dici velleitas, quam absoluta voluntas. Et sic
|
|
|
908 patet quod quidquid Deus simpliciter vult, fit; licet illud quod
|
|
|
909 antecedenter vult, non fiat.</p></div></div>
|
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|
910 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
|
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|
911 float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A6-p9"
|
|
|
912 shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> An act of the cognitive
|
|
|
913 faculty is according as the thing known is in the knower; while an act
|
|
|
914 of the appetite faculty is directed to things as they exist in
|
|
|
915 themselves. But all that can have the nature of being and truth
|
|
|
916 virtually exists in God, though it does not all exist in created
|
|
|
917 things. Therefore God knows all truth; but does not will all good,
|
|
|
918 except in so far as He wills Himself, in Whom all good virtually
|
|
|
919 exists.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
|
|
|
920 xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 6 ad 2"><a name="29236"><span class=
|
|
|
921 "ref">[29236] Iª q. 19 a. 6 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
|
|
|
922 dicendum quod actus cognoscitivae virtutis est secundum quod
|
|
|
923 cognitum est in cognoscente, actus autem virtutis appetitivae est
|
|
|
924 ordinatus ad res, secundum quod in seipsis sunt. Quidquid autem
|
|
|
925 potest habere rationem entis et veri, totum est virtualiter in Deo;
|
|
|
926 sed non totum existit in rebus creatis. Et ideo Deus cognoscit omne
|
|
|
927 verum, non tamen vult omne bonum, nisi inquantum vult se, in quo
|
|
|
928 virtualiter omne bonum existit.</p></div></div>
|
|
|
929 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
|
|
|
930 float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A6-p10"
|
|
|
931 shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> A first cause can be
|
|
|
932 hindered in its effect by deficiency in the secondary cause, when it
|
|
|
933 is not the universal first cause, including within itself all causes;
|
|
|
934 for then the effect could in no way escape its order. And thus it is
|
|
|
935 with the will of God, as said above.</p></div><div style="width: 45%;
|
|
|
936 float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 6 ad 3"><a name="29237"><span class=
|
|
|
937 "ref">[29237] Iª q. 19 a. 6 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
|
|
|
938 dicendum quod causa prima tunc potest impediri a suo effectu per
|
|
|
939 defectum causae secundae, quando non est universaliter prima, sub
|
|
|
940 se omnes causas comprehendens, quia sic effectus nullo modo posset
|
|
|
941 suum ordinem evadere. Et sic est de voluntate Dei, ut dictum
|
|
|
942 est.</p></div></div>
|
|
|
943 </div><div id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A7" next="FP_Q19_A8"
|
|
|
944 prev="FP_Q19_A6" progress="3.62%" n="vii" title="Article. 7 - Whether
|
|
|
945 the will of God is changeable?"><h4 xml:lang="en"
|
|
|
946 id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A7-p0.1">Whether the will of God is
|
|
|
947 changeable?</h4><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div
|
|
|
948 style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en"
|
|
|
949 id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A7-p2" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It
|
|
|
950 seems that the Will of God is changeable. For the Lord says (<scripRef
|
|
|
951 osisRef="Bible.vul:Gen.6.7" parsed="vul|Gen|6|7|0|0"
|
|
|
952 id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A7-p2.1"
|
|
|
953 passage="Gn. 6:7">Gn. 6:7</scripRef>): "It repenteth Me that I have
|
|
|
954 made man." But whoever repents of what he has done, has a changeable
|
|
|
955 will. Therefore God has a changeable will.</p></div><div style="width:
|
|
|
956 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 7 arg. 1"><a name="29238"><span class=
|
|
|
957 "ref">[29238] Iª q. 19 a. 7 arg. 1</span></a> Ad septimum sic
|
|
|
958 proceditur. Videtur quod voluntas Dei sit mutabilis. Dicit enim
|
|
|
959 dominus Genes. VI, <i>poenitet me fecisse hominem</i>. Sed
|
|
|
960 quemcumque poenitet de eo quod fecit, habet mutabilem voluntatem.
|
|
|
961 Ergo Deus habet mutabilem voluntatem.</p></div></div><div
|
|
|
962 style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float:
|
|
|
963 left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A7-p3"
|
|
|
964 shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, it is said in the person
|
|
|
965 of the Lord: "I will speak against a nation and against a kingdom, to
|
|
|
966 root out, and to pull down, and to destroy it; but if that nation
|
|
|
967 shall repent of its evil, I also will repent of the evil that I have
|
|
|
968 thought to do to them" (<scripRef
|
|
|
969 osisRef="Bible.vul:Jer.18.7-Jer.18.8" parsed="vul|Jer|18|7|18|8"
|
|
|
970 id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A7-p3.1"
|
|
|
971 passage="Jer. 18:7,8">Jer. 18:7,8</scripRef>) Therefore God has a
|
|
|
972 changeable will.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
|
|
|
973 xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 7 arg. 2"><a name="29239"><span class=
|
|
|
974 "ref">[29239] Iª q. 19 a. 7 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
|
|
|
975 Ierem. XVIII, ex persona domini dicitur, <i>loquar adversus gentem
|
|
|
976 et adversus regnum, ut eradicem et destruam et disperdam illud; sed
|
|
|
977 si poenitentiam egerit gens illa a malo suo, agam et ego
|
|
|
978 poenitentiam super malo quod cogitavi ut facerem ei</i>. Ergo Deus
|
|
|
979 habet mutabilem voluntatem.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both;
|
|
|
980 margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p
|
|
|
981 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A7-p4"
|
|
|
982 shownumber="no"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, whatever God does, He
|
|
|
983 does voluntarily. But God does not always do the same thing, for at
|
|
|
984 one time He ordered the law to be observed, and at another time
|
|
|
985 forbade it. Therefore He has a changeable will.</p></div><div
|
|
|
986 style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 7 arg. 3"><a name="29240"><span class=
|
|
|
987 "ref">[29240] Iª q. 19 a. 7 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
|
|
|
988 quidquid Deus facit, voluntarie facit. Sed Deus non semper eadem
|
|
|
989 facit, nam quandoque praecepit legalia observari, quandoque
|
|
|
990 prohibuit. Ergo habet mutabilem voluntatem.</p></div></div><div
|
|
|
991 style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float:
|
|
|
992 left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A7-p5"
|
|
|
993 shownumber="no"><b>Objection 4:</b> Further, God does not will of
|
|
|
994 necessity what He wills, as said before <a
|
|
|
995 id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A7-p5.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A3"
|
|
|
996 shape="rect" xml:link="simple">(A[3])</a>. Therefore He can both will
|
|
|
997 and not will the same thing. But whatever can incline to either of two
|
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|
998 opposites, is changeable substantially; and that which can exist in a
|
|
|
999 place or not in that place, is changeable locally. Therefore God is
|
|
|
1000 changeable as regards His will.</p></div><div style="width: 45%;
|
|
|
1001 float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 7 arg. 4"><a name="29241"><span class=
|
|
|
1002 "ref">[29241] Iª q. 19 a. 7 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, Deus
|
|
|
1003 non ex necessitate vult quod vult, ut supra dictum est. Ergo potest
|
|
|
1004 velle et non velle idem. Sed omne quod habet potentiam ad opposita,
|
|
|
1005 est mutabile, sicut quod potest esse et non esse, est mutabile
|
|
|
1006 secundum substantiam; et quod potest esse hic et non esse hic, est
|
|
|
1007 mutabile secundum locum. Ergo Deus est mutabilis secundum
|
|
|
1008 voluntatem.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top:
|
|
|
1009 .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en"
|
|
|
1010 id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A7-p6" shownumber="no"><b>On the contrary,</b>
|
|
|
1011 It is said: "God is not as a man, that He should lie, nor as the son
|
|
|
1012 of man, that He should be changed" (<scripRef
|
|
|
1013 osisRef="Bible.vul:Num.23.19" parsed="vul|Num|23|19|0|0"
|
|
|
1014 id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A7-p6.1"
|
|
|
1015 passage="Num. 23:19">Num. 23:19</scripRef>).</p></div><div
|
|
|
1016 style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 7 s. c."><a name="29242"><span class=
|
|
|
1017 "ref">[29242] Iª q. 19 a. 7 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
|
|
|
1018 quod dicitur Num. XXIII, <i>non est Deus, quasi homo, ut mentiatur;
|
|
|
1019 neque ut filius hominis, ut mutetur</i>.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A7-p7" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> The will of God is entirely unchangeable. On this point we must consider that to change the will is one thing; to will that certain things should be changed is another. It is possible to will a thing to be done now, and its contrary afterwards; and yet for the will to remain permanently the same: whereas the will would be changed, if one should begin to will what before he had not willed; or cease to will what he had willed before. This cannot happen, unless
|
|
|
1020 we presuppose change either in the knowledge or in the disposition of the substance of the willer. For since the will regards good, a man may in two ways begin to will a thing. In one way when that thing begins to be good for him, and this does not take place without a change in him. Thus when the cold weather begins, it becomes good to sit by the fire; though it was not so before. In another way when he knows for the first time that a thing is good for him, though he did not know it before;
|
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|
1021 hence we take counsel in order to know what is good for us. Now it
|
|
|
1022 has already been shown that both the substance of God and His
|
|
|
1023 knowledge are entirely unchangeable (<a
|
|
|
1024 id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A7-p7.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q9.FP_Q9_A1"
|
|
|
1025 shape="rect" xml:link="simple">Q[9], A[1]</a>; <a
|
|
|
1026 id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A7-p7.2" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q14.FP_Q14_A15"
|
|
|
1027 shape="rect" xml:link="simple">Q[14], A[15]</a>). Therefore His will
|
|
|
1028 must be entirely unchangeable.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float:
|
|
|
1029 right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 7 co."><a name="29243"><span class=
|
|
|
1030 "ref">[29243] Iª q. 19 a. 7 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
|
|
|
1031 quod voluntas Dei est omnino immutabilis. Sed circa hoc
|
|
|
1032 considerandum est, quod aliud est mutare voluntatem; et aliud est
|
|
|
1033 velle aliquarum rerum mutationem. Potest enim aliquis, eadem
|
|
|
1034 voluntate immobiliter permanente, velle quod nunc fiat hoc, et
|
|
|
1035 postea fiat contrarium. Sed tunc voluntas mutaretur, si aliquis
|
|
|
1036 inciperet velle quod prius non voluit, vel desineret velle quod
|
|
|
1037 voluit. Quod quidem accidere non potest, nisi praesupposita
|
|
|
1038 mutatione vel ex parte cognitionis, vel circa dispositionem
|
|
|
1039 substantiae ipsius volentis. Cum enim voluntas sit boni, aliquis de
|
|
|
1040 novo dupliciter potest incipere aliquid velle. Uno modo sic, quod
|
|
|
1041 de novo incipiat sibi illud esse bonum. Quod non est absque
|
|
|
1042 mutatione eius, sicut adveniente frigore, incipit esse bonum sedere
|
|
|
1043 ad ignem, quod prius non erat. Alio modo sic, quod de novo
|
|
|
1044 cognoscat illud esse sibi bonum, cum prius hoc ignorasset, ad hoc
|
|
|
1045 enim consiliamur, ut sciamus quid nobis sit bonum. Ostensum est
|
|
|
1046 autem supra quod tam substantia Dei quam eius scientia est omnino
|
|
|
1047 immutabilis. Unde oportet voluntatem eius omnino esse
|
|
|
1048 immutabilem.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A7-p8" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> These words of the Lord are to be understood metaphorically, and according to the likeness of our nature. For when we repent, we destroy what we have made; although we may even do so without change of will; as, when a man wills to make a thing, at the same time intending to destroy it later. Therefore God is said to have repented, by way of comparison with our mode of acting, in so far as by the deluge He destroyed from the face of the earth man whom
|
|
|
1049 He had made.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
|
|
|
1050 xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 7 ad 1"><a name="29244"><span class=
|
|
|
1051 "ref">[29244] Iª q. 19 a. 7 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
|
|
|
1052 dicendum quod illud verbum domini metaphorice intelligendum est,
|
|
|
1053 secundum similitudinem nostram, cum enim nos poenitet, destruimus
|
|
|
1054 quod fecimus. Quamvis hoc esse possit absque mutatione voluntatis,
|
|
|
1055 cum etiam aliquis homo, absque mutatione voluntatis, interdum velit
|
|
|
1056 aliquid facere, simul intendens postea illud destruere. Sic igitur
|
|
|
1057 Deus poenituisse dicitur, secundum similitudinem operationis,
|
|
|
1058 inquantum hominem quem fecerat, per diluvium a facie terrae
|
|
|
1059 delevit.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A7-p9" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> The will of God, as it is the first and universal cause, does not exclude intermediate causes that have power to produce certain effects. Since however all intermediate causes are inferior in power to the first cause, there are many things in the divine power, knowledge and will that are not included in the order of inferior causes. Thus in the case of the raising of Lazarus, one who looked only on inferior causes might have said: "Lazarus will not
|
|
|
1060 rise again," but looking at the divine first cause might have said: "Lazarus will rise again." And God wills both: that is, that in the order of the inferior cause a thing shall happen; but that in the order of the higher cause it shall not happen; or He may will conversely. We may say, then, that God sometimes declares that a thing shall happen according as it falls under the order of inferior causes, as of nature, or merit, which yet does not happen as not being in the designs of the divine
|
|
|
1061 and higher cause. Thus He foretold to Ezechias: "Take order with thy house, for thou shalt die, and not live" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Isa.38.1" parsed="vul|Isa|38|1|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A7-p9.1" passage="Is. 38:1">Is. 38:1</scripRef>). Yet this did not take place, since from eternity it was otherwise disposed in the divine knowledge and will, which is unchangeable. Hence Gregory says (Moral. xvi, 5): "The sentence of God changes, but not His counsel"---that is to say, the counsel of His will. When therefore He says, "I also will repent," His words must be understood metaphorically. For
|
|
|
1062 men seem to repent, when they do not fulfill what they have
|
|
|
1063 threatened.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
|
|
|
1064 xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 7 ad 2"><a name="29245"><span class=
|
|
|
1065 "ref">[29245] Iª q. 19 a. 7 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
|
|
|
1066 dicendum quod voluntas Dei, cum sit causa prima et universalis, non
|
|
|
1067 excludit causas medias, in quarum virtute est ut aliqui effectus
|
|
|
1068 producantur. Sed quia omnes causae mediae non adaequant virtutem
|
|
|
1069 causae primae, multa sunt in virtute et scientia et voluntate
|
|
|
1070 divina, quae non continentur sub ordine causarum inferiorum; sicut
|
|
|
1071 resuscitatio Lazari. Unde aliquis respiciens ad causas inferiores,
|
|
|
1072 dicere poterat, Lazarus non resurget, respiciens vero ad causam
|
|
|
1073 primam divinam, poterat dicere, Lazarus resurget. Et utrumque horum
|
|
|
1074 Deus vult, scilicet quod aliquid quandoque sit futurum secundum
|
|
|
1075 causam inferiorem, quod tamen futurum non sit secundum causam
|
|
|
1076 superiorem; vel e converso. Sic ergo dicendum est quod Deus
|
|
|
1077 aliquando pronuntiat aliquid futurum, secundum quod continetur in
|
|
|
1078 ordine causarum inferiorum, ut puta secundum dispositionem naturae
|
|
|
1079 vel meritorum; quod tamen non fit, quia aliter est in causa
|
|
|
1080 superiori divina. Sicut cum praedixit Ezechiae, <i>dispone domui
|
|
|
1081 tuae, quia morieris et non vives</i>, ut habetur Isaiae XXXVIII;
|
|
|
1082 neque tamen ita evenit, quia ab aeterno aliter fuit in scientia et
|
|
|
1083 voluntate divina, quae immutabilis est. Propter quod dicit
|
|
|
1084 Gregorius, quod <i>Deus immutat sententiam, non tamen mutat
|
|
|
1085 consilium</i>, scilicet voluntatis suae. Quod ergo dicit,
|
|
|
1086 poenitentiam agam ego, intelligitur metaphorice dictum, nam homines
|
|
|
1087 quando non implent quod comminati sunt, poenitere
|
|
|
1088 videntur.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top:
|
|
|
1089 .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en"
|
|
|
1090 id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A7-p10" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection
|
|
|
1091 3:</b> It does not follow from this argument that God has a will that
|
|
|
1092 changes, but that He sometimes wills that things should
|
|
|
1093 change.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
|
|
|
1094 xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 7 ad 3"><a name="29246"><span class=
|
|
|
1095 "ref">[29246] Iª q. 19 a. 7 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
|
|
|
1096 dicendum quod ex ratione illa non potest concludi quod Deus habeat
|
|
|
1097 mutabilem voluntatem; sed quod mutationem velit.</p></div></div><div
|
|
|
1098 style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float:
|
|
|
1099 left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A7-p11"
|
|
|
1100 shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Although God's willing a
|
|
|
1101 thing is not by absolute necessity, yet it is necessary by
|
|
|
1102 supposition, on account of the unchangeableness of the divine will, as
|
|
|
1103 has been said above <a id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A7-p11.1"
|
|
|
1104 href="#FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A3" shape="rect"
|
|
|
1105 xml:link="simple">(A[3])</a>.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float:
|
|
|
1106 right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 7 ad 4"><a name="29247"><span class=
|
|
|
1107 "ref">[29247] Iª q. 19 a. 7 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum
|
|
|
1108 dicendum quod, licet Deum velle aliquid non sit necessarium
|
|
|
1109 absolute, tamen necessarium est ex suppositione, propter
|
|
|
1110 immutabilitatem divinae voluntatis, ut supra dictum est.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A8" next="FP_Q19_A9" prev="FP_Q19_A7" progress="3.65%" n="viii" title="Article. 8 - Whether the will of God imposes necessity on the things willed?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A8-p0.1">Whether the will of God imposes necessity on the things willed?</h4>
|
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1111 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
|
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|
1112 float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A8-p2"
|
|
|
1113 shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that the will of God
|
|
|
1114 imposes necessity on the things willed. For Augustine says
|
|
|
1115 (Enchiridion 103): "No one is saved, except whom God has willed to be
|
|
|
1116 saved. He must therefore be asked to will it; for if He wills it, it
|
|
|
1117 must necessarily be."</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float:
|
|
|
1118 right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 8 arg. 1"><a name="29248"><span class=
|
|
|
1119 "ref">[29248] Iª q. 19 a. 8 arg. 1</span></a> Ad octavum sic
|
|
|
1120 proceditur. Videtur quod voluntas Dei rebus volitis necessitatem
|
|
|
1121 imponat. Dicit enim Augustinus, in Enchirid., <i>nullus fit salvus,
|
|
|
1122 nisi quem Deus voluerit salvari. Et ideo rogandus est ut velit,
|
|
|
1123 quia necesse est fieri, si voluerit</i>.</p></div></div>
|
|
|
1124 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
|
|
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1125 float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A8-p3"
|
|
|
1126 shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, every cause that cannot
|
|
|
1127 be hindered, produces its effect necessarily, because, as the
|
|
|
1128 Philosopher says (Phys. ii, 84) "Nature always works in the same way,
|
|
|
1129 if there is nothing to hinder it." But the will of God cannot be
|
|
|
1130 hindered. For the Apostle says (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Rom.9.19"
|
|
|
1131 parsed="vul|Rom|9|19|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A8-p3.1"
|
|
|
1132 passage="Rom. 9:19">Rom. 9:19</scripRef>): "Who resisteth His will?"
|
|
|
1133 Therefore the will of God imposes necessity on the things
|
|
|
1134 willed.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
|
|
|
1135 xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 8 arg. 2"><a name="29249"><span class=
|
|
|
1136 "ref">[29249] Iª q. 19 a. 8 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, omnis
|
|
|
1137 causa quae non potest impediri, ex necessitate suum effectum
|
|
|
1138 producit, quia et natura semper idem operatur, nisi aliquid
|
|
|
1139 impediat, ut dicitur in II Physic. Sed voluntas Dei non potest
|
|
|
1140 impediri, dicit enim apostolus, ad Rom. IX, <i>voluntati enim eius
|
|
|
1141 quis resistit?</i> Ergo voluntas Dei imponit rebus volitis
|
|
|
1142 necessitatem.</p></div></div>
|
|
|
1143 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A8-p4" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, whatever is necessary by its antecedent cause is necessary absolutely; it is thus necessary that animals should die, being compounded of contrary elements. Now things created by God are related to the divine will as to an antecedent cause, whereby they have necessity. For the conditional statement is true that if God wills a thing, it comes to pass; and every true conditional statement is necessary. It follows therefore that all that God wills is
|
|
|
1144 necessary absolutely.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float:
|
|
|
1145 right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 8 arg. 3"><a name="29250"><span class=
|
|
|
1146 "ref">[29250] Iª q. 19 a. 8 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, illud
|
|
|
1147 quod habet necessitatem ex priori, est necessarium absolute, sicut
|
|
|
1148 animal mori est necessarium, quia est ex contrariis compositum. Sed
|
|
|
1149 res creatae a Deo, comparantur ad voluntatem divinam sicut ad
|
|
|
1150 aliquid prius, a quo habent necessitatem, cum haec conditionalis
|
|
|
1151 sit vera, si aliquid Deus vult, illud est; omnis autem
|
|
|
1152 conditionalis vera est necessaria. Sequitur ergo quod omne quod
|
|
|
1153 Deus vult, sit necessarium absolute.</p></div></div>
|
|
|
1154 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
|
|
|
1155 float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A8-p5"
|
|
|
1156 shownumber="no"><b>On the contrary,</b> All good things that exist God
|
|
|
1157 wills to be. If therefore His will imposes necessity on things willed,
|
|
|
1158 it follows that all good happens of necessity; and thus there is an
|
|
|
1159 end of free will, counsel, and all other such things.</p></div><div
|
|
|
1160 style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 8 s. c."><a name="29251"><span class=
|
|
|
1161 "ref">[29251] Iª q. 19 a. 8 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra, omnia
|
|
|
1162 bona quae fiunt, Deus vult fieri. Si igitur eius voluntas imponat
|
|
|
1163 rebus volitis necessitatem, sequitur quod omnia bona ex necessitate
|
|
|
1164 eveniunt. Et sic perit liberum arbitrium et consilium, et omnia
|
|
|
1165 huiusmodi.</p></div></div>
|
|
|
1166 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><div xml:lang="en">
|
|
|
1167 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A8-p6" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> The divine will imposes necessity on some things willed but not on all. The reason of this some have chosen to assign to intermediate causes, holding that what God produces by necessary causes is necessary; and what He produces by contingent causes contingent.</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A8-p7" shownumber="no"> This does not seem to be a sufficient explanation, for two reasons. First, because the effect of a first cause is contingent on account of the secondary cause, from the fact that the effect of the first cause is hindered by deficiency in the second cause, as the sun's power is hindered by a defect in the plant. But no defect of a secondary cause can hinder God's will from producing its effect. Secondly, because if the distinction between the contingent and the necessary is to be
|
|
|
1168 referred only to secondary causes, this must be independent of the divine intention and will; which is inadmissible. It is better therefore to say that this happens on account of the efficacy of the divine will. For when a cause is efficacious to act, the effect follows upon the cause, not only as to the thing done, but also as to its manner of being done or of being. Thus from defect of active power in the seed it may happen that a child is born unlike its father in accidental points, that
|
|
|
1169 belong to its manner of being. Since then the divine will is perfectly efficacious, it follows not only that things are done, which God wills to be done, but also that they are done in the way that He wills. Now God wills some things to be done necessarily, some contingently, to the right ordering of things, for the building up of the universe. Therefore to some effects He has attached necessary causes, that cannot fail; but to others defectible and contingent causes, from which arise
|
|
|
1170 contingent effects. Hence it is not because the proximate causes are contingent that the effects willed by God happen contingently, but because God prepared contingent causes for them, it being His will that they should happen contingently.</p>
|
|
|
1171 </div></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 8 co."><a name="29252"><span class=
|
|
|
1172 "ref">[29252] Iª q. 19 a. 8 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
|
|
|
1173 quod divina voluntas quibusdam volitis necessitatem imponit, non
|
|
|
1174 autem omnibus. Cuius quidem rationem aliqui assignare voluerunt ex
|
|
|
1175 causis mediis quia ea quae producit per causas necessarias, sunt
|
|
|
1176 necessaria; ea vero quae producit per causas contingentes, sunt
|
|
|
1177 contingentia. Sed hoc non videtur sufficienter dictum, propter duo.
|
|
|
1178 Primo quidem, quia effectus alicuius primae causae est contingens
|
|
|
1179 propter causam secundam, ex eo quod impeditur effectus causae
|
|
|
1180 primae per defectum causae secundae; sicut virtus solis per
|
|
|
1181 defectum plantae impeditur. Nullus autem defectus causae secundae
|
|
|
1182 impedire potest quin voluntas Dei effectum suum producat. Secundo,
|
|
|
1183 quia, si distinctio contingentium a necessariis referatur solum in
|
|
|
1184 causas secundas, sequitur hoc esse praeter intentionem et
|
|
|
1185 voluntatem divinam, quod est inconveniens. Et ideo melius dicendum
|
|
|
1186 est, quod hoc contingit propter efficaciam divinae voluntatis. Cum
|
|
|
1187 enim aliqua causa efficax fuerit ad agendum, effectus consequitur
|
|
|
1188 causam non tantum secundum id quod fit, sed etiam secundum modum
|
|
|
1189 fiendi vel essendi, ex debilitate enim virtutis activae in semine,
|
|
|
1190 contingit quod filius nascitur dissimilis patri in accidentibus,
|
|
|
1191 quae pertinent ad modum essendi. Cum igitur voluntas divina sit
|
|
|
1192 efficacissima, non solum sequitur quod fiant ea quae Deus vult
|
|
|
1193 fieri; sed quod eo modo fiant, quo Deus ea fieri vult. Vult autem
|
|
|
1194 quaedam fieri Deus necessario, et quaedam contingenter, ut sit ordo
|
|
|
1195 in rebus, ad complementum universi. Et ideo quibusdam effectibus
|
|
|
1196 aptavit causas necessarias, quae deficere non possunt, ex quibus
|
|
|
1197 effectus de necessitate proveniunt, quibusdam autem aptavit causas
|
|
|
1198 contingentes defectibiles, ex quibus effectus contingenter
|
|
|
1199 eveniunt. Non igitur propterea effectus voliti a Deo, eveniunt
|
|
|
1200 contingenter, quia causae proximae sunt contingentes, sed propterea
|
|
|
1201 quia Deus voluit eos contingenter evenire, contingentes causas ad
|
|
|
1202 eos praeparavit.</p></div></div>
|
|
|
1203 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
|
|
|
1204 float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A8-p8"
|
|
|
1205 shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> By the words of Augustine
|
|
|
1206 we must understand a necessity in things willed by God that is not
|
|
|
1207 absolute, but conditional. For the conditional statement that if God
|
|
|
1208 wills a thing it must necessarily be, is necessarily
|
|
|
1209 true.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 8 ad 1"><a name="29253"><span class=
|
|
|
1210 "ref">[29253] Iª q. 19 a. 8 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
|
|
|
1211 dicendum quod per illud verbum Augustini intelligenda est
|
|
|
1212 necessitas in rebus volitis a Deo, non absoluta, sed conditionalis,
|
|
|
1213 necesse est enim hanc conditionalem veram esse, si Deus hoc vult,
|
|
|
1214 necesse est hoc esse.</p></div></div>
|
|
|
1215 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
|
|
|
1216 float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A8-p9"
|
|
|
1217 shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> From the very fact that
|
|
|
1218 nothing resists the divine will, it follows that not only those things
|
|
|
1219 happen that God wills to happen, but that they happen necessarily or
|
|
|
1220 contingently according to His will.</p></div><div style="width: 45%;
|
|
|
1221 float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 8 ad 2"><a name="29254"><span class=
|
|
|
1222 "ref">[29254] Iª q. 19 a. 8 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
|
|
|
1223 dicendum quod, ex hoc ipso quod nihil voluntati divinae resistit,
|
|
|
1224 sequitur quod non solum fiant ea quae Deus vult fieri; sed quod
|
|
|
1225 fiant contingenter vel necessario, quae sic fieri vult.</p></div></div>
|
|
|
1226 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
|
|
|
1227 float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A8-p10"
|
|
|
1228 shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Consequents have
|
|
|
1229 necessity from their antecedents according to the mode of the
|
|
|
1230 antecedents. Hence things effected by the divine will have that kind
|
|
|
1231 of necessity that God wills them to have, either absolute or
|
|
|
1232 conditional. Not all things, therefore, are absolute
|
|
|
1233 necessities.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
|
|
|
1234 xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 8 ad 3"><a name="29255"><span class=
|
|
|
1235 "ref">[29255] Iª q. 19 a. 8 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
|
|
|
1236 dicendum quod posteriora habent necessitatem a prioribus, secundum
|
|
|
1237 modum priorum. Unde et ea quae fiunt a voluntate divina, talem
|
|
|
1238 necessitatem habent, qualem Deus vult ea habere, scilicet, vel
|
|
|
1239 absolutam, vel conditionalem tantum. Et sic, non omnia sunt
|
|
|
1240 necessaria absolute.</p></div></div>
|
|
|
1241 </div><div id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A9" next="FP_Q19_A10"
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1242 prev="FP_Q19_A8" progress="3.68%" n="ix" title="Article. 9 - Whether
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1243 God wills evils?"><h4 xml:lang="en"
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1244 id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A9-p0.1">Whether God wills evils?</h4><div
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1245 style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float:
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1246 left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A9-p2"
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1247 shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God wills evils. For
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1248 every good that exists, God wills. But it is a good that evil should
|
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1249 exist. For Augustine says (Enchiridion 95): "Although evil in so far
|
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1250 as it is evil is not a good, yet it is good that not only good things
|
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1251 should exist, but also evil things." Therefore God wills evil
|
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1252 things.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
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1253 xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 9 arg. 1"><a name="29256"><span class=
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1254 "ref">[29256] Iª q. 19 a. 9 arg. 1</span></a> Ad nonum sic
|
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1255 proceditur. Videtur quod voluntas Dei sit malorum. Omne enim bonum
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1256 quod fit, Deus vult. Sed mala fieri bonum est, dicit enim
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1257 Augustinus, in Enchirid., <i>quamvis ea quae mala sunt, inquantum
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1258 mala sunt, non sint bona; tamen, ut non solum bona, sed etiam ut
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1259 sint mala, bonum est</i>. Ergo Deus vult mala.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A9-p3" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv, 23): "Evil would conduce to the perfection of everything," i.e. the universe. And Augustine says (Enchiridion 10,11): "Out of all things is built up the admirable beauty of the universe, wherein even that which is called evil, properly ordered and disposed, commends the good more evidently in that good is more pleasing and praiseworthy when contrasted with evil." But God wills all that appertains to the perfection and
|
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1260 beauty of the universe, for this is what God desires above all
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1261 things in His creatures. Therefore God wills evil.</p></div><div
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1262 style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 9 arg. 2"><a name="29257"><span class=
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1263 "ref">[29257] Iª q. 19 a. 9 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, dicit
|
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1264 Dionysius, IV cap. de Div. Nom., erit malum ad omnis (idest
|
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1265 universi) perfectionem conferens. Et Augustinus dicit, in
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1266 Enchirid., <i>ex omnibus consistit universitatis admirabilis
|
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1267 pulchritudo; in qua etiam illud quod malum dicitur, bene ordinatum,
|
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1268 et loco suo positum, eminentius commendat bona; ut magis placeant,
|
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1269 et laudabiliora sint, dum comparantur malis</i>. Sed Deus vult omne
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1270 illud quod pertinet ad perfectionem et decorem universi, quia hoc
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1271 est quod Deus maxime vult in creaturis. Ergo Deus vult
|
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1272 mala.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div
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1273 style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en"
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1274 id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A9-p4" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 3:</b>
|
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1275 Further, that evil should exist, and should not exist, are
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1276 contradictory opposites. But God does not will that evil should not
|
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1277 exist; otherwise, since various evils do exist, God's will would not
|
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1278 always be fulfilled. Therefore God wills that evil should
|
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1279 exist.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la"
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1280 title="I q. 19 a. 9 arg. 3"><a name="29258"><span class=
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1281 "ref">[29258] Iª q. 19 a. 9 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, mala
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1282 fieri, et non fieri, sunt contradictorie opposita. Sed Deus non
|
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1283 vult mala non fieri, quia, cum mala quaedam fiant, non semper
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1284 voluntas Dei impleretur. Ergo Deus vult mala
|
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1285 fieri.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div
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1286 style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en"
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1287 id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A9-p5" shownumber="no"><b>On the contrary,</b>
|
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1288 Augustine says (Qq. 83,3): "No wise man is the cause of another man
|
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1289 becoming worse. Now God surpasses all men in wisdom. Much less
|
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1290 therefore is God the cause of man becoming worse; and when He is said
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1291 to be the cause of a thing, He is said to will it." Therefore it is
|
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1292 not by God's will that man becomes worse. Now it is clear that every
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1293 evil makes a thing worse. Therefore God wills not evil
|
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1294 things.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
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1295 xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 9 s. c."><a name="29259"><span class=
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1296 "ref">[29259] Iª q. 19 a. 9 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
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1297 quod dicit Augustinus, in libro octoginta trium quaest., <i>nullo
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1298 sapiente homine auctore, fit homo deterior; est autem Deus omni
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1299 sapiente homine praestantior; multo igitur minus, Deo auctore, fit
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1300 aliquis deterior. Illo autem auctore cum dicitur, illo volente
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1301 dicitur</i>. Non ergo volente Deo, fit homo deterior. Constat autem
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1302 quod quolibet malo fit aliquid deterius. Ergo Deus non vult
|
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1303 mala.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A9-p6" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> Since the ratio of good is the ratio of appetibility, as said before (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A9-p6.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q5.FP_Q5_A1" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">Q[5], A[1]</a>), and since evil is opposed to good, it is impossible that any evil, as such, should be sought for by the appetite, either natural, or animal, or by the intellectual appetite which is the will. Nevertheless evil may be sought accidentally, so far as it accompanies a good, as appears in each of the appetites. For a natural agent intends not privation or
|
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1304 corruption, but the form to which is annexed the privation of some other form, and the generation of one thing, which implies the corruption of another. Also when a lion kills a stag, his object is food, to obtain which the killing of the animal is only the means. Similarly the fornicator has merely pleasure for his object, and the deformity of sin is only an accompaniment. Now the evil that accompanies one good, is the privation of another good. Never therefore would evil be sought after, not
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1305 even accidentally, unless the good that accompanies the evil were more desired than the good of which the evil is the privation. Now God wills no good more than He wills His own goodness; yet He wills one good more than another. Hence He in no way wills the evil of sin, which is the privation of right order towards the divine good. The evil of natural defect, or of punishment, He does will, by willing the good to which such evils are attached. Thus in willing justice He wills punishment; and in
|
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1306 willing the preservation of the natural order, He wills some things
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1307 to be naturally corrupted.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float:
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1308 right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 9 co."><a name="29260"><span class=
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1309 "ref">[29260] Iª q. 19 a. 9 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
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1310 quod, cum ratio boni sit ratio appetibilis, ut supra dictum est,
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1311 malum autem opponatur bono; impossibile est quod aliquod malum,
|
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1312 inquantum huiusmodi, appetatur, neque appetitu naturali, neque
|
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1313 animali, neque intellectuali, qui est voluntas. Sed aliquod malum
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1314 appetitur per accidens, inquantum consequitur ad aliquod bonum. Et
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1315 hoc apparet in quolibet appetitu. Non enim agens naturale intendit
|
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1316 privationem vel corruptionem; sed formam, cui coniungitur privatio
|
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1317 alterius formae; et generationem unius, quae est corruptio
|
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1318 alterius. Leo etiam, occidens cervum, intendit cibum, cui
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1319 coniungitur occisio animalis. Similiter fornicator intendit
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1320 delectationem, cui coniungitur deformitas culpae. Malum autem quod
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1321 coniungitur alicui bono, est privatio alterius boni. Nunquam igitur
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1322 appeteretur malum, nec per accidens, nisi bonum cui coniungitur
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1323 malum, magis appeteretur quam bonum quod privatur per malum. Nullum
|
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1324 autem bonum Deus magis vult quam suam bonitatem, vult tamen aliquod
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1325 bonum magis quam aliud quoddam bonum. Unde malum culpae, quod
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1326 privat ordinem ad bonum divinum, Deus nullo modo vult. Sed malum
|
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1327 naturalis defectus, vel malum poenae vult, volendo aliquod bonum,
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1328 cui coniungitur tale malum, sicut, volendo iustitiam, vult poenam;
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1329 et volendo ordinem naturae servari, vult quaedam naturaliter
|
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1330 corrumpi.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A9-p7" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> Some have said that although God does not will evil, yet He wills that evil should be or be done, because, although evil is not a good, yet it is good that evil should be or be done. This they said because things evil in themselves are ordered to some good end; and this order they thought was expressed in the words "that evil should be or be done." This, however, is not correct; since evil is not of itself ordered to good, but accidentally. For it is
|
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1331 beside the intention of the sinner, that any good should follow from
|
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1332 his sin; as it was beside the intention of tyrants that the patience
|
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1333 of the martyrs should shine forth from all their persecutions. It
|
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1334 cannot therefore be said that such an ordering to good is implied in
|
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1335 the statement that it is a good thing that evil should be or be done,
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1336 since nothing is judged of by that which appertains to it
|
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1337 accidentally, but by that which belongs to it
|
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1338 essentially.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
|
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1339 xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 9 ad 1"><a name="29261"><span class=
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1340 "ref">[29261] Iª q. 19 a. 9 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
|
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1341 dicendum quod quidam dixerunt quod, licet Deus non velit mala, vult
|
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1342 tamen mala esse vel fieri, quia, licet mala non sint bona, bonum
|
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1343 tamen est mala esse vel fieri. Quod ideo dicebant, quia ea quae in
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1344 se mala sunt, ordinantur ad aliquod bonum, quem quidem ordinem
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1345 importari credebant in hoc quod dicitur, mala esse vel fieri. Sed
|
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1346 hoc non recte dicitur. Quia malum non ordinatur ad bonum per se,
|
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1347 sed per accidens. Praeter intentionem enim peccantis est, quod ex
|
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1348 hoc sequatur aliquod bonum; sicut praeter intentionem tyrannorum
|
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1349 fuit, quod ex eorum persecutionibus claresceret patientia martyrum.
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1350 Et ideo non potest dici quod talis ordo ab bonum importetur per hoc
|
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1351 quod dicitur, quod malum esse vel fieri sit bonum, quia nihil
|
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1352 iudicatur secundum illud quod competit ei per accidens, sed
|
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1353 secundum illud quod competit ei per se.</p></div></div><div
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1354 style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float:
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1355 left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A9-p8"
|
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|
1356 shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Evil does not operate
|
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|
1357 towards the perfection and beauty of the universe, except
|
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|
1358 accidentally, as said above (ad 1). Therefore Dionysius in saying that
|
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|
1359 "evil would conduce to the perfection of the universe," draws a
|
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1360 conclusion by reduction to an absurdity.</p></div><div style="width:
|
|
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1361 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 9 ad 2"><a name="29262"><span class=
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1362 "ref">[29262] Iª q. 19 a. 9 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
|
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|
1363 dicendum quod malum non operatur ad perfectionem et decorem
|
|
|
1364 universi nisi per accidens, ut dictum est. Unde et hoc quod dicit
|
|
|
1365 Dionysius, quod malum est ad universi perfectionem conferens,
|
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1366 concludit inducendo quasi ad inconveniens.</p></div></div><div
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1367 style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float:
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1368 left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A9-p9"
|
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1369 shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> The statements that evil
|
|
|
1370 exists, and that evil exists not, are opposed as contradictories; yet
|
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|
1371 the statements that anyone wills evil to exist and that he wills it
|
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1372 not to be, are not so opposed; since either is affirmative. God
|
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|
1373 therefore neither wills evil to be done, nor wills it not to be done,
|
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1374 but wills to permit evil to be done; and this is a good.</p></div><div
|
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1375 style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 9 ad 3"><a name="29263"><span class=
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1376 "ref">[29263] Iª q. 19 a. 9 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
|
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1377 dicendum quod, licet mala fieri, et mala non fieri, contradictorie
|
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1378 opponantur; tamen velle mala fieri, et velle mala non fieri, non
|
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1379 opponuntur contradictorie, cum utrumque sit affirmativum. Deus
|
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1380 igitur neque vult mala fieri, neque vult mala non fieri, sed vult
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1381 permittere mala fieri. Et hoc est bonum.</p></div></div></div>
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1382 <div id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A10" next="FP_Q19_A11" prev="FP_Q19_A9"
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1383 progress="3.71%" n="x" title="Article. 10 - Whether God has
|
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1384 free-will?"><h4 xml:lang="en"
|
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1385 id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A10-p0.1">Whether God has free-will?</h4><div
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1386 style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float:
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1387 left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A10-p2"
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1388 shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God has not
|
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1389 free-will. For Jerome says, in a homily on the prodigal son [*Ep. 146,
|
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|
1390 ad Damas.]; "God alone is He who is not liable to sin, nor can be
|
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1391 liable: all others, as having free-will, can be inclined to either
|
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1392 side."</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la"
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1393 title="I q. 19 a. 10 arg. 1"><a name="29264"><span class=
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1394 "ref">[29264] Iª q. 19 a. 10 arg. 1</span></a> Ad decimum sic
|
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1395 proceditur. Videtur quod Deus non habeat liberum arbitrium. Dicit
|
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1396 enim Hieronymus, in homilia de filio prodigo, <i>solus Deus est, in
|
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1397 quem peccatum non cadit, nec cadere potest; cetera, cum sint liberi
|
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1398 arbitrii, in utramque partem flecti possunt</i>.</p></div></div><div
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1399 style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float:
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1400 left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A10-p3"
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1401 shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, free-will is the faculty
|
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1402 of the reason and will, by which good and evil are chosen. But God
|
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1403 does not will evil, as has been said <a
|
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1404 id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A10-p3.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A9"
|
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1405 shape="rect" xml:link="simple">(A[9])</a>. Therefore there is not
|
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1406 free-will in God.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
|
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1407 xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 10 arg. 2"><a name="29265"><span class=
|
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1408 "ref">[29265] Iª q. 19 a. 10 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
|
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1409 liberum arbitrium est facultas rationis et voluntatis, qua bonum et
|
|
|
1410 malum eligitur. Sed Deus non vult malum, ut dictum est. Ergo
|
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|
1411 liberum arbitrium non est in Deo.</p></div></div><div style="clear:
|
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1412 both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p
|
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1413 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A10-p4" shownumber="no"><b>On
|
|
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1414 the contrary,</b> Ambrose says (De Fide ii, 3): "The Holy Spirit
|
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|
1415 divideth unto each one as He will, namely, according to the free
|
|
|
1416 choice of the will, not in obedience to necessity."</p></div><div
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1417 style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 10 s. c."><a name="29266"><span class=
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1418 "ref">[29266] Iª q. 19 a. 10 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
|
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1419 quod dicit Ambrosius, in libro de fide, <i>spiritus sanctus dividit
|
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|
1420 singulis prout vult, idest pro liberae voluntatis arbitrio, non
|
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1421 necessitatis obsequio</i>.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A10-p5" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> We have free-will with respect to what we will not of necessity, nor be natural instinct. For our will to be happy does not appertain to free-will, but to natural instinct. Hence other animals, that are moved to act by natural instinct, are not said to be moved by free-will. Since then God necessarily wills His own goodness, but other things not necessarily, as shown above <a id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A10-p5.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A3" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">(A[3])</a>, He has free will with respect to what He does not
|
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1422 necessarily will.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
|
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1423 xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 10 co."><a name="29267"><span class=
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|
|
1424 "ref">[29267] Iª q. 19 a. 10 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
|
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1425 quod liberum arbitrium habemus respectu eorum quae non necessario
|
|
|
1426 volumus, vel naturali instinctu. Non enim ad liberum arbitrium
|
|
|
1427 pertinet quod volumus esse felices, sed ad naturalem instinctum.
|
|
|
1428 Unde et alia animalia, quae naturali instinctu moventur ad aliquid,
|
|
|
1429 non dicuntur libero arbitrio moveri. Cum igitur Deus ex necessitate
|
|
|
1430 suam bonitatem velit, alia vero non ex necessitate, ut supra
|
|
|
1431 ostensum est; respectu illorum quae non ex necessitate vult,
|
|
|
1432 liberum arbitrium habet.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both;
|
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1433 margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p
|
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1434 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A10-p6" shownumber="no"><b>Reply
|
|
|
1435 to Objection 1:</b> Jerome seems to deny free-will to God not simply,
|
|
|
1436 but only as regards the inclination to sin.</p></div><div
|
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1437 style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 10 ad 1"><a name="29268"><span class=
|
|
|
1438 "ref">[29268] Iª q. 19 a. 10 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
|
|
|
1439 dicendum quod Hieronymus videtur excludere a Deo liberum arbitrium,
|
|
|
1440 non simpliciter, sed solum quantum ad hoc quod est deflecti in
|
|
|
1441 peccatum.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top:
|
|
|
1442 .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en"
|
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1443 id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A10-p7" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection
|
|
|
1444 2:</b> Since the evil of sin consists in turning away from the divine
|
|
|
1445 goodness, by which God wills all things, as above shown (De Fide ii,
|
|
|
1446 3), it is manifestly impossible for Him to will the evil of sin; yet
|
|
|
1447 He can make choice of one of two opposites, inasmuch as He can will a
|
|
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1448 thing to be, or not to be. In the same way we ourselves, without sin,
|
|
|
1449 can will to sit down, and not will to sit down.</p></div><div
|
|
|
1450 style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 10 ad 2"><a name="29269"><span class=
|
|
|
1451 "ref">[29269] Iª q. 19 a. 10 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
|
|
|
1452 dicendum quod, cum malum culpae dicatur per aversionem a bonitate
|
|
|
1453 divina, per quam Deus omnia vult, ut supra ostensum est, manifestum
|
|
|
1454 est quod impossibile est eum malum culpae velle. Et tamen ad
|
|
|
1455 opposita se habet, inquantum velle potest hoc esse vel non esse.
|
|
|
1456 Sicut et nos, non peccando, possumus velle sedere, et non velle
|
|
|
1457 sedere.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A11"
|
|
|
1458 next="FP_Q19_A12" prev="FP_Q19_A10" progress="3.73%" n="xi"
|
|
|
1459 title="Article. 11 - Whether the will of expression is to be
|
|
|
1460 distinguished in God?"><h4 xml:lang="en"
|
|
|
1461 id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A11-p0.1">Whether the will of expression is to
|
|
|
1462 be distinguished in God?</h4><div style="clear: both; margin-top:
|
|
|
1463 .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en"
|
|
|
1464 id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A11-p2" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It
|
|
|
1465 seems that the will of expression is not to be distinguished in
|
|
|
1466 God. For as the will of God is the cause of things, so is His
|
|
|
1467 wisdom. But no expressions are assigned to the divine
|
|
|
1468 wisdom. Therefore no expressions ought to be assigned to the divine
|
|
|
1469 will.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 11 arg. 1"><a name="29270"><span class=
|
|
|
1470 "ref">[29270] Iª q. 19 a. 11 arg. 1</span></a> Ad undecimum
|
|
|
1471 sic proceditur. Videtur quod non sit distinguenda in Deo voluntas
|
|
|
1472 signi. Sicut enim voluntas Dei est causa rerum, ita et scientia.
|
|
|
1473 Sed non assignantur aliqua signa ex parte divinae scientiae. Ergo
|
|
|
1474 neque debent assignari aliqua signa ex parte divinae
|
|
|
1475 voluntatis.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top:
|
|
|
1476 .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en"
|
|
|
1477 id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A11-p3" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b>
|
|
|
1478 Further, every expression that is not in agreement with the mind of
|
|
|
1479 him who expresses himself, is false. If therefore the expressions
|
|
|
1480 assigned to the divine will are not in agreement with that will, they
|
|
|
1481 are false. But if they do agree, they are superfluous. No expressions
|
|
|
1482 therefore must be assigned to the divine will.</p></div><div
|
|
|
1483 style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 11 arg. 2"><a name="29271"><span class=
|
|
|
1484 "ref">[29271] Iª q. 19 a. 11 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, omne
|
|
|
1485 signum quod non concordat ei cuius est signum, est falsum. Si
|
|
|
1486 igitur signa quae assignantur circa voluntatem divinam, non
|
|
|
1487 concordant divinae voluntati, sunt falsa, si autem concordant,
|
|
|
1488 superflue assignantur. Non igitur sunt aliqua signa circa
|
|
|
1489 voluntatem divinam assignanda.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both;
|
|
|
1490 margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p
|
|
|
1491 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A11-p4" shownumber="no"><b>On
|
|
|
1492 the contrary,</b> The will of God is one, since it is the very essence
|
|
|
1493 of God. Yet sometimes it is spoken of as many, as in the words
|
|
|
1494 of<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Ps.110.2" parsed="vul|Ps|110|2|0|0"
|
|
|
1495 id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A11-p4.1" passage=" Ps. 110:2">
|
|
|
1496 Ps. 110:2</scripRef>: "Great are the works of the Lord, sought out
|
|
|
1497 according to all His wills." Therefore sometimes the sign must be
|
|
|
1498 taken for the will.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
|
|
|
1499 xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 11 s. c."><a name="29272"><span class=
|
|
|
1500 "ref">[29272] Iª q. 19 a. 11 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
|
|
|
1501 quod voluntas Dei est una, cum ipsa sit Dei essentia. Quandoque
|
|
|
1502 autem pluraliter significatur, ut cum dicitur, <i>magna opera
|
|
|
1503 domini, exquisita in omnes voluntates eius</i>. Ergo oportet quod
|
|
|
1504 aliquando signum voluntatis pro voluntate accipiatur.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A11-p5" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> Some things are said of God in their strict sense; others by metaphor, as appears from what has been said before (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A11-p5.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q13.FP_Q13_A3" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">Q[13], A[3]</a>). When certain human passions are predicated of the Godhead metaphorically, this is done because of a likeness in the effect. Hence a thing that is in us a sign of some passion, is signified metaphorically in God under the name of that passion. Thus with us it is usual for an angry man to punish, so that
|
|
|
1505 punishment becomes an expression of anger. Therefore punishment itself is signified by the word anger, when anger is attributed to God. In the same way, what is usually with us an expression of will, is sometimes metaphorically called will in God; just as when anyone lays down a precept, it is a sign that he wishes that precept obeyed. Hence a divine precept is sometimes called by metaphor the will of God, as in the words: "Thy will be done on earth, as it is in heaven" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Matt.6.10" parsed="vul|Matt|6|10|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A11-p5.2" passage="Mat. 6:10">Mat.
|
|
|
1506 6:10</scripRef>). There is, however, this difference between will and anger, that anger is never attributed to God properly, since in its primary meaning it includes passion; whereas will is attributed to Him properly. Therefore in God there are distinguished will in its proper sense, and will as attributed to Him by metaphor. Will in its proper sense is called the will of good pleasure; and will metaphorically taken is the will of expression, inasmuch as the sign itself of will is called
|
|
|
1507 will.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
|
|
|
1508 xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 11 co."><a name="29273"><span class=
|
|
|
1509 "ref">[29273] Iª q. 19 a. 11 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
|
|
|
1510 quod in Deo quaedam dicuntur proprie, et quaedam secundum
|
|
|
1511 metaphoram, ut ex supradictis patet. Cum autem aliquae passiones
|
|
|
1512 humanae in divinam praedicationem metaphorice assumuntur, hoc fit
|
|
|
1513 secundum similitudinem effectus, unde illud quod est signum talis
|
|
|
1514 passionis in nobis, in Deo nomine illius passionis metaphorice
|
|
|
1515 significatur. Sicut, apud nos, irati punire consueverunt, unde ipsa
|
|
|
1516 punitio est signum irae, et propter hoc, ipsa punitio nomine irae
|
|
|
1517 significatur, cum Deo attribuitur. Similiter id quod solet esse in
|
|
|
1518 nobis signum voluntatis, quandoque metaphorice in Deo voluntas
|
|
|
1519 dicitur. Sicut, cum aliquis praecipit aliquid, signum est quod
|
|
|
1520 velit illud fieri, unde praeceptum divinum quandoque metaphorice
|
|
|
1521 voluntas Dei dicitur, secundum illud Matth. VI, <i>fiat voluntas
|
|
|
1522 tua, sicut in caelo et in terra</i>. Sed hoc distat inter
|
|
|
1523 voluntatem et iram, quia ira de Deo nunquam proprie dicitur, cum in
|
|
|
1524 suo principali intellectu includat passionem, voluntas autem
|
|
|
1525 proprie de Deo dicitur. Et ideo in Deo distinguitur voluntas
|
|
|
1526 proprie, et metaphorice dicta. Voluntas enim proprie dicta, vocatur
|
|
|
1527 voluntas beneplaciti, voluntas autem metaphorice dicta, est
|
|
|
1528 voluntas signi, eo quod ipsum signum voluntatis voluntas
|
|
|
1529 dicitur.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top:
|
|
|
1530 .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en"
|
|
|
1531 id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A11-p6" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection
|
|
|
1532 1:</b> Knowledge is not the cause of a thing being done, unless
|
|
|
1533 through the will. For we do not put into act what we know, unless we
|
|
|
1534 will to do so. Accordingly expression is not attributed to knowledge,
|
|
|
1535 but to will.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
|
|
|
1536 xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 11 ad 1"><a name="29274"><span class=
|
|
|
1537 "ref">[29274] Iª q. 19 a. 11 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
|
|
|
1538 dicendum quod scientia non est causa eorum quae fiunt, nisi per
|
|
|
1539 voluntatem, non enim quae scimus facimus, nisi velimus. Et ideo
|
|
|
1540 signum non attribuitur scientiae, sicut attribuitur
|
|
|
1541 voluntati.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top:
|
|
|
1542 .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en"
|
|
|
1543 id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A11-p7" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection
|
|
|
1544 2:</b> Expressions of will are called divine wills, not as being signs
|
|
|
1545 that God wills anything; but because what in us is the usual
|
|
|
1546 expression of our will, is called the divine will in God. Thus
|
|
|
1547 punishment is not a sign that there is anger in God; but it is called
|
|
|
1548 anger in Him, from the fact that it is an expression of anger in
|
|
|
1549 ourselves.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
|
|
|
1550 xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 11 ad 2"><a name="29275"><span class=
|
|
|
1551 "ref">[29275] Iª q. 19 a. 11 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
|
|
|
1552 dicendum quod signa voluntatis dicuntur voluntates divinae, non
|
|
|
1553 quia sint signa quod Deus velit, sed quia ea quae in nobis solent
|
|
|
1554 esse signa volendi, in Deo divinae voluntates dicuntur. Sicut
|
|
|
1555 punitio non est signum quod in Deo sit ira, sed punitio, ex eo ipso
|
|
|
1556 quod in nobis est signum irae, in Deo dicitur ira.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A12" next="FP_Q20" prev="FP_Q19_A11" progress="3.75%" n="xii" title="Article. 12 - Whether five expressions of will are rightly assigned to the divine will?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A12-p0.1">Whether five expressions of will are rightly assigned to the divine will?</h4>
|
|
|
1557 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
|
|
|
1558 float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A12-p2"
|
|
|
1559 shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that five expressions of
|
|
|
1560 will---namely, prohibition, precept, counsel, operation, and
|
|
|
1561 permission---are not rightly assigned to the divine will. For the same
|
|
|
1562 things that God bids us do by His precept or counsel, these He
|
|
|
1563 sometimes operates in us, and the same things that He prohibits, these
|
|
|
1564 He sometimes permits. They ought not therefore to be enumerated as
|
|
|
1565 distinct.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
|
|
|
1566 xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 12 arg. 1"><a name="29276"><span class=
|
|
|
1567 "ref">[29276] Iª q. 19 a. 12 arg. 1</span></a> Ad duodecimum
|
|
|
1568 sic proceditur. Videtur quod inconvenienter circa divinam
|
|
|
1569 voluntatem ponantur quinque signa, scilicet, prohibitio,
|
|
|
1570 praeceptum, consilium, operatio et permissio. Nam eadem quae nobis
|
|
|
1571 praecipit Deus vel consulit, in nobis quandoque operatur, et eadem
|
|
|
1572 quae prohibet, quandoque permittit. Ergo non debent ex opposito
|
|
|
1573 dividi.</p></div></div>
|
|
|
1574 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
|
|
|
1575 float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A12-p3"
|
|
|
1576 shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, God works nothing unless
|
|
|
1577 He wills it, as the Scripture says (<scripRef
|
|
|
1578 osisRef="Bible.vul:Wis.11.26" parsed="vul|Wis|11|26|0|0"
|
|
|
1579 id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A12-p3.1"
|
|
|
1580 passage="Wis. 11:26">Wis. 11:26</scripRef>). But the will of
|
|
|
1581 expression is distinct from the will of good pleasure. Therefore
|
|
|
1582 operation ought not to be comprehended in the will of
|
|
|
1583 expression.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
|
|
|
1584 xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 12 arg. 2"><a name="29277"><span class=
|
|
|
1585 "ref">[29277] Iª q. 19 a. 12 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
|
|
|
1586 nihil Deus operatur, nisi volens, ut dicitur Sap. XI. Sed voluntas
|
|
|
1587 signi distinguitur a voluntate beneplaciti. Ergo operatio sub
|
|
|
1588 voluntate signi comprehendi non debet.</p></div></div>
|
|
|
1589 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
|
|
|
1590 float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A12-p4"
|
|
|
1591 shownumber="no"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, operation and permission
|
|
|
1592 appertain to all creatures in common, since God works in them all, and
|
|
|
1593 permits some action in them all. But precept, counsel, and prohibition
|
|
|
1594 belong to rational creatures only. Therefore they do not come rightly
|
|
|
1595 under one division, not being of one order.</p></div><div
|
|
|
1596 style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 12 arg. 3"><a name="29278"><span class=
|
|
|
1597 "ref">[29278] Iª q. 19 a. 12 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
|
|
|
1598 operatio et permissio communiter ad omnes creaturas pertinent, quia
|
|
|
1599 in omnibus Deus operatur, et in omnibus aliquid fieri permittit.
|
|
|
1600 Sed praeceptum, consilium et prohibitio pertinent ad solam
|
|
|
1601 rationalem creaturam. Ergo non veniunt convenienter in unam
|
|
|
1602 divisionem, cum non sint unius ordinis.</p></div></div>
|
|
|
1603 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
|
|
|
1604 float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A12-p5"
|
|
|
1605 shownumber="no"><b>Objection 4:</b> Further, evil happens in more ways
|
|
|
1606 than good, since "good happens in one way, but evil in all kinds of
|
|
|
1607 ways," as declared by the Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 6), and Dionysius
|
|
|
1608 (Div. Nom. iv, 22). It is not right therefore to assign one expression
|
|
|
1609 only in the case of evil---namely, prohibition---and two---namely,
|
|
|
1610 counsel and precept---in the case of good.</p></div><div style="width:
|
|
|
1611 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 12 arg. 4"><a name="29279"><span class=
|
|
|
1612 "ref">[29279] Iª q. 19 a. 12 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea,
|
|
|
1613 malum pluribus modis contingit quam bonum, quia bonum contingit uno
|
|
|
1614 modo, sed malum omnifariam, ut patet per philosophum in II Ethic.,
|
|
|
1615 et per Dionysium in IV cap. de Div. Nom. Inconvenienter igitur
|
|
|
1616 respectu mali assignatur unum signum tantum, scilicet prohibitio;
|
|
|
1617 respectu vero boni, duo signa, scilicet consilium et
|
|
|
1618 praeceptum.</p></div></div>
|
|
|
1619 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><div xml:lang="en">
|
|
|
1620 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A12-p6" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> By these signs we name the expression of will by which we are accustomed to show that we will something. A man may show that he wills something, either by himself or by means of another. He may show it by himself, by doing something either directly, or indirectly and accidentally. He shows it directly when he works in his own person; in that way the expression of his will is his own working. He shows it indirectly, by not hindering the doing of a thing; for
|
|
|
1621 what removes an impediment is called an accidental mover. In this respect the expression is called permission. He declares his will by means of another when he orders another to perform a work, either by insisting upon it as necessary by precept, and by prohibiting its contrary; or by persuasion, which is a part of counsel. Since in these ways the will of man makes itself known, the same five are sometimes denominated with regard to the divine will, as the expression of that will. That precept,
|
|
|
1622 counsel, and prohibition are called the will of God is clear from the words of <scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Matt.6.10" parsed="vul|Matt|6|10|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A12-p6.1" passage="Mat. 6:10">Mat. 6:10</scripRef>: "Thy will be done on earth as it is in heaven." That permission and operation are called the will of God is clear from Augustine (Enchiridion 95), who says: "Nothing is done, unless the Almighty wills it to be done, either by permitting it, or by actually doing it."</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A12-p7" shownumber="no"> Or it may be said that permission and operation refer to present time, permission being with respect to evil, operation with regard to good. Whilst as to future time, prohibition is in respect to evil, precept to good that is necessary and counsel to good that is of supererogation.</p>
|
|
|
1623 </div></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 12 co."><a name="29280"><span class=
|
|
|
1624 "ref">[29280] Iª q. 19 a. 12 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
|
|
|
1625 quod huiusmodi signa voluntatis dicuntur ea, quibus consuevimus
|
|
|
1626 demonstrare nos aliquid velle. Potest autem aliquis declarare se
|
|
|
1627 velle aliquid, vel per seipsum, vel per alium. Per seipsum quidem,
|
|
|
1628 inquantum facit aliquid, vel directe, vel indirecte et per
|
|
|
1629 accidens. Directe quidem, cum per se aliquid operatur, et quantum
|
|
|
1630 ad hoc, dicitur esse signum operatio. Indirecte autem, inquantum
|
|
|
1631 non impedit operationem, nam removens prohibens dicitur movens per
|
|
|
1632 accidens, ut dicitur in VIII Physic. Et quantum ad hoc, dicitur
|
|
|
1633 signum permissio. Per alium autem declarat se aliquid velle,
|
|
|
1634 inquantum ordinat alium ad aliquid faciendum; vel necessaria
|
|
|
1635 inductione, quod fit praecipiendo quod quis vult, et prohibendo
|
|
|
1636 contrarium; vel aliqua persuasoria inductione, quod pertinet ad
|
|
|
1637 consilium. Quia igitur his modis declaratur aliquem velle aliquid,
|
|
|
1638 propter hoc ista quinque nominantur interdum nomine voluntatis
|
|
|
1639 divinae, tanquam signa voluntatis. Quod enim praeceptum, consilium
|
|
|
1640 et prohibitio dicantur Dei voluntas, patet per id quod dicitur
|
|
|
1641 Matth. VI <i>fiat voluntas tua, sicut in caelo et in terra</i>.
|
|
|
1642 Quod autem permissio vel operatio dicantur Dei voluntas patet per
|
|
|
1643 Augustinum, qui dicit in Enchirid., <i>nihil fit, nisi omnipotens
|
|
|
1644 fieri velit, vel sinendo ut fiat, vel faciendo</i>. Vel potest dici
|
|
|
1645 quod permissio et operatio referuntur ad praesens permissio quidem
|
|
|
1646 ad malum, operatio vero ad bonum. Ad futurum vero, prohibitio,
|
|
|
1647 respectu mali; respectu vero boni necessarii, praeceptum; respectu
|
|
|
1648 vero superabundantis boni, consilium.</p></div></div>
|
|
|
1649 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
|
|
|
1650 float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A12-p8"
|
|
|
1651 shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> There is nothing to
|
|
|
1652 prevent anyone declaring his will about the same matter in different
|
|
|
1653 ways; thus we find many words that mean the same thing. Hence there is
|
|
|
1654 not reason why the same thing should not be the subject of precept,
|
|
|
1655 operation, and counsel; or of prohibition or permission.</p></div><div
|
|
|
1656 style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 12 ad 1"><a name="29281"><span class=
|
|
|
1657 "ref">[29281] Iª q. 19 a. 12 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
|
|
|
1658 dicendum quod nihil prohibet, circa eandem rem, aliquem diversimode
|
|
|
1659 declarare se aliquid velle, sicut inveniuntur multa nomina idem
|
|
|
1660 significantia. Unde nihil prohibet idem subiacere praecepto et
|
|
|
1661 consilio et operationi, et prohibitioni vel permissioni.</p></div></div>
|
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|
1662 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A12-p9" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> As God may by metaphor be said to will what by His will, properly speaking, He wills not; so He may by metaphor be said to will what He does, properly speaking, will. Hence there is nothing to prevent the same thing being the object of the will of good pleasure, and of the will of expression. But operation is always the same as the will of good pleasure; while precept and counsel are not; both because the former regards the present, and the two latter
|
|
|
1663 the future; and because the former is of itself the effect of the
|
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|
1664 will; the latter its effect as fulfilled by means of
|
|
|
1665 another.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p
|
|
|
1666 xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 12 ad 2"><a name="29282"><span class=
|
|
|
1667 "ref">[29282] Iª q. 19 a. 12 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
|
|
|
1668 dicendum quod, sicut Deus potest significari metaphorice velle id
|
|
|
1669 quod non vult voluntate proprie accepta, ita potest metaphorice
|
|
|
1670 significari velle id quod proprie vult. Unde nihil prohibet de
|
|
|
1671 eodem esse voluntatem beneplaciti, et voluntatem signi. Sed
|
|
|
1672 operatio semper est eadem cum voluntate beneplaciti, non autem
|
|
|
1673 praeceptum vel consilium, tum quia haec est de praesenti, illud de
|
|
|
1674 futuro; tum quia haec per se est effectus voluntatis, illud autem
|
|
|
1675 per alium, ut dictum est.</p></div></div>
|
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|
1676 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%;
|
|
|
1677 float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A12-p10"
|
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|
1678 shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Rational creatures are
|
|
|
1679 masters of their own acts; and for this reason certain special
|
|
|
1680 expressions of the divine will are assigned to their acts, inasmuch as
|
|
|
1681 God ordains rational creatures to act voluntarily and of
|
|
|
1682 themselves. Other creatures act only as moved by the divine operation;
|
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|
1683 therefore only operation and permission are concerned with
|
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|
1684 these.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p xml:lang="la"
|
|
|
1685 title="I q. 19 a. 12 ad 3"><a name="29283"><span class=
|
|
|
1686 "ref">[29283] Iª q. 19 a. 12 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
|
|
|
1687 dicendum quod creatura rationalis est domina sui actus, et ideo
|
|
|
1688 circa ipsam specialia quaedam signa divinae voluntatis assignantur,
|
|
|
1689 inquantum rationalem creaturam Deus ordinat ad agendum voluntarie
|
|
|
1690 et per se. Sed aliae creaturae non agunt nisi motae ex operatione
|
|
|
1691 divina, et ideo circa alias non habent locum nisi operatio et
|
|
|
1692 permissio.</p></div></div>
|
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|
1693 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A12-p11" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> All evil of sin, though happening in many ways, agrees in being out of harmony with the divine will. Hence with regard to evil, only one expression is assigned, that of prohibition. On the other hand, good stands in various relations to the divine goodness, since there are good deeds without which we cannot attain to the fruition of that goodness, and these are the subject of precept; and there are others by which we attain to it more perfectly, and
|
|
|
1694 these are the subject of counsel. Or it may be said that counsel is
|
|
|
1695 not only concerned with the obtaining of greater good; but also with
|
|
|
1696 the avoiding of lesser evils.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float:
|
|
|
1697 right"><p xml:lang="la" title="I q. 19 a. 12 ad 4"><a name="29284"><span class=
|
|
|
1698 "ref">[29284] Iª q. 19 a. 12 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum
|
|
|
1699 dicendum quod omne malum culpae, licet multipliciter contingat,
|
|
|
1700 tamen in hoc convenit, quod discordat a voluntate divina et ideo
|
|
|
1701 unum signum respectu malorum assignatur, scilicet prohibitio. Sed
|
|
|
1702 diversimode bona se habent ad bonitatem divinam. Quia quaedam sunt,
|
|
|
1703 sine quibus fruitionem divinae bonitatis consequi non possumus, et
|
|
|
1704 respectu horum est praeceptum. Quaedam vero sunt, quibus perfectius
|
|
|
1705 consequimur, et respectu horum est consilium. Vel dicendum quod
|
|
|
1706 consilium est non solum de melioribus bonis assequendis, sed etiam
|
|
|
1707 de minoribus malis vitandis.</p></div></div>
|
|
|
1708 </div></div>
|
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|
1709 <div xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml" id="FP.ii.FP_Q20" next="FP_Q20_A1" prev="FP_Q19_A12" progress="3.78%" n="xix" title="Question. 20 - GOD'S LOVE (FOUR ARTICLES)">
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1710 <h3 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q20-p0.1">Question 20. GOD'S LOVE (FOUR ARTICLES)</h3>
|
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1711 <div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><div xml:lang="en">
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1712 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q20-p2" shownumber="no"> We next consider those things that pertain absolutely to the will of God. In the appetitive part of the soul there are found in ourselves both the passions of the soul, as joy, love, and the like; and the habits of the moral virtues, as justice, fortitude and the like. Hence we shall first consider the love of God, and secondly His justice and mercy. About the first there are four points of inquiry:</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q20-p3" shownumber="no"> (1) Whether love exists in God?</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q20-p4" shownumber="no"> (2) Whether He loves all things?</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q20-p5" shownumber="no"> (3) Whether He loves one thing more than another?</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q20-p6" shownumber="no"> (4) Whether He loves more the better things?</p>
|
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1713 </div></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"/><p title="I q. 20 pr."><a name="29285" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29285]
|
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1714 Iª q. 20 pr.</span></a> Deinde considerandum est de his quae
|
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1715 absolute ad voluntatem Dei pertinent. In parte autem appetitiva
|
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1716 inveniuntur in nobis et passiones animae, ut gaudium, amor, et
|
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|
1717 huiusmodi; et habitus moralium virtutum, ut iustitia, fortitudo, et
|
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1718 huiusmodi. Unde primo considerabimus de amore Dei; secundo, de
|
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1719 iustitia Dei, et misericordia eius. Circa primum quaeruntur
|
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1720 quatuor. Primo, utrum in Deo sit amor. Secundo, utrum amet omnia.
|
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1721 Tertio, utrum magis amet unum quam aliud. Quarto, utrum meliora
|
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|
1722 magis amet.</p></div>
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1723 <div id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A1" next="FP_Q20_A2" prev="FP_Q20" progress="3.78%" n="i" title="Article. 1 - Whether love exists in God?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A1-p0.1">Whether love exists in God?</h4><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A1-p2" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that love does not exist in God. For in God there are no passions. Now love is a passion. Therefore love is not in God.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p title="I q. 20 a. 1 arg. 1"><a name="29286" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29286] Iª q. 20 a. 1 arg. 1</span></a> Ad primum sic
|
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1724 proceditur. Videtur quod amor non sit in Deo. Nulla enim passio est
|
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1725 in Deo. Amor est passio. Ergo amor non est in Deo.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A1-p3" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, love, anger, sorrow and the like, are mutually divided against one another. But sorrow and anger are not attributed to God, unless by metaphor. Therefore neither is love attributed to Him.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p title="I q. 20 a. 1 arg. 2"><a name="29287" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29287] Iª q. 20 a. 1 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, amor,
|
|
|
1726 ira, tristitia, et huiusmodi, contra se dividuntur. Sed tristitia
|
|
|
1727 et ira non dicuntur de Deo nisi metaphorice. Ergo nec amor.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A1-p4" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv): "Love is a uniting and binding force." But this cannot take place in God, since He is simple. Therefore love does not exist in God.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p title="I q. 20 a. 1 arg. 3"><a name="29288" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29288] Iª q. 20 a. 1 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
|
|
|
1728 Dionysius dicit, IV cap. de Div. Nom., <i>amor est vis unitiva et
|
|
|
1729 concretiva</i>. Hoc autem in Deo locum habere non potest, cum sit
|
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|
1730 simplex. Ergo in Deo non est amor.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A1-p5" shownumber="no"><b>On the contrary,</b> It is written: "God is love" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:John.4.16" parsed="vul|John|4|16|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A1-p5.1" passage="Jn. 4:16">Jn. 4:16</scripRef>).</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p title="I q. 20 a. 1 s. c."><a name="29289" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29289] Iª q. 20 a. 1 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
|
|
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1731 quod dicitur I Ioan. IV, <i>Deus caritas est</i>.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A1-p6" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> We must needs assert that in God there is love: because love is the first movement of the will and of every appetitive faculty. For since the acts of the will and of every appetitive faculty tend towards good and evil, as to their proper objects: and since good is essentially and especially the object of the will and the appetite, whereas evil is only the object secondarily and indirectly, as opposed to good; it follows that the acts of the will and appetite
|
|
|
1732 that regard good must naturally be prior to those that regard evil; thus, for instance, joy is prior to sorrow, love to hate: because what exists of itself is always prior to that which exists through another. Again, the more universal is naturally prior to what is less so. Hence the intellect is first directed to universal truth; and in the second place to particular and special truths. Now there are certain acts of the will and appetite that regard good under some special condition, as joy
|
|
|
1733 and delight regard good present and possessed; whereas desire and hope regard good not as yet possessed. Love, however, regards good universally, whether possessed or not. Hence love is naturally the first act of the will and appetite; for which reason all the other appetite movements presuppose love, as their root and origin. For nobody desires anything nor rejoices in anything, except as a good that is loved: nor is anything an object of hate except as opposed to the object of love.
|
|
|
1734 Similarly, it is clear that sorrow, and other things like to it, must be referred to love as to their first principle. Hence, in whomsoever there is will and appetite, there must also be love: since if the first is wanting, all that follows is also wanting. Now it has been shown that will is in God (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A1-p6.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A1" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">Q[19], A[1]</a>), and hence we must attribute love to Him.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p title="I q. 20 a. 1 co."><a name="29290" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29290] Iª q. 20 a. 1 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
|
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1735 quod necesse est ponere amorem in Deo. Primus enim motus
|
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|
1736 voluntatis, et cuiuslibet appetitivae virtutis, est amor. Cum enim
|
|
|
1737 actus voluntatis, et cuiuslibet appetitivae virtutis tendat in
|
|
|
1738 bonum et malum, sicut in propria obiecta; bonum autem principalius
|
|
|
1739 et per se est obiectum voluntatis et appetitus, malum autem
|
|
|
1740 secundario et per aliud, inquantum scilicet opponitur bono, oportet
|
|
|
1741 naturaliter esse priores actus voluntatis et appetitus qui
|
|
|
1742 respiciunt bonum, his qui respiciunt malum; ut gaudium quam
|
|
|
1743 tristitia, et amor quam odium. Semper enim quod est per se, prius
|
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|
1744 est eo quod est per aliud. Rursus, quod est communius, naturaliter
|
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|
1745 est prius, unde et intellectus per prius habet ordinem ad verum
|
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|
1746 commune, quam ad particularia quaedam vera. Sunt autem quidam actus
|
|
|
1747 voluntatis et appetitus, respicientes bonum sub aliqua speciali
|
|
|
1748 conditione, sicut gaudium et delectatio est de bono praesenti et
|
|
|
1749 habito; desiderium autem et spes, de bono nondum adepto. Amor autem
|
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|
1750 respicit bonum in communi, sive sit habitum, sive non habitum. Unde
|
|
|
1751 amor naturaliter est primus actus voluntatis et appetitus. Et
|
|
|
1752 propter hoc, omnes alii motus appetitivi praesupponunt amorem,
|
|
|
1753 quasi primam radicem. Nullus enim desiderat aliquid, nisi bonum
|
|
|
1754 amatum, neque aliquis gaudet, nisi de bono amato. Odium etiam non
|
|
|
1755 est nisi de eo quod contrariatur rei amatae. Et similiter
|
|
|
1756 tristitiam, et cetera huiusmodi, manifestum est in amorem referri,
|
|
|
1757 sicut in primum principium. Unde in quocumque est voluntas vel
|
|
|
1758 appetitus, oportet esse amorem, remoto enim primo, removentur alia.
|
|
|
1759 Ostensum est autem in Deo esse voluntatem. Unde necesse est in eo
|
|
|
1760 ponere amorem.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A1-p7" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> The cognitive faculty does not move except through the medium of the appetitive: and just as in ourselves the universal reason moves through the medium of the particular reason, as stated in De Anima iii, 58,75, so in ourselves the intellectual appetite, or the will as it is called, moves through the medium of the sensitive appetite. Hence, in us the sensitive appetite is the proximate motive-force of our bodies. Some bodily change therefore always
|
|
|
1761 accompanies an act of the sensitive appetite, and this change affects especially the heart, which, as the Philosopher says (De part. animal. iii, 4), is the first principle of movement in animals. Therefore acts of the sensitive appetite, inasmuch as they have annexed to them some bodily change, are called passions; whereas acts of the will are not so called. Love, therefore, and joy and delight are passions; in so far as they denote acts of the intellective appetite, they are not passions. It
|
|
|
1762 is in this latter sense that they are in God. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii): "God rejoices by an operation that is one and simple," and for the same reason He loves without passion.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p title="I q. 20 a. 1 ad 1"><a name="29291" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29291] Iª q. 20 a. 1 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
|
|
|
1763 dicendum quod vis cognitiva non movet, nisi mediante appetitiva. Et
|
|
|
1764 sicut in nobis ratio universalis movet mediante ratione
|
|
|
1765 particulari, ut dicitur in III de anima; ita appetitus
|
|
|
1766 intellectivus, qui dicitur voluntas, movet in nobis mediante
|
|
|
1767 appetitu sensitivo. Unde proximum motivum corporis in nobis est
|
|
|
1768 appetitus sensitivus. Unde semper actum appetitus sensitivi
|
|
|
1769 concomitatur aliqua transmutatio corporis; et maxime circa cor,
|
|
|
1770 quod est primum principium motus in animali. Sic igitur actus
|
|
|
1771 appetitus sensitivi, inquantum habent transmutationem corporalem
|
|
|
1772 annexam, passiones dicuntur, non autem actus voluntatis. Amor
|
|
|
1773 igitur et gaudium et delectatio, secundum quod significant actus
|
|
|
1774 appetitus sensitivi, passiones sunt, non autem secundum quod
|
|
|
1775 significant actus appetitus intellectivi. Et sic ponuntur in Deo.
|
|
|
1776 Unde dicit philosophus, in VII Ethic., quod <i>Deus una et simplici
|
|
|
1777 operatione gaudet</i>. Et eadem ratione, sine passione amat.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A1-p8" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> In the passions of the sensitive appetite there may be distinguished a certain material element---namely, the bodily change---and a certain formal element, which is on the part of the appetite. Thus in anger, as the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 15,63,64), the material element is the kindling of the blood about the heart; but the formal, the appetite for revenge. Again, as regards the formal element of certain passions a certain imperfection is
|
|
|
1778 implied, as in desire, which is of the good we have not, and in sorrow, which is about the evil we have. This applies also to anger, which supposes sorrow. Certain other passions, however, as love and joy, imply no imperfection. Since therefore none of these can be attributed to God on their material side, as has been said (ad 1); neither can those that even on their formal side imply imperfection be attributed to Him; except metaphorically, and from likeness of effects, as already show (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A1-p8.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q3.FP_Q3_A2" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">Q[3], A[2]</a> , ad 2; <a id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A1-p8.2" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A11" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">Q[19], A[11]</a>). Whereas, those that do not imply imperfection, such as love and joy, can be properly predicated of God, though without attributing passion to Him, as said before (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A1-p8.3" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A11" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">Q[19], A[11]</a>).</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p title="I q. 20 a. 1 ad 2"><a name="29292" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29292] Iª q. 20 a. 1 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
|
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|
1779 dicendum quod in passionibus sensitivi appetitus, est considerare
|
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|
1780 aliquid quasi materiale, scilicet corporalem transmutationem; et
|
|
|
1781 aliquid quasi formale, quod est ex parte appetitus. Sicut in ira,
|
|
|
1782 ut dicitur in I de anima, materiale est accensio sanguinis circa
|
|
|
1783 cor, vel aliquid huiusmodi; formale vero, appetitus vindictae. Sed
|
|
|
1784 rursus, ex parte eius quod est formale, in quibusdam horum
|
|
|
1785 designatur aliqua imperfectio; sicut in desiderio, quod est boni
|
|
|
1786 non habiti; et in tristitia, quae est mali habiti. Et eadem ratio
|
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|
1787 est de ira, quae tristitiam supponit. Quaedam vero nullam
|
|
|
1788 imperfectionem designant, ut amor et gaudium. Cum igitur nihil
|
|
|
1789 horum Deo conveniat secundum illud quod est materiale in eis, ut
|
|
|
1790 dictum est; illa quae imperfectionem important etiam formaliter,
|
|
|
1791 Deo convenire non possunt nisi metaphorice, propter similitudinem
|
|
|
1792 effectus, ut supra dictum est. Quae autem imperfectionem non
|
|
|
1793 important, de Deo proprie dicuntur, ut amor et gaudium, tamen sine
|
|
|
1794 passione, ut dictum est.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A1-p9" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> An act of love always tends towards two things; to the good that one wills, and to the person for whom one wills it: since to love a person is to wish that person good. Hence, inasmuch as we love ourselves, we wish ourselves good; and, so far as possible, union with that good. So love is called the unitive force, even in God, yet without implying composition; for the good that He wills for Himself, is no other than Himself, Who is good by His essence,
|
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1795 as above shown (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A1-p9.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q6.FP_Q6_A1" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">Q[6], AA[1]</a>,3). And by the fact that anyone loves another, he wills good to that other. Thus he puts the other, as it were, in the place of himself; and regards the good done to him as done to himself. So far love is a binding force, since it aggregates another to ourselves, and refers his good to our own. And then again the divine love is a binding force, inasmuch as God wills good to others; yet it implies no composition in God.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p title="I q. 20 a. 1 ad 3"><a name="29293" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29293] Iª q. 20 a. 1 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
|
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|
1796 dicendum quod actus amoris semper tendit in duo, scilicet in bonum
|
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1797 quod quis vult alicui; et in eum cui vult bonum. Hoc enim est
|
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|
1798 proprie amare aliquem, velle ei bonum. Unde in eo quod aliquis amat
|
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1799 se, vult bonum sibi. Et sic illud bonum quaerit sibi unire,
|
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1800 inquantum potest. Et pro tanto dicitur amor vis unitiva, etiam in
|
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1801 Deo, sed absque compositione, quia illud bonum quod vult sibi, non
|
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|
1802 est aliud quam ipse, qui est per suam essentiam bonus, ut supra
|
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1803 ostensum est. In hoc vero quod aliquis amat alium, vult bonum illi.
|
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1804 Et sic utitur eo tanquam seipso, referens bonum ad illum, sicut ad
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1805 seipsum. Et pro tanto dicitur amor vis concretiva, quia alium
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1806 aggregat sibi habens se ad eum sicut ad seipsum. Et sic etiam amor
|
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1807 divinus est vis concretiva, absque compositione quae sit in Deo,
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1808 inquantum aliis bona vult.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A2" next="FP_Q20_A3" prev="FP_Q20_A1" progress="3.82%" n="ii" title="Article. 2 - Whether God loves all things?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A2-p0.1">Whether God loves all things?</h4><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A2-p2" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God does not love all things. For according to Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv, 1), love places the lover outside himself, and causes him to pass, as it were, into the object of his love. But it is not admissible to say that God is placed outside of Himself, and passes into other things. Therefore it is inadmissible to say that God loves things other than Himself.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p title="I q. 20 a. 2 arg. 1"><a name="29294" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29294] Iª q. 20 a. 2 arg. 1</span></a> Ad secundum sic
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1809 proceditur. Videtur quod Deus non omnia amet. Quia, secundum
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1810 Dionysium, IV cap. de Div. Nom., amor amantem extra se ponit, et
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1811 eum quodammodo in amatum transfert. Inconveniens autem est dicere
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1812 quod Deus, extra se positus, in alia transferatur. Ergo
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1813 inconveniens est dicere quod Deus alia a se amet.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A2-p3" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the love of God is eternal. But things apart from God are not from eternity; except in God. Therefore God does not love anything, except as it exists in Himself. But as existing in Him, it is no other than Himself. Therefore God does not love things other than Himself.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p title="I q. 20 a. 2 arg. 2"><a name="29295" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29295] Iª q. 20 a. 2 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, amor
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1814 Dei aeternus est. Sed ea quae sunt alia a Deo, non sunt ab aeterno
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1815 nisi in Deo. Ergo Deus non amat ea nisi in seipso. Sed secundum
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1816 quod sunt in eo, non sunt aliud ab eo. Ergo Deus non amat alia a
|
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1817 seipso.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A2-p4" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, love is twofold---the love, namely, of desire, and the love of friendship. Now God does not love irrational creatures with the love of desire, since He needs no creature outside Himself. Nor with the love of friendship; since there can be no friendship with irrational creatures, as the Philosopher shows (Ethic. viii, 2). Therefore God does not love all things.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p title="I q. 20 a. 2 arg. 3"><a name="29296" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29296] Iª q. 20 a. 2 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
|
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1818 duplex est amor, scilicet concupiscentiae, et amicitiae. Sed Deus
|
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1819 creaturas irrationales non amat amore concupiscentiae, quia nullius
|
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1820 extra se eget, nec etiam amore amicitiae, quia non potest ad res
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1821 irrationales haberi, ut patet per philosophum, in VIII Ethic. Ergo
|
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1822 Deus non omnia amat.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A2-p5" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 4:</b> Further, it is written (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Ps.5.7" parsed="vul|Ps|5|7|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A2-p5.1" passage="Ps. 5:7">Ps. 5:7</scripRef>): "Thou hatest all the workers of iniquity." Now nothing is at the same time hated and loved. Therefore God does not love all things.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p title="I q. 20 a. 2 arg. 4"><a name="29297" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29297] Iª q. 20 a. 2 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea, in
|
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1823 Psalmo dicitur, <i>odisti omnes qui operantur iniquitatem</i>.
|
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1824 Nihil autem simul odio habetur et amatur. Ergo Deus non omnia
|
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1825 amat.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A2-p6" shownumber="no"><b>On the contrary,</b> It is said (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Wis.11.25" parsed="vul|Wis|11|25|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A2-p6.1" passage="Wis. 11:25">Wis. 11:25</scripRef>): "Thou lovest all things that are, and hatest none of the things which Thou hast made."</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p title="I q. 20 a. 2 s. c."><a name="29298" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29298] Iª q. 20 a. 2 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
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1826 quod dicitur Sap. XI, <i>diligis omnia quae sunt, et nihil odisti
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1827 eorum quae fecisti</i>.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A2-p7" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> God loves all existing things. For all existing things, in so far as they exist, are good, since the existence of a thing is itself a good; and likewise, whatever perfection it possesses. Now it has been shown above (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A2-p7.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q19.FP_Q19_A4" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">Q[19], A[4]</a>) that God's will is the cause of all things. It must needs be, therefore, that a thing has existence, or any kind of good, only inasmuch as it is willed by God. To every existing thing, then, God wills some
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1828 good. Hence, since to love anything is nothing else than to will good to that thing, it is manifest that God loves everything that exists. Yet not as we love. Because since our will is not the cause of the goodness of things, but is moved by it as by its object, our love, whereby we will good to anything, is not the cause of its goodness; but conversely its goodness, whether real or imaginary, calls forth our love, by which we will that it should preserve the good it has, and receive besides
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1829 the good it has not, and to this end we direct our actions: whereas the love of God infuses and creates goodness.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p title="I q. 20 a. 2 co."><a name="29299" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29299] Iª q. 20 a. 2 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
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1830 quod Deus omnia existentia amat. Nam omnia existentia, inquantum
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1831 sunt, bona sunt, ipsum enim esse cuiuslibet rei quoddam bonum est,
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1832 et similiter quaelibet perfectio ipsius. Ostensum est autem supra
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1833 quod voluntas Dei est causa omnium rerum et sic oportet quod
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1834 intantum habeat aliquid esse, aut quodcumque bonum, inquantum est
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1835 volitum a Deo. Cuilibet igitur existenti Deus vult aliquod bonum.
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1836 Unde, cum amare nil aliud sit quam velle bonum alicui, manifestum
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1837 est quod Deus omnia quae sunt, amat. Non tamen eo modo sicut nos.
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1838 Quia enim voluntas nostra non est causa bonitatis rerum, sed ab ea
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1839 movetur sicut ab obiecto, amor noster, quo bonum alicui volumus,
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1840 non est causa bonitatis ipsius, sed e converso bonitas eius, vel
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1841 vera vel aestimata, provocat amorem, quo ei volumus et bonum
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1842 conservari quod habet, et addi quod non habet, et ad hoc operamur.
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1843 Sed amor Dei est infundens et creans bonitatem in rebus.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A2-p8" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> A lover is placed outside himself, and made to pass into the object of his love, inasmuch as he wills good to the beloved; and works for that good by his providence even as he works for his own. Hence Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv, 1): "On behalf of the truth we must make bold to say even this, that He Himself, the cause of all things, by His abounding love and goodness, is placed outside Himself by His providence for all existing things."</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p title="I q. 20 a. 2 ad 1"><a name="29300" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29300] Iª q. 20 a. 2 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
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1844 dicendum quod amans sic fit extra se in amatum translatus,
|
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1845 inquantum vult amato bonum, et operatur per suam providentiam,
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1846 sicut et sibi. Unde et Dionysius dicit, IV cap. de Div. Nom.,
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1847 <i>audendum est autem et hoc pro veritate dicere, quod et ipse
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1848 omnium causa, per abundantiam amativae bonitatis, extra seipsum fit
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1849 ad omnia existentia providentiis</i>.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A2-p9" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> Although creatures have not existed from eternity, except in God, yet because they have been in Him from eternity, God has known them eternally in their proper natures; and for that reason has loved them, even as we, by the images of things within us, know things existing in themselves.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p title="I q. 20 a. 2 ad 2"><a name="29301" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29301] Iª q. 20 a. 2 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
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1850 dicendum quod, licet creaturae ab aeterno non fuerint nisi in Deo,
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1851 tamen per hoc quod ab aeterno in Deo fuerunt, ab aeterno Deus
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1852 cognovit res in propriis naturis, et eadem ratione amavit. Sicut et
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1853 nos per similitudines rerum, quae in nobis sunt, cognoscimus res in
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1854 seipsis existentes.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A2-p10" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> Friendship cannot exist except towards rational creatures, who are capable of returning love, and communicating one with another in the various works of life, and who may fare well or ill, according to the changes of fortune and happiness; even as to them is benevolence properly speaking exercised. But irrational creatures cannot attain to loving God, nor to any share in the intellectual and beatific life that He lives. Strictly speaking, therefore,
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1855 God does not love irrational creatures with the love of friendship; but as it were with the love of desire, in so far as He orders them to rational creatures, and even to Himself. Yet this is not because He stands in need of them; but only on account of His goodness, and of the services they render to us. For we can desire a thing for others as well as for ourselves.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p title="I q. 20 a. 2 ad 3"><a name="29302" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29302] Iª q. 20 a. 2 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
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1856 dicendum quod amicitia non potest haberi nisi ad rationales
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1857 creaturas, in quibus contingit esse redamationem, et
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1858 communicationem in operibus vitae, et quibus contingit bene evenire
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1859 vel male, secundum fortunam et felicitatem, sicut et ad eas proprie
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1860 benevolentia est. Creaturae autem irrationales non possunt
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1861 pertingere ad amandum Deum, neque ad communicationem intellectualis
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1862 et beatae vitae, qua Deus vivit. Sic igitur Deus, proprie loquendo,
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1863 non amat creaturas irrationales amore amicitiae, sed amore quasi
|
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1864 concupiscentiae; inquantum ordinat eas ad rationales creaturas, et
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1865 etiam ad seipsum; non quasi eis indigeat, sed propter suam
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1866 bonitatem et nostram utilitatem. Concupiscimus enim aliquid et
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1867 nobis et aliis.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A2-p11" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> Nothing prevents one and the same thing being loved under one aspect, while it is hated under another. God loves sinners in so far as they are existing natures; for they have existence and have it from Him. In so far as they are sinners, they have not existence at all, but fall short of it; and this in them is not from God. Hence under this aspect, they are hated by Him.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p title="I q. 20 a. 2 ad 4"><a name="29303" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29303] Iª q. 20 a. 2 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum
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1868 dicendum quod nihil prohibet unum et idem secundum aliquid amari,
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1869 et secundum aliquid odio haberi. Deus autem peccatores, inquantum
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1870 sunt naturae quaedam, amat, sic enim et sunt, et ab ipso sunt.
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1871 Inquantum vero peccatores sunt, non sunt, sed ab esse deficiunt, et
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1872 hoc in eis a Deo non est. Unde secundum hoc ab ipso odio
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1873 habentur.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A3" next="FP_Q20_A4" prev="FP_Q20_A2" progress="3.86%" n="iii" title="Article. 3 - Whether God loves all things equally?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A3-p0.1">Whether God loves all things equally?</h4><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A3-p2" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God loves all things equally. For it is said: "He hath equally care of all" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Wis.6.8" parsed="vul|Wis|6|8|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A3-p2.1" passage="Wis. 6:8">Wis. 6:8</scripRef>). But God's providence over things comes from the love wherewith He loves them. Therefore He loves all things equally.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p title="I q. 20 a. 3 arg. 1"><a name="29304" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29304] Iª q. 20 a. 3 arg. 1</span></a> Ad tertium sic
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1874 proceditur. Videtur quod Deus aequaliter diligat omnia. Dicitur
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1875 enim Sap. VI, <i>aequaliter est ei cura de omnibus</i>. Sed
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1876 providentia Dei, quam habet de rebus, est ex amore quo amat res.
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1877 Ergo aequaliter amat omnia.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A3-p3" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, the love of God is His essence. But God's essence does not admit of degree; neither therefore does His love. He does not therefore love some things more than others.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p title="I q. 20 a. 3 arg. 2"><a name="29305" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29305] Iª q. 20 a. 3 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea, amor
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1878 Dei est eius essentia. Sed essentia Dei magis et minus non recipit.
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1879 Ergo nec amor eius. Non igitur quaedam aliis magis amat.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A3-p4" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, as God's love extends to created things, so do His knowledge and will extend. But God is not said to know some things more than others; nor will one thing more than another. Neither therefore does He love some things more than others.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p title="I q. 20 a. 3 arg. 3"><a name="29306" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29306] Iª q. 20 a. 3 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea, sicut
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1880 amor Dei se extendit ad res creatas, ita et scientia et voluntas.
|
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1881 Sed Deus non dicitur scire quaedam magis quam alia, neque magis
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1882 velle. Ergo nec magis quaedam aliis diligit.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A3-p5" shownumber="no"><b>On the contrary,</b> Augustine says (Tract. in Joan. cx): "God loves all things that He has made, and amongst them rational creatures more, and of these especially those who are members of His only-begotten Son Himself."</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p title="I q. 20 a. 3 s. c."><a name="29307" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29307] Iª q. 20 a. 3 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra est
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1883 quod dicit Augustinus, super Ioann., <i>omnia diligit Deus quae
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1884 fecit; et inter ea magis diligit creaturas rationales; et de illis
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1885 eas amplius, quae sunt membra unigeniti sui; et multo magis ipsum
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1886 unigenitum suum</i>.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A3-p6" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> Since to love a thing is to will it good, in a twofold way anything may be loved more, or less. In one way on the part of the act of the will itself, which is more or less intense. In this way God does not love some things more than others, because He loves all things by an act of the will that is one, simple, and always the same. In another way on the part of the good itself that a person wills for the beloved. In this way we are said to love that one more
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1887 than another, for whom we will a greater good, though our will is not more intense. In this way we must needs say that God loves some things more than others. For since God's love is the cause of goodness in things, as has been said <a id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A3-p6.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A2" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">(A[2])</a>, no one thing would be better than another, if God did not will greater good for one than for another.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p title="I q. 20 a. 3 co."><a name="29308" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29308] Iª q. 20 a. 3 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
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1888 quod, cum amare sit velle bonum alicui, duplici ratione potest
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1889 aliquid magis vel minus amari. Uno modo, ex parte ipsius actus
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1890 voluntatis, qui est magis vel minus intensus. Et sic Deus non magis
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1891 quaedam aliis amat, quia omnia amat uno et simplici actu
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1892 voluntatis, et semper eodem modo se habente. Alio modo, ex parte
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1893 ipsius boni quod aliquis vult amato. Et sic dicimur aliquem magis
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1894 alio amare, cui volumus maius bonum; quamvis non magis intensa
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1895 voluntate. Et hoc modo necesse est dicere quod Deus quaedam aliis
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1896 magis amat. Cum enim amor Dei sit causa bonitatis rerum, ut dictum
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1897 est, non esset aliquid alio melius, si Deus non vellet uni maius
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1898 bonum quam alteri.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A3-p7" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> God is said to have equally care of all, not because by His care He deals out equal good to all, but because He administers all things with a like wisdom and goodness.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p title="I q. 20 a. 3 ad 1"><a name="29309" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29309] Iª q. 20 a. 3 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
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1899 dicendum quod dicitur Deo aequaliter esse cura de omnibus, non quia
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1900 aequalia bona sua cura omnibus dispenset; sed quia ex aequali
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1901 sapientia et bonitate omnia administrat.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A3-p8" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> This argument is based on the intensity of love on the part of the act of the will, which is the divine essence. But the good that God wills for His creatures, is not the divine essence. Therefore there is no reason why it may not vary in degree.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p title="I q. 20 a. 3 ad 2"><a name="29310" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29310] Iª q. 20 a. 3 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
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1902 dicendum quod ratio illa procedit de intensione amoris ex parte
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1903 actus voluntatis, qui est divina essentia. Bonum autem quod Deus
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1904 creaturae vult, non est divina essentia. Unde nihil prohibet illud
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1905 intendi vel remitti.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A3-p9" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> To understand and to will denote the act alone, and do not include in their meaning objects from the diversity of which God may be said to know or will more or less, as has been said with respect to God's love.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p title="I q. 20 a. 3 ad 3"><a name="29311" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29311] Iª q. 20 a. 3 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
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1906 dicendum quod intelligere et velle significant solum actus, non
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1907 autem in sua significatione includunt aliqua obiecta, ex quorum
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1908 diversitate possit dici Deus magis vel minus scire aut velle; sicut
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1909 circa amorem dictum est.</p></div></div></div><div id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A4" next="FP_Q21" prev="FP_Q20_A3" progress="3.87%" n="iv" title="Article. 4 - Whether God always loves more the better things?"><h4 xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A4-p0.1">Whether God always loves more the better things?</h4><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A4-p2" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 1:</b> It seems that God does not always love more the better things. For it is manifest that Christ is better than the whole human race, being God and man. But God loved the human race more than He loved Christ; for it is said: "He spared not His own Son, but delivered Him up for us all" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Rom.8.32" parsed="vul|Rom|8|32|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A4-p2.1" passage="Rom. 8:32">Rom. 8:32</scripRef>). Therefore God does not always love more the better things.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p title="I q. 20 a. 4 arg. 1"><a name="29312" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29312] Iª q. 20 a. 4 arg. 1</span></a> Ad quartum sic
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1910 proceditur. Videtur quod Deus non semper magis diligat meliora.
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1911 Manifestum est enim quod Christus est melior toto genere humano,
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1912 cum sit Deus et homo. Sed Deus magis dilexit genus humanum quam
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1913 Christum, quia dicitur Rom. VIII, <i>proprio filio suo non
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1914 pepercit, sed pro nobis omnibus tradidit illum</i>. Ergo Deus non
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1915 semper magis diligit meliora.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A4-p3" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 2:</b> Further, an angel is better than a man. Hence it is said of man: "Thou hast made him a little less than the angels" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Ps.8.6" parsed="vul|Ps|8|6|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A4-p3.1" passage="Ps. 8:6">Ps. 8:6</scripRef>). But God loved men more than He loved the angels, for it is said: "Nowhere doth He take hold of the angels, but of the seed of Abraham He taketh hold" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Heb.2.16" parsed="vul|Heb|2|16|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A4-p3.2" passage="Heb. 2:16">Heb. 2:16</scripRef>). Therefore God does not always love more the better things.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p title="I q. 20 a. 4 arg. 2"><a name="29313" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29313] Iª q. 20 a. 4 arg. 2</span></a> Praeterea,
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1916 Angelus est melior homine, unde in Psalmo VIII dicitur de homine,
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1917 <i>minuisti eum paulo minus ab Angelis</i>. Sed Deus plus dilexit
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1918 hominem quam Angelum, dicitur enim Hebr. II, <i>nusquam Angelos
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1919 apprehendit, sed semen Abrahae apprehendit</i>. Ergo Deus non
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1920 semper magis diligit meliora.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A4-p4" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 3:</b> Further, Peter was better than John, since he loved Christ more. Hence the Lord, knowing this to be true, asked Peter, saying: "Simon, son of John, lovest thou Me more than these?" Yet Christ loved John more than He loved Peter. For as Augustine says, commenting on the words, "Simon, son of John, lovest thou Me?": "By this very mark is John distinguished from the other disciples, not that He loved him only, but that He loved him more than the rest." Therefore
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1921 God does not always love more the better things.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p title="I q. 20 a. 4 arg. 3"><a name="29314" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29314] Iª q. 20 a. 4 arg. 3</span></a> Praeterea,
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1922 Petrus fuit melior Ioanne, quia plus Christum diligebat. Unde
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1923 dominus, sciens hoc esse verum, interrogavit Petrum, dicens,
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1924 <i>Simon Ioannis, diligis me plus his?</i> Sed tamen Christus plus
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1925 dilexit Ioannem quam Petrum, ut enim dicit Augustinus, super illud
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1926 Ioan. XXI, <i>Simon Ioannis diligis me? Hoc ipso signo Ioannes a
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1927 ceteris discipulis discernitur; non quod solum eum, sed quod plus
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1928 eum ceteris diligebat</i>. Non ergo semper magis diligit
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1929 meliora.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A4-p5" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 4:</b> Further, the innocent man is better than the repentant, since repentance is, as Jerome says (Cap. 3 in Isa.), "a second plank after shipwreck." But God loves the penitent more than the innocent; since He rejoices over him the more. For it is said: "I say to you that there shall be joy in heaven upon the one sinner that doth penance, more than upon ninety-nine just who need not penance" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Luke.15.7" parsed="vul|Luke|15|7|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A4-p5.1" passage="Lk. 15:7">Lk. 15:7</scripRef>). Therefore God does not always love more
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1930 the better things.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p title="I q. 20 a. 4 arg. 4"><a name="29315" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29315] Iª q. 20 a. 4 arg. 4</span></a> Praeterea,
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1931 melior est innocens poenitente; <i>cum poenitentia sit secunda
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1932 tabula post naufragium</i>, ut dicit Hieronymus. Sed Deus plus
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1933 diligit poenitentem quam innocentem, quia plus de eo gaudet,
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1934 dicitur enim Luc. XV, <i>dico vobis quod maius gaudium erit in
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1935 caelo super uno peccatore poenitentiam agente, quam super nonaginta
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1936 novem iustis, qui non indigent poenitentia</i>. Ergo Deus non
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1937 semper magis diligit meliora.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A4-p6" shownumber="no"><b>Objection 5:</b> Further, the just man who is foreknown is better than the predestined sinner. Now God loves more the predestined sinner, since He wills for him a greater good, life eternal. Therefore God does not always love more the better things.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p title="I q. 20 a. 4 arg. 5"><a name="29316" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29316] Iª q. 20 a. 4 arg. 5</span></a> Praeterea,
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1938 melior est iustus praescitus, quam peccator praedestinatus. Sed
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1939 Deus plus diligit peccatorem praedestinatum, quia vult ei maius
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1940 bonum, scilicet vitam aeternam. Ergo Deus non semper magis diligit
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1941 meliora.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A4-p7" shownumber="no"><b>On the contrary,</b> Everything loves what is like it, as appears from (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Sir.13.19" parsed="vul|Sir|13|19|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A4-p7.1" passage="Ecclus. 13:19">Ecclus. 13:19</scripRef>): "Every beast loveth its like." Now the better a thing is, the more like is it to God. Therefore the better things are more loved by God.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p title="I q. 20 a. 4 s. c."><a name="29317" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29317] Iª q. 20 a. 4 s. c.</span></a> Sed contra,
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1942 unumquodque diligit sibi simile; ut patet per illud quod habetur
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1943 Eccli. XIII, <i>omne animal diligit sibi simile</i>. Sed intantum
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1944 aliquid est melius, inquantum est Deo similius. Ergo meliora magis
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1945 diliguntur a Deo.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A4-p8" shownumber="no"><b>I answer that,</b> It must needs be, according to what has been said before, that God loves more the better things . For it has been shown (<a id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A4-p8.1" href="#FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A2" shape="rect" xml:link="simple">AA[2]</a>,3), that God's loving one thing more than another is nothing else than His willing for that thing a greater good: because God's will is the cause of goodness in things; and the reason why some things are better than others, is that God wills for them a greater good. Hence it follows that He loves more the
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1946 better things.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p title="I q. 20 a. 4 co."><a name="29318" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29318] Iª q. 20 a. 4 co.</span></a> Respondeo dicendum
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1947 quod necesse est dicere, secundum praedicta, quod Deus magis
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1948 diligat meliora. Dictum est enim quod Deum diligere magis aliquid,
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1949 nihil aliud est quam ei maius bonum velle, voluntas enim Dei est
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1950 causa bonitatis in rebus. Et sic, ex hoc sunt aliqua meliora, quod
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1951 Deus eis maius bonum vult. Unde sequitur quod meliora plus
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1952 amet.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A4-p9" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 1:</b> God loves Christ not only more than He loves the whole human race, but more than He loves the entire created universe: because He willed for Him the greater good in giving Him "a name that is above all names," in so far as He was true God. Nor did anything of His excellence diminish when God delivered Him up to death for the salvation of the human race; rather did He become thereby a glorious conqueror: "The government was placed upon His shoulder,"
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1953 according to<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Isa.9.6" parsed="vul|Isa|9|6|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A4-p9.1" passage=" Is. 9:6."> Is. 9:6.</scripRef></p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p title="I q. 20 a. 4 ad 1"><a name="29319" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29319] Iª q. 20 a. 4 ad 1</span></a> Ad primum ergo
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1954 dicendum quod Deus Christum diligit, non solum plus quam totum
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1955 humanum genus, sed etiam magis quam totam universitatem
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1956 creaturarum, quia scilicet ei maius bonum voluit, quia dedit ei
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1957 nomen, quod est super omne nomen, ut verus Deus esset. Nec eius
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1958 excellentiae deperiit ex hoc quod Deus dedit eum in mortem pro
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1959 salute humani generis, quinimo ex hoc factus est victor gloriosus;
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1960 <i>factus enim est principatus super humerum eius</i>, ut dicitur
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1961 Isaiae IX.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A4-p10" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 2:</b> God loves the human nature assumed by the Word of God in the person of Christ more than He loves all the angels; for that nature is better, especially on the ground of the union with the Godhead. But speaking of human nature in general, and comparing it with the angelic, the two are found equal, in the order of grace and of glory: since according to<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Rev.21.17" parsed="vul|Rev|21|17|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A4-p10.1" passage=" Rev 21:17, "> Rev 21:17, </scripRef> the measure of a man and of an angel is the same. Yet so that, in this
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1962 respect, some angels are found nobler than some men, and some men nobler than some angels. But as to natural condition an angel is better than a man. God therefore did not assume human nature because He loved man, absolutely speaking, more; but because the needs of man were greater; just as the master of a house may give some costly delicacy to a sick servant, that he does not give to his own son in sound health.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p title="I q. 20 a. 4 ad 2"><a name="29320" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29320] Iª q. 20 a. 4 ad 2</span></a> Ad secundum
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1963 dicendum quod naturam humanam assumptam a Dei verbo in persona
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1964 Christi, secundum praedicta, Deus plus amat quam omnes Angelos, et
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1965 melior est, maxime ratione unionis. Sed loquendo de humana natura
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1966 communiter, eam angelicae comparando, secundum ordinem ad gratiam
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1967 et gloriam, aequalitas invenitur; cum eadem sit mensura hominis et
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1968 Angeli, ut dicitur Apoc. XXI; ita tamen quod quidam Angeli
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1969 quibusdam hominibus, et quidam homines quibusdam Angelis, quantum
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1970 ad hoc, potiores inveniuntur. Sed quantum ad conditionem naturae,
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1971 Angelus est melior homine. Nec ideo naturam humanam assumpsit Deus,
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1972 quia hominem absolute plus diligeret, sed quia plus indigebat.
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1973 Sicut bonus paterfamilias aliquid pretiosius dat servo aegrotanti,
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1974 quod non dat filio sano.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><div xml:lang="en">
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1975 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A4-p11" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 3:</b> This doubt concerning Peter and John has been solved in various ways. Augustine interprets it mystically, and says that the active life, signified by Peter, loves God more than the contemplative signified by John, because the former is more conscious of the miseries of this present life, and therefore the more ardently desires to be freed from them, and depart to God. God, he says, loves more the contemplative life, since He preserves it longer. For
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1976 it does not end, as the active life does, with the life of the body.</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A4-p12" shownumber="no"> Some say that Peter loved Christ more in His members, and therefore was loved more by Christ also, for which reason He gave him the care of the Church; but that John loved Christ more in Himself, and so was loved more by Him; on which account Christ commended His mother to his care. Others say that it is uncertain which of them loved Christ more with the love of charity, and uncertain also which of them God loved more and ordained to a greater degree of glory in eternal life.
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1977 Peter is said to have loved more, in regard to a certain promptness and fervor; but John to have been more loved, with respect to certain marks of familiarity which Christ showed to him rather than to others, on account of his youth and purity. While others say that Christ loved Peter more, from his more excellent gift of charity; but John more, from his gifts of intellect. Hence, absolutely speaking, Peter was the better and more beloved; but, in a certain sense, John was the better, and was
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1978 loved the more. However, it may seem presumptuous to pass judgment on these matters; since "the Lord" and no other "is the weigher of spirits" (<scripRef osisRef="Bible.vul:Prov.16.2" parsed="vul|Prov|16|2|0|0" id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A4-p12.1" passage="Prov. 16:2">Prov. 16:2</scripRef>).</p>
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1979 </div></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p title="I q. 20 a. 4 ad 3"><a name="29321" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29321] Iª q. 20 a. 4 ad 3</span></a> Ad tertium
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1980 dicendum quod haec dubitatio de Petro et Ioanne multipliciter
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1981 solvitur. Augustinus namque refert hoc ad mysterium, dicens quod
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1982 vita activa, quae significatur per Petrum, plus diligit Deum quam
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1983 vita contemplativa, quae significatur per Ioannem, quia magis
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1984 sentit praesentis vitae angustias, et aestuantius ab eis liberari
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1985 desiderat, et ad Deum ire. Contemplativam vero vitam Deus plus
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1986 diligit, quia magis eam conservat; non enim finitur simul cum vita
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1987 corporis, sicut vita activa. Quidam vero dicunt quod Petrus plus
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1988 dilexit Christum in membris; et sic etiam a Christo plus fuit
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1989 dilectus; unde ei Ecclesiam commendavit. Ioannes vero plus dilexit
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1990 Christum in seipso; et sic etiam plus ab eo fuit dilectus; unde ei
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1991 commendavit matrem. Alii vero dicunt quod incertum est quis horum
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1992 plus Christum dilexerit amore caritatis, et similiter quem Deus
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1993 plus dilexerit in ordine ad maiorem gloriam vitae aeternae. Sed
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1994 Petrus dicitur plus dilexisse, quantum ad quandam promptitudinem
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1995 vel fervorem, Ioannes vero plus dilectus, quantum ad quaedam
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1996 familiaritatis indicia, quae Christus ei magis demonstrabat,
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1997 propter eius iuventutem et puritatem. Alii vero dicunt quod
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1998 Christus plus dilexit Petrum, quantum ad excellentius donum
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1999 caritatis, Ioannem vero plus, quantum ad donum intellectus. Unde
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2000 simpliciter Petrus fuit melior, et magis dilectus, sed Ioannes
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2001 secundum quid. Praesumptuosum tamen videtur hoc diiudicare, quia,
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2002 ut dicitur Prov. XVI, <i>spirituum ponderator est dominus</i>, et
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2003 non alius.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><div xml:lang="en">
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2004 <p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A4-p13" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 4:</b> The penitent and the innocent are related as exceeding and exceeded. For whether innocent or penitent, those are the better and better loved who have most grace. Other things being equal, innocence is the nobler thing and the more beloved. God is said to rejoice more over the penitent than over the innocent, because often penitents rise from sin more cautious, humble, and fervent. Hence Gregory commenting on these words (Hom. 34 in Ev.) says that, "In
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2005 battle the general loves the soldier who after flight returns and bravely pursues the enemy, more than him who has never fled, but has never done a brave deed."</p><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A4-p14" shownumber="no"> Or it may be answered that gifts of grace, equal in themselves, are more as conferred on the penitent, who deserved punishment, than as conferred on the innocent, to whom no punishment was due; just as a hundred pounds [marcoe] are a greater gift to a poor man than to a king.</p>
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2006 </div></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p title="I q. 20 a. 4 ad 4"><a name="29322" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29322] Iª q. 20 a. 4 ad 4</span></a> Ad quartum
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2007 dicendum quod poenitentes et innocentes se habent sicut excedentia
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2008 et excessa. Nam sive sint innocentes, sive poenitentes, illi sunt
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2009 meliores et magis dilecti, qui plus habent de gratia. Ceteris tamen
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2010 paribus, innocentia dignior est et magis dilecta. Dicitur tamen
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2011 Deus plus gaudere de poenitente quam de innocente, quia plerumque
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2012 poenitentes cautiores, humiliores et ferventiores resurgunt. Unde
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2013 Gregorius dicit ibidem, quod <i>dux in praelio eum militem plus
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2014 diligit, qui post fugam conversus, fortiter hostem premit, quam qui
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2015 nunquam fugit, nec unquam fortiter fecit</i>. Vel, alia ratione,
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2016 quia aequale donum gratiae plus est, comparatum poenitenti, qui
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2017 meruit poenam, quam innocenti, qui non meruit. Sicut centum marcae
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2018 maius donum est, si dentur pauperi, quam si dentur regi.</p></div></div><div style="clear: both; margin-top: .5em"><div style="width: 45%; float: left"><p xml:lang="en" id="FP.ii.FP_Q20.FP_Q20_A4-p15" shownumber="no"><b>Reply to Objection 5:</b> Since God's will is the cause of goodness in things, the goodness of one who is loved by God is to be reckoned according to the time when some good is to be given to him by divine goodness. According therefore to the time, when there is to be given by the divine will to the predestined sinner a greater good, the sinner is better; although according to some other time he is the worse; because even according to some time he is neither good nor bad.</p></div><div style="width: 45%; float: right"><p title="I q. 20 a. 4 ad 5"><a name="29323" shape="rect"><span class="ref">[29323] Iª q. 20 a. 4 ad 5</span></a> Ad quintum
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2019 dicendum quod, cum voluntas Dei sit causa bonitatis in rebus,
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2020 secundum illud tempus pensanda est bonitas eius qui amatur a Deo,
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2021 secundum quod dandum est ei ex bonitate divina aliquod bonum.
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2022 Secundum ergo illud tempus quo praedestinato peccatori dandum est
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2023 ex divina voluntate maius bonum, melior est; licet secundum aliquod
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2024 aliud tempus, sit peior; quia et secundum aliquod tempus, non est
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2025 nec bonus neque malus.</p></div></div></div></div></div></body></html>
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